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BY
JAMES ADAM, LITT.D.

VOLUME II
BOOKS VI—X AND INDEXES

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484 I. Οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὧν Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐμακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος λόγου μόνος πῶς ἀνεφάνησαν οἱ εἰσὶν ἐκάτεροι. "Ἰςως γάρ, ἐφι, διὰ βραχέος οὐ βάδιον. Οὐ φαίνεται, εἴπων· ἐμὸς γόνων έτί δοκεῖ ἀν βελτιώνως φανήναι, εἰ περὶ τοῦτον μόνον ἐθεὶ ῥηθήναι, καὶ μὴ πολλά τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι 5

4. ἐμὸ γόνων Π: ἐμὸν’ οὖν Ἄ.

484 A—485 A We have now to shew that Philosophers, as defined by us, should be entrusted with the government. It is they alone who, by virtue of the Ideal in their souls, are able to guard the laws and institutions of a city. We shall therefore make them our Guardians, if they possess the necessary practical qualifications. A study of their nature will shew that it is possible for them to unite both kinds of requisites.

484 A I διὰ μακροῦ — λόγου: ‘through the conclusion of a somewhat lengthy argument,’ διεξελθόντος is intransitive, as Schneider saw: cf. Latus 805 B ἀλλὰ γάρ εἶπον τῶν μὲν λόγων ἐδώκα διεξελθεῖν, εἰ διεξελθόντος δὲ οὕτω δοκοῦν αἱρέσαθαι δεῖν. (The reference in εἶπον is to 799 Ε καὶ ή διεξοδὸς αὕτη ὑπὲρ σχούδα τέλος ἰκανὸς ἀν μηνύεις κτλ.) Cf. also Dem. in Mid. 8.4. The word διεξελθόντος is not otiose, because it is not till the very end of the argument that the φιλόσοφος is discovered (V 480 A). The mistaken notion (held by Stallbaum) that the word must be transitive induced Herwerden (Mem. N. S. xix p. 333) to propose διεξέλθονται, a conjecture repeated also by Richards. Baiter (after Hermann and Ast) reads διεξέλθωντες with three inferior MSS, as if the philosophers had “run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed” (J. and C.). τοῦ λόγου (found in a few MSS) is favoured by Stallbaum, and suggested as an alternative also by Herwerden, as if διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς could mean ‘at some length.’ The first hand in Σ omits δια, but it occurs in all the other MSS. None of these expedients is nearly so good as the reading of the best MSS, if Schneider’s explanation be adopted. μακροῦ has also caused difficulty, since the investigation extends over only six pages of Stephanus: see Krohn Pl. St. pp. 105 ff. By Pleiderer (Zur Lösung etc. p. 54), who maintains (in partial agreement with Spengel) that V 471 c—VII (inclusive) embodies the dialogue Φιλόσοφος announced in the beginning of the Politicus and Sophist, μακρό is hailed as a significant lapsus calami, and referred to the investigations of the Sophist, Euthydemus and Politicus. But μακρό is qualified by των, and surely 474 c—480 a may be described as ‘a somewhat lengthy enquiry.’ There is no allusion to the proverbial μακρὸς λόγος of which Aristotle speaks in Met. N 3. 1091 b 7 ff. ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος: ἐγνεια γάρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὑστέρησεν ὁ τῶν δουλῶν, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑξεῖς λέγωσιν.

2 οἱ is found only in A and Π: all the other MSS have οἱ. For οἱ cf. (with Schneider) 493 B and VIII 559 A.

5 πολλά κτλ. Herwerden conjectures πολλὰ <ἡν >, which would weaken the emphasis on πολλά. For the omission of ην see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33.

From the standpoint of Books VI and VII

A. P. II
It is impossible to say what 'just life' means unless we know the idea of an ágaðhó etc. (see 506 a): hence polla tā λοιπά διελθεῖν.

484 B 9 πάντως κτλ. πολτολως was conjectured by Ast and is read by Stallbaum. It occurs as a late correction in Β as well as in A (see cf. n.), and has some insignificant MS authority besides. The difference is like that between δ and ο: see 484 α λ. With πλανάμενοι cf. πλανητών in ν 479 D. It is the fluctuation of the Object which makes the Subject fluctuate.

484 C 13 καθίσταναι: "sc. λέγουσε h. c. κελεύουσες" Schneider.

16 τυφλών. They who cannot see the Ideas are blind: cf. Plato's retort to Antisthenes quoted on ν 476 b.

17 καὶ μὴ δὲν κτλ. A transcendential παράδειγμα of which he knew nothing would be useless to the philosopher-king. It does not however follow that the Ideas are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ, but merely that we are concerned with them in so far as they are known by the philosophers. See on ν 476 a. ὦς αὐτῷ τὰ ἀκριβέστατα admits that he may not see them in all their fulness and purity.

18 εἰς τὸ ἀληθεστάτον κτλ. Cf. 500 c, 500 ε—501 c (where the same figure is employed). The political value of the philosopher's knowledge of the Idea is here for the first time explicitly affirmed and explained: see ν 479 D. εἰκεῖς: because truth is 'yonder' in the Heaven of the Ideas. The philosopher must call it from Heaven to Earth, by assimilating to it 'the earthly canons' (τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα).

19 οὕτω δὴ = 'then and not till then' suggests that it is otherwise in existing States.

484 D 21 οὐν δὲν τίθεσθαι. If he has the happiness to be born 'in his own country' (IX 502 a), whose institutions are already modelled on the Ideas, he need only guard (φολάττουτες suggests the φυλακὲς and preserve what is already established. Otherwise he must himself become a legislator. Cobet's excision of τίθεσθαι is wholly gratuitous: his omission of τά in τά κείμενα is even worse, for the laws need not be of the philosopher's own making.

22 διαφέρει. It would be easy to write διαφέρειν (with γ etc.), but διαφέρει may be impersonal, or Glaucus may be
There is little or no indication to shew that even the ἄρχοντες of I—IV knew or aspired to the Ideas (see 497 C n.). and the ἐπικεφαλέω certainly did not. Krohn is, in a certain sense, right when he maintains that in VI—VII we have "einen neuen Archontenstand und eine neue Archontendisciplin" (Pl. St. p. 127), but the distinction of the 'golden' and 'silver' races in III 415 A ff. prepares us for a more thorough-going discrimination between the two higher classes than was attempted in the earlier sketch, and we must of course remember that the new discipline is not intended to supersede, but to supervene upon the old. See also Hirzel Der Dialog 1 p. 236.

485 B § 47. There is here a sort of "space"—the ἀκμήνων—κινούμενον τε καὶ διασχισματιζόμενον ὑπὸ...
10 Ὄμολογήσθω. Καὶ μὴν, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικρού οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμωτέρου μέρους ἐκόντες ἀφίνεται, ὡσπερ εν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἔρωτικών διήλθομεν. Ὄρθως, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τόδε τοινυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκέπτει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τούτῳ εν τῇ φύσει οἴ δι μέλ.
15 λωσίν ἔσσεσθαι οίον οἴλεγομεν. Τὸ ποίον; Τὴν ἀφευδείαν καὶ σ τὸ ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαμὴ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σφυδός, ἅλλα μισεῖν, τὴν δ᾿ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. Εἰκὸς γ᾿ ἐφη. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὡς φίλε, εἰκός, ἅλλα καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικὸς τού φύσει ἔχοντα πάν τὸ ἐξυγνοιέν τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ὅρθως, ἔφη.
20 Ἡ οὐν οἰκείοτέραν σοφία τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὑροίς; Καὶ πῶς; ἦ δ᾿ ὅς. Ἡ οὖν δυνατόν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφον τε καὶ φιλοφευδή; Ὡδαμός γε. Τὸν ἀρα τὸ ὅντι φιλομαθὴ πάσης Δ ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅ τι μάλιστα ὁρέγεσθαι. Παντελῶς γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἐν τι αἰ ἐπιθυμεῖ σφόδρα ἰδέων, ἵσμεν 25 ποῦ ὁτι εἰς τὰλλα τοῦτω ἀσθενεῖστα, ὡσπερ ῥέμα ἐκείστε ἀπωχετευμένων. Τε μὴν; Ὅμι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔρρυκασαι, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἴμαι, ἢδονῆν αὐτῆς καθ᾿ αὐτὴν εἰεν ἀν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τὸ σώματος ἐκλείπουν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἄλλα ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος τῇ εἰς. Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. 

18 τὸν ἐρωτικὸς κτλ. Love me, love my friend. The Philosopher loves Wisdom, and Truth is Wisdom's kinswoman and familiar friend.

485 D 25 ὡσπερ ῥέμα κτλ. The simile becomes almost an identification, as often in Greek: the desires are as it were a stream diverted eis ἐν τί. Cf. III 401 C (reading τοῖς—ὡσπερ αὕρα), VII 519 A τὰς τῆς γενεώς ἐγγενεις ῥεμα μολεθθειν ρωσματος καὶ VII 534 D. In. To explain ἀπωχετευμένως as for ἀπωχετευμέναι (with Stallbaum and others) is to obtrude our standpoint upon the Greeks. Schneider formerly agreed with Stallbaum, but afterwards drew back (Addit. p. 45) and translated "wie ein dorthin abgeleiteter Strom.

28 τὰς δὲ. τὰς is probably an 'internal accusative' depending on ἐκλείπουν, though rendered easier by the occurrence of περὶ τὴν ἡμοίην—εἰεν ἀν just before. Schneider carries on περὶ, but the preposition is difficult to supply when the two clauses have different verbs. Cf. IV 428 C. H.
485 e 30 σώφρων κτλ. Cf. III. 389 d—390 e.
οὐ γὰρ ἕνεκα: i.e. such bodily and other delights as money can buy.
31 χρήματα—δαπάνης: ‘wealth with its accompaniment of lavish outlay,’ μετὰ τοῦλης δαπάνης should not, I think, be taken with στοιχεῖα (Schneider, D. and V., J. and C., although Jowett’s translation takes the correct view), but rather with χρήματα. Herder too formerly explained δαπάνης as = τῆς τοῦ δαπανῶν ἐπιθυμίας, but afterwards (Mem. N. S. xix p. 333) took it to mean: ‘pecunia cuius ope sumptus fieret’ comparing inter alia VIII. 550 d and Laws 718 a. This view agrees closely with mine, but it is not necessary to suppose that δαπάνη means more than simply ‘outlay.’
486 A 2 ἀνελευθέρωσις. ἀνελευθέρωσις or σμικρολογία is in Plato the antithesis of ὑπερθήκη: cf. II. 391 c and Critias 112 c. The virtuous mean is μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is a sort of high-mindedness (cf. 593 c): hence μεγαλοπρέπεια just below and μεγαλοπρεπῆς in the summary at 487 a. Plato does not, like Aristotle (Eth. Nic. iv 4 c. 4—6), restrict μεγαλοπρέπεια and its opposing vices to pecuniary dealings, although φιλοχρηστεία, for example, is a symptom of ἀνελευθέρωσις (11 391 c).
3 τοῦ ἀλοῦ καὶ παντὸς. Cf. Theaet. 173 ε ff. This and the following sentence admirably describe the peculiar genius of Plato himself. See the eloquent words of Longinus περὶ ἐφώς 35, and compare them with Goethe’s noble characterisation of Plato: “Er dringt in die Tiefen, mehr um sie mit seinem Wesen auszufüllen, als um sie zu erforschen. Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuerzen strebt.”
4 ἡ—διανοια.—ὁ—διανοίας (the reading of π and some other MSS, followed by Ast and Stallbaum) is an obvious ‘emendation,’ to suit τοῦτο below. It is much more elegant, notwithstanding the irregularity involved in τοῦτο, for which Schneider compares Corr. 513 b, a precise parallel, in spite of Stallbaum’s assertion to the contrary. Cf. also X 506 b n. οὐ is moreover found in the quotation of this passage by Marcus Aurelius, according to the text of Vaticanus A: see Stich’s edition p. 87 n.
486 7 δάνατον κτλ. Cf. III. 386 a ff.
11 ἀλαζών is a special case of φιλοψυχικός (485 D). Cf. 489 e.
12 ἀδίκος is used of course in the popular sense, not with the meaning assigned to it in Book IV.
The love of wisdom begins with the love of Virtue (486 c) and the love of Wisdom Temperance (485 d, e). High-mindedness is connected with the contemplation of God and piety (486 a), of which Courage is also a result (486 a, e).

14 ῥήματι—ἀγρια. Cf. 11 375 B fl.

486 b 23 αὐτην—ειναι. The text is successfully defended by Vahlen (Hermes 1877 p. 196) who compares 489 B 20 παρά φθονος ζητούμεν τοιοῦτον ειναι τῶν φύλακα (for the pleonasm) Phaed. 101 B ἵνα γάρ διώκαται αὐτὸν αὐτοίς ἔριδες. Madvig’s proposal (adopted by Baiter) αὐτὰ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν φθονὸν δὲιν ειναι is neat but unnecessary; still less should we (with Herwarden) δὲιν ειναι. With the sentiment Krohn (Pl. St. p. 263) compares Xen. Mem. iv 1 2.

24 ἀσχήμονος. Herwarden should not have conjectured ἀμφίμονος. We are passing to a fresh point. ἀφωνια and ἀσχήμονον (‘bad form’) tend to ζητηματα ‘excess,’ ‘extravagance’ in behaviour (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. iv 8 1175a 12—16); and extravagant behaviour is a form of untruth, because it makes a man appear what he is not. The love of truth will therefore save the philosopher from self-assertion and bad manners.

27 φοιεῖ κτλ. The antecedent of ἔν is διάνοιαν; and φοιεῖ (‘by nature,’ ‘naturally’) should be taken with the adjectives ἐμμετρον and εὐχρημ. It might seem possible to translate: ‘Let us insist, then, on a modest and agreeable habit of mind for a nature whose innate disposition is to make it easy to lead to the Form of each essential Being,’ making φοιεῖ the antecedent to ἔν; but the ordinary view gives a better sense. The preceding note will explain how ἐμμετρον inclines one to the love of Truth or the Ideas. Stallbaum connects ἐκατον with τὸ αὐτοφύε, but cf. v 480 A ad fin. and 484 D (ἐκατον τὸ ὄρο). ἔδειν is, I think, ‘Form,’ ‘Idea’ (so Schneider etc.), rather than ‘contemplation’ (as Stallbaum translates). The word however suggests ἔδειν; see on v 479 A.
Justice and Kindness accompany the other moral virtues (486 b). Aptness to learn, memory, and the virtue of a modest and agreeable disposition also fit one for the study of the Ideas: cf. 486 D n. It will be noticed that all the Virtues receive an intellectual colouring from their connexion—direct or indirect—with ‘amor intellectualis’: see above on 485 A ff.

487 a 3 μὴ μὲν κτλ. The summary is complete, μεγαλοπρεπῆς being the opposite of αἰσθητοὺς and συμπλογός (486 A n.).

487 a—487 b But, in point of fact, urges Adimantus, actual philosophers are regarded as useless, or worse. Socrates admits the correctness of this view, and proceeds to solve the difficulty by a paradox.

487 b οἱ άκούοντες—λέγεις: ‘those who from time to time hear what you now say.’ The text has been suspected, but is, I think, sound. Adimantus implies that the philosopher-king was one of Socrates’ favourite themes, as—in one form or another—it certainly was: see on ν 473 c. The effect produced by Socrates’ usual way of reasoning on the subject is illustrated by a general description of the unsatisfying nature of Socrates’ dialectic; and λέγω δ’ εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀπόβλεψις recalls us to the special case. The looseness lies chiefly in the use of ἄ, where ὅ—Steinhardt’s conjecture—would be expected; but a need not be taken too strictly. Ficinus omits νῦν.

ήγουσιν κτλ. Cf. Euthyph. 11 b—d, Men. 80 a, b and the description of the elenchus quoted by J. and C. from Soph. 230 B ff.

13 μέγα—ἀναφαίνεσθαι. For the anacoluthon cf. Ap. 21 C and διαλεγόμενοι αὐτῷ, ἐδοξεῖ μοι, Laws 686 D and Xen. An. 111 2. 12. In all these cases the verb used is ἐδοξεῖ, and ἀναφαίνεσθαι is a word of the same kind. Other examples of similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Anacol. Pl. Spec. 111 p. 39. Richards would read παραγομένους, but παραγομένους could hardly mean παραγομένους ἑαυτοῦ.

487 c 15 ἀποκλείονται κτλ. The simile is probably taken from the game of πόλεις, on which see IV 422 E n. φέρων is technical of a move at draughts: cf. Laws 739 a. The balance φέρων—λέγων deserves notice: in both words, stress should be laid on the first syllable. Cf. 111 406 b n. and Phaed. 83 D with Geddes ad loc. ἔν is used as in Euthyph. 11 C τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδότακε καὶ οὐκ ἔδειλε μένει.
au ταύτης τινος ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψυβοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεί τὸ γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτη ἕχειν. λέγω δ' εἰς τὸ παρόν ἀποβλέψας. τὸν γὰρ φαίνει ἃν τίς σου λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει καθ' ἐκαστον τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὅραν, ὥσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὀρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεύσαν, 1 ἔνεκα ἀφ' ἰμένων δ νεόι οὔτε ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψασιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνω ἄλλοκοτοὺς γνωριμόνες, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήσαταί εἰπωμεν, τοὺς δ' ἐπεικεστάτους διὸκυνταί ὁμοί τούτῳ γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπικτηδέματος, οὐ γὰρ ἐπανειρθαι, ἀρχίστους ταῖς πόλεσι γνωριμούσοι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, Οἶει οὖν, εἰπον, τοὺς ταύτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι; οὐκ οἶδα, ἢ δ' ὅτι ἀλλὰ τὸ σολδοκοῦ ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσωμι. 1 Λακούνος ἂν, ὅτι ἐμοιγε γεινοῖται τάλανθη Ε. λέγειν. Πῶς οὖν, ἐφ' ἂν, εἰ ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύσοναι αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀρξοῦν, οὐς ἀρχίστους ὁμολογούμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι; Ἐρωτᾶς, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δὲ εἰκόνος λεγομένης. Συ δὲ γε, ἐφ' ἂν, οἷον, οὐκ εἰσαῦθας δ' εἰκόνον λέγειν.

IV. Ἐκείνη, εἰπον, σκοπττεῖς ἐμβεβληκώς με εἰς λόγον οὐτως δυσποδεικτον; ἄκουε δ' οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἃν | ἐτί μᾶλλον ἤδης, 489

18. ταύτη Π: ταύτην Λ.
babbler, altogether useless. Our simile explains itself. What wonder that the philosopher is useless in a city? But the fault lies with those who make no use of him. It is not his part to sue for employment: those who need his services ought to appeal to him.

488 A 2 ὁς γλάσχρως εἰκάζω: 'how greedy I am of parables' (lit. 'how greedily I make parables'), not (as J. and C.) 'what a poor hand I am' at similes, an interpretation which deprives εἰκάζω μᾶλλον of all its force. γλάσχρω (connected with γλα 'glue' and γλάσχω) is used as in Ar. Ach. 452 γλάσχρως προσα- των λπαρών τε. 'Niggardly,' 'stingy' is a secondary meaning, as for example in VIII 553 C and Crat. 414 C. The idea is that a man must be greedy of similes when he runs all over the world to find one (ἐκ πολλῶν εἰσαγαγεῖν), αὐτὸ should be taken with εἰκάζω, by an easy hyperbaton.

5 τραγελάφους and similar fantastic creations were of frequent occurrence in Oriental art. The word is fully illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 937.

6 μιγνύτες should be taken with γράφοντες: 'as painters paint goat-stags and the like by fusing creatures together.'

τοιούτων κτλ. There is no occasion to read τοιούτων τι: see III 388 D n. For γεγομένων Richards would write γεγο- μένων, because of δρόμων etc. in B. and γεγομένων in 488 B. But Plato rightly asks us to conceive of the completed scene, although the scene itself must of course be described by present partic- icles.

7 ναύκληρον κτλ. The ναύκληρος is the Demos, as Aristotle observed (Rhet. III 4. 1406 b 35): cf. also Olympiodorus Prolog. 27 ed. Hermann. Cope on Arist. I.e. erroneously asserts that the ναύκληρος is the 'governor or governors of the unruly mob of citizens'; and Windelband's identification of the ναύκληρος with the younger Dionysius is a strange freak of fancy: see Hirmer Entsteh. u. Komp. etc. p. 520. As the ναύκληρος owned his own ship (11 371 B n.), it is right that the Demos should be ναύκληρος in a democracy. For the frequent comparison of the State to a ship in Greek literature see Smyth's Gk. Mede Poets p. 215. With ὑπόκωφος cf. Ar. Knights 42, 43 Δήμος πυκνότης, δύσκολον γεφυρώνοντι ὑπόκωφον and Blaydes ad loc. Plato's picture of the Δήμος is not unamiable: cf. 499 B ff. Though unwieldy, sluggish, and dull- witted (cf. Ar. 30 E ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοιστερόν καὶ δεσμένον ἐγκρατείαν ὑπὸ μνήμης τινος), he is placid, and not deliberately vicious. It is the δήμαρχος who are here attacked. With μεγέθει καὶ μέγις cf. μεγάλου καὶ λαχαίρου 493 A.

488 B 11 μήτε μαθάντα—ἰμαθανεί. See V 473 C n. and Xen. Mem. IV 2. 4—7. Politics, according to both Socrates and Plato, is a science: see especially Mem. III 9. 11. The heaviest count in their indictment of Athenian democracy was its practical denial of this fact.

13 φάσκοντας κτλ. The thesis that
'Politics cannot be taught' was (in Plato's view) the theoretical basis of Athenian political life: see Prot. 319 Α—320 D. We are here invited to suppose that it was actually maintained in so many words by sophists, demagogues, and others. Something of the sort is asserted by Isocrates adv. Soph. 14, 21; but it is unlikely that Plato is alluding to Isocrates in particular, as Teichmüller supposes (Lit. Feldh. 1 p. 104).

14 τὸν λέγοντα κτλ. as Socrates and Plato constantly did. έτοίμους κατατεθέντος admirably expresses the vindictive fury of the insulted demagogues, but should not be taken as an allusion to Socrates' fate. Plato felt his master's death too deeply to exaggerate on such a subject. See VII 517 Α, 7.

488 C 15 αὐτῷ is ejected by Herderen "quod omni vicaret." Bywater (J. Ph. x p. 73) proposes αὐτῷ. The translators for the most part ignore the word, except Schneider, who translates 'him, the master of the ship.' Perhaps αὐτῷ is 'by himself,' ἵστι in the sense of soli, as in αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐσμεν, and we should translate 'while they them-selves constantly swarm around the solitary master of the ship.' Failing this explanation we must follow Schneider; unless we venture to take αὐτῷ in the sense of 'the Master' (cf. 427 B, n.) and regard τὸν παυκλήρῳ as an explanatory gloss. On the whole I am inclined to think that Schneider is right.

περικεφάλαια: an acanalathon, like ἀξίχειν and πλένι below: we should expect περικεφαλέων. For a parallel see Lattes 686 Α. Here, doubtless, the change of construction is in order to avoid too many participles.

17 ἀποκτεῖνες. On the orthography of this word see Init. 8. 5. ἀποκτεῖνες (sic) in ν and Vind. F may also be a trace of the spelling with εἰ. The reference in ἀποκτεῖνες ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας is of course to the slaying or banishment of rival candidates for office: cf. Corg. 466 B.

19 μανδραγόρα κτλ. False rulers dull the senses of the Demos by the opiate of Pleasure, and so escape detection. With μανδραγόρα cf. [Dem.] Phil. 4. 6 ἄλλα μάνδραγόραν πεπωδόκην ἢ τί φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιούτοιν εἰκάκαμεν ἀνθρώπους. 20 πίνοντας τε κτλ. They are the οὐσίατορας εὐδαιμονιστής of IV 421 B, where see note. For ὁ τὸ εἰκὸς Cobet writes ἃ εἰκὸς, and so also Herderen, who suggests as an alternative that we should bracket τὸ τοιούτον. The expression ὃς εἰκός would refer to πίνοντας τα καὶ εὐσωμομένους ("and pass their time at sea in drinking and feasting, as you might expect with such a crew") D. and V.; but with ὃ τὸ εἰκός (sc. πάρεια) the meaning is: make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them" (J. and C. with Schneider, comparing Pol. 302 Α and Lattes 906 B), i.e. make shipwreck.

21 ἐπανώντας is omitted by Cobet, but (as Richards points out) ψήλλωντας supports it. Richards would transpose and read μὲν ναυτικόν. But ναυτικὸν μὲν καλῶντας etc. is only an explanatory re-duplication of ἐπανώντας: hence μὲν is placed where it would have been if ἐπανώντας had been omitted. In any other position it would have failed to mark the antithesis between ναυτικὸν (with its companion epithets) and ἄρρητον. For the rhetorical asyndeton cf. ΙΙ 362 B, n. An alternative (less good) is to take ἐπανώντας as logically subordinate to καλῶντας (in awarding praise they call etc.).

25 ἐπιαντοῖς. I should adopt the accusative with Stallbaum and others were it not for ὀλόγων. Schneider is fully justified in saying "si Plato ἐπιαντοὶ scripsert et ὀλόγων, fieri vix poterat, quin prīus vitium quibusdam et in accusativum mutandum videretur: alterum ipsa distantia tutum erat." This is precisely what has happened, for while q (with some other MSS, but not II or E) has ἐπιαντοῖς, all the MSS, without exception, have ὀλόγων. The anacoluthon is not harsher than other instances in which the best MSS have the nominative of the participle instead of the accusative, e.g. Phaedr. 241 D, Soph. 219 E, Laws 585 D, Phaed. 81 A. See also Classen on Thuc. II 153 4, where many parallel instances are quoted from Thucydides. A long and unperiodic sentence like the present is peculiarly liable to anacolutha: and one has occurred already in 488 c. For these reasons I now agree with Schneider and others that the text is sound. The nominatives πείθοντες and βιαζόμενοι may have suggested the change to Plato: "vanished proper ἐπιαντοῖς tenet, max velut impatien tenoris di servati paullisier de via deflectit" (Schneider). Similar ungrammatical anacolutha are found occasionally also in Inscriptions, when the sentence runs to a considerable length: see Meisterhans' pp. 203, 205.

28 ὅπως δὲ ... κυβερνητικῇν. The sailors, Plato has already told us, have not the smallest idea that the true pilot must study the year and the seasons etc., if he is to be truly qualified to rule a ship (that is to say, from Plato's point of view, if he is to know how to steer), but as for how he shall steer—let people wish him to or no—of that they think it impossible to acquire either art or study and there-
helm into their hands (488 c): how to handle it, they know not, and deny that it is possible to learn (μήτε τέχνην— 
λαβεῖν). What of άυτα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν? These words should be taken closely with what goes before. The literal translation is (to acquire) 'at once and the art of steering': cf. Phil. 22 D ο̂ς οὔτος 
τέχνην αἰσχρόν άμα καὶ σιγαθῶς 'this life is at once choiceworthy and good.' Now 'to acquire at once the art of how to steer (ὅπως κυβερνήσαι, τοῦτον τέχνην) and the art of steering' is merely a way of saying 'to acquire the art of how to steer and therewith the art of steering.' He who learns the art and study of how to steer necessarily learns therewith the art of steering ('quarum qui compos factus sit, simul gubernatoriam artem tenat') (Schneider): for κυβερνητική is, according to Plato, simply and solely the art of how to steer. τὴν κυβερνητικήν, in short, is nothing but the τέχνη and μελέτη τοῦτον ὅπως κυβερνήσαι, expressed from Plato's point of view. Thus in denying that it is possible to learn either τέχνη or μελέτη of how to steer, the sailors are in effect emphatically denying that it is possible to learn κυβερνητική in Plato's sense of the word at all: cf. 488 B φαίνονται μηδὲ 
διάκρισιν έπαυει. So much for the meaning of this passage as a whole. In regard to details, it should be noted that ὅπως means 'how': 'ὅπως ἐν τούτῳ σπεκτάν μοδῳ ἐκτὸσιν 
ποιμῆνα quam nominem significat' (after Schneider). With Schneider also I understand κυβερνῆσαι as 'shall steer' and not 'shall get possession of the helm.' μελέτη is 'study' (in the more concrete sense of the word), rather than actual exercise or practice: cf. έν 403 B ἄντι τῆς 
αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτῆς. With τέχνην λαβεῖν cf. Pol. 300 c.

The above explanation agrees in the main with that of Schneider, and is in my opinion what Plato meant to say. For other views see App. I.

30 οἱμεμον. οἰόμενον is read by Stallbaum and others, but see note on line 25.


489 Α 3 ἐξεταζομένην: 'cross-examined.'

489 B 8 καὶ ὅτι—λέγεις. 'And also that what you say is true' etc. Socrates identifies Adimantus with his hypothetical objector in 487 D; cf. σὲ λέγειν in D below. Another possibility—less good, I think—is to take ὅτι as introducing a direct address: 'and say to him also 'You speak truly, when you say' etc. λέγειν is found in a few inferior MSS; and λέγει, which Stallbaum and Baiter adopt, occurs in Par. D. λέγειν is indefensible, and the corruption of λέγειν or 
λέγεις to λέγεις is exceedingly improbable here. On τοις = 'also' see I 339 D η.
10. Those who will not use them are to blame for their uselessness. The etymological figure is of course intentional.

11. Or a speaks thus: See 488 D.

12. The learned pate Ducks to the golden fool" (Timon of Athens IV 3). See also VIII 568 A n. The author of the saying was, according to Aristotle (Rhet. II 16. 1391 a 8 ff.), Simonides. Being asked on one occasion by Hiero's queen whether it was better to be a man of genius (sophos) or rich, he replied "Rich; for men of genius are found at the court of the rich"—a characteristic reply, by which the courtliest of ancient poets contrived to flatter the queen without forgetting himself. (It should be remembered that sophos often means 'poet'). There is no reason for supposing (with e.g. Teichmüller Lit. Phdld. I p. 102) that Plato attributed the saying to Aristippus, although a witticism on the subject is ascribed both to him (D. L. II 8. 69) and to Antisthenes (Winckelmann Anith. Frag. p. 58). Plato liked to get his knife into Simonides: see 1 331 E ff.

489 C. 16. Is governed by the idea of obligation carried on from arraph-kaion. The alternative suggested by J. and C., that the infinitive depends on pievkev, is impossible.

20. The tóutó is neuter, like toontón: otherwise ito—etiptenéontan is hardly necessary. The balance of clauses —'in consequence of these circumstances, and amid these circumstances'—is also in favour of this—Schneider's—view.

489 C—491 A. So much for the 'uselessness' of the philosopher. But the most serious prejudice from which Philosophy suffers is owing to those who pretend to be philosophers when they are not. It is they who are meant, when people assert that the majority of philosophers are depraved. Let us endeavour to shew that Philosophy is not responsible for the corruption of the philosophic nature. The true philosopher, in spite of popular misconceptions, is, as we have seen, a lover of Truth, and therefore possesses all the virtues of character—already named. We have to enquire (1) how this disposition becomes in many cases depraved and (2) what is the character of the false philosophers who are responsible for the prejudice against Philosophy.

489 D. 14. Of whom it is that you say the accuser of philosophy declares that,' etc. For tóutó éngkaloúnta see 487 C n.
25 λόγων ἐπὶ almost = 'woe her': cf. 495 c ff., Synp. 210 Α. πλαστάς is similarly used in 490 b.

28 τὴν ἀνάγκην should be taken strictly. There is no possibility of escape: the majority must inevitably succumb. Cf. 492 e n.

489 ε 31 ἐκείθεν—όθεν. As ἀναμμυρίσκοι takes the genitive of a noun, so it can be followed by a genitival—originally ablative—adverb. ὀθέν is attracted for ὀθέν: cf. Soph. Tr. 701 and other examples in Kühner Gr, Gr. ΙΙ p. 915.

32 καλὸν τε κἀγάθον. The fashionable Greek phrase καλὸς κἀγάθος for an ἐλευθέρος, or gentleman, was continually used by Socrates and his followers to express their ideal of what a man should be. An excellent discussion of the Socratic connotation of the word will be found in Döring Die Lehre des Sokrates pp. 398—415: for its usual implications reference may be made to Schmidt Ethik d. alteren Griechen I pp. 328—334. In politics, the expression was applied to the wealthy or oligarchical party (cf. viii 569 Α and Thuc. viii 48. 6). It is therefore probable that Socrates' habitual use of καλὸς κἀγάθος fostered the not unwarranted suspicion that he and his friends were out of sympathy with democracy, and so contributed in some measure to his condemnation and death.

480 Α 2 νῦν ἔχεις: 'you remember.' ἐν νῦν ἔχεις (as in some inferior MSS) would mean 'you intend.' Compare Euthyph. 2 b with Ap. 20 b. The reference is to 485 b—487 Α.

3 η = 'aliasquin.' Cf. v 463 Β. n.

5 οὗτω κτλ. οὗτω "ex Adimantii verbis repetitum et praeclae dictum est pro οὗτω λεγόμενον η." If the word is genuine, it must be taken in this way. J. and C. translate "to say no more," comparing pαθιος οὗτω and the like (see on ii 377 b). But there appears to be no other instance of this idiomatic οὗτω with the adverb σφόδρα. οὗτως σφόδρα in Ar. Hec. 88 is quite different, in spite of Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 461. It is just possible that οὗτω is an interpolation from οὗτω just before.

παρὰ δοξαν. By selecting this form of expression Plato "opusinibus opinionem tribuit" (Schneider), loosely enough, but the words are practically equivalent to ἐναντιον. παρὰ δοξαν would be somewhat easier, but the text is probably sound. For a similar pleonasm see my note on Crito 44 c.

δοκουμένοις. With the passive cf. X 612 b.

αὐτευ is masculine, and means Plato's καλὸς κἀγάθος, i.e. the philosopher, whom popular opinion regards as an ἀλάζων, if not as a liar.

6 ἄρι οὖν δὴ κτλ. Shall we not then fairly plead that the true lover of learning was dispoed by nature to strive towards Being and tarried not at the many particulars which are opined to be' etc.? Socrates has just said that Truth is the leading attribute of the Philosopher. This proposition is challenged by public opinion (παρὰ δοξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις), and in support of it Socrates urges, what
he had asserted before (485 A—C) that the philosopher is a lover of 'to δόεν, εἶναι ('was,' i.e. 'as, we saw') would be the 'philosophic imperfect' in direct speech. For the rare change from Ἱν to εἶναι after a primary tense cf. Xen. Mem. 12. 34 δῆλων (sc. ἐστίν) ὅτι ἄφερεν εἶναι τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν λέγειν, where εἶναι stands for Ἱν (the usual 'erat' for 'essest with words denoting obligation or necessity) of the direct, and Plato Charm. 136 θέλεται ποὺ ὅτι υἱὸν τῶν αὐτῶν μᾶκους ἐπισημεύειν τοὺς οὕτως ἑραθή, ἀλλὰ ἀγαγάινει εἰς ἄρα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν. (Madvig's insertion of Ἱν after ἀγαγαίνω in this passage is without authority.) Cf. also Π 301 C. M. The sequence is all the more easy with the philosophic imperfect because its very nature involves a reference to the past. Ast's conjecture ἀπελογισμέθαι is incorrect; for the philosopher's zeal for Being has not yet been urged in defence of the statement—now for the first time formally challenged—that Truth is his leading characteristic. Madvig conjectures ἀπελογισμέθαι, which Baiter adopts, although the word is wholly inappropriate here. Cf. Χ 607 B n.

ἀπόθεσον κτλ.: 'whereby having come high unto and married with true Being, begetting Reason and Truth, he attained unto knowledge and enjoyed true life and nourishment, and then but not before ceased from travail of the soul.' The mystic union of the Soul with Being is here described in passionate and glowing language. Cf. Phaedr. 246 B—247 D, Symp. 210 A—212 A, and many parallels in Plotinus, for whom, as for the Neoplatonists generally, the mystic side of Platonism had an extraordinary fascina-
tion: see Zeller3 Ι11 2, pp. 611—618.

The imagery should be compared with Thetis. 156 A ff. where the phenomena of Perception are thus analysed. The Subject unites with the Object, and from this union are born two children, one the αἴσθησις e.g. Sight, the other the αἴσθησις e.g. τὸ μέλαν. The former be-
longs more peculiarly to the Subject, the latter to the Object. Similarly with the phenomena of Knowledge. The Subject unites with the Idea, and the children of this union are νοῦς (or rather, strictly speaking, νοησις i.e. the action of νοῦς), on the side of the Subject, and the νοητὸν, i.e. Truth, on the side of the Object. We miss an essential point if we take νοῦς as the object of Knowledge; it is the faculty of Reason, no longer dormant, but suddenly called into actuality. Plato means that Reason does not really live until it lays hold on the Idea. γνῶσις corresponds to νοῦς; it is by the begetting of νοῦς that we come to know. The noster denotes the instantaneous act; cf. Symp. 210 πρὸς τέκνον ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ ἀλλὰν καθαρσίαν την φύσιν καταλείπει. See also on 508 D and Π 517 C. In like manner ἀλλάξων ἢ ἀλλοθεὶς: there is no true life without knowledge of the Truth. ἀλλάξων goes also with τρέφοντως: cf. Phaedr. 247 D and 248 B, C. With ὄνομα cf. Phaedr. 251 ε (ὀνόμα ἔνθεν) and Symp. 206 E. It is tempting to suppose that in ὄνομα Plato is thinking not merely of the lover's pangs, but also of the pangs of birth. The knowledge of the Idea is indeed in Plato's view an intellectual and moral regeneration. But ἀποληψις τοῦ ἐρωτοῦ shews that ὄνομα means the throes of love; and the further view introduces a confusion of ideas which is alien to the peculiar character of Plato's 'mysticism.'

μετέστασι. With μετέστασι cf. X 600 ἐλογίζοντα γὰρ—ἀλλοθεὶς πιστὶ μετ-
15 μυσεῖον: | Μυσεῖον, ἔφη. | 'Ἡγομένης δὴ ἄλληθεῖαι οὐκ ἂν τοτε, | οἵματι, φαίμεν αὐτῆ γορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθήσαι. | Πώς γὰρ; | 'Ἀλλὰ | ὑπὲρ τοίς καὶ δίκαιοι ἡδος, οἷς καὶ σωφροσύνη ἐπεσθαί. | Ὄρθως, ἔφη. | Καὶ δὴ τοῦ ἄλλου τῆς φιλοσοφοῦ φύσεως χορὸν τί δεὶ πάλιν | εὐ προσήκου τούτων ἄνδρεια, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμαθεία, μηνύμα καὶ | σοῦ ἐπιλαβομένου, ὦτι τὰς μὲν ἀναγκασθῆσαι | ὁμολογεῖν οἷς D λέγομεν, ἔάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὅν | ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὅραν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἄχριστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς | κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκοποῦστε ὥσπερ | 25 τούτω νῦν γεγοναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοὶ, καὶ | τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα

esth and Theat. 186 E. τι is adverbial and does not go with ἁνδοῦ. There is no occasion for Madvig's conjecture ἐπιμελεῖς ἔσται: nor need we write ἁντοῦ, as I formerly proposed.

490 C 15 ἠγομένης κτλ. | 'Now where Truth was leader' (as we saw it was | with the φιλόσοφος) 'we shall never, I think, | allow that a quire of evils joined | her train.' ἠγομένης is not the present, | but the imperfect participle (cf. ἡγεῖται | δ' αὐτ' — ἀλήθεια 490 A) the 'philosophic' | past is carried on from the earlier sentence. | The tense is strictly to the point, for | our ἀπολογία is not yet finished: see 490 A n. | We ought not to regard ἀκολουθήσαι (with | Goodwin MT. p. 55) as a gnomic aorist: | still less should we read ἀκολουθῆσαι with | γ', or φαίνει for φαίνει (Stobaeus Flor. 11. | 18 and Vind. F'), taking ἀν with ἀκολο- | θήσαι (as I formerly suggested). | The past tense is the only one appropriate to | the situation both in Greek and in English. | See also on line 17.

17 ἡδος: sc. ἀκολουθήσαι. These 'joined the | train' of virtue at 486 n.

18 καὶ δὴ κτλ. | καὶ is 'also' and goes | with τοῦ ἄλλον: cf. καὶ—δὴ in 494 A.

19 ἀναγκάζοντα has been doubted. | It is read by all the MSS except Ξ, which | has ἀναλαμβάνοντα (cf. 490 D). Stall- | baum accepts ἀναλαμβάνοντα, while Baiter | adopts Madvig's picturesque conjecture | ἀναβιβάζοντα. The text is perfectly sound. | ἀναγκάζοντα is ἀναγκάζοντα τῷ λόγῳ, i.e. | λέγον ἀναγκαία εἰσα, 'insisting on their | necessity': see on Π 363 B (ἀποτίκην) | and cf. Χ 611 B and Theat. 153 C (where | Cobet wrongly brackets ἀναγκάζοντα. Much | the same view is taken by Jackson (cf. of | Ph. xiii p. 218), who compares 486 E μὴ | τῇ δοκοῦσέν σοι οὖκ ἀναγκαία ἑκατα | δειληθέντα. J. and C.'s translation | 'compelling your assent' is scarcely ac- | curate here.

490 D 23 φαίη. | In 487 C we have | φαίη ἀν τις, and Richards would add ἀν | here. But the hypothetical critic (with | whom Socrates himself agrees 487 E) is | now treated as what he really is—the | exponent of opinions held by all. | We should translate 'after you objected that | all men would be compelled to agree | with what we say, but when they set | words aside, and looked at the actual | people of whom the argument spoke, | they declared that' etc. For φαίη after | ἀναγκασθήσει (rather than ἀναγκασθ- | ήσθαι) see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1601.

24 τῆς διαβολῆς. | II and the majority of | MSS have τῆς ἥτις διαβολῆς. If ἥτις | is right, it must, I think, be taken with τῆς | διαβολῆς in the sense of 'ea διαβολή | quae iam apparebat et in conspectum venerat, | cum antea animadversa non suisset' (so | Bernhardy and Schneider Addit. p. 46). | Even so, it is harsh, but not so harsh as | if we take it with ἐπισκοποῦστε, as Stall- | baum—and formerly Schneider—did. So | extreme a hyperbaton would be more | difficult than that in Soph. O. T. 1245, | and scarcely admissible in prose. Perhaps | Plato wrote τῆς διαβολῆς νήσ. Otherwise | we must suppose that A and other MSS | are right in omitting the word.
πάλιν ἀνειληφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ εὔ
Ε ἀνάγκης ὃς ἄρσαμεθα. "Εστιν, ἐφη, ταῦτα.

VI. Ταῦτας δὴ, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ θεάσασθαι τὰς
θοράς, ὡς διόλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σμικρὸν δὲ τι ἐκείνῃν, οὐς δὴ
καὶ οὐ ποινήσω, ἀρχίστους δὲ καλοῦσι· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐ τάς
491 μιμομένας ταῦτην | καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτίθεμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς,
οἴα ἦν οὐσία φύσεως ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον καὶ μειῶν ἐαυτῶν ἀφικοῦ-
μεναι ἐπιτίθεμα πολλαχῶς πλημμελοῦσαι πανταχῶς καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας
ἑξαν ὀιαν λέγεις φιλοσοφία προσήφησαν. Τίνας δὲ, ἐφη, τὰς
diaφθοράς λέγεις; Ἐγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν οἶς τε γένομαι, πειράσομαι 5
dιελθεῖν. τὸδε μὲν οὖν, οἴμαι, πᾶσ ημῶς ἀφολογηθεί, τοιαῦταν
φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἐχουσαν, ὃσα προσετάξαμεν νῦν δὴ, εἰ τελέως
B μέλλοι φιλοσοφοῖς γενέσθαι, ὀλγυκίκας ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ
ὀλγας. ἦ οὐκ οἶε; Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὁλγαν σκόπει
ὡς πολλοὶ ὀλθροὶ καὶ μεγάλοι. Τίνες δὴ; "Ο μὲν πάντων θαν-ιο
8. μέλλοι ΑΠ: μέλλει Α.1.

490 Ἔ 31 τὰς μιμομένας κτλ. Plato distinguishes between two kinds of ποινία,
that which results from the corruption of the truly philosophic nature, and the πο-
νία of pretenders to philosophy. It is the latter—so we are told—which is
responsible for the prejudice under which Philosophy labours (cf. 489 D): but the
former is by far the more serious evil (491 E, 495 B), though engendered, not
by Philosophy, but by the seductive in-
fluence of public opinion.

491 A—495 B The philosophic nature is a rare growth, whose very virtues render
it peculiarly liable to corruption, when it is
placed in unfavourable surroundings. The clamorous voice of public opinion,
expressed in assemblies and other gatherings of the people, inevitably corrupts the
youth by moulding them into conformity with itself. Where necessary, force is
employed, under the name of punishment.
Against these influences, no teacher can
possibly contend, although the providence of God may save some. As for the
Sophists, they do but make into a system and teach the opinions of the Multitude,
which they are wholly unable to justify, but accept without reserve, as their pro-
fession requires them to do. Remember too that the Ideas are foolishness to the
Many, so that they will never love Wisdom
or her followers. Socrates concludes with

a vivid and lifelike picture of a philosophic
nature in process of corruption.

491 Λ 2 ἀνάξιον=’too good for’;
cf. Prot. 355 D and Soph. Phil. 1009.
ἀνάξιον (Benedictus) and ἀνάικος (Her-
werden) are unhappy conjectures.
3 ἐπὶ πάντας: ’all the world over.’
Cf. ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπου in Tim. 23 B.
7 εἰ—γενέσθαι. Cobet, who formerly
proposed γενέσθαι, afterwards rejected
the whole clause. The aorist infinitive
with μελλω is rare, but thoroughly estab-
lished in Plato, if any reliance is placed
on the best mss: see the examples col-
lected by Schanz Vol. v p. vii.

491 B 8 ὀλγακίκας—ὀλγας. ὀλ-
γακίς καὶ ὀλγας is half-proverbal. For
καὶ ὀλγας Stephanus conjectured καὶ
ὀλγας or καὶ ἐν ὀλγας, Richards καὶ
ὀλγας, comparing Arist. Eth. Nic. vii
11. 1161 b 30 δῖ το τά ἐπίρημα ἐν ὀλγας
καὶ ὀλγακίκας εἶναι φανερῶς. But ἐν
ὀλγας would be inelegant after ἐν ἀν-
θρώπως, and Plato could not have written ὀλγηγι. A similar but easier change from
the generic singular to the plural occurs
Π 408 B and infra 500 C. Translate,
keeping the anacoluthon; ‘that such a
nature—one possessed of all the quali-
ties’ etc.—’such natures are few and far
between among mankind.’

10 δ—ὅτι. Cf. I 330 B H.
...but avtov is certainly neutral and not 'the philosophic natures,' as J. and C. suppose.

491 D 21 ἐγγελών—ζῶν. These are possessive genitives. Richards says that "τῶν should probably be omitted before ζῶν or added before ἐγγελών." Cf. however IV 438 C. In this instance I think Plato wrote τῶν ζῶν in order to call special attention to ζῶα as opposed to ἐγγελέα. They are not on the same level of importance, as far as the argument is concerned, for it is the degeneration of ζῶα, not of ἐγγελέα, which Plato has to explain.

23 πλειόνων is much more elegant than Madvig's conjecture πλεῖον. Plato's position on this matter, in the way in which he states it, is open to objection. It might be argued that the naturally strong nature is the best fitted to resist the corrupting influences of its environment. But the philosophic nature is remarkable for sensibility as well as strength, and the sensitive plant needs careful fostering. The general sentiment of this passage is Socratic, as Hermann (Ethik. u. System p. 330 n. 33) and Krohn (Pl. St. p. 305) have pointed out; cf. Mem. IV 1, 3, 4 τῶν ἄνθρωπων τῶν εὐφρενιστῶν ἑρμομε-

20. παντός Α' ΠΙ: πάντως Α.

12 ἀπόλλυσι κτλ. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 114) asks how courage and temperance can tend to corrupt the character. The answer is given by Plato in 494 B ff. They bring their possessor to the front, and therefore expose him to the solicitations of selfish and unscrupulous men. It should be carefully borne in mind that ἀνδρεία and the other virtues are here regarded, not as the result of education, but as natural qualities, derived from the philosopher's native love of truth. We are in fact dealing with the potentiality of the τελεύοι φιλόσοφος (491 λ). It is this which suffers corruption, not the actualized philosopher. Cf. Krohn l.c. p. 115 and Pfeiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 26. 491 C 17 ἔχεις γὰρ—λέγει: not "now I have given you an outline of my meaning" (D. and V.), but 'you understand the general type of the things I mean,' that is, the general character of things which θάλα καὶ ἄποστα, though in themselves advantages or even virtues. Adimantus assents, but would like to have them specified more precisely. In reply, Socrates bids him grasp the notion of them correctly as a whole (ἀντιοῦ is neuter and ἄντι αὐτῶ is practically equivalent to τῶν), and it will become clear to him, and τὰ προφετήματα περὶ αὐτῶν (viz. that they ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἄποστα — φάτερ καὶ ἄποστα B, C) will not appear ἄστα as before (ἄστα—ἀκούσα in Β). The passage is somewhat loosely written;
25 τὴν ἀριστην φύσιν κτλ. The contrast is between the ἀριστην φύσις and the φαύλη, where both are subject to (οὔταν ἐν cf. 495 A) bad τροφὴ. The former 'comes off worse,' 'suffers more' (κάκων ἀπαλλάττειν), because the τροφὴ is more alien to its nature than to that of the others: cf. τοσοῦτον πεινών ἐδει τῶν προετοιμῶν. So Schneider correctly explains the passage. Cf. generally Dante Inferno vi 106—108 "Ritorna a tua scienza, Che vuol, quanto la cosa è più perfetta, Più senta 't bene, e cosi la doglienza." Van Heusde's ἐν ἀλλοτρίῳ τραφέσαι misses the point. Even more unhappy is Bocchi's κακῶν ἀπαλλάττειν, which Stallbaum adopts. κάκων ἀπαλλάττειν is simply the comparative of κακὸς ἀπαλλάττειν: see Cobet in Mies. xi p. 168, where Stallbaum is severely rebuked.

491 εἰς 30 ἐκ νεανικῆς κτλ.: "out of a fulness of nature ruined by education" Jowett. Plato's attitude on this subject is highly characteristic. The educator's whole efforts are to be directed towards saving and improving strong and gifted natures: cf. vii 519 A, B. Weak natures may be almost neglected, without serious injury to the State. They will never do anything great—whether good or evil: see 495 B. For this and other reasons Plato does not trouble to lay down rules for the education of the lower classes in his city.
492 B 11 ἵγνακαθεζόμενοι κτλ. The Athenians sat at an Ecclesias: see Ar. Aesch. 24 f. with Blaydes' note. For πολλοὶ formerly read οἱ πολλοὶ with Hermann; but ἄθροι πολλοὶ is sound, and means 'in large numbers together,' like πολλοὶ ἄθροι in Gorg. 490 B. The subject is of course of ταῦτα λέγεται, i.e. οἱ πολλοὶ (402 B). The mention of numbers is to the point: how can one man stand against so many? Cobet is wrong in deleting πολλοὶ.

12 ἐξω. See on IV 424 D.

14 ὑπερβαλλόντως. Cf. VIII 561 C ff. Exaggeration and excess are characteristic marks of democracy.

492 C 15 πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς κτλ. Plato is doubtless thinking of the Acropolis and the Dionysiac theatre. Cobet does ill to bracket τῶν ψόγων καὶ ἑπαύνων: for Plato characteristically makes the rocks themselves applaud. Cf. VIII 563 C. Translate 'Yea, and besides themselves, the rocks and the place wherein they are resound and give forth a reduplicated uproar of censure and applause.' Cf. Euthyd. 393 B ἐπετίθη δὲ ὅλον καὶ οἱ κινεῖ οἷν ἐν τῷ Ἀκρωπόλις ἐπορούσθησαν τ' ἐπί τῶν ἄθροι καὶ ἐφύθησαν.

17 τίνα ἴσχυον. 'Where, think you, is a young man's heart?' For the saying, cf. Isocr. Ἠρον. 16 οἷον ἐκεῖθε με γρήγορην ἔχειν; and Dem. adv. Ar. 87 οἷον ἐκεῖθε αὐτοῦ ψευχήν ἔχειν; καρδία as the seat of courage is colloquial and rare: cf. Archil. Πτ. 58. 4 καρδίας πόλεος and Plut. Reg. et imp. aorophthegmata 18 εἰ τοῖς δὲ ἔροτρεις—ἐλεγεν ἀστερ τευτόνα μάχαιραν μὲν ἔχων, καρδίαν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν. θα ἔχειν ἄν οἰεί, καὶ Bywater and Herwerden propose τιν' ἄν οἰεί, but the MS reading is better and more picturesque.

18 ποιαν ἂν. I agree with Goodwin (MT. pp. 66, 68, 71) and others that ἂν with the future was occasionally used by the best Attic prose writers. In Plato it occurs Ap. 20 C, 30 B, Symp. 222 A, Rep. X 615 D, Crit. 53 D, Euthyd. 387 D, Phaedr. 227 B, and probably also elsewhere. All these instances have been 'emended,' and it is possible enough that some of them are corrupt. Here ἂν is in all the MSS, and is therefore better retained, although it may of course be an erroneous repetition of the last syllable of ποιαν (as Cobet and others suppose). We may regard the idiom as one of Plato's numerous half-poetical efforts: see X 615 D n. Richards proposes ἂ: but see V 450 C n.

20 καὶ φήσειν κτλ. In oratio recta the whole sentence would have run τοῦ ἂν αὐτῷ παίδεια ἤλωτικὴ ἀνθέξει, ὡς καὶ κατακλυθείσα — ὀξύγκος φερομένη—καὶ φῆσει—καὶ ἐπιτρέψει—καὶ ἑτοί τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ: i.e. (literally translated) 'what private training of his will stand fast, which will not be swamped by such censure or praise, and carried down the stream wherever the stream leads, and he will say' etc. (The metaphor is from a mole or breakwater swept away by a
D αἰσχρὰ ἡναι, καὶ ἐπιτηθεὶσεν ἕπερ ἄν γεῖτω, καὶ ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; Πολλη, ἡ δ’ ὄς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.

VII. Καὶ μήν, ἡ δ’ ἐγώ, οὕτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν. Ποιαν; ἔφη. "Ἡν ἐργὸν προστεθέναι, λόγῳ μὴ πείθουσε, οὕτω οἱ παιδευταὶ τε καὶ σοφισταὶ. ἡ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸν μὴ 25 πειθόμενον ἀτμίσας τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ βανάτοις κολάζουσι." Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα. Τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἴει ἡ ποιῶν ἰδιω
cΕ τικοὺς λόγους ἐναντία τοιῶν 1 τίνος τας κρατήσεις; Οἱμα μὲν οὐδένα, ἡ δ’ ὄς. Οὐ γὰρ, ἡν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἀνοια. οὔτε γὰρ ἠγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται 30 ἄλλοιον ἱδος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευ
μένον, ἀνθρώπου, δὲ ἑταῖρε θείων μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

25. τὸν II: τὸ Α.

flood.) In this there is nothing but the common passage of a relative into a main sentence (see II 357 A 2 n. and cf. Ἀρ. 40 A with my note ad loc.), coupled with an easy change of subject, as in Κρίτ. 46 A. The sentence assumes the form which it has in the text, because both subordinate and main clauses can take the accusative with infinitive in Greek oratio obliqua: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 1050. Stallbaum (followed by J. and C.) understands οὐκ οἶει to account for φέσει, but the negative cannot be supplied, and if it could, it would give a wrong sense. Schneider’s translation is correct, but not his note in the text. With the sentiment cf. Κορ. 510 D ff.

492 D 25 σοφιστα. The Demos is the Arch-Sophist: cf. 492 A 2 n. οὕτω is the contemptuous ἢτι: ‘these teachers and sophists of yours.’

26 βανάτοις. The fate of Socrates was the most conspicuous example of this in Plato’s time, but it is hardly likely that Plato is specifically alluding to it here (as Steinhart and Susemihl suppose). The description is quite general. Contrast VII 517 A 2 n.

492 E 30 οὗτε γάρ κτλ. Plato has just declared that it would be the height of folly in a teacher even to attempt to make a young man run counter to public opinion. The present sentence explains why. There is not, never has been, and never will be produced a character different (from the Many) in respect of virtue, by having been educated on principles op
posed to the education which the Many provide (the force of public sentiment, expressed in assemblies etc.). Consequently every attempt to produce such a character by means of education in the teeth of public opinion is foredoomed to failure. The statement appears at first sight extraordinary; but from Plato’s point of view it is, with the limitations which he makes, strictly correct. Cities are either actual or ideal. In the ideal city, education does not produce a type of character which conflicts with public opinion, because public opinion is itself formed by education. In actual cities, education must conform to the same standard if it is to exist at all: for τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ατμίας τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ βανάτοις κολάζουσι (492 D). How then are we to explain the presence of great and good men in existing cities? They are θείων ἀνδρῶν, saved from corruption by grace of God: see on 493 A. In these circumstances, what is the political re
ger to do? He must break with all existing cities (497 n), and found—as Plato now wishes to do—a new commonwealth in which sound education and public opinion no longer differ, but agree. In other words, his policy must be to make the Philosopher King. For other views of this passage see Αρρ. II 32 ἀνθρώπου: σε. ἱδος; ‘a merely human character.’ Plato makes an excep
tion in favour of a θείων ἱδος, playing on the proverb τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβὲς λέγον, for which cf. Συμφ. 176 C Σωκράτης δ’ εὐσεβ
Lγαν, Phaedr. 242 B Συμμάλ Ονήματον ἄληραίον λόγου (a delicate way of hinting that Socrates and Simmias are θείοι ἄνδρες, and Theaet. 162 D. Any θείος which in existing cities conspicuously transcends the public standard of morality (and is thus ἄλλος πρὸς ἄρετον) is θείος, (and for that very reason sporadic and exceptional (see next note).

399 A θείος μοίραν is best explained by Men. 94 B ff. and 99 C, D. Distinguished statesmen like Pericles, Themistocles etc. are θείοι, just as much as the χρησμοῦδοι, μάντεις, and ποιητοί: they are ἐπίτοιοι—καὶ κατεχόμενοι εἰ τοῦ θείου, οὗτοι κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα (99 D). Education did not produce them, nor have they any scientific knowledge of statesmanship; for which reason also they cannot teach their sons to be statesmen (Men. 94 B, Prot. 320 Α). It was by this theory that Plato accounted for the fact that good men appear from time to time even in corrupt States: εἰς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀδύνατον ἀφελεῖν τοῖς θείοι τιμεῖν, οὗ πολλοῖ—φύσιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομοσύναις πάλιν ἡ καὶ μὴ (Laws 951 B). There is more than a touch of irony in the epithet θείος when Plato applies it to Themistocles, Pericles and other successful politicians with whom he had little sympathy, but θείος μοίραν is not ironical here (cf. 492 Α), nor is Plato ever otherwise than grateful for the birth of statesmen who are truly θείοι. But they do not solve the difficulty, for the scientific knowledge of πολιτική is not only better and more stable in itself, but guarantees the permanent prosperity of a State, because it can be transmitted to posterity. Nor can we be sure that our statesmen ‘by grace of God’ will appear when they are most wanted. For a full discussion of θεία μοίρα in Plato see Zeller 4 II, p. 594 n. 4.

4. ἐκάστος: sc. δοξάσω. Cf. I 334 B, and Theaet. 80 Α, B, where ψυχή, the reading of the best MSS, should be retained. Baiter is certainly wrong in reading ἐκαστόν (with Stephanus and v): for with personal subjects δοκεῖ is used personally. Dümmler (Chr. Beitr. p. 12) and Teichmüller (Lit. Feste. p. 104) suppose that Plato means Isocrates in particular. It is possible enough that he had Isocrates in his mind, but the description applies to many besides him: cf. IV 426 Μ. 6. δοξάζουσιν = ‘opine’ is technical: cf. V 479 E. With ὑπερμάτος etc. cf. “The beast with many heads Butts me away” Shakespeare Coriol. IV 1; and a similar figure in Solon ap. Arist. Ath. Pol. 17 ad fin. and Theaet. 174 D.

493 B Η ἐκάστως. See er. π. Van Prinsterer’s emendation is now universally accepted.

οἰας αὐτοῖς. The party-cry.
13 καλέσεις (though κατεμάθηναν) is written because of κατάμαθαδὸς, after which ἐκλέξεθα would be less suitable. The situation is now treated as a possible one, after the picture has been once allowed. ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος. Cf. the Stoic definition of τέχνη as a σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων κτλ. (Zeno Fr. 12 Pearson).

493 C 16 ὄνομάζει κτλ.: ‘employs all these terms in accordance with’ (literally ‘in dependence on’) ‘the opinions of the mighty Beast.’ This interpretation is better than to suppose with Stallbaum that Plato means ‘applies all these names to the opinions’ etc., though ὄνομάζειν τι ἐπὶ τινι is idiomatically used in that way.

19 τάναγκαία—καλοί. τάναγκαία does not mean “the physical necessities and exigencies of the great beast’s nature” (J. and C.), but simply ‘the inevitable.’ Whatever happens, a public teacher or Sophist must conform to the opinions of the Beast (492 D). In what follows there is a hint of the profound philosophical view that the Works of Necessity are evil (cf. Tim. 29 E, 47 E ff.), and that Moral Freedom consists in following what is good. See on 617 E.

22 δοκεῖ. Ast would read δοκεῖ, but ἄριστος of course goes with ἔκαστον: cf. IV 422 B. See for this idiom my note on Prot. 551 B and Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 1405.


493 D 25 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κτλ. An anacoluthon. The apodosis which requires to be supplied is ‘that much is certain’ or the like: cf. V 465 A n. I formerly thought the anacoluthon too harsh, and proposed to read ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δὲν—ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ἢ κτλ., taking ὅτι as the object of ἐπιδεικνύμενος, and ἢ ποίησιν (‘either poetry’ etc.) as in apposition to ὅτι: but the text is better as it stands. Richards’ proposal to read ὅτι for ὅτι is very unpleasing.

26 ποίησιν. Compare a striking passage in Laws 659 B, C, where Poetry is said to have deteriorated after she accepted ὁ πολλὸς as her judge. See also Laws 700 E, 797 B, Gorg. 502 B ff. and infra X 605 A.

27 κυρίου αὐτοῦ. We should certainly (with Schneider and the majority of editors) read αὐτόι and not αὐτοῦ (which Stallbaum and others adopt, referring to ἡ ποίησιν etc.). The MSS (except 9) mostly read αὐτόι, but their authority in this matter is of no account. Cobet would read αὐτόι and eject τῶν πολλῶν—on what ground, it is difficult even to conjecture.

πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. By coming forward in a public capacity as a poet or
statesman or the like, he 'makes the Many his masters more than is necessary.' In a private station, he is, comparatively speaking, independent; but even then the Many are (in a certain sense) of necessity his masters: see 496 D. Ast and Stallbaum take the phrase with η Διομήδεια ἀνάγκη. "Iungenda sunt verba sic: ἀνάγκη (ἔστιν) αὐτῷ πέρα τῶν ἀναγκῶν (ultra necessaria quae progrediatur) η Διομήδεια λεγομένη, ut vocabulis η λεγομένη Διομήδεια istud πέρα ἀναγκῶν declaretur." (Stallbaum). If this is what Plato meant, he expresses it in a harsh and dangerously ambiguous way, and it would be preferable to cancel πέρα τῶν ἀναγκῶν (with Cobet and Herwerden). But there is fortunately no occasion for such drastic treatment.

28 η Διομήδεια κτλ. Most of the MSS write Διομήδα (sic), but Διομήδεια γε at the end of a line in Ar. Eel. 1029 makes it clear that the word is proparoxyton, unless, as Schneider supposes (Addit. p. 47), Aristophanes shortens the final syllable by poetic license. The proverb, which is used of an overmastering necessity, is illustrated by Leutsch u. Schneidewin Paroxen. Gr. 1 p. 59, 11 p. 367, and also by Blaydes on Ar. l.c. Two explanations of it were given. According to the first, which is adopted by the Scholiast on this passage, the phrase originated in the treatment meted out by Diomede to Odysseus, when they were returning from Ilium to the Greek camp after stealing the Palladium. Odysseus attempted to kill Diomede, but failed, and Diomede paid him out by tying his arms together and driving him home with blows from the flat of his sword. The Scholiast on Ar. l.c. explains differently. Διομήδεια: οτι Διομήδης ο Θράξ, πόρρας ἔχων δυνατότητα, τούς παρόντας ἑξοῦς ἐπιδέχετο αὐταῖς συνεδρία ἐσεύεται έσε ἐν κόρον χώσω καὶ ἀναλυόμενοι οἱ ἄνδρες. ἀς καὶ οἱ μίδοι ἐπους ἀνθρωποφάγους εἶπεν. I agree with Schneider that the proverb is more likely to have originated from the first story than from a euhemeristic explanation of the man-eating mares of Diomede of Thrace.

30 αὐτῶν. The μισθαρρωτεῖ ιδιῶται, not 'the Many.' Plato is probably thinking of actual eulogies of the Athenians by Isocrates and others like him.

32 ἀναμνήσθη. See V 475 E. 494 λ ἕλθος—ἐίναι. The theory of Ideas is not a democratic philosophy. With Plato's attitude here to οἱ πολλοί cf. Gorg. 474 τοὶ δὲ πολλοί οὐδέ διαλέγονται. 4 καὶ δή. Cf. 490 c. n. 494 n 8' ὑμελόγγητα. See 486 c, 486 A, B: and cf. also 490 c.

10. pásow. See cr. n. pásow is retained by Schneider, who takes it as masculine and ἀπαίνω as neuter. Herwerden also approves of pásow: but ἐν τω παίνει (which most of the editors adopt) gives the only correct antithesis to ἐπειδήν προσβέβερος γέγονει ('when he is growing older'), and as are easily interchanged in ninth century MSS: see Introd. § 5.

11. φυλ. Herwerden proposes φύση προσφέρεις, comparing Soph. Αἴας 1077 καὶ σῶμα γεννήσῃ μέγα, but no change is necessary, as Herwerden himself allows. For προσφέρεις, some inferior MSS have προσφέρετος, an easier, but less elegant and idiomatic reading. Schneider also points out that if Plato had written προσφέρετος, he ought to have added αὐτῷ with τὸ σῶμα.

14. ὑποκείσονται: 'they will lie prostrate at his feet.' is the future perfect of ὑποπίπτω. ὑποκείσονται, which Herwerden conjectures, would be less expressive, and denote an act, or series of acts, instead of a never-wearying attitude of supplication and adoration. They so to speak besiege his soul with flatteries and prayers.

494 C 17 εὰν τύχῃ κτλ. It has long been admitted that this picture is drawn chiefly from Alcibiades. In antiquity Plutarch seems to have suspected something of the sort, for he describes Alcibiades' degeneration in language adapted from the present passage (Alc. 4. 1). But the personal touches must not blind us to the fact that Plato is portraying the type, although Alcibiades sits for the portrait.


19. ἤγομένων κτλ. Plutarch (Alc. 17, 2, 3) declares that Alcibiades intended the Sicilian expedition to be a step towards an almost universal empire: Sicily was to be merely the ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου. Alcibiades says nearly as much himself in Thuc. VI 90. 2, with which compare 15. 2. Grote (VII p. 79) is inclined to deny that even Alcibiades dreamt of anything beyond the conquest of Sicily, but the ancient historians thought differently: cf. also Alc. II 141 B ff. Many of the Athenians, probably not without reason (though Plutarch I. c. 35. i leaves the point unsettled), suspected him of aiming at a τυραννία (Thuc. VI 15. 4 and Isocr. περὶ εὐδορος 38).

494 D 21 εξαρείν κτλ. See cr. n. εξαρείν appears also in several MSS besides ν. The present, though retained by Schneider, is very difficult after προσβαλθεσθαι. For the interchange of α and a cf. Introd. § 5. Alcibiades' φίλοι was notorious: see for example Alc. 1 104 A, Thuc. V 43. 2, VI 16 ff., Plut. Alc. 34. 6 and the highly characteristic anecdote in 23. 8. Plato's words appear to embody
an extract from some tragic poet (probably Euripides), as may be inferred both from the rhythm (εχθησισιοι-κενοι) and the language. δὲν νόοις is declared by van Prinsterer, Cobet and others to be a gloss on κενοι. Possibly they are right; but (as Schneider remarks) ότι νοοις οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δὲ, τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητὸν μή δουλεύσαντι τῇ 25 κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἂρ' εὐπτῆς οὐτε εἶναι εἰσακούσαι διὰ τοσοῦτον κακῶν; Πολλοὺ γε δεῖ, ἢ δ' ὡς. 'Εκεῖν ὃν δ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἑγὼ, διὰ τὸ εὐ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ γέγονεν τῶν λόγων εἰς αἰσθάνεται τῇ 30 πη καὶ E καίμπηται καὶ ἐλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἴομέθα δράσειν ἐκεῖνους τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ ἐταιρεῖαν; οὖ πάν μὲν ἐργον, πᾶν δ' ἐπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράτ- τοντας, καὶ περ' αὐτῶν, ὅπως ἀν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθονα,

permanent reform in the midst of so many temptations (ib. 216 b). Perhaps Socrates once hoped that Alcibiades would be his "scientific ruler," and bring back true prosperity to Athens. A tone of sorrow for the 'lost leader' seems to make itself felt in Plato's words.

494 E 29 τοὺς ἡγουμένους: i.e. ἡγοῦνται, whence the article, which Hermerod wrengly rejects. The voice should pause a little between ἐκεῖνους (which refers to 494 c) and τοὺς ἡγουμένους.

30 λέγοντάς τε κτλ. We should expect the future indicative, and on this ground the insertion of διατελεῖν has been proposed by Richards (Stephanus had previously desiderated διατελέσεων). So serious an alteration lacks every element of probability. Ast must be wrong in making λέγοντας etc. depend on όλομέθα. If the text is sound, we should supply πάντα δράσεων or the like after ὅ, and regard the participles as agreeing with the subject of δράσεων. (Schneider and J. and C. take nearly the same view.) δράσεων is of course easy to understand, but it is less easy to dispense with πάντα. Could Plato have written ὅ <πάν>, πάν μὲν ἐργόν κτλ.? Cf. IX 575 E and πάν τοις in Ap. 39 A and Gorg. 479 C. I prefer the anacolouthon.

31 τὸν πείθονα. Such was Socrates, and he was brought to trial. Plato may well have thought of his master when he wrote ὅμως εἰς ἡγέων καθιστάναται. The most fatal count in the charge against Socrates was that he corrupted the youth (Ap. 24 b), and Alcibiades was held to be a case in point (Xen. Mem. 1 2. 12). Plato now turns the tables on the Athenian people. He says in effect 'It was you who corrupted Alcibiades: and you im-
495 A 3 ἀλέγομεν. 491 B ff.
495 B 9 eis should be taken with ἐλθόμενοι and διαφθορά, as Schneider points out. They are spoiled with reference to ‘for’ the best of all vocations. Jowett wrongly connects eis with βελτίστης.
10 φαμέν. 491 A, B. ἐκ τούτων κτλ. Corruptio optimi pessima.
οἱ—ἔργαζομεν was true of Alcibiades: see Grote VIII p. 116 and Lysias In Ael. 1 16, 30, 35 ff. Isocrates' attempt in his peri Θείων to make out that Alcibiades was a benefactor to his city is a futile and fantastic performance.
12 ῥυέντες κτλ. With the metaphor cf. 485 D. For σμικρα—δρα see 419 E n.
495 B—496 A Abandoned by her rightful lovers, Philosophy, alone and desolate, is forced into a shameful alliance with base pretenders. The offshing of this unhallowed union is a bastard brood of sophists.
15 ἀτελή κτλ. ἀτελή is said with reference to the rites of marriage: cf. Philostrat. Vit. Apoll. IV 45 επ' ἀτελεὶ γάμῳ et Soph. Ant. 1240 f. τά νυνικά τέλη λαξων δειλαιος εν γ' Ἀδιου δόμους. With τε followed by δὲ cf. X 611 D and other examples quoted by Hoefer de part. PL. p. 16.
16 ἀληθής is like ἀληθώς ἥγη in 490 B, a passage where the same kind of imagery is employed.
17 ἤσχυναν τε κτλ. Is the aorist gnomic or past? It is usually taken as gnomic, but Plato may be thinking of his own times, in which Philosophy had come to shame, because the unworthy had defiled her.
οῦ φίς. Cf. 489 D and 487 C, D.
Resuming, Plato interposes a comparison, and to this the general idea which forms the logical predicate to πολλοί is accommodated in ποτ’ ἀττα—φαύλα. The sentence was thus understood by the editor of ἡ; for τυχάνονσιν, which seems a difficulty on this theory, is in ζ τυχάνοντες. But τυχάνοντες would be extremely inelegant; and Plato writes τυχάνοντι to correspond to λειώθηται. Even in other cases a finite verb sometimes replaces a participle in the second of two contrasted clauses, e.g. Ἀρ. 21 E. J. and C. explain the passage in nearly the same way, as well as (apparently) Schneider and Stallbaum. It is impossible for many reasons to connect τυχάνοντι with ἐφεύμενοι and so escape the anacolouth. I formerly suspected the text, and proposed <ἀπο>τυχάνονσιν (‘miss the mark,’ i.e. fail to win the distinction which they covet). Another solution might be to place the troublesome τυχάνονσιν after πολλοί. But neither change is in any degree probable; and it is better to acquiesce in the reading of the MSS. Plato’s anacolutha are a device for imparting life and reality to his dialogues. A careful translation should preserve them all.
πληγάς makes it not unlikely that the metaphor is as Schneider supposes. On the νομοχλίθη ἀποτεθωρωμένω (in the margin of Flora. A) see Ruhnken on Theophrastus Lex. s.v. Theophrastus seems to have found it in his text of the Republic.

30 διὰ τὸς βαναυσιας. Cl. Xen. Oec. 4. 2 αἱ γε βαναυσικαλ καλούμεναι (sc. τέχναι)—καταλημανοῦντα—τὰ σῶμα τῶν τε ἐργαμένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελεμένων, ἀνακοίμασιν καθοθαλα καὶ σκπαταιφεισθα, ἐνιαὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἡμερεῖν. τὸν δὲ σώματων θηλυκών καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ πολὺ ἀρωστότερα γίγνονται. It is probable that βαναυσία was "primarily a military conception, dependent for its origin on the obvious fact that certain modes of life and the exercise of certain trades disqualify from prowess in the field" (Greenidge Gk. Const. History p. 22, quoting in support Hdt. II 165—167).

"Sedentary and within-door, says Bacon (quoted by Newman Politics of Aristotle 1 p. 105), "have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition." In practice the term is freely applied by the writers of the best period to every kind of mechanical or illiberal labour or pursuit. Aristotle defines βαναυσία in these words: βάναυσος δὲ ἐργον εἰσὶν δε τοῦτο νομίζεται καὶ τέχνην ταῦταν καὶ μάθησιν, ὡσα πρὸς τὰ χρήσει καὶ τὰς πράξεις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζοντα τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τῆς διάνοιας (Pol. Θ. 2. 1337b 8 ff.). See also Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 42 ff. and Newman I.c. pp. 104—115. The ancients mainly derived the word from βαῖνος "a furnace" and ἀπο, "quasi βάναυσος qui caminum ascendit" (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.). In view of the Boeotian βάναυσιν and βανάκας*νυμφαίας Botoroli in Hesychius, I have conjectured in Cl. Rev. VII p. 112 that βάναυσος, which does not look like an Attic word, may be connected with βάνα. If so, the word perhaps originally meant "e feminate" "unmanly": cf. θηλυκώμενοι in the extract quoted from Xenophon. In any case, however, the ancient etymology can hardly be right.

31 δοκεῖ ὅτι τὰ κτλ. In the "little bald tinker" several critics have recognised Isocrates: see for example Teichmüller Lit. Fehd. I p. 105 and Jackson’s article on the Sophists in the Enc. Brit. εἰς δεσμῶν λελυμένου—ἐν βαλανεῖ δὲ λελυμένου is an admirable example of rhetorical παρομοιώσις, and satirises the tricks of style for which Isocrates was notorious. But all the sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias affected meretricious ornaments of this kind (see Hug on Symp. 194 E ff. and especially Cope’s Rhetoric of Aristotle ι 111 pp. 105, 106), and Plato’s shafts are not levelled at Isocrates alone. As usual, he individualises the type, and if the resultant picture resembles Isocrates, so much the worse for him. Plato would not be sorry (cf. Euthyd. 305 ff., with Spengel’s Isokr. u. Pl. pp. 36—49), and doubtless intended his readers to think of Isocrates, as they certainly would. See also on 498 E.


φαλακρόν καὶ σμικρόν. Was Isocrates bald and short? The bust of him in the Villa Albani is not bald, and it would be pressing the personality to the verge of absurdity to take these words so seriously. The poverty (πενία etc.) and loneliness is of course the daughter’s (cf. 495 C ἐρημοῦ καὶ ἀτελής φιλοσοφίας λειτουργεῖ), not her father’s, as D. and V. suppose. In other words τοῦ δεσπότου belongs only to τὴν θυγατέρα.

496 Α 2 διαφέρει. See on 484 D. Herderwen effects the word, quite needlessly, as usual.
4 ποι' ἀττα—δόξας. Cf. Symp. 210 D

πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέις τικτή καὶ διανοηματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ αἴθων. τίκτεων οὐ γεννᾶν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ μέγαν αὐτῇ, τοις δὲ εὐδαμοὶ προσήκουσα ἀκούσαι σοφίσματα καὶ οὕδεν γνώσισιν οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενοι; Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

X. Πάνωμικρὸν δὴ τι, ἐφην ἕγοι, ὡ 'Αδείμαντε, λείπεται τῶν κατ' ἄξιαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφία, ἡ ποὺ ὑπὸ φυτῆς καταληφθέν B 10 γεναιον καὶ οὐ τεθραμμένον ἡδος, ἀπορία τῶν διαφθεροῦντων κατὰ φύσιν μείναιν ἐπ' αὐτῇ, ἡ ἐν σμικρά πόλει οταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυη συν γεναιον ΛΑΞ ὡς εὑρήσατε ἐξίων μετὰ τοῦ p. 504

6. φρονήσεως Ἀστ: φρονήσεως άξιον ΛΑΞ γ: φρονήσεως άξιον άς Π. 8. ἐφην II: ἐφη ἦν δ' Α.
12 βραχῦ δὲ ποῦ τι κτλ. Some have thought of Phaedo of Elis, and Simon the Athenian, both of whom were members of the Socratie circle (Steinhart Lc. p. 205). The latter (whose very existence has been denied by some recent critics, but—as Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 102 ff. shows—on wholly inadequate grounds) was once a shoemaker (D. L. II 122). We may also in some respects compare the architect-philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus: see Suseinich and Hicks' Politics of Aristotle I pp. 331—334. Zeller I II I, p. 52 n. I thinks Plato may have had had Socrates himself in view, but the daimônion semeion accounts for him.

14 Θεάγους. Cf. Ap. 33 E, where it is implied that Theages died before Socrates. The tribute which Plato pays to his memory is all the more touching because Greek literature too seldom recognises that physical weakness may be combined with mental and moral strength: see III 406 C n. Plutarch (de tuenda san. præcepta 126 C, quoted by Stallbaum) remarks καὶ γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρρήτως τὸλούσον παρέχοντα—a reminiscence, perhaps, of Plato.

496 C 18 τὸ δαίμονιον σημεῖον. Socrates regarded his divine sign as a special if not unique revelation from God, without submitting it to further analysis. As here, so in Ap. 31 D, it is this which forbids him to enter on political life (τούτ' ἐστὶν δὲ μοι ἐναστίπτω τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν). What the phenomenon really was, is a question which different writers have answered differently, according to their different points of view: see Zeller I II 1 pp. 75—91. The subject is treated with great fulness in Ribbing's Socrat. Stud. II pp. 1 ff. and in Kiddle's edition of the Apology pp. 109—117. τῶν ἐμπροσθέν γέγονε does not deny that such a sign may be vouchsafed to others in the future. Schneider conjectures that Plato added this limitation with a view to himself—an unlikely supposition, although no doubt the present passage is in some measure intended as a defence of Plato's abstention from political life: cf. 496 D n.

ἡ γὰρ ποῦ κτλ. Cobet and Herwerden reject ἄλλῳ, because ἡ τις ἡ οὐδεὶς is the regular phrase: cf. Ap. 17 B and Hdt. III 140. But the separation of ἡ from τινι makes ἄλλῳ desirable to help out the meaning of τινι, and to ἄλλῳ in itself there cannot possibly be any objection.

19 τοιτων—γενόμενοι: 'those who have become members of this small band.' J. and C. quote an exact parallel from Thuc. III 56. ὅ ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι: cf. also supra II 360 A, Phaed. 69 D, Parm. 127 D (τῶν τῶν τράκοντα γενόμενοι) and Laws 754 D. γενόμενοι is found in some inferior MSS, and was accepted till Schneider, who restored the true reading: Liebhold absurdly conjectures ἔλθενοι.

22 ὅς ἔτοσ εἰτείν. See on I 341 B.

496 D 23 τὸ δικαίω was restored by Schneider instead of τῶν δικαίων, on the sole authority of Vind. F. It has
since been found that τῶ δικαίως is actually the reading of Α. η τῶν δικαίων δικαίως would mean something quite different, as Schneider shows; viz. "auxilium vel a iustis vel rebus in iustis, vel contra iustos seu iusta latum vel ferendum." With the general sentiment cf. Ap. 31 E—32 A, a passage which proves—if proof were needed—that Liebhold's extraordinary proposal to read σπουδάζοις for σφόδροι is untenable.

εἰς θερία ἄνθρωποι κτλ. Herwerden would read ἄνθρωποι "among men who are as beasts." But the point is that the philosopher in existing commonwealths is like a lonely human being in the midst of wild beasts. Cf. Timon of Athens iv 3 "The commonwealth of Athens is become a forest of beasts." The comparison may have been suggested to Plato by Pherecrates' "Ἀγρία, to which he alludes in Prot. 327 D. In Pherecrates' play the Ἀγρία were savages, to whom apparently some Athenians betook themselves, in the hope of finding more happiness than they enjoyed in Athens: see Kock's Com. Græc. Fr. i pp. 146—150. Plato points out that there are savages enough at home. In πᾶν ἄγριον the emphasis is on πᾶν, we should translate "to hold out alone where all are savages." Cf. ὑπὸ πᾶντων πολεμιῶν 1X 579 B. Herwerden weakens the effect by adding ὄσων after ἄγριον.


οἶνον ἐν χειμώνι κτλ. Jowett constructs χειμώνι with κοινοτόν; but χειμώνι κοινοτόν for "a storm of dust" is scarcely a Greek idiom. κοινοτόν—φερομένον is of course a descriptive genitive absolute.

In this way Schneider also took the passage. ἄγρια is "tempestuous rain" μετὰ βραδεον, as Hesychius explains. χαλάζης was once conjectured by As., but he afterwards rightly withdrew the suggestion. Herwerden proposes ὁ ὁ ἄγριον κοινοτόν ὑπὸ κτλ., and Richards εὐχείμων καὶ κοινοτόν ἄγρια (or ἄγρια κοινοτόν). Neither proposal is supported by any of the ancient citations, except that of Themistius (Or. viii p. 104 c) whose reproduction of this passage is in other respects, as in this, extremely inaccurate: see Schneider's note. And ἄγριον κοινοτόν is, to say the least, a questionable phrase. It is not well to mar the wonderful force and beauty of writing such as this by tasteless and inept conjectures. The passage has often been compared with Lucretius' "Suave mari magno," but the difference is greater than the resemblance. The Platonic philosopher is content (ἀγαπᾷ), if he can keep his own soul pure, because he cannot, as things now are, save both himself and others. But it is no pleasure for him to see "quibus ipse malis careat," for he would fain help others if they would but let him. That they will not is a misfortune, not for others only, but for him (αὐτὸς τε μάλιστα αὐξήσεται κτλ.). We seem to catch in Plato's words a certain tone of sorrow, as if he had not himself attained the highest of which he was capable, because he could not find a philosophic city in which to dwell: see Morgenstern De Plat. rep. p. 161, where reference is made to Ap. 31 E and to the Platonic Epistles V 322 A, B, VII 324 B—326 B, 330 C—331 D: cf. also Gorg. 515 A—522 E, and Suscinio gen. Enitw. 11 p. 190.
497 A 3 prosēkoûsia. The only city suited to the philosophic nature is Plato's: cf. IX 592 A.

497 A—498 C Our justification of Philosophy is now complete. It remains to ask—Where is the political constitution adapted to the philosophic nature? Where, in other words, is the best polity? In the city which we have founded, except that the position of the Rulers requires to be more fully explained. A State, which is to handle Philosophy without success, must assume a new attitude towards the subject. Philosophy should receive more, instead of less attention, as a man grows older.

497 B 10 κατάστασιν πόλεως is treated as a single noun: cf. póleos dioxidēs in Prot. 319 D and Pol. 296 E.

11 ωστερ—ἐκπίπτειν explains and amplifies στρέφονταi te kai ἀλλοιοῦνταi. Asyndeton is regular in such cases, and Stephanus ought not to have proposed the insertion of kal before ωστερ: cf. IV 432 D, VIII 557 C and Prot. 311 E, where more illustrations are cited in my note. Stallbaum's punctuation is here, I think, preferable to that of Schneider, who prints only a comma before ωστερ.

12 els τὸ ἐπιχώριον: as though 'a foreign geranium, allowed to run wild in England' were to 'degenerate into one of the English wild geraniums.' The illustration is due to Bosanquet. Plato's botanical error, such as it is, does not affect the argument.

497 C 15 δηλῶσιν = 'experience will shew' is idiomatic. See Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 1261.

16 ἤν. The past does not exclude the present: cf. IV 436 c n.

17 τίς—πολίτεια: i.e. what the best constitution is. Adimantus was about to ask whether the ἀράστη πολίτεια is not the one which they have described. The reply is yes, provided that the position and status of the Rulers is made clearer. As it stands it is not the best: cf. VIII 543 E καλλίω ἐτι ἔχων (imperfect particle) εἰσέπεν πόλιν τε καὶ ἀνδρα (the Philosopher's City and the Philosopher), where see note.

20 ὅτι δέξησον κτλ.: 'that there would always have to be present in the city a
certain factor possessed of a reasoned theory of the constitution, identical with that possessed by you, the legislator, when you made the laws." The rulers must understand the constitution and not merely accept it on the legislator's authority, if the spirit of the original legislator is to survive his death. ὑδὴ δὲξα is not enough; in order to fill the place of the founder of the city they require ἐπιστήμη. Plato confesses that he did not make this clear enough before (ὦ τικανὸς ἐδηλώθη), and his confession is most true. In one passage (IV 439 c ff.), indeed, he seems expressly to imply that the Rulers do not fill the legislator's shoes. But there are also some hints or traces of the later view: see on III 414 A, IV 433 E (to which, perhaps, ἐφήσθη is intended to refer, although the reference is hardly justified), and 442 c. Cf. 502 D, 503 A, 504 D nn.

... 473 E. J. and C. take ὃν as "ἐκεῖνον ἢ (cognate accusative)," understanding ἀντιλαμβανόμενος as 'objecting to' or 'attacking,' but no objections were made by Glauco and Adimantus. They merely asked for further explanation, and were in fact favourably disposed rather than otherwise (V 450 D, 451 b). Herwerden's conjecture ὃτι for ὃν refutes itself.

... 498 c. Bekker's πάντως (cf. Λαύς 779 ὃ πάντως ἐκδολοτάτον) is a neat emendation, which Burton and others have accepted. But ὃν πάντως ῥάστον 'not in every respect quite easy' (with the usual Greek litotes), is quite unobjectionable, as Schneider points out, and the confusion of ἴν and ἐστι is rare.

... 502 c. The literal translation 'through dread of the topics to which cleaving you have shown that the demonstration thereof is long and difficult.' (So also Schneider.) ἀντιλαμβανόμενος (the opposite of ἀφείνα) as used in V 449 B and infra 504 E) refers to Adimantus' and the others' absolute determination not to let Socrates slur over the questions relating to women and children (V 449 B ff.) and to the possibility of realising the perfect city (471 Cff.). Cf. infra 505 A. φθάνει is explained by V 450 C ff., 457 C,
in Cl. Rev. II p. 324). The correlating or contrasting notion is idiomatically omitted: cf. note on periaugophê in vii 518 E. Plentiful examples of this usage are supplied by Shilleto on Dem. F. L. 181, and Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 434 μεταξύ τῶν Ἰνόσ and Birds 187. With the sentiment of 487 C f. Richards was, I believe, the first to point out the true meaning of this passage; see also Solomon in Cl. Rev. vii p. 11. The traditional view, that μεταξύ κτλ. means 'in the spare moments of housekeeping and business,' though still given as an alternative by J. and C., is untenable.

3 οἷ—ποιούμενοι: 'and they it is, forsooth, who are regarded as accomplished in philosophy.' Sarcasm is often expressed by an appositional participial clause at the end of a sentence: cf. e.g. Ap. 34 A, Crito 51 A. ποιεῖσθαι here is the passive of ποιεῖν in the sense of 'to construct in fancy,' 'represent,' as e.g. in Theaet. 197 D and infra X 609 C. The usage is at first sight strange, but occurs again in vii 538 C, ix 573 B and 574 D, where no other meaning is suitable. Stallbaum's attempt to explain the passages differently is unsuccessful, and the proposed emendations (such as Ast's δοκοῦμενοι for ποιούμενοι) are unsatisfactory in each of the four cases. See notes ad ill.

4 έιν καὶ goes with ἔθελων (Schneider): 'if they do consent' (cf. καὶ ἀπόκλισιν above). It is implied that many, or most of them, do not.

5 μεγάλα κτλ. Plato distinguishes three stages. In the first, τὸ περὶ λόγου is a man's ἔργον after boyhood until he begins practical life; it then becomes his πάρεργον, and he 'thinks it great things' to go to an occasional lecture: towards old age all but very few neglect philosophy entirely. The proper study of philosophy reverses all this (πάν τοῖς τόποντιον) as is shown in b and c.

7 τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἡλίου. Heraclitus Fr. 32 Bywater νόον ἐφ' ἡμέρα ἡλίου. Heraclitus meant the saying to be taken literally, and not merely as an expression of the universal law of change: see the authorities cited by Bywater ad loc. and Zeller* ι p. 684 ν. 2.

498 B 10 φιλοσοφία κτλ. φιλοσοφία in its wider sense denotes any 'liberal' training or study: cf. Theaet. 143 D, 172 C, and Prot. 335 D with my note ad loc. D. and V. are in error (as Bosanquet remarks) when they translate παθέλαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν by 'a course of training in philosophy.' Nor is Susemilh (Gen. Entw. ι p. 187) right in supposing that the reference is to the musical education of the earlier books. Plato explains what he means in vii 536 D, E.

11 ἀνδροῦταί. The early editors read ἀδροῦταί (with Σ). ἀδροῦταί is a rare and somewhat obscure word, nowhere found in Plato; and it is better to retain ἀνδροῦτα, although the subject is not μεγάλα, but σῶματα.

ὑπηρέσιαν φιλοσοφία κτωμένοι sums up in a single phrase the Platonic theory of athletics: see on III 410 A ff. and cf. IX 591 C, D.

12 ἐν ηί. Richards would write ἐν ϕ as in ἐν ϕ βλαστάνει above, asserting that 'ἡ ἡλίκια is their years, not any particular time of life'; but ἡ ἡλίκια is often so used, e.g. Συμπ. 209 B and Μεν. 89 B. Nor is ἐν ϕ, 'while,' appropriate here. Translate 'when the years advance, in which the soul begins to reach its maturity.'
498 C 14 γίγνεται κτλ. The subject is still η ρώμη, ‘their physical strength,’ not τις (as J. and C. assert). In ἀφέτινος νεμεθαί the metaphor (as observed by Heindorf on Prot. 320 A,) is taken de graee numini alieni conscriato: cf. Critias 119 D ἀφέτοις ὑπὸν ταύρων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ποσειδῶν ἐργῷ. νεμεθαί is properly ‘to graze.’ The effect of the Greek may be conveyed by rendering ‘they roam the sacred fields at will,’ although ἀφέτοις of course agrees with the subject of νεμεθαί.

498 C-502 C Aelitanus hardly expects the reasoning of Socrates to carry conviction to most of his hearers. But Socrates will not despair, believing that his words may perhaps bear fruit hereafter, if not here. As for the Multitude, their dissent is easily explained. They have heard enough of jingling rhetoric, but they have never yet seen a Philosopher-king, nor are they accustomed to discourses whose only aim is truth. Our perfect city is realized always and everywhere, wherever and whenever Philosophy sits on the throne. The Multitude will assent, if we approach them rightly; for their hatred is against the false philosophers, and not against the true. The lover of Truth is absorbed in contemplation of the changeless Realities, on the model of which he will frame human institutions, should he be called upon to enter public life. Point this out to the Many, and reason with them, and they will agree. Our proposals, though difficult, are not impossible.

20 ἀντιτίθεναι κτλ. I formerly read ἄντιτιθεν with Stephanus and others; but the present, which is in all the mss, gives a good sense and makes a better balance with λέγειν προθύμως. Translate ‘offer a still more enthusiastic opposition, being not in the least likely to agree.’ The majority of editors retain the present.

ἀπὸ Θρασυμᾶχου κτλ. Thrasymachus was not likely to agree with so fierce an onslaught on his profession: see 403 A ff., 495 C ff.

498 D 22 οὖν—δντας. Cf. 1

354 A n. 24 αὖδις γενόμενοι ‘born again’ implies the re-incarnation of the Soul, as described in the end of Book X; see on 608 D ff. It is from casual allusions like the present, made in all seriousness, that we can best understand how profound and practical was Plato’s belief in immortality. The seed sown here may bear its fruit in another life, so that the educator need not despair.

25 εἰς μικρὸν κτλ. is not merely ironical but incredulous. We need not therefore (with J. and C.) be surprised
Plato here alluding to epidemic harangues by sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias. *toua't* ἀττα ρήματα—expressions of this sort—refers to the jingle in γενήμενον—λεγόμενον, which is an example of the rhetorical device called παρομοίωσις: see Arist. *Rhet.* 111.9. 14.10a. 24 ff. παρομοίωσις δ' εάν ομοία τά ἔσχατα ἓκατερον τό κόλον, ἐγ. ἐν πλείστας δὲ φροντίδαι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίδια, and many other examples: see Cope ad loc. In εἰσεπτήσει—ώφοιομένα, assimilated to one another of set purpose, the same device is meant. Isocrates and his literary brethren employed it constantly: see the references on 493 ε. 

Although not sufficient for a complete reference to παρόμοιωσις (the equality of clauses, as for example in Isocr. *Paneg.* 76: see Cope l.c. p. 106) and παρομοίωσις. The Many have had quite enough of παρόμοιωσις etc. in words; but they have never seen a Man παρισιόμενος τῇ ἀρετῇ. Plato means that the time for mincing Rhetoric is past; we want a Man (ἀνδρα is emphatic), “with heart head hand, One still strong man in a blatant land, Who can rule, and dare not lie” (Tennyson). It is highly probable, as Dümmler holds (Chron. Beitr. p.14), that Plato has specially in view Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* throughout this passage. The contemptible devices which Plato here ridicules are extraordinarily common in that harangue. For other views of this passage see App. III. 

499 A 5 δόξαν is ‘seeming’, ‘appearance’ (τὸ ἀληθὲς above (Schneider): cf. 505 D. The rendering ‘appliance’ (D. and V.) or ‘fame’, is, I think, less likely to be right. For ἐρυγ. cf. V 454 A II.

499 Β 7 τότε, ὶ 473 D.

8 οὐτὲ—οὕτω—οὔτε ἑν is a common sequence where stress is laid on the last alternative: cf. 492 E and X 608 B. ὰδὲ γ’ ἀνὴρ = ‘no, nor yet an individual man’ is said because even the philosopher is not τέλος except in the philosopher’s city: cf. 497 A. ὰμολος means simply in
like manner, 'likewise,' and should not be construed with τέλος in the sense of 'equally perfect,' as J. and C. translate.

II ἀνάγκη—περιβάλλει. See e. n. παραβάλλειν means adderce (not, as has been asserted, accidere); cf. viii 556 c and Lyr. 109 B. The word is not however quite appropriate here: and I should much prefer a convincing emendation of the text of A, Π and other MSS (ἀνάγκη—περιβάλλει) As it stands, περιβάλλει must either be intransitive, or else the infinitive ἐπιμεληθῶνα serves as its object in place of an accusative. Neither view is supported by any evidence. I formerly conjectured ἀνάγκην τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλει 'until some one happens to compel these philosophers' etc., but τις ἀνάγκη—γέγονεν in c does not favour this remedy. It is perhaps safest to read παραβάλλει provisionally and pro tempore. With ἐκ τύχης cf. IX 592 A ἐὰν μὴ βεία τίς ἐξώμιζ τύχη and Ep. vii 327 E.

13 κατηκόρος. Schleiermacher's conjecture is accepted by Madvig, Bai tie, and J. and C. Stallbaum was inclined to read κατηκοῦς. If κατηκόρος is right, it must stand for κατηκόρος, the nominative being due to the interposition of εἰς βοῶντας κτλ. But the construction is difficult, and the sense unsatisfactory. We require some guarantee that the city will obey (cf. 502 B), and κατηκόρος is the only reading which provides it.

τῶν νῦν—ἐστιν. 'I do not doubt but that this was meant as a compliment and incitement to the younger Dionysius (see Plato Epist. 7, p. 327). And I understand what follows p. 502 in the same manner. Hence it seems that this part of the dialogue was written after his first voyage to Sicily, and probably not long before his second, about Ol. 101, 3, when the elder Dionysius was just dead' (Thomas Gray Works ed. Gosse iv p. 251). In the parallel passage v 473 D Plato speaks of kings and ὀδάστα, but not yet of kings' sons. The substance of Gray's conjecture is confirmed by recent criticism (see e.g. Hirmer Ents. u. Kompos. etc. p. 608): but Dionysius I died in Ol. 103, 2 (357 B.C.) and not in Ol. 101, 3 (374 B.C.), and Plato's second visit to Sicily seems to have taken place just after the old tyrant's death (Grote X pp. 346—356). See also on v 473 D, vi 496 B and Introd. § 4.

499 C 15 τούτων δὲ πότερα κτλ. Grote pronounces the Platonic commonwealth impossible because 'we cannot understand from whence the force is to come, tending and competent to generate' it at the first. Once begun, he lolls, 'there is no reason why it might not have continued.' That the real difficulty is in starting it, Plato himself clearly understands (cf. 501 A n.). He would not however allow that the difficulty is insurmountable; since a βεία τίς τύχη (IX 592 A) may well occur. But the true fulfilment of Plato's Ideal, as he himself foretells in IX 592 b, is to be sought, not in any single earthly commonwealth, but in its influence, direct and indirect, upon the moral, political, religious, and intellectual progress of mankind: see v 470 B n. and Zeller's dissertation on Der platonische Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit in his Vorträge und Abhandlungen 2 pp. 68 ff.

17 ἄλλως κτλ. For ἄλλως 'merely' cf. Theaet. 176 D γὰς ἄλλως άχθην. On εὑχαί see v 450 D n.


20 βαρβαρικῶν—ἐπόψεως. Cf. Phaed. 78 A. Touches of this kind are rare in Plato and generally full of pathos, as if the hope of mankind no longer lay in Hellas. The present sentence is a confession of the fact that the foundations of Plato's city are not laid in Hellenism, but in Humanity, understood as Plato himself understands the word in 501 B. See on V. 470 E.

499 D 22 ἐτοιμοὶ. The ellipse of the first person of the copula is rare, except when ἦν or ἦσις is expressed, but ἐτοιμος is a privileged word: cf. Parn. 137 B and other examples in Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 35.

23 αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα. Philosophy.

499 E 27 μὴ πάντων κτλ. Plato's attitude to oL πολλῶν (as Krohn remarks Pl. St. p. 118) has somewhat altered since 492 B ff., partly, perhaps, because his wrath has been diverted against the false philosophers. But this attempt to soothe the many-headed Beast should not be taken too seriously: see 501 E—502 A n.

28 ἀλλοίοι τοῦ κτλ. See App. IV. 500 A 2 ἡ καὶ κτλ. 'Or even if they view them in this light, will you deny that they will change their opinion?' Baiter's correction—see cr. n.—is, as I now think, the simplest, and best explains the corruption. I can see no ground for writing εάν οὖν αἴτηται or εάν τοῦτο αἴτηται with Richards. With ὁ φήσεις cf. VII 534 B. For other views on this passage see App. IV.

5 πράον is an allusion to the universally admitted πράος of the Athenian δόμος; see Arist. Ath. Pol. 22. 4 τῆς εἰλοθῆς τοῦ δῶμος πράος (where Sandys quotes Dem. Timocr. 51) with Isoc. Antid. 20, 300. Hence (as Schneider points out) δημοτικὸν τι καὶ πρᾶον in Euthyd. 303 D. Cf. also Soph. O. C. 1126 f.

6 ἐν ὀλίγοις τωσίν. Dümmler (Chr. Bchit. p. 45) thinks of Isocrates, but there is nothing to suggest a specific reference here.
οὕτω φύσιν γύρνεσθαι. Καὶ ἐγώ ἀμέλει, ἐφη, ἐμποτοῦμαι. 1 Οὐκοῦν B καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔξω οἰκεῖ, τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολιτούς διακείθη τις κύκλως αἴτιοις εἶναι τοὺς ἐξοθεῖν οὖ προσήκον 10 ἐπεισδεκωμακότας, λοιδορομένους τε αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχουσας καὶ αἱ πρὶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιομένους, ἥκεστα ἀρχαία φιλοσοφία πρέπον ποιοῦντα; Πολύ γ', ἐφη.

XIII. Ὁδὲ γὰρ ποὺ τοῦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοὺς οὕτως τὴν διάιδομαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων 15 πραγματείας καὶ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνον τε καὶ δυσμενείας C ἐμπιστεύονται, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αἱ ἐχοῦντα ὀρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὕτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὕτ' ἀδικοῦμεναι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μεμεισθαί τε καὶ οἱ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιούσθαι. η ὅσι τινὰ μεθηνὴν 20 εἶναι, ὅτι τις ὀμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μεμεισθαί ἐκεῖνο; Ἀδικατον., ἐφη. Θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὣς ἐγεῖ φιλόσοφος ὀμίλων κόσμιος τε καὶ D

17. ἀδικοῦμεναι Σ' γ': ἀδικοῦμενον ΑΠ' Ε': ἀδικοῦμενον Π'.
The individual is cleansed by the Socratic elenchus, which purges him of his false persuasion of knowledge: cf. Soph. 230 b—ε, where this kind of καθαρις is expounded in detail. Gildersleeve (A. J. Ph. III p. 201) points out that the 'articulate infinitive' with ἄν is rare in Plato.

5 γράφειν νόμοις: 'to paint or draft laws.' Richards is inclined to cancel μητε—νόμοισ as involving "a most awkward and inartistic confusion of the figure (painting) with the thing figured (legislation)." Nothing is more usual in Plato than such a 'confusion,' if the phrase employed bears, like γράφειν νόμοισ, or is capable of bearing, like ἀνθρώπος below, a meaning of its own as well as an application in the simile, and it is a narrow conception of art which pronounces the idiom inartistic. Cf. 507 A n. and Euthyph. 3 a with my note ad loc., and see also on 445 b. Cobet's ἀνθρώποι νόμοι, which Baiter adopts, is another unsuccessful attempt to obliterate this characteristic feature of Plato's style.

6 παραλαβεῖν καθαράν. Plato would cite as examples a tutor who is entrusted with the sole authority over a child, and legislators who (as in the Laws 701 b ff.) receive autocratic power in order to found a colony. Cf. 499 b n.
characters can be. For the σχήμα ἐκ παραλλήλου see Schanz, Nov. Comm. Pl. pp. 12—15. Schneider can hardly be right in connecting δ τι μάλιστα with ἀνθρώπεια. For ἔθοπλη Badham conjectured ἔθοπλοι—a most arbitrary change, though approved by Cobet and Baier. How could ἔθοπλοι have degenerated into ἔθθοπλη, which is in all the MSS? The opposite corruption was far more likely. Plato means us to understand that God loves those most who most resemble Him: cf. X 612 E. and Laws 716 C.

17 ἐφησθα. ν 474 A.
20 αὐτοῦ; viz. the statement ὁ τιοῦτος —αὐτοῖς with its interpretation in the preceding exposition.

501 D 27 φήσει. We should expect φῆσον, but the transition from plural to singular is common (see on 1 347 A), and Plato is probably thinking of the objector in 487 C (φησὶν ἀν τις κτλ.): cf. 489 D and 490 D. οὐκ ἀγαθὴν just above (instead of μὴ ἀγαθὴν as in μὴ τῶν φήσων) prepares the way for φῆσει, by shewing that the infinitives are begin-

ning to escape from the sway of ἄμφωσις· τῆσαν. φῆσει in φῆσει λογιζόμενος II 366 A furnishes an exact parallel to φήσει here. The best MSS—see cr. n.—read φήσεως, which is retained by Schneider and others. If φήσεως is right, we must either (1) refer it to ἔξους, and suppose that the future is “οὐ ἔσεσθαι ἵνα φᾶσιν receptum” (Schneider, Stallbaum), or (2) supply an ἔτει (J. and C.). Neither explanation is in my judgment possible. φήσεως, the reading of q and editors before Bekker, may be defended from 489 B and 489 D, where Adimantus is identified with the antagonist of 487 C, but the corruption is not a very likely one. Madvig, more suo, expels the word. Cf. Introd. § 5.

501 Eu 31 μὴ ἤπτεν. Herwerden would insert χαλέπους or τικροῦς, Richards ἄγρους or ἄγραυλοις. If ἤπτεν is pronounced with emphasis, its meaning is easily caught, after ἤπτεν in Adimantus’ reply. It is virtually a quotation: “wollen wir nicht statt dieses weniger” etc. (Schneider).
XIV. Οὔτοι μὲν τοῖς, ἣν δ′ ἐγὼ, τούτῳ τεπεισμένοι ἐστων· τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι
5 βασιλέων ἐκγονοὶ ὁ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; Οὐδὲ ἂν εἰς, ἐφι. Τοιούτων δὲ γενομένων ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθείρηι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπῶν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐξυγχω-
ροῦμεν: ὡς δὲ εὖ παντὶ τὰ 1 χρόνων τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ἂν Β
 eius σοβείη, ἐσθ’ ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσει; Καὶ πῶς; 'Αλλὰ μην, ἥν
10 δ’ ἐγὼ, εἰς ἰκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἐχων πειθομένην, πάντ’ ἐπιτε-
λέσαι τα νῦν ἀπιστοῦμεν. Ἰκανὸς γὰρ, ἐφι. 'Αρχοντος γάρ
ποι, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, τίθεντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἢ
dιελθήθαμεν, οὐ δήποτε ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας.
Οὐδὲ ὀπωσιότιοι. 'Αλλὰ δὴ ἄπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δοξαί καί ἄλλοις
15 βασιλεόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον; Οὐκ οἶμαι ἐγώγε, ἢ δ’ ὅς. Καὶ C
μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἰπτε δυνατά, ἰκανὸς ἂν τοῖς ἐμπροσθέν, ὡς
ἐγὼμαι, διηλθοῦμεν. Ἰκανὸς γὰρ. Νῦν δὴ, ὡς οὐκεν, ξυμβαινεί
ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἁρίστα μὲν εἶναι δ’ λέγομεν, εἰ γενόητο,
χαλεπά δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατα γε. Ξυμβαινεῖ γάρ, ἐφι.
20 XV. Οὔκουν ἐπειθῇ τούτῳ μόνης τέλος ἐσχεν, τὰ ἐπίλεγον δὴ
μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέων, τίνα 1 τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε D

9. ἀμφισβητήσεις γ’: ἀμφισβητήσεις ΑΞ: ἀμφισβητήσεως ΠII.

502 Α 3. τεπεισμένοι ἐστων. See on 499 E. Plato’s attempt to conciliate the Many is obviously half-hearted. The Multitude can never be philosophers (494 Α), and are not likely to believe in the Philosopher-king. But it was necessary to prove or postulate some degree of assent or at least quiescence on their part in order to demonstrate the possibility of the perfect city. Cf. 502 Α n.

4 τίς. τίς is read by A, but Adi- 

mantonus’s reply makes it probable that the indefinite pronoun is correct.

5 βασιλέων ἐκγονοι. See on 499 B.

502 Β 10 εἰς ἰκανὸς κτλ. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 125) justly sees in this sentence “an expression of the convictions which led Plato to Sicily” in 367 B.C. Cf. Grote Plato I p. 126 and supra 499 B n. Richards would read "<σως> γενέμενος or γενέμενος <τε καί σως γενε-

μενος> or something similar." "περι" γενεμενος would give the same sense, and be better Greek. "But γενεμενος = ει γέ-

νοητο, ‘should he arise,’ is sufficient. He could not be said to be ikanos if he were corrupted.

14 υπερ ημιν δοκει: i.e. the arrangements of Plato’s καλλιτολις, as J. and C. point out. A ruler may arise who will approve of these, and frame laws accord-

ingly. Plato is trying to prove that his ideal city is not impossible.

502 Β 19 ου μεντοι αδυνατα γε. ‘Not impossible’ is the final verdict which Plato’s readers, like Plato himself, will pass upon his city. His tone is far less hopeful than in Books 11—14, and even in v. 473 Β ff. he is, I think, more optimistic. It is impossible not to feel that 501 C—502 C is written, in some measure, ἵνα μινεται. Plato is glad to escape from so difficult and uncon-

genial a topic into his native element again. He is beginning to see that the Perfect City is in truth a παράδειγμα ἐν οὑροφι (IX 592 B). See on v. 470 E, vi 499 C, 499 E, 502 Α and VII 540 D—


502 Α—504 Α Our next duty is to
describe the Rulers and their position in our city. We have already seen that they must be patriotic; let us now add that they must be philosophers. Those who combine the peculiar features of the philosophical temperament are necessarily few, and they must be submitted to stringent intellectual as well as moral tests, to see whether they will be able to endure the greatest of all studies.

502 D 22 ἔνσονται. ἐγγενοῦσαίναι is conjectured by Richards, who compares 521 C and VIII 552 E, 557 C. The proposal is attractive, but involves too great a departure from the MSS. ἐνέσονται moreover is better suited to καὶ κατὰ τοια—ἀπτόμενοι than ἐγγενοῦσαίναι would be. τὸν τρόσον ἐνέσονται means, I think, not how they will be produced (that is expressed in ἐκ τινω—ἐπιτηδευμάτων), but how they will be in the city, i.e. the whole subject of their position and standing in the State. It is this, as well as their education, which is described in the sequel. The present sentence is intended as a full and accurate forecast of the rest of VI and VII. Ξ has ἐσόνται, which was read till Bekker restored ἔσονται.

24 οὖν ΚΤΛ. Cf. 497 C, D n. n. There, as here, the κατάστασις τῶν ἄρχων and the position of women and children etc. are treated as parts of one and the same question. The first obscure of this connexion is in IV 423 E, but it is not till V 471 C ff. that we begin to see the intimate relation between the two subjects. In V 450 C Socrates for the first time touches on the question 'Are our proposals about women' etc. possible?' The same question reappears in 471 C, but with a larger scope 'Is the perfect city possible as a whole?' The reply is 'Yes, if Philosophers are Kings'; and thus is re-opened the whole subject of the κατάστασις τῶν ἄρχων. Plato is therefore justified in connecting, as he does, the two topics here mentioned. But he overstates the case when he asserts that the κατάστασις τῶν ἄρχων has been omitted in Books III and IV (see III 412 B ff.), or slurred over in the same way as the Community of Wives and Children, in spite of various hints of a fuller treatment still to come (III 414 Α: cf. IV 442 C n.). See also on 503 A and Krohn Pl. St. p. 127, Pfeiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 28, with the replies of Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 49 and Westerwick de rep. Pl. comm. pp. 54 ff.

26 τὴν—κατάστασιν = the appointment of the Rulers' is equivalent, as in the title or heading of a chapter, to τὸ περὶ τῆς—κατάστασες. Of this subject the Rulers' education naturally forms the most important part; but we ought not to explain τῶν ἄρχων as brachyological for τῆς τῶν ἄρχων παιδείας (with Krohn Pl. St. p. 126).

27 παντελῶς ἀληθῆς. The adjective should be translated literally, so as to suggest that the best κατάστασις is also the truest. The ideal is the true in Plato: cf. V 473 A n.

502 E 29 τὸ δὲ—δὲ. Plato admits that the subject of the Rulers requires to be reinvestigated practically from the beginning. Their strictly intellectual needs have hitherto been almost ignored: see 497 C n. But Plato does not propose to supersede the earlier education in Music and Gymnastic, nor are the two schemes theoretically incompatible, as Krohn appears to hold (Pl. St. p. 127). We are clearly intended to suppose that the
Rulers receive the moral as well as the intellectual training, although in practice, no doubt, some modifications might be necessary, so long as the two proceeded simultaneously. See VII 336 D and II 376 E n.

30 ἐλέγομεν ἃ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, δειν αὐτοὺς φιλοτόλο|δάς τε 503 ἀφινεσθαι βασινιζόμενοι εἰ ἰδοναίς τε καὶ λύταις καὶ τὸ δόγμα τούτο μῆτ' ἐν πόνοις μῆτ' ἐν φόβοις μῆτ' ἐν ἀλλη μηδεμιᾷ μετα-βολῇ ἀφινεσθαι ἐκβιαλλοῦτας, ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν 5 δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκήρατον ἐκβιαίνοντα ύσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασιν-ζόμενοι στατέον ἀρχούτα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζωτὶ καὶ τελευτη-σαντι καὶ ἀθλα. τοιαύτ' ἅτα ἃ τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξεύοντο καὶ παρακαλυτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. 1 πεφοβημένου κινεῖτο τὸ ψόν παρόν. Β Ἀληθεύστατα, ἐφι, λέγεις; μέμνημαι γάρ. "Οἶκος γάρ, ἐφι, ὃ 10 φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπείν τὰ ψόν ἀποτετομμένα· νῦν δὲ τούτῳ μὲν τετομμημένοι εἰπείν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσοφοὺς δεῖ καθιστάναι. Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἐφι. Νόσησον δή, ὡς εἰκότος ὁ λόγος ἐσούνται σοι. ἢ γάρ δηλόθυμον φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταῦτο ἐξμυνθεῖν αὐτὴς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγμάκις ἑθελεί, τὰ πολλά δὲ διεστασμένη φύτει. 1 Πώς, ἐφι, λέγεις; Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες θ'.
The philosophic nature ought to be born whole.

503 C 15 ἐνυμαθείς κτλ. 'The faculty of learning easily, memory, sagacity, quickness, and so on, together with spirit and high-mindedness, are, as you know, not often naturally combined with the disposition to live soberly in quiet and stedfast ways,' etc. Plato means that natural intelligence and vivacity, with their accompaniments of spirit and highmindedness, rarely go with moral stedfastness. A good illustration is afforded by the contrast between 'the Athenian and the Spartan, the former 'neither resting themselves nor letting anyone else rest, the latter so slow that aggression can hardly rouse them to repel it' (Boeckh). Cf. Thucyd. i 70. For other views on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage see App. VI.

19 ὑπὸ ἄνευτης κτλ. Theaet. 144 A οἱ το ὕποα—καὶ ἄγχυοι καὶ μνήμους—ἄντοντες φέρονται ὡσπερ τὰ ἀνεμάδιστα πλοία.

20 τὸ βέβαια κτλ. Theaet. 144 B οἱ το ἐν ἐμβριθάστεροι νωθροὶ πως ἀπαν-πως πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέ-μοντες.

503 D 26 ἐφαμέν. 484 D—487 ἐφαμοτέρων is explained in 503 C n. 27 αὐτὸ is probably masculine (Schneider), in spite of αὐτῷ (the philosophic ἦδος) immediately following. We can hardly speak of assigning concrete τιμή or ἄρχη to an ἦδος. The pronoun refers to the philosophic guardian that is to be. See on δυνατή ἦσται 503 E.

503 E 29 ἐλέγομεν. 111 413 A ff. 32 δυνατή ἦσται: sc. ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. φύσις was last employed in 503 B, since it has been represented both by the individual and by the ἦδος (αὐτῷ and αὐτῷ in 503 D). We must bear in mind that the Greek inflexions of gender made it easier for them than it is for us to tolerate such irregularities. No Greek could possibly misunderstand the reference, as soon as he heard the ἦ of δυνατή. A tolerably close parallel will be found in Pla. 254 B (not D, as Stallbaum prints). See also 508 D and x 605 C mm. Bywater conjectures δυνατῆς, but δυνατῆς is unlikely to have been corrupted into δυνατὴ ἦσται.
en tois a'Olos apodeixontes. Přepeti ge tou ∆', efή, ou'to skopeiν. Alla tòa ðη λέγεις mathimata mégista;

XVI. Mhmponeueis meòn pou, ή'n ή'γων, òti treptta eídèn phvχής διαστηματεον ευνεβιβαζομεν δικαιοσύνης te ðepi kal sòfrosúnhs kal ándreias kal sòfias ή ekáston eìn. Mη γαιρ mhmponeuwn, efή, tā xostπa ðn eùn dhikaios mh' akouèν. 'H και τo prórrhθèn aútων;
'To παίon ði; 'Elégomèn pou, òti, ós meν dunameον ή'n kálllsta aútα κατιδειν, òllh makhrotéra eìn peýropoν, ή'n periēlōnτi kata-

2. a'Olos Orelli: a'Olos codd.

504 a 2 a'Olos. See cr. n. Orelli's emendation has met with considerable favour; but Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C. still retain a'Olos. With the ms reading we must, I think, translate 'in the other cases' i.e. in the πόνo et. spoken of just before. (If Plato merely meant 'in other kinds of effort' it was not worth his while to insert the clause at all.) But ωστηρ certainly suggests something more than a mere comparison between flinching at moral, and flinching at intellectual tests; and nothing could be more appropriate, or more in Plato's way, than an allusion to the games: see on v 465 d. That a'Olos in this sense is half-poetic, "occurring only in the Timaeus and the Laws" (J. and C.), is scarcely an objection in Plato. a'Olos also suits well with γυμάτειν. In [AxiocA.] 365 A occur the words ήs gαρ ágnavης δείλας, εν τοις γυμναςις γενναοις φαύλουας, áπαξέ-
loteησαν εν τοις a'Olos. The author of the AxiocA. may have been thinking of the present passage, and if so, he certainly read a'Olos. See also the fine anecdote in Plut. Them. 11. 3.

504 a—505 b. Adimantus enquires what these 'greatest studies' are. You will remember, says Socrates, that we described our earlier or psychological method of arriving at the Virtues as inadequate and incomplete. Our guardians must travel by a longer road, if they would reach their proper goal, i.e. the highest of all studies, which is something above and beyond even the virtues. And these very virtues must no longer be seen merely in outline; they must be studied in all their fulness and perfection. The highest study is the Idea of the Good, as Adimantus has often heard before. It is the knowledge of this Idea which alone renders all other knowledge useful and profitable.

504 a 5 διαστηματεον. IV 436 A ff. ευνεβιβαζομεν: 'we drew conclusions,' viz. in IV 441 c ff. The use of ευνεβιβαζεν as a synonym for συμπεραίνεωθαι, συλλο-
γεζεθαι, is common in Aristotle: for examples see Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v.

504 b 8 elégomèn. See IV 435 D n. ήν: "ut eūnθαι et similia dictum" (Schneider). There is no reason to eject the word (with Medvig) or to write eìn; why should not the mood of the oratio recta be retained? eìn would be unpleasing with eìn following so soon. Liebhold's ώs mēν δυνάτα ή is unclassical: see on i 349 c. Richards conjectures ώs μεν <ωs or δον or ελs τo δυνατον καλλιστα κτθ., taking ώs with κατιδειν. But we ought not to multiply instances of ώs for ωτε in Plato (Π 365 D n.). The infinitive means simply 'for describing,' 'in order to discern them in the best possible way'; see Goodwin NT. p. 308 and Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 586.

9 aútα is of course the four cardinal virtues, like ταῦτα in 504 D. The 'longer circuit' is the educational training necessary in order to enable the guardians to obtain scientific knowledge of the virtues by discerning their relation with the Idea of Good: cf. 506 A. In Book IV Justice, Temperance etc. were regarded as psychological qualities or relations; but the philosophic Guardians must learn their metaphysical import. Throughout the rest of VI and VII Plato, in short, discards Psychology for Metaphysics. Thus much is clear; but many difficult and interesting questions arise in connexion with this passage, as Krohn and others have pointed out. The μακροτέρα περιδος mentioned in IV 435 D appears to be a longer way of determining, not the essential nature of the virtues, but whether Soul has 'parts' or not. (A
solution of this difficulty is suggested on 435 D). Socrates' shorter road, again, is not a way by which the Guardians are to go, but a method employed by himself in studying primarily the Soul, and secondarily the virtues. Finally, what is the relation between the psychological conception of Virtue and the metaphysical? And does the metaphysical conception involve a revised psychology or not? The last question is touched on in the notes to X 611 B, where Plato himself appears to raise it. For the last but one see on 504 D.

10 ἐπομέναι: 'corresponding with,' 'on a level with' (Jowett) viz. in point of ἀκριβεία: cf. IV 435 D τῶν γε προερημένων τε καὶ προσεκεμένων ἑξίων, where see note. For the genitive with ἐπόμενοι cf. (with Stallbaum) Pol. 271 E and Latois 599 C (ὑπό σα τοῦτων ἐυπομενοῦ, according to the best MS). Bywater would read ἐγκαθέσας here and ἐγκαθέσαι in the Politicus, but it is safer to make no change, although the reverse corruption of ἐγκαθέσαι apparently occurs in Gorg. 494 k, if Bekker's restoration is correct.

504 C 14 ἀλλ' ὧν φίλε κτλ. Socrates σφηκτεῖται περὶ τὸ ὅνωμα (509 D)—plays on the etymological sense of μετρίως. In effect he says 'Don't say 'metrical': short measure in such cases is no measure at all: for—if 'Measure' be rightly understood—there can be no imperfect measure of anything.' Etymologically, for example, ἀτελές μέτρον ὅσον is a misnomer, for the measure must be exactly commensurate with the water. Hence the μέτρον τῶν ἀκριβέστατων must itself be ἀκριβέστατον (cf. 504 E). The essential perfection of μέτρον, τὸ μέτρον and the like is expounded in Pol. 284 A ff., Phil. 63 D ff. and 66 A; cf. also Latois 716 C ff., where we read that God, not Man, is the Measure of all things. The translation 'Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything' (Jowett and others) suggests, I think, a wrong idea, and is not so well adapted to μέτρον—γύρευται.

17 τοίνυν: with reference, perhaps, to Adimantus and the others (J. and C., comparing II 372 E. Cf. also v 495 E). Adimantus betrays no consciousness of the allusion in his reply.

504 D 22 ἤ = aliquin. Cf. v 463 D h. vūν δῆ. The reference (somewhat loose, as usual) is to 503 E.
25 διήλθομεν; Καὶ μείζων, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεὶ ὁσπερν ἡνθεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παρείναι. ή γὰρ γελοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἄξιοις πάντας ποιεῖν 1 συνεισφέρειν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἄκριβεστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα Ε ἐξεί, τὸν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἄξιον εἰναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; 30 Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. δ’ μέντοι μεγίστων μάθημα καὶ περὶ δ’ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἵεις τιν’ ἂν σε, ἔφη, ἀφείναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαστα τί ἐστιν; Οὐ πάνω, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλγάκεις, νῦν δὲ η οὐκ ἐννοεῖς η ἂν διανοεῖ εμοί πράγματα παρέχειν 505 ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ ὅτι η τοῦ

25: Τo διήλθομεν; Καὶ μείζων, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεὶ ὁσπερν ἡνθεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παρείναι. ή γὰρ γελοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἄξιοις πάντας ποιεῖν 1 συνεισφέρειν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἄκριβεστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα Ε ἐξεί, τὸν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἄξιον εἰναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; 30 Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. δ’ μέντοι μεγίστων μάθημα καὶ περὶ δ’ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἵεις τιν’ ἂν σε, ἔφη, ἀφείναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαστα τί ἐστιν; Οὐ πάνω, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλγάκεις, νῦν δὲ η οὐκ ἐννοεῖς η ἂν διανοεῖ εμοί πράγματα παρέχειν 505 ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ ὅτι η τοῦ

30: ἔφη Ast: ἔφη, ἔξων τὸ διανόημα codd.
Some account of the enormous literature of the subject will be found in Zeller\(^4\) II 1. pp. 709 ff., 718 n. 1. In addition to Stumpf's treatise to be presently named, I have found the monograph by Biehl *Die Idee des Guten bei Platon* Graz 1879 particularly good and useful. Other special treatises are also referred to in the course of the notes. The majority of interpreters are now agreed in identifying Plato's Idea of the Good with his philosophical conception of the Deity. The best and fullest proof of the identity is still, I think, Stumpf's exhaustive dissertation *Das Verhältniss des Platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten Halle* 1869. There is only one passage in his works where Platon himself appears expressly to identify the two, viz. *Phil.* 22 C, but on the principle that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, the identification is complete, and I have therefore thought myself at liberty throughout the notes occasionally to illustrate Plato's metaphysics by his theology.

3 *δίκαια καὶ τάλλα.* It is only by *κοινωνία* with the Idea of Good that *δίκαια*, καὶ ἄλτα become good i.e. useful and beneficial (synonyms of 'good'; see ν 457 B n.). Otherwise they are altogether useless. *δίκαια* does not of course mean the Idea of Justice, but τὰ τάλλα δίκαια in the widest sense of the term, including κάμμα πρὸς δίκαιον: see on ν 476 A, 476 C, 479 B. Baiter's δὴ καὶ for δίκαια καὶ occurs in one or two inferior miss, but is certainly wrong: see on 506 A.

6 *εἰ δὲ μὴ Τσμεν κτλ.:* 'and if we know it not, and should know all else excepting it never so well' etc. Cobet does ill to expunge *εἰ δὲ μὴ Τσμεν.* The repetition of *εἰ* before *προσταμεθα* is necessary because, while *Τσμεν* expresses a fact, *προσταμεθα* is only an improbable supposition: see next note. The sentiment is one of Plato's commonplace: see for example *Acl.* II 1.44 D ff. (where it is expanded in detail). 147 B, *Charm.* 173 A ff., *Euthyd.* 280 E ff., 289 A ff., 291, and cf. also *Lach.* 199 C, *Lys.* 219 B ff., *Phaed.* 69 B. Stumpf's *Das Verhältniss etc.* p. 87 n. compares also the language about the Gods in *Laws* 905 C. The *Euthydemus* and *Charmides* already forecast the city of the Philosopher-king, in which the Knowledge of Good shall 'sit alone in the helm of the state' (*Euthyd.* 291 B): see Noble *die Staatsthese Pl.* pp. 39–48.

8 *κεκτημένα.* To possess a thing *ἄνευ τοῦ ἄγαθος* is matter of common and daily occurrence; to know everything (except the Good) is not. Hence the indicative *κεκτημένα* is as appropriate now as the optative *προσταμεθα* was before. I formerly read *κεκτημένα* with II and the majority of editors, but now agree with Schneider that there is no reason to depart from the text of A.

505 B 9 *φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἄγαθος.* The last three words were suspected by Morgenstern and bracketed by Stallbaum and others. If we take these words (like *ἄνευ ταῦτης* above) with τάλλα, they are not superfluous; *'eo enim quod quis reliqua omnia excepto bono intelligit, efficitur ut nihil, quod pulchrum et bonum sit, intelligat* (Schneider). That some writers might have omitted the
phrase is no ground for interfering with Plato's characteristic fulness of expression.

505 B—506 A What then is the Good? The majority answer 'Pleasure,' others, who are more refined, 'Knowledge.' Neither of these views is tenable. Men are constantly disputing about the Good, but its existence is practically admitted by all, for it is the ultimate object of all endeavour. The Idea of the Good must be known by our Guardians; for unless they know the connexion between the Good, and particular instances of the just, the honourable etc., they cannot guard the latter, or even indeed be said to know them in any adequate measure.

12 tois mев поллнйς κτλ. We need not (with Tietzel Die id. d. Guten u. d. Gottesbegriff p. 9) find in this an allusion to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. Plato means what he says and no more. Pleasure is always the sumnum bonum of the Many: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1093 b 16. In tois κοµστότροις Dümmler (Antisth. p. 43) and others have recognised Antisthenes: cf. RP 2 218 B n. b. Hermann (Gesch. u. System p. 329 n. 323) interprets the words—more correctly, I think—of Socrates (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 5. 6) and his immediate followers, Antisthenes included. The Megarians sometimes held the same view (D. L. II 166). See also next note.

505 C 19 ἴταδαν κτλ.: "when they utter the mysterious word 'good'." For φθέγγεσθαι of a high-sounding, oracular, impressive utterance cf. VII 527 A, VIII 568 A, Prot. 342 E, Phaedr. 238 D, Ar. Clouds 315. Plato's criticism applies to himself, in common with the other pupils of Socrates, and was doubtless intended to do so. He constantly declares that 'knowledge of the good' is the all-important possession for man: see on εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσιμον 505 A. The present discussion removes the petitio principii by explaining what the ἱδα τοῦ ἄγαθον really means.

21 εἰ οὐ καλ οὔτοι κτλ. This is exactly what happens to Calliecs in Gorg. 495 A—499 C. If Plato is referring to any dialogue at all, the Gorgias i.e. illustrates his point much better than the Philebus (13 A—C), to which Zeller 4 II 1. p. 548, Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 192, and others of the older generation of scholars suppose that Plato is alluding. But there is nothing to suggest any cross-reference at all. On the question whether the Philebus is or is not prior to the Republic see Jackson in J. Ph. xxv pp. 65—82.

505 D 25 τόλεο οὐ φανερόν κτλ. The contrast is between δίκαια, καλά on the one hand, and ἄγαθα or ὀβέλια (V 457 B n.) on the other. All men desire the reality of good (cf. IV 438 A n.), but many are content with the semblance of honour. Cobet expunges τα δοκοῦντα, and kal before dőkein, thereby leaving a very crabbed piece of Greek. Ast's kal dőkein for kal dőkein is on a higher plane of criticism. The text is nevertheless sound. dőkein 'to seem' is used absolutely, as in II 361 B.
and prepares the way for δίκαιον 'seeming' (cf. 499 A) below. So also Schneider and Stallbaum understand the passage. For ἐτι and ὄντος see on ΙΙΙI 412 B.

29 ὅτι διώκει κτλ. With δ followed by τούτον cf. ΙΙI 357 B n. Cobet's ὅτι for τούτον is an unlucky venture. Stumpf justly observes that the Idea of Good is here regarded as the final cause: cf. Phaed. 98 B ff. and Phil. 20 D, 54 C. For a striking theological presentation of the same view see Λατος 715 E ff. and 903 B—D. Plato's ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ laid 'the foundations of the teleological view of the world' (Krohn Ph. St. p. 131).


32 διὰ τοῦτο κτλ. See 505 A n.

506 A 1 καὶ ἐκείνους: i.e. as well as ὁ πολλῷ. For καὶ cf. VII 519 B.

3 οἶδας γοῦν κτλ. No one who does not know the ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ can possibly know in what respect or how far particular δίκαια (such as, for example, a particular νόμων, περί δίκαιον: see V 479 D n.) are good, because it is the ἐπουροχθία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in them which makes them good (505 A n.). And no one who is ignorant ὅτι ποτὲ ἀγάθα ἠστιν can possibly defend δίκαια (such as for example the δίκαια ἐπιστήμουs of Plato's city), because he is at the mercy of anyone who attempts to shew that they are bad. Nor, until we know how far particular δίκαια are good (πρότερον), can we adequately know these δίκαια themselves, i.e. know which of these really is δίκαιον and which not, for we do not know how they stand in relation to the ultimate source of all justice, viz. the Idea of the Good. It is this which, in the last resort, is the true 'measure of all things' (Λατως 716 C ff., where Plato employs the language of theology). Hence the supreme necessity for our Guardians to know the ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Bekker first restored the true reading of this passage, which had been strangely mutilated in earlier editions. Stallbaum reads μηδὲν τούτων:—ἐνα with γ, but instances of the future with ἐν—see on 492 C—should not be willfully multiplied.

506 B 8 τούτων: i.e. τὰ δίκαια τὲ καὶ καλὰ, ὅτι ποτὲ ἀγάθα ἠστιν.

506 B—508 B After some hesitation, Socrates undertakes to describe the Idea of Good, not as it is in itself, but through its image, analogue, or offspring.

Let me remind you (he proceeds) of our
XVIII. Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὁ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῆς εἶναι, ἢ ἱδονήν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὔτος, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανῆς ὅτι σοὶ οὐκ ἀποχρῆσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον μοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἐξερχόμενοι εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ μη, τοσοῦτον χρόνων περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον. Τί δὲ; ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ· ἕκαστος τινὶ τις μὴ σεισθῆναι λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; Οὐδεμιᾶς γ', ἐφη, ὃς εἰδότα, ὃς μὲντοι οἴμονεν ταῦτα ά ὀκεῖται ἐθελεῖν λέγειν. Τί δὲ; εἰπον οὖν ὑσθησαι τὰς ἅπας ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὃν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί: ἢ δοκοῦσί τι σοι τυφλῶν διάφερείς οὐδὲν ὅρθας πορευομένων οἱ ἅπας τού ἄλληθες τι δοξίζοντες; Οὔτεν, ἐφη. Βούλει σὺν ἀισχρᾷ θείασασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολία, ἐξων ἐπὶ παρ' D.


 Plato frequently feigns ignorance and self-distrust in order to emphasize some great principle of whose truth he is himself profoundly convinced: cf. ν 450 D. The notion that he really lays claim only to δόξα or even ὅρθα δόξα of the Good is hardly to be entertained, although he does not claim to have perfect knowledge: to that we may, perchance, attim hereafter. See 505 A n.

19. ἢ δοκοῦσι τί σοι κτλ. On ὅρθη δόξα see Men. 97 A—98 Α, Theaet. 201 C, Tim. 51 D, E. Correct opinion believes, but does not know, and is therefore blind and insecure. Its ethical correlate is πολιτικήν ὄρθον ἀρετήν: cf. 500 D and IV 430 C HN. See in general Zeller4 11 i. pp. 588 ff.

21. σκολία = 'crooked,' 'awry' is objected to by Hermann on the ground that ὅρθα δόξαι may be blind, but cannot be 'crooked.' This is true, but αἱ ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμης δόξαι may be both blind and awry; and αἰσχρά, which looks back to αἰσχράλ, shews that it is not correct opinions, but opinions without knowledge generally, which are described in τυφλα—σκολία. Socrates' mock humility will not pretend to more than δόξα, let alone ὅρθη δόξα. If you wish for 'science,' go to your sophistical rhetoricians, forsooth, and 'hear things bright and beautiful,' φανά τε καὶ καλὰ may be an allusion to the 'lumina orationis' of Isocrates and his friends: see 498 B n. σκότα, which Hermann conjectures, is apparently not used by Plato.
506 D 23 ὠσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὤν: not 'just as you are reaching the goal' (Jowett), but 'as if you were at the end.' Jowett practically omits ὠσπερ in his translation.

506 E 29 ὀρμήν. The idea is as of a start or impulse which enables one to clear the obstacles in the way: cf. v 451 C. 30 τὰ νῦν should be taken with ἐφικέσθαι. If we take it with δοκοῦντος, we must suppose that Socrates intends to suggest that his view of the matter may change (so D. and V.). He is hardly likely to have made such a suggestion, even ironically. ἔσομεν τὸ νῦν ἔσται is also in favour of connecting τὰ νῦν with ἐφικέσθαι. Cf. Tim. 48 C f. θὴν μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἄπαντων ἐτελεῖ ἄρχειν ἐτελεῖ ἄρχας—τὸ νῦν ὅποι μητρὶ, δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν παρὸντα πρῶτον τῆς διεξόδου δηλώσαι τὰ δοκοῦσα κτλ. The emphasis on τὸ νῦν ἔσται and τὰ νῦν seems to hint that a description of the ἁγαθὸν, as it is in itself, may be expected on some future occasion. But there is no dialogue in which the Idea of Good is so clearly described as in the Republic, and it is not without reason that every historian of Philosophy regards this passage as the locus classicus on the subject. O. Schneider (Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἡγαθὸν p. 15) thinks of the Philèbos; Sussemihl (Gen. Entw. 11 p. 193) of the Φιλόδοφος, which was perhaps planned, but probably never executed (see on 484 A). The Philèbos is unsuitable; and of the Φιλόδοφος we know nothing. I am inclined to think—in view especially of Βουλομένων ἀν κτλ. below—that, although Plato may have cherished the idea of describing the Good without the aid of a simile—ἐἰδὸς αὐτῶν δὲ αὐτῶν—he never, at all events in any of his dialogues, did so. In a certain sense, perhaps, the Timæus describes the Good (see Archer-Hind's edition p. 27), but even there, we study the 'Father of all' not in himself so much as in his works. I agree with Stumpf's conclusion (l.c. p. 75) that Plato could hardly have depicted the Idea of Good at all except by means of a comparison. Certainly nothing else could have made it equally clear; and, in point of fact, 'es wird nirgends Mehr gegeben' (Stumpf, l.c. p. 59 n.). See also next note.

ὁς δὲ ἐκγενος κτλ. The ἐκγενος is the Sun, as presently appears. Socrates' procedure in Phæd. 99 C—E is in some respects like his procedure here. A nearer parallel is Phædr. 246 A, where, before describing the soul, Socrates observes ὅτι μὲν ἐστὶ, πάντῃ πάντως θελεῖ ἐστι καὶ μακρὰς διέγερσες, ὅ δὲ έικόνει, ἀφρατήτης τε καὶ ἔλαττων. The Idea of Good, like the Soul, is best described by one man to another in a figure. On ἐισάθυσι see last note and IV 430 C n.

507 Α 2 τῶν τόκων. The comparison, which is already suggested in ἀποτείχεις, ἀποδουῖται ('pay' as well as 'render'), and κοιμᾶσθαι, culminates in the word τόκος ('interest' and 'offspring'). See on γράφειν νόμους 501 A and (for a
similar play on τόκος) cf. viii 555 E and Ar. Thesm. 842—845. κίβδηλον below is a metaphor from counterfeit coinage.

6 διομολογοσάμενός γε. γε (‘yes,’ ‘not until’; cf. with Schneider Phaed. 228 D δείξας γε πρῶτον κτλ.) was restored by Bekker from the best MSS. Stephanus (with Σ etc.) read δέ.

7 ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν. Cf. v 475 E n. 507 B 9 εἶναι is not of course used in its technical sense, otherwise it would be inconsistent with the end of Book Β. Socrates means only that the Platonic distinctions lie between two categories—τὰ πολλά and the Ideas.

10 καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ κτλ. The literal meaning of the text above printed is as follows: ‘So likewise a Beautiful itself, and a Good itself and similarly about all which we formerly took (or ‘postulated’) ‘as many: reversing our procedure (πάλιν εὖδ.) we postulate also one Idea of each, believing that there is but one, and call it the essential so-and-so.’ καὶ—ἐπίθεμεν is best explained as still under the influence of φαίνω—λόγῳ. τότε (as Schneider observes) refers ‘ad eundem, quae modo facta est, multorum commemorationem’: cf. 510 B. Stallbaum is mistaken in supposing that the allusion is to v 475 E ff. Plato’s meaning will appear from a single example. We postulate both πολλά δικαία and also ἐν δικαίων, viz. the Idea μᾶ δικαίων, and we call the latter δ ἐστιν δικαίων: cf. Phaed. 75 B τοῦ δ ἐστιν λογος, Symp. 211 C and elsewhere. We postulate only one ἴδεα δικαίων, because we believe that there is but one: see x 597 C, D, where Plato shews why there cannot be more. For αὐτῷ used of the Ideas, see on iv 438 B, 438 C and v 476 A n. Instead of καὶ ἴδεα, the MSS—see cr. n.—read καὶ ἴδεα (κατιδεάν Vind. Π.). For the interchange of καὶ and κατά see Schaefer’s Grig. Cor. p. 234 n. 26. An unduly sloping accent is enough to account for the corruption of ΚΑΙΔΕΑΝ into ΚΑΤΙΔΕΑΝ (as in uncial MSS it would be written: see Thompson Gk. Palaeogr. p. 127). See also my article in Cf. Rev. XIII p. 100. Other views on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage are discussed in App. VII.

507 C 17 ἄρ ὄνω κτλ. On the unique position of Sicht among the senses see Phaedr. 230 D and Bonitz on Arist. Met. 1. 98α 23: cf. also Phaed. 65 B, Tim. 47 A ff., Hippi. Maior 397 ε ff. It is the costliest (πολυτελεστάτην) because it requires an additional precious or valuable element (μὴ ἄτιμον 508 A) beyond what is necessary for the operation of the others, viz. Light: cf. Tim. 45 C, D and Arist. de An. 11 Π 418 B 2 ff.
20 ἐστὶν ὁ τι κτλ. Steinhardt (p. 689 n. 213) and others remark on Plato's error in denying that a medium is necessary in Hearing etc. Aristotle was well aware of this fact (see his de An. II 7, 410b 25 ff.), and there are several indications that it was not altogether unknown to Plato. In Tim. 67 b, for example, air is regarded as in a certain sense the medium of sound. Here, however, where a scientific analysis of perception is not proposed, Plato takes his stand upon the broad fact of experience, that whereas we can hear, touch, etc. either in light or in darkness, we can see only where there is light.

507 Δ 23 οὐδὲ ἄλλας πολλάς.
'Non alďhšsει supplemendum est, quippe quae non amplius tres supersint, sed δῦνα-

508 έ τινος—τοῦτον: The genitive has been variously explained as (1) dependent on γένος (Schneider), (2) in agreement with παραγενομένον understood (Stallbaum, Campbell), (3) like ιπτων in τί δὲ ιπτων οἰείν; V 459 b (Jowett). (2) is in my opinion grammatically impossible. For (3) cf. V 450 a. Jowett's view is perhaps possible, but we should have expected simply τί δὴ λέγεις—τοῦτο; Schneider's explanation ('Pray what is this whose γένος you mention?') is, I think, the least unsatisfactory. Perhaps we should read δὲὶν for δὴ.

δ  δὴ αὐτός καὶ. Herwerden needlessly writes δὴ καὶ αὐτός καὶ. 31 οὐ εἰμικρά κτλ. ἰδία, 'kind,' class.' is here a synonym for γένος as in Thetæ. 184 D, Pol. 289 b. The dative expresses the 'amount of difference' after the comparative timiōtērō ('more precious'; cf. πολυτελεστάτην in 507 c). Cf. II 373 e and IX 579 c τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς πλεῖω καρποῦται with note ad loc.
XIX. *Tina oyn exeis aitiantasai twn ev ouranwv theon toutou 5 kyrion, ou *heian to fivos *nyin te poiei oran *ti kallistao kai *ta oromvna orasthai; "Oupeter kai su, *epi, kai oi allogoi *ton *nylou gar *nymovs oti *erwtns. *Ar *oun odee *pervkev *nypses pro *touwn *ton theon; *Pois; *Ouk *estian *nylou *nypses ouste auti ouv *en o *egygnetai, do *di *kalovmein 1 *nymia. Ou gar *oun. *Alh *nyloeidest- B 10 *taton *ge *nymia *twn periw *tas aiathtseis *urgawnov. *Poio *ye. *Oukouv *kai *twn *nymiou, *hen *exeis, *ek *tou *tou *tau *nu *nylou *epirruto *kekptita; *Panv *mven *oun. *Ar *oun ou *kal *o *nylou *nypses *mivn *ouk *estiw, aitios 2 *on *auti *noryai *utp *auti *tauth; *Ouvn, *n *nys. *Tou *nynovn, *hyn *n *nuy, *farena *me *legeten *ton *tou

508 A 4 *tou *en *ouranwv *theon: the heavenly constellations, which form the *ouranwv *theon *gygos (*Tim, 40 a). Plato's description of the sun is instinct with religious feeling. The 'clear god and patron of all light, From whom each lamp and shining star doth borrow The Beauteous influence which makes him bright' claims adoration from Plato not merely as an *ouranwv *theo, like the other stars, but as the symbol and scion (*ekyano) of the Supreme Idea or God. Cf. Bonitz Disp. Plat. dion. p. 6 n. 3, and especially Paul Shorey in Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. Vol. 1 pp. 224 ff. The sun-worship of some of the Neo-Platonists was inspired in no small measure by this passage of the Republic; see in particular Julian's 'Address to the Sovereign Sun' (eis *ton *bashial *hynov) Or. IV. Cf. 508 D n.

508 B 9 *nyloeidetanv. The Eye is the Body's Sun: cf. Ar. Theamn. 16, 17 *fi *mun *blepete *chri *pro *epi *nyh *nykato | *ourbalov *autimvnon *hynov *trwcs. A similar idea appears in St Mat, 6. 22 *el *nupov *tou *souvatov *etaiv *o *ourbalov. Conversely, the Sun is often in Greek poetry called the Eye of the World or of Day, and Shakespeare invokes the Sun in the words 'O eye of Eyes!' (Rape of Lucrece): cf. also Milton Par. Lost v 171 'Thou Sun! of this great world both eye and soul.' Both comparisons rest ultimately on the favourite Greek idea of the Universe as the Microcosm, and Man as the Microcosm. See on this subject Zeller II 2 p. 438, III 2 pp. 136, 397 n., and Stein Psych. d. Stoa I pp. 205—214. 11 *ouiouv *ktla. Pindar Fr. 107 (Bergk) expresses the same idea in the language of poetry: 'Aktis *delouv, ti *poulkovo *epysa, *bivov *matet *dymvaton. *Tyn *nymianwv *is of course *tyn *nymianwv *tou *orvan, *the power of seeing.' The translation 'faculty' (D. and V.) for *nymianwv is incorrect; for the faculty of *hys is supposed to be present in the eyes even when there is no light (507 D). But the eye has no 'power' to see, i.e. cannot exercise the faculty of *hys unless such a power is constantly dispensed (taumeunymyn) to it from the Sun. Cf. Biehl die Id. d. Guten p. 52, where the same view is taken. The word 'epirrutos' ('flowing over,' 'overflowing it,' cf. Tim. 80 D) as well as taumeunymyn unmistakably points the allusion to Light. See also on *nymwv *mven *ktla. and *tou *tou *tou *ktla. in 508 D.

508 B—509 A So much for our similitude. The interpretation is as follows. The offspring and image of the Good is the Sun, whose relation to Sight and its objects is the same as that of the Good to Thought (ovos) and the objects of Thought. The analogue of Light is Truth; as we cannot see without Light, so, where Truth is absent, we cannot know. The Idea of the Good is the source of Truth and Knowledge, although itself apprehended by Knowledge. As Light and Sight resemble the Sun, so Truth and Knowledge resemble the Good, but the Good is not identical with either, for it transcends both.

14 *favan. Cf. 473 A n.
The Greek word for 'light' is ἀρκέας, which should be understood in its strict sense of proportion or 'geometrical equality'; see Gorg. 508 a ἑλικών ἡ γεωμετρική καὶ ἐν θεοῖ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. 16 τοῦτον after τοῦτο is needed to balance αὐτῷ (cf. 311 E): in construction, it depends, like ὄν, on ἐγένετο (Schneider). τοῦτο itself, like ἀνάλογον ἐαυτῷ, is predicative ('ut hoc esset'). Stallbaum erroneously supplies φάνει μὲνε τονα γε τοῦτον.

19 ἄν ἄν—ἐπίχει. ἐπίχει 'occupat' as in the Homeric ἔπα τα ́δ' ἐπίστευσε πελεθρα and the like. With ἐπί of light cf. Mimm. 2. 8 ἐπὶ γῆν κύδνατα ἄρτος. The Greek will not admit of D. and V.'s translation 'upon which the light of day is shedding colour'; and Plato moreover, both here and in Tim. 67 c, looks on Colour as something inherent in the Object, not imparted by Light, although Light is of course necessary in order to see. Cf. 507 d n.

φῶς—φῶτον. 'lux—lumina.' The words are constantly interchanged, but, when contradicted with φῶς, φῶς denotes a natural or primary, φῶτον an artificial or derivative light. See Neil on Ar. Knights 1319. Plato knew that the Moon's light is borrowed from the Sun (x 616 ε). 22 ἄν ὁ ἄρτος κτλ. 'The Sun.' is here said loosely for 'the Sunlight' or 'light of Day' (τὸ ἡμιρυν ὁδόν above); for, as appears from 508 e, 508 a, it is not the Sun, but Light, which is to be equated with Truth and Being (ἐν κατὰλαμπει ἀλλ' εἰδα καὶ τὸ ὁν ἐν δ). See also on τοῦτο τοῖς κτλ. in 508 d. Instead of κατάλαμπε, καταλαμπτυς is read by a majority of editors, with several MSS, including Σ: but ὃς for δο ἐν is, to say the least, extremely rare in prose, and the corruption καταλαμπτυς was easy after ὃν. καταλάμπτει was, if I mistake not, originally the reading of A (see cr. n.), and is at least as well supported by the other MSS as καταλάμπτυς. J. and C., reading καταλαμπτυς, strangely observe that 'ἄν would be felt as superfluous after ὃν.' 508 D 23 ἑπέσπευσα φανερα: sc. καθαρὰ δύνας, supplied from καθαρὰς ὀψεως above. ᾧ ὃν ἄρτος <σαφής> lubens suppleverim' says Herwerden, and ὄψεων is found in a few MSS, including G. But the feminine inflexion prevents the possibility of mistake: cf. 503 e n. The initial syllable of ἑπέσπευσα should be emphasized to point the contrast with ὃν ἑπέσπευσα, where ὃν is also emphatic. 24 ὅταν μὲν κτλ. ἀπερεπηλάται = 'is stayed upon' (cf. IX 581 Α), not 'has fastened upon' (D. and V.), which suggests an altogether different and much less appropriate idea. Cf. Phaed. 79 D πέντε τῶν πλάνων, Plut. XX 4 Kirchhoff πάνσα αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀδιάλειπτον πλάνης ἐνδοπήν τὸ ὑνιάται, and Dante Parad. 4. 134, 125 Io veggio ben che gli immagini non si sazio Nostro intelletto, se l'ver non lo illustra. The soul can find no rest except in that 'whereon Truth and Being shine': elsewhere she is tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine (ἀνω—μεταβάλλων. For ἄνω καὶ κάτω see Heindorf on Gorg. 495 Α). Instead of ὃς, van Heusde proposes ὃ, but ὃ is proved correct by ὃν above. With ἑπέσπευσα τε καὶ ὑπερήφανος cf. 490 b n. Here, as there, the aorists
denote instantaneous action. The faculty of 
νοῦς is suddenly actualized into νοσίς 
by being turned upon its proper object. 
Then and not till then does the Soul 
appear to have reason," for Reason has 
hitherto lain dormant within. Cf. (with 
Biehl l.c. p. 51) Tim. 37 c, Parm. 136 E 
and VII 518 c—519 A. See also on τόπτο 
τοίνυν κτλ. below, and 508 n. 
26 κεκρυμένον. The suggestion ke-
κρυμένον forgets that τὸ γνωμένον 
is not total darkness but only twilight. 
It is αμφότερον μετέχον, τὸν εἶναι τα 
καὶ μη εἶναι [v 478 E: cf. also 479 c]—a half-
way house between absolute Not-Being 
and absolute Being. 
27 δοξάζει is explained by v 476 D ff. 
29 τόπτο τοίνυν κτλ. The following 
equations are involved: 

tόπος ὑπάτος = τὸπος νοσίς. 
(1) Sun = Idea of Good. 
(2) Light = Truth. 
(3) Objects of 
Sight 
(Colours) = Objects of Know-
ledge (Ideas). 
(4) Seeing Sub-
ject = Knowing Subject. 
(5) Organ of 
Sight 
(Eye) = Organ of Know-
ledge (νοσίς). 
(6) Faculty of 
Sight 
(ἐννει) = Faculty of Reason 
(νοσί). 
(7) Exercise of 
Sight 
(ἐννει, 
ἐνία) = Exercise of Reason 
(νοσί i.e. νοσίς, 
γνώσεις, ἐπιστή-
μα). 
(8) Ability to 
see = Ability to know. 

With regard to (2), Light has been 
variously interpreted as symbolizing the 
Idea of Good (Plotinus, as appears from 
xxii 14), Reason (Steinhart, Einleitung 
pp. 212 ff.), and the Ideas (Susemihl 
Gen. Entw. II pp. 195 ff.). But the 
chiasmus in 508 F, 508 Α (ἐπιστήμην— 
ἐφό) clearly establishes equation (2) as 
well as (6), and the entire simile is 
plunged in confusion if Light is equated 
with anything except Truth. Cf. Stumpf 
l.c. p. 60 nn. and Biehl l.c. pp. 50—53. 
Plato means that as Light, coming from 
the Sun, enables colours to be seen, and 
the faculty of Sight to see, so Truth (or 
rather Trueness, as Bosanquet remarks), 
coming from the Good, enables the Ideas 
to be known, and the faculty of νοσίς to 
know. It should be carefully noted that 
Truth (or its source, the Idea of Good) 
is not yet regarded as creating, but only 
as actualizing the faculty of Reason. 
The conception of the Good as the 
ultimate cause of all Existence follows later 
(209 B ff.): here it is represented only 
as the cause of Knowledge. See also on 
490 B, 508 D (ὅταν μὲν κτλ.). If we 
would grasp the full significance of 
Plato's comparison, we must not be 
content with the merely philosophical inter-
pretation of Light, but remember also 
the many poetical and religious associa-
tions which attached themselves to such 
words as φῶς and φήγος, especially in 
the Mysteries: see Neil on Ar. Knights 
1319, Monnissen Festes d. Stadt Athen pp. 
229 f., 238 f. and Hatch on The influence 
of the Mysteries upon Christian usages 
in his Hibbert Lectures pp. 283—309. 
The prominent position occupied by Light 
in the half-religious, half-philosophical 
teaching of Plotinus (see Zeller a 111 2 pp. 
498 f., 500 Α, 2, 616 al.) may to a large 
extent be attributed to the elaboration and 
expansion of the mystical elements in-
volved in Plato's simile, the whole of 
which, together with the similes of the 
Line and the Cave, is of the greatest 
importance for the history of Neopla-
tonism. Cf. also 508 Α, 2 Β. 
508 Ε 30 τὴν δύναμιν ζε. τοῦ γνω-
σίου is not the faculty of Knowledge or 
Reason, but the power to exercise that 
faculty, hardly different, indeed, from the 
actual exercise of Reason ("die That-
kräftige Aeusserung,' Biehl l.c.). Hence 
γνώσεως (the exercise of knowledge,' cf. 
ἐπιστήμην, νοσίς and the like) below. Plato's
exposition suffers somewhat from the want of a strict philosophical nomenclature. Aristotle would have expressed the same meaning by saying that *όμη* and *νούς* are two *δύναμεις*, which *ένεργον* through Light and Truth respectively, becoming in the one case *όρασις*, in the other *νόησις*. Plato's *δύναμιν*, in fact, is nearly equivalent to Aristotle's *τὸν ἐνέργειαν*. Cf. Biehl l.c. pp. 50–53.

31. *αἰτίαν κτλ.* 'And being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, I would have you conceive of it as apprehended, no doubt, by Knowledge, but beautiful as is the act of Knowledge, and beautiful though Truth be, you will be right in thinking that it is something other and even more beautiful than these.' The words *αἰτίαν—ἀληθείας* sum up and carry on to—*ἀποθέων*. ως *γνωσκομένης* is in predicative agreement with *αἰτίαν* after *διανοια* (cf. Ps. 258 C πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ώσ εἰσα γίναι εἰς τὸν ἐνεργοῦς): the words are the counterpart of *δ ὁλοκληρώμα* ως ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (Sc. τῇ δύναμι); in the simile 508 B. μὲν *ἀποθέων*—*διανοια* *γνωσκομένης* balances δὲ after *ἀποθέων*; though apprehended by Knowledge, and therefore in some sense subject thereto, the Idea of Good is (as being the cause of both) more beautiful than Knowledge and Truth. I have (with van Heusde) altered *γνωσκομένης* of the best ms—see cr. n.—to *γνωσκομένην*. On other interpretations of this difficult passage see App. IX.

509 A 5 τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐξίων: i.q. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ώς ἔξει (J. and C.).

6 ,event 509 B. is said in view of the question in 506 B. There is certainly no allusion to the Philothesis: see 505 C n.

509 A—C In the second place the Sun also provides the objects of sight with generation (γένεσιν), increase, and nutriment, although generation is not identical with the Sun. In like manner, the objects of Knowledge receive their Being and Existence from the Good, which is itself distinct from and higher than Existence.

509 B ff. 8 τὸν ἡλίουν κτλ. The Good has been shown to be the cause of Knowledge: Socrates now proceeds to show that it is also the cause of Being. In the philosophy of Plato, Knowledge is the epistemological counterpart of Being. Being the ontological counterpart of Knowledge: see V. 476 ff. 111. The final unity in which both Knowledge and Being meet is the Idea of the Good, which is therefore the supreme and ultimate cause of the Universe. See also on ὁκ ὁνάσια κτλ. below and the Appendix to Book VII of Plato's Dialectic.
μόνον τὸ γεγονόςκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ ἔτι οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἔκεινον αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ` ἐτί ἐπέκειναι τῆς οὐσίας προσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχουσον:

XX. Ἡ Γλαύκων καὶ θελοῖς, ἀπολλόν, ἐφι, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς. Σὺ γὰρ, ἂν δ' ἕγω, αἰτίως, ἀναγκάζων τα ἐμοί δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμοῦς γ', ἐφι, παύση, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ

18. ἀλλὰ ἢ φαν. Β 473 A B.


13 οὔκ οὔσιας κτλ. has occasioned a vast amount of discussion. Kroll boldly declares that: 'Die Idee τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ist keine Idee, denn sie hat keine οὐσία, sondern es ist eine Macht, die mit unserer Denkenweise nur als die Gottheit begriffen werden kann' (Pl. St. p. 146). Fouillée La Philosophie de Platon II p. 119 draws an over-subtle distinction between εἶναι καὶ οὐσία, holding that although the Good is not οὐσία, it nevertheless is ἐν (cf. VII 518 c). Others have suspected the text, O. Schneider, for example, proposing οὐ <δύπον> οὐσίας κτλ. (Vergsch er einer genet. Ende d. Plat. ἀγαθοῦ p. 16). That the text is right, the balance with οὐ γένεσας—ἐντα conclusively shews. The Sun, said Socrates, is the cause of γένεσας, though not himself γένεσας. Just so the Good is the cause of οὐσία, though not itself οὐσία, but (to use a Neoplatonic expression) ὑπερβολῆς. Plato's meaning is as follows. The Sun is not γένεσας in the sense in which the objects which he produces are γεγονόμενα. Yet in a certain sense he too is γένεσας, for he is ἐφαρτός; see VII 529 C fl. and Tim. 58 B. (Bosanquet cannot be right in denying that Plato regards the Sun as a γεγονόμενον). As the cause of γένεσας, we may, in fact, regard the Sun as the only true γένεσας, for all γεγονόμενα are derived from him. Similarly the Good is not οὐσία in the sense in which the Ideas are οὐσίαι; but in a higher sense it is the only true οὐσία, for all οὐσίαι are only specific determinations of the Good. The ὑπερβολῆς of the Good is merely Plato's way of saying that the first Principle of all existence must itself be undetermined. See on ἄρχην ἀνυπόδετον 510 B and cf. Biehl l.c. p. 82 and Fouilliée l.c. II pp. 105—111, where the matter is very clearly explained. The doctrine of the ὑπερβολῆς of the Highest afterwards became a cardinal point with the Neoplatonists: see Plotinus ap. RP.7 p. 528, and for other references Hermann Vind. disp. de id. bonti pp. 40 n. 84, 41 n. 87, Zeller III 2 p. 490 ff., Fouilliée La Philosophie de Platon III pp. 289, 291 n., and Shorey Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. I p. 188 n. 1. It is highly characteristic of Plato's whole attitude that he finds the true keystone of the Universe—the ultimate fountain from which both Knowledge and Existence flow—in no cold and colourless ontological abstraction, like Being, but in that for which τὰ αἰτία συνενάζει καὶ συνωδεῖ (Rom. 8. 22)—viz. τὸ ἄγαθον. Cf. Phaed. 97 C ff. and see also on 508 D. The conception is poetical and religious no less than philosophical, and may be compared with Dante's 'L' Amor che muove il Sole e l' altre Stelle' and Tennyson's 'For so the whole round earth is every way Bound by gold chains about the feet of God,' as well as with Aristotle's πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον Met. A 7 et al.

159 C 16 καὶ ὅ Γλαύκων κτλ.

"Glaucus exclaimed, very conically, 'Save us all, what an amazing transcendence!"' It is Glaucus's προβηγμα which is γελοιόν: see 506 D. ὑπερβολῆς is not 'exaggeration' (Jowett), but refers to ὑπερέχουσον: cf. ἄρχηναν κάλλος λέγει 509 Α. A ὑπερβολῆ which transcends existence may well be called δαιμονία ('supernatural,' 'miraculous').

18 ἐδὲ μή τι, ἀλλὰ κτλ. Stephanus proposed ἀλλοι for ἀλλα (as in 501 e), but cf. Men. 86 δ. ἐδὲ μή τι οὖν, ἀλλὰ σιμερον γέ μοι ἡ ἄρχη χάλασσων.

159 C—511 E Socrates, at Glaucus's
request, now proceeds to expound the similitude more fully. Let us take a line, and divide it into two unequal parts, to represent the objects of Sight and the objects of Thought respectively. If we further subdivide each part in the ratio of the original sections, we shall have four segments, representing, in order of clearness, (1) Images and the like, (2) so-called real things, (3) the objects of that intellectual method which descends from assumptions to a conclusion, using sensible objects as images or illustrations, (4) the objects of that intellectual method, which ascends from assumptions to an unassumed first principle, without making use of any sensible illustrations whatsoever, and thereafter descends to a conclusion. The third section represents the subjects investigated by the so-called 'Arts' or mathematical sciences; the fourth is the sphere of Dialectic. The corresponding mental states are called by Socrates εἰκάδια, τίματα, ὀνομα, and νοησις. Each of these is clear or sure exactly in proportion as its objects are true.

509 D ff. The simile of the Line contains perhaps more Platonic teaching than any passage of equal length in Plato's writings, and is of primary and fundamental importance for the interpretation of his philosophy. I have discussed the various difficulties as they occur, partly in the notes and partly in the Appendices to this Book. For a consecutive exposition of the whole simile in its connexion with the simile of the Cave see App. I to Book VII.


24. ίνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ κτλ. "I do not say 'of heaven,' lest you should imagine that I am etymologising on the name." The Sun might well be called βασιλέως οὐρανοῦ. Socrates pretends to avoid the word οὐρανός, lest by thus equating it with ὄρατον (for the contrast with νοητόν would suggest that οὐρανός = ὄρατον) he should be accused of deriving οὐρανός from ὄρας, as certain clever people did in Plato's time (Crat. 396 B). The same derivation is given by Philo Jud. de mund. orp. 10. For σοφίζεια in this sense cf. σοφία in Crat. 396 C, D. E. S. Thompson (Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. 1888 p. 14) takes σοφίζεια simply as 'pun' and thinks that the pun is between νοῦς (suggested in νοητόν above) and οὐράνος, quoting ἀπ' οὖν προείν, and the anecdote in D. L. II 118, VI 3; cf. also Isocrates Apophth. Fr. 8 ed. Blass. But such a pun is both far-fetched and pointless, and in view of the passage from the Cratylus there should be no doubt that Plato more συν is merely scoffing at a well-known contemporary etymology. The reading οὐράνος—see ετ. n.—would be fatal to Thompson's theory, but οὐράνος (which most MSS read) is more pointed and idiomatic, and perhaps right, though the accusative is not indefensible.

27. ἄνεσα. It appears from the Scholiast that even ancient critics debated whether ἄνεσα or ἴσα (εἰς ἵσα) should be read. Proclus (in Plat. remp. p. 288 Kroll) and the author of the third Quaest. Plat. in Plutarch (1001 C ff.) read ἄνεσα: ἴσα appears in a grammarian cited by Stallbaum from Villi- son Anecd. Gr. II p. 199. The dispute still reigns, Stallbaum and some others
preferring ίσα, others, such as Richter (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 145) and Dümmler (Antisth. p. 80) àν ίσα, others even àν ίσα (which is certainly not Greek; though found in a few inferior MSS); but there should be no question that Plato wrote ἄνσα. If the line is bisected, all four segments are equal, and the elaborate proportions drawn in 510 Λ. 511 Ε, VII 534 Λ represent no corresponding relations between the different segments of the line. The inequality, as Schneider and Stein- hart point out, is intended to represent the difference in σαφεία or αλληθεία between the δοξαστῶν (or ὀρατῶν) and the γνώστων (or νοητῶν): cf. σαφεία καὶ αλληθεία below and 510 Λ. (So also Benson in Nettleship’s Lect. and Rem. II p. 239 η.). For this reason the νοητῶν should be represented by a longer segment. Others assign the larger part to the ὀρατῶν, as being the region of τὰ πολλά (Plutarch i.e. and Espinas in his edition of Book VI), but the length of the two main segments should follow the primary and fundamental principle of Plato’s classification. The relevant consideration is not at present multiplicity versus unity, but different degrees of clearness and truth. Beckman’s excision of ἄνσα τέματα (num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit p. 38) needs no retalia- tion. See also next note.

27 τάλιν τῷμ κτλ. See Figure 1 on p. 65.

\[ AD : DC :: AC : CB, \]

and

\[ CE : EB :: AC : CB. \]

It follows (1) that \( AD : DC :: CE : EB, \)

(2) that \( DC = CE; \)

for

\[ CE \]

\[ \frac{AC}{EB} = \frac{CE}{CB} = \frac{AC}{AC + CB}, \]

i.e.

\[ \frac{CE}{CB} = \frac{AC}{AB} \Rightarrow CE = \frac{AC}{AB} \]

Similarly

\[ DC = \frac{AC}{AB}, \quad DC = \frac{AC}{AB} \]

But \( AC = \frac{CB}{AB} \)

has been proved equal to \( CE. \)

\[ DC = CE. \]

(This last equality—so far as it goes—is a slight though unavoidable defect in the line, for \( DC \) is not equal to \( CE \) in point of clearness. See last note). Neither of these inferences is expressly drawn by Plato himself; but he appears to make use of the first in 532 Λ ff.

29 καὶ σοὶ ἐσται κτλ.: ‘and when classified according to their relative clearness and obscurity, the different segments will represent—in the visible sphere, segment 1, Images’ etc. The datives, like ἀλληθεία in 510 Λ, are causal, and state the principle on which the entire classification of νοητά as well as ὀρατά) rests. With ἰν μὲν τῷ ὀραμένῳ Socrates begins to describe the contents of the particular segments. This is interrupted by the definition of εἰκόνες, and resumed, in a different form, at τὸ τοῖνυν ἑτερον in 510 Λ. μὲν before τῷ ὀραμένῳ contrasts with σκόπει ὃ ἀν in B, much as τὸ τοῖνυν ἑτερον balances the second μὲν. On σαφεία see below 511 η.

510 Λ 2 ἄνα τῷν τοιούτουν. Cf. Tim. 46 Λ ff. πυκνά (μανά is ‘of close texture,’ ‘close gained’ (D. and V.), not exactly ‘solid’ (as Jowett).

τὰν τὸ τοιοῦτον. Although the productions of imitative art and the like must be held to belong to this category (see App. 1 to Book VII), there is nothing to shew that Plato was thinking of them when he wrote this sentence.

3 ὅ τοῦτο ἐνέκειν: ‘whereof this is an image.’ ἐνέκειν corresponds to εἰκόνας above.
Fig. i. The Line.

Fig. ii. To illustrate the Cave.

ef. ὂδὸς.
gh. τεῖχος.
ab. Row of Prisoners.
ed. Wall on which the Shadows are thrown.
5 αὐτῷ: viz. τῷ ὄρμενον, with reference to ἐν μὲν τῷ ὄρμενῳ above.
6 ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν κτλ. i.e. AD: DC: : AC: CB.

Pitherto AC has not been called δοξαστὸν, only ὀρᾶτον. The new terminology appears again in 511 D (δοξαστὸν) and VII 534 A: see also on VII 510 D, 523 C. δοξαστὸν is of course a wider term than ὀρᾶτον, for it includes the entire domain of τὰ πολλὰ, by whatever sense or faculty apprehended (V 479 b ff.). δοξα is, in fact, the intellectual state of the ordinary uneducated man. This further specification of AC is of no small importance for the understanding of the similes of the Line and Cave: see VII 514 A, 517 A ην. and App. I to Book VIII.

510 B 9 ἦ κτλ. With ἦ cf. Thaetet. 172 D. τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ CE.

τοῖς τότε μιμηθέντει: i.e. the objects represented by CD, which were ‘imitated’ or copied in AD. They were originals then, but are only images now: this is the force of the collocation μιμηθέντει—ἐκδόσα. Cf. 510 b ἀ πλάττοντοι τε καὶ γράφοντο, ὃν καὶ σκια καὶ ἐν βάσιν ἑκδόντες εἰς τούτοις μὲν ὡς ἐκδοσάν αὐτοῦ χρώμενον, 511 A ἐκδοσά δὲ χρώματι αὐτοῦ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικάσθεν ἐστὶν, and for the meaning of μιμηθέντει X 559 A τὸ τοῦ μιμηθέντομεν καὶ τὸ εἰδώλων καὶ Λαύς 668 b. I have restored the reading of A, μιμηθέσαν, with which Proclus (in Plat. temp. I p. 291 Kroll) also agrees, τυπισθέντα, which appears to be adopted by all other editors, occurs in all the available MSS except A. But τοῖς τότε τυπισθέντα would include AD as well as DC, and the illustrations employed in the inferior νοητὸν are drawn solely from DC, as is proved by 510 e (cited above), as well as by the actual facts of the case. The sole objection to μιμηθέσαι is that the word is generally used only of ‘artificiosa imitatio’ (Schneider): yet in Pol. 293 e, 297 c, Phil. 40 c and Arist. Hist. An. 11 8. 502 b 9 the ‘imitatio’ can hardly be called ‘artificiosa.’ 511 A seems to me sufficient by itself to prove that A is right. Schneider (Addit. p. 51) refers to a dissertation by Mommsen published in 1841 as taking the view here advocated.

10 ἐκ ὑποθέσεων, ὑπόθεσις is correctly defined in the Platonic ὑπόθεσις (415 B) as ἀρχήν ἀναθεοτειός, a starting-point which is not demonstrated, but taken for granted, assumed, postulated. The arithmetician, for example, ὑποθέτων the odd, the even, etc., i.e. assumes that his definition of odd, even, etc. is correct, and draws conclusions from his ὑπόθεσις of the odd, the even, etc. by means of exclusively deductive reasoning: cf. H. Sidgwick in J. Ph. II p. 100. If we attack his ὑπόθεσις, as Lucian for example does (Hermot. 74, quoted by Stallbaum), he must, quid archimeticus, throw up the sponge, for the ὑποθεσμοῖς of the inferior νοητῶν can be demonstrated (or overthrown) only by Dialectic. Cf. generally Mén. 86 e ff. Schneider may be right in supposing that Aristotle had the present passage in view when he wrote εἰ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἔτοιμον τὸν γιγνέται, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπὶ τάς ἀρχάς ἠστιν ἢ ὑδάτων, ὥστε ἐν τῷ σταθμῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκολοθίων ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπλων (Eth. Nic. 1 2. 109a 32), though it is perhaps better (with Zeller II 1, p. 587 n. 2) to suppose that he is alluding to Plato’s oral instruction.

11 τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ ἑτέρον κτλ. τὸ ἑτέρον is E.B. The article after ἑτέρον (see cr. n.) stands self-condemned, although its intrusion is difficult to explain. δ', which Schneider proposes, is also difficult, though in harmony with Ficinus (alterum vero, quod exegcit animus), for the verb of the relative clause can hardly be omit-
The only ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετος is the Idea of the Good: cf. vii 533 A f. Towards this the Dialectician travels, starting from ὑπόθεσεις. He may begin, for example, by 'assuming' the 'just.' In such a case he assumes that his definition of 'just' is correct, i.e. corresponds exactly to the Idea of 'Just.' But whereas the mathematician treats his ὑπόθεσεις as an ultimate truth, and proceeds deductively to a conclusion, making use of sensible images by way of illustration, the dialectician treats his hypothesis as purely provisional, testing, revising, rejecting (vii 533 c n.), and reconstructing, and gradually ascending step by step to the first principle of all (ἡν τὸν παντὸς ἀρχήν), without employing any sensible objects to illustrate his reasoning. The one gives no account of his ὑπόθεσεις (οὔ ἔχει λόγον—φανερῶν in c below); the other not only does, but must do so, just because he is a dialectician: cf. vii 533 C ff. He connects his ὑπόθεσεις with others, subsuming them under higher and yet higher—better and truer—ὑπόθεσεις, until at last he has traversed the whole region of νοημα. Such of his ὑπόθεσεις as survive will be improved at each stage in the ascent, and finally, as soon as the Idea of Good is reached, all his surviving ὑπόθεσεις will actually have become perfect counterparts of the Ideas which they have hitherto been only assumed to represent. In the meantime the ἀρχή τοῦ παντός, which Plato himself described dogmatically δὲ εἰκόνως in 507 A—509 C, will have ceased to be a mere ὑπόθεσις: it will have become, in the fullest sense of the term, an ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετος: for the highest rung of the ladder is not reached until the entire domain of the knowable has been exhausted, and shewn to be the expression of the Idea of Good. Plato's ideal—it is no more—is a comprehensive and purely intellectual view of the totality of νοημα, in which every department is seen in its connexion with every other, and all in their dependence on the Good, which is in itself ἀνυπόθετος and ὑπερούσιος—ἀνυπόθετος because higher than all ὑποθέσεις and itself proved by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοημα, ὑπερούσιος because higher than, and the cause of, all existence. See also on 511 B and the Appendix to Book vii On Plato's Dialectic, together with Jackson J. of Ph. x pp. 143 f., where the distinctive peculiarities of the two methods are very clearly explained.

12 ὑπερ ἕκειν ἐλκόνων: i. q. ἄνευ τῶν αὐτόπερ ἕκειν (ἡγεῖ) ἐλκόνων. I formerly read τῶν περὶ ἕκειν ἐλκόνων (with ό), but now think (with Schneider and others) that A is right. The attraction of a relative in the dative case is rare, but not unexampled. Van Cleef (de attract. in enunt. rel. usw. Plat. p. 45) cites Corr. 509 A, Prot. 361 E, Theat. 144 A, Rep. vii 531 E (all examples of ἔντυχαγως, whose proper construction in the sense of 'fall in with' is the dative, not the genitive), and Ep. vii 327 A (with προστιχους); for examples in other authors see Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 514. If ἄνευ and ἐλκέω are pronounced with emphasis, the meaning, I think, is easily caught. Stallbaum reads ἐν περὶ κτλ. with one Vienna MS, understanding, I suppose, χρῆται.

αὐτοῖς—δὲ αὐτῶν. αὐτοῖς (ἵππις = solis) is further accented by δὲ αὐτῶν ('through themselves alone'): cf. 511 C. The ἐνθα of the dialectician do not employ the adventitious aid of εἰκόνες: see on 511 B. The use of ἐνθα here must not be held to imply that even the dialectician's conceptions of the Ideas are correct before he has reached the Idea of the Good. Till then, they are only ὑποθέσεις, though the false ὑποθέσεις are weeded out (vii 533 C n.), and the hypothetical character of the survivors is gradually eliminated in the course of the ascent. See on ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετον above, and contrast 511 C.

14 ἀλλ' ἀδίδ κτλ. 'Then have it over again, said I.' The ellipse has a colloquial effect. Ast's εἴδος for ἀδίδ is unlikely: nor does Cobet's <ἔρω> after ἐγὼ sound right. If Plato had written ἐρώ, he would, I think, have placed it after ἀδίδ. μάθασε, or the like, supplied from ἔμαθον, suits the con-
text (ῥύον γὰρ—μαθήσει) best. Similarly in D below, ὀνθή is understood out of Glauco’s reply. Cf. also ἄλλʼ ὄνος in I 525 E.

510 C 15 οἱ περὶ κτλ. In CE, as will afterwards appear, are included five sciences, which form the προφητείων (VII 531 D) or προσανατολ. (ib. 536 D) to Dialectic, represented by EB. They are the Science of Number, Plane Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics: VII 522 c—531 c. In each of these the method, according to Plato, is the same. Certain ὑπόθεσεις are taken for granted, and inferences drawn from them by purely deductive reasoning, aided by the use of sensible likenesses or illustrations. See also App. I to Book VII.

18 ὡσ εἰδότες. They have no knowledge of their ὑπόθεσεις, otherwise they would be able to give an account of them: see VII 533 c and 531 E μὴ δυνα-τοί τινες ὡστε δοῦναι τι καὶ ὑποθέσασθαι λόγον εὐθαυσάτο ποτέ τι ἡ γὰρ φαίνει δὲν εἰσὶ-ναι: ὁδ' αὖ, ἐφε, τοῦτο γε.

510 D 21 ὡμολογομένων—“folge-rechterweise” (Cohen Pl. Ideenl. u. d. Math. p. 29) refers to the agreement between premises, intermediate steps, and conclusion: cf. VII 533 C, where ὁμολογία is used in the same way. “With perfect unanimity” (D. and V.) is incorrect and pointless.

23 τοὺς ὀρθομένους εἰσὶν κτλ. They use the ‘visible kinds,’ i.e. visible squares, visible diagonals, etc., but they are thinking about mathematical squares and diagonals etc. Cf. generally Eucl. 290 B οἱ δ' ἀδ' ἑσυχάσκοι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοὶ: θρεπτικὸν γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ οὕτω- ὰ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἀκαστοὶ τούτων ἄλλα τὰ ὑντα ἀνεμφέρουσαι, and VII 527 A.

25 ἑοῖκε. Visible σχῆματα are imperfect copies of ‘mathematical’ σχῆματα: cf. VII 526 A and App. I to Book VII. τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ κτλ.: ‘for that with a view to which they are discoursing is the square itself and a diagonal itself, not this which they draw’ etc. αὐτὸν (‘by itself,’ i.e. apart from its embodiment in perceivable squares) is ambiguous, and might (so far as language is concerned) refer either to the Idea of Square (cf. v 476 A ff.) or to the Mathematical Square (cf. VII 525 D, E nn.),—see App. I to Book VII—Plato holds to be distinct from the Idea. But the ambiguity is resolved as soon as we are shewn (in 511 C ff.) how to interpret διανοομένων and διανοία (511 A), and we then see that Plato is here speaking of the mathematical square. The singular τοῦ τετραγώνου is generic (cf. ὁ σοφιτὴς for the whole class of Sophists), for there are many ‘mathematical’ squares, diagonals etc. (VII 526 A c. and App. I to Book VII). It is conceivably for this reason that Plato drops the article with διαμέτρου (‘a diagonal itself’), thereby also getting a more precise antithesis to ἄλλα ὑπειράς, or else (if this suggestion is hypercritical) διαμέτρου is also generic. Sidgwick is, I think, mistaken when he says (f. Pl. II p. 103) that the language of this passage “in no way supports the interpolation of intermediates (Aristotle’s τὰ μεταξὸ) between particulars and Idees”: for διανοομένων involves διάνοια, and since διάνοια is intermediate between νοεῖ and δίδακτο (511 D), we may reasonably suppose that its objects are likewise intermediate
between the higher νοτά and δηξιάτα. See App. I to Book vii.

27 πλάτσουσιν: with reference to models of geometrical figures, orreries etc., all of which belong to CD, and may themselves have shadows and likenesses in AD.

28 ουκ εἰκόσιν οὖχ χρώμενοι. See 510 B n. The anacolouthon in αὐτά μὲν ταῦτα—οὐκοσιοι μὲν χρώμενοι is illustrated by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 8: cf. also VII 520 D.

29 ζητοῦντες τε. Instead of τε, I formerly read δε (on slight ms authority), with Ast and Stallbaum; but the corruption of δε to τε is exceedingly improbable here. The antithetical force of the clause ζητοῦντες—ιδεῖν is weakened by the occurrence of the words οὐκ εἰκόςιν ἀν in the μὲν clause. If the objects in question are used as images, the further statement that the real object of investigation is their originals (αὐτά έκείνα) loses its antithetical force, and becomes a sort of adjunct. Hence τε following ζητοῦντες is more appropriate than αὐτά δὲ έκείνα ζητοῦντες ιδεῖν, which would be the natural way of expressing an antithesis. Cf. Laws 927 B δηδο μὲν άκούουσι βλέπουσι τε δηδο (where the order is the same as here), Phaedr. 266 c and other examples cited by Hoefner de part. Pl. pp. 17 f.

511 Α 1 τῇ διανοιᾷ. See on του τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ 510 D.

2 ελεγον. 510 B.

3 ἀναγκαζομένην. For the participle we might expect ἀναγκαζόσθαι. But ἀναγκαζομένη gives a better balance with νοτών, and the meaning is 'Accordingly I described this class as intelligible indeed, but the soul as compelled' etc.

4 τῶν ὑποθέσεων—εκβαινεν: 'to step out of and above assumptions,' viz. by reaching the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος: cf. 510 B n.

5 αὐτοὶ τοῖς κτλ. αὐτοῖς is 'the actual things,' the originals, as in αὐτά μὲν ταῦτα 510 B: 'employing as images the originals from which images were made' (lit. 'the imaged-from') "abgebildet" Schneider 'by the objects below,' i.e. employing as images the originals in CD, which were copied by the shadows etc. in AD. For ἀντακαθιστεῖι in this sense cf. ἀντακαθιστάται in Tim. 48 c and (with J. and C.) εκκαθάριστον in Phaedr. 250 B. Other views of this passage are discussed in App. X.

καὶ ἐκεῖνοι κτλ.: 'those also, in comparison with those remoter objects, being esteemed and honoured as palpable and clear.' καὶ is 'also' and not 'and,' as some have supposed. ἐκεῖνοι is DC, and ἐκεῖνα AD. Plato uses the pronoun ἐκεῖνοι to indicate that the objects in CD are less near to the mind of the mathematician than those in CE, which are the immediate object of his study (cf. Sidgwick in Ψ. Ph. ii p. 98). He could not, even if he had wished to, have written καὶ αὐτοῖς (et ipsis) without sacrificing αὐτοῖς just before. ἐκεῖνα is said because AD is remoter still. See also App. X.

6 δεδοξασμένοι means, I believe, 'esteemed,' 'valued' as in Polyb. vi 53. 9 τῶν ἐπ ἀρτῆ δεδοξασμένων ἄνδρων: cf. the regular use of δοξάζων for 'glorify' in the N. T. No other certain instance of this usage appears to occur in Plato, or even in classical Greek; at all events neither Thuc. iii 45: 6 nor Dionys.
Theories. 1. 24 Mclinke, cited by L. and S., is a case in point. But the collocation with τετυμμένοις makes it probable that the usage, though rare, is Platonic; and every other interpretation of the word is beset with serious difficulties, as is shewn in App. X.

τετυμμένοις. τετυμμένοις is read by Schneider, with several MSS (see cr. n.), and understood as 'cut off' (abgeschritten); but, as J. and C. observe, this does not suit δεδομένοις, and it is doubtful if the objects can be said to be 'cut,' although the line is: see on τότε μιμηθείναι 510 B.

511 B 7 τάυτης in spite of γεω-

μετρίας because Geometry is itself one art: cf. VII 533 C γεωμετρίας τῷ καὶ τὰς τάυτης ἐπομένας. The plural γεωμετρίας does not mean the 'various branches of geometry' (as D. and V. suppose), but geometrical investigations: cf. λογισ-

μοῖς for 'Arithmetic' in 510 C.

9 αὐτός ὁ λόγος κτλ.: 'the argument grasps by itself, through the power of dialectic.' λόγος is not the faculty of rea-

son ('Vernunft' Schleiermacher), which is νοῦς, or even 'thought' ("Gedanke" Schneider), but rather "the impersonal reason, or drift of the argument" (Bosan-

quet), the instrument by which νοῦς works (Krohn Pl. St. p. 140). ὁ λόγος is of course personified, as it constantly is in this sense.

10 δινάμει should not be translated 'faculty,' but simply 'power' (cf. 508 E n.): the argument, unaided by ἐλεύθερον (αὐτός 'by itself,' cf. αὐτός εἰσιν 510 B n.), grasps the object by the inherent power of dia-

lectical argumentation (diaλέγεται δαίμον), and nothing else. In spite of Grimmelt (de reip. uiiit. etc. p. 52) it is certainly an error to identify ὁ λόγος with νοῦς. Why does Dialectic dispense with all sensible images or illustrations? Plato (it should be remembered) holds that the intrusion of any element of sense-perception, how-

ever small, impedes the exercise of thought: see Phaed. 79 c ff. The ὅπο-

θεσίς of the dialectician may be and often are generalisations from αἰσθήμα, but a generalisation, regarded in itself, is wholly νοτῶν. These ὑποθέσεις it is the province of Dialectic to test in every possible way, to demolish where necessary (VII 533 C n.), to correct by one another, to classify according to their mutual coherence and interdependence, until by an exhaustive scrutiny of all νοτῶα we grasp the unifying principle of all exist-


τῷ ὅποιοι indicates that we are to take the word in its literal etymological sig-

nification, 'literally hypotheses or under-

positions, stepping-stones as it were and starting-points.' For this use of τῷ ὅποιοι and kindred expressions see I 343 C, v 474 A n. and W. G. Headlam On editing Aeschylus pp. 138 ff. With ἐπιβάσεις cf. Symp. 211 C ἄσπερ ἐπιβάλ

βαλμοι χρώματων.

11 τοῦ ἀνυπόδειτον. See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον 510 B. Plato makes no at-

tempt in the Republic to classify Ideas in such an ascending scale as he here suggests, though it is probable from 500 A that Knowledge and Truth would rank near to the Good. Nor is there any dialogue in which an exhaustive classifi-

cation is ever attempted. Such hints as Plato gives us throughout his writings are enumerated in Stumpf das Verhältniss etc. pp. 50, 56, 76, and in ZellerII 11, pp. 704—707: cf. also Fouillée La Philos-

phie de Platon II pp. 99—104. We must suppose that each higher Idea will excel all the lower both in range and in excel-

lence. These two characteristics are, from Plato's point of view, the same. The wider an Idea is in range and extension, the greater will be the sum of existences of which it is the cause. But the Idea of Good is the cause of all existence, so that each higher Idea will be better than all below it, because it contains more of
Good. Beyond this it is perhaps safer not to go. A systematic attempt to correlate all intelligibles among themselves and in their connexion with the Good would have been premature in Plato's day, and is premature still. The permanent value of Plato's conception lies in the ideal which it sets before every succeeding generation of investigators.

12 πάλιν αὖ κτλ. The dialectician's progress involves both an ascent and a descent—an ascent ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, and a descent ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὴν τελευτὴν (cf. Aristotle quoted on 510 b). By the time that he reaches the Idea of the Good, all his surviving ὑποθέσεις have become exact counterparts of the Ideas which are their objective correlates; the others have all of them been demolished (VII 533 c. n.). The conclusions (τέλευτα) of dialectic are therefore impregnable; ἡ σωφροσύνη is a contradiction in terms (v 477 e. n.). For more on this subject see the Appendix to Book VII On Plato's Dialectic.

511 C 14 ἐδεικνύω—ἐδώ. On αὐτῶς ἐναυτῶν see 510 B 6. ἐδεικνύω may now be taken in its full force; for after the Idea of Good has been reached, the dialectician's conception of each ἐδώ is accurate and complete: see last note. I formerly read αὐτῶς ἐναυτῶν, rejecting ἐν αὐτῷ as superfluous on account of καὶ τελευτᾷ ἐν ἑδῶ. But αὐτῶν is certainly wrong (cf. 510 b), and ἐν αὐτῷ, which may well be taken loosely with καταβάλῃ or a particle supplied from it, merely states that the conclusions of dialectic are likewise ἐδώ: whereas καὶ τελευτᾷ ἐν ἑδῶ seems to lay emphasis on the fact that dialectic never descends below ἑδῶ to particulars ("und bei Begriffen endlid!") Schneider. We may translate 'and with Ideas end.' Plato means to emphasize the fact that the Dialectician quâ Dialectician does not draw conclusions as to particulars: if he did, he could scarcely be said αὐτὸτρ παντάπασιν οὐδεὶς προσχρόμενος, 1 ἀλλὰ εἰδεικτῶν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτὰ, καὶ τελευτὰ εἰς εἰδῆ. Μανθάνων, ἐφι, ικανῶς 15 μὲν οὖν ἀδελφὴς γὰρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν. ὅτι μέντοι βούλευσιν διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωροῦμεν ὡς τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλομένων, αἰς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί καὶ διανοιαὶ μὲν ἀναγάγονται ἀλλὰ

16. οὐ Αἴτιον: οὐν Αἰ.
20 μὴ αἰσθησεὶς αὐτὰ θεᾶσαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἄρχην δὲ ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἔσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσὶ σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἄρχης. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξιν, ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξὺ τὸ δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕσαν. Ἔκαν
tata, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀπεδείχω. καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τοὺς τέτταρας τρίῳσι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γνησίοις λαβεῖ, νόησαι μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνωτέρω, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἐν τῷ τελευταῖῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξιν αὐτὰ ἀνα λόγον,

145 A, B and see Tannery L'Éducation Platonicienne in Rev. Philos. X p. 523, the Appendix to Book VII On the pro-
paedetic studies of the Republic and my article in Cf. Rev. xv p. 220, where I have tried to show that our use of the word 'Arts' in 'Bachelor of Arts' etc. is an inheritance from the Platonic Academy.

19 καλ—δεώμενοι. The relative sen-
tence passes into a main clause, as in
11 537 B, where see note.

20 αὐτά: viz. the subject-matter of the so-called 'Arts': cf. VII 518 B.

811 D 22 κατοῖοι—ἄρχης: 'although they are intelligibles with a first principle.' The mathematician does not ascend to an ἄρχη, and therefore does not exercise—
for ἄρχην in its original half-inchoative sense cf. IX 585 B and Künlen-Blass Gr. Gr. 1 2, p. 434 n.— νοῦς on his subject, 
but nevertheless his subject is νοητῶς (as we have been told before 510 B, 511 A, C) and has an ἄρχην, viz. his ὑποθέσεις (als αὐτοφθέσεις ἄρχαί above). κατοῖοι is not found elsewere in Plato for κατερ πρ with a participle (Hoefner de part. Pl. p. 28) but occurs in Simonides ap. Prot. 339 C, in
Axiol. 364 B and Lysias 31. 34. To write κατερ (with Kugler de part. tou etc. p. 18) would be rash. For other views on this difficult clause see App. XI.

καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς. See 510 D N.

24 ὡς—οὖσαν. διάνοια is the most general word for a state (ἔς) of mind or mode of thought in Greek; and the limitation here introduced is entirely Plato's own. Plato apparently attempts to fortify his innovation by etymology, hinting that the word διάνοια is by deri-
vation that which is between (ὅτι μέσον) νοῦς and δόξα. So also J. and C. Cf. 
eikasia (with allusion to εἰκώνες) in E.

On δόξης see 510 A n.

26 νόσισι is used in its strict sense of
νοῦς in actual exercise, not merely the faculty of νοῦς: cf. 508 E n. The exercise of νοῦς is correctly spoken of as a παθήμα
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γνησίοις, but the faculty itself could hardly be thus described.

511 E 27 πίστις κτλ. If we strictly limit DC to ὁρατά, πίστις must be under-
stood as the state of mind which believes only in visible, palpable (ἐφαρμ. things (τὰ peri ἡμᾶς Ἰς καὶ τὰν τὸ φυσικάν καὶ τὸ σκευατών διὸν γένος 510 A): 'seeing,' as we still say, 'is believing.' But Plato has already spoken of ἈΚ as δοξαστὸν (510 A n.) so that πίστις should not be confined to the objects of sight. It is in fact a subdivision of δόξα, superior in point of 'clearness' (σαφήνεια) to εἰκασία.

We may regard it as the normal condi-
tion of the average uneducated mind.

εἰκασία is the state of mind in which εἰκώνες are held to be true. Here again, if εἰκώνες are strictly limited to images of ὁρατά (cf. 509 E, 510 A), εἰκασία must be similarly confined in its scope, and loses all metaphysical interest and importance: see VII 517 A n. But since the εἰκώνες are a lower grade of δοξαστά (510 A n.), εἰκασία should be understood as a lower variety of δόξα (as in VII 534 A), viz. the state of mind which accepts as true that which is a copy of a copy (τρίτον πρὸς ἀλλάθειαν). In this sense εἰκασία (with a play on εἰκώνες) is a new coinage of Plato's. The translation 'conjecture' is misleading, for conjecture implies con-
scious doubt or hesitation, and doubt is foreign to εἰκασία in Plato's sense. Plato may however have intended to suggest that such a state of mind is in reality no better than conjecture. See also X 598 A n. and Bosanquet Companion pp. 261 f. with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 242—246.
ἀσπέρ ἐφ’ οἷς ἦστ’ αἰλιθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταύτα σαφνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. Μανθάνω, ἐφη, καὶ ἔγνιχρῶ καὶ τάττω ώς 30 λέγεις.

τέλος πολιτειάς 5’.

29 ἀσπέρ ἐφ’ οἷς κτλ.: “attributing to them such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth” J. and C. Liebhold’s ἐφ’ ὅσον for ἐφ’ οἷς is an unhappy suggestion: cf. VII 534 A. A corrector in q changed the first μετέχειν to μετέχει, which, in deference to Schneider’s arguments, I formerly printed. But the text is quite sound. Stated categorically, the clause would run ἀσπέρ ἐφ’ οἷς ἦστ’ αἰλιθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταύτα σαφνείας μετέχει. Under the government of ἡγησάμενος, the first as well as the second μετέχει becomes μετέχειν; for the accusative with infinitive may be employed even in the subordinate clauses of Indirect. See on 492 c. The jingle μετέχει — μετέχει is inoffensive: cf. X 614 A, 621 B.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VI.

I.

VI 488 D. ὃπως δὲ κυβερνήσει εὖν τὲ τινὲς βούλωνται εὖν τὲ μὴ, μὴτε τέχνην τοῦτον μὴτε μελέτην οἶλομενοι δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν.

Schneider's translation of this sentence is as follows:—"wie aber zu steuern sei, es mögen nun einige wollen oder nicht, davon glauben sie nicht dass es eine Kunst und Uebung gebe, mit der man dann eben die Steuermannskunst habe." The view which I have given in the notes is in general harmony with this interpretation; but I think that the word μελέτη denotes 'study' rather than actual 'practice' ("Uebung" or "exercitatio" Schneider): see the notes.

The strength of Schneider's explanation lies in its conformity with the whole course of Plato's argument both here and in the passages which I have cited from the Politicus. In particular, the exact parallel between εὖν τὲ τινὲς βούλωνται εὖν τὲ μὴ and εὖν τὲ ἐκόντας ἐὖν τὲ ἀκόντας (in Pol. 293 b) appears to me the strongest possible confirmation of the general soundness of his view. No interpretation that I know of, Schneider's alone excepted, assigns its proper force to εὖν τὲ τινὲς βούλωνται (cf. εὖν τὲ ἐκόντας, Pol. l.c.) as well as to εὖν τὲ μὴ. The true pilot cares just as little whether people wish him to steer as whether they do not: his art has nothing whatever to do with the sentiments with which his passengers regard his rule. Schneider's interpretation is also supported by the emphatic μὴτε τέχνην—μὴτε μελέτην: the false pilot will not allow that you can learn 'either art or theory' of how to steer, because according to him there is absolutely nothing technical or theoretical about steering. The only 'art of steering' which he will admit is the art of collaborating with himself in order to get command of the ship (ναυτικὸν μὲν καλωντας και κυβερνητικὸν και ἠποσταμένον τὰ κατὰ ναῖν ὅς ἄν ξυλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ἐπὶ ὃπως ἀρξονται κτλ.). It must, however, be admitted that ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν is not altogether easy on Schneider's view. The reader naturally expects τὴν κυβερνητικὴν to be different from the τέχνη and μελέτη: for on a first examination of the passage, Plato seems to be speaking of the impossibility of acquiring at the same time two different arts: whereas Schneider holds that the two arts are the same, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν being only Plato's way of expressing the τέχνη and μελέτη τοῦτον ὅπως κυβερνήσει.

Is it possible to devise any explanation which, while agreeing in the main with Schneider's, will escape the apparent difficulty to which I have just drawn attention?

We note that κυβερνητικὴν has already been implicitly defined by the sailors as the art of helping them to get command (κυβερνητικὸν κτλ.
above). Why then should we not suppose that the sailors *think it impossible to acquire an art of how to steer (δώς κυβερνήσει) along with κυβερνητική* in *their* sense of the term, i.e. (practically) along with the art of making themselves masters of the ship? This interpretation, as far as concerns the language, seems to me possible enough; but it implies that the sailors do think it possible to learn the art of how to steer independently and by itself: whereas they have already said that such an art cannot be taught at all (φάσκοντας μηδὲ δίδακτον εἶναι 488 β). For this among other reasons I think that this solution should not be entertained.

I have endeavoured in the notes to justify Schneider’s explanation of ἄμα καί, and here it need only be added that one source of embarrassment is the tendency which we feel to give to ἄμα more of a strictly temporal signification than necessarily belongs to it in that idiomatic phrase.

An entirely different view of the sentence is taken by Ast and others. According to Ast, Plato is here distinguishing between two arts, viz. (1) scientific pilotage (the knowledge of astronomy etc.), and (2) the “ars imperandi—ut quae scientia et ars ipsum doccant, a multitudine ipsi subjeta fieri curet.” τὴν κυβερνητικὴν is (1), and τέχνην τούτον (2). On this view Plato asserts that the crew in general consider it impossible to acquire both the art of steering (τὴν κυβερνητικὴν) and that of steering whether people wish it or no (δώς κυβερνήσει τέχνην τούτον), i.e. in other words, enforcing and maintaining authority. Both arts—so Ast interprets—are united, according to Plato, in the true pilot.

This explanation Stallbaum apparently accepts, conjecturing only τὴν κυβερνητικὴν for τὴν κυβερνητικὴν. I do not deny that it can be elicited from Plato’s language, if we take this sentence by itself: but it is open to serious objection on the score of meaning, as has been pointed out by H. Sidgwick (J. Ph. v pp. 274—276), Richards (Cl. Rev. viii p. 23), and Shorey (A. J. Ph. xvi p. 234). It represents the sailors as admitting that there is a *true* art of steering, which under certain circumstances it is possible to acquire. But this is precisely what they deny (see 488 β πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας μηδὲ δίδακτον εἶναι), nor could they possibly admit it, so long as they ‘have not so much as a notion that the true Pilot should study the year and the seasons’ etc. (488 δ). Their solitary notion of an art of steering is how to get the helm into their hands (488 ε πάντα ποιοῦντα δώς ἄν σφοι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ and C, D ταυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντα καὶ κυβερνητικὸν —δὲ ἄν ξυλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ἡ κτλ.). Moreover, even if they were to allow that there is an art of steering, they would certainly not allow that others possessed it rather than themselves: cf. Pol. 302 a, b. Nor, again, does Plato ever admit that the art of enforcing one’s authority has anything whatever to do with the art of steering. In the Politics, he is careful to point out that they are entirely distinct: see the passages referred to in the note.

1 For another special discussion of the passage see Richter in Fleckelsen’s Jahrbuch, 1867, p. 145.
Jowett and Campbell's explanation is somewhat different. They do not suppose that Plato himself means to attribute to the true pilot both knowledge and power to enforce his authority; but apparently agree with Ast that the false pilot admits the existence of a scientific κυβερνητική, which can be acquired by itself, but cannot be combined with the art of getting possession of the helm. This view is open to all except the last of the objections already noted.

Sidgwick and Richards both agree with Grote (Plato III p. 80) that Plato does not regard scientific κυβερνητική as involving the power to enforce one's authority as well as knowledge of steering. According to Richards, we should read ἄδυνατον instead of δύνατον. "The crew deem it by no means as impossible as it really is that, while a man acquires κυβερνητική, he should at the same time acquire this other art" (viz. ὁπως κυβερνήσει, ἐὰν τε τίνες βούλωνται ἐὰν τε μή). This view is attractive in some ways, but the corruption of ἄδυνατον to δύνατον is not a very probable one, and it would still seem to be implied that the crew admit the existence of a true art of steering, which is, under certain circumstances, capable of being learnt. If, with Sidgwick, we read οἰορέων, in agreement with ἀυτῷ, this particular difficulty disappears. I formerly accepted Sidgwick's proposal, but there is force in Richards' criticism that "the sentence would be most clumsy in form, nor is it to the point what the true steersman thinks; Plato is describing the state of mind of the crew." δὲ after ὁπως is also a difficulty.

On the whole, I am now inclined to think that Schneider's interpretation has the most numerous and important arguments in its favour, and for this reason I have adopted it in the notes.

II.

VI 492 E. οὐ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλα καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλῇ ἀνοικ. οὔτε γὰρ γέγυται οὔτε γέγονεν οὔδε ὁδὸν μή γένηται ἄλλοις ἥθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παθεῖσαν πεπαιδευμένην, ἀνδρόπειον, ὃ ἐταίρηθε θείον πέντε κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν ἔξαιρωμεν λόγου.

I agree in the main with Schneider's view of this passage, which he translates—more freely than usual—as follows: "Denn keine Erziehung, o Freund, vermag oder vermochte oder wird auch vermögen der Erziehung dieser gegenüber ein Gemüt zur Tugend umzulenken, nämlich ein menschliches; das göttliche freilich müssen wir wie es im Sprichwort heisst, ausnehmen von unserer Rede." J. and C. (with Ast) connect πρὸς ἀρετὴν with πεπαιδευμένοι, comparing Prot. 342 D Δακεδαμίων πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν—ἀριστα πεπαιδευμέναι and Gorg. 471 D ἐν πρὸς τὴν μητροκλῆν πεπαιδευμένα, but the adverbs make all the difference. Without an adverb Plato writes εἰς ἀρετὴν παθεῖν (e.g. Gorg. 519 E). An entirely different explanation is given by Stallbaum and others. Stallbaum translates as follows: "neque enim indoles iuxta istorum erudita disciplinam neque fit neque facta est, nec vero unquam fiet ad virtutes (virtutis habita ratione) aliusmodi (ἄλλων) humana quidem" etc. But (I) Plato is professedly giving a reason (οὔτε γάρ
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κτλ.) why it is the height of folly to attempt to teach a young man what is opposed to public opinion, and Stallbaum's translation gives no such reason: (2) παρά cannot mean ‘iuxta’ ‘according to,' but only ‘opposed to.’ Stallbaum’s view, which is as old as Ficinus, has been widely accepted, but no one has yet explained how παρά can be used for κατά.

The adherents of this erroneous view have also in many cases suspected the word ἀλλαίον. Even if we adopt Schneider's explanation, ἀλλαίον seems at first sight strange: should not Plato have written ἀμελε-νον, which Vermehren (Pl. Stud. p. 95) considers more natural? I think not, for Plato means to suggest that public opinion will not tolerate any kind of dissent, whether better or worse than itself, except the θειόν ἦδος, which is a special example of the ἀλλαίον ἦδος πρὸς ἀρέτην.

Instead of ἀλλαίον the following proposals have been made, all of them (except the last) on the mistaken assumption that παρά means κατά: (1) ὁ μὲν ἀλλαίον (‘not alien to’ Nägelsbach), (2) ἄλλον ἦ (‘other than alien to,’ Hermann, who also suggests ἄλλον ἦ οὐκεῖδος for ἀλλαίον ἦδος), (3) ἀξίολογον (Vermehren), (4) ἀληθινόν (Richards). The last of these critics ‘strongly suspects’ that Plato also wrote κατὰ and not παρά.

III.

VI 498 D, E. oὐ γὰρ πῶτερ εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ τολὸς μᾶλλον τοιαύτ' ἀπαῥήματα ἐξεπίτηθης ἀλλήλως ὁμοιωμένα, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτόματου, ὥσπερ νῦν, συμπεσόντα. ἀνδρα δὲ ἀρετῆ παρισωμένοι καὶ ὁμοιωμένοι μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελείου ἐργῶ τε καὶ λόγω, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρα τοιαύτῃ, ὁ πῶτερ εἴρρακασιν κτλ.

The view which I take of this passage is new in some of its details, but Reinhardt had already pointed out that Plato is referring to Isocrates (de Isocr. aem. p. 39), and Dümmler has made it probable that the reference is specifically to the Panegyricus (probably published about 380 B.C.). The same general view is adopted by the French editors of Book VI (Espinias and Maillet), and was also held by Schneider, as appears from his translation "denn sie haben das jetzt aufgestellte niemals in der Wirklichkeit gesehen, sondern viel eher etwas solche Worte, sorgfältig mit einander in Gleichklang gebracht, nicht zufällig, wie diese, zusammengesetzt; einen Mann aber, der sich mit der Tugend in Einstimmung und Gleichklang gebracht so vollkommen wie möglich in Werk und Wort—haben sie niemals gesehen” etc. See also Hirmer Entstehung u. Kompos. d. pl. Pol. pp. 664, 665. Schneider appears to understand τοιαύτ' ἀπαῥήματα as referring only to what follows (ἐξεπίτηθης—συμπεσόντα), and the same view is apparently taken by Dümmler (Chr. Beitr. p. 14). That they refer more naturally to what precedes will hardly be denied, and γενόμενον— λεγόμενον is as good an example of παρομοίωσις as one could wish. Reinhardt (L.c.) supposes that τοιαύτ' ἀπαῥήματα means proposals for political reform, resembling Plato's ideal State, and on this ground holds
that it is the Areopagiticus, and not the Panegyricus, of which Plato is thinking. But Plato would hardly have compared any of Isocrates' political speeches to his own Republic, and the following words shew that the contrast is intended to be between mere vapouring rhetoricians and true Men. Nor is it likely that the Republic alludes to a work published so late as 354, the approximate date of the Areopagiticus (Christ Litteraturgesch. p. 297). 

'The interpretation which I have given of τοιαυτά ἀπατηρίματα appears to me exactly to suit ἀλλ' οἷς ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομᾶτου, ὥσπερ τύπου, συμπεσόντα. It is perfectly true, as Plato says, that the figure of παραμοιώσεως is never deliberately aimed at by him; or, if it is, he has the good manners to conceal his art. Isocrates' ῥήματα, on the other hand, are correctly described as εὐεπτήθησε ἀλλήλοις ῥμοιωμένα.

Davies and Vaughan completely miss the meaning of the passage when they translate "they have met with proposals somewhat resembling ours, but forced expressly into appearing of a piece with one another, instead of falling spontaneously into agreement, as in the present case." Jowett errs in much the same way, except that he seems to have suspected an allusion to the sophistical rhetoricians in ῥήματα—ῥμοιωμένα. The view adopted in J. and C.'s note is practically identical with that of D. and V.

IV.

VI 500 A. ἦ καί ἐὰν οὕτω θεώνται, ἀλλοίαν τ' οὐ φήσεις αἴτους δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα ἀποκρυνέσθαι; 

The reading of the best mss ἦ καί—ἀλλοίαν τοι κτλ. is retained by Schneider and (with ο服务于 change of τοι to τε) by Stallbaum and Hermann. On this view ἀλλοίαν δόξαν λήψεσθαι must be understood as denoting a change of opinion from the ἀλλοίαν δόξαν of 499 E. But it is extremely awkward to suppose that the ἀλλοίαν δόξα is different in the two cases; nor can men be said to change an opinion which it is doubtful if they ever held. These difficulties have led Hermann to read ἀλλ' οἷς τοι (with Stephanus and some inferior mss) in 499 E, understanding λογιζόμενος before οἷς τοι—surely a strange ellipse, and otherwise an insufficient remedy. ἀλλ' οἷς τοι in 499 E was also adopted by Ast, with other changes too extensive to need refutation, though supported in part by the reading of inferior mss. There should be no doubt that ἀλλοίαν τοι in the earlier passage is sound. In 500A Jowett proposes to read ἦ καί, joining καί and οὕτω, and placing a full stop after ἀποκρυνεσθαι. A similar view was held by Ast. But καί could hardly be taken with οὕτω, and ἦ καί would strike every reader as the usual particle of interrogation. ἦ γὰρ (interrogative), which Vermehren conjectures (Pl. Stud. p. 58), is highly improbable. I formerly read ἦ οἷς, and altered τοι to τε. ἦ οἷς is favoured also by Campbell, but the authority for the negative—q and Flor. U—is extremely slight, and Baiter's emendation accounts more easily for the reading of the oldest mss. The retention of καί 'even' is also an improvement: if a negative had been used, we should have expected rather ὀτὲ than ὀξ.
V.

VI 501 A, B. "Επειτα, οὖν, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἀν ἐκατέρωσε ἀποβλέποιεν πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σωφρόν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὐτό, ἐκ ἑν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖν, ἐμμυμιγνύτες τε καὶ κεραννύτες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιθετευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον κτλ.

My view of this passage agrees closely with that of Schneider (see his translation pp. 169, 303) except that I think it is better to translate ἀνδρείκελον by the 'colour and likeness of true Manhood,' rather than by "die Farbe des Menschen," so as to bring out the double signification of the word (see on γράφειν νόμους 501 A). Schneider formerly denied that ἀνδρείκελον meant anything beyond "imago hominis," but he retracts this view in his Additamenta (p. 49) and Translation.

Schneider's text is followed also by Baiter. The majority of editors prefer καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖν ἐμμυμιγνύτες κτλ. (see εἰς. n.). In that case we must emend and write either ἐμποιεῖν τε (Schleiermacher) or καὶ ἐμποιεῖν (Ast), or ἀποβλέποιεν instead of ἀποβλέποιεν (Stallbaum), or something else to the same purpose. Hermann and J. and C. ignore the difficulty altogether. But even with such an emended text, the sense is faulty; for the legislator who starts with a tabula rasa need not trouble about τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δίκαιον etc. His constitution is not a compromise between for example Athens and the World of Ideas, but something as near the latter as the limitations of earthly existence will allow—in other words such a polity as is described in the Republic. The Philosopher-king is not the man to paint an imperfect picture, though he knows that it will be but a picture after all.

Burnet prints ἐπειτα—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖν ἀὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖν, κτλ. This emendation appears to me to deprive ἐκατέρωσε of all meaning and point.

VI

VI 503 C. Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχύνοι καὶ δέξεις καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ τούτων ἔπεται οἴσθ' ὅτι αὖ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοιὰς ὅσοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἕνσυχας καὶ βεβαιώτητος ἐθέλειν ζην, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ δέξυτητος φέρονται ὑπ' ἄν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ὄπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται.

Such is the reading of Α and Π: and none of the other mss have any variant worth discussing.

Of the qualities named, the following appear in the description of the philosophic character (485 C—487 A): εὐμαθεία, μνήμη, μεγαλοπρεπεία. It is also clear that οἱ κοσμίως—ζῆν represents σωφροσύνη (485 E). ἀγχύνοι and δέξεις certainly refer to intellectual qualities, as appears from their combination with εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες, and with ὅσα ἀλλὰ τούτων ἔπεται: cf. also Theaet. 144 A. νεανικοὶ 'spirited' has af-
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finites with ἄνθρειον (486 b—487 α), but Vermehren (Pl. Stud. pp. 98—103) is mistaken in holding that the two notions are identical.

According to Schneider, who retains the reading of the ms, εἰμαθεῖς—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας forms the predicate, the subject being οἶοι—ἐγὼ. This interpretation gives the right sense, but is otherwise forced and unnatural in the last degree. Moreover, if οἶοι is the subject, we can scarcely dissociate οἵ τοιοῦτοι from it, and even on Schneider's view οἵ τοιοῦτοι refers to εἰμαθεῖς—διανοίας.

Stallbaum prints a comma after φύεσθαι, and understands Plato to mean that a combination of the intellectual virtues enumerated in εἰμαθεῖς—δέεις is itself rare, as well as the union of spirit and sobriety. Such a view, even if grammatically possible, is certainly awkward; and we have every reason to suppose that Plato did not consider the union of kindred intellectual qualities as in any way exceptional. It is the union of certain intellectual and moral virtues with certain other moral virtues which he considers rare: cf. Theaet. 144 a, b, the whole of which passage is important for the understanding of Plato here.

Others, such as Vermehren l.c. and J. and C., suppose that οἰοί—ἐγώ is a consequence of νεανίκοι—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς. This is however (as Shorey points out A. J. Ph. xvi p. 236) opposed to every statement made by Plato on the subject. The opposition between θυμοειδές, νεανίκοι, ἄνθρειον (by which is meant, in this particular contrast, the active side of Courage) and πρᾶον, κόσμιον, σῶφρον etc., is regarded by him as the fundamental antithesis of human character: see for example II 375 c, 111 399 c, 410 d, Pol. 306 c ff., 307 c, 309 e, 311 b, Tim. 18 a and Laws 731 b. We have no right to hide this fact by explaining away νεανίκοι. The word means 'full of youthful vigour,' 'spirited,' and nothing more. νεανίκοι is of course a constituent factor in ἄνθρειον, but it is not identical with it, nor do any of the passages which Vermehren cites (Theaet. 168 c, Rep. 425 c, 491 e, 503 e, Lys. 204 e, Alc. 104 α) prove any such identity. Still less does the word mean "generous" (J. and C.), or "kräftig, manhaft, und sittlich tüchtig" (Vermehren).

We may therefore be certain that νεανίκοι—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς is opposed to οἰοί—ἐγώ. The ms reading will admit of this only if we construe φύεσθαι with οἰοί, and suppose that καὶ νεανίκοι—διανοίας is added parenthetically as a sort of afterthought. This was Schleiermacher's view, and it is also one of J. and C.'s alternatives. It is certainly right in sense, but the construction is intolerably ambiguous and awkward (cf. Susemihl, Gen. Entw. ii p. 191 n.).

Various solutions are possible. I formerly (with Heindorf on Theaet. 144 a) transposed καὶ, reading φύεσθαι νεανίκοι—καὶ οἰοί κτλ. Heindorf's remedy is however not quite satisfactory, because it lays all the stress upon the difficulty of finding the two opposite kinds of moral qualities united with intellectual sagacity, whereas—as appears from the next sentence—the relevant point is that intellectual vivacity and acumen are seldom found along with one of the two phases of moral character, viz. sobriety and stedfastness. For this reason I now venture on the transposition printed in the text. It is worthy of note that in two places where the scribe of A omitted a passage of some length,
without the excuse of homoioteleuton, the number of letters is 41 and 39. (See cr. nn. on 504 D, X 601 A and Introd. § 5). Here it is 40. καὶ 

νεανικός—διανοίας may of course be an interpolation, but it is more likely to be an omitted line or lines wrongly replaced.

VII.

VI 507 B. καὶ αὐτῶ δῆ καλὸν καὶ αὐτῶ ἁγαθὸν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων 

ἀ τότε ὃς πολλὰ ἐπιθέμεν, πάλιν αὐ καὶ ἰδέαν μίαν ἕκαστον, ὡς μιὰς ὀψης, 

tibéntes, ὦ ἐστὶν ἑκαστὸν προσαγορεύομεν.

The difficulties of this sentence have hardly received sufficient attention at the hands of editors.

If κατ᾽ ἰδέαν—the reading of all the mss—is genuine, what is the grammatical object of τιθέντες?

Two possibilities suggest themselves. One is to understand ἐν or the like, as parallel to αὐτῶ καλὸν and αὐτῶ ἁγαθὸν. This view is apparently adopted by Schneider, who translates "Und dann ein schönes selbst und ein gutes selbst und so bei allem, was wir dort als vieles setzten, wiederum eins nach der angenommenen Einheit des Begriffs eines jeden setzend nennen wir jedes das, was ist." Stallbaum seems to have taken a similar view, although his note is not quite explicit. But it is so difficult to supply ἐν as an object to τιθέντες that we must, I think, reject this interpretation altogether. The second and more plausible alternative is— with Prantl, and the English editors and translators—to regard the object of τιθέντες as identical with that of ἐπιθέμεν. But κατ᾽ ἰδέαν μίαν τιθέντες is far from clear. τιθέντες ought clearly to be understood in the same sense as ἐπιθέμεν, and the whole phrase should express the antithesis of ὃς πολλὰ ἐπιθέμεν. We are hardly justified in translating τιθέναι κατ᾽ ἰδέαν μίαν as ‘reduce to a single form’ (D, and V.) or ‘bring under a single idea’ (Jowett), although the phrase might possibly here mean ‘regard as belonging to one Idea.’ If κατ᾽ ἰδέαν is sound, the least unsatisfactory course is perhaps to print a colon after ἐπιθέμεν, and explain thus: ‘reversing our procedure, we view them as falling under a single Idea of each,...and call each that-which-ις’: i.e. for example δικαὶ, σῶφρον etc., each of which we took as πολλά, we now regard as belonging to or falling under one Idea of δικαίον, one of σῶφρον etc. But neither this interpretation nor any other which I can devise (such as ‘regard according to’ or ‘in the light of’ one Idea of each) furnishes a thoroughly clear and simple sense, or a satisfactory antithesis to ὃς πολλὰ ἐπιθέμεν. The only suitable contrast is that between the one Idea itself and the πολλά. For this reason I have ventured to replace κατ᾽ by καὶ. The occurrence of τὰς δ᾽ αὐ ἰδέας in the next sentence is also, so far as it goes, in favour of the proposed correction.

If we read καὶ for κατά, we ought certainly (with Bosanquet) to take δ᾽ ἐστίν ἑκαστὸν as a secondary predicate after προσαγορεύομεν. The translation “we call each ‘that-which-ις’” (Schneider and others) is grammatically possible and even necessary, I think, if κατά is retained; but it will scarcely be denied that δ᾽ ἐστίν ἑκαστὸν, taken by itself, is

A. P. II.
most easily and naturally understood as the generalised form of the idiom δ' ἐστιν καλόν, δ' ἐστιν ἀγαθόν etc. If so, δ' ἐστιν ἕκαστον is an additional reason for reading καὶ instead of κατά. We postulate 'one Idea of each' and call it 'what each is.' The balance between ἰδέας μίαν ἕκαστον and δ' ἐστιν ἕκαστον could not be more precise.

In order to provide an object for τιθέντες, I formerly read ἐκαστον, instead of ἕκαστον, but the correction now suggested appears to me better and more likely to be right.

VIII.

VI 507 D, E. Τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσ- δεῖται; Πῶς; Ἔννοιας ποιοῦν ἐν ὀμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἑκοτος χρῆσθαι αὕτη, παροικῆς δὲ χρώας ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἓν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἐκαὶ ἐπ' αὐτό τούτο πεφυκός, οἵτι, ὅτι η' τε ὄψις οὐδέν ὄψεται τα τε χρώματα ἐσται ἄδρατα.

The mss have no variant of any consequence.

Schneider boldly understands αὐτοῖς as τοῖς ὀμμασιν, referring to Tim. 67 c ff., where it is virtually said that Colour, in an act of Sight, ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὴν ὄψιν. But a careful study of the analysis of Sight in the Timaeus will shew that Schneider's view is not supported by that dialogue. If ἐν αὐτοῖς = ἐν τοῖς ὀμμασιν, it is clear from the rest of the sentence that Plato thinks Colour may be present in the eyes even where there is no light. But in the TimaeusColour does not ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὴν ὄψιν when light is absent: see 45 c with Archer-Hind ad loc. The fact is that both in the Timaeus and in the Republic Colour is regarded as inherent in things and not in the eyes: see Tim. 67 c χρώας ἐκαλέσαμεν, φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἐκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν and Rep. 508 c ὅν ἄν τὰς χρώας τὸ ἠμερινὸν φῶς ἑπέκχῃ.

By Schmelzer and the Oxford editors, αὐτοῖς is interpreted as τοῖς ὁρατοῖς "from τοῦ ὁρατοῦ supra." Plato certainly allows himself great latitude in matters of this kind, but not, I think, where the result would be that he must inevitably be misunderstood; and even an intelligent reader might here be forgiven if he referred αὐτοῖς to τοῖς ὀμμασιν.

Various corrections have been proposed. ἐν αὐ τοῖς <ὁρατοῖς> is Richards' conjecture; but Plato is careful throughout this whole discussion to use ὁρατόν only in the singular, as a general term for the visible: cf. 508 c, 509 d (bis). For 'things seen' he uses ὀρόμενα 507 c, 508 a, 508 c, 510 d. On this account ἐν αὐ τοῖς <ὁρομένοις> or (better) ἐν αὐτοῖς <τοῖς ὀρωμένοις> appears to me preferable, if the passage is to be emended on these lines.

In Cl. Rev. xiii p. 99 I ventured to submit another emendation. It will be observed that in the latter part of the sentence Plato treats the colours themselves as the objects of vision (τὰ τε χρώματα ἐσται ἄδρατα), without alluding to the visible objects in which the colours inhere. Cf. also Tim. 67 c ff., and Arist. de An. II 7. 418 a 26 ff. Hence I proposed to read παροικῆς δὲ χρώας, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἓν μὴ παραγένηται κτλ., i.e. 'unless they' (viz. η' ὄψις and χρώα s. τα χρώματα)'are re-
inforced by one genus—making three in all—specially adapted by Nature for this very purpose, you are aware that Sight will see nothing and the colours will be invisible. The order of words recalls δὲ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον above, and the position of ἐν may perhaps be defended as calling special attention to this one thing without which an act of sight is altogether impossible, and as inviting Glauco's question τῶς δή—τοῖς; Morgenstern retained ἐν αὐτοῖς and connected it with the following clause, but ἐν does not go well with παραγένηται, and the emphasis on ἐν αὐτοῖς is excessive.

Other suggestions are ἐφ’ ἵ ἐστι for ἐν αὐτοῖς (Biehl Die Id. d. Guten p. 52), [ἐν] αὐτοῖς (Stallbaum) and ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς (Ast).

If we might venture to read παρασύνης δὲ χρόας, ἐὰν (ἢ ἃν) αὐτοῖς μὴ παραγένηται κτλ., all difficulty would disappear. Meantime, as none of the remedies hitherto suggested is convincing, I have thought it safest to retain the ms reading, understanding αὐτοῖς perforce as τοῖς δρωμένοις. The interesting analysis of Sight in Theæt. 156D ff. is unfortunately of no use for emending the present passage.

IX.

VI 508 D, E. τοῦτο τούτων τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας παρέχων τοῖς γνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γνωσίσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδέδον τὴν τού νῦν ἀγάθῳ ἰδέαν φανεῖν, ἀλήθεια δὲ ἐπιστήμης οὕσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὔτω δὲ καλῶν αμφοτέρων ὀίτων, γνώσεως τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἐτί τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει.

So A reads. The only important variant is διὰ νοῦ (Ξ ἐν and several other mss) for διανοοῦ.

Jowett and Campbell, following Schneider and Hermann, retain the text of A, and translate as follows: “This then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and gives to the knowers the power of knowing, is what I would have you call the idea of good: and this you will deem to be the cause of knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known: but fair as are both these, knowledge and truth, you will be right in thinking that it is something fairer than these.” μὲν is explained as belonging strictly to αἰτίαν and “opposed to the following δὲ: the idea of good is indeed (μὲν) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (δὲ) it is other and fairer than they.” Schneider’s explanation and translation differs hardly at all from that of the Oxford editors.

The above rendering is open to grave objections both on the score of grammar and of sense. διανοεῖσθαι can hardly be used with a participle (ὁσαν) without ὡς: and ὡς γνωσκομένης surely cannot mean ‘so far as known.’ It is also, to say the least, extremely difficult to explain the position of μὲν. διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἑρωτα, which Schneider (Addit. p. 51) cites from X 607ε, is a very remote parallel. Nor is there any point, so far as I can discover, in saying that the Idea of the Good is the cause of truth so far as truth is known. The Idea of the Good is the cause of all Truth, known and unknown. And
there is no echo of any such limitation in the analogous description of Light.

For these and other reasons, Schneider's explanation is, in my opinion, untenable. Nor can I devise any other reasonable solution without altering the text. Of emendations there is, as usual, no lack.

The smallest change is to read δια νοῦ, with Ξ etc. and the editors down to Bekker. But the construction remains extraordinarily obscure. Few will agree with Schmelzer in construing ἡγούμενος δὲ (τὴν τοῦ ἄγαθον ἰδέαν) αἰτίαν ἐπιστήμης—νοῦ, ἡγούμενος δὲ οὕτω καλῶν κτλ. Other proposals are (1) to omit μὲν (Stephanus, who also suggests that a clause may be lost), (2) δ' αὐτοῦ (viz. τοῦ ἄγαθον) for διανοοῦ (Nägelsbach), (3) to omit αἰτίαν—διανοοῦ or ὡς—διανοοῦ, in the latter case reading γ' for δ' after αἰτίαν (Ast), (4) to transpose and read φάθι εἶναι, ὡς γεγυωσκομένη μὲν διὰ νοῦ, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὕσαν καὶ ἄλθειάς (van Heusde), (5) to cancel ὡς—ἡγγαίης as a gloss (Stallbaum), (6) to read δ' for δ' after αἰτίαν and δια νοῦ for διανοοῦ (Richter Flec. 1867 p. 143).

Of these suggestions (1) is inadequate; (2) and (6) only make matters worse; (3) and (5) fail to provide a parallel or ῥάται ἐπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης (sc. τῆς ὑψεως) in 508ν, and are also in themselves too drastic. Van Heusde's solution, which (in common with Baiter) I formerly adopted, gives a good sense, if ὡς be taken principally with the δ' clause ('as being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, although it is itself known by means of Reason'). But it is impossible to assign any probable motive for so serious a dislocation of the text of the mss. The usual devices of homoioteleuton and the accidental omission of a line in the archetype fail us here. See Introd. § 5.

The explanation given in the notes is, I think, satisfactory in point of sense, and assumes no corruption except that of γεγυωσκομένης to γεγυωσκομένης—a natural error after ἄλθειας. I now regard it as much more probable than Van Heusde's solution. (see his Init. Phil. Pl. ed. 1842 p. 388 n.).

X.

VI 511 α. εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθείσων καὶ ἐκείνως πρὸς ἐκείνα ὡς ἐναργείᾳ δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετμημένοις.

The difficulties of this sentence are familiar to all students of Plato. After much consideration, I believe the text to be sound, and the meaning to be as explained in the notes.

In F. Ph. x p. 76 Bywater objects to taking ἀπεικασθείσων as 'copied' or 'imitated,' urging that it must refer to the actual copies themselves. In order to obtain this meaning, he would read ὑποκάτω for ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω, and explain ὑποκάτω ἀπεικασθείσως as the 'sensible copies, and not the (intelligible) originals,' i.e. as CD and not CE. But (1) on this view αὐτοῖς loses its force, and (2) αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἄ πλαττοσιν τε καὶ γράφοντιν, ὡν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ έν ύδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρωμένοι in 510 ε and τούς τότε μιμηθείσοις in 510 β (where see note) prove that ἀπεικασθείσων means not 'copies' but 'copied.'
It is true that this sense of ἀπεικασθέντα is extremely rare, but Tim. 48 c furnishes a close parallel, and εἰκασθέντος in Phaedr. 250 b (quoted by J. and C.) certainly means ‘copied.’ In this passage ὅτι τῶν κάτω, and ἀπ— in ἀπεικασθεὶσιν (combined with the play on εἰκόνα), as well as the precise parallel in 510 e, would make it impossible for a Greek to mistake Plato’s meaning. Stallbaum’s explanation (“formae rerum adspectabilium intelligibiles, sive abstractae ab ipsis rebus et una mentis cogitatione conceptae, quae a rebus inferioribus, i.e. concretis, tanquam similitudine expressae sunt”) is in my judgment wholly wrong: see below. Liebhold’s conjecture ἄπο for ὅτι would make the higher segment a copy of the lower! His further proposal, to read αὐταὶς (viz. τὰς ὑποθέσεων) δῆμοι τῶις κτλ. plunges everything into hopeless confusion. The explanation which I have given of this part of the sentence agrees with that of Schneider and the Oxford editors.

καὶ έκείνοις is also undeniably difficult; but κάκει (proposed by Bywater i.e.) is hardly less so; and we are certainly not justified in transposing αὐταίς and έκείνοις, as Richards proposes to do. Should we perhaps punctuate ἀπεικασθεὶσιν καὶ έκείνοις, πρὸς έκείνα κτλ., and understand καὶ έκείνοις as only ‘et illis,’ ‘illis quoque’ as in Sympr. 212 λ καὶ εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀθανάτῳ καὶ έκείνῳ? The objects in CD are ‘also’ copied by those in AD, exactly as the νοτὸν is by CD (510 λ).

If δεδοξασμένοις is not ‘valued,’ it can only mean ‘opined,’ and we must translate either (1) ‘being opined and honoured as palpable,’ or else (2) ‘being opined as palpable’ (“für wirklich gehalten” Schneider), and honoured accordingly.’ If we adopt the second alternative, ως εναργέσι belongs only to δεδοξασμένοις: but τε καὶ strongly suggests that ως εναργέσι was meant to be taken also with the second participle. The first alternative remedies this defect, but is hardly less unsatisfactory than the second. For ως εναργέσι must then mean one thing with δεδοξασμένοις, and another with τετιμημένοις—‘opined as palpable,’ i.e. ‘opined to be palpable’ and ‘honoured as palpable,’ i.e. ‘honoured because they are palpable.’ Or is δεδοξασμένοις used absolutely, in the sense of ‘the objects of opinion’? If so, this particular difficulty disappears, and Plato means that the contents of CD are the ‘objects of opinion’ (and not of some inferior εἰς) because they are εναργή, and honoured for the same reason. The sentence would then prepare us for the distinction to be presently drawn between δόξα and εἰκασία (511 e). This interpretation is perhaps the least vulnerable, if δεδοξασμένοις can mean no more than ‘opined,’ but it is too subtle and obscure.

A wholly different explanation is given by Stallbaum, and adopted by D. and V. Stallbaum understands ἐκείνα as the objects contained in CE, compared with which, those in DC are ‘vulgarily esteemed distinct and valued accordingly.’ On this view ως would hint that the objects in DC are not in reality, compared with those in CE, εναργή: and the same insinuation would be still further emphasized by δεδοξασμένοις (‘opined’ as opposed to ‘known’). This interpretation is possible so far as the Greek is concerned, except that ἐκείνα can hardly mean anything but AD. Nevertheless, even if we allow that ἐκείνα could refer
to CE, an allusion to the popular prejudice in favour of materialism would be out of place in a scientific classification of ῥά ὀντα in their order of 'clearness.' And Plato has already shewn a tendency to introduce the shadow segment at each stage "in order to make it quite clear at each step how the whole classification coheres" (Bosanquet): hence τοίς τότε μειμθείσιν (510 b) and ὄν καὶ σκιά καὶ ἐν ὑδάσιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν (510 e). Finally, the whole description in τοῦτο—ἀπεικοσθεῖσιν passes first from CE to DC, and then from DC to AD (ὑπὸ τῶν κατō), and a return to CE in the last clause of the sentence, such as Stallbaum supposes, would be artistically unpleasing.

XI.

VI 511 c, d. ὃτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἑπιστήμης τοῦ ὁντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλομένων, ἄι εἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκαίον ἄλλα μὴ αἰσθήσεων αὐτὰ θέασθαι οἰ θεωμένοι, διὰ δὲ τῷ μὴ ἐπ’ ἀρχήν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖς ἄλλες ἐπὶ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν ὅπι ἰσχεῖν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσι σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὑπότων μετ’ ἀρχῆς.

The ordinary view of the last clause of this sentence appears to be "obwohl es in Verbindung mit dem Anfange denkbares ist" (Schneider: cf. Jowett's "although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason"). Some of the difficulties which this translation involves are pointed out by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 141). The most serious of them is that it makes Plato imply that the objects of mathematical study as pursued by mathematicians are not νοητά, whereas he has repeatedly said that they are (see note ad loc.). It may be urged on the other hand that we ought not to take the words too strictly, and that νοῦν ὅπι ἰσχεῖν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσι σοι prepares us for taking νοητῶν in a narrower sense than it has hitherto had. But νοῦν ὅπι ἰσχεῖν is a different thing from the assertion that the objects are not νοητά, for νοῦς is expressly limited by Plato to the higher intellectual method throughout the whole of this passage, διάνοια being used for the lower, as the next sentence carefully explains. In a passage expressly occupied with defining terms, Plato is not, I think, likely to have contradicted himself within a single sentence, by first saying that μαθηματικά (as ordinarily studied) are νοητά and afterwards implying that they are not. μετ’ ἀρχῆς is also far from clear on the ordinary view, for (1) the use of the preposition is obscure, unless something like λαμβανόμενον is understood, and (2) it is not easy to interpret ἀρχῆς of the ἀρχή κατ’ ἔξοχην, i.e. the Good, just after we have been told that μαθηματικά possess ἀρχαὶ of their own (ἄι εἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαῖ). It may be said that ἀρχὴ in ἐπ’ ἀρχην ἀνελθόντες is the Good. So no doubt it is, from Plato's point of view; but we should translate this also 'a beginning,' for the contrast is between the dialectician who ascend (ἐπ’ ἀρχην ἀνελθόντες) to an ἀρχή and the mathematician who does not, but nevertheless has one (without ascending) in his ὑποθέσις.
On these grounds I am unable to accept what seems to be the current interpretation. Campbell appears to take νοητὰ μετ’ ἀρχῆς as a single phrase denoting a special sort of νοητά (“while not absolute νοητά, they are νοητὰ μετ’ ἀρχῆς” Vol. II p. 16). This is certainly better than Jowett’s view, but linguistically it is a little harsh, and in point of fact the higher νοητά (except of course the Good itself) are also νοητὰ μετ’ ἀρχῆς, for μετ’ ἀρχῆς cannot be construed ‘with a hypothetical ἀρχῇ.’ The interpretation which is given in the notes agrees with that of Prantl, and (if I understand him rightly) Krohn. It is, in my opinion, the only natural meaning of the Greek, and what Plato, if Plato wrote the words, intended to say.

The explanation of this clause is a matter of some importance because, if Schneider’s translation is right, it would appear that μαθηματικά can, under certain circumstances, be apprehended by the higher noetic process, and on this an argument might conceivably be founded for identifying them with Ideas. In App. I to Book vii I have tried to show that Plato himself distinguishes no less clearly between the contents of the two higher segments of the line than Aristotle assures us that he did. In reality however the present sentence does not affect the question either way.

The use of καίτου is so strange that some may be inclined to suspect interpolation. It is noticeable that καίτου was often thus used by Plotinus (e.g. x 9. 490 init.). The clause could easily be spared, and may be spurious; but the evidence is not sufficient to justify its exclusion from the text.
I. Μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἴπον, ἀπείκασον τοιοῦτοι πάθει τὴν 514 ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ

514 A—517 A The following comparison represents our nature in respect of education and the absence thereof. Let us imagine a number of prisoners confined in a subterranean cave, and unable to see anything except shadows of images and other such objects, cast by the light of a fire. Such men will believe that shadows of manufactured things are the only truth. If they are released, and led up step by step towards the light, they will turn and flee back into the cave; but if we compel them to emerge, they will gradually grow accustomed to the brightness, and be able to gaze upon the Sun and understand his sovereignty in the domain of visible things. Pity for their former friends will then begin to mingle with joy at their own escape. Should they redescend into their former place, the darkness will at first affect their vision, and expose them to the laughter of the others, who will, it may be, lay hands upon their deliverer and slay him.

514 A ff. The simile of the Cave presents us with a picture of the life of the uneducated man (τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας 514 A: cf. also 513 A). From this point of view it should be compared with Theaet. 172 C—177 C, and (in spite of the different situation) with Phaed. 109 A—E, where the equation is:—Depths of Ocean: Hollows of Earth = Hollows of Earth: The true Earth. Plato bids us connect the Cave with the Line (517 A), and does so himself (i.e., and 532 C). We have seen that the lower segment of the line (AC) is spoken of sometimes as ὀρατόν, sometimes as δοξαστὸν (VI 510 b 11). Plato does not even now distinguish between the two terms; and since the ἀπαιδευσία is concerned with τὸ δοξαστὸν in general rather than with τὸ ὀρατόν exclusively, we shall best apprehend Plato's meaning if we interpret the simile by the following proportion:—Cave : ὀρατόν s. δοξαστὸν = δοξαστὸν s. ὀρατόν: κοπ. See on 517 A and App. I.

2 ἰδὲ γὰρ κτλ. Empedocles spoke of the terrestrial region as a cave (ἔλι-θοις τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν ὑπόστεγον 31 ed. Karsten), and similar expressions occur in the Orphic verses e.g. ταῦτα πατὴρ ποίησε κατὰ στέψη ἡροεὶς (ap. Procl. in Tim. 95 D); see Rohde Psychē 11 p. 178 n. and Dieterich Nekyia p. 159 n. There is however nothing to shew that Plato borrowed the underlying idea, much less the details, of his simile from any previous writer; for the metaphorical application of ἀνω, ὑψόθεν and kindred words in connexion with true παιδεία is a favourite usage of Plato's (cf. Theaet. 175 b, Soph. 216 c, Phaed. 109 A ff.), and the simile might easily have been elaborated from such a metaphor. For a strikingly eloquent imitation see Cic. de nat. deor. 11 95 (translated from Aristotle: see Frag. 14. 1476a 34 ff.). With the life of the cave-dwellers Bosanquet aptly compares the account of uncivilized humanity in Aesch. Prom. 447—453. A kindred though not identical figure is employed in Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyām LXVIII: "We are no other than a moving row Of magic Shadow-shapes that come and go Round with the Sun-illumined Lantern held In Midnight by the Master of the Show."
Herwerden suspects corrosion, on the ground that the cave is dark, except for the light of the fire. But unless the entrance to the cave is open to the light of day, how are the prisoners ever to emerge, as they ultimately do (513 E)? The évsoás is long (μακρά) and steep (513 E), so that the daylight cannot reach the cave in any case. Prantl is right, I think, in understanding μακρὰν of length and not width, although Schneider and the English translators apparently hold the other view. See next note.

4 পারঃ অর্থাৎ তম স্পৃহালন শুধু (আমি ভাবলাম) প্রবেশ করা হয় না। The words define the width of the entrance, which is "along the whole of," i.e. "as wide as," the cave. The reason will appear later: see on δρα τον ὑπ' 514 B. The translation "extending along the entire length of the cavern" (D. and V.) seems to render μακρὰν altogether otiose. See Fig. II on p. 65.

6 μένων τις αὐτὸς. See cr. n. Hirschig's emendation, which Cobet approves and Hermann and others adopt, I now think right. μένων is not, I believe, used absolutely in the sense of μένων αὑτοῦ, which is the meaning required here. It might be possible to understand μένων as equivalent to μένων ἀκόμης, in view of Crat. 426 E and Phædr. 261 D, but 'remain motionless' is not quite suitable in point of sense. Still less does the possible rendering 'remain by themselves' fit the situation. On the other hand μένων τις αὐτὸς 'remain, where they are,' 'remain in one place' (cf. I 327 C, II 371 C), corresponds exactly to ἐν δεσμῶι τῇ σκέλῃ, just as εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὄραν, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιέχει, φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἀνώθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καόμενον ὀπίσθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν δεσμῶτων ἐπάνω ὄδὸν, παρ' ἵνα τείχῳ παρακο-δομέμενον, ὦσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται 10

6. αὐτοῦ Hirschig: αὐτοῦς codd. τὸ ΑΣ: om. AL.

den's proposal to insert ἀκόμης.

Puerile interpretamentum" says Herwerden, quite superfluously. Hirschig's ἀδυνάτωτας for ἀδυνάτους is no improvement. The word, like ὄντας, depends of course on ὑπ'. For καόμενον, Hirschig, with Cobet's approval, conjectures κασ-μένον, and so Baiter also reads: but καόμενον leaves αὐτοῦ out in the cold. "Vide ne φῶς πυρὸς ita in unam notionem coalescent, ut alterius attributum simul etiam alteri conveniat" Hermann. This explanation is correct: cf. 517 B.

9 ἐπάνω ὄδον. ἐπάνωδον (Badham), which means 'ascensum,' is out of place here. ἐπάνω means only that the road is at a higher elevation than the prisoners (so also Schneider): it should not be taken with ὄδον in the sense of a 'raised way' (Jowett). There is no reason why the ὄδον should be raised above the level of the ground and it is unnecessarily harsh to construe the adverb with the noun. The fact that verbal nouns occasionally take an adverb in Plato (see on IV 434 c) does not justify Jowett's construction in this passage.

10 ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς κτλ. As in a Punch and Judy show. Cf. [Arist.] de Mundo 6. 368b 16 ff. οἱ νευρα-ς pατάζαι μᾶν μήρῳν ἔπιπασάμενοι ποιόι καὶ αὐχέναι καὶ κήρα τοῦ ἵππον καὶ ἵππον καὶ ἢφαλαμδύ κτλ. (Blümmer, Privata letterh. p. 501, n. 5, where other references are given). I agree with the Oxford editors in holding that τῶν ἀνθρώπων denotes the performers, and not, as Schneider and others translate, the spectators. οἱ ἀνθρώποι could not, without further specification, stand for the spectators, and no further specification is given. But Jowett and Campbell are, I think, in error when they distinguish between the θαυματοποιοῖς and the ἀν-
Θρωτον, and suppose that the θαυματοσώς is "not the actual exhibitor or puller of the strings, but the master of the show." The ἄνθρωποι and the θαυματοσώς are the same, and Plato might, if he had been so minded, have written ὡσπερ τοῖς θαυματοσώσις πρὸ ἐαυτῶν κτλ. The substitution of τῶν ἄνθρωπων for ἐαυτῶν puts the matter in a more objective way, and has also a contemptuous effect.

12 ὁρὰ τοῖνυ κτλ. τοῖνυ is 'also' (1 339 D n.). The low wall which crosses the εἴσοδος at a point between the prisoners and the fire intercepts the shadows of the παραφέροντες: but the σκέυος which they carry, presumably on their heads, overtop the wall, and are reflected on the wall of the cave in front of the prisoners. See Fig. ii on p. 65. Plato adopts various devices in order to suggest a due proportion between the objects inside and outside the cave in point of reality. Thus (1) the typical examples ἄνθρωπες etc. are themselves images of the natural objects of the superior ὀράτων: (2) the originals of the Cave are all (except the prisoners themselves 515 A) σκειναστα, whereas those of the superior ὀράτων are —primarily speaking—φυτευτα (for the significance of this see 532 c n.): (3) the contents of the Cave, both originals and shadows, may be regarded as less luminous and true than the ὀράτα outside, because they derive their light and truth, not from the Sun, but from an artificial Fire (see also on 517 c). The interpretation of the simile is to be sought in the δοξαστῶν generally as well as in the ὀράτων in particular (see on 517 λ), but we need not suppose that every detail is significant. Comparisons have been made between the παραφέροντες and (in the ὀράτων) βαίμοσει (Campbell II p. 16, comparing Tim. 43), or (in the δοξαστῶν) Sophists etc. (Shorey, Idea of Good etc. p. 238). The latter analogy is the more fruitful, but neither of them is altogether free from difficulty, and Plato may have intended the παραφέροντες only as part of the machinery of his similitude. If the Cave is to represent the world of τὰ πολλά, it must have a semblance of life and motion; and without the παραφέροντες the shadows would be motionless and dead.

516 A 2 οἶον εἰκῶς should be taken with what follows: cf. IV 419 A n.

3 φθειρομένουs merely prepares the way for 515 B εἰ καὶ ἥχω κτλ., and beyond this, it has, I think, no meaning. It certainly does not "prepare for the science of harmonies" (as J. and C. hold): see 532 B n. and App. I.

τῶν παραφερόντων (braceleted by Baiter) is natural enough, παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τείχος φέροντας being too distant to cause difficulty.

515 B 8 τὶ δὲ; τῶν παραφερομένων κτλ. After τούτῳ supply οἷς ὁ ἐφαρμάζεται αὐτοῖς. I have placed a mark of interrogation after τὶ δὲ, in order that τῶν παραφερομένων may have its proper emphasis: cf. V 470 A n.

10 οὐ ταὐτὰ κτλ.: 'do you not suppose that they were
naming these particular passing objects which they saw?" They have never seen anything of the real παρόντα (or παράδειγμα): therefore (οὐ) they suppose themselves to be naming, i.e. using the name of, not (as is in point of fact the case) the real παρόντα, but only these παρόντα which they see. For example, they call the shadow of a table 'a table,' and in so doing they are, without knowing it, naming, not, as they suppose, the shadow, but the substance. J. and C. remark that "παρόντα is rather confusing as it might signify either the shadows" (cf. 516 C) "or the realities" (cf. 515 D). True: but ταύτα τὰ παρόντα, ἀπερ ὅρφεν can signify only the shadows. The corruption παρόντα for παρόντα (see εἰρ. n.) is easy, and occurs in some MSS at 516 C (where παρόντα again = παράδειγμα scil. Plato means (to interpret the allegory) that what the ἀπαθείνοντα calls a substance is only a shadow. For other views of this sentence see App. IV.

12 εἰ καὶ ἥχω κτλ. The voices heard by the ἀπαθείνοντα are as shadowy as the forms he sees: βλέποντες ἐβλέπον μάτην, ἐκλώστες οὐκ ἦκουν, ἀλλ' ὀφειράθον ἄλγυκος μορφαι τὸν μακρὸν βιόν ἔφευρον εἰκῇ πάντα (Aesch P. V. 447—450).

515 C 15 νομίζοντες κτλ. νόμος, not φύσις, is the watchword of ἀπαθείνοντα.

16 σκευαστῶν is said by J. and C. to be "diminutive images of ordinary artificial objects," but the word does not convey this meaning. For the purposes of this simile σκευαστὰ are reckoned as less real than φυσεῖα: see on ὅν τοῖν κτλ. 514 B and φαντάζομαι θεία 532 C. Plato takes no account of the fact that the prisoners also see shadows of themselves (515 Α).

17 λύσιν κτλ. According to 532 Β (where see note), λύσι—τῶν ἄλλων εἰδολα (516 Α) symbolizes Plato's προταιδεία or inferior νοητῶν.

18 εἰ φύσει τοιάδε κτλ. φύσις has been variously interpreted as follows. (1) 'φύσει is est revera' (Ast, Stallbaum): (2) 'si res et natura ferret,' 'in the course of nature' (Schneider, J. and C., D., and V.): (3) 'φύσει, no one knows how' (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 260). None of these explanations is either linguistically easy or altogether suitable in point of meaning. It should be remembered that the condition of the prisoners, shut out as they are from light and truth amid the darkness of the Cave, is 'unnatural' (παρά φύσιν) in the Platonic sense of the word (see IV 443 B n.). Their release is therefore a return to their true nature, and may for this reason be described as 'natural.' This, I think, is what Plato means to suggest by φύσει. It is true, as we are presently told (515 Ε βίος), that force has to be employed in order to drag the prisoners on high; but their deliverance is none the less the 'natural' in Plato's way of thinking. Schleiermacher and Herwerden wish to read οὗ τιν ἐν εἰς φύσει, εἰ τοιάδε κτλ. The fact that εἰ was omitted by Α, and is absent from five other MSS, may appear to favour this conjecture. We might suppose that εἰ fell out by ὀμοστελέντων after φύσει, disappeared altogether from several MSS, and was wrongly replaced in A. (The evidence of II is unfortunately wanting here.) But on this view it is difficult to see what φύσι adds to οὗ τιν ἐν εἰς, and for this and other reasons I prefer the solution which I have given.
20 αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταύτα ποιῶν ἄλγοι τε καὶ διὰ τὰς μαρμαργύρας ἁδύνατοι καθοράν ἔκεινα, ὡν 1 τότε τὰς σκίας ἐσώρα, τί ἂν οἱεὶ αὐτόν εἴπειν, εἰ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι, D ὅτι τότε μὲν ἐσώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντως καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένοις ὀρθότερον βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ 25 ἐκαστὸν τῶν παριστάντων δεικνύς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζοι έρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ο ὅτι ἐστιν; οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἃν καὶ ἤγεισθαι τὰ τότε ὀρόμενα ἀλήθεστα η τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; Πολύ γ', ἐφι.

II. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι 1 αὐτόν βλέ- πειν, ἄλγειν τε ἃν τά ὄμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρέφομεν πρὸς 30 ἔκεινα, ἆ δύναται καθοράν, καὶ νομίζειν ταύτα το ὄντα σαφέστερα τῶν δεικнυμένων; Οὕτως, ἐφι. Εἰ δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼν, ἐντεθεὶν ἐκλοι τις αὐτόν βία διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ ἄνειθ πρὶν ἐξελκύσεις εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἱλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχι ἄδυνασθαι τε ἂν καὶ ἄγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς | ἐλθο, 516 αὐγής ἂν ἔχοντα τά ὄμματα μεστὰ ὀράν οὐδ' ἐν ἄν δυνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀλθῶν; Οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἐφι, ἐξαίφνυς γε. Συνιήθεις δή, οἴμαι, δέουτ' ἂν, εἰ μέλλω τα τά ἄνω ψευδθαί, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τάς

23. τι ἈΣ: om. Α1 q. 24. καὶ δὴ καὶ ΕΩ: καὶ δὴ Α. 25. ἐκαστὸν ἈΣ q: ἐκαστὸν nisi fallor Α1. 33. ἀνενι Λ1; ἀνενι ΛΠΕι: ἀνενι q.
symbolizes the higher stages of Plato's
t oppaiédela, and ùsterov de autá—oûs
eîov (the higher οράτων) corresponds to
the higher νοημ. See 532 B, C in
autá, tâ év tî oûrâno—νûktowr kai
tûn ἤλων represent an ascending scale of
Idea up to the Good: cf. note on τον
ᠭνοημ. B 511 B. It may be doubted
whether in point of fact the released
prisoner would not be able to look on
the heavens by night sooner than upon
'objects themselves' (αὐτά) by day. But
the simile holds good in so far as the eye
mounts ever higher: and the moon and
stars are nearest to the sun (ἡλioiēiôs,
says Proclus in temp. 1 p. 294. 6 Kroll),
which is the ultimate goal.
516 B 13 συλλογισμὸ κτλ. should be
interpreted by B 509 B (the Good as
the cause of Being). oîôs is preferred
by Stallbaum and others to αὐτός (see cr.
.), in which J. and C. find "a solemn
emphasc." There is no difficulty about the
repetition (αὐτός—αὐτός), but αὐτός
'ipse' is less suitable here than the
deictic αὐτός: cf. αὐτή in 517 C and vi
462 E n.
516 C 20 τῷ δεξιάτα καθορωντι
κτλ. "Induction conceived as inference
from particulars to particulars, its test
being prediction (not explanation), and
its method being association of images or
unanalysed likenesses, by contiguity in
c0-existence or succession" Bosanquet.
Plato is thinking chiefly of the empirical
politician and political adviser, who fore-
tells the future from the present and the
past (cf. Thuc. i 22), but limits his intel-
tlectual horizon by his own experience,
and knows nothing of the real deter-
mining causes of events. The vast
majority of Athenian statesmen belonged
in Plato's opinion to this category: see
on ν 473 C and vi 488 B.
22 αὐτών does not of course depend
on πρότερα (as D. and V. translate), but
is a partitive genitive after οὖσα.
25 te kal ένδυναστεύονται, ὡ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἁν πεπονθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βουλεσθαι ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλοιρ, ἀνδρὶ παρ᾽ ἀκλήρῳ, καὶ ὄτιοι ἁν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἡ κεῖνα τε ἐξοξαζεῖν καὶ ἔκεινοις ζηὖν; Οὔτος, ἔφη, ἐγὼ όμι, τάν μᾶλλον Θ πεπονθέναι ἃν δέξασθαι ἡ ζῆν ἐκείνωσ. Καὶ τόδε ὅτι ἐννοοῦσον, ὡν 
30 δ᾽ ἐγώ. ἐι πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβάς εἰς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θάκου καθίζοντο, ἃρ ὅ σκοτος <ἀν> ἀνάπλεως σχοῖν τοὺς οὐθελμοὺς ἐξαίφνης ἥκων ἐκ τοῦ ἥλιου; Καὶ μάλα γ᾽, ἔφη. Τάς δὲ ὅ σκιᾶς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δεόι αὐτοῦ γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλάσθαι τοὺς ἀεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, ἐν δ᾽ ἄμβλυντετε, πρὶν ἐκαταστήναι τά ὀμματα, οὔτος δ᾽ ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἶν τῆς συνηθείας, ἃρ ὦ γέλωτ' ἀν παρά-

30. ὁ τοιοῦτος ΠΙ: ὅτι οὔτος Α. 

516 D 25 τοῦ Ὁμήρου κτλ. Ι formerly proposed to omit πεπονθέναι, but a precise parallel is furnished by Ἰνύρ. 198 C ατεγυνό τοῦ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἐπετούθην. ἄν makes πεπονθέναι equivalent to the future perfect—a more vigorous form of expression than the future (or aorist with ἄν) would be. The quotation (which is from Ὁδ. XI 489, cf. supra 311 386 c) "has a curious felicity, being the words of Achilles in expressing his destitution of the world of shades (lit. shadows) in comparison with the world of human life" (Bosanquet). It is better, I think, to connect διάχωρον with θητευομένοις (Ameis on Od. I.c.) than with παρά (as Schneider does).

27 καὶ οὕτως κτλ. ἄν (which Richard would alter to ὅ) is as suitable here as before, since since ἄν πεπονθέναι depends in both cases directly on δόξεις. The confusion of ἄν and ὅ is not so frequent as some have thought: see on ν 450 C.

28 δοξάζειν = 'opine' is technical: for the cave is an allegory of τοῦ δοξαστῶν (514 A H.).

516 E 31 ἄν. See cr. n. and IV 437 B H. Stallbaum proposes ἄν πνεύμα, but Baiter's solution (which Cobet and Herwerden also recommend) is easier and better. ἄπαθεως suggests contagion: see Ruhnken on Tim. Lex. s. v. σχοῖν as usual is inchoative or ingressive ('get'): cf. 520 D and 527 B.

33. γνωματεύοντα: 'discriminating,' 'distinguishing,' 'judging,' as explained by the Scholiast (διακρίνοντα, διαγνωσθέντα ἀκριβῶς), Suidas and Timaeus (if with Ruhnken we read γνωματεύοντα for γνωμονεύοντα). A similar explanation appears in the margin of A (γρ κρίνοντα γρ γνωσθεικ subordinate of δοξαστήρ). The word is derived of course from γνῶμα ("means of judging," 'test'), for which see Jebb on Soph. Τυ. 593. γνωματεύω occurs only here in good Greek, but became more frequent afterwards (for instances see Ruhnken in Tim. Lex. s. v.). Here, as J. and C. remark, it seems to be "used with some degree of contempt" (like τεταύξιον in 521 E).

34 ἄμβλυντετε. For the mood see 515 E II. ἄμβλυντοι occurs in γ and Flor. U, and is read by Bekker and others. Herwerden adds ἐτι after ἀμ-

517 A I οὔτος δ᾽ ὁ χρόνος κτλ. is still under the influence of εἰ. With ἄρ' ὦ γέλωτ' ἄν κτλ. cf. Pind. 249 D ἐσταῖμενος δὲ τῶν ἅνσεται πυνθάνων σπουδασμάτων, καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖο γιγαντίου, νοθεύεται μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακίμων, ἐνδο-

4 οὐκ ἄξιον κτλ. The prisoners are almost relieved to find themselves able to suppress their higher promptings and sink back into indolence and self-complacency.
fest and touching passage to the death of Socrates, whose fate was the most conspicuous example in Greek history of the principle here laid down. See Zeller's "Phaedo of Plato," pp. 522—527 and cf. vi, 406 c, D, n. Read in the light of another and even more momentous sacrifice, the sentence assumes a kind of prophetic import, like the famous passage about the λέγοντα θείον in the Phaedo (85 c, D). See Geddes's "Phaedo of Plato," pp. 280—283. The text is difficult to determine. If we retain λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείναν, ἀποκτείναναι ἄν, we must either (a) regard ἄρ' οὖν—λέγοντα ἄν as equivalent to ἄρ' οὖκ οἷον ἔγετο, ἂν αὐτὸν παρασκεύην καὶ λέγοντα ἄν, and take λέγοντας ἄν as equivalent to ἐκεῖνος ἂν εἰπέεν, carrying on ἐκεῖον as subject to ἀποκτείναναι ἄν (Schneider), or (b) supply οὖκ οἷον, although these words do not occur after 516 c (J. and C.). The second solution is preferable to the first, but either is a tour de force. No satisfactory explanation of the infinitive ἀποκτείναναι ἄν appears to be possible, and the immediate juxtaposition of the two forms of the infinitive is also in itself suspicious. A few inferior MSS read ἀποκτείνεται for the ἀποκτείναν and ἄρ' for the ἄν of A; but otherwise there is no important variant. The emendations proposed are (1) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείνειν (Ast), (2) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείναν (Stallbaum), (3) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείναν (Cobet), (4) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείναν (Baiter). The correction in the text appears to me not only easier, but more in harmony with Plato's fulness of expression. I suppose that the error arose thus. A scribe accidentally omitted ἀποκτείναναι, and the infinitive was wrongly replaced after, instead of before, ἀποκτείνειν. This would give λαβεῖν καί ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείναναι ἄν, from which the change is inevitable to the text of A.

517 B—518 B The simile of the Cave should be connected with the death of Socrates. See Zeller's "Phaedo of Plato," pp. 280—283. Read in the light of another and even more momentous sacrifice, the sentence assumes a kind of prophetic import, like the famous passage about the λέγοντα θείον in the Phaedo (85 c, D). See Geddes's "Phaedo of Plato," pp. 280—283. The text is difficult to determine. If we retain λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείναν, ἀποκτείναναι ἄν, we must either (a) regard ἄρ' οὖν—λέγοντα ἄν as equivalent to ἄρ' οὖκ οἷον ἔγετο, ἂν αὐτὸν παρασκεύην καὶ λέγοντα ἄν, and take λέγοντας ἄν as equivalent to ἐκεῖνος ἂν εἰπέεν, carrying on ἐκεῖον as subject to ἀποκτείναναι ἄν (Schneider), or (b) supply οὖκ οἷον, although these words do not occur after 516 c (J. and C.). The second solution is preferable to the first, but either is a tour de force. No satisfactory explanation of the infinitive ἀποκτείναναι ἄν appears to be possible, and the immediate juxtaposition of the two forms of the infinitive is also in itself suspicious. A few inferior MSS read ἀποκτείνεται for the ἀποκτείναν and ἄρ' for the ἄν of A; but otherwise there is no important variant. The emendations proposed are (1) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείνειν (Ast), (2) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείναν (Stallbaum), (3) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείναν (Cobet), (4) λαβεῖν, καί ἀποκτείναν (Baiter). The correction in the text appears to me not only easier, but more in harmony with Plato's fulness of expression. I suppose that the error arose thus. A scribe accidentally omitted ἀποκτείναναι, and the infinitive was wrongly replaced after, instead of before, ἀποκτείνειν. This would give λαβεῖν καί ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείναναι ἄν, from which the change is inevitable to the text of A.
517 B 12 ἄλτιδος: ‘surmise’: cf. ιι 383 B n. The diffidence of tone recals VI 506 E: cf. infr. 523 A. 14 φαίνεται. For the construction cf. I 334 B n. τελευταία as well as μῦχος should be taken predicatively with ὀράσθαι. The sentiment is as in VI 505 A (ὅτι—ίσμεν), where see note. 517 C 17 τεκόσα κτλ. τεκόσα reminds us that the Sun is the ἐκγόρος of the Good (VI 506 E). On ἀλήθειαν καὶ νόην see VI 508 D n. ὅτι δὲι depends on φαίνεται, not (as D. and V. translate) on συλλογιστέα. Cf. VI 505 A, 506 A nn. Plato’s guardians are not to rest satisfied with the ἐκών or ἐκγόρον of the Good; they must see the Good itself, and infer (not by intuition, but) by means of reasoning (συλλογιστέα) that it is the cause of all. See the notes on VI 511 B (αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος and τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου). 517 D 26 ἀσχημονεὶ κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 174 B, c ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἦ πον ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας—διὰλεγόντα, ἑλεχτα παρέχει—ἡ ἀσχημοσύς ἀνεύ—γελοῖος φαίνεται. The whole of the description of the φιλοσοφὸς in the Thetetetus should be carefully compared with this passage. 27 ἐτι ἀμβλυώττων is logically subordinate to ἀναγκαζόμενος. 29 τῶν τοῦ δικαίου κτλ. treats the Cave as an allegory of δοξοστὰ (see on VI 510 A, VII 517 A). The expression ‘shadows of the just’ is vague (cf. σκια-μαχοῦντων in 520 c), and ἡ ἀγαλμάτων ὁν ἀι σκιᾷ introduces more precision. We may regard ἀγαλμάτων as symbolising the enacted laws of a city, and their shadows as the ‘representation or mis-representation of the existing laws (themselves only ‘images’ of justice) by a rhetorician or pleader’ (Nettleship Hell. p. 141 n. 1). Compare (with Shorey Idea of Good etc. p. 287) Soph. 234 C and Pol. 393 C. 30 ὅτι ποτὲ—Ἰδόντων. For the real
point at issue is not the law, but the judges' interpretation thereof. Plato is doubtless thinking of Socrates and his judges throughout the whole of this passage.

518 A 7 φανότερον ('greater brightness,' 'more light') and λαμπρότερον are neuter. The omission of articles elevates the style. Richards would delete ὑπὸ λαμπρότερον, but the words balance ὑπὸ ἄνθειας exactly as ἐσκότωται balances μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπληται, and ὑπὸ δὴ τὴν μὲν εἰδαμονίσεις ἄν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλείσεις, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπί αὐτῇ Βούλιοτο, ἦττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γῆλος αὐτῷ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῇ ἀνώθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἢκούσῃ. Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

IV. Δει δὴ, εἴπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνοιτι νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταύτ' ἀληθῆ; τὴν παίδειαν οὐχ οἷαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι φασίν εἶναι, 

9. εἰδαμονίσεις εἰ: εἰδαμονίσεις ΛΠΣ.
position is emphatic, and makes us half-suspect some allusion to a particular Sophist: cf. Aristotle's use of τοίς (Bonitz Ind. Arist. p. 598). Similar sophistic ἐπαγγέλματα are ridiculed, though on different grounds, by Isocrates Soph. 2 ff.; see also Prot. 318 ff. and Euthyd. 273 D ff. (ἀρέτην, ἐφι sc. ὁ Ἐσθάγμας,—οἴκουσα οὐ  τε' εἶναι παραδοτάν καλλίστην ἀνθρώποι καὶ τάξιστα), and cf. Newman Politics of Aristotle i p. 387. It should be mentioned that the double εἶναι has been suspected by Richards, who would omit the first; but Plato himself is not averse to such repetitions: cf. μετέχειν—μετέχειν in VI 511 E and X 621 B n.

518 C 16 ἐντιθέναι. Cf. Theognis 429—438 (εἰ δ' ἐν ποιητώς τε καὶ ἐν ἔθετον ἄνθρωπον νοήμα 435). The grossly material and mechanical view of education which Plato here attacks has some affinity with what is sometimes called 'cram.' ἐντιθέναι was used of a nurse feeding children (I 345 B n.); but such an allusion, though not in itself inappropriate, is scarcely intended here. Cf. also Smyr. 175 D, E. 17 ὁ δὲ γε γενν. λάγων κτλ. Sophists proceed to put ἐπιστήμη into the soul; but Plato's argument indicates that the power or faculty of ἐπιστήμη (ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν), and its organ νοῦς are already present in the soul of each individual, just as ὄφσ and ὁμα are already possessed by the prisoners in the cave. νοῦς is in fact the θεῖον τι ἐν ἡμῖν, according to Plato, through whose indwelling man is most truly man by being like to God (VI 501 B, IX 890 D n.). The doctrine that μάθησις is αἰνῶμαι implies what is fundamentally the same view: see Mem St A ff. and Phaed. 72 E—76 D, especially 73 A ἐφορόμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐὰν τις κακὸς ἐρωτά, αὐτός λέγοντας πάντα ἐκείν: κατ' αὐτό ομοί εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἐν οὖσα καὶ ὁ δῆσει λάγων, οὐκ ἐν οὐδὲ τ' ἔχαν τοῦτο παθήσαι. We may even go further and say that Plato's conception of the divine element in man is the ultimate basis of all his proofs of Immortality. In its deeper bearings, therefore, the view of education here presented is incomparably grander and more profound than the usual connotation of the word either in ancient or in modern times. We educate our pupils not only for time, but for eternity, and therefore πείρας οὐδὲν ἀνήσυχος, ἕως ἂν η ἐπιστήμην καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τούτος ἂν, ἢ προβρον τι ποιήσαμεν εἰς ἐκέινον τὸν βίον, ήταν αὐτὸς γεγονόμενος τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπιστήμοις λόγοις (VI 498 D). See also X 618 C ff. and Phaed. 107 D f. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἡκύναι εἰς άλλων ή ψυχής ἢταξα πλήρως τοῦτο τοιαῦτα καὶ τοίοῦτο κτλ. Michael Angelo used to say that every block of marble contained a statue, and that the sculptor brings it to light by cutting away the encumbrances by which the 'human face divine' is concealed. In like manner, according to Plato, it is the business of the teacher to prune the soul of his pupil of those unnatural excrescences and incrustations which hide its true nature (519 A, B n.), until the human soul divine (VI 501 B n.) stands out in all its pristine grace and purity. It should carefully be noted that in Plato's theory of education the entire soul is involved (ἐν δὲ ἄλλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ). The Platonic περισσωγὶ, although, or rather, perhaps, because, it applies primarily and immediately to the intellect, effects a moral no less than an intellectual revolution. The moral discipline of Books II—IV, so far from being overthrown, is strengthened and consolidated by being intellectualised. Cf. also 519 A B n. 18 ἐκάστου. ἐκάστος was read by Iamblichus (Propert. 16) for ἐκάστου: but cf. 527 D n. 19 έξιν. See on IV 424 D. Here, as in Gorg. 513 A and Laws 678 C, it implies an intimate, almost organic, connexion ('in conjunction with'). Lina (de praef. usu Plat. p. 33) is mistaken in holding that έξιν introduces a mere "Anhängsel" in this passage.
καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένεται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Ζ

καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένεται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη.


26 23 τοῦτο τοῦτο κτλ. “Construe: (ἡ παίδεια) ἐγὼ ἀν τέχνη τῆς περιαγωγῆς (i.e. τοῦ περιέχειν, quod precedent) τοῦτον αὐτὸν (τοῦ ὁμοίου τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥς καταμαθώντες ἔκαστο) —οὐ (τέχνη) τοῦ ἐμποιεῖται αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα — ἄλλα (τοῦ) μηχανήσατα τοῦτο (ὡστε βλέπειν ὑδείω).”

Ast. This interpretation is, I believe, correct.

Plato began by asserting that Education is not what certain Sophists declare it to be — the putting of sight, as it were, into blind eyes. For there is already in every man’s soul an eye or ὀργανὸν, which sees or learns already; what is required is to turn this ὀργανὸν round. Hence he concludes ἅτιους ὑποτάσσει. Education is not (as the Sophists say) an art of putting sight into the soul’s eye (τοῦ ἐμποιεῖται αὑτῷ τὸ ὄνομα refers to τυφλοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ δὴν ἐντεθεὶτε, but an art of turning round just this very eye or ὀργανὸν which is present in every soul from the first. The prevailing view since Schneider regards τοῦτον αὐτὸν as an anticipative and explained by, not as depending on, τῆς περιαγωγῆς. This yields a tolerable sense, but makes it difficult to supply the subject of μεταστραφῆσαι, and αὐτῷ is also awkward. On Ast’s view τοῦτο — μεταστραφῆσαι explains τοῦτον αὐτὸν τῆς περιαγωγῆς, and the subject of μεταστραφῆσαι as well as the antecedent of αὐτῷ is at once seen to be τὸ ὀργανὸν ὥς καταμαθώντες ἐκαστο, for it is identical with the antecedent of τοῦτον αὐτοῦ.

25 τοῦ ἐμποιεῖται κτλ. The genitive has been wrongly taken as one of the rare examples in good Greek of an independent final infinitive (Weiske quoted in A. J. Ph. IV p. 418), a construction for which see Jannaris Historical Greek Grammar pp. 483, 576. It depends on τέχνη: see last note. For διαμηχανήσατα Ast (with some inferior mss) reads ἄδη μηχανήσατα: but cf. (with Schneider) Laws 746 C τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ διαμηχανώσατα ἐπικε ὑγίειν.

28. γεγονὸς τι εἶναι. Campbell conjectures ἐγγύς τι τέλεως. I once thought of ἐγγύς τι τέλεως, taking the aorist as an explicit reference to the ethical virtues already discussed; but the text is doubtless sound: cf. v 472 c and VIII 544 D (μεταξὺ τοῦ τούτων του εὐεργ.)

518 E καὶ εἴθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεις. Aristotle Nic. Eth. II 1 is in effect a commentary on this text: note in particular ἦ δ’ Ἰδίκη (ἀρετή) εἰ έθυνε περιγράφεται (1103 a 17) —οὐδείμα τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἴδιμι ἐγγράφεται (ibid. 19) — τὰ δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνοντες ἐνεργήσαστες πρότερον (1103 a 31).

ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονίσατο κτλ. The ἀρετή of φρονίσατο (=νοησίας or the exercise of νοῆς) is not merely καλομική ψυχῆς, but does in reality belong to (for τυχάναι ὡσα cf. I 337 b 11)—is an essential attribute of — something more divine (than that to which the other virtues belong),
The meaning of φόνησις has changed since IV 433 b (see on IV 428 b) in conformity with the intellectualism of Books vii and vi.

31 παντὸς μᾶλλον has been suspected, and Madvig proposes ύφασματος or πλασματος μᾶλλον, Richards ὕφασμον μᾶλλον: but the text is indubitably sound. The phrase, like πάντων μάλατα, means 'most assuredly,' and has nothing to do with the comparative θειότερον, but emphasises the whole assertion exactly as in Crit. 49 b and Prot. 344 b.

32 οὕτω δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς is equivalent to οὕτω δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς τοις καὶ μή ('according as it is or is not turned round'). See on VI 408 a.

619 Α 2 δριμὰ μὲν κτλ. ήδριμ is 'shrewdly,' 'astutely,' like a quick-sighted lawyer; cf. (with J. and C.) Thel. 175 D τῶν μυκρῶν ἑκατὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ δριμύν καὶ δικαίων. For ταῦτα Cobet needlessly proposes τά: cf. 519 b n. Instead of ὀφεῖ (which three MSS omit) Ast conjectured καὶ, and E. S. Thompson (Canb. Phil. Soc. Proceed. xxii p. 13) ὥς τε: but the clause δια—ἐργαζόμενον is a logical inference from οὐ φαίνη—ὑπηρετεῖ and should not therefore be introduced by καὶ, still less by ὥς τε. I formerly printed ἐργᾶται (Ξ and the three MSS already referred to reading ἐργᾶσται), but the finite verb is not likely to have been corrupted into a participle, and exactly the same ungrammatical assimilation appears with ὥς τε in Andoc. 4. 20, Isaeus 9. 16 and Isocr. Paneg. 64, 65 (quoted by Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 1015 n. 3). The instances cited by Schneider (Addit. p. 52) viz. Tim. 56 b, [Euryp.] 404 a and Thuc. 125 are not strictly parallel to this.

619 A, B 7 τὰς τῆς γενέσεως κτλ. 'as it were the leading weights, which are of the family of Becoming, and which, through indulgences in eating and through pleasures and glutonous desires connected with such like indulgences, adhere to it' (i.e. to such a nature, ὃ τὸ τοιοῦτον φώςεως) 'and turn the soul's vision round below.' The eye of the soul ought to be turned round ἐκ τῷ γεγομένου (518 C): and it is our duty to shake the soul clear of τὰς τῆς γενέσεως μειον in a intellectual function.

For γενέσεως see on VI 485 b, and cf. μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείαν τε καὶ συστάν infra 525 c and 525 b, 526 b, 534 4 a. Al. With γεγομένης cf. VIII 554 d. Where τὰς του κυρίου γεγομένης ἐπίθυμας—καὶ κυρίου ἐπίθυμας. The μειον are the accumulated products of sensual indulgence and desire: see X 611 c ff., especially αὐτῷ, ἀτε γῆς ἐπίθυμας, γενεά καὶ πετρωθῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἀργα περπάτουμεν ἐπὶ τῶν εὐδαιμονίων λεγομένων ἐπίθυμας 611 e—612 a, and Phaed. 81 c together with ἤπ. viii 326 b. Cf. also Clement Strom. iv 4 p. 1228 C Migne ὀφεὶ μειον in the earth earthy. They become incorporeal with the soul (προσφυής γεγομένης, cf. προσφυής X 611 D), making it, as Plato does not hesitate to say, σωματοειδής, γενόσει, γενεά (Plato ii. cc.), of the earth earthy. They become incorporeal with the soul (προσφυής γεγομένης, cf. προσφυής X 611 D), making it, as Plato does not hesitate to say, σωματοειδής, δοξάζων ταύτα ἀληθῆ εἰναι, ἀπεὶ ἐν καὶ σῶμα φή (Phaed. 83 D, cf. ib. 82 E, 83 c). Milton is platonicizing when he tells how the soul "grows clotted by con-
tagion, Imbodies and imbrutes, till she quite lose The divine property of her first being” (Comus 464 ff.). Through the weight of these encumbrances the eye of the soul is turned down (cf. ix 856 σκόπον εἰς τὸ βίον, etc.). Milton “Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell From Heaven; for ‘e’en in Heaven his looks and thoughts Were always downward bent.” (Par. Lost I 679 ff.). For περικάτω cf. Photius περικάτω πρατήσεται: ‘αντί τοῦ περιτραπήσεται κάτω. The περι- balances περι-. In preestrafted just below. Instead of εἰςωδαι, Jackson suggests εἰςωδη, comparing III 389ο of τῶν περὶ πότων καὶ ἀφοράδια καὶ περὶ εἰςωδαι ἤδωνων. The proposal is attractive and may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient reason for departing from the MSS. See also on περικάτω and the whole of this difficult and highly important sentence, App. V. 

519 B io ὤν εἰ ἀπαλλαγεῖν κτλ. For the anacoluthon cf. Laws 810 δ, ε (Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Σπει. 111 p. 37). Cobet gratuitously adds τά before ἐφ’ α. Cf. 519 A λ. With the sentiment cf. vi 491 C, D nn., 494 C ff. nn. Plato may well be thinking of Alcibiades again. The present passage is a conspicuous proof of the almost boundless influence which Plato ascribed to education, when applied to gifted natures. 519 C 16 σκόπον—ἐνα κτλ. The εἰς σκόπος of Plato’s guardians is the Idea of Good, which is therefore clearly not only a metaphysical but also an ethical concept—the goal of conduct as well as the ultimate cause of knowledge and existence. Cf. 540 A and App. ΙΙΙ. 18 ἐκόντες εἰσαι, 1 336 B η. 20 τῶν οἰκιστῶν—‘the founders’ is in explanatory apposition with ἡμέτερον. 21 εἴ τι πρόσθεν. V 505 A. 22 ἐδείξει τε κτλ. depends on ἀναγκάσαι and explains ἀφίκεται—μέγιστον (J. and C.). The balances καὶ before ἀναβίσσαι. This explanation is better than to regard τε as ‘and’ (with Schneider and D. and V.).
V. 'Επελάθουν, ἵνα δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὁ φίλε, ὦτι νόμῳ ὑπὸ τοῦτο Θείον καὶ ποιήσωμεν χείρων ἔξιν, δυνατὸν αὐτὸς ὑν ἀμέμνοιν;

30 μελεί, ὅπως ἐν τῷ γένος ἐν τούτῳ διαφερούντος εὗ πράξῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν ὀλη τῇ πόλει τούτῳ μηχαναίται ἐγγενεσθαι, ξυπαρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοὶ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιών μεταδίδοναι ἀλλήλους τῆς ὀφελείας, ἵνα ἂν ἐκαστῷ τὸ κοινὸν ἰν δυνατῷ ὦσιν ὀφελεῖν, καὶ αὐτός ἐμποίησαι τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃν ἤνι ἁφη τρέ-πεσαῖ ὅτι ἐκαστὸς θηλεύεται, ἀλλ' ἴνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν ξύνθεσμον τῆς πόλεως. 'Αληθῆ, ἐφη· ἐπελαθόμην γὰρ,

5 Σκέψασθαι τοῖςυ, εἰπον, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὦτι οὐδ' ἀδικήσωμεν τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους κηρυμένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔρομεν προσαναγκάζεται τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελείσθαι τε καὶ φυλάττειν. ἔρομεν γὰρ, ὦτι οὐ μέν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεις τοιούτους γιγανόμενοι Β εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόλων· αὐτοματοῖ γὰρ ἐμ-

10 φυσιται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ, δικήν δ' ἔχει τὸ ἱε αὐτοφαύς, μηδενὶ τροφὴν ὀφελούν, μηδ' ἐκτίνειν τῷ προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα· ὡμέν ἄν ἢμείς ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὑπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἀμεινόν τε καὶ

11. τῷ Π: τῷ Α.
C teleosteron ekeinwv petaiodeuménoj 1 kai mallon dunatoj amfotéroj metéchein. Kataxatéoun ouv en mérej ekeistow eis tin tov 15 allon xounikxisan kai sunneiostéon ta skoteina theússasthai: *synnei- zoomenoi gar myrioj bélion oufsebe tov ekei kai gnwsebe ekasta ta eidolà atta esti kai ou, dia to talhèi èvowekai kalow te kai dikaiw kai ágavon peri. Kai ouw upar hmiw kai hmiw ò tòlwv oikhsetai, òìl ouk ónar, òs wun ai polllai üto skiamà- 20

D xóunton te prods allhlon kai staasiaçontw 1 peri tou arxhein oikónntai, ós megálov tuv ògávou òntos. To de pov allhes òd' échei en póleis ò hikista prôthymoi arxhein oj melloontes arxhein, taútn aríma kai õstasiasstota ònágkei oikeiathai, òth ð' énanvoust arxoutasas xóousan énanvoust. Painn mèn ouv, ëf. 7. 25 'Apetheíousan ouv õmiw, òiei, òi tróphiomoi taút' akóunntes kai ouk evelíousin xumponwv eiv òl póleis ékastoi en mérej, tou dè polllv chrónov met' allhlon oikeiv eiv òl katharò; 'Adunwvou, ëfpl-

520 D 14 amfotéron: "et publicorum negotiorum et philosophiae" Stallbaum. Cf. Gorg. 485 a 9, ómias, to ophélówv éstiv amfotéron metsaxek. Ís the wé- npikos or the praktikos flos the better? It is clear that the subject was often de- bated in Plato's time: see the fragments of Eupirides' Antite in Pl. Gorg. 484 e ff. and Arist. Eth. Nic. 1 3. 1095 b 17 ff., x 7. 1177 a 12 ff. If we contrast them with each other, Plato would reply, the wé- npikos easily wins the prize, but under the existing conditions of human nature the best life is a combination of both. The practical statesman must derive his inspi- ration from wénpia, and experience of affairs is an advantage as well as a duty to the thinker. Cf. vi 496 D—497 a 33. 16 svinthhmenoi ktl. Cf. 518 a n.

19 éidwla. 517 d n. The word is here used quite generally of all the idols of Plato's cave. "We have risen to a point of view from which the sçenvsast and the skial are included under one notion as éidwla" (J. and C.).

19 upar ktl. Cf. v 476 c. The Homeric line ouv onar, aLLa upar éshlon, ð to to teléowmen ouv eitai (Od. 19. 547) is in Plato's mind, though upar and onar are here adverbial accusatives (cf. Cobet V. L. 3 pp. 523 ff.).

20 sðkiamaxoutonw: 'fighting about shadows.' See 517 d n. and cf. ix 586 c. n. Dreamland is also shadowland.

520 D 23 en póleis ò ktl. On ò for ò

\_ see note on òn atopan ouv òst i 111 402. A. Van Cleef (de attr. in emunt. rel. usw Plat. p. 46) explains the construction as equiva- lent to òn ò póleis, comparing Men. 96 c, which is however (like Tim. 45 D) only an example of inverse attraction.

24 taútn: an anacoluthon, as in vi 510 E. For the sentiment see 1 347 D n.

25 xóousan = 'which gets': a gnomic aorist participle. See Goodwin MT. p. 55. Richards conjectures éxousan, and éxous- san (which appears in the margin of A) has slight ms authority; but the inchoa- tive sense (516 e n.) is better suited to òj melloontes arxhein.

27 ékastoi. The plural implies re- lays of governors relieving one another from time to time: cf. ékastois in 540 b.

28 met' allhlon ktl. "Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife." en òl katharò means 'in the undefined.' The phrase is half-mystical, as katharòv con- stantly is in Plato. It is natural to think of the myth of the Phaedo (109 b) ònti ð' tin ònh katharàv en katharò kivstai òn òhirwv, but we should not translate "sub divo" (Ast), nor even "auf der rei- nen Höhe" (Schneider). Either version is too precise, and en katharòv does not mean sub ido even in Homer. The Ideas in Plato are to katharòv: see Phaed. 79 d. òkèis òxetha elai òs katharòv te kai ði òh òi al ònh kai ðavastov òxov.
in my opinion incorrect.

6 τάγαθον 'their good' (Bosanquet), hardly 'the chief good' (Jowett). Not possessing any Ἰδία ἀγαθά in the shape of virtue, they are fain to make up for it at the expense of the State.

περιμάχητον κτλ. For the construction cf. (with J. and C.) Phaed. 60 B.

13 of II: o1 A.

12. μαχοῦσαί ΑΠ: μάχονται Α1.

520 E 29 παυτὸς μην κτλ. The τόλμη ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν has now been found. That Plato intended to recall the prophecy of 1 347 D is clear from the verbal echoes between the two passages. On the absence of the preposition before τὸ ἄρχειν see VIII 553 B, n.


4 πτωχοὶ κτλ.: 'men who are poor and an-hungered for lack of goods of their own.' So Schneider and Bosanquet rightly explain the passage. πτωχὸς is used almost in its original etymological sense (πτευα from πτέν-ις, πτέν-ομαι): cf. Xen. Cypr. VII 5-60 and VIII 3, 39 ὡ μακάρε σὺ τὰ τέ άλλα καὶ αὐτὸ τάτρο, διέ ἐκ πτενυτος πλούσιον γεγένηται: τόλμ πά ὄμαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδικοῖ πλοῦτες, διὲ πτενυτάς χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας. The contrast with πλοῦσιον, and the presence of πτωχοῦ, make it easy to catch the meaning. The translation 'hunger after private advantages' (D. and V., Jowett) is

521 C—523 A We have next to consider how we can lead our guardians up into the light. The studies which we re-
quire are such as will tend to draw the soul from Becoming to Being, and are at the same time of some practical utility in war. Our earlier training in gymnastic and music will not serve the purpose; nor yet will the mechanical arts. What do you say to Number and Calculation, which enter into every art and science? Their importance in strategy is obvious, and we shall find that they do emphatically, if rightly used, lead the soul towards Intelligence and Being.

521 c cf. For Plato's theory of the higher education see Appendix II on 'The Propaedetic Studies of the Republic' and Appendix III on 'Dialectic.'

19 Λέγονται δὴ τίνες κτλ. With el is θεοὺς ἀνέλθειν cf. Plut. de ser. num. vind. 566 A holding to the Δίωνειν εἰς θεοὺς ἀνέλθειν. If Plato's words are to be taken in their full significance, we can hardly (with J. and C.) suppose that the allusion is to Heracles, Pollux etc., for Heracles' descent to Hades was an incident which happened long before his ascent to Heaven; and Pollux's life among the gods was intermittent. Cf. Schneider in his translation p. 304 n. 187. Schneider himself suggests that Plato is thinking of legends about e.g. Aesclapius' delivery from Hades, after Zeus had smitten him (cf. 111 408 C and Roscher's Lexicon d. Mythologie p. 620), and others have thought of Briares and the ekatónchaepé: see H. 1 402—405 and cf. Hes. Theog. 617—731. Mr Walter Headlam has pointed out to me that Semele was also raised from Hades to Heaven, citing Paus. 11 31. 2 and ib. 37. 5: cf. also Plut. 1c. Δίωνειν εἰς θεοὺς ἀνέλθειν καὶ τὴν Σεμελὴν ἀνάγειν υἱόντων. These examples are certainly more to the point. It is worthy of remark that Justin Martyr in a remarkable passage of his Ἀπολογία pro Christianis speaks of the ascent of Asclepius and others into Heaven as Pagan parallels to the Christian doctrine of the Ascension: 'Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν—σταυρωθέντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα καὶ ἀναστάτα ἀνελημέναι eis τὸν οὐρανόν, ὅποια τούτων ἕως λεγομένων υἱὸς τῶν Διός καινῶν τί φέρομεν, πάσος γὰρ τούτων φάσκοις τῶν Διός οἱ παρ' ὑμῖν τιμώμενοι συγγραφεῖς ἐπιτάσσοντες, ἕρμην μὲν λόγον τῶν ἐρμηνευτικῶν καὶ πάντων διάδοσαν Ἀσκληπίων δὲ καὶ θεραπευτήν γενόμενον, κεραυνοθέταν, ἀνελημέναι eis οὐρανόν. Δίωνον δὲ διαπαραχθέντα κτλ. (l.c. 121: cf. also Dialogue cum Tryphone 60). I was once half inclined to suspect that the clause ὅποια τούτων ἕως λεγομένων—ἀνέλθειν (although it appears in all MSS) might be an early satirical adscript by some Pagan scribe on the doctrine of our Lord's descent into Hell, and subsequent resurrection and ascent into Heaven. 

tués might well be a specific allusion (516 B n.), and there is more than a suspicion of satire in δή. But I have no longer any doubt that the text is sound.

20 ὀστράκον—περιστροφή. On the different interpretations given by the ancients of this proverb see App. VI. The proverb is derived from the game of ὀστρακίνα, the authorities for which are cited by Grasberger Erziehung u. Unterricht 1 pp. 57—60. The players were divided into two parties, separated by a line. A shell, black on one side, and white on the other, was thrown on the ground by one of the boys, who shouted νος ἡμέρα or νος ἡ ἡμέρα, 'Heads or Tails,' as he threw it. According as the white or black fell uppermost, one side ran away and the other gave chase. Plato means that education is not, like the 'spinning of a coin,' an affair of no consequence, to be settled off-hand, and by chance, but a slow and laborious scientific process, dealing with the gravest of all possible issues. See also App. VI. 

Ψυχῆς περιαγωγή κτλ.: 'the turning round of a soul from a day which is as night into the true day, that is, the ascent into Being' (not the tarrying in γητῶμενων, which is the νυκτερινή ἡμέρα). In νυκτερινή τινος ἡμέρας (for which see 520 c nn.) Plato, more suo, plays on the
The subject of προσέχειν is τὸ μάθημα ὃς ἥσομεν: its object is τὸ τοῦ. With προσέχειν 'insuper habere' (a rare use) cf. προσγείεσθαι II 375 E n.

32 τετεύτακεν. τεταύαζων πραγματευομένος, ἐνδιαστήμων (Tim. Lex. s.v.), πεταύαζω is always, I believe, semi-contemptuous in Plato (Phil. 56 E, Tim. 90 B). Brugmann's connexion of the word with σέως (Vergl. Gr. i. p. 363) may not be right, but the notion that πεταύαζω is for ταῦταζω (L. and S.) is certainly wrong.

522 A 2 ὅσην κτλ. There is (as J. and C. remind us) a sense in which φιλοσοφία itself is μονική: cf. III 403 C n. and VI 499 D.

3 ἀντίστροφος κτλ. is best explained by III 410 C—412 A, and κατὰ τὰ ἄρμονια—ἐνθυμιάζω by III 400 E, D.

5 τοῖς λόγοις. I 377 ff., III 392 A ff.

6 ἐφή is repeated as in Phaed. 78 A: cf. I 348 D n. and VIII 557 C, Euthyd. 295 D (ὡς δ' ἐγώ repeated). Here "iteratum ἐφή—ethicam, ut si dicam, vim habet" (Schneider). I formerly omitted the word (with Flor. T.), but now believe it genuine. ἐφή (II, v and two other MSS,
with Eusebius Praep. Ev. xiv 13, 3) is unsuitable in point of sense, and also because of ἀττά. 7 ἀληθινώτεροι: not = ‘more true’ but ‘true on the other hand.’ The comparative only points the contrast with μιθοδέοις: cf. Homer’s well-known γνωσικών θηλυτεράν.

πρὸς τοιούτων τι κτλ.: ‘useful for any such purpose as you now require.’ ἀγάθον goes with πρὸς: cf. with Schneider Xen. Mem. iv 6. 10 ἀρ όν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθόν δὲ πρὸς τὰ δεδεὶ καὶ ἐκπίστευσαν διᾶς ἀν- δρείας ἤσει εἰναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοῖς δεδοῦς; The words ὀνοὺ—ὑπερεῖς are equivalent to πρὸς ὀνοὺ—ὑπερεῖς sc. μάθημα ἀγάθον εἰναι: cf. ἐν πολέμῃ ᾧ ἐν πολέμῃ ἐν ᾧ (520 D n), and (for ὑπερεῖς with infinitive) IV 443 B. The Oxford editors connect ἀγάθον with τοιού- των and not with μάθημα, referring ὀνοὺ σὸν νῦν ὑπερεῖς ‘probably to μάθημα’—a highly unnatural interpretation, because it separates ὀνοὺ from τοιούτων, and leaves πρὸς out in the cold. ἄγον (ὑπ II and Eusebius l. c.) for ἀγάθον is an obvious but wholly unnecessary ‘emendation.’ The present passage is Plato’s authoritative statement of the relation between his two curricula of education. The aim of the first is morality, and its method habituation; in the second knowledge is attained by a scientific discipline. Cf. II 376 E, VI 502 E nn.

522 B io aí τε κτλ. On τε used ἀνα- κολοθοῦσα see II 373 B n. “Quid addere Socrates in animo habuerit, Glauconis intercipiens verba docent: καὶ μὲν τι εἶ ἄλλο λειτουργεῖν μάθημα” (Schneider).

11 ἐδοξαν. VI 495 D.

522 C 15 διανοιαῖς scarcely means the mathematical sciences here, as J. and C. suggest, but simply ‘modes of thought’: cf. VI 511 D n. Plato does not, I believe, use the plural of διάφορα in its peculiar technical sense, and in any case such a meaning is here unsuitable.

17. τὸ ἐν τε κτλ. Cf. Laws 818 C μήτε ἐν μήτε δοδὸ μήτε τρία μήθ᾽ ὅλως ἄριστα καὶ περίττω δυνάμειν γιγαντικῶς, μηδὲ ἀριθ- μεῖν τὸ πάραπαν εἰδώς καὶ ἔτη (Σέρμ.) 977 C. ἀριθμοῖ τε καὶ λογισμοῖ: See on λογιστικῆ τε καὶ ἀριθμητικῆ 525 A.

522 D 22 ἐν ταῖς πραγματείαις κτλ. Plato speaks as if he were bored to death by Palamedes’ damnable iteration. Plays on the subject of Palamedes were written by all three dramatists (see the fragments of Aeschylus 180 ff., Sophocles 426 ff., Euripides 582 ff. Dindorf), and the invention of number or the like is ascribed
7. "Allo ti on, i ouden, dti 'K' égyov, máthma anagkaiōn polemikóv E 30 ándrōv thýsomen kai logízebathai te kai ártemiv dúnašvai; Pántovn γ', év, mállosta, ei kai ótiov nélkai táxeov épatieiv, mállon δ' ei kai ánthrōpovn ésebathai. 'Evnoieis ouν, eiptov, peri touto to máthma óter égyov; Tò poión; Kivnduvnei tòn pròs tìn vósov πίπτontov fúsev einaiv án ἔντομεν, χρῆσθαι δ' oudeis autòv 523 ὀρθῶν, ἑλκτικὸν ὅντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν. Pòs, év, légeis; 'Eγώ πειράσομαι, ἴν δ' égyov, τὸ γ' émòi dokouν ἀλλόσαι. ἀ γάρ
to him by Aesch. I.c. Soph. Fr. 379 and
Eur. I.c. Aeschylus also gives Prometheus the credit of the discovery (P. V. 459 f.).
527 KAI TOI KTEL. 'Well, what d'ye think of Agamemnon for a general now?'
KAI TOI (lit. 'and yet' sc. if this was true) is often thus used to introduce a question
'cum quodam indignatione' (real or, as here, feigned); for examples see Kugler de
pars. tui ap. Pl. p. 18. ποίον tina is deri-
sive, as ποίος constantly is; see on 1330 A.
D. and V.'s translation "Yet what do
you think of Agamemnon as a general?"
misses the ἃθος of the original, which is
correctly reproduced by Schneider and
Jowett.
522 E 30 kai logízebathai te kTEL. kai
'also,' because "et aliarum rerum et arith-
metices peritum imperatorem esse decret"
(Schneider). Cf. vi 506 A. The word is
omitted by II 3 q Σ and some other MSS.
kai may of course be spurious, but it was
not likely to have been added by a scribe,
and the balance of MS evidence is in its
favour. The other variants (ξ and το and
mállon ζ in place of kai) are corrup-
tions due to the erroneous idea that állo
τι is 'any other' and not 'nonne,'
31 mállon de kTEL. mállon de is 'vel
potius,' as usual. ἄνθρωπος = 'human
being,' not 'anything of a man' (D. and
V.), which suggests an entirely wrong idea.
We may compare the Latin use of homo,
for example in Cic. ad Quint. II 115. 5 'sed
cum veneris, virum te putabo, si Sallusti
Empedoclea legeris: hominem non puta-
bo.' For the sense cf. Law 819 D, where
the Greek ignorance of arithmetic appears
to Plato óuν ἄνθρωπινων ἄλλα ὅρυκο
τινῶν οὐκαί μάλλον ὑμεῖς. The know-
ledge of number is one of the character-
istic differences between man and the
lower animals; see Tim. 39 β and [Epin.]
978 C.
523 A i fúse belongs to ἄγοντων
(Schneider) rather than to énav (Stall-
baum and others), as is clear from the
antithesis χρῆσθαι δ' ούδεις αὐτῷ ὀρθῶν
(explained in 525 C).
3 τό γ' ἐμοί δοκοῦν. Cf. 517 β. n.
Plato is careful to eschew the appearance of
dogmatism, even where his convic-
tions are most profound.
523 A—524 C I distinguish (says
Socrates) between two classes of perceptions,
those which stimulate the intellect, and
those which do not. To the former belong
all such sense-presentations as are self-
contradictory. We have here, for ex-
ample, three fingers. Sige tells us that
each is a finger. So far there is no con-
tradiction and the intellect is not roused.
But it is otherwise with size and small-
ness, thickness and thinness, and the like.
The perception which reports that such-
and-such a thing is hard frequently tells
us that it is also soft, and the same,
mutilatis mutandis, may be said of all per-
ceptions which deal with relative qualities of
this kind. In such cases the soul is
perplexed, and appeals to the intellect
for help. The intellect, promptly respond-
ing, apprehends 'great' and 'small' (for example) as distinct and separate from one another, unlike the senses, by which they were seen together and in confusion. It is thus that we are first led to ask 'What is the great?' 'What is the small?'

§ 253 B ff. In this section of the Republic, Plato ascribes the originating impulse of his intellectual discipline to the stimulus supplied by the self-contradictory evidence of sense-perception. On the connexion of this principle with earlier Greek philosophy see § 523 c n., and on the aim and scope of Plato's theory of Education as a whole App. II.

§ 8 ὃς ἰκανός κτλ. is taken by Krohn (Pl. Fr. p. 91) as excluding the possibility of Ideas of concrete things. Such an inference is unwarranted. ἰκανός, 'adequately' 'satisfactorily' (cf. E below), does not imply that sensation can apprehend everything there is to know about e.g. a finger, but merely that in the case of a finger etc., sensible perception is as a rule all that we demand: we are not impelled to summon νῶσα to our aid. Even the perception of a finger may awaken the intelligence, and in such cases we shall be led to the Idea of finger (§ 523 d n.).

§ 9 ὃς τῆς αἰσθήσεως κτλ. On αἰσθήσεως see § 523 c n. ποιώσεις has been doubted by Ast, who conjectures νοσώσεις; "sed αἰσθήσεως non est vocu" (Schneider). The Greek means 'produces no sound result,' 'nichts zuverlässiges gibt' (Schneider): the product of sensation is, in such cases, ὑπόκολον or νοσώδες. For οὗδέν ἐγώ metaphorically used cf. Phaed. 90 e and (with Schneider) Ar. Plut. 50, 355 (πρὸς ἀνόδος οὐδέν ἐγώ ἐστι' εἰργαζόμενον).

§ 10 τὰ πόρρωθεν κτλ. readily suggest themselves to Glauco, for they were familiar examples of optical delusion in the Platonic school: cf. (for πόρρωθεν φανόμενα) Prot. 356 c, Theat. 191 b, infra I 602 c ff., and (for ἐσκιαγραφήματα) II 365 c n.

§ 523 c 13 αἰσθήσεως. Strictly speaking, of course, αἰσθήσεως by itself does not, and cannot, present us with a judgment of any kind. It merely furnishes a particular sensation, which is referred to our mental picture of the objects in question, and the resulting judgment is not αἰσθήσεως, but δῶξα, which is, according to Plato, a combination of μὴν and αἰσθήσεως (see Phil. 38 b ff. with Bury's notes). And in point of fact, the sort of contradictory judgments which are here ascribed to the initial step in the psychological process, viz. αἰσθήσεως (§ 524 A), have already been attributed to δῶξα in ν 479 b—479 e. We have already seen that Plato throughout the whole of this part of the Republic is not careful to distinguish between αἰσθητῶν (especially ὀφαντῶν) and δοξάτων (VI 310 A n.); and the same tendency shows itself again here. But in this part of the dialogue, Plato's argument is no way affected by his imperfect analysis of the psychological process involved in such a judgment as 'This is a finger.' The relevant consideration is that in such cases the intellect is not, as a rule, aroused, and this is equally true whether we regard the judgment as an act of αἰσθήσεως alone or as the joint product of αἰσθήσεως and μὴν.
15 μᾶλλον τούτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἰτ' ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἰτε τὸρρωθεὶν. ἀδε ἐδὲ ο λέγω σαφέστερον εἰσεί. οὗτοι, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἄν εἰεν δάκτυλοι, ὅ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος. Πάνυ γ', ἡφ. Ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοῖς ὁρομένοις λέγουσι μοι διανοοῦν. ἀλλὰ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τόδε σκότει. Τὸ ποίον; Δάκτυλοι μὲν 20 αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἐκαστος, 1 καὶ ταῦτη γε οὐδέν διαφέρει, εἲν D τε ἐν μέσῳ ὀρᾶται ἐάν τ' ἐν ἐσχάτῳ, εἲν τε λευκὸς ἐάν τε μέλας, εἲν τε παχὺς ἐάν τε λεπτός, καὶ πάν ὁ τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ή ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι, τι ποτ' ἐστι δάκτυλος. οὐδαμοὶ γὰρ ή ὄψις αὐτὴ ἀμα ἐσθήμμεν 25 τὸν δάκτυλον τοιναντιῶν ή δάκτυλον εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἡφ. Οὐκοὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκότος τὸ γε τοιοῦτον νοσέως οὐκ ἀν παρακλητικόν οὐν 1 ἐγερτικόν εἰη. Εἰκότως. Τί δὲ δὴ; τὸ μέγεθος Ε αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ή ὄψις ὥρα ἱκανός ὥρα, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὴ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινά αὐτῶν κείσθαι ή εἲτ' ἐσχάτωρ; καὶ ὡσαυτώς 30 πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ή μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ή ἀφή; καὶ

523 d 20 λάντεν μέσῳ κτλ.: i.κ. ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ ή ὁ ὁρομένος κτλ. This is said with reference to their size: cf. E below and Phaed. 102 B, C, where the difficulty is explained by the theory of Ideas. Thus b is both great and small, great relatively to a, small relatively to c. Similarly with the other antinomies. The Philebus dismisses such puzzles as τά δεδομένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περί τό ἐν καὶ πολλά (14 D)—an indication perhaps of the priority in date of the Republic (cf. vi 503 C n. and Jackson in f. Ph. X pp. 263 ff.).

23 ἀναγκαῖοτα is said of the ‘Drang nach Wahrheit’: cf. 524 C, E, 525 D and 518 E ff. It is not the ‘nature’ of Soul to acquiesce in falsehood: for man is an οὐράνιον φύτον, οὐκ ἐγγείον (iv 443 B n.). τῶν πολλῶν. Some exceptional natures, who are endowed with an uncommon share of noble curiosity, may find intellectual stimulus even in perceptions such as these; cf. 523 B n. Ast, who missed the point, wanted to excise the phrase. Herderden seriously proposes <μᾶ> τῶν Ἀπόλλων.

24 οὐδαμοῦ: ‘at no stage’ viz. in the psychological process, not exactly ‘never’ (as Jouett, D. and V. etc.).
524 a 2 παραγγέλλω κτλ.; 'intimates to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft when it perceives it to be so.' With παραγγέλλω (needlessly suspected by Stephanus) cf. Τιμ. 70 b τοῦ λόγου παραγγέλλων ὡς τις ἀδικός πρὶν αὐτὰ γλυκείται πράξει. The English translators, together with Schneider, appear to take ὡς with ἀιδόθωμον ("that it feels the same thing to be both hard and soft" D. and V.). But such a construction is difficult (cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 652) and the meaning scarcely satisfactory. It should be remembered that touch does not always report that an object is both hard and soft, but only when it feels the object hard in relation to one thing and soft in relation to another, and similarly in other cases. This limitation is expressed by ἀιδόθωμον (as well as by ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις), and explains its emphatic position. I have sometimes thought that <ὀντος> should be added after ἀιδόθωμον, but the object can be supplied from ὡς—μαλακόν. Prantl understands the construction in somewhat the same way as I do.

5 ἀπορεῖν. The word is Socratic: see on 515 D. It is worthy of note that Plato, like Socrates, makes intellectual ἀπορία the beginning of Education. See App. II.

῾αὐτῇ ἡ ἀιδόθησις means 'this present sensation,' not the sense of touch in general, and similarly with ἡ τοῦ κοῦφος κτλ., which J. and C. erroneously understand as a special sense, apparently 'the same which modern philosophers call the sense of resistance.' But Plato nowhere recognises any such sense, and if he did, he would call it ἡ τοῦ κοῦφον καὶ βαρέος, and not ἡ τοῦ κοῦφον καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος. The parallel in τί τοτε σημαίνει—λέγει shows that Plato means: 'what do the sensation of light and the sensation of heavy mean by light and heavy, if they indicate, the one that the heavy is light and the other that the light is heavy?' The last clause contains an elegant chiasmus. Schneider understands ἀιτή ἡ ἀιδόθησις as ἡ ἀιδόθησις τοῦ καληροῦ, but it is better taken as deictic: cf. 516 b, 523 c. Otherwise his view agrees with mine.

524 b 8 ἄτοποι. Herwerden's ἄτοποι is an elegant conjecture, in view of ἀπορεῖν in A and 524 E; but the text is more forcible.

9 ἐρμηνεῖα = 'communications,' not 'interpretations,' as D. and V. translate. ἀιδόθησις is as it were the ἐρμηνεία καὶ ἄγγελος (Crat. 407 E) between the object of the perception and the soul: cf. παραγγέλλει in A.

10 λογισμὸν. See on λογισμόν 525 b.

12 ὄνοικον ἐὰν κτλ. Thus: Perception reports 'This finger' (let us say) 'is big-and-little.' Thereupon the soul is puzzled (ἀπορεῖ), and calls in νόησι. If big-and-little appear (viz. to νόησι) not one but two, then each of them appears distinct from the other, and one: cf. V 476 A and Parm. 143 D. 'Accordingly—if each appears one, and both together two—νόησι, conceiving as it does of two (τά γε δύο), will conceive of them as separate; for otherwise it would
en ekateson fainetai; Nai. Ei 'apa en ekateson, amfotera de duo, ta ge duo kechoreismena voshe: ou 'ymar an axwrista ge duo 15 evveis, l all' ev. Orodos. Meya mih kai ophis kai smikron eora, C phamev, all' ou kechoreismenou, alla syngkevumenon ti. 'Hymar; Nai. Dial de tiou tou toun saphneian mega au kai smikron h voshis anag-

kasthe idein. ou syngkevumen, alla diaorismena, tovunantoj h 'kevna. 'Alheth. Oukous evtheian tothei prwtou eperechetai erebatai h'mai, 20 ti ouv pot' esti to mega au kai to smikron; Pantaasai mev ouv. 
Kai ouw deta to mev vosthon, to de oratou ekalesamev. 'Orodotat', D efhi.

VIII. Tauta toinun kai artem evxeiron ligein, ou ta mev paraklntika tihs diainoias esti, ta de ouv, a mev eis tiwn aiathetai
25 ama tois evanitioi evaoutoi evpittere, paraklntika orizomenous, osa de mih, ouk egertika ti vosseis. Manthano toinun 'hde, efhi, kai dorxei moi ouw. Ti ouv; arithmoei te kai to ev poteron dorxei

eina; Ov xynnos, efhi. 'Allc ek tov proeiromenov, efhi, anap-
llogizedo. ei mev gar ikanovs autou kath autou oratai h allh tin 30 aisthesi lambasanetai l to ev, ouk an olkon efhi esti tiw oustian, E


have conceived, not of two, but of one.' Plato's object is to make out that voshas, in order to clear up the syngkevumenon ti of sensation (dia twn touton saphneian) is compelled to view sensation's mega-kai-
simkron (for example) separately, i.e. as to mega and to smikron. These antinomies consequently force us to ask 'What is the great?' 'What is the small' etc.; and just herein consists their perplexing or educative value, for to such questions the theory of Ideas alone furnishes an ade-
quate and final answer (Phaed. 99 B ff.), kechoreismena vosheis perhaps = 'are separate to vosheis,' but the ordinary view, which understands vosheis as subject to vosheis, is better. It may have been this passage of the Republic, or Phaed. 96 E ff., or both which inspired the line of Theopompus ra de duo molis (sic) ev estin, ou vosheis Platon (D. L. 111 26).

524 c 15 kal ophis; 'sight also' sc. as well as vosheis.

17 Fy anakasthe. See 523 D n.

524 c—526 c Now consider—to which of these classes do number and 'one' belong? Our perception of 'one' is self-contradictory; for any unit which we see, we see both as one and as infinite in number. This is also true of number generally, since it is true of one.' The science of number is therefore a suitable study on educational as well as on militarist grounds, provided it is pursued in such a way as to lead the soul from visible to the invisible numbers of true mathematics. We may add that arithmetical studies are an excellent test of general capacity, a good intellectual discipline, and difficult.

524 D ff. On Plato's treatment of arithmétique—i.e. the Science of Number, not Arithmetic in the modern sense of the word: see on 525 A—reference may be made to Blass de Platone mathematico (Bonae 1861), Cantor Gesch. d. Mat-

hem. pp. 183 ff., and especially Rothlaufs' excellent monograph Die Mathem. z. Platonis Zeit u. s. Beziehungen zu ihr (Jena 1878) pp. 19—49. See also App. II. 524 D 37 poteron is intrinsically better than poteron, which has consider-
able ms authority (including A1, B and M), and is read by Hermann and Baiter. Cf. tvon av'agogwn ou efhi kal. 525 A. For the error see Introd. § 5.
524 E 31 ei δ' ἐϊ τι κτλ. A visible ev is always seen both as ev and pollla (one wood, many trees; one tree, many branches etc.).

525 A ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις. I formerly read αὐτῷ instead of τὸ αὐτῷ with Σ and a few inferior mss. αὐτῷ, which Bekker, Schneider and Stallbaum adopt, is easier, but lacking in authority; and τὸ αὐτῷ is in reality more elegant. The marked antithesis between ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις ("the intellectual apprehension of the one") and ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις ("the visual apprehension of the same") makes it clear that τὸ αὐτῷ means "the same" as that with which ἡ μάθησις was concerned (viz. τὸ ἐν), and not (as Hermann imagined) "one and the same object of vision" (like ταῦτα presently). Plato may have deliberately employed the two forms τὸ αὐτῷ and τὰ τοῦ in order to dissociate them from one another.

A. P. II. presents us with three separate cases of the contrast between ὕπως and πολλά.

toῦτο (see cr. n.) is preferable to τοῦτῳ, which appears in no ms except A, and would be superfluous after εἰπερ τὸ ἐν. Two ms do in point of fact omit the word altogether.

6 λογιστικὴ τε καὶ ἀριθμητική. Greek mathematicians distinguished between ἀριθμητικὴ "the science of numbers" and λογιστικὴ "the art of calculation" (Gow Greek Math. p. 22). It has been doubted whether Plato also held this distinction; but a comparison of Gorg. 451 B. 453 E. Theaet. 198 A (on ἀριθμητική) with Gorg. 451 C, Charm. 166 A, Pol. 259 E (on λογιστική) proves that he did (Rothschild, l. c. pp. 19–21). Plato does not insist on the distinction here, but we may reasonably suppose that his pupils would begin with λογισμοὶ (λογιστική) and rise from thence to ἀριθμητικὴ: cf. C, D and Latus 817 E, 819 A ff. See also on λογιστική in B.

7 ταῦτα: i.e. τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

525 B 7 ἀληθείαν: viz. the Ideas, and ultimately the Idea of Good (517 B).

10 γενεῖσαι. See on 510 A. ἦ = 'aliqquin' (V 463 D n.). Liebhard absurdly adds ἐστιν after γενεῖσαι.

11 λογιστικὸν: 'a reasoning proficient in the art of calculation,' with a play on λογιστικός in its deeper sense, as
Shorey points out (Chicago Studies i p. 222 n. 4), comparing the double meaning of παραμορφα in IV 424 D. λογισμὸν in 524 B prepared the way for this; and the same ambiguity partly explains why Plato puts λογιστική rather than ἀριθμητική in the forefront of this discussion (cf. λογισμὸν below and λογισμὸν in C).

We readily feel that λογιστική will arouse to λογισμὸν. Cf. also X 602 E n.

13 καὶ πείθειν. προσήκον ἂν ἐγώ is carried on: cf. I 334 B n. and infra 530 B. J. and C.'s explanation, that "μάθημα (or αὐτὸ) is to be repeated in the accusative after νομοθέτησαι and πείθειν επί λογιστικῆς λέγειν," is untenable.

14 τῶν μεγίστων is idiomatically used of government: cf. 534 D and Ἀρatha 22 D with my note ad loc.

525 C 15 θιαν—αὐτήν. The 'nature of numbers' cannot be fully seen except in their connexion with the Good and with all their νοητὰ (VI 511 B—D nnn.). Plato does not of course imply that ἀριθμητική by itself will achieve this result (although it may be doubted whether some of his successors did not exalt the science to something like this dignity: see e.g. the Ἐπισκόπων): neither ἀριθμητική nor all the propedeutic studies taken together will ever carry us so far. He only means that the student, having once set foot on the ladder, must not retreat until he reaches the Good. Then and then only will he understand the ‘nature of numbers’ i.e. the Ideas of 1, 2, etc., because only then will he know Numbers dialectically (VI 511 B). On the use of φῶς see X 397 B n.

16 τῆς νοητῆς αὐτῆς: ‘by thought alone.’ αὐτῆς is ‘by itself’ i.e. (in this case) unadulterated with αἰσθήσεις: cf. 525 D n. and supra IV 437 E, 438 B, VI 510 B, D nnn.

18 ῥαστώπης. A few inferior MSS add καὶ after this word: A alone has ῥαστώπης τε. I agree with Schneider in holding that the conjunctions are interpolated to avoid the concurrence of genitives, in which there is, however, no difficulty at all: cf. V 449 A n.

20 ἢν καὶ ἐννοοῦν. Cf. (with J. and C.) II 370 A ἐννοοῦν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπότοις σοῦ.

λογισμοῦ: see on λογισμός in b.

525 D 24 αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν: ‘numbers themselves,’ e.g. I, 2, 3, 4 etc., in other words individual mathematical numbers and nothing more. αὐτῶν means ‘by themselves,’ ‘alone,’ i.e. with nothing αἰσθήσεων about them, such as is present in the ὀρατῷ ἐπὶ τὰ σώματα ἔχοντως ἀριθμόν (= Aristotle's αἰσθητικὸς or σωματικός αριθμός: v. Bonitz Ind. Arist. s. v. ἀριθμός), e.g. one man, two men etc. These mathematical numbers are not Ideas, but (like τὰ μαθηματικά generally) a half-way between sensibles and Ideas, and for this reason valuable as a προσαδέλφει το Διαλεκτίκειον: cf. 526 A n. and see on VI 510 D
27. δεινοὺς Εἰδ.: δεινοῖς δόα ΑΠ. sed δόο punctis notavere A²Π². 2. ἀξιοῦτε ἑστὶν Εἰδ.: ἀξιοῦτε: ἑστιν Λ: ἀξιοῦτε (sic) ἑστιν ΙI.

and App. I. For αὐτῶν in this sense cf. αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν in ε, αὐτὴ τῇ μοίρῃ 526 B and αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἔχουσιν [Εἰδιν.] 990 c. 27 δεινοὺς. The word δέος, which was originally written after δεινοῦς (see cr. n.) in A and ΙΙ, is probably due to a marginal adscript on the words έάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐπισκεφθῆ—τέμεναι. Burnet neatly conjectures δεινοῦς αὐτῷ, but αὐτό is inappropriate here.

525 Ε 27. έάν τις κτλ. αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν means 'the unit itself' i.e. the mathematical number 'one' which is ex hypothesi and by definition ἀμέροστον καὶ διάμεροστον (Theo Smyrn. 18). If any one maintains that the mathematical unit is divisible, the mathematicians καταγελάται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχοται. Ὡδά mathemati- cians, they never condescend to justify either this or any other mathematical definition (οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἄλλος έτι ἠξιοῦσι—δίδωιν VI 510 c), and think it ridiculous that any one should question the foundations of their science. The moment they begin to render an account of their ὑποθέσεις they cease to be mathematicians and become διαλεκτικοί. See also on VI 510 c and App. III.

28 έάν σὺ καρματικὰ κτλ. 'if you mince it, they multiply it.' If you insist on dividing their unit, they insist on multiplying it (viz. by your divisor), and so defeat your purpose and keep the unit one and indivisible as before. 'I cut that unit up!' you exclaim. 'I multiply it! ' is their reply; and you are check- mated. They have just as much right to multiply it as you to divide it; for the mathematical unit is only a ὑπόθεσις when all is said and done. Plato is humorously describing a passage-at-arms between mathematicians and some obstinate fellow who will not admit the indivisibility of their unit. The words 'back again' in D. and V.'s translation "they multiply it back again" correspond to nothing in the Greek and suggest an erroneous idea; nor can the Greek mean "that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units" (as Jowett suggests). Each of these explanations misses the humour of the original. The word μόρια is doubtless genuine, though its rejection (proposed by Herwerden) would improve the antithesis. Cf. μορίαι τέ εἶχον ἐν εὐαρμό στέφεν (525 Α), for which μόρια here prepares the way.

526 Α 1. περὶ ποιῶν κτλ. On the derisive ποῖος see 522 ΔΗ. Mathematical units are in every case (καταστοί) equal each to each (πᾶν παρίτ.), and destitute of parts; whereas sensible units (e.g. one horse, one cow etc.) are not equal to each other, and are divisible. In πᾶν παρίτ Plato copies the formal language of mathematics: cf. εκατέρων εκατέρα and the like in Euclid ἐκατότητοι. For the sense see Phil. 56 c ff., where these two kinds of number are made the basis of a distinction between philosophical or scientific and popular or unscientific ἀριθμητική. It should be carefully noted that a plurality of mathematical units is expressly recognised both here (λοιπὸν τέ εκαστὸν πάν παρίτι κτλ.) and in Phil. I. c. (κοινά κοινότερα ἐκατατομή τῶν μορίων μορί- μυλαν ἄλλης ἄλλη διασφέρονταν). This entirely confirms what Aristotle tells us, viz. that Plato placed μαθηματικὰ between αἰσθήτα et ἐδοξή τῷ τά μὲν πολλὰ ἄττα ὄροι εἶναι, το δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἐκαστὸν μόρον (Μετ. Α 6. 587b 14 ff.). There are therefore three kinds of κοινά in Plato's scheme—the Ideal κοινό, of

8—2
which only one exists, the Mathematical and the Sensible, of each of which there are many. See on vi 510 b and App. I, where I have quoted further evidence on this subject, and endeavoured to explain the philosophical truth which is contained in the Platonic doctrine of mathematical numbers, magnitudes etc. as intermediates between the Ideas and sensibles.

5 ων κτλ. ων is for peri ων rather than α (as J. and C. hold); cf. vi 510 δ ων peri τοτων διαινοομενοι, and (for the grammatical construction) III 402 λ. διαινοομεναι should be understood in the technical sense of vi 511 ε.

7 τω όντι αναγκαιον. Perhaps with a play on προσαναγκαιον (J. and C.); see on τορ όντι vi 511 b.

526 b 11 ωκείς κτλ. Plato was very emphatic on this point: see Laws 747 b and 819 c. φυσικά was restored by Schneider from the best MSS. Earlier editions read φαίνονται on inferior authority.

ἀν—γυμνάζονται κτλ. Even Isocrates admits this, although his self-styled 'Philosophy' was something very different from Plato's: see Antid. 265—266, especially γυμνάζουσι μέντοι τῆς φυσικῆς και παρασκευής φιλοσοφίας καλω τήν διατριβήν τῆς τουαυτήν (mathematical studies).

526 c 14 a γε μείζων κτλ. is an important principle with Plato, who does not believe in any royal road to learning: cf. 530 c and vi 503 e. In antiquity, while algebra was still unknown, ἀραθμητικά must have taxed the powers of thought far more than now, and been, from the Platonic point of view, all the more valuable on that account as an educational discipline. The treatment of numbers by Euclid Books vii—x will illustrate Plato's observation: see Gow Gk. Math. pp. 74—85, with De Morgan's remarks there quoted.

16 ως τοῦτο. ως='quam' instead of ἃ is found sporadically in Greek literature after comparatives: see my note on Ap. 30 b, 36 d. To say that in all such cases the comparative is equivalent to ὀνόμ with the positive is only to shelve the difficulty; and it is better to recognise the usage as exceptional than summarily to dismiss it as a barbarism (with Thompson on Gorg. 492 e). J. and C. after οὐδε πολλά supply α τόνον οὔτω μέγαν παρέχεται, but the ellipse is too difficult, especially as οὐδε πολλά is only a kind of afterthought to or elaboration of οὗ παρέχεται.

526 c—527 c Next in order comes Plane Geometry. On its practical uses we need not dilate; the important question is whether it tends to turn the soul towards Being. A mere tiro in Geometry knows that it is not a practical art, in spite of such terms as 'squaring' etc., which the poverty of language compels it to employ. The object of geometrical knowledge is ever-existent Being. For this reason we shall prescribe the study of Geometry, a subject which is moreover practically useful and an excellent educational propaedeutic.

526 c ff. On the subject of this
section consult Blass and Cantor referred to on 524 D. Rothlauf Lc. pp. 50—69, and App. II to this book. The great importance attached by Plato and his school to geometry and kindred studies is attested from many sources: see for example Philoponus in Arist. de an. 1 3 (Comment. in Arist. p. 117. 26 ο Πλάτων ου και προ της διατριβης επεγγαμτο 'Αγεωμετρητον μη εισατι, Tzetzes Chil. viii 973 μεθεις Αγεωμετρητοι εισατι μον την στηγην, I. Proclus in Euclid. pp. 29 f. Friedlein Πλάτων καθαρικη της ψυχης και ανασωμός την μαθηματικην ειναι σαφες αποφασις, την άχλων αφαιρομεν τον νομο της διανοιας φωτος κτλ., and D. L. iv 10 προς δο των μητων μοντερνοι μητε γεωμετριαν μητε αστρονομιαν μεμαθησαν, βουλευον δο παρ αυτων (Ευκρινητη) φοιταν. Πορεουν, έρην λαβας γαρ ου εχει φιλοσοφιαν. Among Plato’s companions or pupils in the Academy, Eudoxus and Menonehmns rendered the most conspicuous services to mathematical science (see Allman Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid pp. 129—179), and Euclid himself, according to Proclus (in Euclid. p. 68), was τη πρωμεθει Πλατωνικος κα τη φιλοσοφια τατη οκιο ς. That δ θες δε γεωμετριαν εν ετιγενετης was a characteristic and profound saying of Plato’s (Plut. Conv. Disp. viii 2. 718 d ff.), on the meaning of which see App. I.

IX. Τούτο μεν τοίνυν, είπον, ἐν ἡμιν κείσων· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐξόμενον τούτου σκεψάμεθα ἀρά τι προσήκει ἡμῖν. Τὸ ποιὼν; 20 ἡ γεωμετριαν, ἢ, λέγεις; Ἀυτό τούτο, ἦν δὲ ἐγὼ. “Οσον μένον, δέμη, πρὸς 1 τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τέινε, δήλου ότι προσήκει πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις χωριῶν καὶ συναγωγάς καὶ ἐκτάσεις στρατιάς καὶ ὡσ δὴ ἀλλά σχηματιζόμεθα τὰ στρατοπεδεύτου ἐν αὐταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις, διαφέρον ἃν αὐτὸς 25 αὐτοῦ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὄν. ’Αλλ’ οὖν δε, εἴπον, πρὸς μεν τά...
526 E 31 τὸ εὐδαιμονείστατον τοῦ ὄντος is cited by Stumpf (I.c. p. 95 n. 3) in support of his identification of the Idea of Good with God: see on vi 505 Λ.

33 γένεσιν. 519 Λ. n.
327 Α. 3 αὐτή ἡ ἐπιστήμη κτλ.: "the nature of this science is in precise contradiction to' etc. τῶν τοῦνατιν is adverbal, and ἄνευ intransitive. In what follows Plato is not (as Stallbaum strangely supposed) censuring contemporary geometricians, "sed vitium quodam "ipsius scientiae" (Schneider, who refers to vi 510 B—511 A), for even those δοσι καὶ σημερὰ γεωμετρίας ἐμπειρῶν agree with him. It is however probable on other ground that Plato himself was afraid lest his pupils should depend too much on geometrical figures and instruments; and Plutarch tells us that he reproved Eudoxus and others for this very fault: ἀπολύσατο γὰρ ὅτι καὶ ἀπεδοθέσθαι τὸ γεωμετρίας ἁγάθον ἀδίκητο τὰ τῶν ἀλήθεια χαλαρομοιώση, καὶ μὴ φερομονήν ἄνω μηδὲ ἀντιλημανυμνήσει τῶν ἀτέλεων καὶ ἀσώματων εἴκονων, πρὸς ὅσπερ ἐν ὧν ὁ θεὸς ἄει ἄθεος ἐστί (Con. Disc. vii 2, 7; 18 B; cf. also Vit. Mar. 14. 5—7). The anecdote refers in particular to stereometric instruments, but its moral applies equally to the study of plane geometry. See Rothlauf l.c. pp. 66 ff. and Gow Gk Math. p. 181.

5 ἀναγκαῖος 'in beggarly fashion' ("nothgedrungenden Weise" Prantl). They are 'hard up' for words to express their meaning, and must consequently use language which does not: cf. vi 510 A. J. and C.'s explanation "with merely practical needs in view" is quite wrong; nor does the word appear to me to contain "a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity" (in the sense of ν 458 D), as they assert. Madvig's ἀδάκως for ἀναγκαῖος is a singularly unhappy suggestion.

7 παρατείνειν = 'to apply,' e.g. a parallelogram to a given line: cf. Men. 87 Λ (παρὰ τὴν δοθείαν—γεγραμμὴν παρατεινατα κτλ.) with E. S. Thompson's note. Blass takes the same view (de Pl. math. p. 19). Euclid's expression for this is παραβάλλειν (X 18 ff. and passim: cf. Cantor l.c. p. 145). The ordinary translation 'produce' (as e.g. a line) has no authority, and Euclid's word for 'producing' a line is ἐκβάλλειν or προσεκ-βάλλειν (1 5, 17 and passim). So also in Aristotle: see the Ind. Arist. s.v.)

προστιθέναι : 'to add,' sc. one μέγεθος to another in any geometrical construction; cf. Nicom. Introd. Ar. II 12. 2. Euclid uses συντιθέναι, συγκειμα (X 16 and passim) of such an operation.

Φθεγγόμενοι is said "non sine eleganti quadam irissione" (Stallbaum): cf. vi 565 Α. Μ.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Ζ

527 Σ]

8 το δ' ἐστὶν ποιν τὸ μάθημα γράμμωσι ἡνεκα ἐπιτηδεύομένου. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τούτο ἐπὶ διομολογητέου; Τὸ ποιόν; Ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὠντος γράμμωσι, ἀλλά οὗ τοῦ ποτὲ τι γεγομένου καὶ αποτελομένου. Εὐμολογητόν, ἔφη τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὠντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γραμμὴ ἐστὶν. Ὁλοκοῦν ἄρα, ὃ γενναῖε, ψυχής πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἰς ἄν καὶ ἀπεργαστικόν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἀνω σχεῦν ἢ νῦν κάτω οὐ δέον ἐχομεν. Ὡς οἴον τε κάλλιστα, ἔφη. 

καὶ ὃς σου τ' ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μάλιστα προστατεύον, ὡσοι οἱ εὖ τὴν 15 καλλιπόλεις οἱ μηνδεῖ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέξονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ

11. εὐμολογητῶν Π ετ γρ in marg. Α rekl.: εὖ διομολογητέων Αι. 16. ἀφέξονται Σ.: ἀφέξονται ΑII q.

8 το δὲ: 'whereas'; cf. I 340 D n. 

527 Β 10 τοῦ ἀεὶ ὠντος. Plato held the objects of mathematical study to be 

άδικα καὶ ἀκλίντα 'eternal and unchangeable' (Arist. Met. Α 6. 97b 16: cf. VI 510 Σ f f., VII 526 Α n.), but not Ideas. The Platonic meaning of τοῦ ἀεὶ ὠντος is certainly not exhausted by the observation that "the truths of every science are always true" (Bosanquet). ὠντος implies substantial existence, independently of our thoughts, and independently also of particulars. The existence of τὰ μαθη 

ματικα as πιστευτὰ τῶν ὠντων of copies of the Ideas, 'moving in and out of' the material substance of the Universe, which they stamp with an infinite diversity of forms and shapes, is a cardinal doctrine of Plato's physics (Tim. 50 Α al.), and Bosanquet appears to me to rob the words of Plato of half their significance, in the fruitless attempt to find in his ontology nothing but what commands itself to certain schools of philosophy in the present day. See vi 476 ε and App. I. 

10 τοῦ ποτὲ κτλ.: 'that which at some particular time is a particular instance of becoming and perishimg." τι γεγομένου = ὠντος (the copula) γεγομένου 

τιος, but γεγομένου itself involves the copula, the presence of which would here be intolerable. Cf. vi 473 Β n. and Euclid. 10 c εὶ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι 

πᾶχει, οὐκ ὅτι γεγομένων ἑστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ ότι γίγνεται, γεγομένων ἑστι. Here τι is indeclinable like τι in Lach. 200 Μ, Menex. 247 β (ὁλομένω τι εἶναι), Euclid. 303 C (δικαιῶν τι εἶναι), odhēn, μηδέν etc. tolerably often in tragedy, and the adverbial use of ἀμφότερα and τάναντα 

(e.g., Lach. 185 λόγων γὰρ ποιν ἡ χρηστὸν 

ὴ τάναντα γεγομένων κτλ.); cf. also 

(with Schneider Addit. p. 57) Procl. in 

Tim. 136 Β τοῦ—ἀδιαφέροντα πάντα ὠντος 

et al. The indeclinable form adds to the emphasis, and indeed ποτὲ could hardly stand at all. Schneider translates "des etwas werdenden und ver 

gehenden," apparently taking τι predic 

tively with γεγομένου. But the expression τι which becomes something suggests a 

substratum underlying γεγομένου, whereas the only correct antithesis to ὁν (τοῦ ἀεὶ 

ὀντος) is γεγομένου itself. Stallbaum wrongly explains τι as "alia ratione."

A few inferior MSS omit the word. I believe the text is sound, though possibly 

τι should be accent, as in the exactly similar Aristotelian usage of τι "ad 

significandam τὴν ἀτομοτήτα" (Bonitz 

Ind. Ar. p. 703) e.g. ὁ τῆς ἀνθρώπων. The use of ποτὲ also reminds us of the 

ποτὲ of the Categories. 

12 γεωμετρικὴ is an adjective (Schneider). 

14 σχεῦν. The tense is inchoative or 

ingressive, as usual: see 516 Β n. 

527 Σ 16 καλλιπόλεις. Socrates ral 

lies Glauco on his 'brait toun.' The word, as Ι. and C. point out, is full of tenderness and affection. Callipolis was the name of several cities in Greece (Pape 

Benseler Gr. Eigennam. s.v.), a fact which sufficiently refutes Herwerden's doubts as to the formation of the word: see also (with Schneider) Lobeck's Phry 

nichus pp. 600—607. Herwerden ought not to have revived the tasteless and 

prosaic conjectures καλὴ πόλεις (ΠΙ) and 

καλλιστή πόλεις (Σ).
17 αὐτῷ: viz. τοῦ μαθήματος.
18 καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ. See on 526 B.
20 ἡμέρας τε. Herwerden excises τε, comparing 526 D; but the MSS are a safer guard.

527 C—528 E. Shall we prescribe Astronomy as our third subject? Glance appr. pointing to its usefulness in practical affairs. After reproving his friend for advocating the Platonic curriculum chiefly on this ground, Socrates observes that the solid should first be studied in itself, and afterwards the solid in motion. In other words Stereometry should precede Astronomy. Although the problems of Stereometry are not yet solved, we may hope for success under proper guidance, and with the support of the State.

527 D ff. On stereometry in the age of Plato see Rothlauf loc. cit., pp. 69—74, Cantor loc. cit., pp. 194—202, Tannery Rev. Phil. x (1890) pp. 523 ff. The most famous stereometrical problem of Plato's time was the so-called 'Delian problem' or duplication of the cube, and it is highly probable that Plato had this question in his mind when he wrote the present chapter. A dramatic poet, whom Valckenaer supposed to be Euripides, had already made allusion to it in the lines μικρόν γα έλεξας βασιλικόν σηκόν τάφον. \ 1 ἐπιπλάτεος ἔστω. τοῦ καλοῦ (v.l. κύβου) δὲ μὴ σφαλεῖ 1 ἐπιπλάτει 2 ἐκατόν κύβον ἐν τάχει τάφον (Nauck Trag. Gr. Fr. p. 676). The story runs that the Delians, having been commanded by an oracle to double a certain altar, were in great perplexity, διαπέμψαμεν δὲ τοῖς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ γεωμετρίας ἀξίους αὐτοῖς εἰρήνος ἔφερεν ὁ Ῥισάµονε (Eratosthenes, quoted by Eutocius in Archimedes. I11 pp. 102 ff. Heiberg. See also Plut. de gen. Socr. 7. 579 B—D and de el. ap. Delphos 6.

386 ε. λ., and Johannes Philop. quoted by Sturm Das Delische Problem p. 10). Plato favourably entertained their application, and the students of the Academy set to work with extraordinary enthusiasm. A remarkable stimulus was thereby given to the study of stereometry, and the Delian problem was successfully solved. The anecdote may of course be apocryphal, but we have not the smallest reason for rejecting it. The memory of such incidents is usually cherished with peculiar care in the history of a College, and Eratosthenes (176—194 B.C.) was born only seventy-one years after Plato's death. In any case the duplication of the cube may well have seemed in Plato's time a question of the first importance for the purposes of stereometrical science, for, as Tannery remarks (loc. p. 256), the duplication of the square, which had already been discovered (Men. 82 B ff.), was believed to be the key to plane problems, and so it was probably surmised that the διπλασιασμὸς τοῦ κύβου would give the solution of a whole series of solid problems. English readers will find a short account of this classical απορία with some of its ancient solutions in Rouse Ball's Math. Recreations and Problems pp. 154 ff. The most elaborate and exhaustive history of the problem and its solutions in antiquity is that of Sturm Das Delische Problem 1896.

23 ἐμὸς γοῦν. Schneider and others write ἐμοῦ γενή (see cr. n.), but ὥν is too strongly illative for this passage. Cf. 1 335 E. n.

24 τὸ γὰρ περὶ κτλ. Cf. 526 C n. and Xenophon there quoted, esp. § 4 ἐκείνεν δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπέπου γλυ- αρεθα, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὡραν καὶ μνήσις καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ δύνασθαι γιγνόσειν κτλ. and infra τὰς ὡρας τῶν εἰρήμενων διαγιγνωσκόμενος. The ana-
log of this passage suggests that in Plato καὶ ("both") μηνῶν καὶ έκαστων depends on ὑπό, which is the accusative plural: cf. Λάτος 812 ά empty of empty so that this presents a problem. Practical astronomy will enable one to tell both the time of month and the time of year by looking at the moon and the sun. For ὑπό μηνῶν cf. also, besides the passage of Xenophon just quoted, Εἰκ. 449 f. Ἱπάτη κυκλάει ἄφικα Καρπενίου περισσότερον ὑπό μηνῶν κτλ. Schneider and the English translators take ὑπό as genitive and parallel with μηνῶν κτλ., but it is difficult to see what ἐκαστομέτροι ἔχειν περὶ έκαστων can mean: for ἐπιμελείαν ποιεῖται έκαστων καὶ ὑπὸν in VI 486 D is quite different. Schleiermacher translates the passage correctly.

ἐκαστομέτροι. For this form of the comparative adverb see Ι 343 E H.

26 ἢδος εἶ: 'you amuse me.' See Ι 337 D H.

27 μην ὄντος κτλ. The usefulness of 'useless' studies is a fundamental principle in Plato's theory; and (as Schneider points out) ὅτι εν τούτοις κτλ. is intended to shew that liberal studies are in the highest and truest sense useful.

τὸ δ' ἔστιν. Ι 340 D H.

29 χαλέπον. Cobet's ταχαλέπον (after Nicom. Εἰσ. Αρ. I11 7) is a wholly gratuitous change: see App. VII.

30 εκάστου. Every human being has an ὄργανον ὄργανος viz. τοῖς: it is indeed the possession of τοῖς which makes him at once truly human and therewithal divine (VI 501 B H.). The genitive is more expressive than εκάστου, which Herderren proposes: cf. 518 C H., and for the combination of genitives V 449 A H.

ἐκακαθαρίσεται κτλ.: 'is purged and rekindled.' In passages like this Plato hurrs his metaphors about with Shake

spearian vehemence and confusion. Cf. Π 365 C H., and see the admirable remarks on metaphor by the author of the treatise περὶ ὄροις 32. 4 πλῆθος καὶ τόλμησις μεταφοράς—τὰ τέκαιμα καὶ σοφράδα πᾶν καὶ τὸ γενναῖον ὄρος εἶναι ἰδέα ὤμων τινα ἀλήθεια δύναται. οὐς ἐν οἷς τούτοι μηδαμὴ ἁσθμηνου ἐστίν, εἰκότως

527 E] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Z 121

ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ μήνον γεωργία οὐδὲ ναυτίλλια προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ 25 στρατηγία οὐχ ᾤττον. Ἡδος εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλοὺς, μην ὄντος ἄφροτα μαθήματα προσπάττειν. τὸ δ' ἔστων οὐ πάνω φαύλου, ἀλλὰ χαλέπον πιστεύει, ὅτι εν τούτοις τούς μαθηματικοὺς ἕκαστον ὄργανον τὴν ψυχήν ἐκκαθαρίσεται τα καὶ ἀναζωπυρίζει. Απολλούμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐπίστημων κρεῖττον ὅτι συνοδεύει μνημών ὄντων γάρ αὐτοῦ ἀλήθεια δύναται. οὐς μὲν οἷς τούτα ἐπιδοκεῖ ἁμηχαίνως ὡς εὖ δόξες λέγειν' οὐσὶ δὲ τούτου μηδαμὴ ἁσθμηνος εἰσίν, εἰκότως

527 E 32 οὐς μὲν οὖν κτλ. The logical sequence is somewhat difficult. Do not (says Socrates) be so anxious to persuade oi πολλοὶ of the usefulness of our curriculum. Its true utility is difficult to understand, and oi πολλοὶ will not easily be persuaded of it. Those who agree with us about its true utility will highly approve of your proposals; but oi πολλοὶ will not, for they can see no practical advantage (worthy of mention) accruing from them. δόξες λέγειν attributes the proposals to Glauco as in Ι 5 δ' ὄντος—προστάτες, and ἀλήνη is said with reference to τοῦτον. To the ψεφία of intellectual salvation such persons are blind; and they cannot see any other, i.e. any practical ψεφία worth mentioning in Plato's studies. ἀλήνη cannot be understood as "beyond their practical applications" (D. and V.) unless we refer it to Glauco's remark τῷ γάρ περὶ κτλ. in D, to the detriment both of grammar and of sense.
527 E—523 A 35 σκόπει οὖν κτλ. 'Very well: make up your mind once for all with which of these parties you are discoursing: or are you not addressing your remarks to either, but 'etc.? Glaucos's insistence on the practical uses of astronomy may be all very well with a popular audience, but are out of place in a philosophical discussion. For this peremptory αὐτόνει cf. Sympr. 213 οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους λιτ. 'not to neither': cf. the familiar μᾶλλον οὐ for μᾶλλον ἢ (Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 771—773). I understand ἢ—ὡν-σθαι (with Ast) as an independent question: for it is difficult to supply 'whether.' Schneider's objections to this view are based on the idea that ἢ οὐ (if interrogative) must have an affirmative answer; but οὐ has nothing to do with ἢ, and only balances ἢ: cf. Ar. Plut. 372 μόνον οὐ κέλλοφας, ἢλ ἠσπασα: Plato makes this clear by placing the two contrasting clauses in close juxtaposition. οὖ has been omitted by Ξ and some inferior MSS. The text, however, sound, and none of the proposed corrections—οὐ for οὖ (Schneider), εἰ πρὸς οὐδετέρους (Madvig), οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐτέρους (Cobet), εἰ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐτέρους (Baiter), ἢ ποὺ πρὸς οὐδετέρους (Liebhold)—will bear examination, though Cobet's deserves the praise of elegance.

528 Α 4 ἀναγε—εἰς τοῦτῳ: 'fall back then': cf. Ar. Birds 383 ἀναγε ἐπὶ σκέλος, with Blaydes' note. The metaphor is not naval (as Ast and Stallbaum hold), but military, nor is ἀνάγει (nauv) even in naval language 'inhibere,' but 'put out to sea,' as in Hdt. vii 100, viii 76 et al. and occasionally in Attic (for ἀναγεθαί). Cf. ἀνεκώρησας 528 D.

5 οὐκ ὀρθῶς: see on τὸ ἑξάμενου τότῳ 526 C. The subjects ought to follow each other in the order of their complexity: see App. II. Plato's error was of course deliberately "contrived to emphasize the principle which it violated." (Bosanquet), and also, it may be added, to enable him to call especial attention to the study of Stereometry, on which he laid very great stress (527 D n.).

7 ἡ οὖν should be taken with ὅν ('already in revolution'), not (as D. and V.) with λαβόντες.

528 Β 8 δευτέραν αὐξήνας κτλ. It is better (with Schneider) to translate αὐξήνας by 'increase' than by 'dimension'; for αὐξήνας always implies something increased, and in the phrases δευτέρα αὐξήνας etc. this 'something' is the point. Among the Pythagoreans, who probably originated these expressions, the line was regarded as an αὐξήνας of the point, the plane of the line, the solid of the plane. See App. II.

9 κυβῶν αὐξήνας: 'cubic increase,' i.e. the increase which belongs to, or results in, cubes, with perhaps also a play on a different sense of κυβῶν αὐξήνας, 'how to increase cubes,' as in the famous 'Delian problem' of the διδασασμὸς κυβῶν (so also Tannery l. c. p. 525). See on 527 D. But as cubes are not the only solid bodies, Plato adds τὸ βάθος μετέχειν. By Aristotle's time the name στρειομετρία had not yet been invented, for the subject had already in one form or another engaged the attention of the Py-
thagoreans, Anaxagoras and Democritus (Blass l.c. p. 21. Tannery l.c. x p. 524), not to speak of Hippocrates of Chios, who had concerned himself in the fifth century B.C. with the question of the duplication of the cube (Allman Gk Geometry etc. pp. 84 ff.). He only means that its problems had not yet been 'discovered' (φυσώθειν as in Pythagoras' πυθήκια) or solved. When and by whom the 'Delian problem' in particular was definitively solved to the satisfaction of the Academy, is not quite clear. The tradition which ascribes a solution of it to Plato himself is beset with grave difficulties, as Blass (l.c. pp. 21—30) and others have pointed out (see especially Cantor l.c. pp. 194—202 and Sturm Das Delische Problem pp. 49 ff.). It is however universally allowed that the principle involved—the finding of "two mean proportionals between one straight line and another twice as long" (Gow Gk Math. p. 169)—was first stated by Hippocrates of Chios and well known to Plato, at all events when he wrote the Timaeus (32 A ff.): see also Häbler Über zwei Stellen in Platonis Timaeus etc. pp. 1—17). We may perhaps infer from οὕτως φυσώθην that Plato did not think a final solution of this as of other stereometrical problems had yet been reached; there is at all events nothing in the Republic to justify the curious statement of Diogenes Laertius that ('Αρχυτας) πρώτων κυβών ὑπελειπομένων εὑρεν, ὅς φησι Πλάτων ἐν πολιτείᾳ (viii 83), although it is probably true that Archytas was the first to offer a solution of the famous difficulty (see Sturm l.c. pp. 22—32). In D. L. l.c. Cobet reads πρώτως κυβών εὑρεν κτλ., whether on his own responsibility, or on MS authority, he does not tell us. See also on 527 D, 528 C.

12. τε Α·Π·: om. Α·. 14. οὐκ—μεγαλοφορούμενοι II et in marg. Α·: om. Α·.

εὐτίμους ἔξεις: 'holds in honour,' as in viii 548 A. The expression usually means 'is honoured' (Xen. An. ii. 1. 7); hence ἄξει for ἔξει is proposed by Herwerden, who compares 528 C, 538 E. But the error is not an easy one in such a MS as A, and it is safer to keep ἔξει and take the phrase as ἐν τῇ ἔξει (cf. ἐν τῇ ἔζημι ἔξει Ibd. iii 3, ἐν ηὐτῇ ἔξει [Dem.] 284, 11, and Jebb on Soph. Anv. (509) as ἄξειν εὐτίμους ἐγὼ ἐν τῇ ἔξει (538 E).

14. ὡς νῦν ἔξει belongs no doubt to the following clauses (v i v 419 A n.); but see also on 528 C.

15. μεγαλοφορούμενοι is condemned as un-Attic by Cobet (P. L.2. pp. 232, 541); but μεγαλοφόρων, μεγαλοφορούν are Attic, and Xenophon uses μεγαλοφόρειν μεγαλοφορούμενοι (Cobet's emendation) would mean 'vaunting': cf. III 354 D.

528 C 15 ἐν δὲ πόλις κτλ. is perhaps the earliest demand in literature for the State-endowment— we might almost say the State-endowment—of pure science (cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 169). Plato implies that in his city this claim will be fully satisfied; and the Platonic Utopia is in fact "la revendication du pouvoir pour la science" (Tannery l.c. p. 521).

ζυνεπιστατοί κτλ.: 'should cooperate with the superintendent' etc. not (as Jowett) 'become the director of these studies': for a special ἐπιστάτης—Plato has just said—is needed in any case. Plato's picture of the odiun stereometrum, if the phrase may be allowed, is evidently drawn from life. He seems to speak as if he had himself an ἐπιστάτης ready, and wished to secure for him public support in order that students might be willing to work under him. Now although ὡς νῦν ἔξει belongs, strictly speaking, to the following clause, the words may, so far as the Greek is concerned, be connected with ἐπιστάτης καὶ γενομένου, and will then be equivalent to ὡς νῦν ἔγενος ἐπιστάτης. I think it not impossible that Plato intended his readers to suspect him.
of this further meaning. If there is anything in this conjecture, to whom does Plato allude? Not, surely, to himself, although some have suspected the philosopher of blowing his own trumpet in a somewhat similar passage of the Phaedo (78 a): see Lutoslawski's Plato's Logic pp. 263 f. We are told by Plutarch de genio Socrates 7, 579 c that Plato referred the Delian delegation to Eudoxus, telling them that the problem was οὐ τοι φανον οὐδ' ἀμβλο διανοια όρώση, ἀκρος δὲ τὰς γραμμὰς φημηκένσι ἔργον εἶναι: τοῦτο μὲν οὖν Εὔδοξον αὐτοῦ τὸν Κλίσιον ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυκλίκου Ἐλέκτρας συνεπέλεευκτλ. Now we know that Eudoxus not only himself achieved a solution of the Delian problem (Sturm l.c. pp. 32—37), but was also, in the fullest sense of the term, 'the founder of scientific Stereometry' (Günther in Müller's Handbuch v 1, p. 30), and did more for the subject than any of Plato's disciples (Cantor l.c. pp. 208—210). For these reasons I think it not unlikely that Plato has Eudoxus in his mind. Eudoxus and his pupils seem to have been living and working in the Academy along with the followers of Plato sometime between Plato's second and third visits to Sicily (368 B.C. and 361 B.C.: see Allman Gr. Geometry etc. p. 175), and it is a pleasing and I hope pardonable conjecture—I do not claim that it is more—to suppose that Plato avails himself of this opportunity to pay a graceful compliment to his fellow-workers. See also on line 19 below and Introd. § 4.

16 ἐντίμως ἄγουσα. The phrase is illustrated by Lobeck Phryn. p. 419.

18 ὑπὸ δὲ κτλ. ὑπὸ depends on ἄτιμαξόμενα καὶ κολοῦμένα. There is a sense in which the students also ἀτιμάζομαι καὶ κολοῦσον a subject, which they ἀδείων ἄγωται (B above). κολοῦμένα is in harmony with αἰτήσεται—though cut short, the study still grows or advances. For other views on this sentence see App. VIII.

30 κτλ. The ἐγρώται are the ἐγρήγοροι of B—not, I think, Plato's pupils, but men who cannot explain the true utility of stereometry (as described in 527 D, E), and are unwilling to throw their whole hearts into a 'useless' study.

19 βία—αὐξάνεται. Blass (l.c. p. 22) observes that in these words "sine dubio mathematici ex schola Platonis profecti intelligendi sunt." It is just conceivable—that though of course no stress should be laid on the conjecture—that ὑπὸ χάριτος conceals some complimentary allusion to a particular person. If so, Eudoxus may be intended (see above on 528 C). There is, it is true, a tradition that Plato and Eudoxus had not always been on the best of terms (Allman Gr. Geom. pp. 182 f.), but during the visit of Eudoxus to Athens between 368 and 361 B.C., they appear to have worked harmoniously and even cordially together (ib. pp. 133, 178). See also 530 A n. But we have no evidence to shew that Eudoxus bore the sobriquet of χάρις, though his character and personality (see Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 117 b 15 ff.), and even perhaps his name, deserved such a compliment. I think Plato means merely 'through elegance,' i.e. through the inherent elegance of the subject: cf. τὸ γε ἐπίχαρα καὶ διαφέρωται ἔχει. The use of ὑπὸ as is in ἐν ὑπὸ δώσιν ἐρρίξεις and the like: see Kühner-Gerth Gr. Gr. II 1, p. 523. Badham's ἐπίχαρα for ὑπὸ χάριτος is an unlucky venture. Dr Jackson suggests that ὑπὸ χάριτος may perhaps mean 'by grace, favour,' 'on sufferance': but Glauco's reply appears to me against this view.

528 C, D 30 οὐδὲν—φανημέναι: 'be brought to light,' 'discovered,' 'solved': cf. X 602 Ε and γῇρησθαι καὶ ἐγρώτη above. Unless Badham, Madvig, and Bäiter had entirely mistaken the meaning of φανημέναι, they could scarcely have conjectured or approved of τουαίτρα in place of αὐτά. Plato's language seems to point to some exceptional activity in connexion with the study of stereometrical problems, such as may have been occasioned by the application from Delos (527 D n.), and to encourage his pupils to hope for success at no distant date.
528 \[ \text{D 21} \] \text{\textit{Allá \( \mu οι \) kta.}} \text{The recapitulation is intended to emphasize once more the principle regulating Plato’s sequence of subjects (528 A ii. and App. II).}

24 \text{\textit{spéudwv—}bradávov: a proverbial saying, like our ‘more haste, less speed’: cf. (with Stallbaum) Pol. 164 b. If we \( \text{σπεύδων, τιχόωs, we are apt \( \text{σπεύδουτες} \) bradávov: hence the proverb \text{spéudé} \text{bradávov ‘Eile mit Weile.’ See Jebb on Soph. Ant. 231.}}

26 \text{\textit{ǒtì \( \text{τὴ τἔτης} \) kta.: not ‘qua ita est comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit’ (Stallbaum), but ‘qua ridicule tractatur’: cf. (with Schneider) 530 E.}}

528 \text{E—530 C. Astronomy will accordingly be fourth in order, and Stereometry third. Yes, says Giaucho; for assuredly Astronomy compels the soul to look ‘on high.’ On the contrary, Socrates replies, as stated at present, Astronomy turns the soul’s eye down, though the bodily eye looks upward. True astronomy is not observation of the visible heavens, which are, like all things seen, imperfect and subject to change; it is a mathematical science, which studies the true movements of intelligible stars and uses the visible firmament as its orrery. We shall therefore pursue Astronomy by making use of problems and leave the heavens alone.}

528 \text{E ff. We have seen that the study of Stereometry, the science which deals with \text{πῆρι \( \text{ἀοξία} \)} naturally follows the study of Geometry, in which \text{δεύτερα \( \text{ἀοξία} \) is investigated (526 c n.). Astronomy, like Stereometry, is still concerned with bodies of three dimensions, but in Astronomy we have one additional element, viz. Motion, so that the study of Astronomy, as Plato conceives it, is a degree more complicated than Stereometry; and forms its natural sequel: cf. 528 A, b. Plato’s conception of \text{ἀρχαιώτητι καὶ \( \text{γεωμετρίᾳ} \) would have commended itself in the main to the mathematicians of his day (cf. 525 D ff., 527 A), although they might not have accepted his view of the ontology of these sciences; but in the two remaining subjects of his curriculum, Astronomy and Harmonics, he consciously and deliberately parts company with his contemporaries (see 529 A—530 C, 530 E—531 C). After every allowance has been made for the perpervid enthusiasm of Plato’s style, it must be confessed that the application of the principles laid down in this chapter would have checked the progress of astronomical science. Both Astronomy and Harmonics are treated by Plato as branches of pure rather than applied mathematics; and in each of these sciences Plato either discards or altogether prohibits observation. It must be remembered, on the other hand, that Plato’s object is not to promote the study of physical science for its own sake, but to provide a suitable \text{προσανέδα} for those who are to crown their lives by the contemplation of the Idea, from which every element of sense-perception is far removed. The astronomy which Plato sketches in this chapter is a unique compound of poetry, metaphysics and mathematics. Besides the powerful appeal which it makes to the poetical imagination, it has a permanent value even in the
7. Η Σέρ: η Α" II: η (sic) Α". 9. νοήσει ΙΙ: νοήσεων Α. Ισως—ευθυκίως
Glaucoti tribuit Α".

history of Astronomy as a passionate protest against mere empiricism, and an
emphatic if exaggerated vindication of the
theoretical side of the science. See also on 529 C, D and App. II.

528 E—529 A 31 ἕ σὺ μετέχεις: lit. 'in respect of that, in respect of which
you pursue it,' i.e. 'in the way in which
you pursue it,' no longer for its practical
uses, as I did before (527 D), but
because it leads the soul 'on high,' and
from things here yonder ('from the things
of this world to the next,' say D. and V.,
quite wrongly). The object of ἐπαινέω is
not ἕ σὺ μετέχεις, but astronomy. Glauco
has assimilated the phraseology of Socrates
without its meaning. 'On high' and
'yonder' mean to Glauco the material
heavens, not the νοητὸς τόπος: and he
thinks the soul looks upwards if the bodily
eye is turned aloft. The essence of
Glauco's error consists in materializing the
spiritual; and Plato here warns us against
a danger which is responsible for countless
errors, not only in Platonic criticism, but
in every department of human thought
and dogma. See also on 529 B, C.

529 A 4 οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνά
γωνεῖς: 'those who would lead us up-
wards to philosophy ('welche zur Wis-
senschaftsliebe hinanführen wollen,'
Schneider). Plato is thinking of teachers
who recognise (with Isocr. Antid. 261)
that Astronomy and kindred subjects are the
παρασκευή φιλοσοφίας; but nevertheless
teach Astronomy on methods directly
calculated to turn the soul's eye down.
His description fits some of the Sophists,
particularly Hippias (see Prot. 318 e and
ct. Isocr. Pan. 26—28). In οἵ—ἀναγωνεῖς
Plato takes them at their own valuation.
For the Greek cf. 521 c ψυχῆς περιαγωγή
ἐκ νυκτερίων τιμών ἡμέρας εἰς ἀλήθινην,
tοῦ ὅπως ὁποιον ἔπανω, ἢ δι' ἠλευθοροφίαν
ἀληθῆ φύσαμεν εἰκά, where ἀληθῆ points
the contrast with the false philosophy to
which some would lead the soul. ἀνα-
γωνεῖς preserves the idea of education as
an ascent, in harmony with the prevailing
metaphor throughout this book. The
translation 'those who embark on philo-
sophy' (D. and V.) is untenable: so also
are the two other versions in J. and C.
('raise astronomy to the rank of a science,'
'refer astronomy to philosophy'), as
Shorey—whose view is more nearly cor-
rect—has pointed out (A. J. Ph. XVI p.
237).

5 οὐκ ἄγεννος: 'with a fine au-
dacity,' 'non sine generosa fiducia'
(Schneider), as in Gorg. 492 D οὐκ ἄγεννος
γε—ἰππίζειν τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος,
and elsewhere.

529 B, C 7 κινδυνεύεις γὰρ κτλ.
Glaucoto conceived of astronomy in exactly
the same way as the Aristophanic So-
crates; and this indignat repudiation by
the Platonic Socrates is the more intelli-
gible, if (with Nettleship Lect. and Rem.
ii p. 274 n.) we suppose that Plato is
thinking of the Clitias. Our astronomy
(says Plato in effect), our vision upward,
is not what Aristophanes made it appear
to be, but something very different. See
below on ἄνω κεχρωμένος in B and έξ ὑπτίας
νεών in C.
529 B 10 ἄλλο τι νομίσαι κτλ.: ‘think any other study one that makes,’ etc. “Aliud esse puto νομίσαι τι ποιεῖν, aliud ποιοῦν idque huic loco magis aptum, scilicet non solum facere sive faciendo in praesentia occupatum esse, sed vim et consequendum faciendi habere aliquid existimare” (Schneider). ποιοῦν is half adjectival, like συμφέρον in Xen. Κέρ. Λα. το (quoted by Ast) τοῦτο συμφέρον τῷ εὐγνώμον οὖσιν. Heindorf’s conjecture ποιεῖν was approved by Kühner Gr. Gr. Π p. 631; but ποιοῦν is in all the MSS, and should be retained.

12 ἕαν τὲ τις κτλ.: ‘and if any one attempts to learn aught which is perceivable I care not whether his open mouth yawn upwards or his closed mouth look below—he will never, as I hold, learn ’ etc. For ἕαν τὲ, Hermann and Stallbaum read ἕαν δὲ on slight ms authority; but ὅ δυναμαι and ὅ (τε)— φημα are properly joined by τε (Schneider). The English translators understand συμμεμεκός of closed eyes; but the eyes must of course be open in any case, and the balance with ἄνω κεχυρός is conclusive against this view. συμμεμεκός, as the Lexica shew, is used of closing any bodily aperture. The state of the mouth is ludicrously irrelevant, but κεχυρός, which betokens rapt stupidity, inevitably suggests συμμεμεκός, and the whole expression is a finely indignant outburst of exuberant and extravagant satire on a gross misapprehension of Socratico-Platonic views.

ἄνω κεχυρός refers perhaps specifically to Clouds 171—173 ἵπποιντος αὕτου τῷ σέληνι τὰς ὀδοὺς | καὶ τὰς περιφορὰς εἰς ἄνω κεχυρότος | ἀπὸ τῆς ὁροφῆς νοῦ τωρ γαλαξίας κατέχεσθαι. It will be admitted that Plato had some ground for his anger. I don’t in the least care, he says in effect to Aristophanes, whether your Socrates looks up or down: so long as he studies αἰσθήτα, he is not my Socrates, and I disown your caricature. For the general sense cf. (with J. and C.) Tim. 91 D.

13 ἐπιστήμην—ἐχεῖν: ‘admits of knowledge.’

529 C 15 τῆν ψυχήν: though his bodily eye looks upwards.

καὶ ἐς ὑπτίας κτλ.: ‘aye, even though the learner float face upwards on land or in the sea.’ I understand εἰς ὑπτίας νεῖν ἐν γῇ as an allusion to Socrates in the κρημάθα: cf. Ἱπ. 19 C ταῦτα γὰρ ἐσώρατε καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνου κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτης τινὰ ἔκει περιφορέμενον, φάσκοντα τὸ αερόβατον κτλ. and see L. Clouds 218—226. If we suppose that Socrates lay supine in his swinging κρημάθα, as presumably he did, since he was looking at the moon, then any one who had seen the Clouds would at once catch the allusion, especially after ἄνω κεχυρός and the other references just above. For νεῖν of floating in the air, cf. ἀφάνταχον L. Clouds 337, with Blaydes ad loc. and on Peace 831.

ἡ ἐν θαλάττῃ is thrown in by Plato with the same extravagant mockery as κάτω συμμεμεκός. Float him on land, float him, if you like, in the sea; but though his body’s eye looks upward, his soul looks down. On the text and other views of this passage see App. IX.
\[529\] C. D. 10. ταύτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ ἐν ὀρατῷ πεποι-

Platonic astronomer, on the other hand, looks with the eye of διάνοια at the ἀληθινὰ ποικίλματα, i.e. at the motions of true or mathematical stars. These mathematical stars φορὰς πρὸς ἀληθαὶ φέρεται ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ, i.e. in mathematical number, e.g. in 3 and 73 (not three months, etc.), and also ἀληθεῖσθαι σχῆμας, i.e. in mathematical orbits, viz. the perfect ellipses which are imperfectly reproduced in the orbits of the visible material planets. Furthermore, although here perhaps our imagination may refuse to follow Plato in his flight, just as the visible Mars in his journey carries with him the γεγραμμένα which he contains, so Plato represents the true stars of mathematical astronomy as carrying round with them τὰ ἑνότα, i.e. the mathematical realities which are in them. The mathematical counterpart of Mars, for example, will take with it in its revolution those perfect mathematical forms which are imperfectly reproduced in the canals and snow-caps of the visible Mars. Plato in short conceives of a mathematical οὐρανός of which the visible heavens are but a blurred and imperfect expression in time and space, just as every visible and material triangle is only an approximation to a true or perfect, i.e. a mathematical, triangle. The following remark of Aristotle's is intended as an objection to Plato's theory, but, according to the doctrine of this part of the Κεραυνόν, Plato would have accepted the criticism as containing a just and true account of the astronomy which he prescribes: ἐπὶ δὲ εἰ ἄτομα παρὰ τὰ ἑνότα τὰ αἰσθήτα τὰ μεταξύ θησαυρὸς, πολλάς ἀπορίας ἐξεί. ὁδὸν γὰρ ὅς ὁμολογεῖ τε παρ' αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς αἰσθήτας ἐσονται καὶ ἐκατόν τῶν ἐνότων γενών, ὅπως ἐπείπερ ἀστρονομολογία μιὰ τούτων ἐστὶν, ἐστὶν τὰς καὶ ὀφθαλμῶς παρὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ τάλαμο ὀφθαλμῶς τὰ κατὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν (Met. B 2. 997b 12 ff.). It remains to speak of two particular difficulties. What does Plato mean by ταύτα τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, and by τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἡ ὄσω βραδέτης? The ποικίλματα seem to be generally identified with the stars and nothing more. But inasmuch as astronomy deals with φορὰ βάθους, and the ordinary astronomer, according to Plato, studies τὰς τῶν ἀστρῶν φορὰς (cf. 533 A) rather than
occupied antiquity is than P.

which consists of its full and unimpaired significance the necessary contrast between the astronomy of observation and Plato's form of the science. The place which in popular astronomy is occupied by a γιγαντιον τάχος, e.g. the planet Mercury, and a γιγαντιον βραδύτης, e.g. the planet Mars, is in true astronomy filled by όν τάχος and ουσα βραδύτης. Plato's conception of a true science of Astronomy is a remarkable product of his peculiar half-poetical, half-philosophical imaginative faculty, and differs fundamentally from the theory and practice of the science both in antiquity and now. But it must in fairness be allowed that if a science of astronomy could be constructed on Platonic principles, admitting no element of sense-perception, and dealing exclusively with incorporeal mathematical abstractions, it would prove a better prelude to the study of the αρχόματος τε καὶ ἀσχημάσιος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία (Phaedr. 247 c) than could ever be provided by the astronomy which depends on observation of the heavenly bodies. See further App. II, and for other views of this passage App. X.
σπονδή, ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ληφόμενον ἵσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς συμμετρίας. Τι δ′ ου μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἐφι. 530
Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικὸν, ἦν δ′ ἐγώ, ὡντα οὐκ οἷει ταυτὸν πείσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀστρων φορὰς ἀποβλέποντα; οὐκεῖοι μὲν, ὡς οἷον τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαύτα ἔργα συντήσασθαι, οὕτω εὐνυστίναι τῷ τοῦ ὕμεραν δημιουργὸν ἀυτὸν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοὶ τῆν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν ξυμμετριάν καὶ τούτων πρὸς μήνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν πρὸς ταῦτα 1 καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἷει, ἡγησάται τὸν νομίζοντα γέμισθαι τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὀσαυτοὺς καὶ ὀυδεμίῳ οὕδεν παραλλάττειν, σῶμι τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὀρόμενα, 10 καὶ ζητεῖν παντί τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν; 'Εμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἐφι, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούοιτι. Προβλήμασιν ἀρα, ἦν δ′ ἐγώ, χρώμενοι ὄσπερ γεωμετριάν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομιάν μέτιμεν, τα δ′

530 λ 2 τῷ ὄντι δὴ κτλ. It has been conjectured by Brandt (z. Entw. d. plat. Lehr. v. d. Sedenten p. 8), that Plato is thinking of Eudoxus; but there is nothing to suggest a specific reference here, as there was in 528 b, c, and as Eudoxus, "the father of scientific astronomical observation in Greece" was preeminently "a practical observer" (Allman Gk. Geometry etc. p. 142), he would hardly be described by Plato in this passage as τῷ ὄντι ἀστρονομοῦν. See also Hürner Entst. u. Komp. d. plat. Pol. p. 667.

4. τὰ τοιαύτα; i.e. ὡρατά, σωματοειδή, τῷ τοῦ ὕμεραν δημιουργῷ: the Demiurgus of the Timaeus.

5 τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς κτλ.: with which astronomical observation is concerned. Plato's tone is very different in the Timaeus (47 A.f.) as Grote points out (Plato 111 p. 235 n.). where also an amusing parallel is quoted from Malebranche); but it should be remembered that it is with the educational value of astronomy as a preparation for Dialectic that we are here concerned (note εἰ μελλόμεν—τούθεν in b, and see App. 11).

7 τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρών: 'the other stars' (Schneider), as ταῦτα shews, not 'the stars besides' (as Stallbaum).

ταὐτά: viz. the Sun and Moon, which make day, night, year, and month.

530 b 9 παραλλάττειν—ὁρίμαινa is a cardinal principle with Plato: see Tim. 28 Α, b, 37 D and especially Pol. 269 D, and beside the Tim. 28 Α, b, 37 D παράλλαξις is used half-technically of any change or deviation in the courses of the heavenly bodies, as for example in the legend of Atreus (Pol. 269 Α): cf. Tim. 22 c.

10 ζητεῖν depends on ἄτοπον ἐρήμεται, ἄτοπον being now taken as neuter. A reference to 525 b, n. will shew that Madvig's ζητεῖιν (or ζητεῖν δίων), and Richards' ζητοῦντα, with other conjectures, are wholly beside the mark. J. and C. (following Stallbaum) say ζητεῖν 'depends on νομίζοντα with the common ellipse of δεῖν': but δεῖ is not commonly omitted. In ζητεῖν—λαβεῖν there is a slight suggestion of something like the historical Socrates' distrust of astronomy (Xcn. Mem. IV 7, 6).

11 προβλήμασιν κτλ. Some have cited in illustration "Leverrier and Adams calculating an unknown planet into existence by enormous heaps of algebra" (De Morgan, quoted by Bosanquet p. 293: cf. Lutoslawski Plato's Logic p. 300). The example is striking but inapposite; for, according to this passage, the visible perturbations of Uranus, which occasioned the search for Neptune, would not have seemed to Plato anything very extraordinary. Unless he is greatly exaggerating here, and I do not deny that throughout this passage there is a touch of γεγοναί τάδος, ὡς ἐρ ὑπὸ μανιάς τινὸς καὶ πνεύματος ἐνυποστασικῶς ἐκπένην καὶ οἰονεί φασιδίων τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ (Longinus peri ὑψους 8, 4), Plato's views on law in the heavens must have undergone considerable modification before he wrote the Laws: see the striking passage 821 b ff., and Tim. 47 Α ff.

12 τά δ′ ἐν τῷ ὄραμας ἱάσομεν: 'we
C εν τω οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστρονομιῶν μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμων τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον εἰ τῇ ψυχῇ εἰς ἀρχήστον ποιήσεων. "Ἡ πολλαπλάσιον, ἐφη, τὸ ἐργον ἡ ώς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται 15 προστάτεις. Οὐμαί δὲ γε, ἐστον, καὶ τὰλλα κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων προστάξειν ἡμᾶς, εάν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὀφελοῖς.

14. ἀρχήστον ΑΠ: ἀρχῆς τοῦ Α.

will dispense with the starry heavens.' There is a touch of fine audacity, not to say impiety, in Plato's phrase. Greater than the starry heavens is the mind of man. Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. II pp. 271—277) and Bosanquet (Compagnon pp. 290—293) are, as it seems to me, unduly anxious throughout the whole of this episode to minimise and explain away Plato's depreciation of the senses and their objects, although by so doing they can make his theories harmonize more nearly with the views of certain modern philosophers, and possibly also with the truth. Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 170—174) inclines to the opposite error, although, except perhaps on verbal grounds, Plato would not quarrel with his definition of Platonic astronomy as "die Wissenschaft von den Bewegungen Intelligiblen Körper." Plato's Astronomy is in fact a kind of idealised Kinematics, with occasional illustrations from the visible movements of the heavenly bodies (τῇ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν ποικίλα παραδείγμασι χρηστῶν κτλ. 529 d).

16 οὖμαί δὲ γε κτλ. 526 c n.

530 C—531 C Next will come the science which is sister to Astronomy, viz. Harmonics. For particulars we will refer to the Pythagoreans, taking care, however, to maintain our leading principles intact. We may ignore the good people who try to determine a minimum interval and unit of measurement by the car; but the Pythagoreans are also wrong, for it is the numerical ratios of audible consonances which they study. They ought to ascend to problems and examine which numbers are consonant, which not, and why. The science of Harmonics is useless for our purpose if otherwise pursued.

530 Cff. With the science of Harmonics we reach the end of Plato's προποδέλε. Plato's conception of Harmonics is in all respects analogous to his view of Astronomy. We have seen that the visible movements of the celestial bodies are only imperfect copies of those mathematical movements which true Astronomy seeks to apprehend. In like manner, the audible movements which produce audible consonances are imperfect reproductions of those mathematical movements from which result mathematical consonances, and it is these true consonances which the ἀρμονικός should study. The methods of pure mathematics are to be employed in Harmonics as well as in Astronomy, and observation and experiment are forbidden. If we criticise Plato from the standpoint of acoustical science, we must allow that he falls into the same error as before, but the emphasis, however exaggerated, which he lays on the mathematical and theoretical element in Harmonics, is not without importance in the history of the science; and we must remember that the study of Harmonics is valuable to Plato only as a preparation for Dialectic. The poetical affinities of the Platonic science of Harmonics are worthy of remark, though this chapter refrains from any allusion to them. It is altogether in harmony with Plato's theory to hold that 'the solemn and divine harmonies of music, heard or learned,' appeal to us so powerfully because they are one expression of those 'unheard harmonies' which are also expressed in the sister souls of Nature and of Man (Thu. 35 a ff.), and although there is much in Browning's Abt Vogler to which Plato would demur, the idea which inspires that noble poem has its philosophical basis in some such theory as Plato here suggests.

"But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can, Existent behind all laws, that made them and lo they are! And I know not, if, save in this, such gift be allowed to man, That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star."
Consider it well; each tone of our scale in itself is nought; it is everywhere in the world—loud, soft, and all is said; give it to me to use! I mix it with two in my thought; and there! ye have heard and seen: consider and bow the head!"

It is perhaps because he believed that the Soul of the Universe no less than that of Man is assumed to these eternal harmonies, as well as for other reasons, that Plato makes his προσθέσεις culminate in Harmonics. See also App. II.

530 C 18 ἄλλα γὰρ κτλ. Spectates means: If you examine my curriculum (as in τελείωσις—προσθέσεις), you will doubtless read with suggestions of your own: hence I appeal to you: what suitable study can you suggest? "I cannot," says Gianacone, "make any suggestion straight off." ἄλλα γὰρ: "however" as in Thucr. 144 B. Symm. 530 A, goes closely with the previous sentence; if it were otherwise, Plato would have added ἐν δὲ τῷ or the like. The reading ἄλλα γὰρ: τι [by Vindl. R. Hermann etc.] can hardly stand; nor is Steinhart's ἄλλα γὰρ τι κτλ., or Richard's ἄλλα γὰρ <ἄλλα> τι (or ἄλλα γὰρ <ἐν τί> τι) pleasing or probable. I formerly suggested ἄλλα γὰρ τι <ἐν τί> κτλ., the other subjects having all been suggested by Spectates and not Gianacone, with the partial exception of geometry 536 C; but now believe (with Schneider) that the text is sound.

530 C 20 πλεῖστον κτλ. food is according to both Plato and Aristotelian a specific variety of ἔσος, being in fact, η ἑκάτη τῶν καταλόγων. Of the genera καταλόγοι Plato enumerates ten varieties in Law 893 B 5; of φῶς in particular some specific item are mentioned by Arist. Eth. Nic. x 3 1174 b 32 f.

530 C 21 πρὸς τοῦτον: "praeclarum astronomorum phœnas s. mundus genus" (Stallbaum).

530 C 25 ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομών κτλ. ἀστρονομία is φῶς ἄνθρωπος (395 B 6.), and appeals to the eye in the same way as ἑρμηνείας φῶς, or movement in accordance with the laws of ἑρμηνεία (395 B, 396 B, 5 B mm.), appeals to the ear. In ἑρμηνείας φῶς the air moves more or less quickly etc., and this accounts for the different pitch etc. of notes: see Tim. 67 B, 50 A B. A. and Theod Smyrn. p. 70 Hiller, where this—Pythagorean as well as Platonist—theory of sound is very clearly explained. Cf. also von Jan Musici Scripserit: Græci pp. 130 ff.


530 C 29 ἑκάτην πανσέλιν κτλ. Plato does not claim to be a specialist in musical matters: cf. 111 C 400 A. The words κατά τὸν ἄλλο πᾶς τῶν τούτων look like a general acknowledgment of obligation throughout this part of the Republic to the Pythagoreans. See App. II.
A1 A] POLITEIAΣ 2

ταύτα φιλόξενοι το ἡμέτερον. Ποιον: Μὴ ποτ' ἀπόθεν τι ἀπελευθερωθεὶς ἦμιν μαχαίρινειν οἷς θερψομεθεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουμεν ἔξετο 30 ἀεὶ, οἱ πάντα ἡμῖν ἀφήκειν, οὐν ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν. 531 οὐκ οἵτινες ὁτι καὶ περὶ ἄρματος ἐκείνου | ποιοῦσιν ποιεῖται: τὰς γὰρ αἰσθημάτως ἀδ ἄφθονοις καὶ φθονοις ἀξίλουσ ἀναμε- 

τρούντες ἀνήμενα ἀσπέροι εἰς ἄστρονομοι ποιοῦσιν. Να τούς θεούς, ἐφι, καὶ γελοῖος γε, πυκνῶματι ἄττα ὅσπαξοντες καὶ παραβαδι-

50 ἐξέχει κτλ. The reading del. of gives a weightier and better meaning than of del., which Richards proposes. For ἀφήκαν, Enkelline (Prace, Εν. xiv 21) has ἀφήκειν, also a rare word: Stephanus conjectured ἐσχον. ἐσχον is better, though rarer, than either: cf. (with Schneider) ἐσχος in 531 δ. The reference in 470: is to 530 λ. Σ.

531 A: τοῖς γὰρ ἀναισθημένως κτλ. The intervals reckoned as consonant (μονόθεν) were such as the octave, double octave, fifth and fourth; see on IV 4-50. These the Pythagoreans' measure by (or 'against') 'one another,' by comparing the lengths of vibrating strings of the same material, thickness and tension. It is thus found that the octave is 4:1, the double octave 4:2, the fifth 4:3, and the fourth 4:5. See Dist. of Aret. II p. 153 with Theo Smyrn. pp. 48-9; 76-78 Hiller, and Aristotle. Harm. 20 B. Marquard. Richards proposes <τη> ἀθέον, but the dative is strictly accurate: cf. Tim. 35 δ τοῖς τούτοις καὶ ἀθέους τοις ἀργοστιἀρχόμενοι κτλ.

3 ἀστεροφοιρὸς. The parallel is exact: as the astronomers studied visible, so the Pythagoreans investigated audible φοιο (Theo I. c.). To Plato, on the other hand, δοκεῖν ἄνδρος συγγενεῖς ἐπείρασ(Herac. Fr. 47 Bywater). 'Hear harmonies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter.' See above on 450 Α.

3 η τοὺς Θεοὺς κτλ. There were two rival schools of musical theory in Greece, viz. (1) the Pythagorean or mathematical, who identified each interval with a ratio, (2) the 'musical' (μουσική), who measured all intervals as multiples or fractions of the 'Tone' (Muro in Diet. Aret. II p. 195). Cf. Modes of Aret. Gr. Mus. p. 124. Plato's criticism was intended to apply to the first school; but Glaucius erroneously understands it of the second.

4 πυκνῶματα κτλ. Νπτὰ (μωσικὴ γένει) and ἀστεροφοιρὸς show that τινώσματα is a technical term. The word τινώσμα does not appear to occur elsewhere in this sense, but τινώσμα was a favourite word with writers of the musical school, as may be seen from its constant employment by Aristoxenus. τινώσμα is thus defined: τὸ ἐκ δυό διαματφ 

πυκνώματων μετροῦμενον ἐκ συντεθτοῦ διαματφ 

 Lesbian τετράδος τοῖς τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τριάδος (Arist. 

Harm. 24: 10). Marquard i.e. any combination of two intervals which are together less than the interval remaining in the fourth when the τινώσμα is subtracted from the Fourth, e.g. two quarter-tone intervals, or even two semitone intervals (but not more) see Aristotle. 

20 η. 15 Ε. The definition in Boecchus Deod. 42 τοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἐκ δυό διαματφ 

πυκνώματων μετροῦμενον ἐν ἀρκτῶν γεν 

is less exact, but not so far as it goes, inconsistent with that of Aristoxenus. Plato's τινώσματα must be "have lips τινώσμα τελαία παρεν εἰς τον ομοιομορφι 

interval," so called "proper sound in angusto medio quasi constantrum frequen 

tiam" (Schneider). Cf. τινώσματα in Lom. 800 D, καταστοιχίασθαι, καταστασθαι etc. in Theo 92 and often in Aristoxenus, and see generally Westphal and Rossbach. Gr. Harm., etc. pp. 252 ff. It is possible that the musical application of these terms was originally a metaphor borrowed from the art of weaving: for "vestes spanlothexi, obdensionem, quam inde consequeruntur, τινώσμαta dicta 

ap. Aesch. Schol. 55 παθολογοῦ Σαβαλ 

καὶ τινώσματα." Stephanus-Hase 

5-τοῖς τινώσμα, where reference is made also to Hesych. s.v. πυκνώματα and a Scholion on Ar. Aed. 180c. I agree with Schnei 

der in doubting whether Genius' "frequ 

entaments" (I 11 15, V 5 1) are the same as Plato's τινώσματα.
5 οίον ἐκ γειτόνων κτλ.: ‘as if they were trying to catch a sound in the neighbourhood.’ Cf. Heliod. 1 17 πίνε 
δὲ οὐταῦτα ἐκ γειτόνων καὶ Blaydes on 
Ar. Plut. 435 or Stephanus-Hase Thes. 
s.v. γείτων, where numerous examples of 
this highly idiomatic phrase are quoted. 
J. and C.’s translation ‘from a neighbour-
bour’s house’ is incorrect and pointless: 
still worse is Westphal’s ‘als ob sie die 
Intervallgrüsse dem Nachbarton ablau-
schen wollen.’ The idiom was under-
stood by Ficinus, who translates it by 
‘viciniore loco.’

οἷον μὲν φασὶν κτλ. Some will have 
it that they overhear a note between 
(let us say) B and C, and that this is the 
smallest interval, and should be the unit 
of measurement: others say ‘No! it is 
not different from B.’ Plato (who is all 
for simplicity in music Laws 812 c) here 
satirises the μουσικοί, who made the 
quartertone or δίεις their unit: see 
Theo 55 δίεις δὲ καλῶς ἀλαξίσεται οἱ 
περὶ Ἀριστόκρονος τὸ τεταρτημόριον τοῦ 
τόνου, ἡμαῖς δὲ ἡμιτονίως, ἦς ἀλαξίσαι 
μελώματι διάστημα, and on the ἐναρμό-
μένον γένος generally, which Plato strongly 
disliked (Theo 56; cf. also Procl. in Tim. 
191 ε.), and in which the δίεις played a 
large part, Dict. of Ant. l.c. and Westphal 
and Rossbach l.c.

7 ἀμφισβητοῦτες. We should ex-
pect ἀμφισβητούν (so Theo 6) or else 
φάκσετες instead of φάσιν above. Cobet 
would emend, but the anacoluthon is not 
difficult in a writer like Plato: see on 
VI 488 c, d and supra 519 A n.

8 φθεγγομένων: sc. τῶν χορδῶν, omit-
ted as in η διὰ πασῶν.

Δέτα κτλ. This bitter epigram was 
applied by Adrastus to Aristoxenus (Procl. 
in Tim. 192 B). The cap fits admirably; 
for Aristoxenus was afterwards the leader 
of the μουσικοί whose principle is here 
ridiculed. With the expression itself cf. 
Pliny Epfr. VII 27. 8 sed affirmare ani-
mum auribusque praetendere.

531 Β 8 οὐ μὲν κτλ. Socrates now 
corrects Glauco’s error: see on νῃ τῶν 
θεῶν κτλ. 531 Α. τῶν χρηστῶν is of 
course contemptuous. Plato has no sym-
pathy with the ‘μουσικοὶ.’

9 τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς κτλ.: ‘who 
persecute and torture the strings, rack-
ing them upon the pegs. But lest my figure 
become somewhat tedious if I dwell upon 
the blows delivered with the plectrum, 
and the accusations brought against 
the strings, as well as their denials and 
braggadocio behaviour’ etc. The figure 
(εἰκῶν) is from torturing and beating 
slaves, as βασανίζοντας, στρεβλοῦντας 
καὶ σφηναῖς shew: even πράγματα παρέχοντα 
suggests a court of law (cf. Crit. 44 Ε). 
The strings are the victims, while the 
pegs are the pulleys by which they were 
racked upon the τραχός (see Dict. Ant. 
s.v. cecules). For ετὶ Herwerden 
proposes ὅτι: but the strings are racked by 
the musicians οὐ μην the pegs.

11 πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν κτλ. The 
etymological meaning of πλήκτρον adds 
point to this part of the comparison.

12 πέρι from its position divides 
πληγῶν καὶ κατηγορίας, which refer 
to the behaviour of the musicians, from 
ἐξαφνήσεως καὶ ἀλαξυνείας, in which the 
behaviour of the strings is described. 
For the anastrophe of πέρι see Lina de 
pracoxit. in Plat. pp. 26—30. The 
angry musician is like the prosecutor, 
and blames the strings, which in their turn 
repudiate the charge and swagger away 
like a stubborn slave however savagely 
the screw is turned. For a further discussion 
of this passage see App. XI.
παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνος καὶ οὔ φημὶ τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ ἐκέινους οὖς ἐφαμεν νῦν δὴ περί ἄρμονίας ἐρήσεθαί. ταυτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ. 1 τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς 15 ἀκονομεύσαις ἄριστονος ξητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ εἰς προβλῆματα ἀνάισων, ἐπισκοπέων τίνες ξύμφονοι ἄριστοι καὶ τίνες οὐ, καὶ διὰ τι ἐκάτεροι. Αἱμονίων γὰρ, ἐφη, πράγμα λέγεις. Χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἤν δ' ἐγὼ, πρὸς τὴν τούτον καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ξήτησιν, ἀλλως δὲ μεταδιωκόμενον ἀρχηγόν. Εἰκὸς γ', ἐφη.

XIII. Οἴμαι δὲ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἢ τούτων πάντων ὃν διελθυμέθανεν μέθοδος ἐὰν 1 μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλου κοινωνίας ἀφικται καὶ ξυγγένειαν, καὶ ξυλογισθῇ παῦτα ἦ ἐστίν ἄλληλοις οἰκεία, φέρει τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἀ βουλῶμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐκ

14. ἐρήσεθαι Α.Π.Σ.: αἱρέσεθαι Α.Π.Π. 16. ἀνάισω Α.Π.: ἀνάισω Α. 1

13. ἐκέινους: i.e. the Pythagoreans, and not the mousoi, as Glaucan supposed. 531C 15. τοὺς γὰρ κτλ. It is strange that in spite of οὗτως ἐφαμεν νῦν δὴ κτλ. this should have been so frequently understood as referring to the school satirised by Glaucan: see for example Susemihl Gen. Libw. II p. 210. Plato is of course, as Schneider pointed out, speaking about the Pythagoreans who investigated the numbers or ratios of audible consonances: see 531 Α. ε. and R.P. 7 § 56 C.

16. ἀλλὰ οὐκ κτλ. Cf. 530 B. ἀνάισων is undoubtedly present, and not future, here: see on V. 473 C.

17. τίνες ξύμφοιτοι κτλ. As the true astronomer should study intelligible stars with the mathematical intelligence, using the visible stars only as imperfect παραδείγματα (539 C, D η.), so the true ἄρμονικος must investigate, intelligible, and not audible, consonances. In the words of a modern writer, he must "look, not into the tone-world here, but into the world of harmony beyond." Plato holds that certain mathematical numbers are in themselves ξύμφοιτοι, and others not: see Theo 72—75, where examples of both varieties are given. The numbers or ratios of audible consonances are only particular and imperfect embodiments or expressions of these numbers: they may serve as παραδείγματα, but nothing more. In the Timaeus Plato represents the World-soul as the grandest expression of certain ξύμφοιτοι ἄρμονικοι, so that it is natural enough for him to crown his προπαθεία with the study of mathematical ξυμφωνία, and say that it is "useful in seeking out the beautiful and good." It must nevertheless be admitted that Plato's conception of Harmonics as well as of Astronomy is fundamentally different from that of modern science, in spite of the attempts which Bosanquet and others have made to prove their essential harmony. See on 530 C and App. II.

531 C—533 D. The pursuit of these studies, if carried far enough to reveal their mutual relationship, will contribute to the end which we desire; but after all, they are only the prelude to Dialectic. We may compare Dialectic to the prisoner's progress from looking on real animals to beholding the sun, and these preparatory studies to his release and ascent from shadows and images within the cave to shadows of real objects in the world above. Socrates declines to give an account of the method and object of Dialectic; but insists that the Good must be seen, and that Dialectic alone can reveal it, for Dialectic is the only study which ascends on the ruins of its hypotheses to the Idea of Good, leading the soul on high, and using the 'Arts' as handmaidens and helpers in the process of education. 531 D ff. Plato's conception of Dialectic and dialectical science is fully discussed in App. III.

23. η ὀκεία κτλ. Cf. [Erith.] 901 E ff. πάν διάγγειμα ἄρμονικο το σύστημα καὶ ἄρμονία σύστασιν ἀπασάν τῆς τῶν ἄστρων περιφορᾶς τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀρσαν
miam apatian anaphanei de ti kata prorion manvthanonti, anaphaneitai de an—doros tis eis ti betaion manvhanh. desmos yap persewv pantaiv tivon eis anaphaneitai dianoumevnoi eis de Allh pws vata metaxeumevai tis, tychr de kalwv. The apprehension of the 'one in the many' in these preliminary studies prepares us for the dialectical conception of the universe of Thought as an organic and correlated whole (VI 511 B—D mm); but the mere specialist in mathematics for example, or astronomy, can never become a dialectician. Cf. 537 C and Euthyd. 290 B ff.

28 vómov: 'song' or 'strain.' 'There is no pun on vómov 'law,' as Bosanquet supposes. Dialectic is not a 'law' in the Greek sense of the word.

ou yap pous ktl. Theodorus in the Theadeiris (146 B) is a good example, and everyone who knows men who are distinguished mathematicians and nothing more will heartily echo Glauco's emphatic ou ma ton Dia. 'Taught on the Platonic method, not as an end, but as a means, by teachers who have themselves penetrated into regions beyond and above the sphere of pure mathematics, and who are constantly on the alert to direct their pupils thither, the study of mathematics may prove one of the most valuable of all instruments of education. See App. II.

531 E 30 ón. For the attraction see VI 510 B n.

Alla ymph ktl. 'Well, did it ever seem to you that persons who are unable' etc. The subject is mph dynato tivns ontes—lygon, and after ymph 'suppleendum est ódoxan, quod ipsum Glauconis verbis magis accommodatam est quam dokosin.' (Schneider). The form of Socrates' question is in fact affected by Glauco's reference to the past in ón enw evntwvika. I formerly, with v and three other MSS, including Vind. F, read alla dh, understanding dokosin; but alla dh is scarcely appropriate here (see on II 365 C), and Schneider's explanation gives a satisfactory meaning to ypiv. J. and C. take ypiv with mph dynato tivns ontes ('persons who are as yet unable' etc.); but the hyperbaton is too difficult, and the meaning (which Plato would rather have expressed by mphwv dynato ktl.) unsuitable. Few will approve of Badham's alla dh ktl. or even of Burnet's alla dh, eiswv, mph dynato ontes douvai te ktl. For the sentiment, which is a commonplace of the Socratic school, cf. Xen. Mem. IV 6. 1, Prot. 336 C, Phaed. 76 B, Crat. 390 Cff. al.

32 ouv' ait ktl. 'My answer to this question is also no.'

532 A 3 paraive='performs,' cf. Plut. Crass. 33. 3 anafrakxiasa epitapaevn ekeiva tati mph ktl. Tim. 29 D to miw ouv prooimion thumiasmou aperexemelai sou, tov de dh vnomv ymph ephexi peraue, and Laws 723 E. The metaphor is still from music, though D. and V. erroneously translate "of which dialectical reasoning is the consummation."
5 αὐτὰ ἀστρα. I formerly read αὐτά <τά> ἀστρα with Baiter; but there is no MS authority for the article, and its presence is unnecessary even between αὐτά τά 'ζερα and αὐτῶν τῶν ἥλιων.

οὗτω καὶ κτλ.: 'so also whenever by means of dialectic one attempts through discourse of reason' etc. On τοῦ λόγου and ἀνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων see VI 511 B n. and App. III. Ast's conjecture ὀρμᾶν (see cr. n.) is supported by Clement ΛΙθον. Η 112 B Migne (quoted by Schneider) ἐγὼ ἐπιχειρήσας ἀνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ αὐτὸ 'αὐτό  ἐστιν ἑκατόν ὀρμᾶν κτλ. and closely corresponds with ἐπιχειρεὶν ἀποβλέπειν in the last sentence.

There is no occasion for Stallbaum's professional ridiculing of Schneider's view: 'quasi vero recte dicit poterit: τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖν διὰ τοῦ λόγου ὦρμαὶ ἐπὶ τι; for ωὖν αὐτῷ δὸ λόγος ἀπετείγη τῷ διαλέγεσθαι δύναται in VI 511 B is an exact parallel. On other views see App. XI. B.

7 ἑκατόν is omitted in Λ (see cr. n.) and some other MSS. It is however necessary both in itself, and in order to provide a proper contrast with αὐτῷ δ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν. For the process here described see App. III.

9 τοῦ ὀρατοῦ Λου. Ωνυκμαν Ast: ὄρμας codd.

532 B [ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ Ζ] 137

αὐτὰ ἀστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτῶν τῶν ἥλιων; αὐτῶ καὶ 5 ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσας ἀνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ αὐτὸ δ ἐστιν ἑκατόν ὀρμᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἅπαστι, πρίν Β ἀν αὐτῷ δ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν 1 αὐτὴ νοῆσει λάβῃ, ἐπὶ αὐτῷ γίνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὡσπερ ἐκείνοις τότε ἐπὶ τοῦ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ. Πανταπασὶ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴ ταύτην τὴν πορείαν 10 καλεῖς; Τί μην; 'Ἡ δὲ γε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, λόγις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφῆ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείον εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἑπάνωδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ χρόνα τε

καὶ φυτᾶ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἰλίου φῶς ἐτὶ ἀδύναμία βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τὰ ἐν ὑδάτι φαντάζματα θεία καὶ σκίας τῶν ὁμιτῶν, άλλ' οὐκ εἰδῶλων σκίας δεὶ ἐτέρου τοιοῦτου φωτὸς ὅσ πρὸς ἦλιον κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζόμενας, πᾶσα αὐτῇ ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃς διηλθομεν, ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἑπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῆ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὕσι θείων, ἄσσετε πτῶς τὸν σαφεστάτον ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φαντάτον ἐν τῷ σωματειδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρατοῦ τόπῳ. Ἐγὼ μέν, ἐφή, ἀποδεχόμαι οὐτὸ. κατόι δ' παντιτάσσει γε μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπά μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἰναί, ἄλλον δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ χαλεπά μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὁμοὶ δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παροίτι μόνον ἀκοινότει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐθίν πολλὰκις ἐπαντεύον—25 ταύτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν λέγεται, ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ νῦν ᾠμεν, καὶ διέλθομεν οὕτως, ὅσπερ τὸ προοιμίον διήλθομεν. λέγει δὲν, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, καὶ ἔτι ποῖα δὴ Εὐδοκοῦστην, καὶ τίνες αὖ ὁδοὶ. αὐταὶ γὰρ ἄν ἦδο, ὅς ἔουει, αἱ πρὸς αὐτο ἄγουσαι εἶν, οἱ ἀφικομένοι ὅσπερ ὠδὸν ἀπαντάλα ἀν ἐὖ καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Οὐκέτι, ἵνα ὅ ἐγὼ, ὥς φίλε Γλαύκων,


Platonic phrase for reflections of natural objects produced by natural lights: they are theia because theia érga pòuschos (Soph. 266 C, where the whole matter is very clearly explained). Even without the aid of the Sophist, we might deduce the meaning from the antithetical clause αὖ οὐκ—ἀποσκιαζόμενα, if we remember that the sun is a theos (vi 508 a). The adjective is regularly placed after the substantive when two coordinate qualifications have to be expressed (here ἐν τοῖς ὑδάτιν καὶ theia): cf. III 397 D τῶν τοῦ ἐπεικούς μιμητῆν ἁκρατων, IX 573 A τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαίς συνονίας ἀπειλων. Other examples are given by Jebb on Soph. O. T. 124; and Sandys on Arist. Ath. Pol. 51. 3: cf. also Stallbaum on Phil. 20 b. The present passage explains why Plato was so careful to make the originals in the Cave σκηναστα and σκώλω, and not φωτε- τα: see on 514 b. Other views of this sentence are discussed in App. XIII.

The anacoluthon is illustrated by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. iii p. 45.

532 ἐ—533 λ 30 ὅκετα κτλ. With the general tenour and form of the sentence cf. (with Jackson) Symph. 210 Α. I can see no reason for suspecting the text (with Madvig, who proposes εἰ γ' ἄτοι, or εἴναι γ' ἄτοι, and Badham, who would insert εἶν before οἶδα τ' οὖν). Glaucus has not without difficulty (517 c) followed Socrates thus far: nor is there anything rude in telling him frankly that he has reached his limit, and even if there were, Socrates does not spare Glaucus’s feelings (cf. 527 D, 529 A). That his audience would not be able to follow a description of the Good, has already been implied in vi 506 οὐ βοῦλον ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμὲ τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτήν (the account of the Good itself) ἀποδοθήκαι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομισάσθαι. Here Socrates appears to be a trifle more confident of his own expository powers, though he is careful, as before, to avoid
the appearance of dogmatism and therefore introduces the expressions δ' γε δή μοι φαίνεται etc. (cf. τοῦ γε διδασκαλίας έμοι λέγω ι.ε.) and προσθεμά (cf. προσθετοῦμεν δέ κτλ. vi 560 D). Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 179 ff.) bitterly complains of Socrates for drawing back; and Whewell (Phil. of Discovery p. 436) observes "We may venture to say that it does not appear that he had any answer ready."

The dialectical method recommended by Plato in the República is doubtless, in its full significance, an unrealised ideal (cf. νυν. on ἀρχήν αναπόβετον vi 510 B and τοῦ αναπόβετου 511 B), just as the ultimate object of Dialectic, the Idea of Good, will still recede as we approach it. The description which follows merely recapitulates the account already given in Book vi, with a few additional characteristics already familiar in the Socratic school: but the majority of the Platonic dialogues furnish practical illustrations of many essential features in Plato's dialectical method: so that it is possible to form a tolerably clear idea of the kind of answer which the Platonic Socrates might have made in reply to Glaucos's invitation. See on the whole subject App. III.

533 a 2 oίδ' είκόνα τιν έτι κτλ.; such as we saw before in vi 560 E ff. Glaucos's question refers to the method, Socrates's reply to the object, of Dialectic: it is of course impossible to separate the two. On διαχωρίζεσθαι followed by οικεύματα see 1 336 E n.

4 δότι μέν δεί κτλ. Cf. vi 505 E ff., supra 517 C (δεί ταῦτα έδει κτλ.), 519 C, 526 E (δ δε αυτήν παντί τρόπῳ έδει). These passages are strongly in favour of δε as against δή (see cr. n.), which Schneider, Hermann, and Stallbaum reject.

tain. έδειν is unpleasing if we read δή, and μέν δή is not free from difficulty here. For μέν without δή following see v 475 E n.

533 λ, β 7 τόκος γα κτλ. Socrates proceeds to establish what he has just asserted, viz. that only dialectic can reveal the Good to those who are versed in the propaedeutic 'arts' or sciences. In this at least (he says) every one will agree with us, viz. 'that it is some other θέματος' (different from the five propaedeutic 'arts') 'which endeavours in every case to apprehend by scientific procedure concerning each several self' (e.g. αὐτὸς καλὸν, αὐτὸς δικαίον, etc.) 'that which they severally are' (the οὐσία of each) e.g. δ' είσιν καλόν, etc. Cf. 531 D οù γάρ που διδαχαί γε σοι οί ταύτα (the five propaedeutic 'arts') δείνολ διαλεκτικὸν είναι. Socrates continues: while all the other arts (except τὰ μαθηματικά) address themselves πρὸς δόσις ανθρώπων, etc. even the mathematical 'arts' give no λόγος of their ουσίαις (and so do not apprehend the ὁ είσιν of their subject). Dialectic and Dialectic alone does this (533 C), so that Dialectic is the ἀλλα τις θέματος and alone satisfies our needs. τόσο is the object of λέγοντος, on which, and not on αμφισβητήσει, we depend. ἀλλὰ means other than ἄν νῦν δὴ δῆλθομεν. ἀλλὰ is opposed to the negative notion contained in ἀλλὰ (another θέματος, not that of the five 'arts', but etc.). Badham arbitrarily proposes to read δὴν περικλαμβάνειν for δὴν πέρι παντὸς λαμβάνειν. The expression περὶ παντὸς 'about everything' is of course different from αὐτὸυ εἰκάστου πέρι, and μένδος δὴν is the kind of collocation in which Plato delights. For other views on this sentence see App. XIV.
The XIV. turn of Plato is thinking of a threefold classification of arts under ὅλη, ὀλυτική, and ἐπιμετρητική, or the like (J. and C., comparing Gorg. 403 ff., 501, 502, Soph. 222 ff., 263 ff., Pol. 261 ff.).

12 ἐπιστάται is one of Plato's archaisms: see on r 130 b. Such forms are not found in inscriptions after 410 B.C. (Meisterhans' p. 160).

13 γεωμετρίας—ταύτη. For the syntax cf. vi 511 b n.

533 C 14 ὀνειρώττουσι κτλ. Kroll (Pl. St. pp. 179—181) accuses Plato of a sudden volte face in regard to mathematical studies. It is true that the same language is used of ὄν θα ἐν υ 476 ε (cf. vii 520 c), but there are dreams and dreams, and we may fairly say that if the προτασις is only a dream in comparison with Dialectic, at least it is one of those dreams which come through the gates of horn.

16 ὃ γὰρ ἀρχή κτλ. See vi 510 c, d nνν. ὁμολογεῖα means 'agreement' 'harmony' ('Übereinstimmung') Schneider), viz. of ἀρχή, τελευτητά ἡταν ἡ τεταρτή, not 'admissions' (as D. and V. translate); cf. ὁμολογουμένων l.c.

20 οὐκόν κτλ. 'Well then,' said I, 'the method of dialectic alone proceeds by the destruction of hypotheses to the actual first principle, in order to make its results secure.' Dialectic examines and cancels (ἀναφέρει) one ὑπόθεσις after another, till in the end it reaches the Idea of Good. Suppose for example that ὁμωτάς is the subject of discussion. Various ὑπόθεσεις are proposed, tested, and overthrown.

Out of the ruins of the former ὑπόθεσεις we built a new and better one, which must in its turn be thoroughly tested, tried, and perhaps overthrown, before it can serve as a stepping-stone to one which is higher, truer and better: cf. 534 b, c. Now this process of testing, revising, discarding, is not, ideally speaking, complete until we examine the relations of our ὑπόθεσις of ὁδώτης with all νοητά, and in such an examination we apply the same 'hypothetical method' throughout the whole noetic sphere, testing and correcting all our ὑπόθεσεις by one another. In the final stage, which is of course only an ideal, all our ὑπόθεσεις become exact counterparts of the Ideas, and we have reached the ἀρχή or Good. Thereafter the results of Dialectic are ἴδον: see vi 511 b. The earlier steps in this dialectical ascent may be illustrated from many, if not most, of the Platonic dialogues. For ἀναφώσιμα cf. Arist. Τοπικ. I 6. 1206—31, and especially Eth. Eud. II 6. 1222b 27 f. κινούμενης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα ἀλήτα ἀν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλω, αὐτὰ δ' ἀνάφηκοι μεταβάλλει ἄναρμοστο λιπον ὑπὲρ ὑπόθεσιν ὑπὲρ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνέλει εἰς ἐκκείνη δεῖλοι. The word is often used in connexion with the Eleatic dialectic, of which Plato's ἡ δὲ ὑπόθεσις ἀνάλωσις (Alcin. Isag. 7), here described, is a development: see RPT. §§ 95 n. a, 105 A—106, 110—115. For other views on this passage see App. XV: and for a farther discussion of the method itself and its permanent value in the history of investigation consult App. III.
533 D 22 ἀπορρέω. The image is taken from Orphic theology: cf. Π 363 D n.

77 ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν. VI 511 D, E. ἔστι δ’, ὡς κτλ. Cf. Lais 864 A. Plato constantly reminds us that he has no fixed terminology (see Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 647 and Hinzl Der Dialog pp. 246 ff.), and the ancients were well aware of this fact, though modern interpreters of Plato too often forget it; see the references collected by Hermann Gesch. u. Syst., p. 573 n. 106 and D. L. 111 63 (quoted by Hirmer).

533 E—534 E In conclusion, after pointing out the proportions between the different intellectual states, Socrates declares that the essential feature of Dialectic is its power to grasp the reason or principle of all Being; separating the Idea of Good, for example, from everything else, defining it in words, and scrutinizing the definition by tests, from each and all of which it must emerge triumphantly. Glauco agrees that such a study is indispensable to the rulers, and that the curriculum is now complete.

533 E 29 οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἐφι. See cr. n. The interpolation which follows these words in all mss except Σ is discussed in App. XVI.

ἀρέσκει οὖν. See cr. n. Though γονίς is in A and Σ, a majority of mss read ὄνω, which is alone suitable. The same error occurs in one or more mss in Π 455 E and ΠI 506 C (Schneider).

534 A 4 ὁ τι νόησις—ἐικασίαν. That is to say, in the Simile of the Line (see Fig. 11 on p. 65), (1) CB : AC :: EB : DC and (2) CB : AC :: CE : AD. We have already seen that CE : EB :: AD : DC (VI 509 D n.) ; : compiendo

CE + EB : EB :: AD + DC : DC
i.e. CB : EB :: AC : DC ; : alternando
CE : AC :: EB : DC. This proves (1), and (2) is proved as follows. Since

CE : EB :: AD : DC,

: inverting EB : CE :: DC : AD ; hence compiendo

EB + CE : CE :: DC + AD : AD
i.e. CB : CE :: AC : AD ; : alternando

CB : AC :: CE : AD. I owe this proof to the kindness of a mathematical friend.

5 τινὶ δ’ ἐφ’ οἷς κτλ. Liebhold (who also conjectured καὶ ἐκ νόησις for καὶ δ’ τι νόησις) makes the extraordinary
suggestion τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταύτ' ἀν διέχει ἀναλογιὰν καὶ διάρειον ἐκατέρων (Philo. 1876 p. 373). The text is of course quite sound and=τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἐφ' οἷς ταύτα <ἐστών> ἀναλογιὰν κτλ.: cf. VI 511 E. I cannot agree with Shorey when he says (Idea of Good etc. p. 235) that Plato "avoids drawing out the proportion ἐνθ': objects of διάνοια=ςκεπαστὰ etc.: ἐλέκων, because he is aware that the second member is a blank and the fourth is largely fantastic." Both of these assertions are in my opinion quite wrong, and if they were true, Plato would have restrained from drawing out the proportions between the faculties themselves for exactly the same reasons. See App. I. As it is, we should take Plato at his word. He may well decline to enter on the tedious and unprofitable task of expounding and illustrating in detail the proportions which may be conjectured to obtain between the different objects of our intellectual powers. It would for example lead to no useful result if we tried to establish a proportion between a particular eidos, one of the five mathēmata, a particular object of πίστις, and a particular object of ἐκαστία. Such attempts would certainly involve us in an endless amount of talk, and would hardly result in anything but a series of barren and pedantic formulae and subdivisions.

8 ἡ ὅσον. See cr. n. ὅσον is read by a large majority of MSS, and the confusion of ο and ω is common: see Intro. § 5. The construction (as Schneider points out) is ἡ ὅσον λόγον οἱ παρελη-

luthères λόγοι ἡμᾶς ἐνέπληκαν: cf. (with Schneider) παρὰ δὲ ἔσον τοῖς νῦν ὄρκου-

μένοις VI 490 Α. Madvig's ὅσο has little probability, although it avoids a certain awkwardness.

534 B 9 ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν κτλ. Cf. 531 E n. As far as words go, this definition of Dialectic might almost have come from the historical Socrates, although of course λόγον λαμβάνειν, ὀφθαλμότικον ὄνομα τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν καὶ ὕστερον ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἔλεγχων διεξόντων, μὴ C

8. ὅσον Ξη: ὅσον AII.
and so forth. The Idea of Good has connexions and relations with all the other Ideas (cf. VI 510 B, 511 B nn.); and our knowledge of these may therefore be used to test the accuracy of our conception of Good. Zeller's II i. p. 620 n. rightly compares the present passage with Parm. 135 c—136 e: see App. III. It is perhaps unnecessary to notice Liebhold's foolish conjecture νώσων for ὀδόντων.

20 ὀνειροποιοῦντα κτλ. 533 C n.

534 D οὐκ ἄδαισιν κτλ.: 'you will not suffer to be mere irrational quantities, if they are to rule in the city and control the higher issues.' ἀλογοι γραμμαί are irrational magnitudes (cf. Arist. peri ἄδομων γραμμῶν 508 b 18), which Greek mathematicians treated "geometrically through a symbolism of irrational lines," as in Euclid Bk. x (Gow Gk Math. p. 78). They are ἀλογοι or ἀρρητοί because 'νicht aussprechbar' (Cantor Gesch. d. Math. p. 154 n.), whereas rational lines are ὕπαρξις, 'expressible' (cf. Blass de Pl. Math. p. 18). In its application to Glauco's 'children,' ἀλογοι is active, and means of course μὴ λόγον ἔχουσι διδάσκαι (534 b). Has γραμμάς also any special application? Probably it has: otherwise the witicism seems unnecessarily far-fetched and frigid, even if we make every allowance for Plato's love of a mathematical jest (cf. Pol. 266 b), as well as for the interest which the subject of irrationals seems to have excited among the mathematicians of his day (see Theat. 147 D ff. and Cantor I.c. pp. 182, 191, 293). Lucilius (II 20) has the line 'vix vivo homini ac monogrammo' ('a dead alive sketch of an anatomy') Tyrrell Lat. Poetry p. 175), and Cicero mocks at Epicurus' gods as "monogrammos" (N. D. II 59: cf. I 123 homunculi similem deum—liniamentis duntaxat extremis, non habito solidio—praeditum etc., and other passages in Usener Epicureus p. 734). Perhaps Plato means to suggest that his "airy burgomasters," as Milton calls them, would in such a case be only as it were mere silhouettes ("Schattenrisse" Bertram Bilderspr. IV. p. 46) of rulers moving blindly to and fro in a sort of dreamland (cf. ὀνειροποιοῦντα 534 c and 533 C n.). For other views see App. XVII.

25 τῶν μεγίστων. 525 B n.

27 ἔρωταν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι κτλ.

Plato concludes by emphasizing the most conspicuous and characteristic feature of the Socratic method: cf. Crat. 390 C.
535 A—536 B  It only remains to apportion these studies and prescribe how they are to be pursued. Our pupils must possess not only the qualities of steadfastness and courage etc., but also those other natural qualifications which our peculiar course of training demands. These are now enumerated by Socrates.

535 A 2 διανομή κτλ. Herwerden needlessly and wantonly inserts σκεπτέα after το λοιπόν.

4 την προτέραν ἐκλογήν. III 412 B ff.

5 ἐκεῖνας τὰς φύσεις κτλ. ‘I would have you suppose that it must be those natures which are to be selected,’ lit. ‘those natures must be to-be-selected,’ Kopetsch (de verba — Plat. p. 29) confesses himself unable to quote any parallels for the ‘pleasance.’ We might compare the use of δεῖν in μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ἔγραμεν δεῖν εἶναι VI 486 D, where see note; but the fact is that δεῖν is not altogether pleonastic in the present passage. Without δεῖν we should translate ‘that it is those natures’ etc. and not ‘that it must be those natures’ etc.; and there is a slight but appreciable difference between the two. Richards would expunge δεῖν or read δέ, but δέ is quite unsuitable here. ἐκλεκτός (which I once proposed, taking the words as = ‘ought to have been selected’) is equally unsatisfactory, nor does θεία, which might be suggested in place of εἶναι, carry conviction. The text is in my judgment sound.

6 βεβαιοτάτοις—ἀνδρειότατοις. The contrast is between steadfastness and spirit:

cf. II 375 A ff. and VI 503 C with Appendix VI to Book VI. ευαίσθητος has not hitherto been mentioned as a qualification of Plato’s rulers: for VI 494 C cannot be interpreted in such a sense. The word is however certainly genuine: cf. ἀρτιμελεῖς in 536 B.

536 B 8 γεναιός—τα ἡθή; ‘of noble and masculine characters,’ Cf. Theaei. 149 A μάλα μάλα γεναιάς τε καὶ βλοσυφάτ. Nicostrat. Frag. 35 ed. Kock νέν τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, ὥ ζῷν, βλοσυφάν γε τὴν ψυχήν ἔχει, and Aelian Var. Hist. 12. 21 σεμινάν άμα καὶ βλοσυφὸν ὄρθως (of Spartan women). In Cf. Rev. XIV p. 10 I have tried to show that the original meaning of this vigorous and expressive word is ‘hairy,’ ‘shaggy,’ ‘bristling’ (horridus), from which to ‘virile’ the transition is natural enough. Mr L. D. Barnett has since supplied me with an interesting confirmation from Pollux IV 136 (on tragic masks) οδ οδίλος, εξανθά, ὑπέργος, αἱ τρίχαι τῷ όγκῳ προσεπειγασάν, ὄφρας ἀνατάνται, βλοσυφᾶς τὸ εἴδος.

9 ἀ—πρόσφορα: ‘the natural characteristics suitable for our scheme of education.’ τῆς φύσεως depends on ἀ, not (as Stallbaum supposes) on τῆς τῆς παδελ. The following list of qualifications should be compared with that in VI 485 A ff. The difference is slight, but φιλοσωπαί as a special attribute is new, and on the other hand some of the secondary moral qualities are not insisted upon here.

12 ἀποδειλίως κτλ. Cf. VI 504 A.
The word ἀρρατος, which occurs again in Crat. 407 D, is apparently, like βλασφονάς, an expressive vulgarrum de foro arretium. There is considerable variety here in the inferior MSS, but the evidence of the Scholiast places the reading beyond doubt. ἀρρατος is explained by Timaeus (s. v.) as ἁχιρός, στερῶς, and with this explanation the Scholiast and Lexicographers agree. Some of the ancients derived the word from an obsolete verb ἰλω = ἰλίον. Schneider remarks that the α must be long "si verum est quod scholiastae Victorianos ad II. XIII 45 traditur, pro ἀβρατον alios legisse ἀβρατον." See Stephanus-Hase Ἰδέαις. s. v.

535 C 17 οὐδένα: 'I think no one will.' Van Prinsterer's οὐδενὶ, as Stalbaum observes, is unnecessary. In written dialogue, as in actual conversation, the answer does not always accommodate itself to the exact form of the question: cf. ν 465 E n.

19 πρότερον κτλ. The reference in πρότερον is to VI 495 C—496 A. In οὐ κατ' ἄξιον αὐτής ἀποτελεῖ Dümmler sees an allusion to Antisthenes (Anitth. p. 34), but see on 535 D. E.

535 D 22 ἄπων: not μισθόνων, although μισθόνων appears below. Plato loves variety as well as uniformity, and Herder would not have proposed to write μισθόνων.

23 φιλόθροι. Dümmler thinks Plato perhaps means Xenophon, who loved the chase; but it is unlikely that any personal reference is intended either here or in 535 C. See also on 535 E.

535 D 23 ἰφιλοθριαῖοι: 'whose love of work has taken the opposite direction.'

535 E 29 αὐτή τε καὶ κτλ. See on αὐτής τε καὶ—παρακάλει IV 427 D.

536 A 2 μεγαλοπρέπειαι: 'high-mindedness,' not (as Jowett) 'magnificence.' See VI 486 A n.
μέρη ὁυχ ἢκιστα δει φυλαττειν τὸν νόδον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον. ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίστηται τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν καὶ ἱδιωτῆς καὶ 5 πόλεις, λανθάνουσαι χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις χρώμενοι πρὸς ὑ τι ἄν τύχωσε τούτων, οἱ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ ἀρχονσι. Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφη, οὕτως ἔχει. Ἡμῖν δὴ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διευλαβήτευν, 1 ὥς ἐαν μὲν ἄρτιμελείς τε καὶ ἄρτιφρονας ἐπὶ τοσαῦτην μάθησιν Β καὶ τοσαύτῃ ἀσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδευόμεν, ἢ τε δίκει ἢμῖν οὐ 10 μέρισται αὐτῷ, τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν σῶσομεν, ἦλλοιος δὲ ἄγνοιτε ἐπὶ ταῦτα τἀνατηλή πάντα καὶ πρᾶξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ πλεῖω γέλωτα καταντήσομεν. Αὐσχρόν μὲν ἄν εἰή, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, εἴπον· γελοίον δ' ἐγὼ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐόικα παθεῖν. Τὸ ποίον; ἐφη. Ἐπελαθήμην, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὧτι ἐπαίζομεν, θ' 3. δὲ Λ'II: δὴ Λ'.

4 τὰ τοιαῦτα ("das dazu gehörige" Schneider) is quite general, and means how so-and-so is in respect of the virtues just enumerated: cf. viii 549 D. The Oxford editors wrongly understand τὰ τοιαῦτα as τα τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη.

5 λανθάνουσι κτλ.: 'they unconsciously use cripples and bastards for any of these services that happen, as friends, in the one case, and in the other rulers.' Schneider explains τούτων as "horum negotiorum, hoc est, aliquam ex his, quae dictae sunt, virtutibus requirementum." This is perhaps safer than to understand it merely of the services rendered by friends and rulers. In either case cf. for τούτων viii 543 C n. J. and C. have rightly noted that "the subject of τέχνως is the same with that of λανθάνουσι": but they are mistaken in referring τούτων to τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη, and in connecting πρὸς with χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόδοις. It is certain that χρώμενοι is understood with τέχνως, and, if so, πρὸς can belong only to χρώμενοι. D. and V. are consistently wrong in the translation of this somewhat perplexing little clause.

536 B 8 ἁρτιμελεῖς κτλ. For ἁρτιμελεῖς cf. 535 A. ἄσκησις is of course the physical discipline: note the chiasmus.

9 ἡ τε δίκη κτλ. Cf. vi 487 A where οὔτ' ἀν ὁ Μάσος, ἐφη, τὸ γε τοιοῦτον μέμφαστο similarly concludes the earlier enumeration of qualifications necessary to the philo-sofic ruler.

11 καὶ πράξομεν. καὶ (which some inferior MSS omit) is "paullo insolentius positum, sed ita ut tāνατια πάντα partim ad civitatis conditionem—partim ad opi-
shore, as well as Heraclitus' allusion to Peisianes (Fr. 79 Bywater).

15 Μᾶλλον ἐνεικαίμενον. Plato's apology is by no means intended to appease the 'bald little tinker' (VI 495 E) and his crew; for he still holds them responsible for the insults levelled at philosophy (τοῖς αἰρίοις). He is merely apologising, not without a characteristic touch of irony, for an offence against the canons of literary taste. One ought not to turn 'play' into earnest, and, as Longinus remarks, καὶ βασιλεύσαι νήφες ἀναγκαίον (πείρ ἐφοιν 16. 4).

30 πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν. III 412 C. It is quite clear that the προτέρα ἐκλογή is not supplemented but superseded by the provisions now laid down. Cf. VIII 543 D, 6.

536 D 21 γηράσκων κτλ. γηράσκω δ' άει πολλά διδασκόμενος Solon Fr. 18 Bergk. The line is quoted in [Erast.], 133 C and alluded to again in Lach. 188 B, 189 A.

31 ἤτοι. εἶ ἦτοι, which Herwerden proposes, is no improvement, but rather the reverse. Plato may be alluding to some proverbial saying, as D. and V. appear to believe, translating thus: "an old man can sooner run than learn."


25 παιδίν ὁδεῖ κτλ. This preliminary survey is clearly meant to take place in the years during which 'Music' and Gymnastics are chiefly cultivated. See Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii p. 290.

26 οὐχ ὦς ἐπάναγκες κτλ. We must bear in mind throughout the whole of this subject that Plato is legislating for a select class who naturally love labour and truth. They alone are nature's freemen and must be treated as such in their education, but the compulsory method may be necessary, Plato would say, in order to educate others, so far as others can be educated at all. With the general sense cf. Phaedr. 240 c and Theogn. 472 πᾶς γὰρ ἀναγκαίος χρῆμα ἀνάπον ἴτον.

536 E 31 παιδίνας: with a play on παιδίνας: cf. infra VIII 545 E and ἄρετος παιδίν — μετὰ παιδίνας — μανθάνειν in Laws 819 b, a passage in which the general idea is that play should be study, whereas here it is that study should be play.
The compulsory military or militia service of Athenian youth during their eighteenth and nineteenth years is probably in Plato’s mind; see Gilbert Gk. Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 311—313.

14 τροποὶ συνακτῶν κτλ. τοῦτοι (sc. τοῖς προκριθέντες) goes with συνακτῶν. The proscriptive studies now begin to be pursued no longer χύδη, but systematically and comparatively, so as to reveal the ‘kinship of the studies with one another and with the nature of Being’: cf. 531 D n., and (for the meaning of οἰκείωτης) 526 C n. Platt would omit τῶν μαθημάτων as a gloss on ἄλληλων, but without these words the Greek might mean ‘their mutual kinship and the kinship of true being’ (with itself). τῶν μαθημάτων is also in Theo (l. c.). For the genitives ἄλληλων and τῆς—φύσεως, (which D. and V. wrongly connect with σύνων), cf. VI 501 D τῆς φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου.

Theo, 467 C—E.
8 ἐντρέχεστάτος; ‘most agile in’ (‘der rühdigste’ Schneider). The word is rare, and apparently not elsewhere found in writers of the best period. It occurs in Longinus περὶ ὑψίους 44. 1 ὑπεραιλεῖ τε καὶ ἐντρέχει (φόεσις) and Marc. Aur. VI 14: cf. id. VII 66 (ἐντρέχεστέρων) and 18 (ἐντρέχεσια). For a kindred use of the verb ἐντρέχειν see Hom. Il. 19. 385 εἰ δὲ ἐφαρμάζεται (ἐντρέχεσια) καὶ ἐντρέχοι ἀγάλμα γυία.

537 B 10 ὁ ἄνδρος—ὁ χρόνος κτλ. The κτλ. is added as if it were less necessary in connection with εὐθείαν. It is added as if it were less necessary in connection with εὐθείαν.
19 ο μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς κτλ. Cf. 531 D n. 1: also Phaedr. 265 D ff. εἰς μίαν — ἵδεν συνορώντα άγεν τὰ πολλὰ διεσπαρμένα, Laws xi. 965 β (συνορώντα), Phaedr. 273 e, Soph. 253 D ff. and other passages cited by Zeller2 Π. i. p. 516 n. 3. See also App. III. 21 ἐν αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς is masculine (Schneider), not neuter (as D. and V. translate).

537 δ—540 c At this stage the best proficients will be advanced to higher honours, and tested by Dialectic. Great care must be taken in introducing them to this study; for where the character is immature and weak, dialectical debate too frequently engenders lawlessness, by over-throwing inherited beliefs. We shall therefore forbid such disputations to the young. After five years devoted solely to Dialectic, the next fifteen will be spent in acquiring experience of government and practical affairs. At the age of fifty those who have triumphantly passed through every trial, will henceforward contemplate the God, descending when their turn comes into the Cave to order human institutions after its likeness. All these regu-

lations apply of course to women as well as to men.

537 D 23 ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων. πρὸ-

κριτοί was a familiar term in the organi-

sation of Greek politics: see Arist. Ath.

Pol. 8. 1 with Sandys ad loc., and cf. also

Pl. Laws 753 c f.

25 ὁμάτων—μεθέμενοι. See vi

511 B n.

537 Ε 29 παρανομίας κτλ. Like

Phidippides in Ar. Clouds 1399 ff. ὃς ἦνο κανός πράγματος καὶ δεξίος δικαίων ἱπποῖς καὶ τῶν καθεστῶν ὃ μων ὑπὲρφρονον δύνασθαι κτλ. Schneider retains ἐμπλαταται (see εἰς n.), making the subject τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, but the present tense ('they become filled with lawlessness') favours the plural. Or does Plato mean that the dialectic of his day was degenerating? I think not; for that is scarcely a reason for exercising special care in connexion with his own (ἐνστάσαι δὴ πολ-

λής φιλάκης ἔργον). αὐτοῖς is not decisi-

tive, though it points to the plural, which is also supported by 539 A παράνομος δὴ—

doxy gegovñetai ek nómoqon. 538 A 2 τῶν φασάκοντων γονῶν: 'his self-styled parents.' For the omission
of ἐναι see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 34.
γονεόν < ἐναι>, which Herwerden pro-
poses, is weaker and less emphatic.
5 ὑποβαλλομένου is the reading of A and Cesenas M; whereas all, or nearly all, the other MSS have ὑποβάλλομενου.
"Ας nescio an qui suppositionem sibi ali-
quando filium pro suo habere et venditare
pergunt, ὑποβαλλομενον diei potuertur" (Schneider, comparing καθοδοτάνει in III 410 b). This is true, and the present
may be right, especially as in V 499 E, A
has βαλλω (wrongly, as I think) for the
βάλλοντος of all the other MSS. But M
may here perhaps be allowed to turn the
scale.

13. aἰσθήμενος A1 cum ceteris, excepto M, ubi secundum Rostagno legitur aἰσθή-


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think it possible enough that the higher education will lead his rulers to criticise the dōgya of the earlier 'musical' training. "But if this criticism is only the negative side of the deepening grasp with which a mature and stedfast mind lays hold on reality, no harm, he urges, will be done" (Bosanquet I.c.). We may even go farther and say that Dialectic and its ancillary studies are expressly intended to place the Guardians in the same position as the original legislator (vi 497 D) and enable them within limits to modify and reconstruct the authoritative dōgya of the city (vi 500 E ff.).

538 D 26 ἕλθον ἐρώτημα. See iv 434 D π. 27 ἀποκριμαίον. The genitive is defended by Schneider from ix 590 D. ἀποκριμαίον (Ξ and two other MSS) is obviously a 'correction.'

28 καὶ πολλάκις κτλ. The whole of this passage should be compared with the account of the genesis of μουσολογία in Phaed. 90 B ff.

538 E 33 μήτε—τε. See on iv 430 B. 539 A 2 τῶν κολακεύοντα is explained by the Oxford editors as 'the life that is flattering him,' with reference to 538 D. It is rather, I think, 'the flattering life' i.e. the life of the κόλας (cf. ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος and the like in Arist. Eth. Nic. 1 2. 1095 b 17 ff.). In other words the epithet which properly belongs to the person who lives the life is transferred to the life which he lives. Aristotle reminds us that ὁ συμμαχοῦσα καὶ ὁ κόλας οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄναλογον (Pol. D 4. 1029 a 20), and the demagogic life may be taken as one among many illustrations of Plato's meaning, especially as in παράνομοι κτλ. he seems to be thinking of Alcibiades: cf. Thuc. vi 15. 4 and 28. 2. See vi 494 C ff. nn. and Bosanquet Companion p. 306.

3 δέξι. The appearance does not exclude the reality: cf. (with J. and C.) Soph. O. 7. 402 and Thuc. II. 10. 1. 6 εἰλαβθυμίνω refers not to the pupils, but to Glaucus as legislator, who
meddles with Dialectic' by introducing the Guardians to it. This appears clearly both from εὐλαβεία and from ἑπτάθη δὴ πολλὰς φυλακές ἔργων in 537 D. εὐλαβου-μένους (Madvig) and εὐλαβουμένους (Baiter) are therefore wrong.

539 B 8 μὴ νέος κτλ. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1.1. 1095a 2 τῆς πολιτείας οὖν ἐστιν ὁλίγος ἀποφάσι βόνος. It is clear from the present passage that Dialectic is largely concerned with moral and religious questions, as Bosanquet (Companion p. 302) and Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. II p. 291) remark. See App. III. Grote (III pp. 237—239) has some interesting observations on Plato's exclusion of the young from dialectical debate; but it is scarcely right to say that the Parmenides (135 C—136 E) contradicts Plato's precept in the Republic, for the disputations in the Parmenides are a preliminary exercise (γυμνασία 135 D) to be undertaken before we attempt to define καλῶν τέ & καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἐκαστῶν τῶν οἴων (135 C).

9 οὖμαι γὰρ σε κτλ. The same phenomenon is similarly described in Phil. 15 D—16 A; cf. also Ap. 23 C and Isocr. Panath. 26.

10 ἀντιλυγόμαι. See on V 454 A.

539 D 23 τούτων: this provision, viz. that they shall not begin Dialectic in youth (539 B). The genitive depends on προ-ειρημένα (which refers to passages like vi 485 ff., 490, 503 C; VII 535 A ff.), and not, as J. and C. suggest, on εὐλαβεία.

24 ὡς—ἔρχεται. On the construction see III 410 B μ.

28 έτή—τότε. 537 B.

539 E 29 πέντε δές. Krohn thinks five years very short, compared with the
time allotted to the προπαδεία, and sus-
tpects that we have here "a silent confession that there is not so very much to say about the Ideas after all." (Pl. St. p. 187). Five years devoted ἴνεισκός καὶ ἴςσων to Dialectic exclusively is a good deal; and we may be sure that Plato does not intend his Guardians to neglect the sub-
ject between 35 and 50, although practical duties occupy most of their time. Moreover at 50, Dialectic is resumed, and it is not till then that the Idea of Good is fully apprehended, so that the five years from 30 to 35 were certainly not thought by Plato to exhaust the subject. We must also beware of supposing that there is any break in continuity in the education of the Guardians. The study of each pro-
paedagogic 'art' by itself prepares us for seeing all the 'arts' in their mutual rela-
tions and interdependence, and the comparative survey of the 'arts' in turn prepares us for Dialectic (537 C), nor need the subjects of the προπαδεία be finally abandoned after we enter on Dialectic. See Appendices II and III.

540 Λ 3 πεντηκοντυτων. We are told that in Chalcis the magistrates had to be at least 50 years of age: νόμος δὲ ἦν Ἑλλάδος μὴ ἄρξαι μὴδε προσέχειν νεότερον ἕτων πεντηκοντα (Iheraldides Fr. Hist. Gr. II p. 222), but advanced age was rarely a condition of holding office in Greek states. See Whibley Ol. Olig. pp. 148 f. '5 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγήν: 'the radiant light of the soul,' αὐγή is highly poetic in this sense: cf. Soph. Ajax 70. There is more than a touch of mysticism in this and similar passages throughout Books VI and VII (cf. especially VI 490 A, B), but it is exaggerated by Krolik (Pl. St. p. 187), who boldly declares that "the only person who correctly understood the later phase of the Republic was Plotinus," and that "the so-called Platonic Dialectic is a Mind-
verständnis."

7 παραδείγματε κτλ. See vi 484 c, 501 A—C ῶν. 540 Β ἔτο ἐκάστους. See 520 D n. 11 ὀψ ὡς καλόν τι κτλ. 520 E n. 540 C 14 ἐὰν καὶ ἦ Πυθία κτλ. See on IV 427 B, C, ἕξωναρι. See cr. n. The error in A, II, and several MS besides, is a pretty example of lipography: contrast
15 ὥς δαίμωσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὡς εὐδαίμοσι τε καὶ θελοις. Παγκάλους, ἐφη, τοὺς ἀρχοῦτας, ὃς Σύκατες, ὡστερ ἀνδριαντοποίοις ἀπείργασαι. Καὶ τὰς ἀρχοῦσας τε, ἢν δὲ εγώ, ὃ Γλαῦκων. μηδὲν γὰρ τι ὅνω με περὶ ἀνδρόν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ εἰρηκα ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσα ἀν αὐτῶν ἴκανα τὰς φύσεις ἐγγυζονται. Ὄρθος, ἐφη, εἴπερ ἢσα γε πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνισοῦσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν. Τί' οὖν; δ ἐφην. Ἐγναχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχάς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ τη, καὶ οὐκ ἁλλή ἢ εἰρηταί, οταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφοὶ δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἰς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονισοῦσιν,

20 ἤγγισάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὅρθον περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦτον τιμᾶς, 1 μέγιστον δὲ καὶ Ε ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντες τε καὶ αὐξώντες αὐτῷ διασκευωρίσονται τὴν ἐαυτῶν πόλιν; Πῶς; ἐφη. 'Οσοι μὲν ἃν, ἢν δ' εγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν ἐν τῇ

21. Ἐγναχωρείτε Α.2θ: Ἐγναχωρεῖν τε Α.Π.: Ἐγναχωρεῖς Ε. 29. δεκετῶν Π: δὲ' ἐτῶν Λ.
541 πόλει, πάντας ἑκτέμφωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἁγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν 30
παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἡθον, ὥς καὶ οἱ γονεῖς ἔχουσι, θρέψων-
tαι ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις πρότοσι καὶ νόμοις, οὕτων οἴοις διεληλυθαμεν
tότε, καὶ οὕτω τάχιστα τε καὶ βάστα πόλειν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν
ἐξέγομεν, καταστάσαν αὐτῶν τε εὐθαυμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἐδύνον, ἐν ὧν ἄν 5
Β ἐγγέννηται, πλεῖστα ὁνήσευ; Πόλυ γ’, ἐφ’ ἑκατερ’ ἐπερ ποτὲ γέγονοιτο, δοκεῖς μοι, οἳ Σάκκρατες, εὐ εἰρηκέναι. Ὡκοῦν ἁδρὶ ὡς ἤδη, εἰπον ἔγιο, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἳ λόγοι περὶ τε τῆς πόλεως
tαύτης καὶ τοῦ ὀμοῦ ταύτη ἁρυδρός; δήδος ἄρ’ πον καὶ οὕτως, οἴοιν
φήσωμεν δεῖν αὐτῶν εἶναι. Δήδος, ἐφ’ καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτάς, το
δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν.

télos politeías ἗’.

30 ἑκτέμφωσιν—θρέψωνται. Stephanus (with some inferior ms authority) reads the
future, which Liebhold also would restore; but δόμοι is carried on. Cf. ii
359 B n.

541 A 31 θρέψωνται κτλ. J. and C. accuse Plato of barely considering “how
the provision, which he here abruptly in-
troduces, is to be reconciled with what
precedes. For how are the children to be
taught music and gymnastic when all
their elders have been sent away? From
what other State are the new teachers to
be brought?” Plato is perfectly consistent.
The new teachers are οἵ οὓς ἄλθοις φιλό-
σοφοὶ διαισέται εἰς πόλεις γενόμενοι (540 D :
Cf. vi 499 B, 502 A ff.), and they rusticate
the parents etc. just because their presence
makes it impossible to bring up children
on the new lines. If ‘their elders’ could
teach the young children, it would be un-
necessary and wrong to send them into
the country. Jowett seems to forget for
the moment that Plato is not here speak-
ing of his own city, but of an actual city
which he wishes to transform into his
καλλίπολις.

4 καὶ οὕτω κτλ. The infinitives still
depend on ἐγγενέσθαι.

5 ἐξέγομεν. Liebhold’s λέγουσιν is
harmless, but unnecessary: cf. διεληλυ-
θαμεν τότε above.

541 B 7 εἶπερ ποτὲ γέγονοιτο. Cf.
vi 502 C n.

10 ὅπερ ἐρωτάς refers to Socrates’
question οἰκοῦν— ἄνδρας; Cf. x 595 C
άλλ’ ὁ λέγω, ῥήτεον. “The present inquiry
is, I believe, concluded” (D. and V.) is
an erroneous translation.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VII.

I.

ON THE SIMILES OF THE LINE AND THE CAVE.

The famous similitudes in Books VI and VII have claimed the attention of every writer who has seriously attempted to expound the philosophy of Plato. It must suffice to refer generally to Ueberweg-Heinze Grundriss etc. pp. 167-174; and in particular to Whewell, Philosophy of Discovery, pp. 429-448; Sidgwick, Journal of Philology, 11 pp. 96 ff.; Jackson ib. x pp. 132 ff.; and Shorey On the Idea of Good in Plato's Republic (Chicago Studies in Classical Philology 1 pp. 188-239). The aim of the present Appendix is not polemical, but explanatory, and its scope is limited to an exposition of the difficulties of the subject in a more consecutive and reasoned manner than was possible in the notes.

An interpreter ought in the first instance to confine himself to such express statements, hints, and indications as are furnished by Plato himself in the Republic. The evidence of other Platonic dialogues and of Aristotle is certainly admissible, and may prove extremely useful in supplementing and confirming our results; but it ought not to be appealed to until the testimony of the Republic has been heard.

I will try to conform to these canons of interpretation.

The line is divided into two unequal parts, each of which is sub-

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
\text{ơpata sive ḏoχαστά} & \text{νοητά} \\
\text{eikónes} & \text{ζόα etc.} & \text{Lower νοητά} & \text{Higher νοητά} \\
A & D & C & E & B
\end{array}
\]

Fig. i. The Line.

divided according to the proportions of the original section. Thus (Fig. i.) \(AD:DC::AC:CB\), and \(CE:EB::AC:CB\).

\(CB\) represents the νοητόν: and \(AC\) is called sometimes ơpata, sometimes ḏoχαστόν.

\(AD\) stands for eikónes, i.e. πρῶτον μὲν τώσ σκιάς, ἐπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀστὰ πυκνὰ τε καὶ λεία καὶ φαίνα ἑξυνέστηκεν,
kai páv to toûntov: DC for tâ peri ἡμᾶς ζωά kai páv to φυτευτὸν kai to σκευαστὸν ὄλων γένος (509 D—510 A B). It is clear, therefore, that if Plato means what he says, the objects represented by AD are distinct from those represented by DC, though they are each of them ὁρατά (δοξαστά).

CE stands for one part of τὸ νοητὸν, EB for the other: see 510 B to τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ—τὸ δ' αἱ ἔτερον and 511 C σαφείστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωροῦμεν ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλομεμεων. Here again, if Plato's words are to be taken strictly, the objects represented by CE are distinct from those represented by EB. This conclusion is confirmed by 516 A compared with 532 A ff., where the objects of the lower intellectual method are compared with shadows of so-called real things (AD), whereas the higher νοητά correspond to ζωά etc. (DC): cf. 511 E ἦφι οἷς ἔστιν and 534 A.

So far, it will scarcely, I think, be denied that Plato's language points to a fourfold division, in which there are two main segments, each with two subsections. This view, which had hitherto been generally approved, was attacked by Jackson on the ground that "the introduction of the first segment is unmeaning and worse than unmeaning, on the assumption that 'the universe is compared to a quadrifact line'"]" (see Journal of Philology x pp. 132—150). Let us therefore examine the evidence of the République on the subsection AD.

AD is part of AC, and AC is called by Plato sometimes δοξαστών and sometimes ὁρατών: see 510 A and the other passages cited in my note ad loc. What then is the meaning of δοξαστῶν? The word is certainly not synonymous with ὁρατῶν, and we are surely bound to interpret its meaning here by the meaning which Plato has already given to it in the République. Now according to the explanation of δοξα in ν 476 B—480 A, δοξαστῶν includes not only the objects of sight and the other senses, but also, for example, τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (479 D, with note ad loc.). It would appear therefore that AC embraces not only ὁρατά, but other δοξαστά also, and that among these δοξαστὰ are contained inter alia popular canons or opinions on the subject of what is beautiful, ugly, right, wrong etc., as explained in 479 D. If Plato intended us to restrict AC to ὁρατά, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have used the term ὁρατά throughout, instead of employing a word which he has already defined as including not only visibles, but other opinables as well. That visible εἰκόνες of ὁρατά are of little or no metaphysical importance, is doubtless true; but there are other δοξασται εἰκόνες besides those which are visible, and some of these are by no means destitute of significance and value.

For examples of such εἰκόνες we have not far to seek. Plato himself appears to recognize them in 517 D, 520 C, D (see the notes on these passages, and on 514 A, 517 A). They include the νόμιμα on subjects of taste, morality, truth etc. expressed or embodied in the works of poets, painters, and artists generally, sophists and rhetoricians, demagogues, statesmen, and others, in so far as these canons and
opinions are copied from τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; or from any other opinions and ‘appearances’ whatsoever: see vi 492 a—493 ε. III 401 b ff., 402 b ff. and x 595 b—602 b. Much the same view is held by Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. ii pp. 242—246) and others, although they have not, I think, sufficiently insisted on the fact that Plato stamps this interpretation as legitimate and correct by calling ΑC δοξαστόν, and including among δοξαστά (in Book v) not only ὅρατα but also τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

If we now look for confirmations in other dialogues, the Sophist is ready at hand with its elaborate amount of εἰκωστική and φανταστική (233 ε—236 c, 264 c ff.). The objects with which these two arts are concerned cannot be placed in any segment of the line except ΑD. In the Sophist Plato distinguishes between θεία ποιητική and ἀνθρωπίνη ποιητική (ὁποῖα τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἔνωσάμενα ἀνθρωπίνη, καὶ κατὰ τούτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένης, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρωπίνον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θείον 265 ε), and between θεία εἰδωλοποιική and ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποιική (266 b ff.: see on vii 532 c). Now the works of ἀνθρωπίνη (as well as θεία) ποιητική are expressly recognized in DC, which includes σκευαστά as well as φυτευτά. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that ΑD includes the works of ἀνθρωπίνη (as well as θεία) εἰδωλοποιική. And the sophistic art is one among several varieties of ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποιική, being a subdivision of δοξομιρεῖς. Compare also, for Poetry, Music, and the imitative arts in general, Latus 669 d ff. It may be noted that this is not the only part of the Republic in which we meet with doctrines and ideas which are more fully developed in the Sophist and other dialogues which are now commonly considered to be relatively late: see on 476 a.

On these grounds I am unable to look upon the first section of the line as in any way otiose or destitute of importance. It would be strange if in an enumeration of the objects of knowledge and opinion Plato should have left no room for the whole domain of ‘imitation,’ with which, in the Republic and elsewhere, he is continually concerned. In the analogous classification of Phil. 55 D—58 α μορφόκη is similarly placed in the lowest of the four divisions: cf. Bosanquet Companion p. 262.

The second division of the line need not detain us long. In so far as it is ὅρατων, it includes the originals, whether natural or artificial, of the ὅρατα εἰκόνες in AD. Regarded in its wider meaning, it embraces all the other δοξαστά of which AD presents us with δοξασταὶ εἰκόνες, and doubtless also more; for we need not suppose that everything in DC has its counterpart in AD. The corresponding state of mind is πίστεις, or ‘belief’: cf. Tim. 26 c δ τί περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τούτο πρὸς πίστειν ἀλήθεια and Gorg. 454 d ff., from which and other passages it is clear that πίστεις (in the widest sense) is the normal attitude of the ἀπαίδευτος towards his δοξαστά in general as well as his αἰσθήτα in particular. The difference between πίστεις and εἰκασία, both of which are here regarded as varieties of δόξα, is a varying quantity; for πίστεις may be right or wrong. I think the particular contrast which Plato
has in view is best illustrated by such a case as he himself describes in \( x \ 601 \text{d}—602 \text{b} \), where the maker of a σκείδος is said to have πίστις ὀρθή, ἐνιών τῷ εἰδώλι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν πάρα τοῦ εἰδώτος, whereas the imitator ὤντε ἐσται ὀντα δοξάσει, so that his state of mind can only be εἰκασία. In view of this passage in Book \( x \), we may also (with Bosanquet, Companions, p. 262) compare Phil. 56 b ff. The arts of carpentry, ship-building, house-building etc., as well as ‘popular’ ἀρχιτεκτονική, μεταφρασία etc. (56 E—57 D: cf. VII 526 A n.) are placed in the second lowest category of the Philebus. They are all of them concerned with objects belonging to the second division of the line, and we may therefore take it that the intellectual condition of those who profess and practise these arts is also, according to Plato, πίστις.

It is about the third division of Plato’s line that the greatest disputes have raged.

We have already seen that Plato verbally distinguishes between the contents of \( CE \) and those of \( EB \). It is difficult to conceive why he should have done so unless he meant them to be really distinct; for the resources of his language were certainly equal to expressing his real view, whatever it was. There is moreover an exact correspondence between the objects of the different psychical affections or states (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) and the states themselves; and διάνοια, which Plato regularly uses in connexion with \( CE \) (510 D, 511 A, 511 C, 511 D, 511 E, 526 A, 529 D, 533 D, 533 E, 534 A), is expressly distinguished from νοστίμια or τούτοις in 511 D. We are, therefore, prepared to find a similar distinction between the objects of the two mental states. What is the positive evidence on the subject? That the lower νοστίμα are the subjects of Plato’s propaedeutic studies, viz. mathematical numbers, mathematical plane surfaces, mathematical βάθος, mathematical φορά, βάθος, and 'consonant' mathematical numbers, appears from 510—E, 511 A, B, 511 C (τεχνών), 525 C—526 A, 527 B, 532 C (τεχνών) 533 D συνεργός καὶ συμπεραιγογοῦσι χρωμείν αἰς διήθουσιν τέχναις ἀσ ἐπιστήμης μὲν πολλάκις προσεπόμεν διὰ τὸ ἐθος, δεόνται δὲ δύνατος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρον μὲν ἡ δόξας, ἀμιδρότερον δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμης. Διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτήν ἐπ γε τῷ πρῶτην ποιῷ ὑπομένει, and 534 A. They are ἀεὶ ἄντα (see 527 B and cf. 529 C, D n.). but nevertheless πολλά, i.e. there are many mathematical units etc. (526 A n.), many mathematical triangles, squares etc., many mathematical cubes etc., many specimens (if the word may be allowed) of each mathematical φορά, many of each particular set of ἕξμισθου ἄρθρων. Finally these μαθηματικά occupy an intermediate position between αἰσθητά (δοξαστά) and Ideas. We learn this (1) from their position in the line, (2) from the statement that the mathematical intelligence or διάνοια, which cognizes them, is μετατέθης τῷ δόξαις τε καὶ νοὺς 511 D, (3) from the constantly repeated observation that such studies ‘tend to drag us towards Being’ (i.e. towards \( EB \)) etc. 523 A, 525 A, 527 B: cf. also 525 C, 526 B, (4) from the fact that while αἰσθητὰ are perishable

1 A hasty perusal of 510 D might lead us to suppose that there is but one 'mathematical' square, and even to identify it with the Idea; but see the notes ad loc.
and πολλά, μαθηματικά are πολλά (526 α) and αἱ ὀντα (527 b), whereas the idea is αἱ ὀντα and ἐν.

Aristotle's evidence is in complete accord with these statements of Plato himself in the Republic. The relevant passages are cited by Bonitz on Met. A 6. 987b 14 ff. ἄτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθήτα καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικά τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φήσει (sc. Πλάτων) μεταξὺ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθήτων τῷ ἀόδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ εἴδων τὸ τὰ μὲν πολλ' ἀττα ὀμοία εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἴδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἐκαστὸν μὸνον. "Triarum genera possuisse Platonem, sensibilita mathematica ideas, constanter multis locis refert Aristoteles, cf. 9. 992b 14, B 1. 995b 16, 2. 997b 12, 6. 1002b 12 sqq., Z 2. 1028b 19, K 1. 1050b 4 sqq., A 1. 1069a 34. Et a sensibilibus quidem rebus differre mathematicas acternae et immutabili natura (ἀκίνητα b 16...), ab ideo autem eo, quod mathematicae quidem res eiusdem formae indefinitae numero sunt, ideo vero quaelibet simpliciter est una, cf. B 6. I. l.: τὰ μὲν μαθηματικὰ τῶν δείπρο (i.e. τῶν αἰσθήτων) ἅλλο μὲν τινι διαφέρει, τῷ δὲ πολλ' ἀττα ὀμοίον εἶναι ὅθεν διαφέρει. Ita quin tam natura in medio posita sint mathematica inter sensibilita et ideas (μεταξὺ b 16), saepè ea Platonico sensu significat hoc ipso vocabulo τὰ μεταξὺ, cf. 9. 991b 29, 992b 16, B 2. 997b 2, 13, 908a 7, 6. 1002b 13, 21, K 1. 1. l., M 2. 1077a 11" (Bonitz). It may be desirable to quote one of the numerous criticisms which Aristotle makes on Plato's view of μαθηματικά, because it appears to allude directly to the educational curriculum of the Republic: ἐτὶ δὲ εἰ τις παρὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθήτα τὰ μεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἔξει. ὅπλον γὰρ ὡς ομοίῳ γραμμα τε παρ' αὑτός καὶ τῶς αἰσθήτας ἔστηνται καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἄλλων γενόμενων ὄστ' ἐπιτρέπει η ἀντροπολογία μιὰ τοῦτων ἑστὶν, ἐστά ὑπὸ καὶ ὁμάδος παρὰ τῶν αἰσθήτων ὁμάδον καὶ ἠλιός τε καὶ σεληνίη καὶ τάλλα ὀμοίος τὰ κατὰ τῶν ὁμάδων (cf. 529c, D iii.)—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περί ὧν ἡ ὑποκειμενα πραγματεύεται καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικὸς ἀρμονία (531 c. n.) κτλ. (Met. B 2. 997b 12 ff., cf. M 2. 1076b 11—1077b 14). These words are, in my judgment, an altogether just and relevant criticism on Plato from the standpoint of a man of science, and one with which Plato himself, when he wrote the Republic, would not have quarrelled.

In spite of this body of evidence, Shorey speaks of "futilissima illa hariolatio de numeris mathematicis inter numeros sensiles et numeros ideales possitis" (de Pl. id. doctr. p. 33), refuses to attribute the doctrine to Plato, and is surprised that Zeller should have been led astray. The entire theory, according to the American critic, arose from a mistaken interpretation of 523 D—526 e, where αὐτὸ τὸ ἀριθμὸ (525 D), he declares, are "nihil aliud quam ideam numerorum, sicut autó τὸ μέγα est ipsis magnitudinis idea" (l.c.). I have stated my view of αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν in the notes on 525 D. Here it need only be said that if αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν, about which mathematicians converse, means Ideas of numbers, then αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν (525 D), i.e. the ἐν about which mathematicians converse (526 a), is the Idea of 'one.' But Plato speaks of a multiplicity of mathematical units: περὶ ποιῶν ἀριθμῶν διάλεγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἷς ὄρισε ἀξίουτε ἐστιν, ἵνα τὸ  ἐκαστὸν πᾶν παντὶ καὶ συνε ὁμώνοι διαφέρον (526 a). Are we then to suppose that there are many Ideas of 'one'? It may be added that in his later treatise on 'The
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Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic,’ Shorey still adheres to his old view.

The explanation which I am advocating has the support of Zeller’s Pi. 1. pp. 679 ff., Trendelenburg Plat. de id. et num. doctr. pp. 70—80, Bonitz l.c. and a majority of scholars. To me it appears fully demonstrated by the evidence of the Republic alone; and Aristotle’s testimony is a welcome confirmation from a source which is only second in value to Plato’s own writings.

The ontological theories of the Philebus and Timaeus are, I believe, in harmony with the position here assigned to μαθηματικά. In the República, τὰ μαθηματικά are the link between αἰσθητά and εἴδη, regarded as objects respectively of sensible apprehension and knowledge; in the Philebus and especially the Timaeus, they are the cosmological μεταξύ τι. The αἴτια τῆς μέτεως of the Philebus (23 c ff.) is the Idea, and πέρας in that dialogue is τὰ μαθηματικά. Professor G. Schneider has pointed out that Plato ‘machte für alle Erscheinungen der Welt und des Geistes das Mathematische zum Gesetze für die Verwirklichung des Guten,’ and the Timaeus is an elaborate commentary on his remark. We see the soul and body of the Universe and Man built up by means of the μεταξύ or μαθηματικά of the República, αριθμητική supplying numbers (32 B et al.), Plane Geometry εὐτεία (53 D ff.), Stereometry βάθη (54 B ff.), Astronomy φοραὶ βάθους (36 C ff., 39 A ff., 40 C ff.), and Harmonics the ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί (35 B ff.), according to which the Souls of the world and man are framed. The εἰσίωντα καὶ εξίοντα, τῶν ὄντων ἢ μημήστα, τυπωθέντα ἢ ἀντών πρότου τινα δισφραστον καὶ θαμμαστόν (50 c), which enter into the ἐκμαγέειν and leave it according as mortal things arise and perish, are nothing but mathematical forms—the contents of CE. It is impossible to pursue the subject farther here; but reference may be made to F. Schmitt’s Dissertation on die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil. (Giessen 1891) and G. Schneider’s admirable work on Das Princip d. Maasses in d. Pl. Philos. (Gera 1878), where this interpretation of the Philebus and Timaeus is expounded and justified in detail.

There remains the further question whether these μαθηματικά have, like the Ideas themselves, a real and substantial existence, apart from, as well as in, sensible particulars. Plato speaks of the object of geometrical study as ἄει ὅν, οὐ ποτε τι γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον (527 B n., cf. 529 C, D nn.), and in the Timaeus (l.c.) they are εἰσίωντα καὶ εξίοντα. In the passages already referred to, Aristotle states or implies that Plato regarded them as χωρίστα, not merely in thought, but actually, although in Met. B 2. 998a 7 ff. he informs us that another interpretation of τὰ μεταξύ was current, according to which they do exist, οὐ μὴν χωρίς γε τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτοις. The evidence of the República and Timaeus is in my opinion altogether in favour of the view which Aristotle attributes to Plato.

The Platonic theory on this subject will be most easily apprehended if we contrast it with that of a very different school of Philosophy. According to John Stuart Mill “there exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions” (of geometrical science). “There exist no
points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right." The "really existent" lines, angles, and figures are those which we apprehend through the senses, and the definitions, as they are called, must be regarded as some of our first and most obvious generalisations concerning those natural objects" (Logic, Book II ch. 5 § 1). To Plato, on the other hand, the "really existent" straight lines are just those of which the definition speaks: whereas visible lines and magnitudes do not exist, but only 'become.' It is the true μαθηματικά described in his definitions of mathematical science which the γεωμετρικός investigates, and if they do not correspond with the forms which we see, so much the worse for Nature! The fault lies not with them nor with the δημιουργός, but with the conditions of finite existence: μεμιμημένη γάρ η τούδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συντάσσεως ἐγεννήθη (Tim. 48 a).

If the interpretation which I have given is correct, we can at once see why Plato makes the study of μαθηματικά his προτάσεια. τὰ μαθηματικά are, objectively and de facto, according to Plato, the 'golden chain' between Ideas and particulars, and he who would ascend to Ideas must climb by the ladder which the Architect of the Universe—θεὸς ἄει γεωμετρῶν—has himself provided. Cf. Schneider l. c. P. 54.

If the question is asked 'What is the element of truth embodied in Plato's theory of τὰ μαθηματικά as μεταξῷ;' the answer is not far to seek. "All objects in the world," says Whewell, "which can be made the subjects of our contemplation are subordinate to the conditions of Space, Time, and Number; and on this account, the doctrines of pure mathematics have most numerous and extensive applications in every department of our investigation of nature" (Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, p. 153). It is an admitted fact that "all causes operate according to mathematical laws" (Mill, Logic, Book III, ch 24 § 9). The position which Plato assigns to τὰ μαθηματικά as intermediates between Ideas and sensible things is at once an affirmation of this fact and an explanation, from the Platonic point of view, of the reason which underlies it. The supreme Cause of the Universe, according to Plato, is the Idea of Good, of which, in the last analysis, the other Ideas are special determinations, and τὰ μαθηματικά are the instruments by means of which that Idea works in Nature. This and nothing else is the meaning of Plato's profound and famous text θεὸς ἄει γεωμετρῶι, on which the bulk of the *Timaeus* is only an elaborate commentary. Why is it, to take an obvious illustration, that the laws of physical science are habitually expressed in terms of mathematics? Plato's reply would be: simply because God made use of μαθηματικά in constructing the world, and we must interpret the Universe as God made it. The Laws of Kepler have been described as "three Laws of Divine Working in Nature, discovered by Kepler," and the description is in full harmony with Plato's conception. For the rest it should be noted that such a view of μαθηματικά appeals in its broader outlines with peculiar force to the religious and poetical imagination, as is often the case with the
speculative flights of Plato. We may compare not only the lines of Milton (Paradise Lost, vii 221 ff.)

"Him all his train
Followed in bright procession, to behold
Creation, and the wonders of his might.
Then stayed the fervid wheels, and in his hand
He took the golden compasses, prepared
In God's eternal store, to circumscribe
This Universe, and all created things.
One foot he centred, and the other turned
Round through the vast profundity obscure,
And said, 'Thus far extend, thus far thy bounds;
This be thy just circumference, O world!'");

but also the famous passage in Isaiah xl 12 "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?"

For special discussions on 'The propaedeutic studies of the Republic' and 'On Plato's Dialectic' see Appendices II and III.

The view which I take of the simile of the Cave and its connexion with that of the Line is fully explained in the notes on Book vii (514 A, B, 515 A, 515 C, 516 A—C, 517 A, 517 D, 519 B, C, 520 C, 532 A—C). It is only necessary to add here that Jowett and Campbell's interpretation (Vol. ii pp. 14—18, iii pp. 315—317 and elsewhere) appears to me somewhat seriously wrong in regard to the ἀγάλματα or εἴδωλα of the allegory, which, according to Campbell, "constitute a lower stage of the ideal which in Plato's language is alone the real, not the immediately visible, but the truth of phenomena, the ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἐκάστων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, the infima species, the first intention of the ἐν λογισμῷ ἐξαιροῦμενον" (ii p. 17). Jowett, if I understand him rightly, goes even farther, and apparently regards some of the propaedeutic studies as symbolized by the εἴδωλα (iii pp. 316, 317). It seems to me quite clear from the general proportions of the simile (514 A n.) that the εἴδωλα in the cave represent nothing beyond the higher ὅρωμα and the higher δοξαστά (517 A, 532 B, C nn.), which are emphatically πολλά and not ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, still less "the world as conceived of by the mathematician" (Jowett), which might possibly be figured as a φάντασμα θείου (532 C n.), but certainly not as a σκευαστῶν εἴδωλων: τού γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος η γεωμετρική γνώσις ἔστιν (527 B).

II.

ON THE PROPAEDEUTIC STUDIES OF THE REPUBLIC.

Plato's higher scheme of education has formed the subject of a large number of dissertations and articles, besides the attention which it has received at the hands of commentators and historians of philosophy. The best and ablest discussion of the method and general principles of the system is still, I think, Nettleship's article in Hellenica (pp. 135—180), to which the second volume of his Lectures and Remains
APPENDICES TO BOOK VII.

(pp. 238—294) is a welcome supplement. Tannery’s articles in the *Revue Philosophique* (x pp. 517 ff. and xi pp. 283 ff.) are concerned chiefly with the scientific aspect of Plato’s curriculum. The mathematical difficulties have been to a large extent cleared up by historians of mathematics, and other authors of special monographs mentioned in the notes. Theo’s treatise περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν χρησίμων εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνα ἀνάγνωσιν, which Dupuis has edited and translated (Paris 1892), will be found extremely useful, all the more so that it is largely a compilation from earlier sources.

In this appendix I propose to touch on some questions which could not be adequately treated in the notes.

The novelty of Plato’s curriculum lies in the interpretation which he puts upon the subjects prescribed, and in his conception of scientific method, rather than in his selection of studies to be pursued. It will be observed that he confesses his debt to the Pythagoreans (530 E n.); and, as Tannery points out (l.c. x pp. 521 ff.; cf. Diels Dox. Gr. 555. 17), there is no reason to doubt that the Pythagoreans made use of a quadrivium embracing (1) ἀριθμητική, (2) μονωτική, (3) γεωμετρία, (4) σφαιρική (see *Theol. Ar.* 4. 19 Ast and Hippolytus in Diels l.c., where the order is (1) <ἀριθμητική>, (2) μονωτική, (3) γεωμετρία, (4) ἀστρονομία). See also [Archytas] quoted on 530 D. The allusions in Isocrates (Panath. 26. Antid. 261 ff., 266) to an educational curriculum of this kind may of course be aimed at Plato, but it is, I think, more probable, in view of some passages in the Platonic dialogues, that ἤ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν κατασταθείσα παιδεία (Panath. l.c.) has a wider reference. In *Theaet.* 145 A Theodorus is said to be γεωμετρικός—καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογι- στικὸς τε καὶ μονωτικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας (liberal education) ἔχεται, and Theaetetus professes to have learnt from him γεωμετρίας ἀττα—καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀριθμονία καὶ λογισμοῦ (ib. 145 C, D). The studies in question were called ‘Arts,’ and Hippias was one of those who professed to teach them under this name, as appears from *Prot.* 318 E (see 511 C n. and *Hipp. Mai.* 283 B ff.). From these passages we are justified in drawing the inference that the Pythagorean quadrivium was in some form or another becoming recognized in the early part of the fourth century B.C., and even earlier (cf. Grasberger *Erziehung u. Unterr.* II p. 340). The addition of Stereometry as a separate and independent branch of study is doubtless due to Plato, as may indeed be inferred from his own remarks (528 B ff.); but stereometrical problems had been handled before his time not only by the Pythagoreans, but also by Anaxagoras and Democritus (528 B, c nn.), and were probably reckoned as part of γεωμετρία.

The studies are arranged by Plato in the sequence, Theory of Numbers, Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy and Harmonics. It is not, of course, to be supposed that each of the earlier subjects is dismissed as soon as its successor comes upon the stage; Plato indeed implies the opposite in 531 C ff. and elsewhere. The order which he prescribes is the order in which the subjects are to be begun. I have touched on the principle underlying the sequence of studies in the notes on 526 c and 528 a. We proceed from number, which is presumably the
first 'increase,' to plane geometry and stereometry, which are concerned respectively with the second and third 'increases,' and thence to \( \text{φορά} \ βάθους \), taking Astronomy, the intellectual counterpart of visible \( \text{φορά} \), before Harmonics, which deals with the intellectual counterpart of audible \( \text{φορά} \), viz. 'consonant' and 'dissonant' numbers. The general principle plainly is that we should progress from the less to the more complex (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii p. 269), each successive study adding a fresh element to those which have preceded it and presupposing them all. Plato would not, I think, allow that his intention was 'to arrange the sciences according to their object-matter in a direction from abstract to concrete' (Bosanquet Companion p. 288), for the Platonic sciences of Astronomy and Harmonics are, to say the least, as 'abstract' as the sciences of Number. But inasmuch as a solid concrete thing is after all an embodiment, though only an imperfect embodiment, of mathematical \( \betaάθος \), Plato's curriculum, so far, and only so far, as it does in reality teach us to understand the visible concrete universe, may, if we are so minded, be held to proceed, in Aristotelian language, from the \( \piρτέρα \ φύσει \) to the \( \piρτέρα \ προς \ ημᾶς \).

Except in the position ascribed to 'Music' or 'Harmonics,' the order of studies in the Republic agrees with that of the Pythagorean quadrivium. The phraseology of 526 c and 528 a makes it probable that the principle of the Pythagorean arrangement was the same. 'Second increase' can only mean 'second increase' of the point or unit, the 'first increase' being the line or number. Now the Pythagoreans, as is well known, built up the line out of points, the plane out of lines, and the solid out of planes: see RP.7 § 64. (This is equally true whether we suppose that they consciously or unconsciously regarded the cosmogonical unit or point as having \( \muέγεθος \), though for my own part I agree with Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy pp. 312—315, that they consciously so regarded it, at all events in the earlier and more original form of their theory: see Arist. Met. M 6. 1080 b 20, 32 and N 1091 a 15 with Phys. Z 1. 231 a 24, 10. 241 b 3, and other passages cited in Burnet, i.e. p. 315 n.) It may therefore be inferred that the expressions 'second' and 'third increase' are in their origin Pythagorean, and, if so, we cannot doubt that Plato's principle of arrangement agrees on the whole with that of his predecessors.

The position of Harmonics in the Platonic scheme is however a remarkable divergence, especially as the study, according to 531 c, is concerned with numbers. In discussing this point Theo, who himself expounds the \( \sigmaύμφωνοι \ αρμονίων \) in connexion with \( \αρμονική \), distinguishes between three kinds of \( \alphaρμονία \), viz. \( \eta \) \( \alphaρμανίων \) \( \ας \) \( \alphaιτητή \), \( \eta \) \( \αρμονίων \) \( \νούτη \), and \( \eta \) \( \κόσμων \) \( \αρμονία \) (pp. 16, 47 ed. Hiller). Plato's \( \αρμονική \) deals of course with the second of these \( \αρμονίων \). The first would have seemed to him educationally useless except by way of illustration, like mathematical diagrams (cf. 527 A, 529 D). \( \eta \) \( \κόσμων \) \( \αρμονία \), which is described in \( \xi 616 \ D \) ff., Tim. 35 B ff. and by Theo 139—147, could not serve this purpose, because it is inaudible. If we take Plato at his word, we are bound to suppose that the Music of the Spheres, though more beautiful and perfect than any audible 'harmonics,' is nevertheless inferior to that which the student of harmonics
apprehends in his mind (cf. 529 c, d with 531 c), because it is produced by the movements of visible and corporeal stars; but it is permissible to suppose that the sublime Pythagorean conception of the Universe as 'God's organ' (Censor. de die nat. 13) may have induced him to crown his προτάσσεια with the study of those numerical 'consonances' whose grandest expression in time and space is the harmony of heaven. See also on x 617 B.

The most characteristic and essential feature of the Platonic curriculum is, as I have already remarked, its method: see on 523 b, c, 528 e, 529 c, d, 530 c. Plato himself obviously claims it as new (523 a, 530 c, 530 e ff.), and there can be little doubt that the claim is just. The modern scientific reader cannot fail to be surprised and perhaps shocked by Plato's unconcealed distrust of observation and the use of the senses. In the Theory of Numbers and pure mathematics generally, this is natural and right; but what hope, he will ask, is there for Astronomy if we 'dispense with the starry heavens' (530 B)? And how can Harmonics be advanced if we prohibit all inquiry into οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουσμέναις ἀριθμοῖς (531 c)? It has, indeed, been maintained that 'the discovery of Neptune is a fulfilment of Plato's anticipations' (Bosanquet Companion p. 293), and that 'the mathematical treatment of the analysis of wave-forms (see Helmholtz, Popular Lectures, E.T. i 75) seems to be an example of research which would have been after Plato's own heart' (ib. p. 294). There is something to be said in favour of such a view; and Bosanquet and Nettleship plead their case valiantly and well. But was it possible to discover the perturbations of Uranus without observation? And even supposing they had been observed, would Plato, at the time when he wrote 530 a ff., have suspected that they were due to the influence of an unknown planet, and betaken himself to his desk? If Professor Adams' calculations had failed, Plato might have called him άτομος for thinking γίγνεσθαι τὰ ταύτα ἐις ὁσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν and seeking παντὶ πρόπω τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀτόνων λαβεῖν, although he would have emphatically approved of the algebra. The fact is that Plato and Professor Adams began at different ends—Plato with problems, Adams with observation. That which is only an orrery to the former (529 d f.) is to the latter the reality which calls for explanation. It is true, of course, that Plato makes the primary impulse to reflection come from contradictory sense-perceptions (523 a ff.), but as soon as the intellect is fairly roused, the senses are dispensed with as much as possible, because they thwart and debilitate the operations of the mind, rendering its conclusions less scientific and exact (525 d, 529 c, 531 a, 532 a). Nor does this conclusion rest on a few isolated passages, which may well be tinged with exaggeration, owing to Plato's contempt for the empiric sciolism of certain Sophists. The whole of the seventh book breathes a spirit of uncompromising hostility to the senses, and the same attitude is characteristic of many other dialogues, and, in particular, of the Phaedo (65 a—67 b).

The fact is that the Astronomy and Harmonics of the Republic are fundamentally different from the Astronomy and Harmonics of modern, as well as of ancient science. The objects which they investigate are
not sensible phenomena, but intelligible realities occupying an intermediate position between sensibles and Ideas, and resembling Ideas much more than they resemble sensibles. Plato's whole conception of these sciences is idealistic; nor need we wonder if some light from the land of Ideas irradiates the path of the pilgrim as he nears the end of his propaedeutic journey. Platonic Science, like Platonic Metaphysics, can of course be arrayed in modern attire; but it may be doubted whether Plato does not lose more than Science, or even the cause of liberal education gains, by having his philosophy called down from heaven to earth. See also Appendix III. The famous words of Goethe, which I have already quoted on 486 a, express the true spirit of Plato's teaching in Books vi and vii, and are a loftier and juster tribute to his genius than any panegyric on his contributions to the cause of science: “Er bewegt sich nach der Hölle, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuragen strebt. Was er sich im Einzelnen von irdischem Wissen zueignet, schmilzt, ja man kann sagen, verdampft in seiner Methode, in seinem Vortrag” (Farbenlehre Vol. III p. 141 Weimar 1803).

Plato's error lies in an undue extension of the method of pure mathematics to Astronomy and Harmonics: see on 529 D ff. His theory of these sciences is geometrical, and the heavens are actually compared to a mathematical diagram or orrery. It is not the visible movements of the visible heavens, but the intelligible movements of certain mathematical heavens which the pupil is to investigate. Even apart from his unquenchable idealism, we shall not find it difficult to account for Plato's attitude, if we remember the extraordinary value which he attached to Geometry (see on 526 c), and if we also accept his assurances that the astronomy and acoustics of his day were grossly empirical. It should likewise be borne in mind that his primary aim throughout the whole of this προπαδεία is to discipline the intellectual powers and prepare the student to enter on the higher dialectic, in which all employment of the senses is rigidly proscribed. The goal is never for a moment lost sight of, and to a large extent affects the method by which the preliminary studies are to be themselves pursued. If his aim had been to make his pupils merely specialists in mathematics or astronomy, he might have taught them these subjects on other lines, but the man who is a mathematical specialist and nothing more is unfitted to be a Guardian, for we cannot allow 'our children' ἄλογος ὄντας ὡσ̄τερ γραμμάς ἀρχοντα ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίου τῶν μεγάστων εἶναι (vii 534 D). Plato endeavours to treat the study of mathematics and the mathematical sciences not as an end in itself, but as a means whereby to “revolutionize the whole state of mind” of his pupils; and his vindication of the 'Arts' as the indispensable basis of a liberal training has been justified by history. Even the very name survives in the degrees which our Universities confer (see my article in Cl. Rev. xv p. 220). After Stereometry resumed its place as a department of Geometry, the four Sciences, Arithmetic, Music, Geometry and Astronomy, gradually established themselves as

1 The phrase is applied by Herbert Spencer (Education, p. 86) to the effects of mathematics as an educative discipline, provided the teacher knows how to teach.
the Quadrivium of the Middle Ages, and room was also found for a pale and ghostly shadow of Dialectic in the Trivium (see Grasberger Erzieh. u. Unterricht pp. 235—237). Finally it is clear from some notable passages in his later writings (see on 530 B) that Plato's feeling about the visible heavens underwent a change as he grew older. In the Laws the very name of 'planets' or 'wanderers' sounds blasphemous in his ear (821 c). Such a change of sentiment is characteristic of his later dialogues in general, and in the Laws, perhaps, there is an added touch of the old man's feeling 'εἰς εὐφημία χρή τελευτάν.' But Plato may also have felt that his magnificent dream of a starry firmament more beautiful and perfect than the visible sky had served its purpose in the stimulus which it had given to a more theoretical and educative interpretation of physical science within the Academy. See Cantor Gesch. d. Math. pp. 202—216.

But, when all is said and done, the abiding value of Plato's theory of Education is not affected by his misconception, if such it be, of the sciences of Astronomy and Harmonics. It may be doubted whether any writer has ever held so inspiring and profound a view of the aim and scope of education. Regarding man's reasoning faculty as the element of God within him, Plato makes it the supreme and only duty of education to foster and develop this element, not by feeding it with dull and lifeless dogma, but by emancipating it from the noxious influences which impede its growth. Nothing is admitted into his scheme except what tends to keep alive humanity's most precious heritage, the love of truth and knowledge. By nurturing and cherishing this instinct, Education, according to Plato, turns the moral as well as the intellectual nature of man from darkness to light, until he becomes 'like God as far as it is possible for man to be.' Nor is the horizon of the educator limited to this life. The soul is but a sojourner on earth, and its union with a particular body only a single episode in a life which reaches through 'both eternities.' Plato believes that the teacher can influence the pupil for hereafter as well as for life here, and that the soul which is once smitten with the love of truth may still advance from knowledge to more knowledge throughout unnumbered lives and phases of existence on earth and elsewhere. The sea of knowledge stretches wide, its waves unharvested as ever.

"Nay, come up hither......
Unto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drown'd.
Miles and miles distant though the last line be,
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond,
Still leagues beyond those leagues there is more sea."

III.

ON PLATO'S DIALECTIC.

Although Socrates professes to decline the invitation of Glauco to expound Dialectic (532 E σ.: cf. 506 E), he gives us in Books vi and vii plentiful indications of its method and content, and an editor of
the Republic is bound, I think, to face the task of reconstructing, in its general outlines, the science as it appeared to Plato when he wrote that dialogue. The literature of the subject is immense, as may be seen from the notes in Zeller's Republic. ii. pp. 614—632, pp. 643—718: cf. also Lutoslawski's Plato's Logic pp. 21—27.

It will be convenient to separate, as far as possible, the discussion of the objects of dialectical study from that of its method. Its supreme object, the Idea of the Good, is treated of in VI 504 Ε—509 Β: VI 510 Β, 511 Β, C, and VII 531 Β—534 Ε, 537 Β—540 Β are concerned chiefly with the method, although the objects are occasionally mentioned. Other passages in the Republic which throw light upon Plato's theory will be mentioned in the course of the discussion.

It is hardly necessary to say that Dialectic is concerned with the Ideas. What Plato meant by the 'Ideas,' is a question which has been, and in my opinion always will be, much debated. I have explained my general view in the note on V 476 Α; and it is only necessary to add here that the Republic, as I interpret it, nowhere indicates that the Ideas are only thoughts, whether of the divine or human mind, and lends no support whatever to any of the 'mildere Auslegungen' by means of which certain modern philosophers try to reconcile their own doctrines with those of Plato (see on x 597 Β). Each Idea, according to the Republic, is a single independent, separate, self-existing, perfect and eternal essence, forming the objective correlate of our general notion (596 Α), which may or may not, and usually does not, reproduce it with accuracy and completeness. Any milder interpretation cannot be reconciled either with Plato's language or with the evidence of Aristotle. It may be well to take as an illustration the view of Lotze. 'The truth which Plato intended to teach is no other than that which we have just been expounding, that is to say, the validity of truths as such, apart from the question whether they can be established in relation to any object in the external world, as its mode of being, or not....But the Greek language then, as afterwards, was wanting in an expression for this Validity (Gelten) as a form of Reality not including Being or Existence; and this very expression Being came, often indeed quite harmlessly, but in this instance'—viz. in the interpretation of Plato's Theory of Ideas—'with momentous consequences, to fill the place.'... "The reality of Being, indeed, they"—the Platonic Ideas—'have or have not, according as transient things of sense are clothed with them or not; but that reality which consists in Validity, which is a reality all their own, remains untouched by all this change."... "It seems incredible that the most acute of Plato's disciples, informed by personal intercourse with their master, should have misunderstood him in a point of such

1 Lutoslawski's formidable array of authorities who support the view that the Ideas are 'a kind of notions of the human mind' (i.e. 26, 27) is not always accurate, and I suspect that some of the authors whom he cites would disown the interpretation which he puts upon their works. Among others, Shorey is claimed as holding this view, although he expressly repudiates it in the treatise referred to in App. I, and also in his De Plat. idearum doctr. atque mentis humanae notionibus comment., the very treatise which Lutoslawski refers to in support of his assertion: see p. 22, n. 2: 'Opinio—ideas Platonicas meras mentis humanae notiones fuisse iamdudum explosa est.'
serious moment as this' (Logic E. T. pp. 441, 444). We may fairly
reply that it does not seem, but is, incredible that Aristotle should have
been guilty of so gross a blunder. It is far less incredible that Lotze
is himself mistaken; nor indeed can I believe that any scholar who
is capable of understanding Greek could read Books v—vii of the
Republic and still agree with Lotze. "The truth which Plato intended
to teach is no other than that which we have just been expounding."
In this we have, I think, the key to a whole school of interpreters of
Plato. "Hic liber est, in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque: Invenit et
pariter dogmata quisque sua." It is perhaps the highest tribute which
can be offered to the strength and vitality of Plato's influence that
successive generations of idealists rejoice to discover themselves anew
in him; but only by employing the methods of Procrustes can we force
Plato into the habiliments of modern philosophy. Even if it were
granted that the transcendence of the Ideas is, philosophically speaking,
absurd (see Lotze i.e. p. 440), we cannot too strongly insist that Plato's
thought is steeped in poetical and religious fervour: "Verlangen zum
Guten und Göttlichen pulsirt durch alle seine Adern" (Krohn Pl. St.
p. 191); and I confess that Plato, without transcendent Ideas to fire the
imagination and generate philosophical and even religious enthusiasm,
appears to me perhaps an eagle still, but chained. Those critics who
deny the transcendence of the Platonic ideas are compelled to discredit
the authority of Aristotle, who assures us that the Ideas were χωρισταί:
but in reality such writers resemble Aristotle far more than Plato, for
their eagerness to acquit Plato of such a 'poetical absurdity' (Lutos-
lawski Plato's Logic, p. 447) springs from the same scientific instinct
which made Aristotle attack the doctrine, as in Aristotle's day they also
would assuredly have done. Zeller's discussions, with the results of
which I in the main agree, appear to me both temperate and sound1.

It is clear that in the Republic Plato believes in the existence of an
Idea corresponding to every class or group of particulars, artificial as
well as natural. See on v 476 Λ and x 596 Α ff. If we are mainly
concerned in that dialogue with Ideas like Justice and its sister Virtues,
the sole and sufficient reason is that the Republic is an ideal city, and
the institutions of an ideal city must be regulated chiefly by ethical and
political principles: see on vi 484 c and 501 Α ff. The totality of
Ideas forms an hierarchy reaching in just and well-ordered sequence to
the Idea of the Good, of which each individual Idea must be held to
be one particular form, aspect, or determination. The hints which the
Republic furnishes as to the place of the several Ideas in this hierarchy
are enumerated in the notes on vi 510 b, 511 b. On the supremacy of
the Good, there is little to add beyond what the notes contain: see on
vi 506 e ff. The Idea of the Good transcends Knowledge and is its
source and fountain, as well as the ultimate cause of whatsoever shadow
of Truth still clings to the lower grades of intellectual apprehension
enumerated in the simile of the Line. Itself above and beyond Being,

1 In edition 4, Vol. II 1. pp. 658—679. See also Krohn Pl. St. pp. 188—192,
and Kramm De Ideis Platonis a Lotzei iudicio defensis Halae 1879. The last-named
writer appears to me to have completely refuted Lotze's interpretation of Plato's
theory of Ideas.
the Good is the author of the other Ideas, and through them of the realities which the mathematician studies: it is also the cause of that image or semblance of reality which remains in the objects comprehended under the name of υέρεις. We may therefore call the Idea of Good the 'Maker and Father of all' (cf. Tim. 28 c), and identify it, in this aspect, as in others, with the supreme God (505 A n.). Its relation to the Universe of Mind and the objects which are apprehended by mind may be expressed by the following diagram, in which the lines $A'B'$ and $AB$ are divided according to the proportions of the simile of the Line:

![Diagram of the good and its relation to the universe of mind and objects apprehended by mind.](image)
A further and perhaps still more significant presentation of the Good in the Republic is as the true and ultimate object of all creation—the of ἔρετα of the whole universe and every part thereof, and consequently at once the regulating law of everything which exists, so far as it exists, both organic and inorganic, and the πρῶτον φίλον for which the whole of Nature, with greater or less degree of consciousness, for ever yearns and strives. See on vi 505 D f. It is, I think, scarcely more than half the truth to say that the Idea of Good, "means, when stripped of its poetic vesture, a rational consistent conception of the greatest possible attainable human happiness, of the ultimate laws of God, nature or man that sanction conduct, and of the consistent application of those laws in legislation, government and education" (Shorey On the Idea of Good etc. p. 239). Man is not the whole of creation, though its highest product; and the Good is the final as well as the efficient cause, not only of human institutions, but also of the rest of nature—the ἀρχή ἀφ᾽ ἃς ἦρηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις (cf. Arist. Met. Α 7. 1072b 14). The reason why in the Republic Plato deals, not indeed by any means exclusively, but chiefly perhaps, with the bearings of the Good on human life and interests, is because that aspect of the Idea is more relevant than any other for the founder of a city. In the Timaeus Plato completes his account of the Good by tracing its operation in the works of Nature. It helps us to understand the many-sidedness of Plato's conception if we remember that 'good' was a term of wide application among the Greeks in general, and that the Socratic school in particular regarded things as good in proportion as they fulfilled their proper office in the economy of Nature and Society. See i 353 A—E, v 457 B and the suggestive remarks of Nettleship Lectures and Remains ii pp. 221—225.

There remains the further question: How does the Supreme Cause operate in the Universe? or in other words, What is the mode or kind of relationship existing between the Idea of Good and the particular of which it is the cause? The subject is full of difficulties, and it must be premised at the outset that the relation between the eternal and self-existent and the derivative and transient cannot be otherwise expressed than by a metaphor. Cf. A. E. Taylor in Mind N. S. v pp. 309 f. But we are none the less bound to examine the metaphors employed in describing the connexion if we would see how the relationship was figured by Plato in his own mind. If we follow the indications furnished in our dialogue, we may suppose that Plato, when he wrote the Republic, conceived of the matter somewhat in the following way. The Idea of Good is the principle from which the other Ideas derive their existence (vi 509 B ff. nn.), and may therefore be regarded as the ultimate cause of everything which they in their turn produce. The immediate cause accounting for the existence of a particular is the 'presence' (παρωσία) of an Idea. Thus for example the cause which enables us to say that Socrates is a just and pious man is the 'presence' in Socrates of the Ideas of Justice, Piety, and Man. The Ideas are therefore the immanent causes of particulars, each of which is the meeting-ground of as many Ideas as there are predicables rightfully belonging to it. Thus much may be
inferred from Republic v 476 A ff., not to mention other dialogues; but the difficulties attending such a theory of Causation, if it is strictly inter-
preted, are great and numerous, and in particular the immanence of the Idea
can hardly be reconciled with their self-existence and unity. Plato
was well aware of this objection, at all events when he wrote the
Parmenides¹ (see Parm. 130 E—132 B, and Waddell’s edition of that
dialogue pp. xliii f. and lxix), but in the Republic, whether because he had
not yet realised the difficulty, or because he was occupied with other
and more fruitful topics, he ignores it altogether. The more poetical
and figurative conception of the Idea as a παράδειγμα, whereof the
particular is an image or likeness or shadow, visible beauty, for example,
being only, in the words of Shelley, the “shadow of Beauty unbeheld,” is
also found in the Republic, as in other dialogues, side by side with the
doctrine of παρονωία, μέθεσις, or καμώνωία. See on V 476 D and A. E.
Taylor in Mind l.c. pp. 308—311. This view, like the other, is by no
means free from philosophical difficulties, as has been pointed out by,
among others, Waddell l.c. pp. li f., and Taylor l.c. pp. 307, 312, but the
paradigmatic relation of the Idea to the particular is more in keeping
with the Platonism of Books vi and vii than the theory of participation,
and it is the form in which the relationship presented itself to Plato in
the last of his great metaphysical dialogues, the Timaeus. Finally,
itis should be remarked that in applying his doctrine of causation to sensible
or concrete numbers and numerical relations, concrete mathematical
figures and the like, Plato introduced a fresh link between the Idea and
the particular in the shape of τά μαθηματικά. See on this subject

I pass now to the subject of dialectical method, as expounded in the
Republic. Formally considered, it proceeds, like the Socratic cross-
examination, by question and answer (534 D). Dialectic is above all
things synoptical, striving everywhere to see the one in the many (531 D,
537 B, c). Hence the coordination of the Sciences is a good preparation
for the higher study (ll. cc.; cf. also Zeller¹ ii 1. p. 616 n. 1). This
synoptical faculty is akin to the συναγωγή of the Phaedrus and other
dialogues (see on 537 c), although the word συναγωγή does not occur
with this meaning in the Republic. But whereas the dialectic of the
Phaedrus includes the combination of particular sense-perceptions εἰς ἐν
λογισμῷ ἐνυπαρχόμενον (249 B, cf. 265 D), that of the Republic aims at
combining different Ideas under yet higher and higher Ideas, and all of them
finally under the Idea of the Good. Cf. [Archytas] in Mullach
Frag. Phil. Gr. i p. 599 ὅστις ὁν ἀναλύσει οἶδ᾽ εἶναί πάντα τὰ γένεα ὑπὸ
μιᾶν τε καὶ τὰν αὐτὰν ἀρχάν, καὶ τὰλιν συνθεινά τε καὶ συναρμολογοῦσαι,
ὅστος δοκεῖ μοι καὶ σοφότατος ἦμεν καὶ παναλαβότατος, ἔτι δὲ καλὰν
σκοπίαν εὑρίσκειν, ἀφ᾽ ὧν δυνατός ἐσεῖται τὸν θεόν κατοψεῖται καὶ πάντα
τὰ ἐν τῇ συνοικεῖᾳ καὶ τάξει τὰ ἐκεῖνω κατακεχυρισμένα, καὶ ταύταν
τὰν ἀρματίλατον ὑὸν ἐκπορισμένοι τῷ νόῳ καὶ εὑρεῖαν ὀρμαθήμεν καὶ

¹ I assume that the theory of Ideas which the Platonic Parmenides criticises is that
which appears in the Republic and the Phaedo. The resemblance is so exact that I
cannot see how we can escape from this assumption. Cf. Jackson in J. of Ph. xi
p. 296. A different view is maintained by Taylor l.c. p. 317.
teleodromâsai tâs áρχâs toîs pérasî svnâqas te kai èpigynous, òti ò theûs
árchâ te kai télos kai mûsôn èvtî páutov tów katá dîkan te kai tôn órðon
lógon peranumênov. Neither in his ascent nor in his descent does the
dialectician have anything to do with sense-perception, or 'particulars'
in the ordinary acceptance of the term (511 B f.). It is clear therefore,
as Oldenberg has pointed out1, that the dialectic of Books vi and
vii is a higher dialectic, to be compared in some respects with the
intellectual discipline recommended in the Parmenides (135 C—136 E,
especially 135 E ón en eîas én toîs drwmméíov òîðë peri tàuta tîn plâvyn
éptwkoûn, allâ peri èkêna â máliata tîs ân ëwv ëisbîoi kai èidî
âv ëgîktato eînai). In taking this view I do not mean to deny that
dialectic in the Phaedrus embraces the higher as well as the lower
branches of the study; but in the stricter dialectic of vi 510 B—511 B
the lower variety is expressly excluded. Of diaîreîs the Republic says
comparatively little. There is a casual reference to the process in
v 454 A, and it is of course represented in an idealized form by the
descent of the dialectician from the Idea of the Good (511 B c:
cf. 534 B n.). But the full development of this side of Dialectic belongs
to a later period of Plato's life, if, as is now widely believed, the
Sophist and Politics are later than the Republic. It should also be
remarked that definition, which belongs to Dialectic (534 D) and depends
on grasping the Essence of the object to be defined (533 B, 534 B:
cf. 531 E), involves diaîreîs in a certain sense as well as svnâqygrî.

We have still to discuss the most serious difficulty in Plato's descrip-
tion of the dialectician's progress, viz. the ascent eîs ùpôthèsews ép' árkhîn
ánuptôstov (510 B, 511 B, 533 C). Socrates gives no precise explanation of
this part of the subject, although it is not, in my opinion, this particular
difficulty which makes him say that Glauco will be unable to follow him
any farther (532 E).

The principal passages in other dialogues which appear to throw
light on Plato's meaning are Men. 86 E ff. and Phaed. 100 A ff. In
the Meno Socrates proposes eîs ùpôthèsews skopêtâbai èîte dîdaktoûn
èstîn (sc. è ãrêthî) èêre ùpôsoûn, and proceeds as follows. We will, he
says, assume (ùpêtînêsthâi) that Virtue is Knowledge, and see what
follows. On this assumption Meno at once admits that Virtue is
teachable. Thereupon Socrates says we must examine his original
ùpôtêrês of Virtue, viz. that Virtue is Knowledge, and begins the
examination by propounding a fresh ùpôtêrês, viz. that Virtue is good.
From this second ùpôtêrês he arrives by a series of steps at the conclu-
sion that Virtue is Knowledge and thus proves that Virtue can be
taught. We may compare Aristotle's svlllogymòs eîs ùpôtêsews, on which see
Wallace Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle pp. 41 f., and Waitz

1 De Plat. arte dialectica (1873) p. 48. Łutowslawski must himself have read this
work very superficially before he could have described it as "very superficial" (Plato's
Logic p. 21 n. 58). The judgment of Peipers, though he frequently disagrees with
Oldenberg, is very different: "quae Herm. Oldenberg egregie disputat in com-
mentatione de Platonis arte dialectica." (Ontol. Plat. p. 402 n.). So also is that of
Zeller11 l. pp. 619, 620 n. et al. I am far from accepting the whole of Olden-
berg's results, but his treatise is anything but superficial, and a large part of it is in
my judgment true and admirable.
This method is parallel to that described in Book vi in so far as the original ὑπόθεσις is not left ἀκίνητος (533 c), but itself deduced from something higher. It is not parallel in so far as this 'higher something' is itself only a ὑπόθεσις and not an ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετος. Much the same is true of the well-known passage in the Phaedo. That which Socrates ὑποτίθεσαι is his conception or definition of αἵρεσις as the presence of the Idea in the particular thing making it what it is (100 b, c). From this he deduces the immortality of the Soul. So far, I agree, in the main, with Jackson (J. of Ph. x p. 149) and Archer-Hind that the διάφορον πλοῦς of the Phaedo follows the same method as the διάνοια of Book vi, although, as already stated in Appendix I, διάνοια in the Republic is, I believe, occupied with τὰ μαθηματικά alone. But when in τοῖς, E Plato writes ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δεόν σε διδόναι λόγον, ὑστάτως ἂν διδοῦσί, ἄλλην αὐ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἤτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη σφαίρα, οὐς ἐπὶ τὶ ικανὸν ἔλθαι, he has in mind a possible defence of the original ὑπόθεσις by deducing it, as in the Meno, from some ὑπόθεσις still higher, and the διάνοια of the Republic, quâ διάνοια, never defends its ὑποθέσεις at all (510 c, 533 c), not even by any other hypothesis. There is also in 107 b an express direction to examine the ὑποθέσεις themselves: τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὦν εἰσίν, ὡς ἐπισκέπτεσθαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτῶς ἰκανώς διήλθη, ὡς ἐξείπου, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὁσον ὑπάρχουσι μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπων ἐπακολουθήσατε· καὶ τούτο αὐτὸ σαφές γένηται, οὐδὲν διήλθησε περαιτέρω. These two passages of the Phaedo therefore resemble the dialectic of the Republic inasmuch as they contemplate and prescribe an examination of the ὑποθέσεις with which we start. In the first, however, no hope is held out of ever rising above ὑποθέσεις, for ἰκανὸν τι is not the unhypothetical Idea, although it may very well happen in any given case to be a ὑπόθεσις, of Good. The exhortation in 107 b is different, and seems to hint at something like the dialectic of vi and vii, for the original ὑποθέσεις cannot be satisfactorily proved (καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται) except by connecting them with the Idea of Good, and this involves an exhaustive survey of the whole field of νοητά such as Plato sketches in the end of Book VI.

It appears, therefore, that the ὑποθέσεις of Dialectic are not, like those of Mathematics, immovable and fixed, and that we may be called upon to render an account of them, nay more, that it is our duty to submit them to examination ourselves. To this extent the Meno and Phaedo, taken together, are in agreement with the Republic on the nature of Dialectic. But by what means is the dialectician to scrutinize his ὑποθέσεις? In what way is he to ascend from ὑποθέσεις to the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή? The passages in the Republic which help us to answer these questions are vi 511 b τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιοῖσιν οὐκ ἄρχας, ἀλλὰ τῷ οἷς ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάλεις τε καὶ ὁρμᾶς, vii 533 c ἦ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταῦτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναπροσέα, ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν βεβαιώσηται, and 534 b, c ὅτι ἡ μῆ ἢ ἐπιβάλεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ λόγῳ τὴν τῶν ἄγαθον ἰδέαν, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τῷ μαχητικῷ παῖς ἔλεγχον διεξεῖται ἡ μῆ κατὰ οὗτον ἀλλὰ κατ' οὗτον προθυμοῦμαι ἔλεγχειν, ἐν τῷ τούτου ἀποτείχτῳ τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύεται, οὕτω
The key to the solution of the difficulty is furnished by the words υποθέσεις ἀναροῦσα 533 c, and διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξίων 534 c. In my notes on these two phrases I have tried to indicate the general character of the dialectician’s ascent εἰς υποθέσεως εἰς ἀρχήν αὐνόποθεν. He begins by offering a υποθέσις on the subject to be discussed, and then proceeds to test his υποθέσις by the conclusions to which it leads. If these conclusions are untenable, the original υποθέσις is cancelled or annulled (ἀπαρέσται), and a new suggestion takes its place, only to suffer the same fate. The process is repeated again and again, until at last we reach an ἀρχή which will withstand every test (ὡσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξίων κτλ. 534 c). Thus each successive υποθέσις serves as an additional step in the stair by which we ascend, and is useful to the dialectician just because he is willing to leave it and mount higher. Cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, i pp. 303—306, where the scientific value and importance of this method is very clearly explained. In the completed Dialectic which Plato adumbrates in Books vi and vii, we are invited to suppose that the whole kingdom of knowables, in the spheres alike of Nature and of Man, has been surveyed and mapped out by this method, of which the intellectual γνωσία of the Parmenides is a kind of example on a lower plane. The result is a number of true and irrefragable ἀρχαί, apprehended not only in their mutual coherence and interdependence, but also in their relationship to the supreme Idea, which is itself, when we have climbed to the summit, no longer a υποθέσις, but an ἀρχή αὐνόποθεν, because the exhaustive scrutiny of all νοστά has demonstrated that the Universe of thought and things is in reality nothing but the expression or embodiment of the Good. See on vi 510 b. If it be urged against Plato that we have no right to assert that the Universe and all its
The progress of human knowledge from generation to generation will help to demonstrate the supremacy of the Good, of which, by virtue of the δεινον τι εν ημῶν, we are already well assured.

The later stages in the dialectician's journey belong to an ideal which human investigation can hardly hope to reach (vi 511 b 4.), but, as I have hinted on 533 c, the general character of his progress may be illustrated from many Platonic dialogues. In the Laches, for example, we have several υποθέσεις of courage, each of which is treated as a stepping-stone—οἱον ἐπιστάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμῇ—on the way to a better and truer conception of the virtue. The first definition given by Laches, that courage is καρτερία τις ψυχῆς, Socrates attacks with the elenchus and overthrows (192 c, d), but a new and better υποθέσις rises on its ruins, viz. that courage is φρόνιμος καρτερία ψυχῆς (192 d). A further application of the Socratic weapon shews that this υποθέσις must also be revised (192 e—193 d), and Nicias suggests a third, defining courage as τὸν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν (195 a). In the sequel, this definition is widened into ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμη (199 c), whereby courage becomes, no longer a specific part of virtue, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή (199 e), and the unity of virtue is affirmed. The final definition is not refuted on its merits, although Socrates declares it to be inconsistent with the position already assigned to courage as one of the parts of virtue. It will be observed that each υποθέσις owes something to its predecessor, that in the progress of the argument courage is brought into connexion with other υποθέσεις, such as τὸ δεινὸν and τὸ θαρραλέον, and that the last υποθέσις is wider and more comprehensive than any which has preceded. A cursory glance at the course of the argument in the Charmides and Euthyphro will provide many illustrations of the process which Plato calls τὸ ἀνώφειν τὸς υποθέσεις, and a more careful analysis will reveal a gradual advance in both dialogues from the accidental and superficial to the essential and profound. See for the Euthyphro my edition of that dialogue pp. vii—xxii. These distinguishing characteristics of Plato's method are easiest to trace in his simpler and less elaborate dialogues, but nearly all his writings shew analogous features, and the Republic is itself a conspicuous example of the same method. It is not too much to say that the true unity of the Republic, as of many other dialogues of Plato, consists in a continuous ascent from stage to stage, each successive elevation not only revealing new and wider prospects, but also enabling us to modify, correct and enlarge our apprehension of that which we have seen before.
It lies beyond the scope of this Appendix to discuss the origin of Plato's dialectical method, and I must here content myself with saying that although it owes not a little to the Eleatics, still more to Socrates, and something perhaps to geometrical analysis, which Plato is said to have invented (see Hardie in Mind N.S. v p. 180), the full development of the method must be ascribed to Plato himself. Rightly understood and practised, the method is extraordinarily valuable and fruitful, not merely for purposes of education, but as a weapon of scientific discovery. Every teacher who is worthy of the name employs it to kindle and feed the love of knowledge in his pupils. It is the method which an editor of necessity adopts in endeavouring to explain and expound the text of an ancient writer. The conjectural emendations and interpretations by which his pathway is beset are all of them ὑποθέσεις of more or less value, and the very process of testing and rejecting these ὑποθέσεις frequently brings to light the true interpretation. An editor, in short, ἀναρέτις ὑποθέσεις, ἐπὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἄρχην πορευόμενος, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, and ought not to rest content until διὰ πάντων ἡλέχυων διεξόν—ἀπτώτε ἥλιον διαπορεύσηται (534 c). And that which takes place on a small scale in the exposition of an ancient text is reproduced on a larger scale in the history of investigation and discovery not only in the humanities, but also in natural science. Speaking of the part played by hypotheses in the progress of scientific discovery, Professor Kucker in his Presidential Address at the British Association, 1901, remarks: “The wraiths of phlogiston, caloric, lumniferous corpuscles, and a crowd of other phantoms haunt the investigator, and as the grim host vanishes into nothingness he cannot but wonder if his own conceptions of atoms and of the ether

'shall dissolve
And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind.'

But though science, like Bunyan's hero, has sometimes to pass through the 'Valley of Humiliation,' the spectres which meet it there are not really dangerous if they are boldly faced. The fact that mistakes have been made, that theories have been propounded and for a time accepted, which later investigations have disproved, does not necessarily discredit the method adopted. For scientific theories, as in the world around us, there is a survival of the fittest, and Dr James Ward's unsympathetic account of the blunders of those whose work, after all, has shed glory on the 19th century, might, mutatis mutandis, stand for a description of the history of civilisation. "The story of the progress so far," he tells us, "is briefly this—divergence between theory and fact one part of the way, the wreckage of abandoned fictions for the rest, with an unattainable goal of phenomenal nihilism, and ultra-physical mechanism beyond" (James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. i p. 154). "The path of progress," says Professor Karl Pearson, "is strewn with the wreck of nations. Traces are everywhere to be seen of the hecatombs of inferior races, and of victims who found not the narrow way to the greater perfection. Yet these dead peoples are, in very truth, the stepping-stones on which mankind has arisen to the
higher intellectual and deeper emotional life of to-day” (Karl Pearson, *National Life from the Standpoint of Science*, p. 62). When hypotheses are mistaken for established and unquestionable truths, the love of knowledge gives place to the love of dogma, and progress is arrested. In Plato’s way of thinking, the path of knowledge is and must be paved out of the ruins of generalisations, if we are to tread firmly on the road to

“That untravelled world whose margin fades
For ever and for ever as we move.”

IV.

VII 515 b. *el oun dialeugewhui oioi 7 eieiv p[pros] alllhous, ou 7a[utai ]7gyei an 7a parovta autous nomuleiv onomaciv, 7aper orfwei;*

*tautâ* appears for *tautâ* in Λ and some other Mss. Instead of *pârówna*, all the Mss except Flor. Τ have *pârôvnâ*, while Iamblichus (*Protrep. 15*) and Proclus (*in remp. 1 p. 293 Kroll*) appear to have read *ôntâ*.

The following are the principal solutions which have been proposed.

(1) With *tautâ*—*tâ parovntâ*. “Hoc rogat Socrates—an haec, quae viderent, tamquam res praesentes, non tamquam umbras appellare, de praesentibus, non de absentibus loqui sese opinaturi essent?” (Schneider).

“Do you not suppose that they would believe that they were naming those things that they actually saw before them?” (J. and C.). This interpretation separates *tautâ* from *tâ parovntâ*, and makes the whole force of *tâ parovntâ* depend upon its antithesis (‘*non de absentibus*’), which is not expressed, and difficult to supply. Other objections are urged by Vermehren *Plat. Stud.* p. 105. Prantl (after Schleiermacher) takes *nomuleiv* as “für üblich halten” (cf. *Laws 637 e*), translating “glaubst du nicht, dass sie es für üblich halten würden, eben die je anwesenden Dinge, welche sie sehen, mit Namen zu nennen?” (So also D. and V.) Prantl’s view has been demolished by Schneider: “non hoc rogat Socrates, an nomina umbris imponenda existimatur aut re vera imposituri essent, quippe quod citra errorem facere eis liceret.” The progress of the argument, as well as the close parallelism with the next sentence, makes it clear that the prisoners *are* in error. The same criticism applies to the view of Ast, who reads *tautâ*—*tâ parovntâ*, and translates “Nonne censes eos res praeterlatas arbitratus esse nominandas quas viderent?”

(2) With *tautâ*—*tâ parovntâ* (Hermann, Stallbaum). Stallbaum translates “*nonne putas eas res, quae praeterveherentur, iisdem nominibus atque quae viderent nominare solituros esse*”, explaining *tautâ* (predicative after *onomaciv*) *âper orfweiv* as equivalent to *tautâ* *touvois âper orfweiv*. “Sententia igitur haec est: vincitos illos nonne putas nomina rerum, quas conspicerent (conspicere sibi viderentur) ad umbras illarum praeterentes esse de more translaturos?” But what objects at all except shadows can the prisoners see?
(3) Emendations. (a) Cobet (Mnem. xi p. 173 and V. L.2 p. 531) proposes οὐ ταῦτα ὑγεία ἄν—τὰ παρῳδία νομίζειν [ὁνομάζειν] ἀπερ ὄρφεν. The word ὄνομαζειν is rejected also by Baiter, who further changes οὐ ταῦτα to οὐκ αὐτά, following Vermehren and Madvig: see below. Neither of these criticisms appears to have noticed that εἰ οὐν διαλέγεσθαι οὐδ' τε ἔλευ becomes altogether superfluous if ὄνομαζειν is omitted. For this reason Richards’ insertion of καὶ between νομίζειν and ὄνομαζειν (Cl. Rev. viii p. 192) is preferable to the suggestion of Cobet. (b) Vermehren, in an elaborate and careful examination of the passage (Plat. Stud. pp. 193 —196), argues that the sense required by the context is “dass die Höhlenbewohner die vorüberziehenden Schatten für die Gegenstände selbst nehmen und sie demgemäß benennen würden, gerade wie sie die vernommenen Töne vermöge des Widerhalls den Schattenbildern, nicht aber den sie erzeugenden Originalen zuschreiben würden.” He therefore conjectures οὐκ αὐτά—τὰ παρῳδία κτλ. “glaubst du nicht, dass sie in ihrer Lage die vorüberziehenden Gegenstände selbst zu benennen meinen würden, die sie—ihrer Meinung nach—sähen?” According to this view, τὰ παρῳδία denotes the real παραφερόμενα: but how could the prisoners suppose themselves to be naming the real παραφερόμενα, of which, ex hypothesi, they know nothing whatever?

The interpretation given in the notes appears to me to give the sense required, without attributing to the prisoners any knowledge from which their situation excludes them. I have not seen it anywhere in print, but I am glad to say that Dr Jackson writes as follows: “So I have long taken this passage. I copy my old note. ‘Read ταῦτα, retain ὄνομαζειν, and translate: Don’t you think they would suppose the names which they used to belong to the passing objects which they saw before their eyes?’”

V.

VII 519 A, B. τοῦτο μέντοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ ταῦτα εὖθες κοπτόμενον περιεκόπτῃ τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἡγγυγεινες ὡσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δ' ἐνδωδαὶς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἱδόναις τε καὶ λειξεῖαις προσφυνεῖς γεγονόμεναι περικάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν.

This passage has been strangely misunderstood by many editors and critics.

gενέσεως is taken as ‘birth’ by (among others) Schneider, Stallbaum, Jowett (‘attached to them at their birth’—an impossible construction), although the correct translation (which has recently been reaffirmed by Seymour in Cl. Rev. x p. 325) was already given by Schleiermacher and afterwards by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 161). Others, such as Schneider and D. and V., make the weights adhere to the pleasures of eating etc. It is, however, obvious that they must adhere to that from which they are to be knocked off (περιεκόπτῃ), and it is τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως from which they have to be removed (κοπτόμενον περιεκόπτῃ). Moreover x 611 e.—612 A, quoted in the notes, conclusively disproves this view.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VII.

As regards the text, τὰ τῆς γενέσεως ἐννυχεῖται is read by many editors on the authority of some inferior mss. To me the neuter appears a manifest ‘correction,’ and far less elegant and expressive than the feminine, which has the support (among other mss) of A, Π and q. See also on III 401 c. It is strictly true, according to Plato, that theelden weights of appetite and self-indulgence are ‘kindred with,’ ‘of the family of’ γενέσεις (see especially, in addition to the evidence adduced in the note, IX 585 b—586 b), so that the adjective ought to agree with μοιραῖες.

Instead of the περὶ κατώ of the best mss, Hermann, who is followed by Burnet, reads κατώ, adopting a suggestion of Schneider’s. Schneider himself, with Stallbaum and other editors, chose the reading of q (περὶ τὰ κάτω), which is unexceptionable in point of sense, and which I also once thought right. Longer reflection has however convinced me that Madvig is right in restoring περικάτω. The strongest evidence (other than that of the best mss) in its support is furnished by Photius (see note) and Plutarch. The latter certainly read περικάτω or περὶ κάτω (the reading of A): see de fac. quae in orb. lun. app. 943 D ἐνίας δὲ (sc. ψυχᾶς) καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ περὶ κατω τρεπομεῖται (v.l. τρεπομένας) δόν εἰς βεβοῦν αὐθίς ὀρθοὶ καταγγομέναι, an obvious imitation of this passage of Plato. J. and C. object that περικάτω could only mean ‘upside down.’ Such a translation is of course ridiculous here, but it does in point of fact accurately represent the situation. The eye of the soul, according to Plato in this passage, naturally looks up; so that when forced to look down, it is itself, strictly speaking, turned ‘upside down.’ The fact is that περικάτω στρέφειν (τρέσειν) simply means ‘turn round downwards,’ and the translation ‘upside down’ is suitable only when it is applied to goblets (as in Strattis ap. Ath. xi 467 ε) and similar objects which can themselves be said to have an ‘up’ and ‘down,’ or perhaps in cases like Lucian Adv. ind. 1 (where Cobet restores περικάτω). The word is discussed by Madvig Adv. Gr. i p. 27 and by Cobet Mm. N.S. xi p. 174 and V. L.ª p. 90. It is doubtless better (with Photius) to write περικάτω as one word, than (with A, Π, etc.) as two. The analogy of ὑποκάτω, ἐπάνω, ὑπεράνω etc. favours this accentuation: cf. Lobeck Phryn. p. 48. For other instances of prepositions combined with adverbs see Kühner-Gerth Gr. Gr. ii 1, pp. 538—540.

VI.

VII 521 c. τούτο δή, ὡς ἕοικεν, οὐκ ὅστρακον ἄν εἰς περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγῆ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὅντος ὦσαν ἐπάνω, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφικὰν ἀληθῆ φύσιμον εἶναι.

The proverb ὅστρακον περιστροφή was variously explained by the ancients as (1) ἐπὶ τῶν ταχύως τι ποιοῦντων: (2) ἐπὶ τῶν εὐμεταβόλων: (3) ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ κρειττών εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβαλλόντων: (4) ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδρῶν καὶ ἀνεκλίπτων ὑφισταμένων: (5) ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τάχος εἰς φυγήν ὀρμώντων or the like (Schol. l.c. and on ὅστρακον μεταπεσόντος in Phaedr. 241 β). See Leutsch und Schneidewin Parosm. Gr. i p. 285 f., II p. 84.
The last of these explanations touches on an essential feature of the game, which was itself also (according to Pollux ix 112 and the Scholiast on this sentence of the Republic) called ὀστράκον περιστροφή, but does not fully elucidate the meaning of the phrase when it is used as a proverb. None of the ancient interpretations is exactly suited to the present passage, and it is clear from their number and diversity that the phrase was not clearly understood. As the proverb is believed to have originated with Plato (Leutsch und Schneidewin i.c. p. 285 n.), we are bound to interpret it as the context requires, and Schleiermacher's solution appears to me to come nearest to the truth: "hier ist mehr zu denken theils an die Flüchtlung, mit welcher solche Spiele überhaupt behandelt werden, theils an die Zufälligkeit, mit welcher die Scherbe auf diese oder jene Seite zu fallen scheint" (Translation of the Republic p. 577 n. 372). This view combines the first and second explanations, and is in no way invalidated by the criticisms of Schück (de Schol. ad Pl. civ. pertinentibus p. 31). Plato is perhaps aiming a taunt at the educational theory and practice of contemporary sophists (cf. 518 B n.).

The details of the game itself have been often discussed, and are now tolerably clear. See (besides Grasberger quoted in the notes) Blümmer Privatallt. p. 298 and Förster in Rh. Mus. 1875, pp. 287 ff. The latter was, I believe, the first to point out the allusion in νυκτερινής τοιος ημέρας to 'νυξ ἡμέρας.'

I think that the placing of a comma after ἀληθινήν restores sense to the latter part of the passage. The reading in the text has the support of A, Π, and a great majority of mss; and the comparison with 517 C seems to me conclusive in favour of the view taken in the notes. Hermann and others have pointed out that ἡμέραν should be supplied with ἀληθινήν, but those who take this view have hitherto (with, so far as I know, the single exception of Jackson) connected τοῦ ὀτροῦ with ἀληθινήν (ἡμέραν). It was perhaps on this ground that Schneider peremptorily declined to admit such an explanation. In any case the emphatic opposition between νυκτερινής and ἀληθινήν invites us to supply ἡμέραν, and the transition from the metaphor to its interpretation would be too abrupt if ἀληθινήν were connected with ἐπάνωδον. ὀὔσαν is a further difficulty on this view; and Ξ accordingly omitted the word, while χ boldly changes it to ἑώσης. Schneider, with whom J. and C. are inclined to agree, joins ἀληθινήν with ἐπάνωδον, and argues that ὀὔσαν is added partly on account of ὀτρος, but more 'ad augendam veritatis significationem.' But, as J. and C. remark, ὀὔσαν still drags, "and ἐπάνωδον gives a feeble antithesis to ἡμέρας." The passage from the Laws (728 b) which Schneider quotes in support of his interpretation is not parallel.

Of emendations there has been no lack. ἑώσης is adopted by Stephanus, Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum, the last of whom construes ἑώσης ἐπάνωδον by 'adscendentis' and supplies ἡμέραν with ἀληθινήν, as Schleiermacher also did. This yields a better sense than the old view, which connected ἀληθινήν with ἐπάνωδον, but is harsh in point of syntax, and ἑώσης has been demolished on its own merits by Schneider. Hermann read ὀὔσα ἐπάνωδος, quoting Iamblichus in Villoison's Anecd. II p.
194, where οὕσα ἐπάνοδον (not ἐπάνοδος, as J. and C. assert) is found. But the περαιμογή ψυχῆς is not itself the ἐπάνοδος, and οὕσα ἐπάνοδος drags unpleasantly.

Cobet’s emendation, which is partially adopted by Baiter, changes οὕσαν to οὕσαν, inserts καὶ before ἐκ νυκτερῆς, and reads ἐπάνοδος for ἐπάνοδον. But, apart from other objections, τοῦ ὄντος οὕσαν, in spite of Soph. 262 c, is extremely unpleasing. Jowett and Campbell’s otherwise excellent note appears to me fatal to their own as well as to every other solution proposed before they wrote, and overthrows all the emendations except ἄγονα for οὕσαν, which I suggested in 1897. I take this opportunity of withdrawing so hasty a proposal, and restoring the text of the best mss, which I am glad to say that Jackson also defended when in a letter to me some years ago he remarked “I have been in the habit of putting a comma after ἀληθινῆ, and otherwise keeping the reading of Α.”

VII.

VII 527 d. τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν οὐ πάνω φαίλοι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶν πιστεύειν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστος ὄργανος τοῖς ψυχής ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλυόμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρείττον ὅν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὄμματών· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὀρᾶται.

This eloquent sentence was deservedly famous in antiquity, and is constantly quoted or alluded to by many authors: see the references in Ast, Schneider, Wex (Fleek. Jb. 1864 p. 381), and Hiller (on Theo Smyrn. 3).

An attempt has been made by Cobet (Mнем. xi p. 177) to remodel the text in accordance with Theo’s citation, which is as follows: τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν οὐ πάνω φαίλοι, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι χαλεπῶν πιστεύειν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστος οὖν ὄργανος τὸ ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ὀμμα τυφλούμενον καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρείττον ὅν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὄμματών· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὀρᾶται (ed. Hiller p. 3).

Wex (l.c. 1863 pp. 692 ff.) had maintained, strangely enough, that ὄργανον ψυχῆς would mean something bodily, e.g. the bodily eye; and Cobet accordingly adopts Theo’s version ὄργανος—ὀμμα. Neither of these critics appears to have remembered ταυτήν τήν ἐνούσαν ἐκάστον δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ὃ καταμαθάνει ἐκατόρτος in 518 c, a passage to which, as ἐκάστον shews, this sentence expressly refers. ὄργανον ψυχῆς was also, as Wex admits, the reading of Plutarch (Conv. Disp. vii 718 ε.). ἀποσβεννύμενον, which Cobet substitutes for ἀπολλυόμενον, is in itself good, and may point to an early variant, but ἀπολλυόμενον is supported by the evidence of Plutarch (l.c.) and Alcinous (Isgag. c. 27).

Nothing could be a more instructive lesson on the almost utter worthlessness of early citations of Plato for determining the text of the Republic than to compare A’s readings in this passage with its reproduction by Theo and Nicomachus (Intr. Ar. i 3. 7). Even the meanest and most corrupt of our mss is, from the literary point of view, superior; and there is not in these citations a single variant to which any of our mss here lends support.
VIII.

VII 528 c. ἵπτε καὶ ἤν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολονύμεα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἔτοιμων, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοντο καθ’ ὑ τι χρῆσιμα, ἀμοὶ πρὸς ἀπαίτα ταῦτα βία ὑπὸ χάριτοι αἰτεῖται.

I have returned in this edition to the reading of the best MSS, which is kept also by Schneider, Hermann, Stallbaum, and J. and C.

The explanation in the notes appears to me required by the grammatical construction, as well as suitable in point of meaning if we remember that the mode in which stereometricians ‘dishonour’ their subject has already been explained. The Many dishonour Stereometry negatively, ὅτι οὐδεὶς πόλις ἐντύμως οὐτά ἔχει, and thereby negatively clip or curtail the study, for until it receives public support, it will not attain to its natural and proper growth. The students of stereometry dishonour and curtail their study positively by prosecuting it feebly and in a slight degree, because they do not know its real utility, and (as was said before) have no public encouragement to support them in so difficult a subject. The omission of μὲν before τῶν πολλῶν was apparently a stumbling-block, for it is replaced in Ξ and some other MSS of second-rate authority. See however i 340 D n. If ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν were read, we should, I think, expect another passive participle to be present in the balancing clause. As it is, δὲ merely marks the formal contrast between οἱ πολλοὶ and οἱ ἔτοιμοι.

Schneider understands ἔτοιμα or the like after χρήσιμα, and takes ὑπὸ τῶν ἔτοιμων with αἰτεῖται. This explanation is too tortuous, nor is ὑπὸ accounted for by calling it “quasi primitiae orationis monumentum.” Stallbaum’s solution is in principle the same as Schneider’s. According to the Oxford editors, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἔτοιμων “may depend on some general idea of disadvantage, e.g. κολονύμεα understood from the previous clause.” The zeugma is however difficult, and ἀτιμαζόμεα καὶ κολονύμεα are just as true of the ἔτοιμα as of the πολλοὶ.

The following emendations have been proposed. (1) ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολονύμεα ὑπὸ τῶν ἔτοιμων (‘dishonoured by the many and curtailed by students’). I formerly accepted this change, which is due to Voegelin, and has the support of Madvig and Baiter. The sense is excellent, but the intrusion of δὲ into all the MSS is very difficult to account for satisfactorily. (2) ὑπὸ—κολονύμεα, τῶν δὲ ἔτοιμων κτλ. (Cobet). This correction, which (with the addition of μὲν before τῶν πολλῶν) commends itself to a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Lit. Centralblatt 1898 pp. 296 f., is much too drastic. The same criticism applies to (3) Badham’s ἀτιμαζόμεα, κολονύμεα δ’ ὑπὸ κτλ., and also (4) to Liebhold’s ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν—ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἔτοιμων <ἀμελούμενα> κτλ.
IX.

VII 529 c. καὶ ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γιγί ἐν βαλαττὴ μανθάνῃ.

The ms tradition in this difficult passage points to the existence of two early variants, viz. ὑπτίας μὲν and ὑπτίας νέων. The former is read by A, Cesenas M, and two other mss; probably also μὴν (Vind. B) is a corruption of μὲν, and μὴ (Vind. E) of μὴν. ὑπτίας νέων has the authority of II, q and other mss. ναιὼν and νέων, which some mss read, are corruptions of νέων.

No one, so far as I know, has defended μὲν. For the obnoxious particle Madvig proposes ὡς, Richards θεώμενοι or κεῖμενοι, while J. J. Hartman ejects it altogether. None of these conjectures is in the least degree convincing. By far the best suggestion on these lines is Marin- din's ἐνυπτιασμένοι for ἐξ ὑπτίας μὲν (Cl. Rev. viii p. 193 n.): cf. ἐνυπτια- ζοντι τὴν κεφαλὴν in Arist. ap. Ath. 1 34 B and ἐνυπτιαζόν όμια (Schütz's conjecture for ὀμια) in Aesch. Sept. 577. The active is three times used by Lucian intransitively for throwing the neck or body back (Gall. 12, Herod. 3, Adv. ind. 21), and once with εἰναιν in the same sense (Catapl. 16). But the accidental omission of -ος is not easy to explain in a ms of the ninth century or its progenitors, though natural enough at a later date (see Bast Comm. Pal. p. 772 and Tüb. iv 18).

If μὲν and νέων each contain an element of truth (a very improbable supposition), it may be thought that μὲνων is what Plato wrote. But the word is much too feeble and pointless.

The editors, except Baiter, unanimously and (I think) rightly, read νέων. A confirmation of this reading is supplied by Pollux vii 138 νέων δ᾽ ἐξ ὑπτίας μάθημα κολυμβητῶν Ἀριστοφάνης ἔπει καὶ Πλάτων: for it is unlikely that Pollux is thinking of the more artificial passage in Phaedr. 264 A οὐδὲ ἄπρος ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἀνάπαλω διαινῶ ἐπιχειρῶ τον λόγον. Schneider's translation "und wenn er auch auf dem Rücken schwimmen in Landes- oder in Meeresgewässern lernt" is in harmony with his note "in ea orbis terrarum parte, quae γιγ ὑκοι, non minus quam in altera natari potest. γιγ non idem est, quod χέφος." But even if we allow that ἐν γιγ may bear this meaning, there must be some more specific reference, or else the phrase is pointless; for there is no object in swimming on one's back in a river with a view to watching the heavens, when the adjoining bank affords a more secure and stedfast post of observation. Stallbaum avoids the difficulty, merely translating "etiamsi (more urina- torum) resupinus natans in terra vel mari discat," with the note "dictio ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων vel διαινῶ ab arte urinorum petita." J. and C. see in Plato's phrase "a piece of extravagance" and nothing more; but even the extravagance of Plato is never destitute of point. To understand νέων ἐν γιγ as no more than lying on the land (with some older transla- tors, including Ficinus), and to transpose ἐν γιγ and ἐν βαλαττῃ (with q and Flor. U) are of course wholly illegitimate resources. I have some- times suspected that ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων (ἐν γιγ) may be a slang phrase borrowed from the language of Greek athletics: sometimes it has seemed to me to refer to the story of Thales in the well (Theaet. 174 A and cf.
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D. L. i 34). That it has some peculiar and specific meaning I am convinced; and the explanation offered in the notes appears to me far more probable than any other. The Aristophanic instance of εὐτώς νεών does not occur in any of the extant plays. It should be added that εἰπὶ γάς μὴ πλεῖον was a Pythagorean συμβολον (Clement Strom. v 5. 49 A Migne), but I do not think there is any allusion to the maxim here. See also my article in Cl. Rev. xiii p. 11.

X.

VII 529 C, D. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐδαίῳ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ ἐν ὀρατῷ πεποίκιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖται καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἐχεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἑδείν, ἃς τὸ ὑπ' ὀψαλίον καὶ ἣ οὕσα βραδύτης ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πάσι τοῖς ἀληθείς σχήμαι φοράς τε πρὸς ἀλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνῶτα φέρει: ἄ δη λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανόη ληπτά, ὑψεῖ δ' οὖ.


A large majority of editors and critics approve the ms tradition, but there is no consensus of opinion as to the meaning among those who have seriously attempted to grapple with the unusual difficulties of the sentence.

On grammatical grounds, there should be no doubt that τῶν ἀληθινῶν means τῶν ἀληθινῶν ποικίλματων. It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand φορὰς after ἀληθινῶν (with Steinhart and Susemihl), or to take τῶν ἀληθινῶν absolutely in the sense of 'the true' sc. system, as Bosanquet desires to do. The accusative ἃς—φοράς is believed by Schleiermacher and others to be equivalent to κατὰ τὰς φορὰς, but the construction, to say the least, is difficult and obscure. Schneider, who as usual is clear and precise, repeats ποικίλματων with ἀληθινῶν, and holds that ἃς—φοράς κτλ. defines the true ποικίλματα "quasi dicat τῶν ἀληθινῶν ποικίλματων, τοτε' ἐστι τῶν φορῶν ἃς" etc. This view, which I have adopted in the notes, appears to me unquestionably correct.

Schneider interprets the whole passage as follows:—"quemadmodum—sensibilis coeli varietas eo efficitur, quod stellas in coelo conspicuas alias celerior, alias tardior motus per definita temporis spatia certasque figuras circumagat, qui motus est non verae, sed sensibilis celeritatis tarditatisque et per numeros atque figuras item sensibiles decurrat, ita veram varietatem vera celeritas et tarditas efficiunt eo, quod veras stellas secundum verum numerum verasque figuras movent, qui motus partim ipsarum est, quia celeritas et tarditas motu carere non possunt, partim ad res motas seu veras stellas pertinent, quae τὰ ἐνῶτα dicuntur quia celeritas et tarditas cum eis sese coniungentes eas amplectuntur et
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continent.” It will be observed that Schneider identifies τὰ ἐνοίτα with ‘verae stellae,’ ‘die intelligiblen Analogen’ of the visible stars (Krohn), and τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς with ‘vera celeritas et tarditas’; whereas, according to my interpretation, τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς represent the ‘verae stellae,’ and τὰ ἐνοίτα the mathematical ὀίτα which they contain, analogous to the sensible γεγρόμενα which are present in visible stars. Others, such as Steinhart and Susemihl, have actually recognised in τὰ ἐνοίτα the visible stars themselves. To the latter view there are many objections, and it may be urged against both Schneider and Steinhart that neither intelligible nor visible stars can reasonably be said ἐνεικοῖ τὸ δὲ τάχει etc. τὰ ἐνοίτα is a precise and definite expression which Plato ought not to have employed if he merely meant that ‘celeritas et tarditas cum eis’ (i.e. according to Schneider ‘veris stellis’) ‘esse coniungentes eas amplecuntur et continent.’ The meaning which I have given to τὰ ἐνοίτα appears to me the only one which assigns its full and proper connotation to the word.

It has been thought by some critics that τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς are the self-existent Ideas of Speed and Slowness. Apart from other objections to this view (see Zeller ii 1, p. 697 n. 3), we must insist that the astronomer as such is not yet concerned with the Ideas at all, but only with τὰ μεταζῦ i.e. τὰ μαθηματικά, which, though πολλά, are nevertheless both ὀίτα (hence τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς) and ἀδία: see 527 B n., with App. I and Zeller ii 1, p. 701 n. 1 and Susemihl l.c. p. 209. The whole structure of the sentence in my opinion compels us to find the mathematical analogues of the visible stars not in τὰ ἐνοίτα, but in τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς, and I have tried in the notes to indicate the reason which induced Plato to express his meaning in this particular way.

The text has of course often been called in question. The first to suspect corruption was apparently Ast, who suggested δὲ τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς <καὶ> ἐν κτλ., and Richards accepts the principle of this proposal, merely substituting ὅς for δὲ. I was myself once inclined to read ἐν τῷ ἀληθῶν κτλ., omitting τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς as well as the final κ τοῦ τῆς, but τὸ δὲ τάχος καὶ ή ὠσα βραδυτῆς is in all the mss and was read by Proclus (in Tim. 244C and elsewhere), and it is hardly necessary to say that ‘emendations’ on passages of this kind are peculiarly liable to error. I see no good reason for doubting the accuracy of the mss.

XI.

VII 531B. σὺ μὲν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χρόναις πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλότων στρεβλοῦντας· ἡμῖν δὲ μη μικρότερα ἡ ἐκών γίγνεται πληκτρῳ τε πληγῶν γεγομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ ἐξαιρήσεως καὶ ἀλαξιονείας χρόνων, πανομοι ἡς εἰκόνας κτλ.

I take ἡ ἐκών with πέρι in the sense virtually of λέγουσα πέρι. This construction appears to be generally accepted, but there is considerable diversity of opinion as to the meaning of κατηγορίας κτλ. Many inter-
preters understand κατηγορίας as something which is done by the strings, and not by the musicians, in which case χορδῶν is a subjective genitive going with κατηγορίας as well as with the other two nouns. Grammatically, this view is defensible enough: but whom, and how, do the strings κατηγορεῖν? Is it the musician? If so, the tortured slave should ‘accuse’ the executioner, but he does not, although he may revile him. The slave upon the rack may denounce or accuse his accomplices, but the strings can hardly be said κατηγορεῖν in any sense analogous to this. Others, as for example Schneider, suppose that κατηγορία is a technical term in music ("hoc quoque artis vocabulum esse liquet"). For this idea there is no authority in any ancient writer, so far as I can discover. D. and V. translate “the peevishness, reserve and frowardness of the strings,” but the word κατηγορίας does not mean peevishness, but ‘accusation.’ On the other hand the contrast between κατηγορίας and εξαρνήσεως is strongly in favour of holding that it is the musicians who accuse, and the strings that deny. Stallbaum and others think εξαρνήσεως means giving out no sound, and ἀλαζωνείας ‘nimis acute sonant.’ This too is in my judgment far-fetched and weak. Plato’s words should be taken in their full sense. The musician accuses the strings; the strings protest their innocence like an obstinate slave upon the rack. If more point is needed, we should remember that if the strings are innocent, the musician is guilty.

Jowett apparently makes κατηγορίας govern εξαρνήσεως: “they have a controversy with the strings and torture them: they accuse them of refusing to speak or of speaking too much.” But the grammatical construction is harsh and the sense inadequate. The alternative view in J. and C. is in my opinion correct, except that ἀλαζωνείας is rather ‘effrontery,’ ‘swagger,’ than ‘exaggeration.’

XII.

VII 532 A. οὖτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῶν διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ ἀνευ πασῶν τῶν αἴσθησεων διὰ τὸν λόγον ἐπί αὐτοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐκαστὸν ὄρμα, καὶ μη ἀποστῇ, πρὶν ἄν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀγαθῶν αὐτῆς νοήσῃ λάβῃ, ἐπὶ αὐτῷ γένεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει κτλ.

The ms reading ὄρμα is retained by J. and C., as well as by Richter in Fleck. Jb. 1867 p. 145. The Oxford editors treat ἀνευ—ἀποστῇ as explanatory of οὖτω—ἐπιχειρῇ, remarking, truly enough, that such an asyndeton is “not without parallel in Plato.” But the objection is not so much to the asyndeton in itself, as to the misunderstanding which it would occasion. No one would readily imagine that ὄρμα is a subjunctive dependent upon ὅταν: it would naturally be construed as an indicative, and the words ἀνευ—ὄρμα would almost inevitably be taken as the apodosis corresponding to ὅταν—ἐπιχειρῇ. Richter is certainly wrong in supposing that ἀν can be understood before ἀνευ πασῶν κτλ. out of ὅταν.

Ast’s emendation is in my opinion all but certain. Other proposals are (1) ἐπιχειρῇ, ἀνευ—ὄρμα, καὶ ἀν μη ἀποστῇ κτλ. (Stephanus, with
whom Hermann and Stallbaum, reading κἂν, virtually agree): (2) έπι-χειρῆ, <ἀν> ἀνευ—ὀρμᾶ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆ (Baiter); (3) ἐπιχειρῶν for ἐπι-χειρῆ (mentioned in J. and C.). The last conjecture is too drastic; of the others, (2) is better than (1), but neither is satisfactory. On the one hand, if ἀνευ—ὀρμᾶ is in the apodosis, it is too prominent, and looks too much like a definition of the dialectical method; on the other hand, Baiter’s remedy seems to imply that it is or may be possible to attempt dialectic without dispensing with πᾶναι αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Neither of these objections applies to Ast’s conjecture, which is also more in harmony with the previous sentence than any other emendation.

XIII.

VII 532 B, C. ἕδε γε, ἵνα δ’ ἔγω, λύσις τε αὖ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μετα-στροφῆ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κυτωτίνου εἰς τὸν Ἱλίου ἐπάνοδον, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρῶς μὲν τὰ εἴσα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἱλίου φῶς ἐτι ἀδύναμία βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὄρει ἄναγματα θεία καὶ σκιάς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιῶς δὲ ἐτέρον τοιοῦτον φωτὸς ὃς πρὸς Ἱλίου κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζομένας κτλ.

The reading ἐτ’ ἀδύναμία has the support of the best mss and is retained by Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C., not to mention older editors.

According to Schneider’s explanation (with which the Oxford editors agree), βλέπειν is a substantival infinitive, parallel to ἐπινοοῦσ, and ἐτ’ ἀδύναμία is adverbial (‘with inability’ or the like), while ἐτὶ δύναμε βλέπειν (or something of the kind) is to be supplied with the contrasting clause. But ἐτ’ ἀδύναμία, if taken adverbially with βλέπειν, is an extraordinary phrase, and none of the instances cited—chiefly from the tragedians—by Schneider and J. and C. is comparable to it. Stallbaum makes βλέπειν depend on ἀδύναμία (“bei dem Unvermögen hinzublicken nach” etc.), and supplies ἐτὶ δύναμει to govern the βλέπειν which has to be supplied in the next clause. This explanation does more justice to the Greek, as far as ἐτ′ ἀδύναμία is concerned, but ‘bei dem Unvermögen’ etc. could not be coupled with ἐπινοοοῦσ unless we admit an extremely offensive anacoluthon. Schneider appears to have felt that a nominative was needed, and would have liked to write ἀδύναμία (with v and two other mss). This is also Herwerden’s proposal, but ἐτὶ is a great improvement, and fitly reminds us of the continuity of the prisoner’s progress. Other and older emendations, mentioned by Schneider, in which ἐτ’ ἀδύναμία is retained, are none of them in the least degree probable, and it may now, I think, be taken as certain that Iamblichus was right.

The words ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα, which formerly appeared between φαντάσματα and θεία, were rightly rejected by Schneider. They occur in no ms except Ε, which is the basis of the Aldine and Stephanus’ text. ἐνταῦθα δὲ in this connexion could only mean the region of intelligibles, as Schneider points out; and the whole passage is plunged into confusion if these words are introduced. It is remark-
able that Herwerden alone of recent critics has proposed this reinsertion, beguiled, perhaps, by the homoioteleuton, which Schneider thinks was a deliberate artifice of the forger ("quis non glossema ex male intellecto adverbio ἐκεῖ vel undelibet oriumum et de industria homoeoteleuton factam agnoscat?").

The adjective θεία has caused a great deal of discussion. I once unhappily proposed to read <καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὧνα πως te καὶ λ>εία, comparing VI 510 A. The correct view was pointed out by Shorey in his severe though just denunciation of my remedy (Cl. Rev. iv p. 480). Schneider takes φαντάσματα θεία as virtually φαντάσματα θεοῦ, supposing that φαντάσματα of the sun alone are meant (cf. 516 B), but this is scarcely adequate. Against Stallbaum, who (without quoting the Sophist) bracketed θεία, Richter (Fleck. Jb. 1867 p. 145) rightly argued that the epithet was indispensable "um den Unterschied zu markieren zwischen den φαντάσματα und den im katáγειον vorkommenden εἰδώλα." Ast's conjecture θεία is neat, and has won considerable favour (see E. J. Palmer in Cl. Rev. v p. 278 and Apelt in Fleck. Jb. 1891 p. 556, where Apelt makes the same proposal independently), while Madvig's ἄδεια has been deservedly ignored. I have no longer any doubt that the text is sound. Some may find a difficulty because the Sophist is now believed by many to be later than the Republic; but θεία in this sense may have been familiar in the Platonic school, and in any case (see note ad loc.) the meaning can be inferred from the context, even without the aid of the Sophist, whose theory of a θεία and an ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποιήσιν may, if we think fit, be viewed as a further development of the expression in the Republic. There are also other traces in the Republic of doctrines supposed to be especially characteristic of the so-called 'dialectical dialogues': see App. VII to Book V. Finally, it should be noted that Herwerden's excision of σκίας after εἰδώλων is not only unnecessary but wrong, because ἄποσκιαζομένας would then be most naturally taken with σκίας τῶν ὄντων.

XIV.

VII 533 b. τόδε γονίν, ἵν δ' ἔγω, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφοτεροῦσιν λέγοντιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἐκάστου πέρι, ὁ ἔστιν ἐκαστὸν, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὄδω περὶ παῖτος λαμβάνειν, ἄλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι κτλ.

The ordinary explanation of this passage takes ὡς with ἀμφοτεροῦσιν and not with λέγοντιν, interpreting ἄλλη as 'other than dialectic' (Schneider in Addit. p. 58, Stallbaum and J. and C.). But it is scarcely possible to separate ὡς from λέγοντιν, and for this reason J. J. Hartman (who understands ἄλλη in the same way as Schneider) cuts λέγοντιν out.

If λέγοντιν is retained, and connected, as it must be, with ὡς, either ἄλλη does not mean 'other than dialectic,' or else we must read <ὁκ> ἄλλη. The latter alternative was adopted by Stephanus, Ast, and Bekker, whose apparatus criticus stated by implication that ὡκ was actually written in Paris A. Recent editors have rightly rejected ὡκ.
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after it was found to have no ms authority. It is clear, therefore, unless we resort to unjustifiable emendation or excision, that ἀλλή does not mean ‘other than dialectic.’ The only other possible explanations are (1) other than all the arts spoken of in ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι—

αὑτῶν, (2) that given in the notes. Against (1) it might be urged that ἀλλή does not easily look forward in a sentence of this kind, and (2) is in every way simpler and more natural, provided we observe that the stress falls on αἱ δὲ λαοὶ rather than on αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πάσαι etc. (’while all the other arts—the remainder’ etc.).

XV.

VII 533 c. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἑγώ, ἦ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναφέρωσα, ἐπὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἥρχην, ἰνα βεβαιώσῃ.

The mss without exception have ἀναφέροσα, which a majority of editors retain. ἀνάγουσα was read by Canter (Stob. ii p. 157), and is found as a correction in one ms of Stobaeus (Edl. ii 2. i Wachsmuth). I formerly printed ἀναφέρωσα, which Oldenberg (de Pl. arte dial. p. 38 n.) had already (as I have since found) mentioned as possible, though he himself preferred ἀνάγουσα. On an earlier occasion I conjectured ἀνουσα (Cl. Rev. iv p. 357), thinking of Symp. 211 B: cf. also Alcin. Isag. 5 and 7. Schneider’s ἀναφέροσα is an excessively rare word, and has met with little favour from critics; but ἀνάγουσα has been approved by various writers, among others Oldenberg (l.c.) and Richards (Cl. Rev. viii p. 194).

Further investigation into Plato’s ‘hypothetical method’ has now convinced me that the reading and punctuation of Paris A represent the truth. See App. III, where the subject is discussed at length.

The expression τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναφέρωσα throws a much-needed light on the real nature of the process described here and in vi 511 B, vii 532 A. It is not, as has been asserted, inconsistent with the description of Book vi, for although we demolish our ὑποθέσεις and must do so if we are ever to rise above them, they are none the less τῷ ἐπὶ ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τὲ καὶ ὄρμα, without which we cannot even make a start. The path of knowledge is strewn with the wrecks of hasty generalisations, which have served as stepping-stones to students in the very act of their demolition: and in this sense, if in no other, it is true that “Error in the round of time Still fathers Truth.”

It is perhaps necessary briefly to advert to some erroneous interpretations of the authoritative text. Steinhart (Einleitung p. 693) translates “die Voraussetzungen aufhebend, um das Princip zu gewinnen,” taking ἐπὶ with ἀναφέροσα: but ἐπὶ cannot be separated from πορεύεται, and such a sense of ἐπὶ in this connexion is harsh and unnatural. Stallbaum’s attempt to shew that ἀναφέροσα ἐπὶ can mean ‘taking up to’ is unsuccessful, for all the parallels which he quotes are cases of ἀναφέρειν ἐπὶ. Finally Jowett and Campbell remark “The hypotheses are done away with; that is, when seen in their relation to
the good they cease to be ὑποθέσεις": but ἀναφεύ cannot be thus pared down, and should be taken in its full force as explained in the note.

XVI.

VII 533 ε. Οὗ γὰρ ὄντι, ἔφη [ἅλλ' ὣ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνειά λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ]. Ἄρεσκει ὄνν κτλ.

The words within brackets are printed as they appear in A. II agrees, except that it has ἄλλο (corrected to ἄλλ' ὣ) and ἐξίν (sic). In q and Flor. U we find ἄλλ' ὣ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια (i.e. σαφήνειά) ὣ λέγοι ἐν ψυχῇ, and this reading is adopted by Bekker. There is also some slight authority (in addition to Π') for ἄλλο instead of ἄλλ' ὣ, for σαφήνειαν instead of σαφήνεια, and for λέγειν instead of λέγει.

Jowett and Campbell remain faithful in their allegiance to A, except that with q they insert ὣ before λέγει. "The words in the text," they remark, "are very possibly genuine and may be rendered—'we only require' (the verb is gathered from οὗ περὶ δόματος ἀμφισβήτησιας) 'an expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition, that of which it speaks as existing in the mind. For example, διάνοια may not be a very clear or definite expression, but the state of mind which it expresses is also far from clear.' But they do not explain how the words which I have italicised represent the Greek, and few will find themselves able to accept the translation which they offer.

The reading of q is carefully examined by Schneider, who justly characterises it in these words "sententia mihi tam abscona videtur, ut cam vix interpolatori mediocri, nedum Platoni tribuere audem." The chief emendations are (1) ἄλλ' ὣ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια <ὁ> λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ (Winckelmann), (2) ἄλλ' ὣ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνειαν <ἀ> λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρκέσει (Hermann, and Badham, except that the latter writes ἔξει for λέγει, and begins the next sentence with Ἀρκέσει). (3) ἄλλ' ὣ ἄν ὀνόμα δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνειαν <ὁ> λέγει (or ἄν λέγου) ἐν ψυχῇ <ἀρκέσει> (Steinhart), (4) ἄλλο ἄν ὀνόμα δηλοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια, <ἄλλο> λέγοι ἄν ψυχῇ (Richter in Flech. Jb. 1867, p. 146), (5) ἄλλ' ὣ—ἐξίν σαφήνεια, λέγει, εἰ ἐν ψυχῇ (Madvig, Baiter), (6) ἄλλ' ὣ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ τὴν ἐξίν <πῶς ἔξει> σαφήνειας <ἀ> λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ (Bywater), (7) ἄλλ' ὣ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ τῶς αὐτῶν ἔξων σαφήνειας λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ <ἀρκέσει>. Ἀρκέσει (or ἀράκεσει) γονὸς κτλ. (Richards), (8) ἄλ' ὣ ἄν μόνον δηλοὶ πὼς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια λέγειν ἐν ψυχῇ <ἀρκέσει; Ναὶ. Ἀρκέσει κτλ. (Burnet).

Some of these conjectures are ingenious and scholarly, but none of them, nor any other which I can devise, is altogether satisfactory in point of sense, or diplomatically probable. (The last remark does not apply to Madvig's correction, which is easy enough, but κακόν κακό λάται and does not attempt to cure πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν σαφήνεια at all.)
The independent reasons for holding the clause to be interpolated are:—(1) it is absent in Ξ, which the Aldine edition and Stephanus as usual follow: (2) "in Platonis dialogis quum negationi assensus per formulam οὐ γαρ οὐν praebetur, nusquam assentiens quicquam addit, quod ex contrario petitam negati descriptionem continent idque per affirmationem cum particula ἀλλὰ definitat" (Schneider). Little weight need be attached to the first argument, in view of the general character of Ξ, but if (as I believe in opposition to Schanz Platonis ed. etc. p. 81) Ξ is sometimes independent of Λ, it is possible enough that the words were omitted in the ms (or mss) from which Ξ was copied in this passage. The second consideration, which Schneider establishes by a vast number of instances, is extremely weighty.

As regards the origin of the gloss Schneider observes (Addit. p. 59) "ceterum primitivam formam et originem glossematis investigaturos contulisse iuvabit Platonis verba Leg. 1 p. 633 Α: περὶ τῶν τῆς ἀλλῆς ἀρετῆς εἴτε μερῶν εἴτε ἀπ’ αὐτὰ καλῶν χρεὼν ἔστι, δηλοῦντα μόνον ἃ λέγει, et haec Galeni Εἰραγγεύς διαλεκτικὸς p. 12: οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν διαφέρει συμπτελευμένην λέγειν ἀποφασικῶς ἢ συμπλοκὴν ἀποφασικῆς, ἔγοντος γέ σου σκοτών ἐν ἀπάσῃ λέγει τὸ δηλοῦσαι τοὺς πέλας, οὐ τί περ ἄν αὐτὸς ἐννοεῖ." Cf. also Theae. 177 Ν, Ε, Soph. 218 Β, Hipp. Mai. 296 Δ. The sentence is evidently an attempt to say that we should be content if the words we use express our meaning clearly. In λέγει (and still more λέγεις) ἐν ψυχῇ we may detect an allusion to the Platonic theory of thought as the conversation of the soul (see on ΠΠ 400 Β) and perhaps also to the λόγος ὑπιδάθετος of the Stoics. On this account, and also because of ἐξίν, I am inclined to attribute the interpolation to some adherent of the Stoic school, of which, in point of style, it is not unworthy.

XVII.

VII 534 Β. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοὺς γέ σαυτοῦ πάρασα, οὗ τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παθεῖς, οἱ τοστέ ἐργον τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἔσαστας, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀλλόγως ὑπάρχει γραμμάς, ἀρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίου τῶν μεγίστων ἐναι.

Schneider was the first to discover in this passage a punning reference to mathematical ἀλλόγως γραμμάς, as defined by Euclid x Def. 5—11. The same explanation, although it did not commend itself to Stallbaum, is apparently accepted by the Oxford editors, who aptly quote Theae. 146 Α προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιήσας διαλέγωσθαι καὶ φιλοσ τῆς καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλως γέγονοται. It is to Theodorus the mathematician that these words are spoken, and Campbell is, I believe, right in thinking that προσηγόρους is quasi-mathematical: cf. viii 546 Β πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ἤπια πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηγην.

It is better, I think, and more pointed to connect ἀλλόγως directly with γραμμάς (cf. 519 Α τὰς τῆς γανέσως ἐξαγεναίς ὡσπερ μοικυβάδας with note ad loc.), than to translate "incapable of reason, like irrational lines" (with Schneider and J. and C.). In order to extract this meaning from the Greek, we must understand γραμμάς as = ἀλλόγως γραμμάς, which is doubtless possible, but less natural than the view given in the notes.

A. P. II.
J. and C.’s translation also gives ωσπερ γραμμάς a certain otiose appearance, as if Plato had deliberately gone out of his way to drag in a mathematical allusion. On this account we may wonder that none of the Dutch critics has hitherto proposed, so far as I know, to excise ωσπερ γραμμάς.

There is little to be said in favour of the non-mathematical interpretations, though perhaps the following contain an element of truth: “unvernünftig wie Figuren” (Schleiermacher), “unvernünftig wie todte Striche” (Prantl), “lineae penecillo praeformatae” (Stallbaum). γραμμάς has, I think, a non-mathematical as well as mathematical meaning in this place, and the former is fairly expressed by Prantl’s “todte Striche.” Ast thought of “literae s. scripitiones,” remembering the well-known passage about dumb books in Phaedr. 275 ff.; but γραμμάς cannot be thus interpreted. Others have thought of pictures, as for example Stallbaum, who refers to Plut. Lycurg. 10. 3 ωσπερ γραφήν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκάλυτον, and is inclined to read γραφάς instead of γραμμάς. The correction γεγραμμένος is suggested by Steinhart (Einleitung p. 694) and γράμμα or γράμματι (with reference to v 472 d) by Apelt (Fleck. Jb. 1893 p. 556). The eccentric proposal ὡς Φρύγας Μίδας ἄρχοντας is due to Cornarius, who remarks “coniectura est nostra, qua falli possum: sed tolerari poterit donec rectior occurrerit” (Eclog. p. 101). Stallbaum’s conjecture is neat and elegant, but the text is indubitably sound.
543 A—545 C. Socrates now returns to the point at which the digression occupying Books V—VII began. There are, as we observed, four leading varieties of States and individuals, in addition to the perfect polity and perfect man. In order of merit they are (1) Timarchy, or the Cretan and Laconian State, (2) Oligarchy, (3) Democracy, (4) Tyranny. All other kinds of commonwealths, such as dynasties etc., lie somewhere between these primary and conspicuous varieties. Furthermore, inasmuch as the specific character of a State is determined by that of individuals, there will be free leading types of individual character, embodied respectively in (1) the aristocratic, (2) the timarchial, (3) the oligarchical, (4) the democratical, (5) the tyrannical man. The first of these we have already described; but we must review the others also, in order that, by contrasting the best and worst, we may apprehend the relation between undiluted justice and undiluted injustice in respect of the happiness and misery of their possessors. As before, we will examine the commonwealths first, and afterwards the individuals.

543 A ff. The description of the philosopher and the philosophic city is at last complete, and the argument returns to the point at which the 'digression' began, viz. v 449 A: see note ad loc. Plato has already said repeatedly, and reminds us yet again in 544 A, that the aim of our whole investigation was to decide ἐὰν ὁ ἐρωτός εὐθαμωνετάτος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀνθύμωτατος, ἢ ἄλλοι ἔχοι (cf. II 368 E, 359 A ἐπί). With the character of the perfect man we are now familiar, but we have still to discover and describe τὸν κακίστον, in order that we may institute our comparison and pronounce our verdict. This is the task to which Plato addresses himself in VIII and IX (down to 576 B). The method which he follows resembles that adopted in II 369 B ff.—IV. In the first place, he retains throughout the former analogy between the Soul and the City, and his account of the imperfect man is in every instance preceded by an account of the imperfect State. Secondly, instead of going straight to the mark and giving us a single ready-made sketch of total and complete depravity, Plato draws an elaborate and quasi-historical picture of the gradual descent of the perfect State and the perfect Man through successive phases of ever-growing degeneration down to the lowest depth of wickedness and crime. In the same way, as Nettlestone observes (Lect. and Rem. II p. 295), "in describing a perfect state, or certain steps in the process of forming a perfect state," he sometimes wrote "as if one step of that process succeeded another in a historical order." See on II 369 B, 372 D, 373 D et al. The question has often been discussed whether the sequence of polities in VIII and IX was intended to be really historical or not: see for example Zeller 11 pp. 925—935, Henkel Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre v. Staat p. 56 and Krohn Pl. St. pp. 104 ff. Aristotle seems to have understood Plato's account as an attempt to describe the actual facts of Greek history, and severely criticizes it from his usual standpoint in Pol. E 12. 1316a 1—b 27; but Plato himself must of course have known as well as Aristotle that the historical development of Greek constitutions did not by any means always correspond with his scheme. See Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 62—88 and Greenidge Gk Const. Hist. pp. 12—35. The fact is that Aristotle altogether ignores the real object of Plato, which is, as we have seen, to arrive at the worst State and the worst man, and treats him as if he had undertaken to exhibit a full
and complete genealogical tree of all the changes good or bad which had ever taken place in Greek constitutional history. But Plato does not here profess to describe political advance, but only political decay; and even his theory of political decay is itself based upon a theory of psychological degeneration which justly and deliberately ignores, as irrelevant for our present purpose, the undoubted power of human character to improve as well as to deteriorate. The question, as Nettleship says, which Plato puts before himself is this: "The human soul being as we have described it, and having in it a certain capacity for evil as well as for good, what would it come to, and through what stages would it pass, if its capacity for evil were realized gradually but without any abatement? In actual human experience there is always some abatement; there are always counteracting circumstances which prevent any one tendency working itself out in isolation and unhindered; but the philosopher may, as Plato here does, work out the result of a single tendency logically. These books therefore put before us an ideal history of evil, as the previous books put before us an ideal history of good" (I. c. p. 293). The different stages in the decline of the individual are each reflected in the decline of the polis, which is still, as in II—VII, not 'a lifeless instrument, or dead machine,' but in the words of Isocrates, simply the soul of the State (ἐστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως ὁ θεὸς ἡ πολιτεία Areop. 14). But although Plato treats the whole question from a psychological rather than a historical standpoint, it is none the less true that the materials of his picture are taken from Greek political and social life. In Books VIII and IX of the Republic we have an extraordinarily vivid and life-like embodiment of the results of Plato's observation and experience of the Greek character, both private and public, in all its different phases, Laconian, oligarchical, democratic or Athenian, and tyrannical; and the student of Greek history, whether political, economical or social, will obtain a clearer idea of the inner life and animating spirit of Greek constitutions from Plato's description than from any other ancient source whatever. For the rest, it should be noted that Plato has given us in this part of the Republic the earliest attempt at a Philosophy of History, and founded the psychological interpretation of the State. Every political movement is, according to him, the expression of some particular psychological impulse or impulses, and the Constitution inevitably assumes different forms, according as one or another element or 'part' of soul obtains the mastery in the individual citizen. See on this subject Krohn Pl. St. pp. 199 ff., and Bluntschi Theory of the State pp. 76 ff.

543 A 1 τη ἔλευσιν ἀκρούς κτλ. Cf. Laws 739 C, D. The adverb ἀκρούς is said by Herderen (Min. xix p. 335) to be a ἀπαξ εἰρήμενον in classical Greek. On the word basileas Pfeiderer (Zur Lösung etc. p. 73) bases a chorizonic argument; but see on IV 445 D. Plato's rulers may well be called 'Kings,' for Plato holds that there is no difference of principle between Kingship and Aristocracy: cf. VII 520 B with V 473 C, IX 567 B, and Henkel Stud. zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 57. 

4 αὐτῶν. The genitive is partitive: 'and that those of their number are to be Kings who have shewn themselves best' etc. Jowett wrongly translates 'their kings.'

543 B 6 ἐπευχωρίσαμεν. III 415 D ff. 10 οἵα. The reference is to III 416 D ff.
Liebhold's conjecture δη κοινά is an undeserved reflection on Glauco's powers of memory.

Ottei unnecesary, viz. has a vigorous aorist, KaOairep ot dyaOrjv a9XT\]Tas dXXd Heindorf.

The MSS fluctuate between άλλα γ' (the reading of A), αλλ' α'γ' and αλλ' α'γε (III), the last of which readings is adopted by all editors except Schneider. άλλα γε, though rare, is, I believe, firmly established in Plato: see on 1 331 B. It fits the situation in this passage exactly, whereas αλλ' α'γε does not, if we translate επειδή τούτ' απετελέσαμεν correctly, and not (with D. and V., Jowett etc.) by 'now that we have concluded the subject.'

To έδησ, the reading of B, is, I think, of no stylistic effect. An alternative view might be to understand δι' αλλοι of the rest of the citizens (των αλλων below) and νυν as 'in point of fact' or 'in our present discussion'; but this explanation is much less satisfactory.

The MSS vary between this reading, and 6ς διεληλυθός—πολέως: 'quasi disputazione de civitate absoluta' (Stallbaum); cf. v 450 A. The MSS vary between this reading, and 6ς διεληλυθός or διεληλυθά: alone: but A (with which Π2 and several other MSS agree) is certainly right.

17 καθαρπε νυν. νυν refers to 541 B.

18 λέγων κτλ. v 449 A.

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18 λέγων κτλ. v 449 A.

The MSS fluctuate between αλλά γ' (the reading of A), αλλ' α'γ' and αλλ' α'γε (III), the last of which readings is adopted by all editors except Schneider. αλλά γε, though rare, is, I believe, firmly established in Plato: see on 1 331 B. It fits the situation in this passage exactly, whereas αλλ' α'γε does not, if we translate επειδή τούτ' απετελέσαμεν correctly, and not (with D. and V., Jowett etc.) by 'now that we have concluded the subject.'

To έδησ, the reading of B, is, I think, of no stylistic effect. An alternative view might be to understand δι' αλλοι of the rest of the citizens (των αλλων below) and νυν as 'in point of fact' or 'in our present discussion'; but this explanation is much less satisfactory.

The MSS vary between this reading, and 6ς διεληλυθός—πολέως: 'quasi disputazione de civitate absoluta' (Stallbaum); cf. v 450 A. The MSS vary between this reading, and 6ς διεληλυθός or διεληλυθά: alone: but A (with which Π2 and several other MSS agree) is certainly right.
Der Dialog pp. 235 ff. Jowett's translation "although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man" is a defensible construction, but unnatural, and certainly not what Plato meant. The passage has been curiously misunderstood by some critics, through inattention to the force of the imperfect participle ἔχων. Herderwen, for example, actually proposes to insert ὀδῷ before καλλίω. Schneider and Stallbaum translate the sentence correctly.

544 A 3 ἔφησα κτλ. IV 445 C. On the pronomes ὄν-ἀυτῷ see II 357 B n. Plato is very careful to make it clear that he does not profess, like Aristotle, to give a complete account of faulty States. From his watch-tower he can descry infinite varieties, but only four on which he need expatiate. We may take it that these are, in Plato's view, the four most conspicuous landmarks in the history of political degeneration, as well as the most important and clearly-outlined varieties of existing States. Cf. IV 445 C and infra 544 D ἦτε καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ διαφανές τιν κύριαι.

5 ἦν πάντας κτλ. reminds us of the thread which is the clue to the labyrinthine reasoning of the Republic: cf. 545 A, 548 D and II 368 E n.

6 ἔχων. The optative, for which Ast and Stallbaum needlessly read ἐκεῖ with Σq and some other inferior mss, is due to the oratio obliqua: cf. VII 515 D n. 8 ἐρόμενον. V 449 A.

544 B 11 ὀσπερ παλαιστής. The Scholiast remarks ἔδος γὰρ τὸ τοῦτον, ὅταν τέσσαρα διόμοι—πάλιν ἐγείρθεντας ἐπὶ ὀμόφω συμπλακαίον σχῆματα, ὅπερ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ λαβήν. Plato, as Stallbaum points out, uses the same figure in Phaedr. 236 B: cf. Phil. 13 D, Laws 682 E and ἀντιλαμβανόμενος VI 505 A n.

13 ἐπιθυμῶ—ἀκούσαι: 'I am desirous also on my own account to hear 'sc. apart from the half-polemical motive suggested by the figure. Herderwen remarks "locus vix sanus," but it is sound enough, although the English translators ("I shall particularly wish" etc. Jowett) miss the meaning.


17 αὐτή: is a ‘that of yours,’ ‘your Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitution.’ On their connexion see Arist. Pol. B 10. 1271b 22 ff. with Susemihl and Hicks’s notes. It is, I think, fanciful to see in αὐτή an allusion to Glauco’s sympathies for Sparta, in spite of 548 D below.

καὶ δευτέρως. Hermann prints his own conjecture ἡ δευτέρως, but the common confusion of καὶ and ἢ (Bast Comm. Pol. p. 815) is, I believe, later than the date of Paris A, and the text is free from objection: ‘and second in order as in esteem, a constitution fraught with many evils, bearing the name of oligarchy.’

dευτέρα agrees with πολιτεία, not with ὀλυγαρχία.

18 διαφοράς: not of course ‘different’ (as Jowett), but ‘antagonistic,’ adversaria (Stallbaum). διαφοράς ‘different’ gives a poor sense, and would take the genitive, which Ast erroneously proposed to read.

Greek history furnished only too many proofs of the natural feud between democracy and oligarchy: see Greenidge Gk Const. Hist. pp. 208 ff. and Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. 11 p. 285 n. 2.

19 ἔφεσις γνωμομένη. From this and other indications it would appear on a first perusal that the sequence of commonwealths in VIII and IX is intended by Plato to be not merely logical, but historical also; but there is no question that the political evolution of Greek constitutions was far more complex than would appear from Plato’s description. See on 543 A. We must above all things remember that it is in order to furnish a picture of the worst city and the worst man that the whole of this enquiry is undertaken, and Plato is at liberty to adopt whatever mode of presentation is best adapted for the object which he has in view. The form which he does in point of fact select is that of a historical narrative (see on 543 A, 545 D), but the real order of the development which he describes is a ‘logical order,’ and is primarily determined by psychological, and not by historical considerations. Although there are many points of contact between the development of Greek constitutional history and Plato’s arrangement, Plato here employs narration primarily and chiefly as a vehicle or instrument for expressing the results of psychological analysis, and not because he believes that political development always and inevitably follows the same lines. See also on 543 A and infra 544 D.

20 διαφέρουσα κτλ. The reading of Ε  — see cr. n. — is confirmed by ν and two other mss, as well as by Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 115) and Ficinus (ab his omnibus differens). All other mss appear to have διαφερόντια. ‘Error—occasionem pronuntiatio non absimilis delisse videtur’ (Schneider). The word does not mean ‘differs’ (as Jowett) but ‘excels’ (ironically, of course, like ἡ γενναία δῆ). Father Rickaby has suggested to me that we should read καὶ ἡ πολιτεία τῶν διαφέρουσα, ἡ γενναία δῆ τυραννίς, τέταρτον κτλ. The conjecture is an attractive one, both on other grounds and also because it enables us to retain the article which appears before πασών (see cr. n.) in A, but it is perhaps safer to follow Ε.


ἡ τίνα. Ast and others write ἡ τίνα (with slight ms support), but τίνα is perfectly good: cf. IX 573 A.

ἐν εἰδεὶ διαφανεὶ τινι. See on 544 A.

544 D 22 δυναστείας. Δυναστεία is that form of polity in which the son succeeds the father καὶ δοχεὶ ὁ νόμος δυναστείας (Arist. Pol. D 5. 1202b 5 ff.: cf. Latos 680 A, 8). Such a δυναστεία might be good, but was of course generally bad: see Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. Pol. B 10. 1271b 3. Examples are pro-
victed by Thessaly (Thuc. IV 78. 3) and (about 480 B.C.) Thebes (Thuc. III ii. 2. 3; cf. Gilbert Griefch. Staatsalt. II pp. 10, 46). See Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 124—126.

**23. **toinatviknes: such as, for example, alexandria, and the other specific varieties (as Aristotle reckons them) of Plato's typical politeiai: see Pol. I, Δ, Ζ passim.

εύροι δ' ἂν κτλ.: whereas Plato confines himself to Greek history throughout viii and ix.

26 καὶ ἀνθρώπων κτλ. Cf. IV 445 C, and on the principle here laid down see IV 435 E n. The present passage is a clear and emphatic statement of the psychological basis on which Plato's philosophy of History rests. Political aitia, like political dikaiosunè (IV 443 B n.), is after all no more than elouchon τι: injustice in the true sense is στάσις within the individual soul (IV 444 B), and social and political wrong-doing is but its outward manifestation. The double genitive, which is easy enough (cf. E below and v 449 A n.), has led to the corruption τρόπων τινά in several MSS. Liebold also suggests καὶ τρόπων instead of τρόπων. The expression εἶδοι τρόπων ('specific characters') is treated as a single word, and should be repeated with politeitów: cf. IV 445 C ὅσοι politeitews τρόποι εἶδον εἶδη ἔχοντες, τοιούτου κινούμενοι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι (a passage which proves, I think, that Schneider and Stallbaum are wrong in supplying only εἶδη with διστερ κτλ.).

27 ἐκ δρῶν κτλ. Iom. Od. xix 161 f. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὦς μοι ἐπε τένο γένος, ὀποδὲν ἐσοί ὅ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρῶν ἐσοὶ παλαιστάτου ὄ ddl' ἀπὸ πέτρης, i.e. you have a γένος (cf. Αρ. 34 D) and are not miraculously sprung ἀγενεαλογημένοι out of tree or stone, like the fabled men of old (see Preller-Robert Gr. Myth. p. 79 n. 4). In Plato the saying is used much like the German 'es ist doch nicht aus der Luft gefallen' (Schück de scholiis p. 32, where the proverb is illustrated).

544 E 29 ἂν κτλ. ὅ ἂν was read till Schneider on the authority of Σ; but ἂν (AII and a large majority of MSS) is quite satisfactory.

"Reipublicae formae eos dicuntur sequi mores, qui in quavis civitate veluti pondere praegravantes ad se suamque regionem attraerent reliqua." (Schneider, comparing for ἐβαθατα Hdt. vii 135). The word ᾧεβαθατα (Σ and some other MSS) is unattic (Lobeck Phryn. p. 738): Plato's form is ῥεβαθα e.g. vi 495 B.

33 ὀρϑος is more naturally taken with φαινεῖ (Jowett etc.) than with the adjectives (as Schneider). We rightly call him 'good' etc., because he is ὀμοιος ἀριστοκρατία.
645 Λ 4 ἵνα κτλ. See 544 Α.ν.
645 Β 9 ἱπράξεως. II 368 Ε.ν.
12 ὁνομα γὰρ κτλ.: 'for I have no other name in our language for it; we must call it either "timarchy" or "timocracy"' ('"Ehrenherrschaft oder Ehrenobmacht" Schneider). Plato called the constitution in question φιλότιμος πολιτεία, which may be cumbrous, but is certainly Greek. If we want a single name, we must, he says, invent: and either τιμαρχία or τιμοκρατία will do. The Oxford editors erroneously suggest that ἵ—κλητον is interrogative: nor is there any reason to suspect the text, as W. H. Thompson did. Both of Plato's coinages survived, but they never became popular, and were used in another sense from Plato's—τιμοκρατία with the meaning of the νοὸς nikilei τιμημακρατία or ἢ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων φόρη (Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII 12. 1160α 36) and τιμαρχία for the Roman censorship (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.).

13 πρὸς—ταύτην = 'ad hanc'; cf. IX 577 β and Tim. 24.α τοὺς μὲν οὖν νόμους σκάπετε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς (Schneider).

545 Β—547 Β How does Timarchy arise out of Aristocracy? We may lay it down as a universal rule that constitutional change is originated by dissension within the governing class. Socrates invokes the Muses to tell 'how first sedition entered.' Like everything else, our perfect city is subject to Nature's universal law, that whatever is created perishes. Out of the elements of the number which expresses the shortest period of gestation in the human kind, Socrates builds up a 'geometrical number,' which he calls 'the lord of better and worse births.' When, through ignorance of these, couples are united inopportune, as one day they will be, a degenerate race of offspring arises. The best of these in due course become rulers; but the mixture of races—golden, silver, copper, iron—waxes greater, and sedition is the result. The contending parties finally, by means of a compromise, effect the transition to Timarchy—a form of commonwealth standing midway between Aristocracy and Oligarchy.

545 Β ff. I have discussed the famous 'Number of Plato' at length in Appendix I, and must refer the reader to that Appendix for a fuller justification of views which considerations of space preclude me from defending toto viribus through-out the notes. The connexion of the episode with the argument of the Republic may be expressed as follows. In accordance with the form of a historical narrative which he employs throughout these two books, Plato invites us to conceive of his perfect city as having actually existed long ago, just as in the Timaeus (33 C ff.) and Critias (109 β ff.) the Platonic Utopia appears as prehistoric Athens. In making this demand upon the imagination of his countrymen, Plato could count upon the support to be derived from the prevalence of the view that mankind had degenerated from an age of innocence and bliss in the far-distant past: see the references in my
edition of the Protagoras p. xxiii and Rohde Griech. Romank pp. 216 ff. What, then, was the originating cause of degeneration? Plato finds the cause, not in anything peculiar to the Ideal city, but in a law which prevails throughout the whole of Nature—the law that everything created is doomed to decay. There cannot be any ἰδιος μεταβολή (to quote the phrase of Aristotle Pol. E 12. 1316 a 12) of a perfect City; for a city which carries within itself the seeds of decay is not perfect, but imperfect. In the sequel Plato first describes the manner in which degeneration begins to take effect (οὔ μὴν —διὸν 546 A, b), and afterwards proceeds to construct a Number which is the expression of that law of inevitable degeneration to which the Universe and all its parts are subject. The substance of what he has to say on the first head is that a psychologically inferior offspring gradually makes its appearance because children are sometimes begotten inopportune. It is noteworthy that here, as everywhere in Books VIII and IX, the decline of the constitution or soul of the State (543 A u.) is traced to the decline of the soul of the individual. In the words ἀνθρωπίνη δὴ—γραδός (546 b, c), Plato, copying the method of the Pythagoreans, and closely following their calculations, at all events in the first part of the reckoning, attempts to give an arithmetical expression to the Law of Change in that which he calls the γεωμετρικός ἀριθμός. According to the view which I have endeavoured to establish in Appendix I, the arithmetic, in which each of the factors and processes involved was full of significance to ancient speculators on the theory of numbers, may be thus expressed in modern arithmetical notation:

1. \(3^2 + 4^2 + 5^2 = 216.\)
2. \((3 \times 4 \times 5)^2 = 12,960,000\)

\[= 3600^2 = 4,800 \times 2700.\]

The first number, 216, is the shortest period of gestation in the human race expressed in days. In the second equation, the number 12,960,000 expresses, also in days, the duration of a Great Year in the life of the Universe. Expressed in years, the number is 36,000, if we count, as Plato here does, 360 days in the year. The two ‘harmonies,’ 3602 and 4800 \times 2700, are the two cycles described in the Politicus, each of which is a Great Year. In the first ὁμοιότης prevails, in the second ἀνομοιότης: the World ‘waxes’ in the first, and ‘wanes’ in the second, without, however, suffering dissolution. In what sense the whole number 36,000 years, which astronomers sometimes called the Platonius annus in the middle ages, is at once the numerical Cause of Change, and the ‘lord of better and worse births,’ is pointed out in App. I, Pt ii § 7, and also in the notes on 546 C. How far Plato attached a serious value to his Number and the calculations from which he derives it, I have briefly discussed at the end of App. I, Pt ii. Here it must suffice to say that the episode, like many other passages in Plato, is half-serious, and half-playful. The setting of the whole is mythical, for it is only for literary and artistic purposes that Plato pictures his ideal city as historically true; and the meaning of the latter part of the Number is deciphered by the aid of one of Plato’s myths. Moreover, the style of the whole passage, though extraordinarily rhetorical and highly-wrought, acquires a touch of fantastic humour from the bewildering parade of mathematical terms, at some of which even Plato’s own contemporaries would probably have smiled. On its serious side, the Number affords an interesting example of the application of Number and Mathematics to explain the life of the Universe and Man; and, as I have said in the Appendix, finds its fittest apology in the saying θεός ἐστιν γεωμετρία. It is of some importance in the history of philosophy because of its connexion with Pythagorean embryology and physics, and its employment by the Neoplatonists to justify the wildest astronomical vagaries. The extreme difficulty of the Greek has made the Platonic
Number a favourite hunting-ground of successive generations of scholars, and the works which have been written on the subject, a few of which are mentioned in the Appendix, are very numerous.


24 κινηθήναι: an ominous word, used here, as constantly throughout Greek literature, of constitutional changes for the worse.

27 ὅπως δή κτλ. An imitation of Hom. II. xvi 112. ἐσπετε νῦν μοι, μοῦσαι —διὰ τοῦτο δή πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσα νῦν

28 καὶ φῶμεν κτλ.: 'and shall we say that they speak in the lofty tragic vein, as if it were all earnest, whereas it is only the banter of the Muses playing with us, as if we were little children?' Instead of φῶμεν, I once suggested θόμεν (cf. Laws 654 A and 677 C), but φῶμεν, which is in all mss., though less picturesque, may stand. Herwerden's excision of παῖδας καὶ obligates a tender touch; for there is of course a play on παῖδας (cf. v. 715 536 E π.). The remarks of Proclus in Tim. 300 c ff. on the style of this and similar passages deserve to be quoted: ὁ δὲ χαρακτῆρι τῶν λόγων ἔστω ἐνθύμισι- στικὸς, διαλαμπτός τῶν νοερᾶς ἐπίβολας, καθαρὸς τὸ καὶ σεβόμενος—ἐξηλαμμένος τὸ καὶ ὑπὲρφέων τῶν ἀνθρωπών ἐννοιῶν, ἀβρός τὸ ἐνιοῦ καὶ καταπληκτικὸς καὶ χαρί- των ἀνάκης κάλλους τε πλήρης καὶ σύντομος ἄμα καὶ ἀπερεκμιαζόμενος. 'The Muses playing' warns us that there is an element of the mythical and fantastic in what follows, but by no means implies that it is foolish and nothing more. See on 545 c and App. 1. Pt ii ad fin.

546 A 2 γενομένων κτλ. This is a universally recognised principle of ancient philosophy, alluded to again by Plato in Tim. 41 A. Cf. Arist. de cael. 12. 281 b 8 τὸ γὰρ γενέστω καὶ τὸ φθάρων ἀκόλουθον ἀκόλουθος and ib. 10. 77 b 20 ἀπαντά γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα φανέρωσιν. That τὸ ἀγένετρον is ἀφθάρων and τὸ ἀφθάρων ἀγένετον was also held (cf. Phaedr. 245 D, Arist. I. c. 282 a 30 ff., al.): hence Plato always regards the pre-existence and immortality of the soul as involving one another. γένεσις is here, as usual, σύγγενος, and φθορὰ διάκρισις. The point of ἐτεί—ἐστιν is that the cause of decay is not contained in the ideal city itself—the city would be less than ideal if it were—but springs from a universal law of Nature, to which the city, like everything else, is necessarily subject: see on 545 c and App. 1. Pt iii.

4 Αἰσχ. δὲ ἦδε κτλ. Here begins Plato's description of the mode of dissolution. οὖ μόνον—ἐκτραίας, literally trans-
5 and even ἐπιγείεις χοίροι φορά καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστως κύκλων περιφοράς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίως μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἑναντίος δὲ ἑναντίας: γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγνώσιας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίτερ 1 ὡς σοφὸι οὐδ ἐγγεμ. μόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μάλλον λογισμῷ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως τεῦξονται, άλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδας ποτε οὐ δένων, ἐστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περιόδοις, ἢν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἰνδροπειί δὲ ἐν ὁ πρῶτῳ αἰσθήσεις δυνάμεναι τε

lated, is 'Not only to plants within the ground, but also among animals above the ground, there cometh production or non-production of souls and bodies, as

often as turnings-round join for each species' (of animals, plants etc.) 'circumferences of circles faring a short way for the short-lived, and the reverse for the reverse.' See Fig. 1. Suppose the revolution starts at the fixed point A. The circumference is joined as soon as the revolving wheel reaches A again, and at that point there is φορά ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, if the seed was sown at A and has come safely to maturity. If the seed was not sown, or, though sown, did not take root or miscarried on the way, there is ἀφορία. The phrase is only a fantastic way of saying ὅταν περίοδο ἐκάστως ἀποτελεσθῶσιν. The περίοδο of a short-lived species is βραχύπορος and conversely, because short-lived creatures have short periods of gestation, and long-lived creatures long (Arist. de gen. anim. iv 10. 777β 31 ff. al. See App. I, Pt ii § 2). Soul, viewed merely as the vital principle, is one and the same in every organic creature: hence the singular ψυχή (App. I. c.). This explanation, so far as I know, is new, the περίοδο being generally supposed to be 'Umlaufszeit.' Cf. App. I. c.

Fig. 1.

II έστι δὲ—τέλειος. 'For a divine creature, there is a period comprehended by a number which is final.' The 'divine creature' is the World: it is θείον, because it is a God, γεννητόν, because it is created (i.e. has been brought out of chaos into order). Cf. Tim. 30 A and Proclus in Tim. 89 D. With περιλαμβάνει cf. Theaet. 148 A. The ἀριθμὸς τέλειος is the period expressing the gestation of the Universe, i.e. the time which its creation occupies. For the metaphor cf. the Orphic verses cited by Proclus in Tim. 94 B and 95 E. The number is a final or consummating number because it
καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέταρτας δὲ ὄρους λαβοῦσαι, ὀμοιοῦντος τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντος καὶ αὐξητῶν καὶ φθινοτῶν,


12 ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ—ἀπίθημαν gives us the period or period of gestation for the human creature: ‘and for a human creature the number is the first in which root-and-square increases, comprehending three distances and four limits, of elements that make like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things consummable and rational with one another.’ The construction is ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ <γεννητῷ ἐτῶν ἄριμοι> ἐν ὕ κτλ., and that is itself short for ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ <γεννητῷ ἐτοῖς περιοδὸς ἀρίμοι περελαιαζόμενοι> ἐν ὕ κτλ. The ‘first’ number is of course the first number after unity. ἀνθρωπεῖς ‘increases’ may in itself mean either ‘additions’ or ‘multiplications.’ δυνάμεναι refers to ‘roots’ (cf. Encl. X def. 11), δυναστευόμεναι to ‘squares’ (Procl. in remp. comm. ed. Kroll ii p. 36. 9—12 et al.), and ‘root-and-square increases’ means either ‘additions of roots to squares’ or ‘multiplications of roots by squares.’ τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις etc. shew that multiplications and not additions are meant. The three distances are μήκος, πλάτος and βάθος, and the four ὄροι their attendant limits. Thus in Fig. 2 AB,

![Fig. 2.](image)


![Fig. 3.](image)

The Pythagorean triangle.

as we are informed by many authorities—Aristotle, Plutarch, Aristides Quintilianus, Proclus and others—Plato made use of in his Number. The antecedent of ὦν in ὄν ἐπίτροτος πυθὼν πεμπάδι συγγεισὶς ἡμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντων καὶ ἀξιοῦντων καὶ φθινοῦντων, and as ὄν ἐπίτροτος πυθὼν means ‘of which 4, 3,’ Plato himself tells us two of the numbers, and the third is also readily suggested by πεμπάδι 3, 4 and 5 are said to ‘make like,’ because, as we shall see, in the latter part of the Number, where the triangle fulfils its office as a κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον (Proclus l.c. ii p. 45. 23), they produce the ‘harmony’ 3600, and square numbers are ὄροι (Iambl. l.c. p. 82): they ‘make unlike’ because they produce...
The 'harmony' 4800 x 2700, and oblong numbers are ἀνυμωτός (fib.); they are said to wax and wane in a figurative sense—to wax in the first harmony, which represents in a certain sense the waxing of the Universe, and to wane in the second, which represents its wane. As the elements out of which the Universe is formed, they may be said to grow with its growth, and decline with its decline. The words have also a further meaning as a description of 3, 4, 5 regarded as the ἄρχαί of everything which exists: see App. I, Pt ii § 5. Now the first number in which cubings of 3, 4, and 5 are present is $3^2 + 4^2 + 5^2 = 216$, and Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage where he refers to Plato's number, speaking of the Pythagorean triangle, remarks ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πενείων ἔκαστον κατά βάθος αἰσθάνειν (βάθος γὰρ ἡ σωματος φύσις) ποιεῖται ἐν τῷ διάκόσια δέκαξ, ὑπάρχουσι γὰρ τῶν ἔπατα-μήνων (p. 151 Meibom). Aristotle also in Pol. E 12. 1316 a 5—8, according to Schneider's interpretation of his words, which I believe to be right, informs us that the whole number of this section is 216: see App. I, Pt iii. On πάντα—ἀλληλα see next note. In App. I, Pt ii § 4 I have fully treated of the meaning of all these calculations. The different mathematical terms are discussed in detail ib. Pt i § 1. My explanation of this passage is, as far as I can discover, new, except as regards αἰσθάνειν—ὑπάρχουσι· μενα. Some other views are mentioned in App. I, Pt i § 1 ad fin. in n. 15 πάντα προσήγορα κτλ. Cf. Philol. Fr. 13 Mullach πάντα γρωστά καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλήλοια—ἀπεργαζέται. The Pythagoreans asserted that the embryo develops according to the proportions of the ἄρμονια or musical scale. The first stage is complete in 6 days, the second in 8, and 8 : 6 is 'the fourth' (διὰ τέσσαρων). The third stage (making flesh) takes 9 days, and 9 : 6 is 'the fifth' (διὰ πέντε). In the next 12 days the body is formed: and 12 : 6 is the octave (διὰ παισῶν). Total 6 + 8 + 9 + 12 = 35, and 35 is a ἄρμονια (Plut. de anim. gen. in Tim. 1017 f). Now 216 = (6 x 35) + 6, so that 216 contains 6 ἄρμονια together with 6 times ἵππων ἄρχη i.e. the unit (Excerpt. ex Nicom. in v. Jan's Mus. Script. Gr. p. 279), or if you like together with the marriage number 6. For the evidence and further details see App. I, Pt ii § 4.

546 C ὅν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν κτλ. In ἀνθρωποείν δε—ἀπεφηναν the Pythagorean triangle was employed to construct the period of gestation for the microcosm or man: here it is used to construct two periods in the lifetime of the macrocosm or Universe, for that is what Plato means by the two 'harmonies.' The translation is: 'of which, 4, 3 married with 5, yields two harmonies when thrice increased, the one equal an equal number of times, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong—on the one side, of 100 squares of rational diameters of five diminished by one each, or if of irrational diameters, by two: on the other of one hundred cubes of three.' The antecedent of ὅν is ἰμανοίων τε καὶ ἰμανοίωντων καὶ αἰσθά- των καὶ φυσιών, which I have already interpreted as the numbers 3, 4, 5. Of these numbers (ὁν) the ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν i.e. 3, 4 (cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 80 ed. Hiller, Proclus i. c. ii p. 37 ὅ πυθμήν τ霭δρατ' καὶ 5), is 'married or 'coupled' with 5. That is to say, 3, 4, and 5 are multiplied together: whence we get $3 \times 4 \times 5 = 60$. 'Thrice increased' is 'three times multiplied by itself'; and 60 thrice increased is therefore $60 \times 60 \times 60$. This sum, which is 12,960,000, yields two harmonies. One of the two harmonies is 'equal an equal number of times, viz. so many times 100,' in other words, it is a square (cf. Theat. 147 E) each of whose sides is a certain number of times 100 (for τοσούτως cf. τοσούτων in Alc. 108 b), viz. of course 36 times 100, for $60 \times 60 \times 60 = 3600^2$. See Fig. 4.
Theaet. 148 a), one of whose sides is one hundred cubes of 3, i.e. 2700, and the other the number which Plato describes in ἐκάστον μὲν—διὸν. What is that number? ἀριθμὸν ἀρδέν means (numerical) ‘squares of’ (cf. Procl. l. c. II p. 38. 9 et al.); the side in question is therefore ‘100 squares’—what? Of the rational diameter of 5 etc. Now the ‘rational diameter of 5’ is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose side is 5 (Theo l. c. pp. 43 ff. and other authorities). The real diameter of a square whose side is 5 is \(\sqrt{50}\). See Fig. 5. \(AC^2 = 5^2 + 5^2 = 50\) (by Pythagoras’ famous ὀρθου εὐθεία Eucl. I 47): \(AC = \sqrt{50}\). And the nearest rational number to \(\sqrt{50}\) is 7; for \(\sqrt{49} = 7\). Consequently 7 is the ‘rational diameter’ of 5. And 100 squares of 7 = 100 \(\times\) 49 = 4900. But we are told to diminish the 100 squares by 1 each. Do so: 4900 – (1 \(\times\) 100) = 4800. This side is therefore 4800. The words ἀρρήτων ἐδ οὐν give us an alternative way of reaching the number 4800. The construction is \(\triangle \) ἀρρήτων ἐδ \(<\) διαρρήτων δεμένων \(\geq\) υὸν \(\triangle \) ἐκάστων\(>\) (or of 100) ‘squares of irrational diameters of 5, wanting 1 each.’ Now the irrational diameter of 5 is \(\sqrt{50}\). Square this and it becomes 50. 100 squares of 50 = 5000. Subtract 2 from each square and you have 5000 – (2 \(\times\) 100) = 4800. The two sides of the oblong are therefore 4800 and 2700 (‘one hundred cubes of three’). The area is 4800 \(\times\) 2700 = 12,960,000 which is 60 \(\times\) 60 \(\times\) 60 \(\times\) 60. See Fig. 6. Thus the arithmetical meaning of this part of Plato’s Number may be expressed by us as follows:

\[
(3 \times 4 \times 5)^2 = 3600^2 = 4800 \times 2700.
\]

In this explanation, which is defended at length in App. I, Pt i § 2, the most important novelty is my view of τῆς αὐξήσεως. Most, but not quite all, of the other expressions have been explained in the above way at one time or another, though never, as far as I have noticed, by any single critic. The meaning of ἐκτίμησις πωμὴν was perfectly well known to ancient mathematicians: and Proclus fully understood the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ diameters of 5. The full explanation of ἐκάστον μὲν—τριαδὸς is due to Barozzi, except that he did not multiply the sides. As regards τῆς αὐξήσεως, I believe that I have proved my view in App. I, Pt i § 2 and Pt iii. Here I will only say that just as in the increasing series 1, 60, 3600, 216000 the number 216000 or 60 is the ‘third increase’ (τρίτη αὐξήσι) of unity, so in the increasing series 60, 3600, 216000, 12960000, the number 12960000 or (as we express it, but as Plato, to whom ‘power’ means either ‘square’ or ‘root’, never did or could express it, 60) is the third increase of 60.

15 συνήγεις. The metaphor is from marriage, and marriage, among the Pythagoreans, was usually expressed by multiplication. Thus 6, which is the product of the first male number 3 and the first female number 2, was called by them marriage. συνήγεια also means ‘multiplied with’ in Proclus l. c. II p. 544 (App. I, Pt i § 2).

Δυὸ ἀρμονίας. The square and oblong may be regarded as ἀρμονίαι because in them, as in the number 216 above, all things are προσθήκῃ καὶ ἡγεῖ πῶς ἀλλήλα. Thus \(12,960,000 = (35 + 1) \times 360,000\), so that, as 35 is a ἀρμονία, 12,960,000 contains the portentous number of 360,000 ἀρμονίαι plus \(1 \times 360,000 = 360,000\), each ἀρμονία thus having added to it, as before, the unit which is ἡ πάντων ἀρχή. The analogy between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm is thus preserved: see on πάντα—ἡγεῖ 546. B
above. So much for the arithmetical meaning of the term ἄρμονια. In App. I, Pt ii § 5 I have given my reasons for connecting the two ἄρμονια with the myth of the Politicus. In that myth we are told how two cycles of equal and vast duration invariably succeed one another in the life of the Universe, a progressive and a retrogressive cycle. These two cycles are two Great Years, in the first of which ὁμόιος prevails and the Universe is fresh and strong, while in the second, in which we are living now, ἀνωμοιός begins to assert itself and the Universe flags and wanes. Cf. 547 Α' n. Here the first ἄρμονια, which is a square and therefore ὁμοιος, represents the progressive cycle, the cycle of ὁμοιός, and the second ἄρμονια, which is an oblong, and therefore ἀνωμοιον (see above on 546 b line 12), stands for the retrogressive cycle, the cycle of ἄνωμοιός. If this identification is, as I believe, correct, each ἄρμονια represents a Great Year. The area or number of each harmony, according to Plato, is 12,960,000, and as Plato elsewhere says that the Great Year is measured τῷ τοῦ ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοίου ἀντίστοις κύκλῳ (I Tim. 39 D), i.e. by the diurnal revolutions of the heavens, we may take this number as denoting days. Converted into years, on the astronomical calculation of 360 days to the year, followed by Plato here and elsewhere, the number becomes 36,000 years, which was known in Ptolemaic astronomy as the magnus Platonius annum. For the evidence on all these points, see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5, 6.

20 ἐξίμπας δὲ οὖτος κτλ. 'This whole number, a number measuring the earth, is lord of better and worse births.' On its arithmetical side, γεωμετρικός means only that the number is reached by means of γεωμετρία and expressed in geometrical figures: but I have no doubt that Plato meant the word to bear another and pro-founder meaning, suitable to the real import of the two harmonies whereof this is the number. The number is τῷ ὧν γεωμετρικός, for it measures an aeon of the Universe, of which the Earth is part (cf. 555 A n. and VI 511 B n.): and indeed it is artistically right that the meaning of the two harmonies should be summed up at the climax of the whole in a single pregnant word. How do good and bad births depend upon this number? Because in the early days of our era, when God had but lately left the world, and ἀνωμοιός and ἀνομαλία were young, Nature produced better children than οὐ οὖν βροτόν εἶσον. Plato in fact invites us to think of his city as having existed soon after the change to the aeon in which we now live, just as throughout Book VIII and part of IX the Ideal City is figured in the past. For more on this subject see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5-7. I know not what others will think, but to me it seems that the extraordinary range and elevation of its central ideas make the Platonic number worthy even of a writer who is full of 'thoughts that wander through eternity.' The connexion between the Human Child and the Divine, the Microcosm and the Macrocusm, has played no small part in the history of human thought, and the story of a Great Year, with the hope which it affords of the ἀποκατάστασις of all things (Acts 3, 21), has been and is, in its religious setting, the solace and support of many a 'human child.' 546 D 22 para kairoph: 'inopportune,' 'improperly': cf. Pol. 277 A and οὗ δέον 546 b. The phrase does not, as I once thought, imply that Nature has appointed certain periodic times or seasons in the life of men and women when their union will produce good offspring, but refers to unions of wrong couples, superabundance of marriages, and the like: cf. v 459 E ff. The notion that the number of the Great Year is to be
used by the rulers as a means of determining at what time unions should take place, derives no support from the Greek, and ought not to be entertained. In point of fact, the number is not a nuptial but a secular number, being γωνιομετρον ὡς ἀληθὸς. The expression 'nuptial number' is not applied to it either by Plato or by Aristotle, and it is only in later writers that we meet with ὁ τῶν λεγόμενον γάμου τότος (Nicom. Introd. Ar. p. 144 Ast), γαμήλων διάγραμμα (Plut. de Is. et Os. 373 F) and γαμήλων ἀρθμὸς (Jambl. in Nic. Ar. p. 52. 21 Pistelli).

23 καταστήσασθαι. The active καταστήσασθαι, found in ν and two other MSS of little moment, is read by Hermann. Some may prefer it because καταστήσασθαι is passive just below: but Plato is careless about matters of this kind, and it is better to follow the best MSS.

25 ἡμῶν κτλ.: 'us they will first begin to neglect when they are Guards' (i.e. after they have come εἰς τῶν πατέρων δόματας), 'setting too little store by music first, and second by gymnastic.' Political decay is constantly associated by Plato with neglect of 'Music': see on IV 424 C. In place of δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικά, which is in all MSS, Balier adopts Madvig's conjecture δεύτερα τε γυμναστικά. At first sight ἵδεν ἄμοιστορει—νέοι would seem to favour such an alteration, as well as the fact that in the city which comes next in order Gymnastic is more esteemed than Music (348 C). But πρῶτον after ἡμῶν supports the MS tradition, and the decline of the ideal city, which, as we have seen, arises from inevitable organic deterioration, shews itself in a general lowering of vital energy, rather than in the exaltation of any one pursuit at the expense of another. In the Spartan city Gymnastic ranks higher than Music, because Music has fallen from the high position which she formerly occupied, and not because Gymnastic stands higher than before.

27 ἢδεν—νέοι: 'and so our children will forget us.' The Muses are speaking, and the children of Plato's Muse may well be called the Muses' children. This is the force of ἡμῶν, which is the reading of A, Σ and some other MSS: Π and others have ήμων. Schneider says "Μοβοιας—ἀμοισον γέγραβα νullo modo tolerabile est." That is true, only ήμων does not go with ἄμοιστορει, but is an ethic dative, and seems to me at least to be full of a strange beauty and pathos. As true Gymnastic educates the soul and not the body (III 410 c ff.), the neglect of Gymnastic in the ideal city itself contributes to ἄμοισια.

547 Α 1 τὰ παρ' ὑμῖν γένη. See III 415 Α ff.

3 ἄμοισιτης καὶ ἄνωμαλα ἄναρμοστος. We have already seen that as the second scroll of the World's life unfolds itself, ἄμοισιτης, ἄνωμαλα, and ἄναρμοστια, with their attendant refinement of sedition, strife and war, make their appearance and wax more and more aggressive, until at last, in the words of the Politicus, careful lest the world χειμασθείς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθῇ εἰς τὸν τῆς ἄνομοισιτητος ἄπειρον οὐτὰ τὸ ὅπων δόγ, God takes the helm again and κοιμᾶτε τὲ καὶ ἐπαναρχῶν ἀδάνατον αὐτῶν καὶ ἄγνωρον ἀπεργαζάτε (Pol. 273 D f.). See on 546 C and App. I, Pt. ii § 5. The same insidious enemies, not from any fault of the rulers, but because the part must neces-
sarily suffer with the whole, fasten both on the perfect individual and on the perfect State, and the fall of men and cities, which Plato describes in viii and ix, is one long record of the triumphal progress of áρμοστής, until at last she sits enthroned in the soul and city of the tyrant. The Platonic number is thus the setting in which Plato’s ‘Philosophy of History’ is framed.

§ tauntès toj geneas.

From Homer Π. vi 211: al. tauntès toj geneas te kai ámastos e'çhomaie elwai. Plato means of course ‘Such, as we must say, is the pedigree of Sedition, wheresoever she arises.’ D. and V. are wholly wrong when they translate: ‘so that we may positively assert that the rise of such a generation will invariably be marked by divisions.’

547 b 9 eilektēn ktl. The logical object of eilektēn and ἡγέτην (in line 13) is τὴν πολιτείαν. For the omission of the object with ἐκ λοις and ἐγὼ cf. 560 b, X 604 A, 604 D et al. It is only another way of expressing oneself to say that the verbs are practically intransitive. The sedition which arises is not between rulers and ruled, but between the rulers among themselves, as is clear from 545 D and elsewhere: hence τὸ μὲν σιδήρων καὶ χαλκοῦν does not refer to the farmers and artisans, who probably possessed oikia from the first (III 417 A 11.), but to the section of the rulers who have become σιδήρων and χαλκοῦν by the intermixure of different breeds. Cf. the oracle foretelling the destruction of the city ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σίδηρος ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς φιλάτῃ (III 415 c).

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change is effected, as in the case of the corresponding man (§ 550 B), by a peaceful compromise. In the later stages of political decay, when ἄρεωδος has gathered strength, revolution is attended by civil war (§ 557 A), and the tyrant wades through bloodshed to his throne (565 E f.).

10 περίοικοι τε καὶ οἰκεῖας. We meet with περίοικοι not only in Sparta, of which city Plato is chiefly thinking, but also in Crete, Thessaly and Argos; see Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II pp. 16, 74, 220. In each of these States there was also an inferior grade, in Sparta the Helots, in Crete the θρόνιοι of the Gortynian inscription, sometimes also spoken of as οἰκέται, in Thessaly the περίοικοι, and in Argos the γυμνωτητες or γυμνωσίας (Gilbert Lc.). It is clear, I think, that in οἰκέται Plato is thinking of this lowest order. The Spartan Helots had to perform the duties of domestic servants, as appears from Plut. Lyc. et Num. comp. 2. 4 ὅποι ἢ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευή δεδομένη δοῦλοι καὶ ἔλλησιν, ὡσπερ ἢ περὶ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ ὧν διακοινοῦν. The function of watching and guarding—sensu inimico—of the περίοικοι and οἰκέται. The institutions and history of Sparta are a sufficient commentary on the phrase.

19 οὐκοῦν—πολιτεία. Cf. § 547 c n.

547 C So much for the origin of Timarchy. In character, it will resemble Aristocracy on the one hand, and Oligarchy on the other; partly also it will have peculiarities of its own. The aristocratical features of Timarchy are respect for the ruling class and so forth; its own distinctive peculiarity is the love of war and warlike matters; in expedition and avarice it is like Oligarchy. On the whole Timarchy is a mixture of good and evil; but the one conspicuous feature of this polity is the love of victory and honour.

547 D C Plato’s description of ‘timocracy’ is, as he says himself, a sketch (§ 548 D), but one in which hardly any feature of first-rate importance is wholly ignored. He regards ‘timocracy’ as primarily and essentially the political embodiment of θυγαείας (§ 548 c), and consequently a sort of half-way house between aristocracy and oligarchy, as θυγαείας is between λογισμοῖς and φιλοχρήματος. It is, however, at the same time a ‘mixed’ constitution (§ 548 c n.), and partakes in the characteristics of both its neighbours. The portrait of timocracy is drawn in the main from Sparta, as the notes will show, but it represents the Sparta of the fifth rather than of the fourth century, during which the oligarchic element in the Spartan constitution began to acquire an undue predominance, owing to the temptations of empire and other causes: cf. Isocr. de Pace 95—103. Plato’s sketch may be filled in from the sources enumerated in Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. pp. 176—191, 251—260. The student of Greek history and political science should read Aristotle’s account of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan polities (Pol. B 9, 10) in connexion with Plato’s description of the timarchical constitution and the timarchical man. See also Schoemann-Lipsius Griech. Alterthümer pp. 196—323.

548 D C 548 ἔξοργιών—χρηματισµοῦ: I4—2

26 ξευστία. Cf. Hermann-Thumer l.c. pp. 182-191. In Crete, the ξευστία were maintained at the expense of the State; in Sparta, by the contributions of the ξευστίον. The former arrangement of course prevailed in the ideal city (111 416 E), and as timarchy copies the ideal city in regard to ξευστία (τὴν προτέραν μιμήσατα), we may suppose that in the timarchical polity, as conceived by Plato, the Cretan method was observed. Cf. Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271b 28 ff. and see also on 551 A, B.

28 τῷ δὲ γε φοβείσθαι κτλ. The Spartans were notorious for their dislike and distrust of knowledge and intellectual cultivation: see Hipp. Mai. 285 B ff. and Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271b 1 ff., with Susemihl and Hicks' notes. For the anacoluthon τῷ δὲ γε—τὰ πολλὰ—ἐξεί (548 A cf. (with Schneider) Laws 931 C, 949 A.

547 E 29 κεκτημένη. See cr. n. Bekker's silence is often untrustworthy, and as he omitted Α and Ξ as well as ν in the list of mss which read κεκτημένη, it is doubtful if even ν has the nominative here. κεκτημένη is however very awkward from its position between τῷ προτέραν μιμήσαται and πολεμόσα, and the error is so easy and common that I agree with Bekker and others in rejecting the accusative. See Introd. § 5. In illustration of what Plato says we may contrast Pausanias for example and Lysander with Brasidas and Calliocrates. The former were σοφοὶ but far from ἀπλοῖοι: the latter θυμοειδεῖς and ἀπλούστεροι.

30 τοὺς τοιούτους: i.q. τοὺς σοφοὺς. With μεικτοὺς cf. 547 A.

31 ἀπλούστερος = ‘more single-minded.’ Since they distrust σοφοὶ be-
cause their σοφοὶ are not ἀπλοῖοι, it is natural enough that they should seek ἀπλούστεροι, and find them in θυμοειδεῖς, whose single all-engrossing idea is war (548 A) and φιλοκίλαι (548 C). The text would hardly have been suspected if critics had grasped the meaning of ἀπλοῖοι (see on 1 351 A, 11 370 B and 14 434 C).

As it is, there is a host of superfluous conjectures: ἀλλοκοτέρως, άνατιτρός, ἀνθωδέστερος, ποικιλάτερος (Ast), πολ- λαπλούστερος (Stallbaum), ἀγχυροστέρος (Müller), ὑποσαιωνοστέρος (Herwerden), ἀμονιστέρος (Herwerden, Apelt, Richards). It should be remembered that the Spartans prided themselves upon τὸ ἀπλοῦν in the ordinary sense of the term.


καὶ πολεμοῦσα κτλ. Isocrates says much the same of Sparta in Paneg. 128 and Philipp. 51: cf. also Laws 686 B. The description up to this point recalls to some extent the city of Books 11—14, minus the ἄρχοντες proper and some parts of the ‘musical’ education, and Plato may well have looked on the constitution of Lycurgus, from which he borrowed several features, as in some respects a kind of imperfect edition of his earlier καλλίτολις. See on this subject K. F. Hermann Die historischen Elemente d. plat. Staatsideals, in his Gesammelte Abhandlungen, pp. 132—159. Cf. also Laws 692 C. where the Lacedaemonian polity is called a παράδειγμα γεγονός. In what follows the strictly oligarchical features of the Spartan polity are described.

3 έπιθυμητάι δὲ γε κτλ. Spartan avarice was the theme of universal com-

5 τιμώτες ἀγρίως: 'passionately adoring.' The adverb was unnecessarily suspected by Herderven.


οἰκεῖοι—κρυπταῖαι refers specifically to the hoarding of specie as practised by Spartan citizens. It may be doubted whether the Thucydidean Pericles was justified even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war in telling the Athenians that the Spartans possessed οὐσὶν ἑδαύν οὐσὶν ἐν κοινῷ χρήματα (1 141. 3), in spite of Xenophon Rep. Lac. 7. 6.

7 περιβόλους οἰκησεων κτλ.: not 'walled houses' (D. and V.) but 'dwellings to encompass them withal, veritable private nests': cf. Theact. 174 Ε σηκών ἐν οἷς τὸ τεῖχος περιβληθημένον and Crat. 400 C. The phrase has a poetical sound and may be taken from the drama, but is more likely to be one of Plato's own poetical flourishes. A Spartan husband could occasionally escape from the rigid discipline of camp-life and take shelter—this is the force of περιβόλου—inside his own domestic nest: see Plut. Lyæ. 17. 4—7. Plato seems to imply that this arrangement encouraged habits of extravagance and luxuriousness in the wives as well as in the husbands: cf. Arist. Pol. B 9. 1250b 22 ἃς ἔχουσι γὰρ (the Spartan wives) ἀκολούθως πρὸς ἄπαν ἀκολούθιας καὶ τρυφερῶς. Aristotle's remark is amply borne out by other evidence: see Hermann-Thummer l.c. p. 180 n. 5 and Newman on Arist. l.c.

548 B 8 οἰς ἐθελον ἀλλοι: masculine, not (as D. and V. translate), neuter. The reference is probably intended to include παίδακα as well as others. The Spartan's domestic nest was doubtless occasionally a nest of vice.

12 τῶν νόμων ἀποδιδάσκοντες. The expression is borrowed by Aristotle Pol. B 9. 1270b 34, where see Newman's note.

13 τῆς ἀληθείας—φιλοσοφίας. Cf. the famous saying φιλοσοφία μεγάλητη μοιρικὴ in Phaed. 61 A.

548 C 15 μεμυγμένην καὶ μέμκηται sound half-technical, and it is clear from Laws 712 Dff., 691 E, 693 D, Isocr. Nicocles 24 (with Arap. 61) and Arist. Pol. Δ 9. 1294b 18 ff. that Greek political theorists were in the habit of viewing the Spartan constitution as a 'mixed polity,' although they did not always analyse the μιξις in the same way: cf. Henkel Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre v. Staat p. 62 nn. 35, 36, and Whibley Gk Olig. pp. 14, 19. The
analysis which is attributed to Archytas may serve as a specimen: "..." and "The analysis which is attributed to Archytas may serve as a specimen: "..."

Plato's Deity: "..."

with that of the timarchial State (548 D—549 B). In origin (continues Socrates) he was the son of a good father living in an ill-regulated city and abstaining from public life. Drawn by his father's precepts and example towards the higher life, and by maternal and other influences towards the lower, he finally surrendered himself to the dominion of the intermediate principle in the soul, and thus became timarchial.

25 ἄνευ τῶν γενόμενων: 'how did he arise?' Richards proposes γεγονότος: but the past tense is in harmony with ἔμπεσε 545 D, with εἰλή尽早, ἔτεκθα, ὠμολογήσαν 547 B, and indeed with the whole of Plato's exposition, which is deliberately arrayed in the vesture of a historical narrative or epic poem: see on 543 A, 544 C. It appears to be the custom to translate most of the aorists of this kind in Books VIII and IX by the present, but in some cases the effect is much more realistic and picturesque if we make them past, and I think that Plato intended some of these aorists to be understood in that way. The instances in point are 550 B ἐλθεῖσαι, παρέδωκε, εὐγένετο, 550 E ἀπειρῆσαντο, 551 B καταστήσαντο, 555 D ῥήγαγασαν, 560 A—C ὑπεχύρωσε, ἔδοξαν, ἐξέστησαν, κατεκαμάθη, ἔγένετο, ἀληθῶς, ἐνέχει, κατέλαβαν, κατέσχερ, 565 B ἔσχον, 566 E ἀληθέσθωσι, διδόμενη. Except in 550 E, 551 B, 555 D, 556 B, and 566 B, in which the aorists are no doubt the so-called gnomic aorists "used in animated language to express general truths" (Goodwin III: p. 53), each of these tenses is in my opinion correctly translated by a past in English. Plato of course repeatedly employs the
present also, not only where he is painting a scene (e.g. 549 B ff., 553 A ff., 555 C ff.), but also when he is describing the actual genesis of a particular sort of commonwealth or individual (e.g. 550 D, 551 A, B al. and many instances of γλυφεται), and in such cases the appearance of historical narration is not preserved, for it would be pedantic to view all these presents as merely examples of the praeceps historiacum. See also on 549 C.

27 φιλονικίας: ‘desire to excel.’ The translations ‘party-spirit’ (D. and V.), ‘spirit of contention’ (Jowett) are misleading: see 548 C n. On Glauco’s φιλονικία see Introd. § 2.

548 E 29 υπόσωμοσήτορεφ. It is unnecessary (with Herwerden) to add <μεν> , although υπόσωμοσήτορεφ is contrasted with φιλόμουσοι: see on I 340 D.

30 φιλόμουσοι. The ‘timocratic’ man has neglected τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μοι-
σης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας (548 B), but he is nevertheless φιλόμου-


31 οὐ καταφρονοντα κτλ. is a subtle psychological touch. Those who have no moral or intellectual right to ‘despise’ inferiors are apt to treat them harshly, in the vain effort to convince themselves of their own superiority. ὁ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος uses those below him “as creatures of another place” (All’s well that ends well l. 2. 41). Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 8. 1124b 5. 20 and (for καταφρονών) Thuc. II 62. 4 ἀδύμα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπό ἀμαθίας εὔθειοι καὶ διεύθυναι ἐγγύνεται, καταφρονήσει δὲ δὲ 

εἰ ἀν καὶ γνώμη πιστεύει τῶν ἐναντίων προφερεῖ.

3 οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν κτλ. Cf. Prot. 342 E ff. The Spartans were men of deeds, not words.

5 φιλογυμναστική—φιλόθηρος: as in Sparta: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 182 nn. 1, 2.

549 B 8 ὡς δὲ πρεσβύτερος κτλ. The life of the timocratic man is an epitome of that of the State, in which,
as actually happened at Sparta, the oligarchical element grows more and more powerful as time goes on (547 c n.).

11 λόγον—κεκραμένον recalls the ἀλήθεια Μοίσα of 548 B.

12 σωτήρ ἀρετῆς. Virtue is never secure unless it rests on knowledge, and can render a λόγος of itself: cf. VI 497 c and VII 531 E mii.

549 C 15 ἐνίοτε κτλ. Kohrn finds a difficulty in οὐκ εἰ τοιοτομῇ, for timarchy is a degeneration of the perfect city (Pl. St. pp. 208 ff., insufficiently refuted by Grimmelt de recp. Pi. comp. et unitl. p. 71). But Plato is here speaking of the origin of the 'timarchical' man, not of the 'timarchical' State, and the ἄρσοτερκατίκος whose son becomes τιμοκρατικός may be found in any one of the degenerate commonwealths, although he will not rule except 'in his own city,' i.e. aristocracy. We must beware of supposing that there is no remnant of good men in deprived States (cf. VI 492 E ff., 496 C ff., IX 521 E ff.). If Plato had here preserved the fiction of a historical narrative and made the τιμοκρατικός νεώνias the son, of an ἄρσοτερκατικός in his own ideal city, he could only have attributed his fall to the same law of natural degeneration which subtended the καλλίστον (546 A fl.). As it is, the description is drawn from facts of daily experience and observation, and Plato, as is suggested by the Oxford editors, may well be thinking of some 'Laconizing youth of Athens,' perhaps of some member of the Socratic circle. We have already seen that Plato frequently deserts the epic or narrative form of exposition which he has chosen to express his views: see above on 548 D. I formerly printed a comma after πως and a full stop after ἔχειν, but now revert to Stallbaum's punctuation, because (1) the contrast with καὶ ἔστι μὲν γε κτλ. seems to require a fuller pause after πως, (2) ἐνίοτε—ἐχείν does not explain the γένεις of the τιμοκρατικός, as it ought to do, if γένεις—ἐχείν is all one sentence, (3) Adimanus' interruption τὴν δὴ—γένεις, which calls attention in a lively manner to the point which Plato wishes to emphasize, is most easily accounted for on the supposition that ἐνίοτε κτλ. begins a separate sentence: cf. 567 E n. and Soph. ο. C. 644 f., with Jebb's note. νέος νόσι is resumed in νέος (550 Α), and has no other predicate except ἃδει etc. in 550 B.

17 φεύγοντο κτλ. Cf. VI 496 C ff. and Theaet. 173 C ff. φυιγαρὴ (if the word may be allowed) on the part of the best men was a growing evil in Athenian politics: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 749 n. 4. In a bad State, according to Aristotle (Pol. Ι 4), the good man is apt to be a bad citizen.

549 C D 19 ὅταν κτλ.: 'whenever, I continued, he listens in the first instance to his mother, who is annoyed because her husband has no place in the government and is on that account belittled among the other wives, and who also sees,' πρῶτον μὲν has nothing to do with ἐπιστα, but prepares us for καὶ οἷς οἶκεται κτλ. in 549 E. See also on 549 D. Kohrn (Pl. St. p. 198) thinks the present sentence inconsistent with the position assigned to women in ν; but actual wives ἐν πόλει οὐκ εἰς πολιτευόμενη may be allowed to differ from the perfect products of an
ideal city. Plato's description as realistic as anything could well be: he speaks as though εἰσφέρετον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγοροῦν ἐν ταῖς κατ' οἴκαν πράξεως (IX 577 A). Socrates and his relations with Xanthippe possibly furnished some details of the picture (so also Müller on p. 749 of his Translation).

549 D. 23 λοιδορόμενον is certainly middle, not passive, as Ast imagined: cf. VI 500 η.

ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. The opposition between ἑδικαὶ and δημόται δίκαι (cf. Λουκ. 927 A) is not to the point here, as Vernhenn remarks (Plat. Stud. p. 107), but we should not, with that critic, expunge ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. The expression ἑδικαὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ refers to ἑδικαὶ δίκαι: and δημόται to other public gatherings, as e.g. the assembly: cf. Theat. 174 C ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἔνοι ποιὸν ἀλλοὶ ἀναγκασθῆ κτλ.

24 ῥαβδιμός κτλ.: 'indifferent to everything else': cf. Xen. Mem. II 9. 1, Theat. 173 C, D and (for the vague use of τα τοιαῦτα) VII 536 A.

25 ἀισθάνητα is usually explained as by anacoluthon for ἀισθανομένη: but no parallels have been cited, nor are the anacolutha by which Engelhardt (Anac. Pl. Spec. 111 p. 43) illustrates the sentence in any degree comparable. The sense compels us to regard the subject of ἀισθάνητα as the mother, but grammatically it can only, as with ἀκόη, be the son. I formerly placed ἀισθάνηται after ἁχομένης τε: Richards excises it altogether. Neither solution is perfectly satisfactory; and it is possible that the sentence by some accident or other was imperfectly revised by Plato. The grammatical structure of this chapter from ἐν εἰστε πατήρ down to ἐπαινομένου (550 A) is considerably freer than is usual even with Plato, and there are other passages in Book VIII which seem to stand in need of revision: cf. 494 A η. Nothing is easier than to 'emend' them all in accordance with our grammatical rules, but such emendations involve so great a departure from the mss. that they lack every element of probability, and as it is possible that the fault is Plato's, it is safer for us to adhere to the mss. Nearly all the greatest writers occasionally offend against the rules by which we seek to bind them. See the excellent remarks of Longinus on the subject of correctness τετυπείς fire in composition (περὶ ὑποκλίτων 33—35).

27 ἀνανδρος—καὶ λλαν ἀνεμίμους rings poetical. The rhythm may be intentional, to suit ὑπερεῖν: or Plato may have taken the words from a tragedian. Such a line as ἀνανδρός ἐτε καὶ λλαν ἀνεμίμους might well have been applied by Zethus to Amphion in Euripides Antiope, which was in effect a comparison between the πρακτικός and the ἄρωπος βίος: see Gorg. 485 ff. and Eur. Frag. 157 Dind. Cf. also VI 494 D η.
550 A 7 ἄκουει. See cr. n. If we retain ἄκουει, ὅταν must be carried on from 549 C, in spite of the intervening sentences in 549 E. In that case we should regard Socrates' description (549 C - 550 B) as virtually a single sentence ἐν οἷο- ἐχειν, ὅταν - ὄμειν, καὶ ἐξιῶν—ἐπανυμένους, τότε δὴ—ἀνήρ, and ignore Adimantus' replies, as well as οἶδα οὖν—πατρὸς (549 E). But although ὅταν sometimes extends its influence in this way (VII 540 D—541 A), the interposition of 549 E makes it very difficult to retain the subjunctive here, and I therefore agree with other editors in holding the sentence to be independent. Cf. 553 B n.

6 παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. Others know his father πάροικον: the son sees him near at hand, comparing his ways of life with those of other men—and consequently understands and appreciates his father more. J. and C. wrongly translate "having a nearer view of his father's ways than of the ways of others."

7 ἐλκόμενος κτλ. describes the στάσεις in the soul. Cf. 545 C, D.

550 B 8 ἄρδοντος. The metaphor is common: cf. x 660 D and Ἐνυπηρή. 2 D with my note ad loc. So also in Cor. 1 3 - 6 ἔγω ἐφότευσα, Ἀπόλλων ἐπότισαν.

9 διὰ τὸ κτλ.: 'because he is not naturally a bad man,' lit. 'his nature is not that of a bad man': not 'because he is by birth the son of no bad man.'

10 εἰς τὸ μέσον—ἡθε κτλ. A compromise is effected, reminding us of the compromise which converted the aristocratical State into timarchia: cf. 547 B εἰς μέσον ὑμολόγησαν κτλ. The aristocrats ἡθε, παράδοκε etc. are past, and should be so translated: see on 548 D.

14 ἔξομεν ἀρα κτλ. Richards thinks this sentence interrogative; but ἀρα rather points the other way.

550 C—551 C Next in order comes Oligarchy or Plutocracy. The change originates in the growth of avarice and cupidity within the timarchial State; it is completed as soon as a property qualification for the holding of office has been established by law.

550 C 16 οὐκόν μετὰ τούτο κτλ. As θυμοίδες in Timarchy superseded λαστικῆς, so in Oligarchy φιλοχρήματος. The lower 'parts' of soul assert the mastery in turn, as the scale of commonwealth descends (cf. 553 D and 547 C n.); and the continuity is unbroken, for the element of φιλοχρήματος already displayed an ominous activity in the Spartan State, although it had not yet attained the
sovereign place. Plato's description of Greek oligarchies, if we judge it by the facts of history, probably lays rather too much emphasis on its philosopher's sense: but it is certainly true that the pursuit of riches was the characteristic feature of ancient oligarchy. See on the whole subject Whibley Greek Oligarchies, and Newman The Politics of Aristotle (pp. xxxvi—xxxvi, and compare the account which Aristotle gives of the causes producing revolution in what he calls 'aristocracies' (Pol. B 7).

17 in the Euprates. See 515 B ff.

20 the at oligarchies. By Herodotus (i.i.81) oligarchia is used in its strictly etymological sense; and Socrates' own name for that which Plato calls 'oligarchy' was πλουσιοκρατία (Mem. IV 6. 12). The establishment of a property qualification for full citizenship was the central feature in the programme of the Athenian oligarchical party from 412 B.C. onwards: see (for (411) Thuc. V 62. 3, 97. 1 and (for 404) Xen. Hell. II 3. 48, with Hermann-Thumer I.C. pp. 724—734. It is therefore natural enough that Plato should define oligarchy as he does, especially as in his younger days, both personally and

through his friends, he was himself connected with the Athenian oligarchical faction (Grote VIII p. 30). The term 'oligarchy' retained its Platonic sense after Plato (cf. e.g. Arist. Pol. 1830 B 1. 'ἀναγκαζομένοι τὴν ἐξουσίαν...' Ναι. Καὶ μήν, ἡ δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλὸν ἡ δῆλον, ὡς μεταβαίνει. Πῶς; 'Τὸ ταμείον, ἡ δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο έκαστον χρυσόν πληροίμενον ἀπόλλυσε τὴν τοιαύτην 25 πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὐτῶς ἑξευρίσκομαι, καὶ Εὔφορος νόμους ἐπὶ τούτῳ παράγομαι, ἀπειθοῦντες ἀυτοὶ ἐπὶ καὶ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν. Εἰκός, ἐφη. Ἡ ἐπειτά γε, οἶμαι, ἄλλος ἄλλον ῥόμοι καὶ εἰς ξῆλον ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιούτων αὐτῶν ἀπειθήσατο. 19. τοιαύτην II et in marg. A²: om. A¹. 28. αὐτῶν II: αὐτῶν A.
30 Εἰκός. Τούτων τούς, εἴπων, προίντασ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ὡσπὸ ἐν τούτῳ τιμιώτερον ἦγονται, τοσοῦτῳ ἀρετῆ ἀτιμιότεραν. ἡ οὖν οὕτω πλοῦτον ἀρετὴ διεστηκεν, ὡσπερ ἐν πλαστηγι ἄγος κειμένον ἐκατέρου ἂν τούτον μέρον τέποντε; Καὶ μᾶλ, ἐφι. Τιμομένου δὴ πλοῦτον ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλούσιων ἀτιμιότερα ἀρετὴ τε καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ. Δήλων. Ἀσκείται δὴ το ἂν τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμιαζόμενον. Οὔτω. Ἀντί δὴ φιλοφυκῶν καὶ φιλοσίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισται καὶ φιλοχρήματι τοῖς τελευτώντες ἐγένουτο, καὶ τοῦ μὲν πλοῦσιον ἑπινοοῦσιν τε καὶ θαυμάζουσιν καὶ εἰς τὰς ἁρχὰς ἄγουσιν, τὸν δὲ πένητα ἀτιμάζουσιν. Πάνω γε. Οὐκών τότε δὴ νόμον τίθεντα ὑπὸν πολιτείας ὑλογραφικής, ταξάμενον πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὐ μὲν μᾶλλον ὁλογραφία Β πλέον, οὐ δὲ ἤπτον, ἔλαττον, προεισόντες ἁρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν, δὲ ἂν
tense see 548 D n. A few MSS read ἀπειρόγάστο: but ἄλλος ἄλλον is in partitive apposition to the plural subject, according to the regular idiom: cf. II 369 B, C, IX 581 c n.

32 ἡ οὐκ κτλ. Cf. 555 c and especially Laws 743 a ff. ἁγαθῶν δὲ διὰ διαφερόντων καὶ πλοῦσιον εἶναι διαφερόντων ἄδικαν ("how hardly shall a rich man," etc.). Other parallels are quoted by Spiess Logos Spermatikos p. 74. Cf. also III 416 E n.

ὡσπερ κτλ.: "as we were inclining always in opposite directions when each is placed in the scale of a balance." As the scale containing virtue rises, that containing riches falls, and vice versa. Cf. Hom. Il. xxii 209 ff. Madvig's κείμενον ἐκατέρου, though adopted even by J. and C., is questionable Greek, and certainly no improvement. ὡσπερ should be taken with ἐπότον "quasi non πλοῦτον ἀρετὴ διεστηκεν, sed πλοῦτο καὶ ἁρετὴ διεστηκατο πρακτισσιτο" (Schneider). There is a kindred figure in 544 E above: ἀν ὡσπερ ἡφαίστα τάλα ἐφελλόγαται. Ξ and some other inferior MSS have the obvious "correction" ἐπότος. Other conjectures are ἐπότεα (Liebhold) and ἐν ἐπότεα (Price), but neither could ever have been changed to ἐπότε. 551 A 4 φιλοχρηματισται κτλ. Although Aristotle (Pol. E 12, 1316 a 30 ff.) pronounces it ἄτοτον to think that oligarchy arises διὶ φιλοχρηματισται καὶ χρηματισταὶ ω ἐν ταῖς ἁρχαῖσ, there is no doubt that the special oligarchy which Plato probably has in view, viz. Sparta in the fourth century B.C., became to all intents and purposes an oligarchy chiefly from this cause, as in fact Aristotle himself recognises ib. 7. 1307 a 34 ff.: cf. also B 9. 1270 a 14 ff. It should also be remembered that Plato's selection of the αἱρα ἡς φθορὰς is primarily determined by his psychological standpoint: see on 543 A 5 ἐγένουτο. See 548 D n.

7 νόμον τίθεντα κτλ. In Sparta, apparently, matters never went so far as this, although those who were unable to make the statutory contribution to the public mess forfeited their citizenship, according to the laws of Lycurgus, and later abuses swelled the ranks of the ὑπομόλοι from this cause; see Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271 a 34 and Hermann-Thumer i.e. pp. 258—260 n. "The minimum amount of property qualifying for privilege in an oligarchy" was of course different in different oligarchical States: cf. Whibley Gk Olig. p. 22. 551 B 8 οὐ μὲν μᾶλλον κτλ. See again Whibley l.c. pp. 126—132. As an example of a moderate oligarchy (in the Platonic sense) we may take the Solonian constitution, which was, broadly speaking, the ideal of the moderate oligarchs at Athens towards the end of the fifth century (Beloch Att. Pol. p. 74: cf. Thuc. viii 97. 2), and is commended by Plato in Laws 698 b ff.
IO ἡ βία κτλ. "To an Athenian, as to ourselves, this would naturally suggest a revolution against a democratic system such as took place at the establishment of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C., or of the Thirty in 404 B.C., and constantly throughout Greece during the Peloponnesian war" (Iosanquet). The remark applies with equal force to πρὸ τοῦτο φοβήσαντες (cf. Thuc. VIII 66. 2), and it can scarcely be doubted that the familiar struggles of oligarchy against democracy in his own as well as other times supplied Plato with this detail of the picture. But the employment of force would be equally necessary in order to transform a timarchy into an oligarchy, owing to the opposition to be apprehended from the impoverished and relatively poorer sections of the timarchs, who would under an oligarchy be formally and for ever excluded from office. The conspiracy of Cinadon partly illustrates Plato’s point; for it was supported by δυναστεύειν, and suppressed by force (Xen. Hell. III 3. 4—11 with Grote IX pp. 70 ff.). Krohn (Pl. St. p. 211) asserts that Plato has already forgotten 545 C, D, where constitutional change was said to originate from στάδιον in the ruling class. But the struggle between those timarchs who have, and those who have not, the proposed στίμα, is in reality στάδιον between the rulers, for until timarchy is abrogated by law, the poor, if otherwise qualified, are de iure rulers as well as the rich. In Sparta it would be otherwise, because those who failed to pay their contributions to the κυβερνηντής ceased ἐπος ἔστειν to be rulers; only Plato’s timarchy is not in this particular a copy of Sparta, but rather resembles Crete (547 D, 551 A nn.). See also on 545 C.

10 ἡ βία κτλ. For the aorist cf. 548 D N. ὡς ἔστειν is illustrated on 1 341 B. ἔστειν refers to 544 C.

551 c—553 A. There are many grievous faults in the oligarchical city. It makes wealth instead of knowledge the qualification for ruling, is divided against itself, incapable, in all probability, of waging war, and false to our principle of ‘one man, one work.’ Worst of all, Oligarchy is the first constitution which permits a man to dispose of all his property by sale. From this cause spring up a large impoverished class resembling drones, some stingless and others stinging. The former are only poor, but the latter are criminals who have to be repressed by force.

551 c 16 πρῶτον μὲν: sc. ἀμάρτημα (ἔστιν).

ὁρος—ἔστιν: ‘terminus eius quiais sit.’ ὁρος is the limit or defining mark which separates it from all the other πολιτείαι: cf. 1 331 D. Few will approve of Badham’s conjecture τὸν αὐτῷ ὁρὸς αὐτῆς ὁλῶν ἔστιν, especially as ὁρος echoes ὁρον in 551 A. οὗ ἔστιν, ἀδρεία: εἰ γάρ νέων κτλ. (Liebhold) is scarcely less unhappy. The text is above suspicion.

17 εἰ νέων κτλ. The illustration is a favourite one both with Socrates and Plato: cf. Xen. Mem. III 9. 11 and supra VI 488 A ff. nn. There is probably no apoiosis after ἐπιστεύετο: we should translate 'just consider if one were to choose pilots on the census principle and refuse to let a poor man steer though better qualified!' 

18 πονηρὰ κτλ. "Adimansus quasi non videre, sed quid videat renuntiare iussus, πονηρὸν, inquit, τὴν μακραίαν αὐ- τοὺς μακριλεοθείαν εἰς ὁρῶν" (Schneider). Cf. VII 535 C N. This explanation is, I think, easier than that of Stallbaum, who prints ἀδρεία γάρ: εἰ νέων κτλ., understand-
ing (after επιτρέπω) τι λέγοις ἄν περὶ τοῦτον; or the like, and λέγομεν ἃν to govern the accusative with infinitive. J. and C.'s solution is in principle the same as Stallbaum's. The text may be corrupt, but no convincing emendation has hitherto been offered. The different proposals are εἰκὸς (Ast, Richards) and ἃν εἴη δέος (Liefhold) for ἃ δ' ὄν: <φαίνει ἄν> added after ἃ δ' ὄν (Stephanus): πονηρά εἴη ἃν ναυτιλεῖ ἀυτοῖς ναυτιλλεῖσθαι (Ast): πονηράν <ἀνάγκη> κτλ. Richards—but it would surely be better to add the word after ναυτιλλεῖ.

I have sometimes fancied that Plato wrote πονηράν, ἃ δ' ὄν, τίνι ναυτιλεῖ ἀυτοῖς ναυτιλλεῖσθαι, taking the accusative as in apposition to the previous sentence (cf. in some respects Ἱππ. Λαί. 291 ε and infra 357 c); but, for a reason to be mentioned presently on 551 δ, it is more likely ναυτιλλεῖ <ἀνάγκη> is right.

19 περὶ ἄλλου κτλ. See κτλ. ἃ τινος is retained by Schneider, who takes it as neuter, and ὁτοῦν as masculine. The words can hardly be anything except a gloss or variant on ὁτοῦν: the corrections ξάττιος or ξαττισθεῖν (Ast) are much less easy and probable. περὶ governs ἀρχὴν, on which ἄλλου ὁτοῦν, which is neuter, depends. Cobet's περὶ ἄλλης ὁτοῦν ἄρχην ("about any other ἀρχὴ whatever") does not suit with πλῆς πόλεως (i.e. ἄλλου—not ἄλλης—οτοῦν πλῆς πόλεως).

19. ναυτιλλεῖ Λέξιγ.: ναυτιλλεῖσθαι (sic) Α'Π.' 20. ὁτοῦν vertit Ficinus: ὁτοῦν ἡ τινος ΑΠ.Σ.Γ. 24. ἀνάγκη Ast: ἀνάγκη codd. 27. Ε: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀδύ τὸν Α: καὶ μὴν ὀδύ τὸν Α:'

(Pol. Ε 12. 1316b 6 ff.) urges that this is equally true of all States where inequality of property prevails: but Plato would not allow that it is true of his ideal city, or even of timarchy except in so far as timarchy is itself oligarchical (548 a).

ἀνάγκη. See κτλ. The word could be dispensed with here, and, as all those MSS which are in the habit of writing the iota subscript at all regularly appear to have the nominative and not the dative, it is possible, and even perhaps probable, that this is the ἀνάγκη which Richards desiderated on 551 c: see note ad loc.

27 τὸ ἀδυνάτους κτλ. The sense of course is 'to be—probably—unable' i.e. 'that they are in all probability unable.' Richard says ισός is 'feeble': to me it seems exactly the right word in the right place. The conjectures ισός (Badham) and ἱσχυρός (Richards) are each of them for different reasons very unpleasing, and even if the passage were corrupt ἱσχυρός is far too violent a change to deserve consideration.

28 χρωμένους κτλ. In illustration the Oxford editors cite Thuc. ΗΠ. 17. The Spartans in particular had regularly to arm and employ the πλῆθος, both Perioci and Ileots, in their wars (see e.g. Thuc. ΗΠ. 19. 3), and were consequently sometimes exposed to grave dangers (Thuc. ΗΠ. 80).
although to sell it was ou kallo (Pol. B 9. 1270a 19 ff.). The conflict of evidence is discussed by Newman and Susemihl on Arist. l.c.; see also on the other side Hermann-Thunser l.c. pp. 259 ff. In many Greek States besides Sparta it was either illegal, or at least dishonourable, to dispose of the 'ancient lot'; see Whibley Ck Olig. pp. 113—115.

31 φιλοχρημάτως: with emphasis on φίλο (Schneider, who compares 568 B for ἄτε without the copula). The sentiment is illustrated by Bosanquet from Arist. Pol. B 9. 1271b 13 ελαφρώσι τε κακῶς (of the Spartans): cf. also infra 554 E. F. and Theophr. Char. 26, where the διαλογικός cries πότε ταυτόμεθα ὑπὸ λειτουργῶν καὶ τριπαχίων ἀπολλυμένου; and more in Hermann-Thunser l.c. p. 68 a. n. 1.

παλαί. IV 434 A ff.

552 Λ 4 τὸ ἐξίσωτα κτλ. According to some ancient authorities (cited in Hermann-Thunser l.c. pp. 186 f.), the constitution of Lycurgus absolutely forbade the alienation of a certain minimum of the original νῆσος, called the ἀρχαία μῶρα. The evidence of Plato does not go far, but so far as it does go, it supports this view; for he says that oligarchy is the first polity which permits a citizen πάντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἀποδίδοσα: cf. also Laws 744 D. Aristotle says nothing of the ἀρχαία μῶρα, and states that a Spartan might legally part with his estate by gift or bequest,
15 ἐν κηρῷ κηφὴν ἐγγύνεται, σμίνυς νόσημα, οὐτὸ καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφὴν ἐγγύνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; Πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἐφ', ὁ Σωκρατεύς. Οὐκοῦν, ὃ Ἀδείμαντε, τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφήνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ θεός πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίον δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν 20 τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τελευτῶσιν, ἀ ἐκ δὲ τῶν Δ κεκεφαλαμβαμένων πάντων ὅσοι κέκληται κακοῦργοι; Ἀληθεστάτα, ἐφῆ. Δήλον ἄρα, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει, οὐ ἂν ἠδης πτωχοὺς, ὅτι εἰς τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκερμένωι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλλαντιτούμοι καὶ ιερόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακοὺς δημουργοί.

25 Δήλον, ἐφῆ. Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλγαρχουμέναις πόλεις πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὄρασι ἔνοικοι; 'Ολίγον γ' ἐφῆ, πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἄρχοντων. Μή οὖν οἶωμεθά, ἐφην 1 ἐγώ, καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν Εὐ αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὐς ἐπιμελεῖα βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ

25. ἠλλ' ὁ πλ. 11. om. A. 27. οἴωμα ΛΔ: οἴωμα ΛΠ.ρ.

552 C 15 ἐν κηρῷ: not 'in the hive'(as D. and V.), but 'in a cell.' The drone-cell in which the drone is produced stands to the whole hive as the οἰκία to the πόλις. For κηρῶν in this sense, see Bonitz Ind. Arist. s.v.

τὸν τοιοῦτον—κηφήνα. The comparison is frequent in Greek literature from Hesiod onwards (O.D. 304 ff.): see Ruhnken on Tim. Lex. s.v. κηφήνες καθόροι and Blaydes on Ar. Wāsps 1114. "We would purge the land of the drones, that rob the bee of her honey" (Pericles Prince of Tyrre 11. 59).

10 τελευτῶσι: i.e. τελευτώντες εἰσάν. 'To the stingless belong those who die paupers in their old age.' τὸς τὸ γῆρας is adverbial as in vi 498 A. Stallbaum and others understand τελευτῶσιν as only 'tandem fiunt'; but the other view—Schneider's—is better and more natural: cf. II 372 D γραμμαί τελευτῶν and Synph. 179 E.

552 D 21 πάντες: sc. εἰσάν (understood from τελευτῶσι) rather than γηγο- νονται (as J. and C. explain).

22 ἐν πόλει κτιλ. Compare the melancholy picture of Athens in Isocrates Areop. 83 τότε μὲν οὖν ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν ἐνεδεῖ τῶν ἁγνακίων, οὔτε προσαίτων τοὺς ἐντυγχανόντως τῶν πόλεως κατήχειν, τῶν δὲ πεζους εἰσαν οἱ σπανιότεροι τῶν ἐκχόντων: οἴς αξιόν ἦστι πολλών συγγράμμων ἕχει, εἰ μὴν τῶν κοινῶν φροντὶζον ἀλλὰ τόσο σκοποῦσιν, ὅπουν τὴν ἀδιαρκός ἡμε-
The ravager hence—see the similitude of the shipwrecked Hartman (Stephanus) of Abundant. 

VIII. ‘Ar' on we málistata eis ólignarchikón ek toú timokratikó 5 tikon ékeíon metaβàllle; Πώσ; 'Otan autóv pai's génoìmos; tò mév próton ëxholó tò tón pàterá kai tâ ékeíon íxhì diókwi, B èpeita aítovn idh ékañvìs ptauàsanta | ωsper proós érmati proús tý

succeeded to the political party of Cimon; for Cimon was timokratikós rather than ólignarchikós (cf. ν 470 Cn.). The description of the progress of individual degeneration from the aristocratic down to the tyrant constantly reflects Plato’s own experience of Athenian society and domestic life: cf. 549 C, D mm. Abundant materials for the picture were doubtless ready at hand in the παύσπαῤῥοφα ἀθρούσια (557 C) of the ‘bazaar of politics’ (557 D). For the construction of this sentence cf. 549 C—550 A n. We ought not to understand metaβάλλει before ὅταν, for the metaβάλλει does not take place until 553 C, and ἀφ οὔκ—παραβούσῃ is the only apodosis which Plato thinks it necessary to provide.

8 πταισάντα κτλ. For the figure cf. Aesch. Αgl 1066 and Εum. 554—565.

553 B ὡσπερ πρὸς ἐρματι κτλ. In some other examples of this idiom (iii 414 E, viii 520 E, supra 545 E, ix 573 E et al.) only the first preposition is expressed; but in Euthyph. 2 c, Phaed. 255 D and Phaed. 67 D (according to Ven. T) we find as here both prepositions. Cobet is not justified in excising the second preposition either here or elsewhere (V. L.2 pp. 541, 164 ff., 532); for while ὡσπερ πρὸς ἐρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει (for example) is only a similitude, in ὡσπερ πρὸς ἐρματι τῇ πόλει the connexion is much closer, amounting almost to identification: see my note on Euthyph. l.c. and cf. Braun de Hyperb. Plut. II p. 9.
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24 μηδέν is written rather than οδέν owing to the infinitives θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν.

27 ἀλλά: i.e. other than you have just described.

Jowett's translation "Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one" is quite wrong.

653 E 30 ἐτ. Stallbaum and some others place a mark of interrogation after ἐτ.: "quod ego non penitus ineptum, sed inter proxime praecedentem et proxime sequentem interrogationem minus apsum existimo" (Schneider). Cf. 550 C.

654 A — 555 B In character, the oligarchical man resembles the oligarchical State. He gratifies his 'necessary' desires and no others. He is avaricious, niggardly, sordid, and the blind god of wealth is leader of the chorus of his soul. From time to time, as opportunity offers, the drone-like desires within him assert themselves, but for the most part he forcibly represses them through fear of consequences. Thus, although his soul is a prey to sedition, his better desires generally prevail over those which are worse. In public competitions he is usually content to be beaten and save his money.

654 A 4 ἐγράφης: not simply 'hard-working' (D. and V.), but with reference to illiberaris labor.

ἀναγκαῖος. This form of the feminine recurs in IV 425 D, supra 558 D, 559 A, 561 A (ter) and IX 572 C; but in 558 D we have ἀναγκαῖος, and ἀναγκαῖος in 559 B, C. See Schneider on IV 425 D. There is no justification for making ἀναγκαῖος consistently an adjective of either two or three terminations (as suggested by Richards). The full meaning of ἀναγκαῖος ἐπιτύμβια is explained in 558 D ff.

5 τὰ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα "sunt pecuniae in cetera impenitendae, quas hic negatur παρέχεθαι, de suis præbere" (Schneider). With ἄλλα cf. ἄλλας 554 C, and with παρέχομεν IV 421 D. The translation 'not affording or allowing himself' (J. and C.) is inaccurate. παρέχομεν, which was read, with slight mis authority, before Bekker, has been rightly discarded by later editors.

8 οὓς δέ. For the plural cf. (with Stallbaum) Laws 508 D and Eur. Hel. 440 "Εἴλας περφικώς, οἷς οὖν ἐπιστροφαί. See also on 1 347 A.

554 B 12 τυφλὸν κτλ. τῶν Πλατον, 15—2
the fifth line, and the plural masculine, in spite of αὐτῷ above (1 347 A n.).
18 ὡστε πολλὴς κτλ. See II 350 b 11. Socrates would say that the picture which
Glaucu there draws is only too true of the oligarchical man.
19 τοῦτο δῆλον: ‘clear by this,’
‘clear from this,’ as in Eur. Hipp. 627
τοῦτο ὑπὸ δήλον and Αt. Plat. 587 (τοῦτο ὑπὸ).
Stallbaum reads τοῦτο with Σ and a majority of the inferior MSS; but there is
no reason for deserting Α and Π. The antecedent to τοῦτο is contained in οὖν—οὖν—αὐτῶν (566 A)
and the like. The qualification ἐπικείμενος: there is no real
554 ε 30 ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς. Richards would omit τῆς, but the article (which is in all MSS), implies, I think, that such a soul exists and has already been described, as it has in ἐνα γενέμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σῶφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον IV 443 D. μη. άνταγωνιστῆς γε κτλ. See on 551 E. Sussemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 232 reminds us of the disinclination on the part of rich Athenians to undertake κατοργία: see Herrmann-Thunser l.c. pp. 687 ff. 555 Α 2 τῶν καλῶν: sc. φιλοτιμίων. In χρήματα τε τοῦ τε connects its own with the preceding clause, and does not here mean 'both,' τοιούτως: i.e. εὐθὺς. This interpretation is more idiomatic and forcible than to refer τοιοῦτων to φιλοτιμίας κτλ. 5 φιλονικίαν κτλ. The ἀληχικής, when competing for μιχῆ, is a φαινός ἀνταγωνιστῆς, because he is afraid to summon his ἀνάλογοι ἐπείθμαι 'to fight and strive for victory along with him,' precisely as the oligarchical city was afraid to arm the πλῆθος (551 D n.). And just as the oligarchs found themselves ὃς ἀληχικοὶ τοῦ τάξις τῷ καθήκοντι (551 E), so the ἀληχικός ἀνήρ, 'true to his name of oligarch' (ἀληχικός), 'employs but few of his forces in the war, and is usually beaten and keeps his money' (loses the prize and saves his

554 e—555 A Oligarchy is succeded by Democracy. As dissipated young men in an oligarchical government are permitted and even encouraged to squander their property, a large impoverished class of 'stinging drones' makes its appearance in the city. The rulers take no steps to remedy an evil which increases their own fortunes, and become luxurious and effeminate. In seasons of stress and common danger, the poor discover their own
strength and the weakness of the rich, and
to overthrow the rotten fabric. Democracy
is established as soon as the introduction of
the lot affirms the principle of equality.

555 B 9 διμοκρατίαν δή κτλ. We
have seen that the dominant feature in
the oligarchical State is ηο φιλοχρήσται,
and the present chapter describes how in
process of time the polity itself is in
evitably overthrown by that very principle.
The incidents which prove the immediate
cause of revolution are such as may fre-
quently have happened in Greek history:
see 556 C, D, E and 557 A nn. It is
instructive to compare with this chapter
Aristotle's a posteriori analysis of the
causes of revolution in oligarchical cities
(Pol. E 6). On the psychological basis
of democracy see 557 A n.

11 παραστησώμεθα κτλ. For the
use of παραστησώμεθα Schneider refers to
11 360 E, 361 B and Lucian Icarom. 17,
ωσπερ αν εις παραστησώμεθα πολ
λοθν  χορευτάς—ἐπειτα προστάζει κτλ.
όμοιος κτλ. See 543 A n. meta-
βάλλει = 'it changes,' viz. the πολιτεία.
The verb is scarcely impersonal, as the
English translators appear to suppose.

14 προκειμένου κτλ. προκειμένου is
not 'publicly acknowledged' (D. and V.,)
but 'propositus,' as in ηο τέλος το προκει-
μένον, δείν (wrongly rejected by J. J.
Hartman) 'resumes the notion of προκει-
mένον' (J. and C.). Similar pleonasm
occur in Crit. 44 C, Gorg. 500 C and else-
where: cf. also εξείναι in C below and VII
535 A n.

555 C 15 ἀτε—ἀρχοντες κτλ. As
in timarchy (550 D ff.), so in oligarchy, it
is the love of money which sows the seeds
of party strife and political degeneration.
Cf. generally 552 A n. and Aristotle Pol.
E 6. 1305b 39 ff., with his criticism of
Plato ibid. 12. 1316b 15 ff.

18 εἰσδανείζοντες: i.e. 'lending money
on-the-security-of' (els). The τά τῶν τοι-
ώτατων should be taken with the els of
eἰσδανείζοντες as well as with οὐνομένον:
cf. Arist. Pol. 7. 4. 1319a 13 δανείζοντες ευ
τί μέρος τῆς ὑπάρχουσας ἑκάστῳ ὑσις
and Dem. in Aphob. 1:28. The word εἰσδανείζο
is a ἄπας εἰσημένων, but we certainly ought
to substitute ἑκάστεις (suggested by
Stephanus) or προσδανείζοντες (with
Richards).

20 δῆλον ήδη τούτο κτλ. See
550 E n.

555 D 24 ούκ ἄγενεις κτλ. = 'of no
common stamp' etc. (von nicht gemeiner
Art, Schneider), not simply 'of noble
birth' (as D. and V.). Catiline would
have seemed to Plato a case in point (cf. Sallust Cat. S), and the Catilinarian conspiracy illustrates not inaply the description which follows (555 D, E). The aorist ἢμάγκασαν is gnomic, as appears from the plural in ταῖς διλογραφίαις.

25 κεκεντρωμένοι κτλ. See 552 C, D πρ. εξαπλωμένοι; does little more than explain the metaphor, more Platonic: see on v. 451 B and cf. καὶ πτωχὸν (wrongly discarded by J. J. Hartman) in 556 A below.

555 E, 29 ἐγκυάσσαντες. τοιαύτα γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἀγάν φροντιζόντων καὶ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκτόνων σχήματα (Schol. on Ar. Clouds 191). A comparison with ιχ 586 A κατὰ ἀεὶ βιλαμένατα καὶ κεκυφθέντες εἰς γῆν suggests that the stoop of the χρηματιστὴς in reality betrays the inherent earthliness of his soul: see on VII 510 A, B and cf. Dante Purg. 19. 70—72.

31 τοῦ πατρός κτλ. Cf. vi 507 A κτλ. τόκοις is bracketed by Herwerden, but τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἐκγονὸν (i.e.) supports it.

556 A, 3 οὕτω γε κτλ. καὶ appears before οὕτω in ΠΕΓ and a majority of MSS, but the reading of A is, I now think, right. We should translate 'At all events, said I, they are unwilling to extinguish this kind of mischief when it is beginning to break into a flame, either by preventing' etc. If they quenched it in its earlier stages, then the πτωχὸς would not be πτωχὸς: and πτωχὸς bears the emphasis in both the previous sentences. For this use of γε see 550 B πρ. and cf. ιχ 581 C and (with Schneider) Isocr. Paneg. 153. With ἐκκάθαρσιν cf. Ar. Plate 1132. D. and V. understand the word of 'cauterizing,' wrongly, as ἀποσβεβενώναι shews.

4 δη. I formerly, with two inferior MSS, Bekker and Ast, read ὅπως, which is certainly more exact: see the examples cited by Blaydes on Ar. Clouds 855 τὰς δ’ ἐμβάζας πολ’ τέρτοφας; The verb βούλεται is however treated as more than a mere auxiliary, and the relative accommodated to it by a species of attration, even at the cost of sacrificing something of the peculiar force of τρέπειν. Translate 'to dispose of one's property as one likes.'

5 ἐτερον νόμον. Plato's language here and in δο μετ’ ἐκείνων ἐστι δεντόροι seems to imply that such a law would not be altogether a novelty in Greece. According to Theophrastus (Frag. 97; 5 Wimmer = Stob. Flor. 44. 22), it found a place among the laws of Charondas: ἐκ' ἐν δ' τοῖς ποιεῖσθαι, μη ἐγὼ δικην’ αὐτὸν γάρ αἰτίον ἔναι τῆς ἀδίκαιας. Plato makes a similar provision in Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E.
556 B 11. toüς μέν δὲ κτλ. μέν balances δὲ after σφάς, and should not be taken with δὲ in the ordinary sense of the collocation μὲν δὲ: so that there is no reason to omit δὲ (with Σ and two other mss) on the ground that μὲν δὲ comes too late in the sentence. "δὲ" prior membro dilatando inservit et vinculi per μὲν injector nexum relaxans alterum membrum ut nova interrogatione instructum minus miremur efficit." (Schneider, comparing Lavois 751 E).

13 ἀρ' οὗ τρυφώντας κτλ. Note the usual Platonic chiasmus.

556 C, D 18. παραβάλλοντι: 'come alongside,' originally perhaps a nautical expression (J. and C.), as in Arist. de gen. anim. III 11. 763a 31. The usage occurs again in Lys. 203 B, and tolerably often in Aristotele.

21 ἦ καί κτλ. διὰν extends its influence to καταφορώντας and ἤδη. On θεώμενοι κτλ. Schneider remarks "post verba ἄλληλοις θεώμενοι expectabantur ἑκατόν ὡς πρότερον περὶ ἄλληλοις διανοί- γοντα, vel tale quid, quod ad utroque se invicem conscientes pertineret; cuius loco statim divisione facta quid iam de pauperibus divites, de divitibus pauperes sentient, infuriat. Cuius non consequentiae, sed breviloquentiae significandae causa supra post θεώμενοι comma—sus- tuli." The effect is analogous to that produced by so-called partitive apposition (IV 431 A n.), of which idiom a somewhat similar extension occurs in v 465 C, where see note. Richards suspects corruption, proposing to read either (1) θεώμενοι and perhaps also ἦ καί or ἦ καί <ἐκάν> instead of ἦ καί, or (2) simply to insert καί before μῆδαμη. The second proposal is neat and scholarly; but καί was unlikely to disappear, and Plato's rapidity of thought and style renders him particularly liable to grammatical and other irregularities in his more spirited and dramatic passages: cf. VI 488 C, D, VII 531 A, and infra 558 A. See also on 549 D above.

556 D 22. ταύτη is emphatic, implying that it is otherwise when danger does not threaten.

24 πολλάς κτλ.: 'with quantities of alien fat about him.' (viel fremdes Fleisch an sich habend, Schneider), 'cumbered with much fat.' παχεῖς 'bloated' was, it may be remembered, a nickname for oligarchs: see Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 275 n. 2 and Neil's edition of Ar. Knights App. II p. 209. ἀλλοτρια is 'not his own,' i.e. no real part of him, and hence useless, superfluous. As Graser points out (Spec. advers. in serm. Pl. p. 91), it is Homer's γναθοῦς ἀλλοτροῦ (Od. XXX 347) which is the source of this and other kindred uses of ἀλλοτριος, e.g. Thuc. I 76. 6 and Isocr. Paneg. 86. Hermann thinks the meaning is that he has grown fat at the expense of others, like the drone. This explanation is less pointed, and the drone represents not the rich oligarch, but the πτωχὸς (555 E). With the feeling of this passage cf. Plut. Aprod.
Reg. et Imp. 192 D tois poliourkous epi-
leiseis ('Epiemiswvias) kai tina tous tis
atpiaste tis stratias, eivn oti melis
autoi akxon na ginaf ti estev tis
epiKretes.

27 anbres—oudev. 'We have them at
our mercy: for they're good for no-
thing,' anbres hemeteroi is virtually an
exhortation to rise in revolt: hence para-
gyelleis. The omission of the article
heightens the dramatic effect: cf. X 617 D.
hemeteroi has a colloquial ring ('they are
ours'). A kindred meaning, but without
any colloquial touch, appears in Xen.
Cyru. II 3, 2 (quoted by Schneider Addit.
p. 65) 'n mev hemi nukovmen—deijou oti
ote polemoi hemeteroi kai taw polemion
agasha patata: cf. also VII 5, 73. This
interpretation, which Schneider finally
suggested, has the support of A, II and
other MSS. Baiter's anbres hemeteroi eisai
par' oudev has found considerable favour,
and gives a fair sense, but par' oudev (for
which see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 466) ap-
ppears to me unpleasantly weak. anbres
hemeteroi elai oudev (y and others) is
intrinsically better (cf. 562 D), and may be
right, but the intrusion of yap in the best
MSS remains a difficulty, and paragyelleis
(as in Baiter's reading) is shorn perhaps
of its full force. It is on the whole easier,
I think, to understand hemeteroi as I do
than to explain the insertion of yap in
our two oldest and best MSS.


Soph. O. T. 961 smikra palaioti sumwai
euvetai rothi. The Platonic simile is
and may also, as Stallbaum thinks, have
been in Demoethenes' mind when he wrote
Ol. 11 21.

32 epagomenon ktl. A familiar feature in
the history of Greek revolutions:
cf. Whibley Gk Olig. p. 52 and
(for examples) Gilbert Gk. Staatsalt. II
passim.

557 A 4 kai wos to polu ktl.: 'and
the magistrates in the city are for the
most part given by lot.' These words,
which depend, of course, on etan, explain
ev toun—arkhyn, and should be taken in
close connexion with that clause, as Ast
long ago pointed out. The difference in
tense (metadawi but glvymai), no less
than the meaning, clearly indicates that
the two clauses do not express two
separate and distinct acts. It is by
means of the lot that isotes is secured;
and hence democracy is not established
until offices are assigned thereby: cf.
Hdt. III 80 tano mev arxas arxai and
Arist. Rhet. I 8, 1365b 32 demokratia mev
poleiteia en y kaiwre dianeiwta tos
arxas, with Whibley Gk Olig. p. 35 and
The clause was, strangely enough, condemned
by Hermann. Plato was not likely to
omit all mention of the most character-
istic and necessary factor in the establish-
ment of a democracy, especially as he
introduces the same feature in describing the democratical man (§61 B ὃστο ἀριστερός). J. and C., with Schneider and others, read γρηγορεῖται, for which there is very little ms support, remarking that 'the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on ἄνηρ should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy.' The fact is that the words do explain the origin of democracy by explaining ξεις τοιαύτης κτλ., where the arist is rightly used of the act by which democracy is established; whereas if we read γρηγορεῖται the clause must be taken by itself, and then it can only express a characteristic of democracy after that constitution is in force, so that its proper place would be in the next chapter. It should be observed that in no ancient democracy that we know of was the lot employed in electing to all magistracies: see Gilbert l.c. p. 318. For this reason Plato writes ὦ ὁ πολίτης.

557 A—558 C The peculiar characteristics of Democracy are liberty and licence. It is of all governments the most manifold and many-coloured, resembling a bazaar of constitutions rather than a single polity. In a democratic city the individual is free to adopt his own policy independently of the State. Little trouble is taken to execute judicial sentences. The people are indulgent to educational defects in their leaders and require nothing beyond a profession of loyalty to the masses. Truly a delightful constitution, full of anarchy and colour, distributing a species of equality to equal and unequal alike!

557 A 8 τίνα δή οὖν κτλ. The psychological principle of Democracy, as well as of Oligarchy, is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. But whereas in Oligarchy everything was subjected to the dominion of one particular desire, viz. the desire of wealth (§50 C n.), Democracy, on the other hand, is the political embodiment of absolute freedom and equality among all desires, unnecessary as well as necessary: see on 558 C f. The materials for Plato's picture of democracy are of course taken from Athens more than any other single city. It is an extraordinarily vivid sketch; and indeed Plato's whole account of democracy and the democratical man (557 A—558 C), in spite of manifest exaggerations, brings Athens nearer to us than almost any monument of ancient literature, Aristophanes alone excepted. We can see that Plato was fully alive to the wonderful variety and colour of Athenian life; but even on this ground democracy did not appear to him worthy of praise. Multiplicity and variety are the offspring of that fatal δυναμικής which works ruin alike in the city and the soul (§547 A n.). In other respects, Plato represents democracy as a land of Hedonism, peopled by Anarchy and Waywardness, and darkened by the shadow of the Tyranny to which it must at last succumb. Nearly all the greatest writers of Greek antiquity were on the whole unfavourable to democracy, except of course the Orators: and least of all in Plato could democracy expect a champion. For the other side of the picture, we should of course take Pericles' speech in Thuc. ii 33 ff. See Neil's Knights of Aristophanes pp. vii ff.

557 B 9 δήλον γιάρ κτλ. It is the ἄνηρ rather than the πολιτεία which is the ultimate object of our search; but as the ἄνηρ in a democracy will be δημοκράτικος τῆς, we cannot understand him until we understand δημοκρατία. Hence the question ποιά τῆς—πολιτείας. Cf. 545 B, C. 11 ἑλευθερία. Ελευθερία was the fundamental ὑπόθεσις of ancient democracy: ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίκης πολιτείας ἑλευθερία, says Aristotle Pol. Z 2. 1317a 40. Cf. 562 B. It involves, according to Aristotle l.c., two ideas, viz. (1) τὸ ὧν
γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὃ τί τις βούλεται; Αὐγεταὶ γε δὴ, ἐφι. "Ὅποιος δὲ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἴδιαν ἔκαστος ἂν κατασκευήν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, ἴτις ἔκαστον ἀρέσκοι. Δῆλον. Παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἂν, οἷμαι, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ 15 μᾶλλον ἐγγίγνοντο ἄνθρωποι. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Κινδυνεύει, ἂν ὁ ἐγὼ, καλλιστή αὐτή τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι: ὄσπερ ἵματιον ποικίλον πάσιν ἀνθρέπτει πεποικιλήν, οὔτω καὶ αὐτή πάσιν ἔθεσιν πεποικιλήν καλλιστὴν ἂν φαίνοτο. καὶ ἵσως μὲν, ἂν ὁ ἐγὼ, καὶ ταύτη, ὕστεροι οἱ παῖδες τε καὶ αἱ γενεάκες τὰ ποικίλα θεωμένα, καλλιστὴν ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν. Καὶ μᾶλ', ἐφι. Καὶ ἐπιστευτὲς γε, ὃ μακάριε, ἂν ὁ ἐγὼ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ. Τί δὲ; Ὁτι πάντα γένει πολιτείαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βούλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, ὁ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιούμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρατουμένην 25 ἐλθόντι πόλιν, δὴ ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκη τρόπος, τούτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὕστεροι εἰς παντοπώλειον ἄφικτο καὶ καλελέγαμον ἐστὶν κοινοίς ἀναβολοῦσθαι. Ἱσως γοῦν, ἐφι, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροὶ παραδειγματίζειν δὲ ἀρχεται καὶ ἄρχεται, (2) ἂν ἐγὼ ὡς βουλεταί τις (Ib. 131711). Throughout this chapter Plato illustrates the second of these characteristics. Cf. Whibley Greek Olig. pp. 33—35.

παρθένες and ἐξουσία are democratical watchwords; see e.g. Gorg. 461 e, Eur. Hipp. 422, Ion 671 ff., and Thuc. VII 69 (τῆς—συντακτῶν πάσων ἐς τὴν διαίταιν ἐξουσίας) with 11 37. 2 and infra 557 D, 593 E, Arist. Pol. 6. 4, 1318b 39 al.

557 C 17. ὅσπερ ἵματιον κτλ. For the asyndeton cf. VI 497 b n. ποικίλων 557 B 8 n. ποικίλων "many-coloured" is cancelled by Herderen and J. J. Hartman. The word is in every MS and thoroughly harmonises with Plato's characteristic fulness of style: 'like a many-coloured garment, diversified with every shade of colour.' In itself it is the antithesis of ἄπλως, and symbolic of kaleidoscopic diversity and changefulness, just as in recent years we have heard the expression 'Joseph's coat of many colours' applied to a versatile and distinguished statesman. See also on 561 E. ἄπλως is not 'flowers' (as seems to be generally supposed), but 'dyes,' 'colours' (IV 429 D n.): nor need πεποικιλήν be understood of embroidery: for ποικίλων means no more than 'to diversify with colours' and implies nothing whatsoever as to the process: cf. 11 378 C. On the verbal play in ἄπλως—ἡβης see III 406 b n. For ὁ ἐγὼ repeated cf. VII 522 A n.


26 τούτον ἐκλέξασθαι κτλ. Pericles (Thuc. II 37. 1) regarded the Athenian constitution as a παραδειγμα: Plato humorously describes it as a motley aggregate of παραδειγμάτων. Democracy is πόλεις παμπολλαὶ, ἀλλὰ οὗ πόλις, the different varieties of individuals living in it representing so many different constitutions. In view of 561 c we may even go farther, and say that every democratical individual is himself a kaleidoscopic succession of polities—χαμάλεων τις καὶ σαθρὸς ὦρμενος (ap. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 11. 1100b 6). Hence, as Plato would hold, the waywardness and instability of democratic policy, constantly reversing to-morrow what it decrees to-day. See Thuc. I 44, II 65, III 36 ff., IV 28 and VIII 1. Democracy in fact, from Plato's point of view, is the political expression of monochronous Hedonism: cf. 558 A and 561 c n.
557 E 29 ἀνάγκην. The Athenians gloried in their ἀνεμένη διαίτα. See Thuc. II 39. 1 and Laws 642 c μόνον γὰρ ἁνέν ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφωρία, θεία μορφα, ἀληθῶς καὶ αὖ τί πλαστῶς εἰσίν ἁγαθῶς.

32 μὴ δὲ αὖ—δικαίως: 'nor again, if any law prevents you from being a magistrate or judge—actually to be both magistrate and judge in spite of the law, if you take it into your own head to be so.' The grammatical construction would naturally be μὴ δὲ αὖ (ἀνάγκην εἰναι)—μὴ δὲν ἡττον καὶ ἁρχεῖ καὶ δικαίως κτλ.

This could only mean 'nor any necessary compelling you to act as magistrate or judge if a law forbids you,' etc. i.e. 'you are not even compelled to follow your own inclination when it goes against the law.' The sentiment is intelligible, but too extravagant and subtle a piece of satire even for so highly coloured a passage as the present. As it is, Plato starts as if he would write 'nor again—to refrain from being a magistrate or judge,' but by a dramatic anacoluthon expresses the last part of his sentence in a positive form. μὴ δὲν ἡττον and the emphatic καὶ—καί make it easy to catch the meaning. The corruptions in A II (see cr. n.) and some other MSS are probably due to assimilation.

558 A 1 θεσπεία καὶ ἴδεια is almost a hendiadys: cf. IV 429 e n. Democracy is political hedonism: see on 561 c. Hermann's θεσπεία ὑπ' ἴδεια is inelegant and even questionable Greek: nor does θεσπεία καὶ θέλα (Stallbaum) merit praise.

2 τί δὲ; ἡ πράσινης κτλ.: 'And is not the perfect good temper of some who have been tried exquisite? or have you never seen in such a State, when people have been condemned to death or exile, how none the less they remain and roam about in public, and the culprit saunters round as though unheeded and unseen like some spirit from another world?' They bear the State no malice, and show their good temper by stopping where they are—for the sentence remains unexecuted. See also App. II.

3 δικασθέντων has been thought to be neuter (Weil Rev. d. Phil. viii pp. 171 ff.); but although the usage of the word in other passages of Plato (Critias 1120 c, Laws 807 e, infra x 614 D, Crit. 50 B, Gorg. 523 c and elsewhere) favours this view, it yields no satisfactory sense, and πράσινη is an attribute of persons rather than of things. The perfect passive—it is not the middle—of δικαίως is similarly used of persons in Lysias 21. 18 αἰσχρὰς δίκαια δέδικασμα. The circumstances of Socrates' own imprisonment after his condemnation illustrate, though only imperfectly, what is said here, for the Athenians were not careful to prevent him from escaping: see Crit. passim and my Introduction to that dialogue pp. ix f.

4 ἄνθρωπων κτλ. The construction is extremely irregular. Perhaps the simplest and least unsatisfactory solution is to make καταφησάθησαν a genitive absolute and regard μεθύνων etc. as attracted by ἄνθρωπων καταφησάθησαν (so also J. and C.). See App. II.

Θανάτῳ ἡ φυγής κτλ. For the genitive Kühner (Gr. Gr. 11 p. 332) compares θανάτου κρίσεως, ὑπάγεως and the like, in which δίκη is probably understood. The genitive of the penalty seems not to occur elsewhere with καταφησι-
11. καταπατήσας όδονός?

12. ταύτα II: αύτά Λ.
558 C 14. γενναία. — γενναία—see cr. n.—is much less elegant, in spite of the exclamatory anacolouthon ὡς μεγάλο-πρεπῶς κτλ. See on ν 465 E. Apelt strangely suggests ἐφι. Γενναία ταῦτα τε κτλ. (Fleek, Th. for 1803, p. 556).

15 ἀλλὰ ἀδέλφα. — It is remarkable that Plato says nothing of ὑψηλότροπη, which were regarded as an essential feature of advanced democracy—see Arist. Pol. Δ 4. 129a10 and Gilbert Boir. zur innern Geich. Ath. etc. pp. 79 ff.


558 C—559 D. — We cannot describe the origin of the democratical man, unless we explain what we mean by 'necessary' and 'unnecessary' desires. Desires which cannot be eradicated, and desires which we gratify with advantage to ourselves, are called 'necessary': those of the opposite kind are 'unnecessary.' The oligarchical man is ruled by the former; the latter sway the drone.

558 D 22. βία δὴ κτλ. — The description is interrupted by the digression on Desire: hence the anacolouthon.

23 οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι. — See 554 A n.

24 ὡς χαίς κοσμημένοις κτλ. — It becomes important at this stage to investigate the subject of the Desires, because τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν in the widest sense is the psychological basis of the democratical as well as of the oligarchical character. Plato's complete classification distinguishes between (1) necessary desires, (2) not-necessary, (3) not-necessary and παράνομοι (IX 571 B). The διαργορίσκος is the embodiment of (1): the διομορφικός of (1) and (2) equally (561 A ff.): the τυραννικός of (3). Cf. IX 571 A n. If we translate παράνομοι by 'unnatural' (as in view of IX 571 C ff. we are justified in doing: cf. IX 571 B n.), Plato's account becomes almost identical with that of Epicurus, who classified Desires as (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and not-necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary. For the authorities see Usener Epicurea pp. 78, 294. Cf. also Athen. xii 511 ff.

27 ἀν. — See cr. n., and for the loss of ἀν before ἀναγκαῖοι IV 437 B n.

28 ὡς—ἡμᾶς. — As Aristotle would say, those also are ἀναγκαῖοι ὃν ἄνευ
II. ἡ Π: ἡ Α.

559 ΚΑΙ ΜΑΛΑ. Δικαίως τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι (Met. Δ 5. 1015 b 22).

558 Ε τοῦτον—ἀνάγκη justifies the appellation ἀνάγκαια. The pronoun τοῦτον is used somewhat vaguely, and denotes not the desires themselves, but their objects. Cf. 433 c n.

560 ἡ φύσις, It follows that no desires which are necessary can be unnatural: see Epicurus referred to on 558 D.

559 Α 2 καὶ πρὸς: 'and which moreover' ('idem est quod καὶ προτέρως, ut praeterea, atque insuper' Stallbaum). Two kinds of necessary desires were distinguished viz. (1) ἢ—ἀπορρέα, (2) ὅσα—ἡμᾶς. Corresponding to this, which is not of course a mutually exclusive division, Plato emphasises two distinct features of unnecessary desires: so that καὶ πρὸς ('and which moreover,' or according to the Greek idiom, 'and these moreover') see on II 357 B is altogether appropriate. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Euclid. 298 D and Blaydes on Ar. Knights 578. Schneider takes πρὸς οὐδὲν together ('nullius rei habita ratione'), but οὐδὲν cannot easily be separated from ἀγαθὸν, unless we read <οὐδὲν> πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθῶν, as I formerly suggested. I have no longer any doubt that Stallbaum's view is right. Ast's conjecture πρὸς οὐδὲν is refuted by Schneider.

561 οὐκ ἐν πιστεύει: 'merely of food,' as opposed to e.g. pleasant food, sweet food (τῶν τοι ἀνθιστόρων ἐστίν) of Epicurus: Usener Epic. p. 395). See in particular IV 437 D—439 A nn.

563 Ε τοῦτον: 'Hunger, which is the desire of σιτον, is capable of putting an end to life'; since it is easy to gratify. With πᾶσας ἑστοις: 'and accordingly for ἑστοιν. The Greek is terse but not obscure. With πᾶσας ἑστοις cf. Gorg. 523 C, D and Menex. 241 b. Jowett thinks the expression 'very strange' for ἑστοιν. It is strictly accurate: the sword kills, but hunger πᾶσας ἑστοις: we merely 'cease to live.' Other views on this passage are discussed in App. III.

564 ἦλλοιον—τοῦτον: 'alias generis—quum quales modo diximus' (Stallbaum).
what is by far the best appreciation of Plato's hierophantic vein; see especially cc. 33—36, where we can hear more than a mere echo of that sublimity which is itself, according to Longinus, the 'echo of high-mindedness' (ψοφός μεγαλοφοσσόν ἄνθρωπῳ ἀντίχεια ib. 9. 2). For a very different estimate the student may be referred to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ad Crn. Pomp. Gen. 753—765 Reiske), whose pedantic criticisms make it tolerably plain that a study of the Attic orators does not qualify a man to sit in judgment upon Plato. The present episode is hardly less remarkable for psychological insight than for elevation of style, and the description of the democratic man as the chameleon of human society paints him for all time (561 c ff.). As a representation of actual fact, the picture is doubtless somewhat exaggerated, as usual; but it is extra-ordinarily vivid and powerful, and shows that the Platonic analogy between the individual and the State may prove in the hands of a master an admirable clue whereby to unroll the workings of the human soul in the individual as well as in the State.

559 D 24 νῦν διὰ κτλ. See 558 c, d. With απάντασιν cf. 552 E, h.
25 κηφήνων κτλ. It is clear from the summary of this passage in ix 572 c συγγενομένους δὲ κοιμητέριοι ἄνδρας καὶ μεστοῖς ὑπάρχοντες ἐπιθυμοῦν that κηφήνων and αἴθων ἔπραξεν καὶ δείνοις τελεῖν to human drones, and not to the κηφήνων δὲς ἐπιθυμεῖαι in the young man's heart. αἴθων 'furious,' 'wild' (Jebb on Soph. Ajax 221) shews that the drones are of the 'stinging' order (552 c ff., 555 d ff.).
559 e 28 διλαριχίας—δημοκρατίαν. See cp. u. Schneider defends the ms by explaining μεταβολή διλαριχίας as "ea quae ad διλαριχίαν pertinent emaque efficit," and referring τήν εν εαυτῷ "ad ipsam διλαριχίαν in adjectivo latentem." δημοκρατίαν he thinks is written for διλαριχίαν by a sort of attraction. This explanation is much too difficult and obscure. Nor can διλαριχίας by itself stand for διλαριχίας πολιτείας, at all events in this connexion. The ms reading can only mean 'of the oligarchical change within himself into a democratical,' an expression which bears no sense. I formerly wrote διλαριχίκου τοῦ—δημοκρατίαν, comparing 559 e, 560 λ., but it may fairly be objected that the 'oligarchical element' within the man does not change into a democratical: it is the government that changes. For this reason I now prefer my old suggestion (Cl. Rev. IV, p. 357.), although the corruption of διλαριχίκου—δημοκρατίαν is perhaps somewhat easier to explain. For the combination of genitives cf. V 440 η. An alternative solution would be to insert πολιτείας after εαυτῷ. This gives excellent sense, but it is difficult to assign a plausible reason for the loss of πολιτείας in all our ms. I am unable to resist the conclusion that the text is corrupt, otherwise I should not venture to make any alteration. If Plato did not write the passage as it is printed above, there can be little doubt that πολιτείας has accidentally disappeared.

29 μεταβάλλει κτλ. See 556 e. τοῦ ἐτέρῳ τῶν means of course τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐδει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.

33 τῶν εν εαυτῷ διλαριχικῶν: 'the oligarchical element within one.' εαυτῷ is 'oneself': cf. III 407 ε μελέτας πρὸς εαυτῶν. εν αὐτῷ, which As adopted (after Stephanus), would be easier; but I think Plato means to suggest that the oligarchical element present in this νεανίας is a universal feature of the human race. J. and C. think ἐκείνῳ and εαυτῷ may have changed places—a conjecture which is surely too bold. Schneider, taking εαυτῷ as 'himself' and not 'oneself,' compares ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν below and αὐτῷ—ἐν εαυτῷ in 559 D, E; but here there is nothing corresponding to the αὐτῶ in each of these passages, and εαυτῷ cannot therefore be translated in Schneider's way.

560 α. I στάσεις κτλ. Cf. 556 e, 557 Α. On the tense of ἐπιθυμέοντες and the other aorists throughout this passage see 548 D, n.

4 τίνες—αἱ μὲν κτλ. Cf. IV 431 Α, Ν. The words διερθάρησαν—ἐξεπεσον correspond to ἀποκτείνω—ἐκβάλωσι in 557 Α. Madvig's διετάρασαν is an unlucky venture.

A. P. II.
7 ἀνεπιστημοσύνην — πατρός: the father is himself ἄπαθετος (552 Ε. ὁ.), and the ἄπαθετος cannot παθέων. On the genitives see V 449 η.

560 Β 9 τάς αὐτὰς ἁμιλίας κτλ. The reference in τάς αὐτάς is to ξυγγέννηται—δεινοῖς 559 Δ. Así's conjecture τάς αὐταὶς ἁμιλίας is wrong in point of sense, λάθρα ξυγγενόμεναι: viz. with the desires of the 'drones': see 559 D.

13 ἐν ἀνδρῶν κτλ. The stately cadence is worthy of the theme: cf. τὴν—τέλεα 560 Ε, and see the remarks of Longinus on rhythm and the arrangement of words as an element of υψός (περὶ υψῶν 30 ff.).

560 Ο 15 ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον: 'ran up and seized,' ἀναδραμόντες preserves the metaphor in ἀκρόπολις (560 Β).

17 εἰς—Δωτοφάγους: 'to those Λοτοσ-eaters' land.' εἰς τὸν ἀκρόπολις: 559 Δ. The figure is strikingly appropriate, for the lotos-flower of sensual indulgence makes man, who is an ἀφορμός φυτῶν (Clem. Alex. Cohort, ad Gen. 96. ed. Migne, following Plato Tim. 90 Α), forget 'the imperial palace whence he came.' Cf. VII 519 Α, Β ἄπθ., and (for Δωτοφάγοι) Luc. Sall. 2–4, Anth. Pal. X 12. 8 ἄφθ. Δωτοφάγων ἀλκυρίνης λιπά-πατρίν ἰδωθύν (with reference to Epicureanism).

αὐνερωματοκοικία: no longer λάθρα (560 Β). He glories in his shame. Her-
autōi τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδὸν ἡλιθίοττα ὑνομάζουσιν ἐξώ ἀτίμωσ φυγάδα, σοφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανθρίαν καλοῦσι τε καὶ προπηλακίζουσι ἐκβιάλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην όσι ἀγροκίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὕσαν πειθοῦνες ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμῶν; Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὲ ήτο που κενώσαντες καὶ καθάραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε θυί σπουδής καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐξιπάσσειν, ἀναφέρομεν μὲν τοῦ-τα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχήν μεγάλοισι τέλεια, τὸ μετὰ τούτο ἦδη ὑβρίν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὸς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγονσιν ἐστεφανομένας, ἐγκομιάζουσι τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καὶ ἀυθεντικοῖς ὑβρίν μὲν ἐνυπαίθειαν καλοῦσιν, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. ἀρ' οὖν οὕτω πως, ἢν δ' εὔγον, νέος ὁν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις πρεσμομένον τῆς τῶν μη ἀναγκαίοις καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθερώσω τε καὶ ἀνέσειν; Καὶ μᾶλλα γε, ἢ δ' ὅσο, ἐναργώς. ἦν δ' οἷοι, μετα τάσσα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μάλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίοις ἢ μῆ ἀναγκαίοις ἡδονής ἀναλίσκοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς; ἀλλ' εάν εὐτυχῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἑκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλ' τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος τοῦ πολλοῦ

22 μαχόμενοι: viz. with τὸ φειδωλόν (560 c).
25 μετὰ: 'with the aid of' (in Vereinigung mit, Schneider).
26 καθάραντες κτλ. The imagery is borrowed from the Eleusinian rites. On the first day of the Greater Mysteries, which was called ἄλαδε μόστα, took place the cleansing of the μώστα in the sea: cf. Mommsen Forte d. Stadt Attik. p. 107 n. 2. κατεχόμενος is used as in Min. 99 δ κατεχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ.
560 ε 28 μεγάλους τέλει κτλ. The archaic termination in μεγάλους adds solemnity: see on Ι 330 B. λαμπρός = 'in a blaze of light.' Plato's language would suggest to an Athenian the brilliant scene on the evening of the Iacchus-day, when the procession following the figure of Iacchus transformed itself into a λαμπαδήφορα' (Mommsen l.c. p. 219): cf. Ar. Frogs 340 ff. έγειρε φλογος λαμπαδας ἐν χερσιωνωσους' Ιακχ', ὡ 'Ιακχε. The exiled ὅμηροι etc. are conducted home like Iacchus to Eleusis. In χορῷ there is an allusion to the χορὸς μωστῶν.
32 μεγαλοπρέπειαν. See on VI 456 A.
561 A 2 τοῦ—τρεφομένου. Mascu
line, not neuter.
τῆρ—ἀνωσι. I formerly read εἰς τὴν (with ΗΕ and many other MSS) instead of τῆρν, but now believe that Α is right. "Non est idem, εἰς δημοκρατικὸν μεταβάλλει, et τῆρ—ἐλευθερώσω μεταβάλλει. Hoc prius, illud postierius, haec, ille finis est" (Schneider). If Plato had written εἰς, it should have been followed by an accusative masculine, contrasting with εἰκ τοῦ—τρεφομένου, as in 553 λέοντος εἰς τοῦ τιμωρικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει. For the use of μεταβάλλει cf. (with Schneider) IV 424 c et al. With the force of εἰς... cf. IX 575 A (ἀνελθέντα) and 590 Α.
6 εὐτυχῆς ἦ 'if he is fortunate' is much better than εὐτυχῆς (Cobet), which would mean 'if he becomes fortunate.' Cf. IX 578 c n.
7 ἀλλὰ τι κτλ.: 'but, owing also in some measure to the influence of years,
when the tumult of the soul has mostly passed,' etc. Cf. I 329 c. Plato means that good fortune does something, and growing age the rest.

561 B 9 ἐς ἵσον κτλ. Pleasures are regarded by the δημοκράτειον ἀνήρ as individual men are regarded by the δημοκρατικὴ πολιτεία (557 A, 558 C on.), they are all equal. For ἄπαντα λαχοῦσθαι see on 557 A. ἔσω ἄν πληροθῇ means 'till he' (not 'it,' as D. and V. etc.) 'is filled.' Sensual pleasures πληροῦσι because they are πληροθέν: cf. Phīl. 35 D ff. This is the χαράδρῳ βίος so powerfully described in Gorg. 493 A—494 D.

13 τὸ φρούριον κτλ. The φρούριον is the ἀκρόπολις of 560 B. With εἰς τὸς λέγει κτλ. cf. Gorg. 495 A ff.

561 C 19 διδαχὴ κτλ. The δημοκρατία, like the State of which he is the counterpart, is a living example of the Cyrenaic cult of μονόχρωμος ἰδιότης: see 557 A, D, 558 C, and KP. 707 b, 211. Stein-

561 B 20 ό τοτὶ Π. τὸ Λ.
ing every law! For the etymological figure cf. 11 376 b n.
29 παντοδαπόν τε καί—μεστόν. Richards proposes to write the genitive, remarking "surely the words are parallel to ἵσονομοκεν." Logically they are, but grammatically they need not be, for the life of an ἵσονομοκεν ἄνγη is of course ἵσονομοκεν. With πλείστων ἵδων cf. ταῖσιν ἱδέας πεποναλμένης 557 c.

καὶ τὸν καλὸν τε κτλ. lit.: 'and that this man is the beautiful and many-coloured man, as the city described above' (was the beautiful and many-coloured city). "Sunt diversa hominum et civitatum genera, unum simplex ac rectum, alterum duplex, alium multiplex et varium. Qui primo accensendus est, δ' αἰπλοῦς, qui alteri, δ' αἰπλοῖς, hic vero ὁ καλὸς τε καί ποικίλος audit" (Schneider). Thus understood the article is strictly to the point, and there is no reason for writing τῶν καλῶν τε καί ποικίλων with Vind. B and W. H. Thompson. On ποικίλον see 557 c n. It is worthy of remark that Clement interprets Joseph's 'coat of many colours' in the Old Testament as symbolic of desire: εἰς δ' ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ποικίλον ἐνδύμα (Stron. v. 8. 84 c ed. Migne).

30 ἐκεῖνη τὴν πόλιν. See 557 c, and which and 557 d the words ὁ πολλοὶ κτλ. are also in close correspondence.

562 a—563 e. It remains to describe tyranny and the tyrannical man. As oligarchy was overthrown by the insatiate pursuit of wealth, so democracy begins to change to tyranny, when evil cup-bearers provide the wine of Freedom in excessive draughts. Anarchy under the name of Freedom infects every department of life—political, domestic, educational, and social: the very dogs and beasts of burden become tainted with the prevailing vice. In the final stage no regard whatever is paid to laws, whether written or unwritten.

562 a ff. 3 ἡ καλλίστη κτλ. As Oligarchy fell a victim to the excessive pursuit of its ideal, viz. Wealth, so also the extravagant devotion to liberty and equality subverts in course of time the democratic State. In 562 a—563 d Plato puts before us the different stages in the fall of democracy: cf. Arist. Pol. A 4 1291 b 30—1292 a 38, where the various εἰς τῆς δημοκρατίας are distinguished, and Newman The Politics of Aristotle pp. xxxvi—lxi. Plato's description, as usual, can be illustrated in many places from Greek and especially Athenian political and social life: see 562 d, e, 563 b, c, d al. nn.

562 a 5 γίγνεται = 'profit,' 'quae- rentis se offert' (Schneider). Cf. 111 412 c οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἀριστοὶ άρον οἱ γεωργιο- κάτατοι γίγνονται, Euthyd. 298 ε ὡς ὅσον παθή γίγνεται ο ἀτόμῳ καὶ οὐ κυνάρων ἀδέλφων, infra 560 a, ix 576 b and Prot. 325 b with my note ad loc. 'What,' asks Socrates, 'do we find to be the character of tyranny? As for its origin, it is pretty obvious that tyranny comes from democracy.' For the order of questions cf. 558 c. The words οἱ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. when taken in connexion with the preceding question, seem at first sight to suggest that the μεταβολή will not be described: but cf. v 466 d, where μὲν γὰρ is used in exactly the same way, and followed by a full account of the topic to which its clause refers. See also App. V.
'Αρ' οὖν τρόπον των τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς ὁλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυράννης; Πώς; 'Ο προθέμενον, θ' ἐγώ, ἀγαθοί, καὶ δι' ἥ ὁ ὁλιγαρχία καθίστατο—τούτο δ' ἢν πλοῦτος; ἡ γὰρ; Ναί. Ἡ πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια διὰ χρηματισμοῦ αὐτὴν ἀπόλλυ. 'Αληθῆ, ἐφι. 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ δ' ὁ δημοκρατία ὀρίζεται ἀγαθοί, ἡ τούτων ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει; Δέσεις δ' αὐτὴν τί ὀρίζεσθαι; Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἰπον, τούτο γὰρ ποὺ ἐν δημοκρατομένῃ πόλει ἀκούσας ἢν ὡς Ὁ 15 ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ ταύτα ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ ἀξίων οἰκεῖν ὅστες φύσει ἐλευθέροις. Δέσεις γὰρ δὴ, ἐφι, καὶ πολὺ τούτῳ τὰ βήματα. 'Αρ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐρώτημα, ἡ τούτων ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησιν τε καὶ παρασκεύαις τυραννίδος δεῖξομαι; Πώς; ἐφι. 'Οταν, οἴμαι, 20 δημοκρατομένῃ πόλεις ἐλευθερίας διηγήσατα κακῶν οἰνοχών προστατοῦντος τύχης, καὶ πορρωτέρον τοῦ δέουσαν ἀκράτων αὐτῆς τιοῦ ἀρχοντας, ἢν μὴ πάνω πράοι ωσὶ καὶ πολλὴν την ἀναλογίαν. 


7 ἀρ' οὖν κτλ. begins a long description of the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως: the τρόπος τῆς πολειτάς is not described till 560 D ff. Here again the situation in ν 466 D is nearly, though not quite, analogous: see note ad loc. For other views on this passage consult App. V. 562 B δ' προθέμενον: sc. the citizens of the oligarchical State. Stallbaum reads προδιήθη, on inferior ms authority; but the plural is easy enough: cf. 555 D. 9 καὶ δ' δ' κτλ. explains and amplifies δ—ἀγάθων. Wealth is the cause of oligarchy, that 'on account of' which it was established: cf. §50 D ff., 551 C, 555 B (τοῦ προκείμενον ἀγάθου). The reading δι' οὖ (see cr. n.) would make wealth the means or instrument in producing the result, and that it was not, except in the loose sense in which the προκείμενον ἀγάθου is also a means. I formerly conjectured δι' ἃ οὖ (Cl. Rev. IV p. 357), but ή is unsuitable. For the corruption in the ms see note on διὰ τοῦτο X 610 D. Jowett wrongly translates καθίστατο by 'was maintained.'
parèkstoi tôn éleuthèrían, kolázei aitíomêni ós miarou's te kai
diyugarchikous. Drôsin gar, ëph, touto. Tous dé ge, eîpou, tôn
àrkhonton kathêous prospíhakizei ós ëthelodòuous te kai ouèdu 25
òntas, tous dé àrkhontas mév àrkhomènous, àrkhomènous dé àrkhousin
òmioious idía te kai dhimias épaidi te kai tîmu. Æp ouk anâgkê

E en toiautê | tôn pòlei éti páv tôn tis éleuthèrias ènai; Pòs gar ou
Kai kataáduesastai ge, ën d' ëgw, ò filè, eis te tás idias oikias kai
teleutain mékri tôn ðhrôi tôn ònaraçhian ëmfýnoin. Pòs, ë n' 30
òs, tò toioúton légeomèn; Òloin, ëphn, pàtéra mév èbízèsthai paioi
òmioin ñýgnèsthai kai fоbèsthai tòus ûveis, ònù de patrì, kai mìte
aiçxúvesstai mìte dedèiènai tòus gônèias, ìna ë òleuçètheros ë n'
métokon

563 | dé åstó kai åstó metoiç éxèsoiçai, kai ëxenw òsàutous.

Gîngnetai ñar ouwos, ëph. Tauta te, ën d' ëgw, kai smíkra touide
àlla gîngnestai; didásskalòs te en tò toioútòu ðoiitêtas fòbeitai
kai thopènéi, ÷oiitêta te didasçkalòw ðiýugarchìsin, ònùtò de kai
pàdadagôgwn, kai òlou oì mèn nèoi prèbìnterous àpèiakózontai kai 5
diamilládntai kai en lógous kai en ðrÌgos, oì ònè ðéronûtes ëxèngakíèn-
B tes tósoi néoi èutrapelìas te kai xaraièntisomou 1 émpítìplanta,
mioumènoi tòus néous, ìna ðì ù de dokòwun ðídeis èinai ùndeî
dèstotikoi. Pàwn mèn ouw, ëphn. Tò òde ge, ën d' ëgw, ëxçhaton, ò
filè, tòs ñèlvèrèias tòu plàðhous, ðoson gîngnetai en tò toiautê 10
pòlei, òtan ðì òi ë ònèmènou kai ðì ë ònèmènou mièdên ðùtò ñèlvèrèoi
òsì tòw prèiamènou. Ën ñvaiçiê dé ðe pròs åndras kai åndràsi pròs

of the proceedings after Arginaeus in Xen. Hell. 1. 12—15.
562 e 30 ùkái twv ðhrlou. See on 563 c, d.
563 A ò ñèvngkàdîntes. v 567 B n.
563 B 9 to dé ge ktl. 'But the
extreme amount of freedom which appears in such a city is when,' etc.; lit.
'the extreme of the amount of freedom,' etc. to—éxchaton is the subject to something like èstwv or pérgento understood: cf.
such idioms as ou tou énva ðhrôm—ou ktl. 1 330 B, where see note. The sentence is not exclamation, as some have
supposed. With plàðhous ñèlvèrèias cf. plôlìv—tò ñèlvèrèion 562 D, and (for plôlìv) IX 501 E (plôlìv sòias), Lâus
xi 913 D, Theat. 158 D (plôlìv chrônoû) and Dem. Phil. iv 2. This explanation is that of Schneider, and indubitably right.
The English editors and translators make tòu plôlìvov depend on ñèlvèrèias: but "servi servaemque non sunt pars tòu plô-
lìvov," and ños—pòlei is not easily either separated from plôlìvov or connected with èxçhaton.
mètòikon ðelest עליה דוסרנ ðìbuls, kai ouèdei patáçai èxçható autòth, ouè
dékèsstatai ou ðì ðòlìwv ktl. In Arist. Pol. E 11. 1373 b 35 ðòlìwv ðàsa is said to be a symptom of extreme democracy.
12 ên ñvaiçiè ktl. Arist. Lc goes father and speaks of a ñvaiçkèstta ðèl-
tòs ðòias. A German critic characteristically sees an 'admirable' illustration of Plato's remarks in the social life "jenes
transatlantischen Staatvercins" (Stehnhart Einleitung p. 243). Some have accused
Plato of already forgetting the liberalism of Book v (Krohn Pl. Sl. p. 214): but an ideal city is one thing, and a lawless democracy another; and corruptio optimi, in the relations between the sexes, as in other cases, may well be resitiva.

563 C 14 δὲ τι νῦν—στόμα: 'what rose to our lips just now, whatever it be,' as Aeschylus observes,' See Aesch. Frag. 337 Dindorf=334 Nauck. The reference in νῦν, which here as in some other places (III 414 B n.) has the meaning of 'just now,' is to 563 E καὶ τελευτῶν μέχρι τῶν θερίων τῶν ἀναρχικῶν ἐμφυμένων. Nauck restores the fragment of Aeschylus in the form ὅτι νῦν ἦλθο ἐπὶ στόμα: the enclitic is unpleasing, and as ὅτι is absent from the other two places where the quotation occurs (Plut. Anab. 763 b, Them. Or. IV 52 b) Aeschylus probably wrote νῦν γὰρ ἦλθο ἐπὶ στόμα ('just come to my lips') or something of the sort. With the general sense cf. III 394 D. Similar expressions in Greek literature are collected by Schaefer on Dion. Hal. de comp. verb. pp. 12, 13, Jackson ingeniously propone to connect the present passage with Arist. Eth. Nic. 111 2. 1111δ 9 ff. where he conjectures ὅσον γενέτευς φασιν ἐκπεσον αὐτοῦ ἀ (for ἦ) οὐκ εἰδότα ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἔν ὅπως Ἀισχύλος τὰ μνηστικὰ (Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc. XII 8 and Journal of Philology xxvii p. 150f.). 'Is it possible,' he asks 'that the phrase ἦλθο ἐπὶ στόμα is a proverbial survival of the plea urged by Aeschylus in plain prose on the occasion referred to in the Ethics?' I think an Athenian speaking in plain prose would have said ἦλθεν ἐπὶ στόμα or ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα, not ἦλθο ἐπὶ στόμα. The elision is tragic.

15 οὔτω: i.e. in the spirit of the Aeschylean phrase: the idea occurred to me, and it shall out, though never so extravagant and absurd!

16 ἅλεθρωτερὰ. For the concord cf. Phil. 45 ε and Laws 657 δ (Ast). 18 τὴν παροιμίαν. The proverb was ὁδυσσαίος δέδουσιν, τοῖς θανόσιν (Schol.), and meant ὅτι ὅποι δέδουσιν, τοιαύτῃ καὶ ἥραπαύαν 'like mistress, like maid.' Plato takes κῶς literally: hence ἄρεγκνος. See Leutsc und Schneidewin Parowen. Gr. II p. 44. The traveller in modern Greece will remember the 'democratic dogs' of Peloponnesian villages.

γιγνονταὶ τε δὴ κτλ.: 'aye, and there arise both horses and asses' etc. This explanation—Jowett's—catches the mock-heroic humour of the passage and is at the same time easier grammatically than to supply, with Schneider, ὁδυσσαίος ὁ δέδουσιν or, with Campbell, ἅλεθρωτερος or the like. There is no ground for suspecting the text as some have done. Plato's humorous description brings vividly before us the anarchical condition of the Athenian streets. Foot-passengers have a poor time of it where the very beasts of burden forsooth are tainted with the spirit of democracy! 'The regulation of traffic,' remarks Bosanquet, perhaps a little sententiously, 'is in some degree a real test of social order.' No doubt this is what Plato means.

20 ἐμβάλλοντες κτλ. See the amusing and characteristic anecdote about Alcibiades' childhood in Plut. Alc. 2. 4 μικρὸς ών ἅπασιν ἀστραγάλοις ἐν τῷ στενῶτῳ, τῆς δὲ βολῆς καθηκόσισι εἰς αὐτῶν ἀμαξας φορτηγῶν ἐπηγε. πρῶτον μὲν ὁμών ἐκεῖνον περιμενα τὸ ἄγοντα τὸ ξέγους: ὕπει- πιπτε γὰρ ἡ βολῆ τῇ παρόδῳ τῇ ἀμάξῃ: μη πειθομένου δε δι' ἀγοράκιαν, ἀλλ' ἐπάγοντο, οἱ μὲν ἀλλὰ παιδίς δίεχον, ὁ δ' Ἀλκιβιάδους κατ' αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ στόμα πρὸ τοῦ ξέγους καὶ παρατινίαν ἐκαστὸν ἐκεῖνον ὤτος, εἷς βουλετάτης, διεξείλθει, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἀνακροἰς ὅτι ξέγους ὁποῖο σείλασα, τοῦ δ' ἱδοντας ἐκπληγησάται καὶ μετὰ βοῦς συνδραμεῖ πρὸς αὐτὸν.


563 D 21 τὸ ἐμὸν γ'—διαρ is manifestly proverbial (Schneider). For διαρ cf. Charm. 173 αὔκων δή—τὸ ἐμὸν διαρ and Theaet. 301 E.

22 αὐτὸς γὰρ κτλ. 'I frequently experience what you describe when I am on my way to the country,' sc. through the congested streets of Athens. Jowett's 'when I take a country walk' is hardly accurate. The present πορεύομαι should be taken in its full force.

25 καὶ οὕτων κτλ. If the middle is to be pressed, we must translate: 'if any man applies to himself the very least degree of slavery' etc. That is to say, they are so sensitive that they cannot bear to see any one making himself even a willing slave. In the sacred name of Freedom, Democracy, which is now on the verge of Tyranny, puts freedom down. The sentence is perhaps a little exaggerated, but otherwise suitable enough; only we should rather have expected Plato to express this meaning by αὐτὸς αὐτῷ προσφέρῃ. If there were any well-authenticated examples of the middle of προσφέρω used for the active, it would be better to construe προσφέρηται as if it were προσφέρῃ, and suppose that the slavery is applied to others: but the instances of προσφέρηται = προσφέρων in Stephanus-Hase s.v. are either dubious or from late authors. The syllable -ται at the end of a line is sometimes abbreviated in uncial MSS (see Bond and Thompson Public. of the Pal. Soc. 1 Plate 166), and this fact lends additional plausibility to W. H. Thompson's conjecture, that we should write προσφέρῃ for προσφέρηται. I once proposed τισι, and the proposal is approved by a critic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252. The citizens become so sensitive that the least degree of pressure applied to any section of them rouses them all. Meantime, as neither of these conjectures is quite convincing, I have retained the MS reading pro tempore, although I think Thompson's conjecture represents what Plato meant to say.

26 τελευτώντες γὰρ κτλ. There is steady deterioration; and the last stage of democracy is the worst. Aristotle holds the same opinion: see Pol. Δ 6. 1293a 1 ἡ τελευτα τῶν χρόνων εὖ τἀϊς πόλεωι γεγενήμενη along with 1291b 30—1292a 37.

οὖν τῶν νόμων κτλ. Cf. Laws 701 b and Xen. Hell. 1 7. 12 ff. Such a democracy works by means of ἑψήφισμα rather than laws, and is analogous to the μόρφων τῶν μοναρχῶν τῆς τυραννίδος (Arist. l.c. Cf. also Gilbert Beiträge zur inn. Gesch. Athens pp. 79 ff.).

563 E—566 D Such is the seed which develops into Tyranny, excessive freedom generating excessive servitude, in accordance with a common law. The drones wax more numerous and violent, and ruin the democracy in course of time as once they ruined oligarchy. A democratic State contains three classes of citizens (1) the drones, stinging as well as stingless, (2) the rich who serve as drones' preserver, (3) the Demos, with whom the sovereignty lies. The most active members of the drone-fraternity become leaders of the Demos against the rich. By dint of extortion and calumny the propertied classes are at last compelled in self-defence to form an oligarchical party. Hence arise impeachments etc., and the people range themselves under a single Champion. As in the fable he who tasted human flesh became a wolf, so this Champion of the People, as soon as he spils the blood of fellow-citizens, is doomed to become a tyrant. Civil war begins; the Champion is either driven from the city, and returns a full-fledged tyrant, or receives a body-guard to protect him from secret assaults, and thus achieves his end.
563 E ff. 29 "άυτή μὲν τοῖνυν, ἵνα δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἡ ἄρχη σύντωςι καλὴ 30 καὶ νεανίκη, οἴειν τυραννίς φύεται, ὅς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Νεανίκη δήτα, ἐφ᾿ ἄλλα τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; Ταύτων, ἵνα δ’ ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ ὀλυναρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἵσχυροτερον ἐκ τῆς ἔξοψίας ἐγενόμενον κατα- δουλουται δημοκρατίαιν. καὶ τὸ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην 35 φιλεί εἰς τοιονιτίον μεταβολήν ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἐν ὀρίσι τε καὶ ἐν | φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἦκιστα. Εἰκός, ἐφ᾿. Ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἐοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτη καὶ πόλει. Εἰκὸς γὰρ. Εἰκότως τοῖνυν, ἐπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης τολιτείας τυραννίς 5 καθίσταται ἡ ἐκ δημοκρατίαις, ε太阳城 τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ ἁγιωτάτη. "Ἐχει γὰρ, ἐφ᾿, λόγον. 'Ἀλλ’ ὦν τοῦτ', οἰμαί, ἵνα δ’ ἐγώ, ἥρωτας, ἀλλὰ ποιῶν νόσημα ἐν ὀλυναρχίᾳ

1. καὶ δὴ καὶ II: καὶ Λ.

563 E. In his account of the genesis of tyranny, as in his description of the tyrant himself, Plato has borrowed several features from the career of the most conspicuous tyrant of his own age, Dionysius I of Syracuse. See on 564 A, and for other historical references 566 B al.

καλὴ καὶ νεανίκη: 'fair and proud.' For νεανίκη cf. IV 425 C.

32 νόσημα: viz. the drones, as explained in 564 B (ἐκαῖνο τοῖνυν κτλ.).

33 ἐξουσία κτλ. See on 557 B. For τῷ ὄντι cf. VI 497 D n.

564 A I καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ. See cf. n. The omission of καὶ δὴ was a natural slip, and a majority of MSS agree with II. For καὶ δὴ καὶ with οὐχ ἦκιστα following cf. (with Schneider) Soph. 216 B. The present passage brings out very clearly Plato's conception of the State as a living organism and no mere 'dead machine.' See on this subject Bluntschli Theory of the State E. T. pp. 18—24 and cf. 543 A n.

3 ἄγαν δουλείαν. For the omission of the article cf. IV 434 C n. We certainly should not read, with Schaefer, τὴν ἄγαν, or delete ἄγαν with Cobet.

4 οὐκ εἴ ἄλλης κτλ. In early times, according to Aristotle (Pol. E 5. 1305a 7 ff.) democracies used to give rise to tyrannies. The tyranny of Dionysius I of Syracuse is a notorious illustration from later history (see Grote c. 81). But

tyranny had other origins as well: it constantly appeared for example during the transition from Aristocracy to an oligarchical form of government (Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 71—83). Plato deliberately selects that particular origin which accords with his psychological standpoint. In the decline of an individual soul, 'lawless' or unnatural (παράφωνοι) desires succeed the λαρνώμα in which all desires are treated as equal. Hence tyranny, which is only the political expression of unnatural desire, succeeds democracy in the fall of a State. Granted that Plato thought Athens was still degenerating, he must certainly have expected her, unless the process of decay should be arrested, to end in a tyranny. See also on IX 576 B. With the position of οἴματι cf. 568 C and other examples in Braun de hyperb. Plat. II p. 12.

5 ἀκροτάτης. Herderwen (with Flor. T) conjectures ἀκρατοτάτης: but ἀκρατος does not easily admit the superlative, and the word is less suitable here than in the elaborate similitude about the wine of freedom 562 D. For the superlative of ἀκρατος cf. V 419 E al.

7 ἥρωτας: 'you were asking about' (doch wohl nicht danach fragtest du), Schneider, viz. when you said τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; (563 E). Cf. Crat. 407 C τὸν Ἀύγι ἐρωτά (‘ask about Ares’). καὶ τῷ ὄντι—ἀγιωτάτη (563 E—564 Α) is a digression, and Adimantus' question is
not answered until Socrates specifies what particular νόημα was meant by the al-
lusio in 563 Ε. J. and C. erroneously refer ὧδες to πῶς—τὸ τοιοῦτον μέγαμεν; (562 Ε).

564 Β 9 ἐκεῖνο κτλ. ‘Well then,’ said I. ‘I was referring to your class’ etc. ἐκεῖνο = ‘already-mentioned’ (in 552 Ε and later). On τὸ μὲν—ἐπόμενον see 564 Δ ν.

11 ἀφομοιόμενον. See cr. n. The present is less suitable, especially with ὅποιον (=ut seis, Schneider). For the error see Introduct. § 5.

13 τάραττεν κτλ. τάραττεν is used absolutely as in Ἰἱππ. Μίν. 373 Β Σωκράτης—ἀλλ’ ἀπαντᾷ εἰς τοὺς λόγους. On φλέγμα τε καὶ χόλιν the Oxford editors refer to Arist. Προβ. I 29. 862b 27 τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἀνδρῖτον ἢ χόλιν μὲν ἔστι βεσμόν, τὸ δὲ φλέγμα ψυχρόν, and rightly hold that ‘the hot humour answers to the stinging, the cold to the stingless drones.’ Cf. Tim. Ἐπ. D ff.

564 Ε 15 μελίττουργόν is the reading of Σ η as well as II (see cr. n.), and is elsewhere better attested than μελίττουργόν, which “api magis quam homini convenit” (Schneider).

17 έξιν has been suspected by W. H. Thompson and Herwerden; but the pre-
position is occasionally found with this idiom both in poetry and prose (Kühner Gr. Gr. Ι. p. 356 and Lina de praep. usw. Plat. p. 33). The half-poetic έξιν (see on 4. 424 E and 718 Β) suits well with the archaic form αὐτώς (1 330 B n.).

19 τριχὴ διαστημοθείμα. With what follows cf. Eur. Syp. 238—245 τρεῖς γάρ πολλῶν μερίδες: οἱ μὲν ὄλοι ἄνω-
φελεῖς τε πλεῖστον τ’ ἑρώω· αἰτέι· | οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίσσωσί βλέποι· νέ-
μοντες τῷ φόνῳ πλεῖον μέρος, | έσ τοῦτ ἔχοντας κάτερ’ αὔφασιν κακά, | γλυσ-

21 τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος: viz. the drones. 564 Ε ἔξουσιαν. See on 557 Β.
25 ἐρρωμένοι γίγνεται, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τοῦτο ποῦ τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς ἔκτος ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ’ ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βῆματα προσαίζει βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὡστε πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου διοικεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων. Μάλα γε, ὃ δ’ ὁς Ἀριστ. 252. ἐγερομένοι τοῦ 5. 1959 ἔπειτα. Τὸ ποῖον; Χρηματιζόμενον τοῦ πάντων οἱ κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατον γίγνονται. Εἰκός. Πλείστον δὴ, ὁμιλοῦν τοὺς κηφήσι μέλει, καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐνεύθεν βλάττειν. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἐφ’ ἐπι, παρά

25. προεστὸς II et nisi fallor A¹: προεστὸς A².

25 προεστὸς refers not only to the δ’ προσαίζει τοῦ βῆμα τοῦ δήμου (565 c. n.), but to ὄπισθανοι in general and all who lead the people whether as orators or as officers (λέγει τε καὶ πράττει). 26 ἔκτος ὀλίγων. The leaders in a democracy, says Plato, belong to the class of drones—with a few exceptions. Pericles, for example, was an illustrious exception (Thuc. II 65; 8, 9 and Xen. Symp. 8. 39); and so, according even to Plato himself, was Aristides (Cyc. 526 B). Plato’s general attitude towards Athenian demagogues has often been censured; but nearly all the greatest writers of antiquity, except the orators, pronounce the same verdict.


28 τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος. Vermehren proposes τοῦ, comparing V 479 A οὖν ὅπως ἀνεχόμενοι ἄν τις—φης and IX 579 A. If Plato had wished to say ‘any one,’ he would, I think, have written ὁδενοθεῖ: τοῦ is too weak. The article is generic.

564 E 28 τοῦ τοιούτου: the class of drones in general, not simply τὸ δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ. Cf. τὸ τοιούτον γένος in C above.

29 χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων is neuter and should be taken with πάντα. The different liturgies etc. would scarcely be performed by the drones; and some departments of civic administration might be in the hands of the few exceptions noted above (ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων D). 30 τοῖνυν is ‘also’: see 1 339 E n.

31 χρηματιζόμενον κτλ.: ‘if all are engaged in making money’ etc. πάντων is the whole of which οἱ κοσμιώτατοι form a part; not ‘all the citizens of a democracy,’ for the aim of democracy is not πλουσίος but ἐλευθερία, and the drones at least are not engaged in money-making.

32 πλείστων δὴ κτλ.: ‘thus, I imagine, there is plenty of honey for the drones, and it is most easy to squeeze honey from this source.’ My correction βλάττειν (see cfr. n.) is regarded as certain by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252. βλάττειν is retained by J. and C.; but there is no authority for the intransitive use of the verb, and βλάσεω is in the very next sentence is active. Schneider reads βλάττει, which would be a ἅπαξ ἐρμηφώνον. Ruhnken’s βλάττει is inexcusable in point of sense, and has found much favour. The author of this emendation claims (in his note on Tim. Lex. s.v. βλαττεῖν) that it is confirmed “cum Scholiastae, tum Codicis Parisini auctoritate.” But the Paris MSS have all either βλάττει or βλάττει; and Bekker’s emendation of the Scholium is βλάττει: ἄφαιρε (not ἄφαιρει) τὸ μέλη ἀπὸ τῶν κηφήσι. Moreover, although the syllable τα was sometimes abbreviated in uncial MSS (see on 563 D), it is easier to suppose that the horizontal stroke for final ν was here accidentally omitted, as constantly in the Republic: see Introd. § 5. For the sense cf. 1 343 A n. and on the word βλαττεῖν (i.e. μημ(βλαττεῖν) from μελι) Blaydes on Ar. Knights 794.
34. βλάσεις (sic) m: βλάσειες Α: βλάσεις Εξ.: βλάσεις ut videtur Π1; βλάσεις Π2.

35

655 A 3 κυρίωτατον. In a democracy the sovereignty lies with the δῆμος in its assemblies.

4 ου θαμά κτλ. Under the earliest and best form of democratical government, according to Aristotle, the δῆμος consists chiefly of farmers, and ἐκκλησίαι are infrequent, for διὰ τὸ ἐπιστάθη κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὅπ' ἄπαντως ὁμοίως δέονται τῇ συνόδῳ ταύτῃ (Pol. ν. 4, 1319a 30 ff., 3. 1318b 11, and Δ. 5. 129ab 27). It is a later and degenerate phase when assemblies are multiplied by the payment of ἐκκλησιαστικὸς μισθὸς and other forms of 'honey' (ib. Δ. 6. 1298a 16 ff.). Plato in this passage contributes some hints towards a historical analysis of the evolution of Greek democracy such as we find in Aristotle.

632—643. There is little doubt that the compulsory migration of Athenian farmers into Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had a decisive effect on the course of Athenian democracy: cf. Thuc. II. 14 and 16 and Gilbert Beiträge etc. pp. 98 ff.


655 B 7 οὔτως: emphatic, 'with that proviso' (D. and V.).

9 πράττοντες is quite satisfactory: cf. λέγει τα καὶ πράττει 564 D. Richter should not have proposed ταράττοντες.

8πὶ δύναντα κτλ.: 'in any way they can.' Their opportunities of public action in self-defence are limited; hence they form e.g. secret associations and the like. On the tense of ἐσχον see 548 D n., and for the statement itself (αἰριν—ὁμ- γαρχικοί) many passages in Aristophanes, e.g. Wasp. 488 ff. and others quoted by Whibley Pol. Part. in Ath. p. 65 n. 3.
565 C 14. τὸν ἱβδονες εκοντες. Isocrates makes a similar complaint (Antid. 318): οὐδενες μὲν ἐνδοιαστοϋν τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μᾶλτα δυναμενος ποιήσαι τι τῶν πόλιν ἄγαθον, ὀλιγαρχικάν ὁδειζόντες καὶ λακωνισμὸν, οὐ πρότερον ἕπαντάτο (sc. οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν) πρὸς ἵνα γάρ καὶ ἔμοιον γενθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις ταῖς λεγομέναις περὶ ἀντῶν; Cf. also Arist. Pol. E 5. 1304 b 21 ff. Observe how Plato now begins to insist on the inevitable necessity which dogs the footsteps of political decay; see on 566 a and 67 c.

16 εἰσαγγελία: 'impeachments,' as e.g. for κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου. On eisangelia in Attic legal procedure see Hager Dict. Ant. s.v. and Meier u. Schömann Att. Proc. 1 pp. 312—335.

17 ἄγωνες περὶ ἄλλων; 'trials of one another' (Jowett): lit. 'trials about one another,' i.e. trials in which the individuals chiefly concerned, viz. the defendants, belong to one or other of the two parties in the State, ἄλλων by itself would be better suited to the words εἰσαγγελία καὶ κρίσεις, but ἄγωνες ἄλλων is too harsh an expression, and that, I think, is why Plato writes ἄγωνες περὶ ἄλλων. This explanation is in my opinion better than to translate "Processe um Leben und Tod." (Schneider: cf. ἄγωνες—περὶ σφόννων αὐτῶν Hdt. vii 101). Some may think that ἄλλων should replace ἄλλων: but περὶ with the accusative would not express a close enough connexion in this passage.

18 οὐκοῦν κτλ. So in At. Knights 1127 Demos says βούλομαι τρέψειν ἑνα προστάτην. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου in Athens was simply "the leading demagogue, who acted as guardian and representative of the demos, as the ordinary προστάτης did of the metoeces" (Whibley Pol. Part. in Ath. p. 51). He was not a magistrate, although his position was recognised and much sought after. Pericles was certainly προστάτης, and, among his successors, apparently Cleon and others. For the authorities see Whibley loc. and Gilbert Beitäge etc. pp. 78 ff. For ἵνα τινα Cobet substitutes ἵνα γε τινα, without sufficient reason; cf. vi 494 a μ. To my mind the emphasis on ἵνα is much stronger without γε: and Plato clearly intends to emphasise that word, for it is by the rise of a single champion that tyranny is caused.

565 D 20 ἐκ προστατικῆς πρίης κτλ. Arist. Pol. E 10. 1310 b 14 ff. σχέδον γαρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγονόσι ἐκ δημαρχιαν ὡς εἰτεις, πατευθύνετε ἐκ τοῦ διαζάλλειν τοῦς γινομένους. This was especially true of earlier times, when the orator also held military command (ib. 5. 1305 a 7 ff.). See Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. 11 pp. 280 ff.

21 καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοθεν. If we treat this sentence as a statement of historical fact, Plato expresses himself too strongly; for tyranny sometimes arose in other ways. See however on 564 a and 543 A, 544 c mno.

23 τοῦ μυθ. See [Hecat.] Frag. 375 in Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. 1 p. 31 and Paus. viii 2. 6. In his note on the latter passage, Frazer collects the ancient legends about werewolves. For the later history of the superstition consult McLennan's
article Lycaentropy in Enc. Brit. ed. 9, and for parallels in non-classical mythologies Tylor Prim. Culture 1 pp. 308—

26 ἐνός is bracketed by Herwerden; but τοῦ in τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνων proves it genuine. But for ἐνός Plato must have written τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνων <τοῦ> ἐν ἀλλοι κτλ. The were-wolf superstition was similarly associated with cannibalism in some of its later European forms (M'C-Lennan l.c.).


30 ἀνδρός is poetic for ἀνθρώπου: cf. Aesch. Ag. 1020 f. ἀνδρός μέλαν αἷμα τί ἔν πάλιν ἴγκαλλεσάτ' ἑπεαιδὼν; and often in Pindar (Ol. 1 35, 66 etc.).

31 γλωττῆ τε καὶ—ἐνυγγενος. The blood of fellow-citizens is kindred blood: for all are sons of the same fatherland. ‘The unholy tongue and lips’ is an eloquent amplification of γενομένοις, in harmony with the story to which Plato has referred in d above. J. and C. seem to me to have exaggerated the effect of Plato’s eloquence by remarking that ‘the tongue and lips which make the slanderous accusation are vividly imagined as actually tasting blood.’

566 ἀνδρηλατή κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 466 c τι δὲ; οὐχ ὀφεῖστοι ὁ τύραννος ἀποκτινώσατε (sc. οἱ ἰδιωτες) δν ἄν βούλωμαι, καὶ ἀφαιρέσαι τρίματα καὶ ἐκβάλλοντες ἐκ τῶν πόλεων δν ἄν δοκῇ αὕτως; Νη τῶν κυρίων. The unscrupulous mob-orator is a budding tyrant.


567 ἀνάγκη—καὶ ἐφιμαρται κτλ. Once more Necessity rings her knell (565 c n.): the instinct of self-preservation makes the final stage inevitable. For the same reason Xenophon remarks (Hier. 7. 13, 13) that a tyrant never dare lay down his power: cf. also Periander in D. L. 1 97 and the pathetic saying καλὸν μὲν εἰσίν τὴν τυραννίδα χωρὶς, οὐκ ἔχειν ὑπὸ ἀπὸδεσίαν (Plut. Sol. 14. 10). See also on 545 c and 547 a.

567 οὕτω κτλ. ‘This then,’ said I, ‘is the man who is guilty of sedition against the holders of property.’ γίγνεται is not ‘becomes’ (‘the leader of the faction against the rich becomes that person’) J. and C.), but ‘turns out to be,’ is sc. in our argument or picture: cf. 562 A n. οὕτω γίγνεται is similarly used at the end of the picture of the tyrannical man in IX 576 b. Schneider seems to suppose that σταθάων refers to civil war (‘viit et arma civilitii’) such as is described in what follows, but the incidents just enumerated.
5 staasiz'ov gignetai pr0s tov' exontas tas odyias. Oytos. 'Ar' onv ekpesow men kai katelebwo bia t'ov' eikhrwv t'uriwnos apeirsga-
menos katyretai: Dllov. 'Ean de adunatai ekballew auton
asw h 1 apokteinai diababallontes t' polioi, biaw 0 de
bavnto V eti bouleunon apoktumyai aladb. Filiei gow, h 0 os, ouyto
10 gignesbai. To de turyunikov aitwma t' poluvthiletov ent t'ouwt
pantes oi eis touto probergkotes exferiskousin, aitein t'ov diwmou
fulakas twn t'ov' somatos, iva sows autois h 0 t'ov diwmou bothios.
Kai mel', ephem. Diddosu 0, oimai, deisantos men uper ekeinou,
tharrhisautes de uper eauton. Kai 1 maala. Oukovn touto onan C
15 ide anph chrismata exchon kai meta twn xerimatwn aitwma
miothemos elinai, tote de ouyto, o etaire, kata t'ov Kroisow
geunemenov xrisiomou

poluvphida par 'Ermw
fevgei, ouddd meveni, ou'd aiaytaikakos einai.

20 Ov yap an, ephem, deuteron autis aiedebein. 'O de 0e, oimai, 0n 0'
egw, katalhfeis bavnto didotai. 'Avagke. 'O de de prostatgis
ekieinos autos diilw 0 deini megyas megalostr 1 ou keitai, allla D
katabalow allous pollos evstheken en to diufrh tis polwos,

23. kataballow A'II: katabalow (sic) A'.

would certainly be called staas by a Greek, and oytos de-
gignetai points backward rather than forward, as is clear
both from de and from Adimantus' reply.
3 ekpeswv ktl. He is transformed
into a full and finished tyrant in one of
two ways: either by being expelled
(in course of the staas) and returning bi
wn ekhrov, or else in the way described
in 0n de—aposteleomeinous (D). Pisis-
tratus is not a perfect example to illustrate
ekpeswv etc., for he had made himself a
tyrant before he was expelled (Arist. Ath.
Pol. 14 3).

556 B 8 diababallontes t' polioi: 'by
setting the citizens against him' (J. and
C.) rather than 'by accusing him to the
State' (D. and V.). Cf. VI 498 C and
Phot. 65 v.

10 aitwma t' poluvthiletov: as in
the case of Theagenes of Megara, Pisis-
tratus, and Dionysius of Syracuse: see
Arist. Rhet. 1 2. 1357 30—33 with Cope
ad loc., and (for Dionysius) Grote X pp.
202 ff. and Freeman's Sicily III p. 558.

Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. II p. 281 n. 1)
remarks that the body-guard plays a part
in the genesis of nearly every Tyrannis.

556 C, D 14 tharrhisautes—eauton.
Cf. Solon Frag. 11 5—8 Bergk.
16 t'ov Kroisow ktl. See Hdt. I 55.
20 aiedebein ktl. Liebhold's con-
jecture oikadebein is of course absurd.
The expression thevani doudai is paulo ex-
quissitum dictum, resembling our phrase
'is done to death': cf. (with Stallbaum)
IX 571 E. 574 C and Phaedr. 254 E (doudai
basis endek, imitated from Homer Od.
XVII 567).

21 megas megalostr. II. XVI 776.
23 en t'w diufrh ktl. The figure—a
common one—is of course suggested by
the Homeric allusion. Cebriones aorw-
tirot oikovs kappi's apti enfrwos diufrh
(ib. 743). Not so the prostatheis: he tells
others, but himself (autov) evstheken en t'w
diufrh tis polwos.

556 D—569 C. The tyrant begins his
reign with popular measures, but as soon
as his position is secure, he impoverishes
and oppresses the citizens by a continual
succession of wars. All who expostulate, he 'removes': it is a sad necessity of his situation that he should purge the city of wealth and virtue. To provide against his growing unpopularity, he must increase his standing army by enlisting foreign mercenaries and the slaves of private citizens. These are his 'new citizens' forsooth! Euripides and other tragedians praise tyranny and its retinue; that is why we exclude them from our city. The higher they climb the hill of commonwealths, the more the honour paid to poets flags. As for the tyrant, after exhausting the property of temples and the prescribed, he will compel the Demos that begat him to support his rabble rout. All renonstrance is in vain. The Demos now learns what slavery means—slavery in its most cruel form, where slaves are masters.

566 D ff. 26 διελθωμεν δι' ητης κτλ. Throughout the whole of this picture, it is tolerably clear that Plato has Dionysius the first of Syracuse in his mind: see on 566 E, 567 B, E, 568 A, D. The reader should compare Aristotle's brief account of the three kinds of Tyranny in Pol. Δ 10. 12955—1297. That which Plato describes is of course the commonest variety ζητησεν διοικησις διακριτικα των ιθων και βελτιωσιν παντων προς το σφετερον αυτην συμφερον, αλλα μη προς των αρχεμενων (ib. 20—22).

27 βροτος: 'creature' (Jowett). The tyrant is something less than man.

29 παντως οτι αν κτλ. For the grammatical concord cf. IV 436 C n. The sense is well illustrated by Stallbaum from Eur. I. A. 337—342, where Menelaus says to Agamemnon: ουθ' δ' ιερ' λατεσσας αρχαιν Δαναοιδα προς Τινοι | —ος ταπεινος σταθη, πασης δεξιας προστηγεγανων, | και θυρας εξων ακλητους τω θελοντι θημων, | και διδοσ προσφηνει εξης πασι, κει μητης θελονε | τοις τροποις ιππων προσβαλε το φαιτιτιμον εκ μεσου; | ουτε οπου παλαιον εκ κυνον τα κρατουν και ου νεον εκ των θεμων.

33 προς τους έξω εξηθρους κτλ. : 'in his relations to foreign enemies' etc. With the construction of τοις μεν κτλ. cf. IX 591 E | —592 A αλλα μην και τιμας γε— των μεν μεθεξε και γενεσται εκων, ος ην υπηγη τα μεν πουσεσαι, δι' αν λυσει την υπαρχουσαν εξων, έφευσεν ιδια και δημοσια. In both cases the idiom resembles so-called partitive apposition, for which see IV 431 A n.
A majority of MSS have πρὸς τὸ, which is also the older reading (see cf. n.); but εἰσὶν πρὸς τι in this sense lacks authority, and is inherently improbable. Cf. Phaedr. 249 D and IX 555 A, X 604 C, D n. 5 ὅτως — πολέμιοι: sc. πολέμιοι τινὰς ἄρει as before. ἄρειον in line 7 is impersonal—a rare usage, for which cf. Ἐφ. 7. 333 A and Eur. H. F. 86.

567 31 ὅτε ὑπεξαίρειν. For the correction ὑπεξαίρειν (cf. Xen. Hiero 5. 2 ὅταν ἐκ τούτων ὑπεξαίρεται [J. G. Schneider’s conjecture for ὑπεξαίρεται of the MSS]. On this passage the poet Gray remarks: “Compare this description with the Hiero of Xenophon: it is in almost every step a picture of the politics and way of life of the elder Dionysius.”

12 ἔως ἀν μήτης φιλος κτλ. There is no solitude or desolation like the tyrant’s: for he is the enemy of the whole human race. See the passages quoted by Nagelsbach Nachhorn, Theol. p. 304. 567 C 17 καθάρμου. Cf. VII 540 E n. The famous anecdote of Thrasybulus and Periander (Hdt. v. 92: cf. Arist. Pol. Π 13. 1284a 26 ff., B 10. 1311a 20 ff., also Eur. Suppl. 445—449, where the poet borrows his imagery from the same story) is one instance out of many in Greek history: see Greenidge Gk Const. Η. pp. 31 ff. 20 ἀνάγκη: sc. ἐστιν. J. and C. strangely say that ἀνάγκη is the subject.
of eóke." For αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη cf. 568 E and IX 579 A. On the force of ἀνάγκη here and just below see 565 C, 566 A, H.

567 D 27 ἔχοντι πετέμενοι: 'will wing their way.' πετέμενοι leads up to κηφῆς.

τὸν μισθὸν: 'the pay,' i.e. 'the necessary pay' (J. and C.). W. H. Thompson would omit τὸν or replace it by μόνον: but insufficient pay would not attract mercenaries.

567 E 28 ξενοκόσιοι—παντοδαποίοι. The body-guard of foreign mercenaries was a familiar feature in Greek tyrannies; see Xen. Hic. 5, 2 and (for Dionysius in particular) Grote Χ p. 221.

29 τί δε:—ποιήσασθαι: The words from αὐτόθεν το ποίησασθαι form a single sentence, παρ’ αὐτῷ neglected: cf. τὴν δὴ—γίγνεται in 549 C, where see note and Jebb quoted ad loc. αὐτόθεν by its emphatic position already suggests what Socrates is about to say; and Adimantus' interruption, besides its stylistic effect, expresses the anxiety and horror with which the bare idea of such a proceeding would inspire a Greek. "Slaves were normally of non-Greek race; so this is what enlisting a band of negroes would be in the United States to-day" (Bosanquet). The best MSS read τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν κτλ., but τίς is indefensible, and retained by no editor. Schneider's τοῦς δὲ αὐτόθεν (with several MSS of inferior authority) seems to me grammatically awkward, as well as lifeless and dull. In Richards' proposal τί δὲ; αὐτόθεν ἄρ’ οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλησει πως τοὺς δοῦλους etc., the enclitic πως is singularly weak. J. and C., who print, with Hermann and Stallbaum, τί δὲ; αὐτόθεν—ἐθέλησει; and a full-stop after ποιήσασθαι, supply 'some general notion such as λαβεῖν οὐ ποιήσασθαι' with ἐθέλησει "from metapēmēta in the previous sentence"—surely an impossible solution. The punctuation in the text removes, I think, all difficulty, if the words are taken as I take them.

30 τοὺς δοῦλους κτλ. As Dionysius, for example, did (Grote Χ p. 221 and Freeman's Sicily IV p. 13).

568 A 4 οἱ νέοι πολίται: 'the new citizens,' viz. these quondam slaves etc., not (as D. and V.) 'the young citizens.' It is, in view, for example, of νέον τειλόρους 'new friends' IX 575 D, quite unnecessary to read οἱ νεοτυλίται (apparently with Pollux III 56: cf. also id. IX 26), although according to Diodorus XIV 7 Dionysius called his body-guard of emancipated slaves νεοτυλίται. See Freeman's Sicily I C.
5 te kai fevγousi; Tí δ' ou mēλλουsin; Oúk étós, ἡν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τε τραγῳδία ὁλος σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Ἐυριτίδης διαφέρων εἰν αὐτῇ. Tí δή; "Οτι καὶ τοῦτο πωϊς διανοιας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγξατο, ὥς ἄρα σοφὸι τύραννοι 1 εἰς τὸν σοφὸν συνουσία. καὶ Β ἐλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτον εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς, οἰς ξύνεστιν. Καὶ ὡς

10 ἵσοθεν ο'γ', ἐφι, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωμιεῖ, καὶ ἔτερα πολλά, καὶ οὕτως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Τοιγάρτοι, ἐφι, ὅτε σοφοὶ οίτε οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταί συνηγγονώσκουσι ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἑκεῖνοι, οἵοι ημῶν ἐγγύς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδείγμεθα ἄτε τυραννίδος ὑμνήτας. Οἰμαί ἐγὼγ', ἐφι, ἡνηγγονώσκουσιν

15 σωσιπέρ γε 1 αὐτῶν κομψολ. Εἰς δὲ γε, οἰμαί, τὰς ἄλλας περι-

ε. περιοδέτες Λ'Ει: περιοδέτες Λ'Η.

1 οὐκ ἐτός κτλ. Α. highly ironical

and sarcastic sentence. It is not without

reason that tragedy 'in general' (ὅλος is

not 'on the whole' as D. and V. render)

is thought σοφόν, and Euripides a master-

tragedian (Euripides was notoriously 'σο-

φός'—see Blaydes on Ar. Clouds 1378): for

he gave utterance inter alia to this

sapien remark (for ἐφθέγξατο of an

oracular, would-be profound observation,

see on VI 505 C): σοφόι τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν

συνουσία, in which by τῶν σοφῶν' he

meant of course τῶν ἔξεστιν (ἐν τύραννοι)

the associates of the tyrant, i.e., as we

have seen, a rabble of emancipated slaves

and foreign mercenaries. In τραγῳδία—

σοφόν δοκεῖ εἶναι Plato is also perhaps

 scoffing at the constant use of σοφός in

tragedy, especially by Euripides: σοφός

is, no doubt, that σοφός says! None but

a σοφός could have written σοφὸι τύραννος

τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία. The poet of course

really meant that tyrants gain wisdom from

the wise men who throng the 'rich man's

courts' (VI 489 b.). but Plato maliciously

twists the words into a compliment to

tyrants and their raffle rout, and makes

them a reason for tabooing tragic poets as

τυραννίδος ὑμνήτας (B). Cobet would

omit τῶν before σοφῶν: but the article

is necessary because τῶν σοφῶν repre-

sents τῶν σοφῶν of the quotation. As

regards the verse itself, it was Sophocles

(in his Αῖας ὁ Δακρός), and not Euripides,

who was the author: see the references

in Schneider, with Blaydes on Ar. Thesm.

21, Frag. 311 and Dindorf on Soph.

Frag. 12 = Nauck Frag. 13. Plato's

error is repeated in Thesp. 125 b. and

the Scholiast on Ar. Thesm. l.c. remarks

that Aristophanes and Antisthenes made

the same mistake, suggesting that either

Aristophanes misled the others (so also

Hirmer Ents. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 658 n. 2), or that the two tragedians

wrote the same line independently (so

Schneider also thinks). The latter sup-

position is unlikely. Perhaps the re-

duplication of the cant Euripidean σοφός

is responsible for a kind of error which

was easier in antiquity than it would be

now. There is little to be said in favour

of Dümmler's conjecture (Akadem. p. 16),

that Antisthenes had quoted the line as

from Euripides in an attack on Plato

for associating with tyrants (Dionysius I

and II), and that Plato, in his hurry to

reply, forgets to rectify his assailant's

error. Still less should we suppose that

Plato's perverse exegesis is meant to cari-

cature Antisthenes' way of expounding

poetry.


1169 ἡς ἰσθενον τυραννίδος. Isocrates

ad Nic. 5 appears to allude to the same

verse (Dümmler Chronol. Beiträge p. 32).

Ἴτερα πολλά: e.g. Phoen. 524 f., Fragg.

253, 336 Dindorf. In point of fact,

however, Euripides blames tyranny at

least as often as he praises it: see e.g.

Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Fragg. 277,

288, 608 and other passages in Stob.

Flor. 49. The elder Dionysius himself

had the effrontery or candour to write the

line η γὰρ τυραννίς ἀδίκιας μὴ γέναι έφο

(Stob. Flor. 49. 9, quoted in Freeman's

Sicily IV p. 7 n. 1).

13 παραδεξόμεθα: not παραδεχόμεθα

(as Stephanus suggested), in spite of the

present συγγενικόσκουσιν, for "civitas ipse
to Poetry varies inversely with the merit of the constitution. This is perhaps the severest thing which Plato has yet said against Poetry. The striking metaphor in οὕστε ὑπὸ ἁθσματος ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύσθαι. Plato κείνος μὲν ὑπαγόρευεν ἄν τῶν ἡ τιμή, οὕστε ὑπὸ ἁθσματος ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύσθαι. Πάνιν μὲν οὖν.

Χ. 'Ἀλλὰ δὴ, εἰπον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγω μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον, τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ πολὺ 25 καὶ ποικίλον καὶ υδέπτοτε ταυτῶν, πόθεν θρέψεται. Δὴ λοιπόν, ἕφη, ὅτι, εάν τε ἑρᾶ χρήματα ἦ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταύτα ἑπάλωσεν, ὅποι τοτε ἄν ἔξρηκη, <καὶ> τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων, ἐπάλλος εἰςφορᾶς.

αναγκάζων τὸν δήμον εἰσφέρειν. Τί δ' ὦταν δὴ ταύτα ἐπιλίτης; Ε 30 Δήλου, ἐφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατριών θρέψεται αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταίροι καὶ ἑταίραι. Μανθάνω, ἐφην ἐγὼ· ὅτι ο ὁ δήμος, ο γεννησάς τῶν τύραννων, θρέψει αὐτὸν τε καὶ ἑταίρους. Πολλὴ ἀυτῷ, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη. Ὑπὸ δὲ λέγει, εἰπον, ἐὰν τι ἀγανακτῇ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δήμος, ὅτι οὐτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὑὼν ἡμῶν, 35 αλλὰ τούναιτιον ὑπὸ ύεως πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτὸν ἐνεκε | ἐγέννησεν τε καὶ κατεστήσεν, ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε 569 αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοὺς αὐτῷ δουλίσας τρέφοι εἰκείων καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ εὐγνωμονίαν ἀλλαον, ἀλλ' ἕνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κακαθών λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑλευθερωθηκέν εἰκείουν 5 προστάτως, και νῦν κλείνει ἀπίστευτοι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν τε καὶ τοῖς ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ πατήρ ὑὼν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν συμπτωτῶν ἐξελαύνων; Γυνώσεται γε, ἡ Δία, ἡ δ' ὅσ, τότ' ἕνα ὁ δήμος, 1 οἷος Β ὁλον θρέμμα γεωνων ὡστάξετο τε καὶ ἥξεν, καὶ ὤτι ἄσθενεστος ὑὼν ἵσχυροτέρως ἐξελαύνει. Πῶς, ἢ δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις; τολμήσει τὸν 10 πατέρα βιαζοῦσα, κἀκ μὴ πείθηται, τυπτειν ὁ τύραννος; Ναί,

29. ἐπιλίτης Ξ q: ἐπιλίτης ΑΠ. 30. συμπόται Π: συμπόται (sic) Α. 31. ἐφην ἐγὼ nos: ἐφην δ' ἐγὼ ΛΠ: ἐφην ἢ δ' ἐγὼ q. 32. ἑταίρους Π: ἑταίρισ Λ. 33. εἶν τι q: εἶν τε ΑΠΣ. 3. ἀπὸ q: ὑπὸ ΑΠΣ.

568 E 29 δη. Badham suggests ἤδη, needlessly: cf. ΙΧ 573 E and 574 C (Baiter). ἐπιλίτης κτλ. ἐπιλίτης (see cr. ι.) is retained by Hermann, but the arist, which nearly all the ms read, is no less necessary here than in i 346 Ε, ΙΧ 573 Ε and Σ 601 Β. Cf. Hellen Curiae Criticae pp. 3 ff. Ον τῶν πατριών see ΙΧ 574 Α Λ. 31 μανδάω—δτι. A comparison with 584 Α line 8 and with 406 Α line 8 (see cr. ιι, ad loc.) shows that ἐφην ἐγώ, and not ἢν δ' ἐγώ is in all probability the right reading in this place. δτι=(you say so) 'because,' not 'that' : see on 332 Α. 33 πῶς δὲ λέγεις κτλ. 'And how say you,' quoth I, 'if the Demos be somewhat wroth,' etc. I formerly read πῶς λέγεις with Ξ and some other inferior ms, but now revert to the best supported reading, except that, with q, I print εἶν τι for εἶν τε (see cr. ιι). If we read πῶς λέγεις, we must take the words as referring to σολὴν αὐτῷ—ἀνάγκη; if πῶς δὲ λέγεις, the reference will be to the words which follow εἰπον, and πῶς δὲ λέγεις will then invite the reply which Adimantus gives below, viz. γνωστὲ τε—ἐξελαύνει. It seems to me better in every way to make the question refer to the new point which is about to be raised by Socrates; for the statement that the Demos will have to support the tyrant is already complete, and needs neither further elucidation nor any expression of surprise. A majority of editors read εἶν τι δὲ for εἶν τε. I think that τε must be wrong in any case, unless (with Schneider) we postulate an awkward anacoluthon, as though Socrates meant to add εἶν τε μη. The reading of τι for τε enables us to retain πῶς δὲ λέγεις, and refer the question to what follows: for which reasons I now follow q.

569 Α 3 ἀπὸ is read by Flor. Υ and V as well as q. Schneider alone retains ὑπὸ, but εἰλευθερωθηκαί ὑπὸ means only 'be freed by.' It is better to write ἀπὸ than (with Baiter) to excise the preposition. For the corruption see Best Comment. Pal. p. 794. 4 κάλων καγαθῶν. See on vii 439 Ε. 5 κελεύει. Baiter's conjecture κελεύει is a curious error. κελεύει depends of course on δτι: in oratio recta the δήμος would say κελεύει σα ἐπιίναι. Cf. διακελευοῦτο in x 614 Α and note ad loc.
569 B 13 τὸ λεγόμενον. τὴν κατηνοφανὴν φεύγων εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐνέπεσον ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ μικρὰ τῶν δεινῶν φευγότων, καὶ εἰς μείζονα δεινὰ ἐμπτωτῶν. (Diogen. VIII 45 in Leutsch u. Schneidewin Parnem. Gr. I p. 314, where the other authorities are also cited.)

φεύγων κτλ.: ‘in trying to escape the smoke of servitude to free men will have fallen into the fire of the masterdom of slaves.’ Herwerden proposes to excise ἐλευθέρων καὶ δοῦλων (both here and in C below). It is difficult to believe that he had read 567 E and 569 A (δουλεύων τοῖς αὐτοῦ δοῦλοι) before making this audacious suggestion. The chiasmus δουλείας ἐλευθέρων — δοῦλων δεσποτείας is in Plato’s finest style.

569 C 15 ἀκαίρου, ἀκράτου (Herwerden: cf. 562 D) would be grossly incongruous with μεταμπισχόμενος, and is otherwise less suitable here than ἀκαίρου. ἁδὸς δοῦλων is emphatic: ‘the most galling form of slavery’ is slavery to slaves (J. and C.). Cf. 567 E η.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

I.

THE NUMBER.

The famous Number of Plato is notoriously the most difficult passage in his writings. The difficulty lies in the Greek, and not in the calculations, which are, as will be seen, extraordinarily simple, and can be understood by any one who has a rudimentary acquaintance with the multiplication table, and is willing to believe a single proposition of Euclid, viz. i 47. I have explained my conception of the passage as a whole in the note on 545 c: and in this Appendix I propose to investigate and illustrate the entire section in detail with a view to justifying the explanations which I have given throughout the notes.


It should be mentioned that this Appendix is in a few passages identical with the treatise on The Number of Plato which I published in 1891. During the eleven years which have elapsed since my earlier publication, my views have been considerably modified, especially as regards the interpretation of the words τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις—φθινότων and the philosophical significance of the latter part of the Number; and the explanations contained in this Appendix are those which I now believe to be right. I may perhaps be allowed to express my obligations to those scholars who have supplied me with criticisms, whether written or printed, on my former work. The Provost of Oriel's discussions on my Number of Plato in the Classical Review have been constantly before me while engaged upon this subject. Some of his objections to my earlier theory were sound: others, and these the most important, I believe that I have refuted in the course of the present discussion. I am wholly unable to acquiesce in the praetulicata opinio that "there is no complete solution because there was no consistent meaning in Plato's mind" (J. of Ph. viii p. 285), but my revised explanation owes something to Mr Monro's resolute and sturdy application of the 'negative arm of the elenchorus,' and I am not less grateful to him for the opportunity which he has given me of shewing (in Paris ii and iii of this Appendix) that the incomplete solution which he himself suggests is one which cannot be attributed either to Plato or Aristotle, without infringing, as it seems to me, the laws alike of logic, arithmetic and Greek\(^1\).

It will be convenient to quote the passage in full and also, for the sake of facilitating reference, to divide the words with which we are more immediately concerned into five sections, A, B, C, D, E.

\(^1\) Mr Archer-Hind's criticisms in the Cambridge Review for Jan. 28, 1892, have also affected my view on the meaning of the two ἀρμονίαι: and I now also agree with him in his suggestion that σύγγραμμα ἐπιτροπος τιμημω τιμέας αὐξωμεν invites us to multiply together the three numbers 3, 4 and 5. The review by Hultsch in Berl. Phil. Woch. 1892 pp. 1256 ff. may also be mentioned. Hultsch agrees with me in making the two numbers 216 and 12,960,000: he was also the first, so far as I know, to see that the sides of the ἀρμονίαι should be multiplied and not added, and that the rectangle is equal to the square; but in other respects his proposed solution is almost entirely different from mine. It is due to Hultsch and to the reader, that I should give the two solutions side by side, and I now do so.

### A. Hultsch's Solution.

1. \(2^3 \times 3^3 = 216\) (so also Schneider)
2. \((3 + 4 + 5) \times 3 = 36\),

and 36 by somehow or other developing out of itself a square number multiplied by 100, becomes 3600\(^2\), which is the first harmony. The second is the rectangle whose sides are

\[
(1) \ 100 \times 7 \sqrt{7 - \frac{1}{7}}
\]

and

\[
(2) \ 100 \times 3^2 \sqrt{7 - \frac{1}{7}}.
\]

For further information the reader should consult Hultsch's article in Zeitschriften f. Math. etc. l.c.

### B. The solution now proposed.

1. \(3^2 + 4^2 + 5^2 = 216\),
2. \((3 \times 4 \times 5)^2 = 3600\times 2700\).

In the interpretation of Plato's Greek I am seldom if ever able to agree with Hultsch.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

For the sake of clearness I will endeavour as far as possible to confine myself in the first instance to the elucidation of the numbers and numerical processes, reserving the question of the philosophical significance of the Platonic Number for separate treatment in Part ii of this Appendix. But as it is impossible thoroughly to grasp the numbers apart from their meaning, or their meaning apart from the numbers, I may perhaps be allowed to suggest that the student, after he has read a section in Part i, before going on to the succeeding section, should glance at the corresponding division of Part ii. I have added a third Part by way of epilogue, in which Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Number is fully discussed.

Before we embark on our task, it is desirable to allude to the evidence which there is for believing that Plato made use of the Pythagorean triangle in his Number. 'The triangle in question, as is well known, is the right-angled triangle whose sides are 3 and 4, whose hypotenuse is consequently 5, and whose area is \( \frac{4 \times 3}{2} = 6 \). See Fig. 1.
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It will be shewn in Part iii that Aristotle regards the Pythagorean triangle as the basis of the number in the section which I have called B. Besides Aristotle we have the testimony of at least three authors (cited by Schneider1), viz. Plutarch (de Is. et Os. 373 F), where he says τῶν τριγώνων τὸ κάλλιστον—δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ προσκεχρησθαι, τὸ γαμήλιον διάγραμμα συνντάττων. ἦγεῖ δὲ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τρίγωνον πριν τὴν πρὸς ὥρθαι, καὶ τεταράδιον τὴν βάσιν καὶ πέντε τὴν ύποτείνουσαν ἴσον ταῖς περιεχόμεναι δυναμένην: Proclus (in Euclid. p. 428, ed. Friedlein) in these words: τὸ ἐν πολιτείᾳ τρίγωνον, οὗ τὴν ὥρθην περιεχομένην δὲ τε τρία (sc. ἀριθμός) καὶ ὅ τέσσαρα: and Aristides Quintilianus, who (De Musica, ed. Meibom p. 152 = Jahn p. 90) remarks: αἱ δὲ τὴν ὥρθην περιεχομέναι δήλωσεν τὸν ἐπίστροφον. τούτῳ δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ἡφσίν ἐπίστροφον πυθμένα πεμπάθεια συνυγέιτα. To this testimony may now be added Proclus and the authorities whom he quotes in his commentary on the Platonic Number (ed. Kroll 11 pp. 1 ff.), in the course of which constant reference is made to the wonderful properties of this κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον, as it was sometimes called (ib. 45. 23).

PART i.

THE ARITHMETICAL SOLUTION2.

I will take the four divisions B, C, D, E in the order in which they occur. The division which I call A involves no arithmetical calculations, and will be better discussed in Part ii.

§ 1.

ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ—ἀπέρθημαν.

It may be well to give at the outset a translation of this passage. 'But the number of a human creature is the first number in which root and square increases, having received three distances and four limits, of elements that make both like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational with one another.'

The construction of the words ἀνθρωπεῖς—πρώτως is ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ <γεννητῷ ἐστὶν ἀριθμός> ἐν ὧν πρώτως, which is itself an abbreviated expression on ἀνθρωπεῖς δὲ <γεννητῷ ἐστὶν περίοδον ὧν ἀριθμοῖ περιλαμβάνει> ἐν ὧν πρώτως, as a glance at the preceding clause will shew.

The meaning is: 'while the number of a human creature is the first

rectangle \( \text{ABDC} \), i.e. it is \( \frac{4 \times 3}{2} = 6 \). Cf. Theol. Ar. p. 39 ed. Ast, where in a description of the Pythagorean triangle it is expressly pointed out that the area is 6. So also in Proclus in remp. 11 p. 42 ed. Kroll.

1 l.c. p. xxxii. Cf. also Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. § 131.

2 A brief summary of the results of Part i has already been published by me in Ch. Rev. xvi pp. 17—23.
number in which,' and 'the first number' signifies of course the first number which satisfies the conditions about to be described. In the notes on 546 a ff., as well as in Pt ii § 3, I have shewn that by 'period' Plato means 'period of gestation'; so that the 'number of a human creature' must be a number which measures the time during which the human creature is in the womb. It will be well to bear this in mind throughout the calculations which follow.

I proceed to explain ai?€ξη€τεις δνάμειαι τε και διναστενάμειαι.

The word ai?€ξη€τεις means 'increases,' and in its arithmetical significance must denote either 'additions' or 'multiplications.' Which of these two meanings the word bears here, Plato himself, as we shall presently see, informs us by means of the clause τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέταρτας δὲ ὄροις λαβοῦμεν.

What is the meaning of δνάμειαι? It is clear from more than one passage in Plato that the mathematical sense of δύναμις 'be equal when squared to,' i.e. 'be the square root of,' was not yet fully and firmly established in his day. In Theaetetus 147 e—τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δὲκα διελάβομεν. τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ίσον ἵσικες γένεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τῷ σχήμα ἀπεκάσαστες τετράγωνον τε καὶ ἵσικες προσεπείμερον— it is a square number which is said to be δυνάμενον (viz. ἵσικες γένεσθαι), while in 148 e—δοσά μὲν γραμμαί τὸν ἵσικεν καὶ ἐπιπέδουν ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνιζον, μήκος ὤρυσθείναι. δοσά δὲ τὸν ἐτερομηνίκη, δυνάμεις, ὥσι μήκει μὲν οὖν ἑξήμετρων ἑκεῖναι, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιπέδους ό δυναίται— it is the roots which are δυνάμεναι (sc. to produce squares), as in Euclid x def. 11 καὶ αἱ δυνάμειαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα. But on comparing these two passages from Plato, we note that, while δυνάμενον is not used absolutely in the sense of a square, but requires to be further explained (viz. by the words ἵσικες γένεσθαι), δυναίται, where it is used absolutely, means 'are the roots of.' We infer that δυνάμειαι in our passage refers to roots and not to squares. Our inference will be confirmed as we proceed.

We have next to deal with the word δυναστενάμειαι. It is fortunate that Proclus should have expressly alluded to this part of Plato's Number. At the outset of his commentary on the first book of Euclid he endeavours to shew that the ἄρχαί of the Universe of things—τῶν ὄντων ἀπαίτων—are also the ἄρχαί of Mathematics. One of his examples, that from δυνάμεις, is as follows: καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀναφαίνεται πᾶσιν ὁμοίως προσήκει τοῖς μαθήμασι, τῶν μὲν δυναμένων, τῶν δὲ δυναστεναμένων. ἡ δὴ καὶ ὅ ἐν πολλεῖς Ἀρκάτης ταῖς μοισιαῖς ὑπηλογουμέναις ἀνέθηκεν, τὰ κοινὰ παινών τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγων ἐν πέρασιν ὠρυκέοις περιλαβὼν καὶ προστησάμενοι ἐν τοῖς εἰρημείοις


2 The word δυνάμεις is here confined to irrational roots, but this is a limitation introduced by Theaetetus. Theaetetus in fact proposes to confine the word δυνάμεις to surds, and to use μήκος for the rational roots. The usual meaning of δύναμις in Plato's mathematics is 'second increase': cf. Gow Gk Math. p. 78 n. 1.

3 In Euclid ed. Friedlein, p. 8.

4 In Eucl. l.c.
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The first sentence means that 'powers' play a part in every department of Mathematics as well as in Nature and in Life—'some having power, while others are subject to power.' For example 3 is δυνάμενος, because it has power (viz. over 9—to make 9): 9 is δυναστευόμενος, because it is subject to power (viz. of 3—to be made by 3). It will not be denied that δυναστευόμαι is intended by Proclus as the passive of δυναμαί. Now δύναται, said of a root, means δυνάται τετράγωνον ποιεῖν. The passive of this, said of a square number, is δύναται τετράγωνος γίγνεσθαι (δύναται ἵσος ἰσώς γίγνεσθαι in Theaet. 147 e). In the case of the active, it was found possible to drop τετρά-

γωνον ποιεῖν: but if, in the passive, τετράγωνος γίγνεσθαι is discarded, at least the passivity must not be. For this reason δύναται becomes δυναστευόταν.

We may therefore take it that δυναστευόμεναι in our passage refers to squares. But before interpreting the expression as a whole, it is necessary to discuss a passage of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, which has not unnaturally been quoted in connexion with section B, since it seems to be the only other passage besides those already quoted in which δυναστευόταν occurs in mathematical surroundings. The words are: ἀνίκιαν δὲ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λέγεσθαι τὴν πεντάδα, τούτο δὲ ὅτι τῶν ὀρθογώνιων τριγώνων τῶν ἑκάτερων ῥητάς τὸς πλευρᾶς πρῶτον ἐστὶ τῶν περιεχομένων ὑπὸ γεωμετρίας πλευρῶν ἢ μὲν τρίων ἢ δὲ τετράων, ἢ δὲ υποτεί-

νουσα πέντε. ἔτει τούτων ἡ υποτείνουσα ἵσον δύναται ἀμφότεραι ἀριά, διὰ τοῦτο ἢ μὲν δυναμή καλεῖται, ἢ δὲ δυναστευόμεναι, καὶ ἐστὶ πέντε. τὴν τε πεντάδα ἀνίκιαν ἑλεγον ὡς μὴ νικωμένην ἀλλὰ ἀγτήτην καὶ κρατοῦσαν.

The general drift of the passage is that the Pythagoreans called the number 5 'Invincibility,' because it is the hypotenuse of the first right-angled triangle with rational sides—the one 3, the other 4. As the hypotenuse is equally powerful4 with both the other sides, it is called δυναμῆ, the others δυναστευόμεναι. It is ἀνίκια, because it remains unconquered and prevails.

δυναμῆ here means 'powerful,' 'prevailing': δυναστευόμεναι 'subject to power,' 'prevailed against.' Our sympathies being with the hypotenuse, because the odds are against him, we call him conqueror even although the battle is a drawn one. The only bearing of the passage on our text is this: it uses δυναστευόμενη as a passive of δυναμῆ. But whereas, in Proclus, δυναστευόμενα includes 'what can be produced by roots' (i.e. squares), and δυναμῆ 'what can produce squares' (i.e. roots), here δυναμῆ means 'equal, or rather greater in power' (viz. the hypotenuse), and δυναστευόμεναι 'prevailed against' (viz. the sides). It is evident that the words are used by Alexander

1 Cf. also Proclus in repu. 11 p. 36 τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον τὰν πρὸς τὸ δυναστευόμενον ἀποδίδοτα, and ib. p. 5 δύναται μὲν γὰρ οἱ πλευροὶ (sc. ἀρίθμοι), δυναστευόταν δὲ οἱ ἐκ τοῦτον. The use of the passive is like that in τιμοκρατεῖται, δημοκρατεῖται, ἑγὼν and the like.

2 See e.g. Zeller 4 11, p. 858 n., Zeller 5 1 p. 400 n. 1, and Susemihl Aristoteles' Politik 11 p. 374.


4 Being equal when squared to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.
less in a technical, than in a metaphorical sense, and with no reference to their occurrence in the Platonic Number—to which indeed he makes no reference at all. The interpretation of ὁ ἑξής ἐπιθέτον of the light of Theaet. 147 e ff.

We are now in a position to interpret the highly elaborate and fantastic expression αἰσχρὸς ἑξής ἑπιθέτον. The literal translation is ‘root and square increases’ or ‘increasings,’ and the correlation of meaning between the words ἑξής ἐπιθέτον and ὁ ἑξής ἐπιθέτον—

τὸ γὰρ δινάμειαν πᾶν πρὸς τὸ δινάμειαν ὑποδιδοτακι—requires us to suppose that in a ‘root and square increase’ the ‘root’ in question is the root of the ‘square’ in question, and the ‘square’ in question the square of the ‘root’ in question. When for example the ‘root,’ the ‘square’ will be \( x \), and where the ‘square’ is \( x^2 \), the ‘root’ will be \( x \). What then is the meaning of a ‘root and square increase’? If αἰσχρὸς ἑξής means ‘addition’ it will be \( x + x^2 \), if ‘multiplication,’ \( x \times x^2 \). And the plural ‘root and square increases’ will refer to more than one instance of the same process, i.e. for example either (1) to \( x + x^2, y + y^2, z + z^2 \) or (2) to \( x \times x^2, y \times y^2, z \times z^2 \). Whether the αἰσχρὸς ἑξής mean processes of addition or processes of multiplication will presently be seen: meantime it should be noted that the awkwardness of the English expression ‘root and square increases’ is escaped by the Greek idiom, because δινάμειαν and διναστευόμεναι are participial adjectives.

I come now to τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τεταρτάματα ὑπο ρον λαβόνσαι. The literal translation is ‘having received three distances, and four limits,’ and the meaning will appear from a glance at the following passages.

In Nicomachus Introa. Ar. pp. 143 f. ed. Ast we read τὰ μὲν στέρεα

1 I have treated the words of Alexander seriously, because there is no a priori reason why the Pythagoreans should not have called ἀνίκαι, or indeed almost anything else in heaven or earth, as readers of the Theologumena Arithmetica and other similar treatises will readily admit. But so much confusion has elsewhere arisen from the similarity of vowel in νεικ- and νικ- (see on IX § 81 b) that I should not be surprised if ἀνίκαι and ἄνικαι was in reality the original form: see Theol. Ar. p. 26 ed. Ast: καὶ ἀνέκικαν προσηγέρουσιν τὴν πεμπάνα, οδόν, ἐπαύθηνα τὸ πέμπσι καὶ κατι ἀότο τεταγμένος στοιχείον, ὁ αἴσχρο, κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἱσταμένος ἐξομ βιατελekt, κεικοὺς καὶ μεταξόλην ἐν τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὑπορχόντων ἀπὸ σελήνης μέχρι γής, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ διαφέροντα καὶ οὐχ ὤμοι τοῦ ἄρθρου ὤδε ἑική, ἄρτικο καὶ περιτῆς, ἀνήσταμεν ἐφιλεῖν ταὶ συνάθροισι τλ. Megillus is quoted to the same effect a few lines lower down, and Ast in his note adds further references. Zeller 1 p. 400 n. 1 regards ἄνικαι as more original than ἀνίκα.

2 Proclus in remp. 11 p. 36.

3 As it will shortly be found that αἰσχρὸς ἑξής refers to multiplications, I may remark here that Schneider and Donaldson so far agree with me in explaining αἰσχρὸς ἑξής δυναμεῖν τῇ καὶ δυναστευόμενῃ ὡς ‘increase ment per multiplicationem radices seu lateris et quadrati mutuum factum’ (Schneider l.c. 111 p. xx). But Schneider is mistaken when he makes the whole expression αἰσχρὸς ἑξής—δυναστευόμεναι equivalent to actual or concrete cubes: hoc loco numeros per eiusmodi αἰσχρὸς ἑξής effectos αἰσχρὸς obscurius dici intelligitur: il vero cubi sunt. The Greek word αἰσχρὸς means ‘actio ipsa augendi,’ as Schneider himself remarks, and, as will presently appear, there is no occasion to interpret it as anything else. It is of course obvious that the words αἰσχρὸς ἑξής—δυναστευόμεναι are to some extent deliberately and intentionally fantastic: the Muses, we remember, ἥθηλογογότα: but there is also a touch of serious import in the structure of the phrase. See Part ii § 4.
diaostēmeta λέγεται τριχῆ διαστατὰ, τὰ δὲ εἴπεδα διχῆ...ταῦτα δὲ τὴν οἰκείας σαφηνείας ἐπιλύσεται ἐν τῇ Πλατωνικῇ συναναγώσει κατὰ τὸν λεγομένου γάμου τόπον εἰς τῇ Πολιτείᾳ ἀπὸ προσοποῦ τῶν Μονών παρεισαγωγένου.  

There are many other statements to the same effect not only in Nicomachus, but also in the Theologisma Arithmetica, in Theo of Smyrna, and in Iamblichus' commentary on the work of Nicomachus. The distances are sometimes called διαοτήματα, sometimes διαστάσεις, and in at least one passage ἀποστάσεις, as in Plato. The fullest explanation of the matter is in the Introdr. Ar. p. 116: πρῶτον δὲ διαοτήματα γραμμῆ λέγεται: γραμμὴ γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἕφε ἐν διαστατῶν: δύο δὲ διαοτήματα ἐπιφάνεια: ἐπιφάνεια γαρ ἐστὶ τὸ διχῇ διαστατῶν: τρία δὲ διαοτήματα στερεῶν: στερεῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ τριχῆ διαστατῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὕδαμος ἐπισκευόμενον, ὁ πλειόνων τέτευχε διαοτήματα ἢ τριῶν, μήκους, πλάτους καὶ βάθους...εἴ τι γὰρ στερεῶν ἐστιν, τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις πάντως ἔχει, μήκος, πλάτος καὶ βάθος: καὶ ἐμπελών εἰ τι ἔχει τὰ τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐκεῖνο πάντως στερεῶν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδέν. Compare also pp. 117, 123, 128, and Theol. Ar. p. 38, in each of which places διαστάσεις is used with this meaning, Theo pp. 24 f. ed. Hiller τῶν δὲ συνβεβηκότων (sc. ἀρίθμων) τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ δύο ἀριθμῶν περιεχομένων καλοῦσιν ἐπιπέδου, ὡς κατὰ τὸ ὑπὸ διαστάσεις θεωρομένους καὶ οἷον ὑπὸ μήκους καὶ πλάτους περιεχομένους, τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ τριῶν στερεῶν, ὡς καὶ τὴν τρίτην διαστάσειν προσειληφότας, Theol. Ar. p. 48, Nicomachus l.c. p. 136 οἱ κύβοι τρίχη διαστατοὶ δύτες καὶ Iamblichus l.c. p. 58. In Theol. Ar. p. 23, the author, in speaking of the number 4, which according to the Pythagoreans τριῶτη ἐδείξει τὴν τοῦ στερεοῦ φύσιν νημεῖον γάρ, εἶτα γραμμῆ, εἶτα ἐπιφάνεια, εἶτα στερεῶν, εἶτα σώμα, remarks τὰς—πάσας ἀποστάσεις ἦτοι τὰς τρεῖς ἂπέστη, ὡν περαιτέρῳ οὐκέτι εἰσὶ. Finally, we may refer to Simplicius in physica IV 1, p. 331. 9 ed. Diels σώμα—τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις and ibid. p. 634. 11 ff., to Aristotle Top. Z 5. 142b 24 ὁ τοῦ σώματος ὄροσμός, τὸ ἔχον τρεῖς διαστάσεις, Phys. IV 1. 259a 4 ff. διαπτήματα μὲν οὖν ἔχει (sc. ὁ τόπος) τριά, μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, οἷς δρίζεται σώμα πάν τινα καὶ ἄλλους, and other passages cited by Bonitz in the Index Arist. s. v. διαστάσεις, and also to Plato himself, who in Laws 894 A has the following sentence: γένεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἥνικα ἃν τὶ πάθος ἡ; δῆλον ὡς ὅτι ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὕτη εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἐνθευματίσειν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίαν, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἔλθουσα αἰσθήσεων σχῆ τοὺς αἰσθανομένους.  

From these passages it is clear that the three ἀποστάσεις of which Plato speaks are μήκος, πλάτος καὶ βάθος. What then ought we to understand by the four ὄρος? In Theol. Ar. p. 16 Ast we find the words τὸ ἕφε ἐν διαστάσεως καὶ ἐδοὺς αἰσθητών, ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα τρικῆ διαστάτων, ἐν τέταρτῳ ὄροις ἐστὶν, and in Iamb. in Nic. p. 93 Pistelli στερεῶν δὲ ἐστὶν ἀρίθμος δ τρίτων διαστάτων παρὰ τὰ ἐπιπέδου δύο προσειληφόφοις, δηλονοὶ τεταρτῶν ὄρους προσγενομένου ἐν γὰρ τέσσαριν

1 The reader will observe that Nicomachus had the Platonian number in his mind when he wrote these words. Cf. Mr. Monro in J.f. of Ph. VIII p. 276 "The Pythagorean writer Nicomachus says (Introdr. Aarithm. p. 143) that solid figures are called τρικῆ διαστάτα, plane figures διχῆ διαστάτα, and that this receives full light from the Republic of Plato, κατὰ τὸν λεγομένου γάμου τόπον."
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The meaning will be easily apprehended from the accompanying figure of a στερέος ἀριθμός (Fig. 2), which I borrow from Theo p. 42 ed. Hiller. AB is the μύκος, BC the πλάτος, CD the βάθος (or ὄψος or πάχος, as it was sometimes called: see Nicom. l.c. p. 123), and the points A, B, C, D are the four ὅροι (αἱ στιγμαί τῶν μέγεθων ὅροι Arist. Met. Ν 5. 1092b 9): ἐν γὰρ τεσσάρων ὅροις τῷ τριγώνι διαστάτον, as Lamblichus observes.

From these and other passages to the same effect, I conclude that the three ἀποστάσεις and four ὅροι are μύκος, πλάτος, and βάθος, with their attendant limits, that consequently αὐξήσεις refers to multiplications and not to additions, and that the whole expression αὐξήσεις δυνάμεια τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τριεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅροις λαβοῦσαι i.e. ‘root and square increases comprehending three distances and four limits’ means cubings and nothing more.

The περίσσος of the ἄνθρωποις γεννητὸν is accordingly the first number in which cubings make everything conversable and rational with itself: but what are the numbers to be cubed?

Let us examine the phrase ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοίοιστον καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ φθινούσων.

In point of construction the genitives might depend, so far as the Greek is concerned, either on (1) ὅροις, or (2) on ἀποστάσεωι and ὅροις combined, or (3) upon αὐξήσεις. Other possibility there is none. As far as concerns the sense, we observe that whereas the meaning of ἀποστάσεις and ὅροις is complete—for μύκος, πλάτος and βάθος, with their four ὅροι, demand no further specification—that of αὐξήσεις is incomplete, because ‘increasings’ necessarily imply something to be increased. Now we have not yet been informed what we are invited to increase: and we are therefore compelled to suppose that the information is contained or concealed in ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοίοιστον καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ φθινούσων. I therefore believe that the genitives depend on αὐξήσεις.

In point of grammatical gender the genitives can only be neuter. ὁμοιούντων, for example, is the genitive of ὁμοιοῦσα i.e. τὰ ὁμοιοῦσα, the article being dispensed with in accordance with Plato’s frequent practice in passages of real or affected elevation. But as Plato is trying to reach a certain number (‘the first number in which’ etc.), the

1 λαμβάνει is literally ‘having received,’ The completed process ἔχει τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, ‘has three distances’ or as we should say ‘dimensions’: and as each successive ἀπόστασις is acquired, the process itself is said λαμβάνειν ἀπόστασιν. The usage is like that of προσελιφθος in Iambi. μι Nic. p. 93 (quoted above): cf. also Theo P. 2, and Nicom. l.c. pp. 123, 127.

2 It is the Muses who are speaking, and the article was rarer in their language, as the usage of poetry attests. The intransitive use of αὐξο—tolerably common in Aristotle and later Greek, after poetical words and idioms began to be freely admitted into prose—has a similar stylistic effect. We are bound to suppose that αὐξήσεις and φθινούσων are opposed to one another no less than ὁμοιούντων and ἀνομοίοιστον, and therefore as φθινούσων is intransitive, αὐξήσεις must be intransitive too.
objects which are subjected to the processes of cubing cannot themselves be anything but numbers: so that for practical purposes we may regard ὀμοιώτων etc. as ὀμοιώτων ἀριθμῶν etc.

It is clear, therefore, that ὀμοιώτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιώτων καὶ ἀξιώτων καὶ φθινώτων stands for the numbers which we have to cube. What then are the numbers that ‘make like and unlike, wax and wane’? The Muses are evidently teasing, and we must be patient with them till they choose to tell us.

Let us look a little farther on. The next half of this sentence begins with ὅν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, and ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, as will presently be shewn (§ 2), means the numbers 4, 3. Now if we take the expression ‘of which, 4, 3’ in its simplest and most natural signification, it means ‘of which numbers, the numbers 4, 3,’ so that the antecedent to ὅν will be some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.

Now what is the grammatical antecedent to ὅν? The possibilities—
I use the word in a generous sense—are (1) ἀξόμεσις—διαστενομένη, (2) τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις and τέταρτας δὲ ὄροις, either or both, (3) πάντα, (4) ὀμοιώτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιώτων καὶ ἀξιώτων καὶ φθινώτων.

It will be agreed that (2) is scarcely possible, and also, I think, that (3) is unlikely. On grounds of sense neither the first nor the second alternative is suitable. The antecedent to ὅν, on the most natural and simple translation of ὅν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, must be, as I have said, ‘some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.’ Now ἀξόμεσις is not ‘numbers,’ but (as Schneider remarks) ‘actiones augendi,’ and the three ἀποστάσεις and four ὄροι are only μήκος, πλάτος and βάθος with their limits. As for πάντα, so comprehensive a word might certainly include numbers, and numbers, too, in which 4 and 3 are present: but it will be shewn in Part ii § 4 that πάντα has not in point of fact the meaning required, but another and very different meaning.

We conclude therefore that the grammatical antecedent to ὅν is ὀμοιώτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιώτων καὶ ἀξιώτων καὶ φθινώτων, and I think no one will deny that the relative is most obviously and naturally connected with these words. It follows that ὀμοιώτων—φθινώτων are ‘some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.’ We have thus obtained two of the numbers which are to be cubed, viz. 4 and 3. It is however clear from the partitive genitive ὅν that 4 and 3 are not the only numbers: there must be at least one more. What the missing number is, Plato does not tell us, but as the numbers 4 and 3 are ‘married with 5’ (περιπάτων ἅντιγγεις) in the second half of this sentence, and as we are so frequently warned by the ancients of the presence of the Pythagorean triangle throughout this passage, we may fairly suppose that the number we are looking for is the number of the hypotenuse, viz. 5. That this supposition is right, the sequel will shew.

There remains the question ‘Why are the numbers 3, 4, and 5 said to make like and unlike, wax and wane?’ The full explanation of these words belongs to Part ii, and will be given there. But ὀμοιώτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιώτων has also an arithmetical meaning in the Platonic number, in addition to its real or philosophical significance, and that meaning should here be explained. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are said to ‘make like
APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

and unlike, both for other reasons, as will afterwards be pointed out, and also in view of the use which is presently made of them to construct the two harmonies in the latter half of the number. It will be shewn in § 2 that these harmonies are built up out of the numbers 3, 4, and 5, by multiplying them together, and then multiplying the product three times by itself. Nothing is contained in either of the two harmonies except what 3, 4, and 5 supply. It is, in short, the numbers 3, 4, and 5 that make the two harmonies. Now the first harmony, as we shall see, is the square of 3600, and square numbers, according to the ancients, were ὀμοιοι. The second harmony is 4800 x 2700, and oblong numbers were considered ἀνύμοιοι. See Iamb. in Nic. Intr. Ar. p. 82; Pistelli 1 ος ἐν παλαιοὶ ταιντοι τε καὶ ὀμοιούς αἴτους (i.e. τοὺς πετραγώνους) ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰς πλευρὰς τα καὶ γωνίας ὀμοιότητα καὶ ἱσότητα, ἀνύμοιος δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναιτίου καὶ θατέρως τῶν ἔτερομεν, and Nicomachus himself Intr. Ar. pp. 132 ff. Ast1. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are therefore ὀμοιούσιτες καὶ ἀνύμοιουσιτ, in connexion with the arithmetical side of the Platonic Number, because they produce the square and the oblong which express the γεωμετρικός ἀριθμός in its twofold aspect, first as ὀμοιος and afterwards as ἀνύμοιος. This is the arithmetical significance of ὀμοιούσιτων τε καὶ ἀνύμοιοúσιτων in this passage: but the words have an even wider significance as a description of the Pythagorean 'cosmic triangle' (Proclus in temp. II pp. 45. 23 Kroll): see Part ii § 5. To the same section of Part ii I defer my account of ἀβιτόντων καὶ φυτόντων, because these words have no technical arithmetical meaning, but merely describe the sides of the Pythagorean triangle in its cosmic and creative aspects.

I accordingly believe that the περίοδος of the ἀνθρώπων γεννήτων was obtained by Plato, following of course the Pythagoreans, by adding together the cubes of the three sides of the 'zoogonic triangle':

3² + 4² + 5² = 16. The justification for adding the cubes together is that the numbers are said to be contained in the total (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κλα.). The result which we have reached is supported by the evidence of Aristotle, who gives us to understand that the total number of this section is 216: see Part iii of this Appendix. It is also in exact correspondence with Aristides Quintilianus, who informs us, in a passage where he alludes expressly to the Platonic Number, that the number 216 is nearly equivalent to 'the number of the seven months' child,' and can be reached by adding together the cubes of the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, precisely as Plato does here: ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἐκάστην κατά βάθος αἰθήσαμεν (Βάθος γὰρ ἡ σφάδας φύσις) ποιήσαμεν ἐν τὸν διακόσια δέκαξι, ἑσάρμην ὁμα σύνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἑπταμήνων (de mus. 111 p. 151 Meibom, 89 Jahn).

The words παῦτα προστίγγαρα καὶ ῥήτα πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀμφίππαν can be 1 That the habit of calling square numbers ὀμοιοὶ and oblong numbers ἀνύμοιοι was not merely a later development of Pythagoreanism, is expressly stated by Iamblichus (οἱ παλαιοί), and the same inference may be drawn from the Pythagorean συστοιχία (Arist. Met. A 5. 985a 22 ff.), in which τετράγωνον appears on the same side as πέρας, ἄγαθον etc., and ἐτερήμηνες along with ἄπειρον, κακόν etc.
I conclude¹ that the arithmetical meaning of section B is

\[ 3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216. \]

¹ In my former treatise on the Number, I explained section B in a different way (The Number of Plato, pp. 33—35), taking the three ἀποστάσεις as denoting 3, 4, and 5. Except as regards αἰτίησεις ὑπάκειν τε καὶ ὑπακεχλεῖται, the explanation which I now offer is new, so far as I know. That the ἀποστάσεις are length, breadth, and thickness, and not what I formerly supposed them to be, nor anything else except length, breadth, and thickness, seems to me proved by the evidence of Aristotle as well as the other authorities quoted above, and is in harmony with the passage cited from Λαύος 894 Α. Other attempts at solving the Number have usually supposed that the ὄροι denote terms in a numerical progression, and ἀποστάσεις the intervals between them. The words ὄροι and ἀποστάσεις could of course bear such an interpretation: but what can the ὄροι be? According to Proclus and Hermann, they are 27, 36, 48 and 64; according to Schneider, 8, 12, 18, 27. I cannot see that Plato furnishes any hints to justify us in selecting either of these progressions, and nothing can be made of them without having recourse to arbitrary calculations for which there is no authority in Plato's language; whereas it is clear from ὃν ἐπίτετος πυθαίνῃ κτλ. that 3 and 4, and at least one other number, which πεμπά- δε συγγεινCL suggests is 5, are present in section B. With regard to ὑμοιοῦντων κτλ., it is to be noted that Proclus makes ὑμοιοῦντες = square or cubic numbers, viz. in this case 27 and 64, αἰτίησεις = ἴσας τοιοῦ μεταφάκκας, in this case 3 × 3 × 4 = 36, and φίλινοντες = ἴσας τοιοῦ ἡλισσοντάς viz. 4 × 4 × 3 = 48. I think it is clear that this explanation is devised by Proclus (or those whom he is here following) to suit his hypothesis about the ὄροι: at all events I have found no trace of any such explanation in Theo, Nicomachus, Iamblichus, the Θεολογικανα Ἀριθμητικα, or any other ancient writings. Cf. Hultsch in Kröll l.c. p. 402. According to Schneider and Donaldson, ὑμοιοῦντες is equivalent to ὑμοῖοι, and means numbers "whose factors are in the same ratio...i.e. as length to length, so breadth to breadth" (Donaldson l.c.), e.g. 8 and 27, ἀνθρωπομοιοῦντες equivalent to ἀνθρώποι or numbers whose factors are not in the same ratio, e.g. 12 and 18; while αἰτίησεις is equivalent to ὑπερτερεῖς, i.e. numbers whose 'parts' or measuring numbers make up a sum exceeding the numbers themselves (see Nicom. Intro. Ar. pp. 87 ff. Astl), e.g. 12 and 18, and φίλινοντες to ἠλισσεῖς, i.e. numbers which are larger than the sum of their 'parts,' e.g. 8 and 27. But the identification is purely speculative, and no proof of it is offered. It has also been suggested that since ἤμοιοι and ἄνθρωποι were sometimes used for 'square' and 'oblong' numbers (Iamb. in Nic. p. 82 ed. Pistell), ὑμοιο- υντες and ἀνθρωπομοιοῦντες may be odd and even numbers, because according to the Pythagoreans "the odd numbers produce the series of squares, and the even numbers the series of oblongs," and further that αἰτίησεις καὶ φίλινοντων may be "only another way of describing the antithesis odd and even" (Mr Monro in J. of Ph. VIII p. 278). This too is the merest conjecture. There are other suggestions no less speculative: but these will suffice. It should be mentioned, in conclusion, that 216 is the number at which Schneider, Donaldson (whofollows Schneider closely) and Hultsch have also arrived, although they reach it by multiplying 2³ and 3³, and not by adding 3³, 4³, and 5³. Those who wish to study the explanations of these writers will find them in the works referred to at the beginning of this Appendix. Ifultsch is more interested in the mathematics than in the Greek; but Schneider, here as always, studies the language carefully, although he himself recognises that in order to reach his conclusion he has to strain the meaning of some words, and introduce conjectural steps for which the language gives us no sanction or authority.
As before, I begin by giving a literal translation. ‘Of which the numbers 4, 3, married with 5, furnish two harmonies when thrice increased, the one equal an equal number of times, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong—on the one side of 100 squares rising from rational diameters of five diminished by one each, or if from irrational diameters, by two; on the other, of 100 cubes of 3.’

Let us now examine the individual words, beginning with ὅν ἐπιτριτὸς πυθμὴν.

What is ἐπιτριτὸς πυθμὴν? About the meaning of this phrase there can no longer be any doubt, if we put any faith in the repeated statements of ancient writers on arithmetic and mathematics. The words denote, as Mr Monro expresses it (Cl. Rev. 1.c.) “the ratio 4 : 3 in its lowest terms (the actual numbers 4 and 3).” See Theo Smyrnaeus Ἐξρος. rerum math. ad legendum Platonem utilium pp. 80 f. ed. Hiller πάντων δὲ τῶν καὶ εἶδος εἰρημένων λόγων οἱ ἐν ἑλάχιστοι καὶ πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοὶ ὡς οὕτω καθ’ ἐκαστὸν πρῶτοι λέγονται τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐχόντων καὶ πυθμὲνες τῶν ὁμοιῶν—ὅν διπλασίαν μὲν λόγον πρῶτος καὶ πυθμὴν ὁ τῶν β’ πρὸς ἐν’ μετὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐν μείζον καὶ συνθέτους ἀριθμοὺς λόγοι εἰσὶ διπλασίως, ὅ τῶν δ’ πρὸς τὰ β’ καὶ τῶν σ’ πρὸς τὰ γ’ καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπ’ ἀπειρον. τριπλασίων δὲ λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμὴν ὁ τῶν γ’ πρὸς τὸ ἐν’ οἱ δὲ ἐς μεῖζον καὶ συνθέτους ἀριθμοὺς ἐπ’ ἀπειρον προάγονσιν. ἐσάκτος δὲ εἰς τῶν ἄλλων πολλαπλασίων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπειροῖς. ἡμισελλική τῶν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμῆς τῶν γ’ πρὸς τὰ β’. ἐπιτριτῶν δὲ τὰ τῶν δ’ πρὸς γ’, καὶ ἐπιπετάρτων ὁ τῶν ε’ πρὸς δ’. οἱ δὲ ἐν μεῖζον όροις καὶ συνθέτοις πάλιν ἀπειροὶ τὸ πλῆθος. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται καὶ εἰς τῶν ἄλλων. Thus for example 4 : 3 is the πυθμὴν of 8 : 6, 12 : 9, 16 : 12, and so on: and Plato calls it the ἐπιτριτὸς πυθμῆς because it is the πυθμὴν of all the ἐπιτριτῶν λόγων: cf. the expression ὅ ἐπιγόδιος πυθμὴν in Theo p. 70. With Theo’s evidence Nicomachus Intro. Ar. ii p. 134 is in exact correspondence, as Mr Monro has shewn (Cl. Rev. vi pp. 243 f.; and Proclus takes the same view: see his commentary ii p. 37 [ἐστιν οὖν οὕτως] ὁ ἐπιτριτὸς πυθμῆς γ’ καὶ δ’. We may therefore take it as certain that the ἐπιτριτὸς πυθμῆς is the numbers 4 and 3, forming two of the three sides of the Pythagorean triangle. ὅν, as we have seen, has for its antecedent ὀμοιότυπον τε καὶ ἀναμοιότυπον καὶ ἀδέσποτον καὶ ἀνθρώπων, which we have already identified with the numbers 3, 4, 5.

Of these three numbers, viz. 3, 4, 5, Plato bids us take 3, 4, and ‘couple’ or ‘marry’ them with 5. So far as I can discover, the word συνείγυμνωσιν did not either in Plato’s time, or later, any fixed and stereotyped mathematical meaning, and συνενεισις in this passage is obviously

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1 For πυθμην cf. also Iambl. in Nic. Ar. ed. Pistelli pp. 38 ff., 42 f., 47 f., 64, 66 (πυθμην δε ἐπιτρίτων δ’ τ’ πρὸς γ’ εὐτίν), 67 et al. The other explanations which I originally offered of ἐπιτριτὸς πυθμὴν need not be mentioned. They have been shewn by Mr Monro, among others, to be untenable: see Cl. Rev. vi pp. 153, 243.
in the first instance a metaphor from marriage, not inapposite in connection with a number which is 'lord of better and worse births': cf. Nicolaus ap. Proclus in remp. ii p. 26 Kroll ως εν τοις ἀριθμοις αε ποιαν συνένεως ὑμοίους ἣ ἀνοιμοιοι ἀποτελοῦν τοις ες αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ εν τοις βίοις. But how is the metaphor to be interpreted? If συνενεῖς has no arithmetical meaning in this passage, the numbers 3, 4, 5 will stand side by side like lonely celibates throughout all time, and the riddle can never be solved. If it has an arithmetical meaning, the reference must be either to addition or to multiplication. We may fairly say that the process of multiplication is at least as readily suggested by Plato's metaphor as the process of addition, and in point of fact the Pythagoreans frequently denoted marriage by the number 6, because, among other reasons, 6 is produced by multiplying together the first male number, i.e. 3, and the first female number, i.e. 2. It is therefore permissible to hold (with Schneider and others) that συνενεῖς refers to multiplication, and as it has been asserted that "there is no parallel to lead us to take συνενεῖς to mean multiplied" (Cl. Rev. i.c. p. 154), I may mention that Proclus uses the word with this meaning.

On this view ἐπίτρητος πυθμήν περμαύδι συνενεῖς cannot mean anything except \(4 \times 3 \times 5 = 60\). Every other possibility is excluded. We cannot interpret the phrase as \((4 + 3) \times 5\); for ἐπίτρητος πυθμήν is not \(4 \pi\) \(\rho\) \(\iota\) \(\mu\) \(\iota\) \(\nu\); but only 4, 3, and there is nothing in the Greek to justify the addition, nor yet as \((4 \times 5) + (3 \times 5)\), for here again we introduce a \(\pi\) \(\mu\) \(\iota\) \(\nu\) without any warrant from the language. If on the other hand we refuse to connect the numbers in any way whatever, and hold that if ἐπίτρητος πυθμήν means 4, 3, ἐπίτρητος πυθμήν περμαύδι συνενεῖς means 9, 8 or 20, 15 and nothing more, the marriage is either altogether sterile, or else it produces, not a number, but only a ratio: whereas Plato himself expressly describes the issue of his calculations not as a ratio, but as a number (ἐμπάσας ἰ ὄντος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικὸς 546c). Those who, like Hultsch, suppose that συνενεῖς denotes addition, and make the whole clause equivalent to \(3 + 4 + 5\), justly extend the arithmetical process to the two numbers of the ἐπίτρητος πυθμήν: and if multiplication is intended, we are equally justified in multiplying all three numbers together. The 'coupling' of 3, 4, 5 is simply \(3 \times 4 \times 5\).

The words ἐπίτρητος πυθμήν περμαύδι συνενεῖς therefore mean that 3, 4 and 5 are to be multiplied together. \(3 \times 4 \times 5 = 60\).
Let us now proceed to τρίς αὐξηθεῖς. The literal translation is 'thrice increased,' and, as far as concerns the Greek, the words might refer either to three additions, or to three multiplications, and the addenda, or multipliers, might be either the number which has to be increased, that is, 60, or any other number or numbers whatsoever. But as we have seen that αὐξηθεῖς in section B refers to multiplications and not additions, it is the most natural and obvious course to give αὐξηθεῖς the same meaning here, and as Plato does not specify any multiplier, the simplest inference from his silence is that the multiplier is the same as the multiplicand, that is to say, 60. And $60 \times 60 \times 60 = 12,960,000$.

At this stage it becomes necessary to discuss the arguments which have been advanced in favour of a different explanation of τρίς αὐξηθεῖς, and against the explanation which was first proposed in my Number of Plato pp. 25—28. The discussion will bring to light several points which will, I hope, convince the reader, as they have completely convinced me, that τρίς αὐξηθεῖς means 'three times multiplied by itself,' and cannot possibly mean anything else in the context where it occurs.

By every writer whom I have read, the words are taken as meaning cubed, or else the multiplication of some three factors: Weber, however, as I learn from Mr Monro, saw this much—that the words denote three separate processes of multiplication. I may be permitted to take Mr Monro and Dr Gow as types. The former observes: "The phrase τρίς αὐξηθεῖς may be translated 'raised to the third dimension,' since it may imply either 'solid' numbers (products of three factors) in general, or the cube, which is the solid number par excellence. For the former use, see Rep. 528 b; for the latter, Rep. 587 b. Aristotle paraphrases τρίς αὐξηθεῖς by the words οὗτος ὁ τῶν διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τὸν τόπον γένιται στερεός." In Dr Gow's article we read: "στερεός" (sc. in the passage quoted from Aristotle in Part iii of this Appendix) "seems to be equivalent to and explanatory of τρίς αὐξηθεῖς (cf. Plato Rep. vii 528 b)."

That is, they would regard 60 τρίς αὐξηθεῖς—granted that επτάρθιος πυθήμων περπάδων αὐξηθεῖς means 60—as equivalent to 60 multiplied twice, and not thrice, by itself. I say 'would regard,' because Dr Gow does take τρίς αὐξηθεῖς as meaning merely the multiplication of three numbers, which in this case, he thinks, are different from one another (viz. 15, 20, 25), but Mr Monro admits, and Dr Gow would not deny, that the three factors may be identical. The fact is αὐξηθεῖς means simply 'multiplied,' and, if the multiplier is not otherwise stated, it can only be the multiplicand.

In support of their explanation these two scholars quote, in the first place, the well-known passage in which Aristotle refers to Plato's

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1 The phrase cannot however bear Hultsch's interpretation 'multiplied by three,' for a number which is multiplied by 3 does not receive three increases, but only one, or, if we suppose that the increase means addition, two. Thus $60 \times 3$ (one increase of 60) = 180 = 60 + 60 (two increases of 60). The Greek for 'multiplied by 3,' if we choose the verb αὐξάνω, would be τριάδι αὐξηθεῖς: cf. τριάδι αὐξηθη Νικόμ. Infr. Ar. p. 127 Ast and έκατον αὐξηθεῖς Theol. Ar. p. 39.

2 J. of Ph. viii p. 284.

3 I.c. p. 280.

4 J. of Ph. xii p. 93.

5 I.c. p. 280.
Number (Pol. E 12. 1316a 4 ff.). This passage of the Politics is so important for the correct understanding of the whole of Plato's Number that I have found it necessary to devote a separate division of this Appendix to its explanation. In Part iii I have, as I believe, shewn that the words quoted by Mr Monro do not paraphrase τρίς αὐξηθέσις at all, but tell us that Aristotle believed to be the number of the section which I have called B. I will therefore ask the reader to defer his judgment on the Aristotelian passage till he has read Part iii.

In the second place, the above-named writers refer to Republic vii 528b and ix 587d. I cite these two passages in full. The first is as follows: μετὰ ἑπτάδεκα, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἐν περιφορᾷ ὅπου ἦσαν στερεῶν λαβώντες, πρῶτον καθ' αὐτὸ λαβών· ἀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἐξής μετὰ δεύτεραν αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἦστι δὲ τὸν τούτο πέρι τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθως μετέχον (528b). The second runs thus: κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην δηλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὑπὲρ ἀφαιτηκός γέγενται (587d).

I have fully commented on these passages where they occur, but it may be convenient once more to recapitulate my explanation of τρίτη αὔξη in each of these places. The first passage is where Plato says that the study of solids by themselves should precede the study of solids ἐν περιφορᾷ, i.e. astronomy: after the second 'increase,' says Plato, we ought to take the third. What does this mean? A point (= unity) has no 'increase'; a line (say 3) has one: a rectangle (say 3 × 4) has two (δεύτερα αὔξην); a solid figure (say 3 × 4 × 5) has three. A solid figure is therefore rightly said to be or have τρίτη αὔξη, because your reckoning begins from the point, which has no increase. The second passage deals with a case, not of solids in general, but of cubes. The number in question is 9—which is (says Plato) the distance separating the tyrant from ἀληθῆ ἕδωρ, measured ἀρθμῦν or κατὰ τῶν τῶν μῆκους ἀρθμῶν, i.e. "numero seu secundum longitudinem, numerus enim omnis quatenus monadibus constat, lineae instar habendus" (Schneider iii p. lxxxv): 'and how far removed the tyrant is according to the square and the third increase, is manifest.' But the third increase of what? Not of 9 (though belonging to 9), for 9 is itself already one increase, viz. of unity—but the third increase of unity in that special case where 9 is its first increase. 'The first increase (viz. of the unit or point) was δ ἐν τῶν μῆκους ἀρθμῶν, i.e. in this case (1 × 9 = 9): by the second-and-third increases on the same scale we obtain 9 × 9 (second increase or δύναμις) × 9 (third increase) = 729' (n. ad loc.). Both in 528b and 587d it is unity or the point which suffers a third increase: in Plato's number it is not unity, but 60, and that makes all the difference. Cf. Pt iii.

Let us consider for a moment what is the meaning of the Greek word αὔξη or αὔξησις. Aristotle distinguishes γένεσις ἀπὸ αὔξησις in these words: φανερὸν δὴ—ὅτι οὐκ ἦστιν ἡ αὔξησις μεταβολή ἐκ δύναμις μεγέθους, ἠνεκελεία δὲ μηδὲν ἐξχώτος μεγέθος...Εἰτ οὐ 'γε τοιοῦτῳ μεταβολήν οὐκ αὔξησις ἦτον ἀλλὰ γενεσίας: ἡ γὰρ αὔξησις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἑνντιπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἡ δὲ φύσεις μείωσις. Compare with this another passage of the same treatise: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ γεγένεσθαι τι

2 ib. 321a 22 ff.
The Greek did not regard 'nought' as a number and had no symbol for it: see Cantor Vorlesungen zur Gesch. der Mathem. p. 144.

2 It will be shewn in Pt iii that δ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀρίθμος τοῦτον is 6.

suggestions for the phrase is therefore in harmony both with Greek linguistic usage and with the theories of the school to which above all others Plato confesses his obligations in the domain of mathematics (see on vii 530d, e and cf. also App. II to Book vii), and no rival interpretation is offered either by Mr Monro, or, so far as I am aware, by any other critic.

Finally, my interpretation of τρίς αἰσθεῖσις has been admitted to be "logical, but it is not," says Mr Monro (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 154) "in accordance with the usus logiandi, which in this and many similar cases follows the inclusive method of reckoning." In support of this allegation Mr Monro quotes a passage from Euclid IX 3 εἰσ ἀπὸ μονάδος ὁποιον ἄρθροι εἴσ ἀνάλογον ἀκόμη ὁ μὲν τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς μονάδος πετράγωνος ἑπτακτῆς, and refers to a similar passage in Archimedes, quoted by Nesselmann, *Alg. d. Griechen* p. 124 n. 16. "On the latter of these" continues Mr Monro "Nesselmann remarks: 'Es ist bei diesem Satze nur zu bedenken, dass die Griechen bei Angaben von Abständen beide Grenzen mitzählen' (*Alg. d. Griechen* p. 125, cp. p. 161)." I have no fault to find with Nesselmann, whose remarks are perfectly true and relevant in both the places cited by Mr Monro, and in the fullest harmony, so far as they go, with my explanation of τρίς αἰσθεῖσις. My only objection is to the inference which Mr Monro on his own account draws from this and similar passages in Greek. That inference will claim our attention presently: but first it is necessary to explain what Euclid means.

The meaning is as follows. If, for example, we take the series

\[1, 60, 3600, 216000, \ldots\]

in which \[1 : 60 : : 3600 : : 216000, \ldots\] then the **third number**—it will be admitted that ἀρθροὺς is understood with τρίτος—from 1 will be a square. (Here it is of course 60².) The expression 'third number from 1' is doubtless, as Mr Monro thinks, somewhat illogical, for one cannot be the first number from itself: and it is perfectly true that 'this is only one of many examples of the usus logiandi' of the Greek language.

But what inference does Mr Monro draw from the usage in question? Because the third number from one is a square, he seems to infer that the third **increase** is also a square. This is the only way in which I can interpret the words: "We may feel sure, I think, that the 'third increase' would naturally mean the third term in the increasing series rather than the fourth." (The italics are mine.) Well, the increasing series is 1, 60, 60², and the third term in the series is 60², so that according to Mr Monro's view 60² is a τρίτη αἰσθήσις. This no one believes. 'It is not in accordance with the usus logiandi,' not to speak of logic.

My reviewer's inference from the idiom to which he calls attention is therefore unwarranted and fallacious. The fact is, of course, that the

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1 The passage of Archimedes is, as Mr Monro remarks, similar to that from Euclid; and what I say of the one applies equally to the other.

2 That Euclid regards the increasing series as beginning with unity, and not with the second number, is clear from the words with which he begins his demonstration: ἐτελ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ μονάς πρὸς τὸν Λ, ὀυτὼς ὁ Λ πρὸς τὸν Β κτλ.
third increase' meant to the Greeks, as it means to us, the fourth term in the increasing series, and not the third. Thus in the increasing series 1, 60, 3600, 216000, the fourth term, viz. 216000 or 60 × 60 × 60, is the 'third increase' and in the increasing series which is involved in the words ὁν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὸν περιπάδι συνεγείς τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς, that is to say, 60, 3600, 216000, 12,960,000, the 'third increase' is also the fourth term viz. 12,960,000 or 60 × 60 × 60 × 60 i.e. 60 τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς. So far am I from interpreting τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς differently from τρὶτη αὐξη, as has been asserted by Mr Monro (l.c. p. 154) 1.

Our conclusion therefore is that ὁν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὸν περιπάδι συνεγείς τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς means 60 × 60 × 60 × 60 = 12,960,000.

This number, according to Plato, 'furnishes two harmonies' (δὰ ἀρμονίας παρέχεται). What does Plato mean by 'furnishes'? Does he mean 'furnishes of itself,' or 'furnishes after it has been submitted to various arithmetical operations'? παρέχεσθαι elsewhere bears the meaning 'de suo praebere' (iv 421 D n.), and we are not justified in supplying any new arithmetical processes out of our own imaginations, in the absence of any hint contained in the Greek 2. No such hint is given: so that παρέχεσθαι can only mean 'furnishes of itself.' Now in what sense can a number be said to furnish of itself a square and an oblong? The natural and obvious answer is 'When it can be resolved both into a square and into an oblong' 3.

1 The reason why τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς has been misunderstood so long is due in part to our habit of expressing Plato's mathematics in the technical language of a later generation. Mr Monro for example calls it a paradox to hold "that τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς means 'raised to the fourth power,' while τρὶτη αὐξη denotes the third power" (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 242). The 'paradox' becomes a truism if we say 'τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς means thrice increased, and τρὶτη αὐξη denotes the third increase.' And this is in fact the only admissible way of stating the case. The mathematical terms 'fourth power' and 'third power' were unknown to Plato. 'Power' or δύναμις alone was sometimes used by him with the meaning which we express by 'second power' (Rep. ix 587 D), but he also employs δεύτερα αὐξη to convey that meaning (ib. vii 528 d), and δύναμις itself actually means 'root' in Theaet. 148 A. See Allman Cl. Geom. p. 208 n. In the course of my commentary on the Republic I have had occasion to point out some instances in which the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has suffered by the employment of later philosophical formulae and phrases, and it is interesting and instructive to find so conspicuous an example of the same tendency in connexion with his mathematics.

2 It is at this point where all the previous attempts to solve the Number with which I am acquainted have broken down. In order to make their conjectures about the ἐπίτριτος πυθμὸν περιπάδι συνεγείς τρὶς αὐξηθεῖς yield the two harmonies, the different writers on the subject have been compelled to interpret παρέχεσθαι κτλ. as 'furnishes two harmonies after it has been submitted to other arithmetical processes,' and as no such processes are indicated by Plato, they have supplied the missing links by a variety of purely imaginative conjectures according to their different interpretations of the ἐπίτριτος πυθμὸν etc. and of the harmonies which it provides.

3 A less natural but still possible answer would be 'When it is produced by the sum of a square and an oblong.' But the sequel shows that this alternative is not intended here.
1 Euclid vii def. 11 ἑτεράγωνος ἀριθμὸς ἑστὶν ὁ ἰδίας ἴσον.
2 In my Number of Plato p. 21 I explained τοσαυτάκις in substantially the same way. It was urged against my ex-
planation that τοσαυτάκις ought not to refer to a number “discovered by an alge-
braic process from a subsequent statement” (Cl. Rev. L.c. p. 153. The italics are mine). The words in italics do
not apply to the present solution, in which the Number is investigated in the order of the Greek, and not, as on the previous
occasion, from the end upwards. I now interpret τοσαυτάκις not by what follows, but by what precedes it, but I still regard
the pronoun adverb as meaning so many times i.e. a certain number of times.” The usage is just as natural in
Greek as in English, and resembles the use of τοσοῦνον in βλάτου τόθε τοῦθε καὶ
τοῦ καὶ τοῦτον Ἀλ. 1 ιθεῖ, τῶν καὶ τῶν in Laws 721 B and τοσόθε in Arist. Pol.
P 12. 128 γ τοσόθε γὰρ μέγεθος ἐκ κρατο-
τον τοσὸθε, τοσόθε ὅδε ὃς ἱσόν. In Cl.
Rev. L.c. p. 241 I suggested that the whole phrase might be equivalent to τοσοῦν ἴσον
τοσοῦνον, the word τοσοῦνον having for its antecedent the square number which
τοσοῦνον ἴσον denotes, and I find that Schnei-
der, Donaldson and apparently also Hultsch (ll. cc.) understand the expression in this way. In that case the first harmony
will be 360² τοὺς 100 instead of 3600², and the total result remains the same. But the symmetry of the passage is impaired
if we take this view: for just as in the case of the oblong it is not the area, but the sides which are multiplied by 100 (ἐκατον
μὲν ἀριθμῶν—ἐκατον δὲ κύβων τριάδος), so also here the number 100 should multiply the
sides, and not the area, of the square. Mr Monro thinks that “the ordinary inter-
pretation of ἐκατον τοσαυτάκις—‘a hundred taken that number of times viz. 100 times’
—is unassailable” (l.c. p. 153). This view of the word is as old as Proclus (l.c. 11
p. 37), but is far from universally held, as I have just pointed out. I am by
no means sure that Plato would have expressed the area of his square in this way:
certainly in Μεν. 83 c he writes τετά-
ρων γάρ (not τέταρτα) τοσαυτάκις ἴσων ἐκκα-
δικα (cf. ib. 82 c, 83 e), describing the
'The first 'harmony' is therefore 3600"; what is the second?

Plato describes it in the words τὴν δὲ ἴσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δὲ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἄριθμον ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν περιμάδος, δεσμένων ἐνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυον, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριμάδος, 'the other of equal length one way, but oblong; on the one side, of 100 squares of rational diameters of 5, diminished by one each, or if of irrational diameters, by two; on the other, of 100 cubes of 3.'

Let us examine the words one by one. It is clear that τὴν δὲ ἴσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δὲ means that the 'harmony' is expressed by means of a rectangle. "When the sides of the rectangle were expressed in numbers," says Allman1, "προμήκης was the general term for an oblong," and προμήκης is the term employed here. Compare the Platonic definition of an oblong number in Theaet. 148a πλεῖον ἐλαττονάκες ἡ ἐλάττων πλευράκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων αὐτῶν περιλαμβάνεται. The sense would have been complete if Plato had merely said τὴν δὲ προμήκη, but the addition of ἴσομήκη μὲν τῇ has a stylistic effect: the rectangle, like the square, is also ἴσομήκης, though only in one direction2.

We have now to interpret ἑκατὸν μὲν ἄριθμον ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν περιμάδος, δεσμένων ἐνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυον.3 These words express the first of the two sides of the rectangle: cf. Critias 118a προμήκης δὲ square as 'of' its sides, just as he usually describes an oblong (cf. Critias 118a προ-

2 Hultsch (Zeitschrift f. Math. etc. i.c. p. 49), who agrees that the words denote a rectangle, changes τῇ into τῇ, but τῇ is not sufficiently precise. The order is of course intended to throw emphasis on τῇ, and at the same time to bring ἴσομήκη as near as possible to ἴσον ἴσοις. τῇ is demonstrative as in τῇ μὲν, τῇ δὲ (Theaet. 158e et al.), and the position of μὲν is as in Χ 514 δ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνικίας—ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου and elsewhere. The usual theory seems to make τῇ mean the square: 'equal to the former in one dimension' (J. and C.). If Plato had intended such a meaning, he would certainly have written ἐκάλυψι and not τῇ. There should be no question that τῇ is adverbial.

3 The full explanation of this passage is due to Barozzi (see Schneider i.c. p. xxv), but Proclus (i.e. p. 38) understood 'the rational' and 'irrational diameters of five.' Barozzi's only error was that he added, instead of multiplying, the two sides of the oblong. I think Hultsch was the first to see that multiplication is intended, although he interprets the sides of the rectangle wrongly.
In the language of Greek arithmetic ἀριθμὸς ἀπό means ‘square of’: see for example Euclid VII 20 ἐὰν τρεῖς ἀριθμοὶ ἀνάλογον ἄνυν, ὃ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκρων ὕψος ἔσται τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, i.e. for example, in the proportion 2 : 4 :: 4 : 8, the product of 8 and 2 = 4². The same use of ἀπό is found in Plato, e.g. Μεν. 85 B ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἀν, ὡς τύχει, ὃ πρὸ Μένωνος, γίνοντ’ ἄν τὸ ὁπλίτευμα χαρίν.

Consequently ἐκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπό is simply ‘of one hundred squares of’.

What are διάμετροι ῥητὰ πεμπάδος? The rational diameter of 5 is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose side is five', i.e. to \( \sqrt{50} \) by Euclid I 47 (see Fig. 4). Now the nearest rational number to \( \sqrt{50} \) is 7 = \( \sqrt{49} \). Therefore ῥητὰ διάμετροι πεμπάδος = ‘sevens.’ Thus the entire clause ἐκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπό διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδους means ‘of one hundred squares of 7’, i.e.

\[
100 \times 49 = 4900.
\]

It remains to explain δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων ἃ ὑπὸ δυὸν.

δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων means ‘wanting one each,’ i.e. each ἀριθμὸς ἀπό or square being diminished by 1. The normal expression would be δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ‘wanting, each of them, 1,’ but Plato allows ἐκάστου to assimilate itself to ἀριθμῶν.

We can now interpret the whole expression ἐκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπό διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδους, δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων. It is equivalent to

\[
(7^2 \times 100) - (1 \times 100) = 4900 - 100 = 4800.
\]

The words ὑπὸ δυὸν merely give another way of arriving at 4800. The translation is: ‘or, if you take irrational diameters of 5,

1 For evidence of this see Theo Smyrnaeus, pp. 43ff. Cf. also Proclus in l. 11 p. 38, Gow, Ch. Math. p. 96 and Cantor Gesch. d. Math. p. 191. This is the only passage in Plato where ‘rational diameters’ are mentioned. In Theaet. 147 D ff. he merely distinguishes rational from irrational roots or surds: while a careful study of Polit. 266 A shows that the passage is in no way parallel to ours except in the use of διάμετρος. But there is nothing harsh or difficult, from the Greek point of view, in the expression ‘rational diameter.’ The geometrical construction is very simple. See Fig. 5. Let \( AB = \sqrt{50} \), i.e. the irrational diameter of 5, and consequently \( ABDE = \) the square of \((\alphaπό)\) \( AB = 50 \); we have only to insert in \( ABDE \) the largest square of a rational number which it will contain, say \( AFGH \), and \( AF \) will be the rational diameter of 5, i.e. that part of the diameter of 5 which is rational.
wanting 2 each.' The construction is $\pi\alpha\nu\delta\alpha\pi\varepsilon\rho\gamma\theta\tau\nu\omega\nu\delta\varepsilon\delta\iota\alpha\mu\epsilon\tau\rho\omega\nu\nu\delta\varepsilon\omicron\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\n
§ 2. The meaning of the words from χαλεπόν μέν to γεννήσουσι παιδάς ποτε οὐ δέον.

We have thus obtained the point of view from which the whole passage is to be interpreted. While the cause of change from the best to the second-best commonwealth lies in the perishability of everything which is created, the process which leads to change is the begetting of children inopportune.

Plato deals first with the process leading to change (λύσις). To plants and animals, he says, cometh production or non-production (a bearing or no bearing) of soul and bodies, whenever revolutions join for each the circumferences of their circles, these circumferences faring a short way for the short-lived, but the reverse for the reverse. That is to say, plants and animals have fixed periods of gestation, which may be represented by circles whose circumferences revolve (Fig. 7). Every time that the fixed point A is reached, there is φορά ψυχής τε καὶ σωμάτων, if the seed was sown on the last occasion when the same point of the circle was at A, and if it has come, without accident, to maturity: if however the seed was not then sown, or, though sown, has not come to maturity, there is α'φορία ψυχής τε καὶ σωμάτων. The singular ψυχή is used because soul, viewed merely as the principle of life, is one in all plants, in all animals, and in both. Why are the circumferences long in the case of long-lived animals, and short in the case of short-lived? Because animals that live long have long periods of gestation, and conversely. Aristotle also takes note of the same general rule: see Probl. x 9. 891b 25 ff., διὰ τί τὰ μὲν ταχύτοκα τῶν ἔγγον ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ πολυχρόνως ἡ κυησις; ἢ ὅτι τὰ μακροβιωτέρα βραδύτερον πέφυκε τελειούσθαι; ἐστι δὲ βραδυτόκα τὰ μακρόβια καὶ δὲ γενε. anim. iv 10. 777a 31 ff., where the elephant is cited as a well-known case in point.

The meaning of the words from λύσις δὲ ἔηδοι εἰναντίας may therefore be summed up in the sentence: In all plants and animals the period of gestation is fixed by nature. Now as man is the animal with whom in the ideal State we are concerned, we are prepared by this exordium for the mention of the period of gestation in the human race. It will come in due time.

1 Cf. Tim. 77 B.
Plato proceeds to narrow the case down to man: 'Now as touching your kind (i.e. mankind), clever though the leaders of the city be whom you educated, none the more will they by calculation together with perception obtain' (literally, hit the obtaining of) 'good offspring and no offspring, but it will escape them, and the day will come when they will beget children when they ought not.' Several points in this require to be explained. First: in place of repeating πορὰ καὶ αφορία Plato writes εὐγονίας τε καὶ αφορίας, because it is not enough for the prosperity of the ideal State merely to produce children—the children must be good in quality. The word αφορίας is full of meaning; it is the duty of the rulers to render, if possible, illicit unions unproductive, πάντα διακελεστήρεις προθυμείσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν μηδε εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύμα μηδέ γ' ἐν, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δὲ τι βαίνῃ, οὕτω τιθείαι, ὡς οὐκ οὕσιν τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ (v 461 c). Second: what is the meaning of λογισμὸς περὶ αἰσθήσεως? Nothing very recondite. Both calculation and perception by the senses must be employed by the rulers in arranging the details connected with marriage and the bringing up of children: perception in settling what couples are to be brought together (v 459 λ ff.), which children should be reared, and which exposed (460 c al.), and calculation in order to determine what number of marriages are needed to keep the population nearly uniform (460 λ), what couples may marry by reason of age (460 ε ff.), and other things too trivial to mention. Plato means that however well the rulers employ the means at their disposal, that is, λογισμὸς and αἰσθήσεις, yet the time will come when mistakes must happen. We are not to blame the rulers of our perfect city, nor yet αἰσθήσεις (with Amelius ap. Procl. l.c. p. 29 and Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii p. 302): for the real fons et origo mali, as we shall shortly discover, is the Universe, the failure of whose energies is beginning to affect the ideal city, as well as every other portion of the whole. See §§ 5 and 7.

§ 3. The περίοδος of the θείων γεννητῶν.

We come now to the words ἐστὶ δὲ θεῖω μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδὸς ἢν ἄριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος. Plato has stated that all ζωὰ have a fixed period of gestation: he now proceeds to deal with the periods of (1) the θείων γεννητῶν and (2) the ἀνθρώπων, beginning with the θείων, on the principle ἐκ Δῶς ἀρχώμεθα.

Four expressions require to be discussed before we can arrive at Plato's meaning—viz.: περίοδος, περιλαμβάνει, ἄριθμὸς τέλειος, and θείων γεννητῶν.

The word περίοδος means nothing more than 'way round.' One complete revolution of any circle is a περίοδος: two or more of the same circle, or one (or more) of one circle and one (or more) of another or others, are περίοδοι. This will not be denied by any one who will take the trouble to study by side by side the examples quoted in Asti's Lexicon of the use of περίοδος in Plato. In the present passage the 'way round' is that described above in the words ὅταν περιτριτταί ἕκαστος κύκλων πεικοφορίας ἔμναττοσι: the περίοδος of a θείων γεννητῶν is therefore
fulfilled ὅταν περιτροπῆ θείω γεννητῶ κύκλον περιμερῶν ἔυνάττη. Now it has already been shewn that the words from ὅταν περιτροπαὶ to ἐνακτὸς refer to periods of gestation, so that the περιόδος of a θείω γεννητῶ is the period of gestation which ends in the birth of a divine creature. This is the only possible interpretation of the Greek, nor is the meaning otherwise than appropriate, as will appear when we apprehend what the 'divine creature' is.

The word περιλαμβάνει means 'comprehends.' If a number is represented by a rectangle, its sides, or factors, are said to 'comprehend' it, as in Theaet. 148 A, where the number which μεῖλων καὶ ἀλλίτων ἕνα περιεπράσσει is called a πρωτήθης ἀριθμὸς. In the present case, we are dealing, not with a number, but with a περιόδος which is comprehended by a number, and that number περιλαμβάνει περίοδον which gives the time that the revolution takes to accomplish. The period of gestation of a divine creature is therefore expressed by a 'final number.'

I will now discuss the words τέλειος ἀριθμὸς. It is well known that a 'perfect' number meant to Euclid and Greek arithmeticians generally a number which is equal to the sum of its divisors, e.g. 6 = 1 + 2 + 3; 28 = 1 + 2 + 4 + 7 + 14. Although there is no trace of such a meaning in Plato, nor in the fragments of Philolaus, the usage may very well be old: but even among the Pythagoreans numbers are often called 'perfect,' although they are not equivalent to the sum of their factors. The τέλειος ἀριθμὸς par excellence was 10 according to Philolaus: θεωρεῖν δέ τὰ ἐργα καὶ τῶν ἐστὶν τὼν ἀριθμῶν κατανάλωσιν, ἀτις ἐστίν ἐν τῷ δεκάδι: μεγάλα γάρ καὶ παντελῆς καὶ παντοτερός καὶ θείω καὶ οὐρανίου βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἀρχῇ καὶ ἄγεμων καὶ κομψότερων δύναμις ἑν τῷ δεκάδοιο. But 10 was called by them παντελῆς or τέλειος simply because, as the basis of their system of calculation, which was a decimal one, it may be regarded as the 'consummating' or 'all-ending' number, the numbers above ten being considered merely repetitions of the first ten. Plato was perfectly at liberty to call any other number τέλειος which 'ends' or 'brings a consummation,' and in fact of point he does so in the Timaeus. In 39D of that dialogue we find the words: ἐστὶ δὲ ὅσος οὖν ὄντων κατανοησάν δύνατον, ὡς ὃ γε τέλειος ἀριθμὸς χρόνου τῶν τέλεων ἐναντῶν

1 For περιόδος in the sense of 'period of gestation,' cf. Aristides Quint. De Musica, p. 143 Meib. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν περιόδοις. Many writers on the Number understand by περίοδος 'Umlaufszeit' (e.g. ZellerII 11, p. 88.), but the word must of course be interpreted by what precedes and follows. I have shewn that 'period of gestation' is the only meaning which harmonises with ὅταν περιτροπαὶ κτλ. above, and it is the only meaning possible below, where the period of the human creature is described.

2 VII def. 23 τέλειος ἀριθμὸς ἐστίν ὃ τοις ἐναντοὶ μερεῖσι φοίνῳ.

3 Some of Philolaus' fragments, whether genuine or not, are at all events, in my opinion, tolerably early.

4 E.g. 3 and 9; see the Theolog. Arithm. pp. 13, 58. ed. Ast. The number 3 is on p. 15 said to be τέλειος ἠθανατοῦν τῶν ἀλλῶν, implying that other numbers may also be τέλεια, though in a less specific sense. Cf. Demme (referred to above) pp. 84 f.

5 Irag. 13 in Mullach II p. 4.

6 See Zeller I p. 398 n. 2, and Aristotle quoted there.

7 Cantor in his Vorlesungen zur Gesch. der Math. p. 143 agrees in denying that 'perfect number' here means 'a number equal to the sum of its divisors.'
The ancients explained these words, with perfect justice, as referring to the Universe: οὕτως ἡ κόσμος ἦ καὶ ἄλλο ὁ τί ποτε ὑμοιομέρειον μάλιστ' ἀν ἔδεχοτο, τούθ' ἡμῖν ἄνωμάσθω (Tim. 28 B). In the Timaeus there is abundant evidence that Plato regarded the World as a divine creature: τόνδε τόν κόσμον, he says, ἐφον ἐμφύσχον ἐννοών τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τήν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν,5 with which compare the words of Proclus (in Tim. 89 D): ὅταν δὲ ἐμφύσχων αὐτό καὶ ἐννοών ἑώρα, θεοῖν αὐτό καλέσας, ὅπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Πολυτείᾳ καὶ θείον γεννητόν, εἶσαύθα δὲ θείον εὐδαιμονία προσεπείν τόν κόσμον ἥξισσε. The Universe is θείον, because it is a God; γεννητὸν, because it is created.6

The θείον γεννητὸν is therefore the World, and the words which we have been discussing mean that the time during which the world is in the womb7 is comprehended by a final or consummating number, the size of which Plato prudently conceals.

1 viz. the circle of the Fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Moon: see Plut. x 616 Dff. There is a good definition of the Great Year in Macrobi. Somn. Srih. II. 10.
2 By the 'World's creation' is meant, of course, the development of a κόσμος or ordered universe out of the primeval chaos. Cf. Tim. 30 A ff. and Pol. 273 B τολῆς ἡ μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τόν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι. It ought to be mentioned here that I formerly thought the period of the θείον γεννητὸν is actually specified by Plato in the sequel, and that it is identical with one of the two harmonies; but the identification cannot be sustained, and I now withdraw it.
3 τέλειος is used with the same meaning in the Theol. Arithm. p. 58 Ast: καλεῖται δὲ αὐτῷ (sc. ἐννοῶ) τέλεσφόρος, τελείος δὲ τά ἐννεάμφωον.
4 See Plutarch peri τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογοιας 10. 1017 C and the references in Schneider.
5 30 B: cf. 30 D, 32 D, 34 A, 34 B (εὐδαι-...
6 Tim. 28 B ἠγονευμένος γὰρ ἀπό τοῦ ἔστι καὶ σώμα ἐχόμεν, πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα αἰσθήτα τά ἀισθητά, δόξη περιλήπτω μετ’ αἰσθήσεως, γεγόνενα καὶ γεννητὰ ἑφάντασαν. Whether these words are to be taken in their literal meaning or not, it will be allowed that if Plato can call the world γεννητὸν in the Timaeus, he may do so with equal justice in the Republic.
7 In the Orphic verses this identical metaphor is found: see Procl. in Tim. 94 B πάντα γὰρ ἐν Ζηνὸς μεγάλῳ ταῖς ὀνοματε κειται καὶ Ζηνὸς δ’ ἐνι γαστέρι ισόν ἐν περιλήπτω καὶ εἰς ὑπέφοιτο τῶν ποιητῶν τῶν ποίητων δόξας πάλιν ἐντύχθη αἰθέρος εὐφράς δ’ ὁ ὦμοιον ἄγλαυ τὸν ὑφὸς κτλ. It is well known that there is a large element of Orphic belief embodied in Pythagoreanism; and if these verses are early or embody an early tradition, the figure which Plato here employs may itself be taken from Pythagorean sources.
§ 4. The periodos of the ἄνθρωπειον γεννητόν.

The general statement, with which we started, that every living thing has a fixed period of gestation, has now at last been narrowed down to man. The period of gestation for a human creature, says Plato, is the 'first number in which root and square increasings, comprehending three distances and four limits, of elements which make like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational towards one another.'

The arithmetical meaning of this sentence, as we have seen, is $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$, the numbers 3, 4, and 5 denoting the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. In order to apprehend its real significance, it will be necessary to say something about (1) the numbers 3, 4, and 5, (2) the expression αὐξήσεις ὑπάρχων τε καὶ δύναστεωμέναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέταρτος δὲ ὅρων λαβοῦσα, and (3) the whole number 216 together with πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν.

As regards the numbers 3, 4, and 5, I have already alluded to the evidence which there is for holding that Plato made use of the Pythagorean triangle throughout the Number. The oldest testimony, as we shall see in Part iii. is that of Aristotle, and practically all the ancient commentators, as appears from Proclus (i.e. ii pp. 22 ff.), made the figure in question the starting-point of nearly all their investigations on the subject. That the properties of this triangle were employed by the Pythagoreans to explain and enforce their embryological theories, is also attested from many sources, such as Aristides Quintilianus iii 151 ff. Meibom = 89 ff. Jahn, Proclus l. c. p. 26 ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ τριγώνου τοῦτον δείκνυεν Πυθαγόρας τὸς τῶν ἐπταμηνῶν καὶ ἐνεαμηνῶν εὐγονίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ὀκταμηνῶν πηρόσεις, Nicomachus Excerpt. ex Nicom. in von Jan's Mus. Scr. Gr. pp. 278 f., Theol. Ar. p. 40 Ast, and Censorinus de die Nat. 11 (redeo ad propositum, ut doceam quid Pythagorase de numero dierum ad partus pertinentium senserit etc. The authority followed by Censorinus throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the whole of chapters 4—15, is Varro, as Diels has shewn Dox. Gr. pp. 186 ff.'). Compare also Plut. περὶ τῆς ἐν Τυμάω ψυχογονιάς 12. 1018 b and Diog. Laert. viii 29. The most exact parallel to the calculation adopted by Plato is found in the passage already quoted from Aristides l.c. p. 89. Jahn: ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἑκάστην κατὰ βάθος αὐξήσαμεν (βάθος γὰρ ἡ σώματος φύσις), ποὺσάμεν ἀν τὸν διακύσια δεκαέξ, ἵσαρίθμων ύστα συνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἐπταμηνῶν. We may therefore, I think, regard it as certain that Plato is closely following the Pythagoreans when he expresses the period of human gestation in terms of their favourite triangle. In what sense are the numbers 3, 4, 5 said 'to make like and unlike and wax and wane'? As the numbers in question produce not only the number 216, but also the γεωμετρικὸς ἄρθρος 12,960,000, we shall be in a better position for dealing with this question after we have interpreted the meaning of the larger as well as of the smaller number. This subject is accordingly reserved for § 5.

The phraseology of αὐξήσεις δυνάμεια τε καὶ δυναστεωμέναι, τρεῖς 19—2
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It should be mentioned that Proclus finds a further astronomical meaning in δυνάμειαν τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, interpreting δυνάμειαν as the stars which prevail, and δυναστευόμεναι as the stars which are prevailed against, in ταῖς ἀπορμίαις ὄραι (ib. 11p. 57). Το ὄμοιοντων, ἀνομοιοτων, ἀνόιων and φύλοντων Proclus also attributes an astrological as well as an arithmetical connotation (ib. pp. 57 ff.), but it is most unlikely that these words meant anything of the sort in Plato's time.


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Let us now briefly discuss the number 216.

The number 216 is the first number (ἐν ψ πρώτῳ κτλ.) in which the cubes of 3, 4, 5 occur, and was known to the Pythagoreans as the ψυχογονικός κύβος (Anatolius in Theol. Ar. p. 40), because it expresses the period of the seven months' child, counted in days. It is also the cube of the number 6, which the Pythagoreans called the marriage number, owing, as we are told, to the fact that 6 represents the union of the first male number 3 and the first female number 2 (3 × 2 = 6). In other respects also the number 216 maintains its character as a matrimonial and generative force: for it is the cube of the area of the zoogonic triangle and the product of the cubes of the first male and female numbers (3^3 × 4^3 = 216). 216 can likewise be produced by multiplying together the marriage number 6 and 36, and 36 is not only the sum of the Pythagorean τετρακτύς (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), but an ἀριθμός τέλειος καὶ τοῦ ὀρθογωνίου ἕξω τὴν αὐξήσιν, and also peculiarly important in the growth of the embryo, as will presently be shewn, both on other grounds and because it is the number of the δεκανολα.

Any one who cares to examine the writings of later Pythagoreanism will discover many other virtues in the number 216: but enough has been said to shew that the number was suited to express the meaning which is here attached to it, that is to say the number of the seven months' child. I will only add, in conclusion, that the number of the ἑνεάμηνον γεννητοῦ was itself also connected with the smaller number by adding thereto the product of the sides of the triangle: πάλιν δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ἐπὶ ἀλλήλους κατὰ βαθὸς ποιήσαντες, καὶ τῷ πρωικημάφῳ προσβάλετε, τῶν τῶν ἑναεμήνων συνιπεθεμένων διακόσια ἐβδομήκοντα ἕξ (Arist. Quint. p. 89 Jahn. 3 × 4 × 5 + 216 = 276. As 210 and 270 were usually held to express the exact numbers of the two periods, Aristides adds ἐν ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ὑπὸ ἑξ εἰσπομένοι, ἁγικός ὦν δὲ ἧν εἰσομέν οἴπαιν ναί, because συνιπεθεμένου ἐκ πρώτου περιττοῦ καὶ ἄρτου: see p. 73 ed. Jahn).

We have still to discuss πώντα προσειγορα καὶ ρήτα πρὸς ἡλια ἀπέφηναν. It is curious that these words find an echo in a fragment attributed to Philolaus on the virtue of the number 10. The resemblance may be interpreted as an indication either of the spurious or of the genuine character of the fragments of Philolaus, but I am inclined to think that it is in favour of the authenticity, if not the genuineness, of

ἀπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἐπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτην καὶ γεγενημένην οὕσιν καὶ other passages to the same effect in that dialogue.

1 Iamb. in Nic. Introd. Ar. p. 34–19 ff. Pistelli, and many other passages, some of which have already been cited.
4 Proclus l.c. 11 pp. 44 ff., 56 ff. et al.
6 Ancient authorities were not agreed "quo post conceptionem mense infantes edi soleant" (Censor. de die nat. 7. 2). The different views are given by Censorinus l.c., following Varro: cf. also Gellius Nact. Att. iii 16, Proclus l.c. ii pp. 33 ff., and Diels Dox. Gr. pp. 427—429.
7 Mullach iii 11 p. 4 ὦν δὲ ὄντος (sc. ἄριθμός) ποταῖν ψυχάν ἀριστειον πάντα γνώστα καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλήλοις κατὰ γράμμων φόσιν ἀπεργάζεται. 
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This particular fragment, for it is not unlikely that in a passage so full as this is of Pythagorean influence there should be some verbal indications of the source whence Plato drew something of his inspiration. However this may be, we are told by Censorinus\(^1\), whose authority, as we have already seen, is Varro, that the Pythagoreans thought the development of the embryo proceeded according to the proportions of the harmony or octave: *eos vero numeros, qui in uno quoque partu aliquid aderunt mutationis, dum aut semem in sanguinem aut sanguis in carnem aut caro in hominis figuram convertitur, inter se conlatos rationem habere eam quam voces habent quae in musica σύμφωνοι vocantur*. How they worked the idea will appear from these words\(^2\): *quorum prior ac minor (sc. partus, i.e. the seven months' child, to which they usually assigned a life of 210 days within the womb) scenario maxime continetur numero. Nam quod ex semine conceptum est, sex, ut ait (sc. Pythagoras), primis diebus umor est lacteus. deinde proximis octo sanguineus: qui octo cum ad primos sex accesserunt, faciunt primam symphoniam διὰ τεσσάρων. (That is, the fourth, which is 8:6 or 4:3.) Tertio gradu novem dies accedunt iam carmen facientes: hi cum sex illis primis collati sese-clam faciunt rationem et secundam symphoniam διὰ τέντε*. (That is, the fifth, which is 9:6 or 3:2.) *Tum deinceps sequentibus duodecim diebus fit corpus iam formatum: horum quoque ad eodem sex collatio tertiam διὰ πασῶν reddit symphoniam duplici rationi subjacent.* (That is, the octave, which is 12:6 or 2:1.) Now \(6 + 8 + 9 + 12 = 35\), and as 35 is a *δρομοί*\(^3\), 210, which is \(6 \times 35\), contains 6 *δρομοί*. Plato's number is not 210, but 216: but in 216 all these *δρομοί* are also present, together with the marriage number 6. The statements of Censorinus are confirmed by other authorities, among whom we may cite Plut. *perί τῆς ἐν Τιμάῳ ψυχογονίας 12. 1017 F.* Arist. Quint. p. 83 Jahn, Proclus l.c. 11 pp. 34 f. and Nicomachus *Excerpt. ex Nic. p. 279 von Jan*\(^4\). If we search the works of Plato to discover how he himself conceived of the 'harmony' in the development of the child, our quest will be in vain, but it is worthy of remark that the making of Soul in the *Timaeus* proceeds according to the proportions of the octave\(^5\), and that the Universe is constituted, as Plato thought, in the

1 l.c. 9 ad fin.
2 l.c. 11.
3 Plut. *perί τῆς ἐν Τιμάῳ ψυχογονίας 12. 1017 F.*
4 It should also be mentioned that Empedocles thought the *διάθωρος* began on the thirty-sixth day from conception. For the views of ancient philosophers on em- bryology in general see Diels *Dox. Gr.* pp. 417—433. I may here add that Ari-tides l.c. gives a few fresh points. He tells us that the sum of 1, 2, 3, 4 (in which are involved the τετραόν, διπλασίων, ἑμιδιπλῶν, and *ἐπίτροπος* ratios) added to 35, yields 45: καθ' ὕψοις μαρφοῦθαν τὰ ἐνεκάμηνα: and \(45 \times 6 = 270\), which is the number of a nine months' child. It is also important for our purpose when in speaking of the Pythagorean triangle he notices (p. 89) that the sum of the sides 3 and 4 = 7 (the *περίκος*, in months, of the *ἐπιστρωμοι*), of 4 and \(\bar{5} = 9\), of 3, 4, and \(\bar{5} = 12\) (the number of signs in the zodiac), and that (as we have already noted) the sum of the cubes of the sides = 216, and 216 + \((3 \times 4 \times 5) = 276\), which is about the period of the nine months' child.
5 *Tim. 35 v.* In the *Timaeus 44 D ff.* the creation of man's body by the created gods is described. It is reasonable to suppose that the embryo was thought by Plato to develop on the same lines as
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same way. There can be little doubt that if he speculated on the subject at all, he followed in the path already marked out by the Pythagoreans, framing the Microcosm, as his manner is, on the lines of the Macrocosm.

§ 5. The meaning of the words from ὅν ἐπίτριτος κότβων τριάδος.

The chief question which requires to be discussed in this section is 'What does Plato mean by the two harmonics?' So far as I can see, he does not, in this passage, inform us, and we are therefore justified in trying to discover his meaning from other passages in his works.

From the Republic itself we obtain little assistance: but I think that the myth of the Politicus (Pol. 268 E—274 E) furnishes us with the right solution.

It will be advisable to begin by giving a succinct analysis of the story itself.

At one time, says Plato, God himself accompanies and helps to wheel the revolving world, at another, when the times are fulfilled, he lets it go, and the Universe begins to roll back again spontaneously, ἔφαν ὁ καὶ πρότητα ἐληχος ἐκ τοῦ ἱσχυρῶσαντος κατ' ἀρχας. The reason for the reversal of the world's motion is that the Universe, since it partakes in body, is not exempt from change, but being more nearly so than is aught else corporeal, τὴν ἀνακύκλησιν ἐληχεῖν, ὃς συμπροτάτην τὴς αὐτοῦ κύψεως παράλλαξεν. Thus Plato declares that the Universe toτε μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλης συμποδηγείσθαι θείας αἰτίας, τὸ ἐν τοῖς πάλιν ἐπικτόμενοι καὶ λαμβάνοντα ἄθανασιν ἐπισκεκαστήν παρά τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοτῇ ἔσκε γένεται, δι᾽ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸν ἕτοι, ἀφαίηντα ουκοτὸν ὅτε ἀνάπαλιν παρέεύθεθα πολλάς περιόδουν μυριάδας. At present the universe is rolling back (ἀνακύκλησις): in the reign of Cronus it rolled forward. The end of the backward is the beginning of the forward movement, and when the forward ends, the backward begins. The change from either movement to the other, says Plato, ἥγεσθαι δεὶ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ὀυρανῶν ὑγιομένων τροπῶν πασῶν ἔτι μεγάλη καὶ τελεωτάτην τροπήν, and this τελεωτάτη τροπή is marked by wide-spread destruction among animals and men.

When the backward movement ends, and the forward begins, a few men are left surviving, and these suffer change in sympathy with the whole. The old grow middle-aged and young again till at last they dwindle to a point and disappear: fresh generations are born, not from one another, but from the earth: for those that died in the former cycle and were buried within the earth now rise again from the dead and in those on which the gods first made the human body, and a minute study of the Timaeus from this point of view possibly yield one or two interesting results. In Tim. 91 d Plato sums up the development of the embryo in the words μέχρι περ ἄν,—ὡς εἰς ἄραν τὴν μήτερα ἄρα τοῦ σμικρότερος καὶ ἀδιάπλαστα ἀρατὰ γας καταστειράτες καὶ πάλιν διακρίνατε μεγάλα ἐν τούτο εἰκηρίην καὶ μετὰ τούτο εἰς φως ἀγαπώμενος ὅφως ἀποτελέσσοι γένεσιν.

1 Rep. X 617. 2 Pol. 269 C ff. 3 270 A. 4 271 D, 269 A.
their turn are born old, grow young, and vanish, ὀσοὺς μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισον. In those days, when God ruled the rolling world, and divine shepherds kept their flocks, no creature preyed on any other, nor was there any war or strife. God was himself the shepherd of the earth-born: they had no πολιτείας ποιητέων καὶ παιδῶν, being born by resurrection from the ground. The earth, their mother, fed them with abundant fruits, and they toiled not, neither did they spin. Whether they were happier than we depends entirely on whether they used their manifold advantages as means to help them to attain unto wisdom: tradition says they did not.

When the forward movement ended, and μεταβολὴν ἔδει γίγνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γῆμον ἡγη τῶν αἰγάλωτο γένος, πάσας ἐκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν γενέσεως ἀποδεδωκιών, then the pilot of the Universe οὖν πηγάλων οἰακός ἀφένεν εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιπτήν ἀπέστη. Thereupon began the backward movement. At first there was σιωπή within the world, attended by destruction among all kinds of living things. The few who survive, ceasing to become young, grow old, while those just born from the earth with hoary hair die and return to the earth from which they came. Fresh generations are no longer born from the earth, but even as the world is now left to itself, so also are all its parts, and each race breeds offspring from its kind. After the shock of turning, προελθόντος ἕκανον χρώμον, ὕποβους τε καὶ ταραχῆς ἡγη πανόμενοι καὶ τῶν σειμαρῶν, γαλάζησις ἐπιλαβάμενος εἰς τέ τῶν ἐνωστὰ δρόμον τῶν ἐαυτοῦ κατακόσμουμένος ἱερὶ ἐπισήμεναι καὶ κράτος ἱχων αὐτὸς τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τε καὶ αὐτοῦ, τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπόσωμην διδαχῆς εἰς δύναμιν. Gradually the Universe became less and less accurate in its movements: τῶν δὲ αὐτῶ τὸ συµµετείδες τῆς συγκράσεως αὐτῶν, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως ἐξύπερφοι, δὴ πολλῆς ἡν μετέχουν αταξίας πρὶν εἰς τῶν ἑων κόσμων ἀβίκεςθαι: it is ἡ ἐμπροσθεν ἐξῆς to which is due ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐν σφαίρῃ γίγνεται. As time rolls on, the disorganization increases more and more until the world is at last in danger of perishing with all that it contains. Thereupon God, careful lest his Universe should vanish εἰς τῶν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀπειρον ὡτα τότον, takes the helm again, and reversing the motion of the world, ἀδανατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων ἀπεργάζεται.

It would be an interesting enquiry to investigate the sources from which Plato drew the materials for this myth. That it embodies many echoes of the early cosmogonies, there can be no doubt. As I have elsewhere pointed out, an essential feature of the story is already involved in two lines of Hesiod, who, in speaking of the end of the fifth or iron age in which we live, observes

Ζεῖς δὲ ὀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,
ἐντ' ἄν γεινόμενοι πολιοκροτάφοι τε ἐλεθωσίν.

1 273 E ff.
2 273 A—B.
3 273 B.
4 273 E.
6 Works and Days 180 ff. See also Heraclitus Frag. 78 Bywater φησιν Ἰράκλειτος ταῦτα εἶναι εἰν καὶ τεθνηκός, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορόν καὶ τὸ καθόδου, καὶ νῦν καὶ γηραιόν τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσώτα
Hesiod means that the iron age will end, and consequently a new, and presumably happier, era begin, when men are born grey-haired. We may perhaps regard the grey hairs as a sign that the time is at hand when human creatures, as in Plato's myth, will all be born with grey hairs (πολα φυτα Pol. 273ε) and pass from age to infancy and fade away. It is tolerably clear that there was a tradition according to which old or grey-haired children were considered to be a sign of the end: for in the Testament cited by James in his account of the Revelation of St Peter, we are warned that when the end is near there shall be 'children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired.' But for our present purpose the details of the myth are of less importance and value than the underlying idea of the whole. That idea is that in the life of the Universe there are two recurrent cycles, in one of which peace and uniformity prevail, while in the other discord and dissimilarity gradually assert their sway. It is also, I think, clear that the two cycles are of equal length, for the march of the Universe being regarded as progression and retrogression along one

έκεινα ἄσι κάκεινα πάλιν μεταπε- σόντα ταύτα. The last four words mean that the θενηκός changes to ἄσι, καθεύδειν to ἱγγηγορος, and ἄγριοι to νεόν as well as reversely: so that the essence of Plato's story would seem to be present here also, if we are to understand the participle μεταπεσόντα in its full and proper sense. In the happy land of the Meropes, hard by the river of Pleasure, there are some fabled trees, of whose fruit he that tastes γίνεται κατά βραχω νεώτερος, το μεν γάρ νήμα ἀπορρίγα, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν ὑποστρέφει, ἐταὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν μειρακίων ἥλικαν ἀναχωρεῖ, ἐταὶ παῖς γίνεται, ἐταὶ βρέφος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐξακάληθ (Theopompus Fr. 76, Müller F. H. G. 1 p. 290). A careful study of Empedocles' cosmology will also discover some interesting analogies with the myth of the Politicus.

1 In Hesiod's description of the golden age, the return of which he seems to hope for after the age of iron has passed away, there are some features which resemble the life of Plato's γυγγενες: see especially Works and Days 109 ff. The expression of Hesiod αἰεὶ δὲ πόδας καὶ χειρὰς ὄμοιοι perhaps receives some light from Symp. 189 E, and we should remember that ὄμοιοι is the dominant feature in the progressive cycle of the Politicus. It is worth while to compare the whole of the Aristophanic travesty in Plato's Symposium with the myth of the Politicus, and the latter with Hesiod l.c.

2 P. 57.

3 Professor Ridgeway (Early Age of Greece I p. 618) interprets πολικρύβατοι in Hesiod l.c. as 'fair-haired' and thinks the line εὐθ' ἄγειμνηνι πολικρύβατοι τελέθωσιν 'some sort of oracular utterance referring to fair-haired invaders of some Teutonic stock,' remarking that, according to Hesiod, the children of the Iron Age 'are born with white hair.' The exact translation is however 'when they are hoary-headed at their birth,' and it is quite clear from Ηείς δ' ὀλέγει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων εὗτ' ἄν κτλ. that the white hairs foreshadow the end of the Iron Age: so that we should look for parallels to the Hesiodic conception in passages which, like the myth of the Politicus, describe the end of one epoch and the beginning of the next, and not to Diod. Sic. v 32. 2. Plato's πολλα φυτα (Pol. 273 ε) is an exact parallel to γειμ- λυμενοι πολικρύβατοι, and the rest of the Platonic myth shews us how we ought to interpret the words of Hesiod.

4 The student of ancient philosophy will naturally recall the cosmological periods of Empedocles: but it would lead us too far to institute a comparison between them and Plato's story. I may say, however, that the myth appears to me to confirm the view of Burnet, who maintains that we are now living in the second of Empedocles' periods, that is, 'in the period when strife is gradually gaining the upper hand' (Early Ck Phil. p. 249). The fundamental difference between Plato and Empedocles is that in Plato Strife never obtains the victory altogether, for as soon as the Universe is in serious danger, the Deity steps in.
and the same circle, the forward revolution has to traverse the same space as the reverse, and nothing is said of any difference in the speed of the two revolutions. That the cycles occupy a long period of time may be inferred from πολλὰς περιόδους μυρράδας in 270a.

Now what do these two cycles represent? If we are to believe Deuschle, one of them is 'the transcendent realm of Ideas,' the other 'the world of appearances,' and the myth is intended to show us 'the relations existing between the world of Ideas and that of phenomena, and the dependence of the latter on the former.' It is surely unnecessary to refute a view which requires us to assign a metaphysical significance to the γγγενείς. Deuschle's interpretation belongs to a style of criticism which always makes Plato sing the same old strain, forgetting that his was a παναρμόνιος φυσις. To my mind it is quite clear that in the myth of the Politicus, we have before us an astronomical, and not a metaphysical conception. The prelude to the story indicates in what direction we should look for its significance: ἕν τοίνυν καὶ ἐτί ἐσται τῶν πάλαι λειβείσων πολλά τε ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἄτρεως τε καὶ Θεόστουν λειβείσαι εἴρει φῶς μα—τὸ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς δύσεως τε καὶ ἀνατολῆς ἦλιου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων, ὡς ἀρα οὖν ἀνατέλλει νῦν, εἰς τούτον τὸν τόπον ἐνυπε, ἀνέτελλε δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἑαντίου, τότε δὲ δὴ μαρτυρίσας ἀρα δ' θεος Ἄτρει μετέβαλεν αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν σχῆμα (268Eff.): and Plato himself tells us that the myth will explain this astronomical revolution as well as other stories of a far distant past (269b).

The only possible explanation of the two cycles is that each of them represents a Great Year. The τροπή which ends one cycle and begins another is said by Plato to be τροπών παιδῶν—μεγίστη καὶ τελεωτάτη τροπή, and the number of the period which culminates in such a τελεωτάτη τροπή is a τελειος ἀριθμός in precisely the same sense as the number of the Great Year (Tim. 39d), that is to say, it is a 'final' or 'consummating' number, and ends an epoch in the life of the world. But we must beware of supposing, as I formerly did, that the Great Year which is symbolized by the forward movement expresses the period during which the world is made, or that the world is dissolved when the ἀνακύκλωσις ends: for it is clear from 273b, c that the creation of the world is prior to both movements, and 273d shews that the κόσμος, though it may be storm-tossed (χειμαθείς), is never actually wrecked.

The next step in our argument is to connect the two 'harmonies' of the Republic with the two cycles of the Politicus.

1 In 271a we find περιφορά applied to the forward movement: and in 273e περιόδος is said of the backward. The life of the Universe is thus pictured as the revolution of a single circle. The plural περιόδοι in 269c and in 270a refers to the revolutions of the world on its own axis, and not to the two cycles which Plato describes.

2 Der Plat. Politikos pp. 6 ff.

3 δύο γὰρ ἄτυχη φυσικά λέγονται γενέσθαι παναρμόνιοι Olymp. Vit. Pl. 6. The reference is to Homer and Plato.

4 The legend about an ἀνακύκλωσις of the sun in the time of Atreus is mentioned also by Euripides Orest. 1001 ff. and El. 726 ff.; and from the second of these passages we can see that the story was by some interpreted as the mythical expression of a permanent change in the movement of the heavens. Cf. also the well-known story of the Egyptian priests in Hdt. 11.142 and see Sir G. C. Lewis Ancient Astronomy pp. 69, 133.
We note, in the first place, that the harmonies are equal to one another, and that they are of vast extent (12,960,000 days). In like manner, the two cycles in the myth are of the same duration and occupy πολλάς περιάδων μύριάσις (Pol. 270 Α). Secondly, during the progressive movement which precedes our era, the dominant features are concord and harmony—in one word άμοιότης: during the second, under which we live, strife and discord, or in one word άμοιότης, prevail (Pol. 273 Α—Δ). Now the first of the two harmonies, which I take to represent the progressive cycle, is ίσην ίσακις, έκατον τοσαιτώκις, i.e. as we have seen 36003: whereas the second is προμήκης or oblong, the product of two unequal numbers viz. 4800 x 2700: and the Pythagoreans were in the habit of calling square numbers όμοιοι, and oblong numbers άμοιοι: see Iambl. in Nic. p. 82 Pistelli ob de παλαιοι ταυτοίς τε καί άμοιοις (sc. τούς τετραγώνους) έκάλουν διά την περί τάς πλευράς τε καί γωνίας άμοιότητα καί ισότητα, άνομοίοις δε έκ του έναπτίον και θυσέρνους τούς έπεραμήκες2. It may also be observed that the harmonies, viewed by themselves, in the connexion where they occur, clearly denote some vast periodic cycles, and none of the cycles recognized in antiquity is so large as 12,960,000 days except the Great Year. That Plato should pass from describing the period of gestation in the human race to an account of the Great Year is natural enough: and the arrangement is the same in Censorinus' de die natali (c.c. 5—19), the whole of which, according to Diels4, is taken from Varro. In conclusion I may note that Aristotle himself appears to have connected the Platonic number with the myth of the Politics, and that at all events he regarded the Number as expressing a certain cycle, at the end of which there is a change: see Part iii. My conclusion therefore is that the harmony 36003 measures the cycle of Uniformity, and the harmony 4800 x 2700 the cycle of Dissimilarity described in the Politics.

Let us now see how Plato builds up the two numbers. Each of the two numbers is constructed out of the sides of the Pythagorean triangle 3, 4, 5: for each of them is only (3 x 4 x 5)4. We have already met with the triangle as a zoogonic agency, and here it establishes its claim to the title κοσμικών, by which, as we are told by Proclus5, it was known to

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1 In Tim. 39 D it is said that the Great Year is measured τῷ τού ταυτόν καί άμοιοις ἕντος κύκλας, that is to say, 'by the number of days and nights' it contains, as Mr Archer-Hind points out. Νῦν περίδων here means the diurnal revolutions of the heavens, which make days and nights; and the 'harmonies' of the Republic are also expressed in days, so that both in the Politics and in the Republic Plato employs the unit of measurement which the Timaeus prescribes in the formal definition of the Great Year.

2 It should be mentioned that Proclus also observes the prevalence of τὸ άμοιον in the first harmony, and τὸ άνυμάκον in the second: see Kroll's edition l.c. 11 pp. 52 ff.

But when he proceeds to talk of the first harmony as the ὁδός from νοτών to νοτών, connected with angels at hoc genus omne, and designates the second as the ὁδός from γένεσις to γένεσις, guarded by 'the Ephors of Descent' (ὁι τῶν καθόδων ἔφοροι), and when he further canonizes Prometheus as the προστάτης of both because he stole the fire from Heaven, we can only regret that Plato should ever have been made the vehicle of such vagaries.

3 Dox. Gr. p. 188.

4 l.c. 11 p. 45. 23. εἰκώτως ἡμι κοσμικὸν τριγώνων εἵλειας τούτο καλεῖν οἷς τῇ ἀλλοι σοφοῖ καὶ τῇ Ἀριστοτείου ἑιστροφίες κτλ. Proclus expounds the appellation by shewing in some detail how the heavenly
some ancient thinkers, ὡς πάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχον καὶ περιέχων ἐν ζαυτῷ. The force of the words ὀμοιοῦτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦτων καὶ αὐξῶντων καὶ φθινῶτων can now be more readily apprehended than before. It has been pointed out in Part i § 1 that the arithmetical application of ὀμοιοῦτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦτων in the Platonic Number is to the making of the like and unlike harmonies, that is, the square and the oblong: what is their philosophical application in this passage? It is that they are the makers of the like and unlike cycles in the world’s history, the era in which concord and uniformity prevail, and that in which discord and dissimilarity gradually assert their sway. It will be remembered that we were able to interpret ὀμοιοῦτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦτων as the numbers 3, 4 and 5 by means of the second part of the Platonic Number, viz. ὃν ἐπιτριτος πνεῦμαν κτλ.; and it is by means of the second part of the Number that we are able also to understand the suitability of these words to describe 3, 4 and 5 in the context where they occur. The period of the ‘human creature’ is fitly constructed out of the elements which build up the cycles of the ‘divine creature’: for man is the μικρὸς, and the Universe the μέγας κόσμος. The words αὐξῶντων καὶ φθινῶτων ‘waxing and waning’ have also a reference to the two cosmic periods. We may regard the first of the circles as representing the αὔξησις or growth of the Whole, and the second as representing its φθίσις or decline. And if we make the numbers 3, 4 and 5 the cosmic ἀρχαι, and follow the method of Pythagorean physics, the αὔξησις or growth of the Universe is only the ‘waxing’ of these numbers on a large scale, its φθίσις only their ‘decline.’ The Universe renews its energy and strength because its elemental forces expand and grow: and when they begin to flag and fail, εὖ διαφορὰς κινῶνυν αὐτὸν τε αὐκνεῖται καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (Pol. 273 D).

Such is the special applicability of ὀμοιοῦτων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦτων καὶ αὐξῶντων καὶ φθινῶτων in connexion with the Platonic Number. But these words would have a still more comprehensive meaning in Pythagorean theory, and while we recognize their special fitness as a description of 3, 4 and 5 in the Platonic number, we are bound, I think, to suppose that Plato was conscious of their wider significance, and intended us to think of it too. According to Philolaus Fr. 3 Mullach ανάγκαι τὰ ἑνώτα εἰμέν πάντα ἡ περαιόντα ἡ ἀπειρά, ἡ περαιόντο τε καὶ ἀπειρά, ἀπειρά δὲ μόνον οὔ καὶ εἰπα: and as ὀμοιοῖσι belongs to the category of πέρας, and ἀνομοιοῦσι, ἀνομαλία, ἀναρμοστία etc. to that of ἀπειρῶν, we may express what he means in other words by saying that everything in the Universe is either like or unlike, or both like and unlike. Philolaus continues ἐτεὶ...
We know from the *Latus* that Plato counted 360 ‘days’ in the year: the Great Year, which is $360^3$ or $(360 \times 10)^3 = 360^3 \times 10^3$ days, is therefore the square of the number of days in the ordinary year multiplied by the square of the Pythagorean perfect number 10. We are now able to express the period in years: it is $\frac{12960000}{3600} = 36000$ years.

Further, 3600 is $360^2 \times 100$. Now we know from the *Republic* that Plato reckoned the duration of human life as 100 years, i.e. $100 \times 360 = 36000$ days. It follows that a day in the life of the *anbropoivnion* gynnητων corresponds to a year in an aion of the *theion* gynnητων. Further, in arriving at the first harmony, Plato is careful, as we have seen, to direct our attention especially to the number 36: each side, he tells us, is so many times 100, i.e. 36 times 100. We have seen on p. 293 that 36 is an exceedingly significant number in many ways: but its special significance here may be that it suggests to us the reason why the number 12,960,000 is called a harmony. We have already found that the number 35 is a *dynamia* because it contains all the proportions of the

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1 Cf. also *Tim.* 53 c—56 c, 81 c, d, 89 c. It will be observed that it is the inroads of *anomoiotēs* which lead to decay and dissolution in *Tim.* 81 c, d διαν $\delta$ $\theta$ $\beta$ $\tau$ τῶν τριγώνων $\chiαλα$ διά το τοπλών ἀγώνων ἐν πολλώ χρόνῳ πρὸς πολλά ἰχνον, τα μεν τῆς τροφῆς εἰσόντα οὐκέτι δύναται τέμνειν εἰς ὁμοιότητα εὐαντίων, αὐτὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἑξοδόν ἐπεισοδίων ἐσφετοῖ διαίρεται. "φύσεις δὲ πῶς ἦσαν ἐν τούτῳ κρατούμενον, γῆρας τε ὁμοιαζέται τὸ πάντος. τελος δὲ, ἐπειδὰν τῶν περὶ τῶν μεν ἐκ τῶν τριγώνων οἱ ἐναντισοσθένεις μήκετι ἀνέχεισαν δεσμον τῷ τῶν διατάσσοντι, μεθαί αυευς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδ σεμοιο, ἡ δὲ λυθείσα κατὰ φύσιν μεθ᾽ ὕσσως ἐξεπέτατο."

2 *vi* 758 b. The number of Senators in the *Latos* is 360; these are to be divided into 12 sections of 30 each, and each section is to administer the State for one month.

The number 60 with its multiples and divisors is the dominant number throughout the *Latos.* 360 ‘days’ is of course only an ideal division of the year: see § 6. Plato elsewhere recognises (with Philolaus) 364 $\frac{1}{2}$ days (*Rep.* ix 587 E, where see note).

3 See note 1 on p. 299.

4 *x* 615 B, where see note. Sir James Crichton-Browne in an address on old age (see the *Times* of Oct. 2, 1891), said that "he thought it a good working hypothesis that the natural life of man was 100, and that in so far as it fell short of that, it was 'curtained of fair proportion.' He would especially exhort medical students to start with a resolution that they would not be content with a duration of life shorter than that either for themselves or for their patients."
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... or scale. Now in 36 we have a harmony plus 1, which is η παντον αρχη (Excerpt. ex Nicom. p. 279 von Jan): so that the Number of the Great Year contains \( \frac{129,996,000}{360,000} \) ρρηνα, plus 360,000 units, each harmony having the η παντον αρχη added to it. In like manner the number 216 contained 6 ρρηνα together with 6 units: so that the larger number is called a harmony for the same reason as the smaller number 216 was said to render παντα προσγορα και ουτη προς Αλληλα. The analogy between the Microcosm and the Macrocosp could not be more faithfully observed. In the second harmony the number 100 is still predominant. It is of 100 squares of the rational diameter of 5, minus one each, and of 100 cubes of 3. Now

\[ 4800 \times 2700 = (480 \times 10) \times (270 \times 10) = (480 \times 270) \times 10^2. \]

(Just so the first harmony is 360° x 102.) 270 is the Pythagorean period of gestation for a nine months' child, and 480, which = 210 + 270, is the sum of the usually recognised periods of gestation for children born after seven and after nine months1. The Great Year of the Universe may therefore be denoted by a rectangle whose sides are respectively the longer period and the sum of the longer and shorter periods of gestation in the race of man, after it has been multiplied by the square of the Pythagorean perfect number 10. As the Universe is a 'magnus homo,' and man a 'brevis mundus,' these and similar analogies may well have seemed significant to the Pythagoreans, whom Plato is certainly copying here.

§ 6. The number 36000.

We have thus seen that the harmonies represent two recurrent aeons in the life of the Universe, in which the World waxes and wanes alternately. Before we proceed to discuss άρμονιο γεωμετρικά, τοιούτων κύριος, ἀριθμόν τε καὶ χειρόν τε ὑπερέσεων, let us briefly explain the system upon which Plato's reckoning is based.

The number 36000 rests upon the Babylonian sexagesimal system 3, which made 60 the unit, and multiplied it by the factors of itself. This mode of reckoning, which to the present day divides our hour into 60 minutes, and our minute into 60 seconds, was widely spread in very early times, and there are traces of it as far west as Italy. It survived in the Latin use of sescenti for an indefinitely large number, and in the period of 6000 years, which was the duration of a dynasty of Etruscan gods. Among the Greeks we find traces of the sexagesimal system as a measure of time as early as Hesiod4.

1 Arist. Quint. l.c. Cf. also Theolog. Arith., p. 40 Ast, Cens. 11 and Macrob. Somn. Scip. 1 6. 15—16. Tannery (Rev. Phil. 1 p. 179 note) also supposes that in 2700 there is a reference to the nine months' gestation.

2 Macrob. Somn. Scip. l 11 11. The same expression is used by Philo: see Zeller3 lill 2, p. 397.

3 Full information on this system will be found in Brandis, Das Münz- Mass- und Gewichtswesen in Vorderasien, pp. 1—21, and in Cantor, Gesch. der Math., pp. 67—94.

4 Works and Days 562, 764 et al. It is of course obvious that there must even in Hesiod's time have been some way of making this division correspond with the
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and Cleobulus¹, and Herodotus expressly tells us that the Greeks borrowed from the Babylonians the division of the day into 12 parts². It is therefore unnecessary to suppose that Plato borrowed his reckoning directly from the Babylonians, even although, if Berosus may be trusted, 36000 years was actually the duration of a Babylonian cycle³. What it is of importance to note is, that the sexagesimal system was very commonly used in calculating long periods of time, from the notion that the year could be divided into 360 equal parts corresponding to the 360 degrees of the circle yearly traversed by the sun⁴. Thus among the Indians 360 years was 'a year of the gods,' 3600 a 'cycle of Bṛhaspati,' 216000 a 'cycle of Prajapati,' 4,320,000 an 'age of the gods,' and the 'kalpa' 1000 'ages of the gods' or one 'day of Brahma,' while twice this number, or 8,640,000,000 years, was 'a day and a night of Brahma.'

Let us now see how the number 36000 is connected with other Greek cycles.

It does not appear that Anaximander, Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, or Anaxagoras defined the period during which the world endures, although they held the Universe to be φθαρτός⁵.

According to Stobaeus⁶ the Great Year of Heraclitus was 18000 years, that is, one half of Plato's. Schuster's conjecture⁷, that the time from one ἐκπύρωσις to another was reckoned by Heraclitus at 36000 years, 18000 being the ὀδὸς κάτω, and 18000 the ὀδὸς ἀνω, is in harmony with the tone of Heraclitus' philosophy, and brings Heraclitus very near to Plato⁸, although no ἐκπύρωσις marked the end of Plato's year.

The nearest approach to the doctrine of a Great Year in Empedocles is the theory that the wicked ἀδικοὶ are condemned 'to wander away


¹ If the epigram quoted by Stob. I 240 is genuine.
² Hdt. II 109. It would appear that for astronomical purposes the Babylonians divided the day into 60 parts: see Cantor l.c. p. 82.
³ I take this from Brandis, Das Münz-
etc., p. 11. Compare Sir G. C. Lewis's Ancient Astronomy, pp. 400 ff. The Greek and Egyptian cycle of 36525 years (ibid. pp. 282, 389) is reached by a similar calculation, viz. by multiplying the number of days in the year (taken as 365¼) by 100. Lewis's excellent and learned work is a mine of information (see pp. 236 ff.) on the part played by the numbers 60 and 360 in the astronomical reckonings of the ancients.
⁵ Martin, l.c. p. 286. Martin interprets the verses of Hesiod beginning τοῖς γενέας λακτήρας κορών ἀναφέραν ἡλικίαν των (Plut. de def. Or. 415 c) by taking 400 years as the life of the κορών, and thus assigns 43200 (= 3600 x 12) years to the phoenix, whose appearance was generally supposed to herald some kind of new era, and 432,000 years to the nymphs. 432,000 years was according to the Chaldaean the period from the creation to the deluge.
⁷ I 264. Cens. 18. 11 assigns 10800 (= 30 x 360) years to Heraclitus' cycle.
⁸ Zeller⁷ I p. 630 note 2.
⁹ The ὀδὸς κάτω leads to the formation of the world, and the ὀδὸς ἀνω to its dissolution. It is the same way, now up, now down. Just so in the Politicus the περιδόσ is the same, now forward, and now backward. Burnet's attempt to show that Heraclitus did not believe in a periodical ἐκπύρωσις, as he himself confesses, "in direct contradiction with the statements of most writers, ancient and modern," and appears to me unsuccessful (Early Gk Phil. pp. 160 ff.).
from the blessed for thrice ten thousand seasons. Zeller rightly observes that this in no way determines the duration of the world, since the δαίμονες must have lived before the beginning of their wanderings and will live after they are done.

A comparison with the Great Year of Philolaus will not yield any satisfactory result, because, as we know from Censorinus, he counted 364⅓ days in the year. We can only say that had he counted 360 days in the year, then, according to the method of reckoning which he employs, his great year would have been 59 × 360 = 21240 years, which is 59/100 of Plato's cycle—and Philolaus (as well as Oenopides) recognised a smaller cycle of 59 years.

Aristotle is hostile to the idea of a Great Year, and the only passage which could possibly be otherwise construed is in the first book of the Meteorologica 14 p. 352a 28 ff.; but the most that can be made out of his words is an assertion of the periodical recurrence of partial floods.

Of later authorities, it is enough to mention the Stoics, whose great year was 365 × 18000 years, i.e. 365 3/4 times the great year of Plato, and the astronomer Ptolemy, whose great cycle, like Plato's, was 36000 years.

It will be seen that the Great Year contained in Plato's Number was arrived at in the same way as that of many of the other Greek philosophers.

In conclusion, I may now be permitted to draw attention to the fact that the period of 36000 years is sometimes actually called the 'great Platonic year' in early astronomical treatises. In Baroccius' Cosmographia 1 p. 6 (Venetiis, 1598) I find these words said of the movement of the ninth heaven: "qui profecto motus complet unam perfectam revolutionem spatii 36000 annorum iuxta Ptolemaei opinionem; iuxta autem Albategnii, spatii 23760 annorum; iuxta vero Alphonsi, et quamiam aliorum sententiam, 49000 annorum; quod utique" (i.e. whatever its duration is) "temporis spatiium vacant magnum Platonicum annum." Even more precise is the Sphaera of Johannes de Sacro-Bosco (ed. Burgersdicius, 1639) p. 12: "orbis nonus centenisi quibusque annis iuxta Ptolemaei unum gradum proprio motu conficit, totamque periodum peragitannis 36000 (quod spatium magnus annus appellari solet, aut annus Platonicus), subjectasque sphaeras una secum circumducit." The work from which this sentence is quoted was a regular text-book of Astronomy till the Copernican theory prevailed over the Ptolemaic: and 36000 years could hardly have come to be called the annus Platonicus in a text-book of Ptolemaic Astronomy unless Ptolemy or some of his predecessors or commentators had understood the Platonic Number, for there is no other passage in Plato which gives the duration of the Great Year. We can even perhaps trace the knowledge of the Number as far back as Hipparchus. The precession of the Equinoxes, which is

2 Ch. 19. See also Tannery Rev. Phil. xiii pp. 213 ff.
3 Cens. 18. 8: cf. Stob. 1 264.
4 This explains the remark of Censorinius in 18. 11, as Usener has pointed out (Rhein. Mus. xxviii pp. 302 ff.).
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in reality caused by the movement of the axis of the Earth round the pole of the Ecliptic, was—so we are told—discovered by Hipparchus, and the period of time during which the equinoctial points make a complete revolution was maintained by that astronomer to be 36000 years (Hultsch in Pauly-Wissowa art. Astronomie p. 1851) It is difficult to believe that Hipparchus was uninfluenced by Plato's number, if indeed the whole theory of a Great Year is not—as I am sometimes inclined to suspect that it is—connected with some pre-Hipparchian notions about the equinoctial περίοδος, the real extent of which is not 36000, but about 26700 years.

§ 7. Ἐμπασ δὲ οὗτος—γενέσεων.

'This whole number, a number measuring the earth, is lord of better and worse births.' The number 12,960,000 may fairly be called γεωμετρικός in the ordinary sense of the term, for it is arrived at by mathematical calculations, and expressed in two mathematical figures, the one an oblong, and the other a square. But what Plato chiefly means, as I believe, is that the number in question, since it expresses the duration of an aeon of the World, is τὸ ὅτι γεω-μετρικός (cf. Rep. vi 511 B n.), and measures a period in the lifetime of the Earth. Plato loves to play on the etymological meaning of words, as for example in viii 555λ ὀλίγοις τοσίν ἐαυτὸν πολεμῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἦττάται καὶ πλούτει, and it is appropriate and right that in a passage where so many of the mathematical terms are symbolic, γεωμετρικός, coming at the climax of the whole, should be symbolic too1.

In what sense is this number 'lord of better and worse births'? I think the simple and sufficient explanation of Plato's words is that in the early stages of our cycle of 36,000 years, before disintegration and dissimilarity have gone far, γενέσεις are for the most part ἀμείωσεις, whereas later they are apt to be χεῖρων because the Universe is growing χεῖρων. Good and bad births are consequently determined by this number2. See also § 2 above and Part iii, with the notes on 546 c. There is in Plato's theory a suggestion of the view expressed by Lucretius when he wrote:

Tristis item vetulae vitis sator atque vietae
temporis incusat momen caelumque fatigat;
nec tenet omnia paulatim tabescere et ire
ad capulum spatio aetatis defessa vetusto3.

I have elsewhere4 pointed out that Plato, in order to pave the way

1 Cf. Proclus in Tim. 270 E, and 271 A, B. In speaking of the ἀριθμὸς τέλειος of the Great Year, Proclus says ὁ χρόνος μετρεὶ τὴν ὀλὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν διὸ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐποιομάζεται καὶ τέλειος, and again μετρεὶ δ' οὖν ὁ διός χρόνος ὁ ἐγκόσμος τὴν μιᾶν ἦχην τοῦ παντὸς.

2 Proclus, as we should expect, has resort to all manner of astrological explanations of τούτου τῶν κόσμων, ἀμείωσων τὲ καὶ χεὶρῶν γενέσεων: see his in temp. comm. ii pp. 70 ff. al. I have already said that I can see no justification for reading theories of this kind into Plato.

3 Ἰ Ι Ι Ι — Ἰ Ι Ι 4.

4 VIII 543 A n.
for his 'philosophy of history' in Books viii and ix, plants his ideal city—only of course ἑωρίας καὶ διδακτικὰς χάριν—in the distant past, and in accordance with this fancy we may picture it as belonging to the early stages of our present era of 36,000 years.

Some may be disposed to ask the question: 'Did Plato think that these speculations have any serious value?' I am not sure that an editor is called upon to reply: but it is certain that his reply will convince no one who is not convinced already. According to Prof. Huxley (Life ii p. 426) "Plato was the founder of all the vague and unsound thinking that has burdened philosophy, deserting facts for possibilities, and then, after long and beautiful stories of what might be, telling you he doesn't quite believe them himself." The unconscious humour of the words in italics may be allowed to atone for the libel which precedes. Plato does not here tell us that 'he doesn't quite believe' the Number: but he warns us in advance that the Muses are jesting. But as there is often a touch of playfulness when Plato professes to be serious, so there is usually an undercurrent of serious meaning in the frolics of his Muse. De iœcis non est disputandum: every reader, according to his nationality and nature, will find his appropriate food for laughter in these pleasant 'Babylonian numbers.' The only thing that I venture to assert is that the point of the jest cannot be that it is unintelligible. About the serious side of the episode there is less room for difference of opinion. Plato was profoundly convinced of the truth, which inspires and animates all these calculations, that the Universe and all within it are created and sustained by mathematical laws. The grand old saying, θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖ, is the abiding lesson of the Platonic Number.

PART iii.

In this division of the Appendix I propose, by way of epilogue, fully to explain the passage in which Aristotle refers to and criticises the Platonic Number. The duty cannot be evaded, because it has been alleged that Aristotle explains τρις αὐξένθεις in a different way from that in which the phrase has been explained in Part i of this Appendix. In

1 If we understand τρις θεός in Arist. Pol. E 12. 13. 17 to refer to the τρις of the Politicus, and press the criticism of Aristotle for all that it is worth, it would seem that Aristotle thought Plato assigns his city to the previous era, before the μεγίστη καὶ τελεωτὰ τρις τοῦ takes place. I do not believe that Aristotle seriously thought anything of the sort, but if he did, he was certainly mistaken. Plato's ideal city contains of course some features in common with ἐπὶ κόρων βίος, such as the principle of 'No property in wives' (Pol. 271 E), but in other respects the life of the γεωμετρεῖ is ludicrously unlike the life of Plato's citizens, and in the Républde we do not hear of any τρις ushering in the change from Aristocracy to the Spartan State.

2 Cl. Rev. Lc. pp. 154, 243. Mr Monro's own explanation of Aristotle's criticism does not pretend to be exhaustive, and involves, as will presently be shown, several grave mistakes, even if we treat it as a partial explanation and nothing more. That of Susemihl is more complete but hardly less erroneous: see his Aristoteles' Politik II pp. 369—378. Newman's treatment of the subject is confessedly tentative and incomplete (Vol. iv pp. 481—483).
point of fact, as we shall see, Aristotle's criticism, so far as it goes, is completely in harmony with the results of our investigations.

The words of Aristotle are as follows (Pol. E 12, 1316a 1—17):

In δε τη τοπιτεία λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μάντις λέγεται καλώς: τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης ὑπῆρξε σωτῆς οὐ λέγεται τὴν μεταβολὴν ἰδίως. ὅμοι γὰρ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ μὴ μένειν μεθὲν ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς περὶδο μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν τούτων ὡς ἐπίτριτος πυθμῆν ημεῖς δύναμθαι συνεχείς οὖν ἀρμοσίας παρεῖσται, λέγων ὅτι ἐν τοῖς διαγράμματος ἀριθμοῖς τοῦτον γένεται στερεός, ὡς τῆς φύσεως ποτὲ φυσικὰς φάους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας, τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτὸ λέγων ἰσως ὡς κακῶς ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἶναι τις οὐς παρευθύνει καὶ γενεάθαι στουδαίας ἀνδράς ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' αὐτὴ τι ἐν ἰδίοις εἰπὶ μεταβολῆς τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνων λεγομένης ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων παισῶν καὶ τῶν γεγομενῶν παίτων; καὶ διὰ γε τοῦ χρόνου, δὲ δὲν λέγει πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἀμα ἀρξάμενα γίνεσθαι ἀμα μεταβάλλειν, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς τροπῆς, ἀμα ἀρα μεταβάλλειν.1

The words from φησὶ τό πάϊτων concern us first. They mean: 'for he says that the cause of change is the fact that nothing abides, but all things change in a certain cycle of time, and that the beginning of change comes from' (lit. 'is of') 'those' (sc. elements or numbers), 'whereof 4, 3, coupled with 5, furnish two harmonies, meaning, when the number of this diagram is made solid, the theory being that Nature sometimes produces inferior children and children who defy education. In this particular point, indeed, Socrates is probably right: for there may well be persons who cannot be educated and made into good men. But why should this be a change peculiar to the constitution which he calls the best more than to every other constitution and everything that comes into being?'

In this sentence Aristotle distinguishes between Plato's account of the cause of change and his account of the beginning of change. The cause of change, he tells us, is τὸ μὴ μένειν μηθέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τινὶ περίδο μεταβάλλειν: and the beginning of change is 'when the number of this diagram is made solid.' In the words of Schneider, who was, I think, the first to apprehend the meaning of this passage: "τοῦτων ad ēn pertinet et sensus verborum talis est: Principium mutationis positum esse in numeris—quorum sesquiteria radix etc. Deinde verba λέγων ὅταν declarant tempus, quo Plato initium mutationis posuerit." Now what is 'this diagram'? 2 There can be no question—nor is the point disputed—after the evidence already adduced, that the diagram is the Pythagorean triangle, whether we suppose (with Schneider) that the antecedent of τοῦτων is contained in ἐπίτριτος πυθμῆν, or, as appears to me most probable, that Aristotle inserted in his manuscript a diagram, to which he refers in τοῦ διαγράμματος τοῦτων. Now the number of a triangle is its size or area expressed in numbers, and the area of the

1 Newman prints a mark of interrogation at the end of this sentence.
3 I have not found the precise expression 'the number of a diagram' in any other Greek writer, but we can easily divine the meaning. It was the custom of the Greeks to express numbers by means of geometrical figures, and the 'number of a diagram' must

20—2
Pythagorean triangle, as we have seen, is 6. Make this number solid, as Aristotle bids us do, that is, cube it, and the result is 216. Aristotle therefore informs us that change begins, according to Plato, with the number 216: or in other words, that the number 216 expresses the beginning of change.

Let us next enquire in what sense Aristotle interprets the view which he attributes to Plato, I mean the view that the number 216 is the beginning of change from aristocracy to democracy. Aristotle's own words leave us in no doubt upon this subject: for immediately after he has said that change begins with the number 216 (λέγων—στερεῶς), he adds the explanatory clause ὡς τῆς φύσεως ποτὲ φύσεις φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας: 'the theory being that Nature sometimes produces inferior offspring,' etc. That is to say, the number 216 is the ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς because it is in some way or other connected with the production of offspring. In what way is it so connected? Because of course the περιόδοι of the αὐθρωπείον γενετήρα, according to Plato, is 216 days, and, according to the same authority, change begins with the child in the womb: ὅταν...οὐκ εὔφεις ὑπὸ εὐθυμίας παιδεῖς ἐσονται (546D). Thus it is clear that ὅταν ὃ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένεται στερεῶς is Aristotle's way of stating the period which Plato assigns to the αὐθρωπείον γενετήρα, viz. 216 days, and Aristotle's evidence is therefore in harmony with the result at which we arrived in our investigation of the words αὐξήσεις—φθινότον. If we look at the words of Aristotle a little more closely, we shall see, I think, that he construed the passage exactly as we have done. 'Plato says that the beginning of change comes from these elements'

of course be the number which the diagram expresses. Thus for example the number of the square whose side is 3 can only be 9: for 9 and no other number is expressed by that square. In Theop. p. 39 ed. Hiller the number 9 is actually represented by the diagram 

a a a

by the diagram a a a, in which the sum

a a a

of the letters represents the area: and this method of representing the area of figures was earlier than Aristotle, as appears from Met. N 5. 1092b 10 ff. ὃς Ἔδωρος ἔταπτε τίς ἀριθμὸς τίνος, ὅσον ὁδι μὴν ἀνθρώπου, ὅδι δὲ ἰπποῦ, ὃς ὁ ποὺ ἀριθμοῦ ἄγοντες εἰς τὰ σχῆματα τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον, ὄσως ἄριθμοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὰς μορφὰς τῶν φυτῶν. Cf. also Theophr. Fr. 12. 11 ed. Wimmer. In the face of this evidence, which was first adduced by me in C.B. Rev. xvi p. 22, I cannot believe that Mr Monro will continue to deny that the 'number of a diagram' is its area.

On a former occasion he remarked: 'The 'number of this diagram'—to wit, the Pythagorean triangle—does not seem to me to mean the area, but the linear measurement of the several sides' (C.B. Rev. i.c. p. 1:4). If so, then we must suppose that the number of the square diagram which I have just taken from Theo is not 9, but 3 + 3 + 3 = 12: whereas the number 12 is oblong, and not a τετραγωνον ἀριθμός at all. After a reference to IX 587 D κατὰ τὸν τὸν μικῶν ἀριθμόν, a phrase which has no bearing on this passage at all (see my note ad loc.), Mr Monro continues 'The fact that the three cubes of the sides are together equal to the cube of the next whole number (3 + 4 + 5) is surely a strong confirmation of this view.' (The Italics are mine.) I am unable to attach any relevant meaning to this sentence unless it means that we are to cube 3 + 4 + 5 by making it into 3² + 4² + 5². Such a solution of the clause ὅταν ὃ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένεται στερεῶς would make it an exact reproduction not only of the whole number, but also of the arithmetical processes which I find in Plato's αὐξήσεις—ὁμοιότητα, but it is of course wholly illegitimate, for the cube of 3 + 4 + 5 is 12³ and not 3² + 4² + 5². I will revert to this point later.
(viz. the ὀμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντων καὶ αἰτίαντων καὶ ἕθειντων i.e. 3, 4, 5) of which the numbers 4, 3, coupled with 5, furnish two harmonies—meaning (that change begins) when the number of this diagram is cubed. In Plato the beginning of change does come from 3, 4, 5 because these three numbers are made by him to produce the number 216 ($3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$), which is the ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς, as Aristotle points out. The only difference between Aristotle's calculation and Plato's is that Aristotle reaches the number by cubing the area, and not by adding the cubes of the sides, of the Pythagorean triangle, and that is exactly the kind of difference which we should expect; for Aristotle likes to vary his predecessors' ways of expressing their results, and 6 was known among the Pythagoreans as the ψυχογονικὸς κύβος: see p. 293. That Aristotle was aware of the way in which Plato himself reached the number is clear enough from his reference in τούτων to the ὀμοιοῦντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντων καὶ αἰτίαντων καὶ ἕθειντων.

Let us now consider Aristotle's further remarks on Plato's beginning of change. He proceeds to say that Plato is quite right in holding that Nature sometimes produces bad offspring; for there may well be persons who cannot be educated. But this mode of change, urges Aristotle, is not peculiar to the ideal city, for it is found in all the other cities, and in fact in everything which is created (ἀλλ' αὐτῷ—πάντων). The remark is perfectly true: Nature does sometimes produce φαῦλοι and φαύλα in every sphere, among plants and lower animals as well as in every aggregate of human beings. But Plato would of course reply that he had no intention of assigning an ἔδωσ μεταβολὴ to his ideal State: there cannot be any ἔδωσ μεταβολὴ of a perfect city: for a city which carries within itself the germs of dissolution is for that very reason imperfect. If our city is to decay at all, it must do so from the operation of a law from which there is no escape just because the law is universal throughout the whole domain of Nature, and not peculiar to the city.

Hitherto Aristotle's criticisms have concerned themselves solely with Plato's ἀρχὴ of change, viz. the number 216, which Aristotle interpreted by the sentence ὡς τῆς φύσεως ποτε φυσικής φαύλου καὶ κρείττου τῆς παρειας. We have seen that he gives a qualified approval to Plato's account of this matter, his only objection being that deterioration in the breed of children is not confined to aristocracy and so cannot be an ἔδωσ ἀρχῆς μεταβολῆς εἰς ἀρσετοκρατίας εἰς τιμαρχίαν. In the next sentence Aristotle directs his remarks against Plato's conception of the Cause of change, viz. τὸ μὴ μένειν μηθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς περιοδίωσ μεταβάλλειν. And moreover through the time, by reason of which1 he says that all

1 I follow Bekker's text, except that (with Susemihl) I read γε for τε. It has been proposed to change τοῦ χρόνου into τοῦ χρόνον or, as an alternative, δι' ὥν into δί' ὧν. Neither of these changes would affect my argument; but neither is necessary. "Instrumentalis ad modalis vis praep. δι' e genet. coniunctae interium prope accedit ad causalem vim praep. δί' c. acc., ut de eadem re utrumque usurpe-
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things change, those things also which did not begin to come into being at the same time are changed at the same time. For example, if a thing was born the day before the turning, it consequently changes at the same time,' (loc. cit. as something born at a different time from it). We have seen that in Plato 'the time, by reason of which all things change,' is the ἑωμετρικός ἀριθμός, viz. 36,000 years. Aristotle's criticism then amounts to this. In that case, he says, 'a thing born the day before the end of the cycle changes at the same time as a thing born, let us say, 100 years before the cycle ends: but if you hold that the περιόδος of the whole is the cause of change, it should be fulfilled for each individual thing before it can cause that thing to be changed: so that if you call the περιόδος 36,000 years, a thing born in the year 1 should be changed in the year 36,000, while another born in the year 2 should be changed in 36,001 and so on.' The προπη in Aristotle is obviously one of the two secular τροπαί of which Plato speaks in the Politicus; see 270C-D, 271C, and we note by the way that Aristotle agrees with us in regarding the ἑωμετρικός ἀριθμός as the measure of an aeon in the life of the World. See Part ii § 5. Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Cause of Change is perfectly intelligible, but exceedingly perverse and unfair, as is sometimes the case when he is dealing with Plato: for in the Platonic Number, 36,000 is the Cause of Change from Aristocracy to Timarchy only in the sense that it measures a secular epoch, marked, as time goes on, by a gradual and ever-increasing deterioration of the Universe and all its parts. Cf. p. 305.

So much for Aristotle's criticism of Plato. But before I conclude, it is necessary to advert to the rival interpretation of φησὶ γὰρ—στερεός, which has been held by many writers, and which Mr Monro has advocated in Cl. Rev. l.c. pp. 154, 243, as well as in the Journal of Philology viii p. 280. According to Mr Monro "Aristotle paraphrases τρίς αὐξήθεις by the words ἡταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμός τούτου γένηται στερεός. By the 'number of this figure' he cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses ἀριθμός in the sense of 'linear measurement,' as opposed to surfaces or solids (cf. Rep. p. 587D, where κατά τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν is opposed to κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὐξήν). Now the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads us at once to the remarkable fact that \(3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216 = 6^3\). It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was in the mind of Plato" (J. of Ph. l.c.). I have dealt with the phrase κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν in my note on 1x 587D, and need not touch on it again. The other statements will now be discussed in order. The theory which underlies them is, as the reader will observe, that \(δύν \text{ ἐπίτριτος} \nu \text{πυθμίν} \nu \text{προπάδα} \text{σανάγεις—τρίς αὐξήθεις} \) in Plato means \(3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216\).

"Aristotle paraphrases τρίς αὐξήθεις by the words ἡταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμός τούτου γένηται στερεός." What proof is offered of this erleiden?" There is nothing in the Greek to justify us in translating \(διὰ \) \(διὰ\) by 'desen Einheit,' and I can see no reason for making \(διὰ\) in \(διὰ\) τοῦ χρόνου refer to time. I am glad to find that Newman also interprets \(διὰ\) of agency ('through the influence of time' l.c. p. 483).
statement? "I do not see," says Mr Monro, "what proof of this is needed beyond placing the two passages together. We have:—

Plato's sentence

"ἀν ἐπίτριτος πυθήμην πεμπάδι συνεγείς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται τρίς αὔξηθεὶς."

Aristotle's quotation and comment

"ἀν ἐπίτριτος πυθήμην πεμπάδι συνεγείς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τόου διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένηται στερεός."

Stated in this way, the view which Mr Monro supports is superficially engaging and attractive. But it is wholly illegitimate to institute a comparison of this kind between two parts of a sentence, each of which is incomplete in point of sense, and cannot possibly be otherwise than incomplete because they each begin with a relative pronoun—a pronoun, too, of which, so far as I can see, Mr Monro offers no explanation whatsoever. No fair-minded jury would ever accept as evidence of identification the scrap of incomplete and unintelligible testimony on which we are invited to identify τρίς αὔξηθεῖς with Aristotle's γένηται στερεός. They would insist that the evidence should be intelligible in itself and as far as possible complete. Make the evidence in this case intelligible and complete by writing αὔξηθεῖς —ἀπέφθην before Plato's ὅν, and φησὶ—ἀρχήν δ' εἶναι τούτον before Aristotle's ὅν, and I think a jury of scholars will then pronounce that λέγων ὅταν—γένηται explains ἀρχήν and not τρίς αὔξηθεῖς, a phrase which Aristotle does not even quote. If it does not explain ἀρχήν, but Plato's τρίς αὔξηθεῖς, the participle λέγων is not only superfluous but misleading, for ὅταν—γένηται by itself would in that case be sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, and the addition of λέγων would suggest that what he is about to explain has already been named or referred to.


1 Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 243.
2 As it seems to have been suggested that my reason for interpreting the passage in Aristotle as I do is because the other interpretation would be fatal to my view that τρίς αὔξηθεῖς means 'thrice increased' (see Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 154), it is fair to remind the reader that it was Schneider, and not the writer of this Appendix, who first interpreted λέγων ὅταν ὁ τόου διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτον γένηται στερεός as explaining the number arrived at in αὔξηθεῖς —ἀπέφθην, and Schneider was not exposed to the same temptation as myself, for he makes τρίς αὔξηθεῖς mean 'cubed,' like most other writers on the Number. Another objection raised was that my explanation makes "Aristotle's comment refer to words which are not only not quoted by him but are in the sentence preceding the words quoted" (Cl. Rev. l.c. p. 243). In point of fact, I now make Aristotle's comment refer to ἀρχήν, which is in the text of Aristotle: the other view makes them refer to τρίς αὔξηθεῖς, which is not. A somewhat parallel sentence in English would be 'Mr Disraeli says that the root of the mischief is a man "whose egotistical imagination can at all times supply an inextricable series of arguments to malign his opponent":'—meaning Mr Gladstone.' Why then does Aristotle trouble to quote the words ὅν ἐπίτριτος πυθήμην πεμπάδι συνεγείς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται at all? Because these words, as we have seen, give us Plato's cause—and not merely his ἀρχή—of change, and in the sequel Aristotle is going to criticise the Platonic Cause (καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμα ἄμα μεταβάλλει, as well as the Platonic beginning, of deterioration. In effect Aristotle says: Plato says the Cause of change
“By the ‘number of this figure,’” continues Mr Monro, Aristotle "cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses ἀριθμὸς in the sense of ‘linear measurement’ as opposed to surfaces or solids.... Now the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads us at once to the remarkable fact that $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216.$"

Mr Monro supposes that the ἀριθμὸς of the Pythagorean triangle is $3 + 4 + 5.$ I have already, as I think, proved that the ἀριθμὸς of a figure is its area, and not the sum of its sides: and here it need only be remarked that ἀριθμὸς cannot possibly stand for ἀριθμοῦ, but must denote a single number. By Mr Monro it is interpreted as three separate numbers, which he proceeds to add together—here again, as it appears to me, without the shadow of a hint from Aristotle himself.

Mr Monro says that “the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of its sides.” I should have thought that a more natural way of effecting this result would be to cube the area; but in point of fact it is not the Pythagorean triangle which Aristotle inviting us to make solid: it is the number of the Pythagorean triangle. And if the number of the Pythagorean triangle is, as Mr Monro supposes, $3 + 4 + 5,$ surely the most natural way of making that number solid is by cubing 12, since $3 + 4 + 5 = 12.$ Or are we to suppose that Plato was so ignorant of arithmetic as to believe the cube of $3 + 4 + 5$ to be $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3$?

Finally, Mr Monro remarks, "It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was in the mind of Plato." I hope there are other students of Plato besides myself who find it easy to resist an impression which attributes so many inconsequences both to Plato and to Aristotle. I should find it difficult to believe that this was in Plato’s mind even if Aristotle categorically assured us that it was: but Aristotle does nothing of the sort, and Schneider’s explanation of the words ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦ τοιοῦ γένηται στερεὸς will now, I hope, be at last admitted to be right.

II.

VIII 558 A. τί δέ; ἡ πραότης ἐνὶων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἡ οὖτω εἰς ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταγραφθέντων θαυμάτου ἡ φυγή, οὐδέν ἔτην αὐτῶν μενότων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφόμενων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὁμοίως ὀρφισθείς περιουστε ὦστερ ἅμως;  

This sentence has been much discussed. I will take the different points in order.

is that everything changes in a certain period of time (i.e. as we found, the Great Year), and that the beginning of change comes from the numbers $(3, 4, 5),$ out of which he also builds up the numerical expression of the Cause of change etc. This ‘beginning of change’ is the number $216$: it comes from $3, 4, 5$ because $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$: and the only difference between Aristotle and Plato is that Aristotle, who is interested only in the result, and not in the process, expresses $216$ as $6^3$ and not as $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3.$ See p. 309.
Is εἰνόν κτλ. (a) objective or (b) subjective genitive? Does Plato mean lenitas erga damnatos or lenitas damnatorum? Schneider and others hold the former view; the Oxford editors (apparently with Ficinus, Schleiermacher etc.) prefer the latter. In favour of (a), we might refer to vi 500 A, where allusion is made to the proverbial πράγματι of the δήμος. Schneider also remarks, quite justly, that throughout this section it is the characteristics of democracy which Plato is describing, so that the behaviour of criminals would seem to be irrelevant. But surely the description of the placid criminal is only an artistic and highly ironical way of ridiculing the ἀσφαλέα of the constitution; and it is in the highest degree forced and unnatural on grammatical grounds to explain εἰνόν as an objective genitive. Neither εὐνὸς κατὰ... nor βέλη αὐτῶν in Laws 717 A is an exact parallel, and even if they were, the construction would still remain ambiguous and obscure. The proposal to insert a preposition (κατά Herwerden after Stephanus, περί Richards) is the refuge of despair.

I once inclined to believe (with Weil) that δικασθέντων is neuter. But apart from the difficulty mentioned in the notes, the sentence cannot be described as πρᾶγμα, if the culprit is condemned to death or exile.

On these grounds we must accept the interpretation manuementum damnatorum quorundam, as Ficinus translates. A new set of difficulties begins with ἦ ὡτω εἶδε. The words καταφερθέντων θανάτου ἡ φυγής have often been doubted. Hermann (Ges. Abh. p. 175) makes the plural agree with both substantives taken together; but this solution is inadmissible, because the alternative penalties are mutually exclusive (Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 72). Madvig's καταφερθέντων appears to me to let too much stress fall upon ἄνθρωπον. I formerly printed θάνατον ἡ φυγή, but the MSS have no variant and the text may be sound.

The syntax of ἄνθρωπον—ἀναστρεφόμενον is certainly difficult. It is impossible to supply ἐκείνην τὴν πράγματα to govern the genitive (with Reisig, quoted in Schneider's note). Few scholars will agree with Schneider in holding that εἶδον αὐτῶν μενοῦντων could mean vidi eos manere because οἷον θνητὸν ὅν is scio me mortalem esse. Kühner (loc. cit. p. 311) makes the words equivalent to ἦ ὡτω εἶδε—ἄνθρωπον ('in men condemned' etc.)—ὅτι ὡτὴν ἡττόν ἐμεινὸν τε καὶ ἀναστρέφοντο κτλ., comparing Xen. Mem. i 1. 11 ὡσεὶς δὲ πίστει Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ὁσεῖς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδον οὔτε λέγοντος ἢκοσ εκεῖνον, but the direct object of εἶδον in Xenophon is the accusative οὖδεν, and there is no such accusative here.

On a general review, it must be admitted that in spite of its picturesqueness the sentence is unusually disjointed even for Plato. As in some other cases, for example 549 D, so here, we seem to miss the finishing touch. The alternative is to suppose that the text was seriously corrupted at an early date. There is no MS variant of any consequence, except περισσετεί οι καταφερθεις instead of περισσετει in Ες ν, and that is obviously a gloss. Schneider's conjecture, αὐτῶν for αὐτῶν, is hardly necessary and does not attempt to remedy the graver faults. Herwerden formerly proposed ἡ πράγματι <κατ' ἐνόν—ἡσθον (for εἶδε)—καταφερ-φερθέντων: on a later occasion he made the following changes only:
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καταψηφισθέντος—[καὶ] ὡς—ὁρῶν δοκοῦντος (συν ὀρῶτοι)—περαιώστοις ὀσπέρ ἤρως. Richards would read the accusative singular (ἀνθρωπον καταψηφισθήντα etc.) or plural consistently throughout. Such drastic treatment is altogether inadmissible in dealing with the text of Plato. In 1867 Richter suggested ἦττον ὄντα τῶν μενοῦντων in place of ἦττον αὐτῶν μενοῦτων (Fleck. ἠθ. for 1867 p. 146). On the same lines is Weil's correction (Rev. d. Phil. viii pp. 171 ff.): 'η οὔπω εἰδε-αὐθροπον <τῶν> καταψηφισθέντων—οὐδέν ἦττον αὐτῶν—ἐν μέσῳ [καὶ] ὡς κτλ. 'have you never seen how a man who is condemned—saunters about just as freely as those who remain' etc. This emendation deserves to be considered by those who think the text corrupt, although αὐτῶν <τῶν> would perhaps be easier and more natural than αὐτῶν: but for my own part, I think it much safer and wiser to leave the text alone.

III.

VIII 559 b. ἦ μὲν γε πον τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαία, ἦ τε ὀφέλιμος ἦ τε πάνσαι ζώντα δυνατή.

My interpretation of this passage agrees with that of Schneider and Stallbaum.

Hermann (Rhein. Mus. 1846 p. 442) proposed ἀδυνάτη, and afterwards, when it was pointed out that ἀδυνάτη is not Greek, οὐ δυνατή, which he prints in his text. A similar conjecture (μὴ δυνατή) has forced its way into the text of q and Flor. U. Hermann's conjecture (‘and because it cannot be stopped during life’) is amply refuted by Schneider (Addit. pp. 66, 67), who observes that although ἀδώνατος πάντως in the sense of ‘impossible to stop’ is perfectly good Greek, ἀδώνατος πᾶνσαι ζώντα in the sense of ‘impossible for a living man to stop’ is incorrect. The words could only mean ‘unable to put a stop to life.’ It is, I suppose, for this reason that Baiter proposes πάνσαι ζώντα ἀδώνατον and Richards ζώντε—οὐ δυνατή, the latter comparing Xen. Anab. iv 1. 24 αὐτὸς δ' ἐφ' ἡγήσεσθαι δυνατήν καὶ ὑποχείην πορεύεσθαι ὁδὸν. Both these emendations are unexceptionable in point of grammar; but there are more serious difficulties, as will presently appear.

Campbell, reading μὴ δυνατή (with q), remarks that "negation is expressed through μὴ rather than οὐ—which Coraes suggested—because the sentence states a condition. The complete expression would be ἀναγκαία (ἀν εἶ) μὴ μὴ (ἐστι) δυνατή (τινι) πάνσαι ζώντα." To me the sentence appears as categorical a statement as it is possible to make, even if we understand ἀν εἶ after ἀναγκαία, and, in spite of ἀναγκαίος ἀν εἶ above, ἐστι is much more naturally supplied. Campbell explains the accusative ζώντα by quoting iv 422 b. c to illustrate "the transition from the dative to the accusative with an infinitive," but there is no "transition,' where the dative (apparently τινι) is only understood.

The reading of A, P and a vast majority of MSS would never have been suspected except from a desire to find a verbal correspondence between πάνσαι ζώντα on the one hand, and οὐκ ἂν ὁι τ' εἰμεν ἀποτρέψαι (558 D), ὡς γε τις ἀπαλλάξειον ἂν (559 A) and δυνατή—ἀπαλλάττεσθαι
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(559 b) on the other. But in point of fact, the correspondence, on Hermann's view, is not even verbal; for πάντως ἐπιθυμῶν and ἀπαλλάξαι ἐπιθυμῶν are different. The way 'to stop a desire' is to gratify it; the way 'to get rid of a desire' is never to gratify it at all. On the other hand, if we adopt the authoritative text, the correspondence, though not verbal, is real. A desire which is 'capable of putting a stop to life' is precisely one which we cannot ἀποτρέψαι or ἀπαλλάξαι, i.e. turn aside, get rid of, finally, and for this very reason it is 'necessary,' and we must gratify it. πεινώντα, which Ast reads (cf. Ath. XII 511 ε) is of course absurd. Hunger is not cured by homoeopathy.

IV.

VIII 560 C, D. Κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγου ἐκείνου τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πόλας ὅπερ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐμμαχίαν παραισίν οὕτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται.


Neither Badham, nor any other of these scholars except Heller, attempts to shew that ἰδιωτῶν is corrupt. Heller's criticism is as follows: "praeterquam quod ἰδιωτῶν vox insitumam conlocationem occupavit, quid orationes hominum privatorum, qui" (sic) "tamen legati mittuntur, sibi volunt? An putas πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν ratione habita τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους memorari? Credat Judaeus Apella: ego ἰδιωτῶν depravatum esse censens Britannii mutationem et facielse et sententiae aptissimam amplector" (l.c.). The suggestion contained in 'An putas' etc. is due to Stallbaum. No one else, so far as I know, has adopted it; and it is certainly wrong. But the erroneous interpretation of a single commentator is poor evidence on which to condemn the text.

The explanation in the notes appears to me to solve the two difficulties felt by Heller. Some may be disposed to regard ἰδιωτῶν as contrasting with αὐτὴν τὴν ἐμμαχίαν ('nor admit the ambassador-words of elderly men who are not members of the alliance'). But the word ἰδιώτης has in itself a wider connotation; and the antithesis would not be strictly accurate, because it is the λόγοι of οἰκείων, and not οἰκείοι themselves, who form the alliance. The word ἰδιωτῶν should be taken in its full signification; for οὕτε πρέσβεις provides a sufficient antithesis to οὕτε αὐτὴν τὴν ἐμμαχίαν. Schneider translates "noch nehmen die Reden an, die von einzelnen älteren abgesandt werden," but ἰδιωτῶν is more than 'einzeln.'

Το δὲ ὁσαν there are the following positive objections. (1) All the MSS have ἰδιωτῶν. (2) The ἀλαζόνες λόγου are personified throughout; and εἰσδέχομαι δὲ ὁσαν means 'I admit through my own ears.' Surely the spectacle of ἀλαζόνες λόγου admitting other λόγου through their ears is ludicrous and unmeaning. (3) The words δὲ ὁσαν—supposing they
could be referred to the young man’s ears—are not only in themselves superfluous—for by what other avenue could the λόγοι be admitted?—but also a blot on what is otherwise one of Plato’s finest and most artistic similitudes. They compel us to identify the ‘gates of the king’s wall’ with the man’s ears. Apart from questions of literary and artistic propriety, it is enough to point out that the identification is false. We have before us a simile of the soul, and just as the gates of a city’s acropolis are in the city, so the gates of the soul’s acropolis are in the soul. The false λόγοι, who are themselves in possession of the fortress, shut its gates and keep the key of the situation in their own hands; but it does not follow that the young man may not hear the good message with his ears. It is because the wise words are not admitted to the soul’s citadel (λόγον ἀληθῆ—οὐ προσεξομένου οὐδὲ παρεῖς εἰς τὸ φροῦριον κτλ. 561 b) that their purpose fails.

To me these arguments appear to prove conclusively that Badham’s emendation gravely disfigures one of the most finished and melodious passages that Plato ever wrote. If any still think differently, I hope they will admit that it is at least unnecessary and unwise to exercise the art of emendation until the text has been proved to be corrupt.

V.

VIII 562 a. Φέρε δή, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὁ φίλε ἑταίρε, γέγενται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδὸν δὴλον. Δῆλον. Ἀρ’ οὖν τρόπον τινά τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ τε δημοκρατίας δημοκρατία γέγενται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυραννίς; Πῶς;

The explanation which I have given of this passage is due to Schneider. So far as the language is concerned, it is, I think, invulnerable; but we must allow that ἄρ’ οὖν—τυραννίς would be easier and more natural if the original question referred to the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως and not to the τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας.

Jowett and Campbell boldly construe τίς—γέγενται as ‘τίς τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ’ (sic); ‘what is the nature of the process in the case of tyranny?’ They cite no parallels, and it is surely inadmissible to do violence to the Greek in this way.

Others have resorted to emendation. Stallbaum thinks of τίνα τρόπον—τυραννίς γέγενται or (with pardonable hesitation) τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος οὐ, ὁ φίλε ἑταίρε, γέγενται; Other suggestions are τίς ἀρχὴ τυραννίδος γέγενται, or γενέσεως for γέγενται (Richards). I once conjectured τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος—<καὶ τίνα τρόπον> γέγενται in view of 555 b. If we adopt any of these readings, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ etc. means ‘as for the fact that tyranny comes from democracy, that is pretty clear: so that we need only describe the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως.’

The sense is excellent, but none of the emendations carries conviction, and it is at least doubtful whether the text has suffered corruption. I agree with Krohn (Πλ. St. p. 214) and previous editors in adhering to the reading of the mss.
VI.

VIII 568 b. Δῆλον, ἐφη, ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ἡ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, ὅποι ποτὲ ἀν ἰείρα ἐξαρκῇ, <καὶ> τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων, ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζον τὸν δήμον εἰσφέρειν.

The reading of the best MSS—ὅποι ποτὲ ἀν ἰείρα ἐξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων, ἐλάττους κτλ.—is retained by Schneider and Stallbaum. The Oxford editors print ἀποδομένων, but pronounce it wrong. Schneider remarks "quidni τῶν ἀποδομένων sacerdotes et sacrorum antistites intelligamus, quos tyrannus sacra vendere camque pecuniam ad se deferre cogat?" and Stallbaum understands the passage in much the same way.

The arguments against this view have been well put by Vermehren. "Abgesehen davon dass es eine ganz unnöthige und Platonfremde Ausführlichkeit wäre, wenn für das an sich völlig klare und ausreichende ἀναλώσειν τὰ ἱερὰ χρήματα noch die Art und Weise der Ausführung dieser Maasregel angegeben würde, begreift sich schwer, wie jener Gedanke aus den Worten hergeleitet werden soll" (Plat. Stud. pp. 108—110). τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων cannot mean 'the proceeds of sales', but only 'the property of those who sold,' and it is inaccurate or strained to describe the tyrant as spending the sellers' property.

To meet the linguistic difficulty the following emendations have been proposed: (1) τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων οὐ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀποδομένων (Stephanus); (2) τὸ τῶν ἀποδομένων (Hermann, who compares τὸ τῶν πωληθῶν and the like); (3) τὰ τῶν ἀποδεδομένων (Stallbaum); (4) τὰ τῶν πωλουμένων (Campbell). The first and third are wrong in point of language, for ἀποδίδοσθαι is not τενδί but vendere (see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. The disputed reading ἀπέδοσαν in Thuc. vi 62. 4 will scarcely be considered evidence). Hermann's eccentric conjecture hardly needs refutation. πωλουμένων deserves the praise of ingenuity, but τὰ τῶν πωλουμένων cannot surely mean 'the proceeds of what is thus exposed for sale.' ἐκ is needed before τῶν.

Even if these suggestions were linguistically sound, which is not, I think, the case, Vermehren's first objection still holds good. Why should Plato have troubled to explain so simple a process as ἱερὰ χρήματα ἀναλώσατι?

The kind of solution which I have adopted was first suggested by Vermehren. Dübner (Schneider Addit. p. 70) asserts that the λ over the δ of ἀποδομένων in A is by the first hand. Possibly; but I think it doubtful. ἀπολομένων is however read by Flor. U as well as by q. The correction in A is certainly old, and ought to carry weight; but in any case the intrinsic merit of ἀπολομένων is very great. τε in ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα suggests that some other kind of χρήματα will presently be specified, and it would be strange if Plato had ignored so obvious a source of revenue as the goods of the proscribed (Vermehren l.c. p. 109), in view especially of 567 b, c, as well as the history of tyranny in general.
and Dionysius' tyranny in particular (see note). The change from Δ to Δ is easy in uncial mss. After ἀπολομένων was corrupted to ἀποδο-
μένων, it was natural to omit καὶ, and make τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων (probably mistaken for passive) subject to ἐξαρκῇ. Nothing short of this would give even a semblance of meaning to the passage. The editor of q, who was certainly an intelligent, if too facile, emendator, added καὶ before ὅποι. I formerly accepted his view: Vermehren adds τε after τὰ: but Baiter's insertion of καὶ before τὰ is not more difficult, and intrinsically, I think, better.
571 I. Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἤν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ δημοκρατικοῦ γενόμενος τοῦτος τίς ἔστιν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔξι, ἄθλιον ἢ μακάριον. Λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν ἔτι οὕτος, ἔφη. Οἶσθ’ οὖν, ἤν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ ποθό ἐτι; Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων, οἶαι τε καὶ ὅσι εἰσίν, οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἰκανῶς διηρήσθαι. τούτω δὴ 5 Β ενδεῶς ἔχοντος, ἡ ἁσφαστέρα ἐσται ἡ ἐξήγησις οὐ ἔχοντοι. Οὐκόν, ἡ δ’ ὅσι, ἔτι ἐν καλῶ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ σκόπει γε ὁ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ἱδεῖν. ἐστιν δὲ τόδε, τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίων δοκοῦσι τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἱ κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγύγενεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν 10

7. ἔτι (vel ἔτι) ἐν καλῷ Σ: ἔτι (vel ἔτι) ἐγκαλὼ. AII.

571 A—572 B There remains the tyrannical man. Before beginning to describe his origin and character, we must complete our analysis of desire. Among the unnecessary desires, there is a special class which we call lawless or unnatural. It is these which are apt to be aroused in sleep, after over-indulgence in eating or drinking. But when we retire to rest with Desire and Anger in abeyance, and the rational element within us in full play, our dreams are innocent, and much is revealed to us in visions of the night.

571 A ξ οὐ—διηρήσθαι. The psychological foundation of Tyranny, as well as of Oligarchy and Democracy, is Desire; but there are three varieties of Desire, and it is the lowest of these, viz. the Unnecessary and παράνομοι, which Tyranny represents. See VIII 558 D n., and cf. Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 310—314.

571 B ἔτι ἐν καλῷ. See cr. n. ἐν καλῷ might well be written ἐγκαλῷ in early Greek script: see Meisterhans Gr.

d. Att. Inschr.3 pp. 106—108. It is strange that Apelt (Berl. Philol. Woch. for 1895 p. 965) should defend ἐτὶ ἐγκαλῷ: “soll ich (das Fehlende) noch einklagen” gives a poor sense. For ἐν καλῷ see Jebb on Soph. El. 384 νῦν γὰρ ἐν καλῷ (i.q. ἐκκαλὸν) φρονῶν.


10 ἐγγύγενεσθαι παντί: ‘are born in,’ ‘form an original part of every one’ (D. and V.), not simply ‘arise in’ (as Bosan-
betulionov eπιθυμιμον μετα λόγου ευνοι μεν ανθρωπων η πανταπασιν απαλλάττεσθαι η διληναι λειπεσθαι και αισθειες, των δε ισχυρότεραι και 1 πλείους. Λέγεις δε και τίνας, ἐφη, ταύτας; C Τας περί των ὑπον, ἢν δ’ ἐγοί, ἐγειρομένας, οταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς
φυχῆς εὐθή, ὦσον λογιστικον και ἡμερον και ἄρχον ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριοδές τε και ἀγριον η σίτων η μέθης πλησθεν, σκιρτα τε και ἀπωσάμενον τῶν ὑπον ἐξή τε λέγει και ἀποτιμπλάναι τα αὐτοῦ ἡθ. οἰσθ’ ὅτι πάντα ῥὲ το τυωοτρ τολμᾶ ποιεῖν, ὃς ἀπὸ πόσης λευκουνέν τε και ἀπηλαχμενένι αἰσχύνης και φρονίσεως. μητρὶ

15 τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρείν 1 μεγισθαί, ὡς οἴηται, οὐδὲν ὅκεν ἄλλῳ τα ὀτροφοῦν D ανθρώπων και θεῶν και θηρίων, μιαφονεῖν τε ὀτιοῦν, βρώματος τε ἀπέχουσι κυδενος· και ενι λόγῳ οὕτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλειπε ὡς ἀναίχυντας. Ἀληθεστάτα, ἐφη, λέγεις. "Οταν δὲ τε, οἴμαι, ὑγεινὸς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ και σφωρίνως καὶ εἰς τὸν ὑπον

25 ἢ τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἐαυτὸ καὶ ἐστίασας λόγων καλῶν

22. ἐπὶ λόγῳ Α:Π: fortasse ῆν ὀδηγῷ Α.

quet suggests, ignoring or forgetting ἀπαλλάττεσθαι and λειπεσθαι. Cf. εἰγείνεται in 572 A and ιδαίον ενεατο 572 B. There is something of 'the ape and tiger' in every human being; see infra 588 C ff. These παράνομοι επίθυμαι doubtless represent "der verbrecherische Hang der menschlichen Natur" (Krohn Pl. St. p. 216), but we ought not to compare Plato's conception with the doctrine of 'original sin," as Schleiermacher (Platons Staat p. 601) and Susemihl (Gen. Entw. II p. 238) appear to do. According to Plato, Man is an οὐδάνιον φύτων, οὐκ έγείρων.

571 C 13 λέγαις δε καὶ κτλ. 'And pray what are these desires?' Lit. 'And you mean by these desires, pray, which.' καὶ "significant accessum aliquam pro interrogantis voluntate necessariam vel maiores in modum expetitam" (Schneider, who compares Polit. 291 A τίνας αὐτοῦ καὶ λέγαις; Euhyd. 271 A and Heindorf ad loc.).

14 τας περὶ τῶν ὑπον κτλ. "The cursed thoughts that Nature Gives way to in repose" (Macbeth 11 1, 8) We must however beware of supposing that Plato regards sleep as the time when the lowest part of soul normally and naturally asserts its sway. It is only in the vicious, and after acts of self-indulgence, that the beast within us pollutes our slumber: cf. Cic.
div. I 115 and II 119. To translate οἴταν by 'when' (D. and V.) is therefore misleading: it means 'as often as.' See 571 D n.

17 λέγαι "vix sanum videtur," says Herwerden. The text is perfectly sound. Although the man is, as we say, sleeping, his θηρίων 'has shaken off sleep' and 'seeks to go and gratify its instincts.' The theory is that in dreams the part of the soul concerned is not asleep, but awake, and goes out to seek the object of its desire. Cf. 572 A n.


571 D 20 ὡς οἴηται goes closely with μεγισθαί ('intercourse, as it supposes, with' etc.). ὡς Οἶδεν (suggested by Förster Rhein. Mus. for 1885 p. 631) is a tasteless conjecture, which confuses reality and dreamland.

21 μιαφονεῖν τε ὀτιοῦν; such as particular and other unnatural murders (φόνοι παράνομοι Phaed. 113 E).


25 ἐστίασας κτλ. For the metaphor
in ἐπιστάσας see I 364 A n. The general meaning of this passage is best illustrated from Tim. 45 E—46 A γενομένης ὑπὸ πολλάς μὲν ἕνιοχοις ὑπὸνομοῖς ἔμπιπτει, καταλειψθέντα δὲ τῶν κυνῆσεων μείζων, οἷοι καὶ ἐν ἐσφίσματι τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὁποία ἡμῖν, τοῦτο ὑπὸ σαφῆνεσταὶ ἐντὸς—φαντάσματα, with which Aristotle's theory closely agrees: see Eth. Nic. I. 113. 1103b 7 ff. and Stewart's note. In like manner Zeno recommended his followers to gauge their moral 'progress' (προκόπη) by the nature of their dreams (frag. 160 ed. Pearson). See also on 572 A.

26 ἐπὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κτλ. In Cic. de div. II 116 the Pythagorean veto on beans is attributed to this motive. Plato's psychology in this passage recalls the myth of the Phaedrus: cf. especially 753 C—756 E of that dialogue. 572 A 1 ἄλλα 65 κτλ. The bearing of this remarkable chapter on the theory of divination did not escape Cicero, who has translated, or rather paraphrased, from ὦτα 571 C to ἀπεται 572 A: see his de div. I 60, 61. In Tim. 71 D—72 B it is not, as here, the best part of soul which is said to perceive 'past, present, or future' in dreams, but ἰη εἰς ἡ πρόχειν ὑπὸ κατακαμένον, the function of λογισμὸν being to interpret the visions seen by the ἐπιθυμητικοὶ in divination (whether ὑπὸ ὑπὸνομοῖς ἐπιθυμητικοὶ ἦπερ τῶν σημαίνει καὶ ὑπὸ μελλόντων ἢ παρελθόντων ἢ παρόντων κακῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν (16. 72 A). In the present passage Plato appeals to the widespread popular view that the soul during sleep is freed from the trammels of the body, foresees the future, and has access to a region of truth denied, with few exceptions, to the waking mind: "viget enim animus in somnis, libereque est sensibus et omni impedimentio curarmi, incerte et mortuo paene corpore" (Cic. de div. I 115); see Pind. Frag. 131 3—5 Bergk τὸ γὰρ ἐστὶν μόνον ἐκ θεῶν ἐδεί 

εἰς προσαντοντων μελέων ἢ 

ἀπὸ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἐν 

πολλὸς ὡρίστη 

δεικνυς τερτον ἐφερ 

ποιαν 

χελε 

κρίνων, Aesch. Ag. 179 ff. (στάζει δ' ἐν θ' ὑπὸν κτλ.), Emp. 104 ἑνδονομά γὰρ φρονὶς ὁμοιότροπος λαμπρύνεται καὶ Χεν. Cyrt. VIII 7, 21, and cf. generally Rohde Psyche 1 pp. 6 ff., 11 pp. 300 n. 2 and 314. On this view the Stoic theory of divination by dreams was based (see Cic. Ic. I 110 ff.), and the same idea appears also in Aristotle Frag. 15 ὡτα—ἐν ὑπὸνομοῖς ἐπὶ ἐντὸς ἡμῖν ἕξεχθα τότε τὴν ἔναν ἀπολαβόντα φιλίαν προμανετείνη τε καὶ προαγορεύει τὰ μελλόντα. We may compare the lines of Wordsworth:

"that serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on
Untill the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things."

2 ὁρεγεσθαι τοῦ. Schneider and Stallbaum read ὁρεγεσθαι τοῦ ἀλαθάνεσθαι with II (see cr. n.) and a majority of MSS; but such an expression would be heavy and unpleasant. Jowett and Campbell think "καὶ ἀλαθάνεσθαι should perhaps be struck out and the accent restored to τοῦ," but Burnet omits καὶ, reading ὁρεγεσθαι τοῦ ἀλαθάνεσθαι. The text, I believe, is sound, but cannot mean 'to aspire further (καὶ) to perceive something which it knows not' (J. and C.). We may translate 'to yearn after it knows not what and perceive what it knoweth not.' Just as in evil dreams the baser part of soul reaches out after the object of its desires (571 C), so also the βελτίστον, in these happier visions of the night, has longings which are all its own. ὁρεγεσθαι expresses the instinctive and unconscious turning of the soul towards the fountain of her being, and the waking counterpart of these visions of the night are just

"those shadowy recollections,
Which, by they what they may,
Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
Are yet a master light of all our seeing."

With the use of ὁρεγεσθαι cf. Phæd. 65 C ὁρεγεσεται τοῦ ὑπὸνομοί κτλ., a passage which throws light on Plato's meaning here in more ways than one.
Plato

5. Ἰσχαίρασα. Ἰσχαίρῳ is used transitively only in the aorist: cf. Solon ap. Arist. Ath. Pol. 5, 3. Schleiermacher (Platons Staat p. 619) thinks that Plato recognises here, and in ἐγείρασα, ἐστίασα, πραῖνας, κυνῆς ἂν, etc., a fourth principle or 'part' of soul, that viz. which is able to excite or calm the others. Krohn on the other hand sees in this passage a sort of implicit recognition of the 'ego' as a separate and distinct entity (PZ. St. p. 217).

The latter view is nearer the truth (cf. ν. 462 a, D mm.); but we ought not to press the words too much: cf. ἐπεικεῖν τινί ἔαντον βία κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας VIII 554 C, and III 411 B n. 6 ἔνδη. Other examples of this rare form of the dual in Plato are cited by Roepel de dual. usw Plat. p. 12.

7. μάλιστα: i.e. more than when he retires to sleep in any other condition. It is better, in view especially of the second half of this clause, to understand μάλιστα in this way, than to take the word generally, as if divination by dreams were the best way of grasping truth. Plato would hardly say this, nor indeed would the average Greek. See especially Tim. 71 D ff.

8. παράνυμφος. 571 b n. 572 b—573 c The origin of the tyrannical man is as follows. A democratic father has a son, who is led away by evil associates into every form of lawlessness. When his family come to the rescue, these tyrant-breeders implant in him a master-passion to act as champion of his drone-desires. The history of the corresponding State repeats itself in the young man's soul, and the champion Lust becomes a tyrant in due course. We look on Lust, Drink, Madness as tyrants; and the tyrannical man arises when these three tyrants establish their dominion over the soul.

572 b 10. Βουλόμεθα. W. H. Thompson's βουλόμεθα is unnecessary and even awkward with the present etis just following. The Greek means simply 'but what we want to notice is this' etc.

12 καὶ πάνω belongs to μετρίως (Schneider) rather than to δοκοῦντι (J. and C.): 'however virtuous we may some of us appear to be.'

15 οἶνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι. VIII 561 a—562 a. ἢν δὲ πον κτλ.: 'he had been, you remember, produced, by having been brought up from early years' etc. So-crates recalls the genesis of the democratic man (described in 558 c, 559 D ff.) before recalling his nature (in D below). Ast suggested γεγονός <καί> οτ γεγονός <το καί>, taking γεγονός of birth. The correct interpretation was pointed out by Schneider.
573 A 2 ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφήνα τινα. ἢ τί ἄλλο οἷον εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτα; Οὐδέν ἐγώγε, ἢ δ᾿ ὡς, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ τούτο. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν περὶ αὐτῶν βομβουσαί αἰ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἴδουν ἀνειμένων, ἐτί τὸ ἐσχατὸν αὐξουσαί τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρων ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κηφήνι, τότε δὴ δορυφόρεται τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἴστρα 1 οὕτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς Β ὑψηλῆς, καὶ εἰν τινὰς ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἡ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας. 

10 χρήστας καὶ ἐπὶ ἐπαισχυνομένως, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὅθει παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ, ἐὼς ἀν καθήρη σωφροσύνης, μανίας δὲ πληρόσα ἐπάκου. Παντελῶς, ἐφι, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν. Ἀρ’ οὖν, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διά τὸ τοιούτων τύραννοι ὁ Ἔρως λέγεται; Κινδύνει, ἐφι. Οὐκοῦν, ὃ φίλε, ἐπιτό, καὶ μεθυσθεῖς ἀνήρ τυραννικὸν τι φρόνημα Ῥ ἵσχει; Ἡ ἵσχει γάρ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε μανόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκιμηθὼς οὐ μόνον ἀνδρῶποι ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν

10. ἐπαισχυνομένως II: ἐπαισχυνόμενος Α. ἀποκτείνει—ὅθει Α.ΠΙ: ἀποκτείνη
—ὡθή Α.2. 11. μανίας ΠΙ: καὶ μανίας Α.
Plato’s
341
Plato
341

The
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man
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and
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Pantelé
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20

III. 

Gίγνεται 

μέν, ὁς ἐοικεν, ὠτώ καὶ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ: ζῇ δὲ 

Δ ὡς 

Τὸ 

τῶν 

παιζόντων, ἐφή, τούτο 1 ὑπὸ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἑρείς. 

Δέγω

(D. and V.). The litotes in ὑπὸ-

is

only euphemistic. ὑποκεικιμένωs with this

meaning does not apparently occur else-

where in classical Greek: see Stephanus-

Hase 

Phil.

Theo.

s.v., where the only parallel

cited is from a scholiwm on Soph. Až. 531

ὑποκεικιμένως μὴ πιστεύομαι. W. H.

Thompson (on Phœdr. 219 D) proposes

παρακινήσεως, in view of Ar. Frogs 643,

where he approves ‘on κύριος’ authority’

the reading ἵππο με παρακινήσας’ ἤδη. In

point of fact, however, this reading will not

scan, and the Raverna with other MSS has

ἵππο μὴ ὑποκεικιμένος’ ἤδη, although

ὑποκεικιμένος is not used with the same

sense as here.

οὐ μόνον κτλ. The madman also τυ-

ρανίκος τι φιδούρια ὕσειε. ἐπίλεξε is not here ‘expects’ (D. and V.) but ‘fancies,’ ‘imagines’ (II 383 B ἄ.).

18 τυρανίκος δὲ κτλ. I formerly printed ὅδ for ἰδ (with 6 and Vermehren 

Phot., Stud. p. 112), but now prefer the 

reading of the best MSS. Plato is testing 

his account of the origin of the tyrannical 

man by obvious and admitted facts: cf. 

(with Schneider) IV 442 E ff. Lust, 

Drink, and Madness are confessedly 

tyrants; and we hold that a τυρανίκος

ἀνήρ in the strictest sense of the 

term (for ἰδεῦ cf. I 341 c) is produced 

when a man falls under the domination of 

all three. So that our theory accords 

with everyday experience. μελαγχολίς 

is not of course ‘passionate’ (Jowett), 

but ‘insane’: cf. ὧ γε μακάνεις καὶ ὑπο-

κεικιμένους above.

573 c—576 b In respect of his 

character and mode of life, the tyrannical 

man plunges into every form of dissipa-

tion, and is haunted by ever fresh 

desires. His income and property soon 

disappear; and in order to satisfy his 

calamous lusts, he plunders his father’s 

estate, not hesitating if need be to lay 

violent hands on father and mother. Then 

follow sacriilege and theft, and every 

variety of crime; for he has now become 

in living fact that which once he rarely 

was in dreams. Such men, if few in 

number, may go abroad and join a 

tyrant’s bodyguard or remain to swell 

the ranks of petty criminals at home; 

but if they are numerous, they make the 

worst of all their crew into a tyrant over 

their fatherland. Tyranny is the goal 

and consummation of such a man’s de-

sires. Throughout his whole existence, 

both before and after he attains the 

crown of his ambition, the tyrannical 

man is a stranger to freedom and friend-

ship, faithless and superlatively unrighteous— 

in one word, he is the living embodiment 

of the monstrous lusts we found in dreams,

and the longer he rules, the worse he 

grows.

573 c ff. Plato’s τυρανίκος is a 

monster without a single redeeming 

feature of any kind, the incarnation of 

unnatural desire, “bloody, Luxurious, 

avaricious, false, deceitful, Sudden. ma-

licious”—“not in the legions Of horrid 

hell can come a devil more damned 

In evils” (Macbeth Act IV Sc. 3). It 

must be admitted that Plato takes a 

terrible revenge on Dionysius: see on 

577 A.

21 γίγνεται κτλ. ‘Such, apparently, 

is the origin also of the tyrannical man.’ 

The stress of the voice falls on τοιοῦτοι 

i.e. τυρανίκος (τυρανίκος ἀνὴρ in Socrates’ 

last sentence), καὶ εἰτίμω: we have 

now described his origin as well as that 

of the others. J. and C. propose ἀνὴρ, 

as if Plato meant γίγνεται ὡς, καὶ 

ἐκτὸς τοιοῦτος. But the character of 

the man has still to be described (? ὅδ ὡς 

πῶς:); hitherto we have been 

concerned only with his geneis (γίγνεται 

μὲν). Schneider caught the meaning (“so nun 

entsteht auch dieser Mann”); but recent 

English translators are wrong. For μὲν 

Richards conjectures μὲν ὡς (or ὡς γίγνεται 

μὲν as an alternative). The 

asyndeton helps of course to accentuate 

the antithesis between γίγνεται and ἢδ.

22 τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. παραμύη ἥνικα 

τεις ἐρωτηθῆσθε τι ὑπὸ γινώσκοντος το ἐρω-
δή, ἕφη. οἶμαι γὰρ, τὸ μετὰ τὸντο ἐορταῖ γέγονοντα παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κώμοι καὶ θαλάσσαι καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὅν ἦν 25 Ἐρως τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκών διακυβερνᾶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαντά. Ἀνάγκη, ἕφη. 'Αρπ οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμία ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἐκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεθα; Πολλαὶ μέντοι. Ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκονται ἓναν τινας ὡςι πρόσοδοι. Πῶς δ' οὖ; Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ δανεισμοι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραρέσεις. Ε 30 Τί μὲν; "Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντως ἐπιλίπη, ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοῶν πυκνὰς τε καὶ σφοδρὰς ἐννεειστεπεμένας, τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλαυνομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ διαφεροῦτος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος, πάσας ταῖς ἄλλαις ὥσπερ δορυφόροις ἠγουμένου, οὐστράν καὶ σκοπεῖν, τίς τι ἔχει, δυνατὸν 35 ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατησάντα ἢ | Βιασάμενοι; Σφόδρα γ', ἕφη. 'Ἀναγ- 574 καλὸν δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ μεγάλας ὃδιοι τε καὶ ὀδύναις 24. θάλασσα Π.: θάλασσα Α. 30. ἐπιλίπη Α'Π.: ἐπιλίπη Δ. 1 τροθέν, αὐτὸς ἄγνωσιν, οὐτός ἀποκρίνεται 'αὐ καὶ ἐμοί ἔρεις' (Schol.). Cf. Phil. 25. 573 D 23 αὐτόις: the τυραννικός and his associates. 24. θάλασσα. See cr. π. θάλασσα is either an adjective or the name of the Muse. Schneider (who was unaware that Π has θάλασσα) retains θάλασσα, but his note conclusively proves, I think, that the Attic writers as well as Homer invariably observed the distinction. Stallbaum alone of recent editors reads θάλασσα. ἔταιραι. "Nullus locus scortis est inter ἐορτάς atque κόμου καὶ θάλασσα" says Stallbaum. On this account he prefers ἔταιραι (a conjecture of G. W. Nitzsch), taking the word, strangely enough, for ἄρμανα. There is not the shadow of a difficulty: cf. Π. 573 A II. and ἔταιραι 574 B below. 33 ὃν κτλ.: 'in who's breast the tyrant Love indwelling steers all their soul.' The words are tinged with poetical colouring, as often in passages of this kind: cf. VIII 560 D, E al. J. and C. erroneously make ὃν neuter and dependent on ἔρως. The pronoun is construed with τα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαντά by Shorey (A. J. Ph. xvi p. 237), but in that case ὃς would have been more natural. The view I take agrees with Schneider's. 26 παραβλαστάνουν: 'shoot up beside' the master-passion. These desires correspond to τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατη- πεδόν τὸ κάλον τε καὶ τοῦλ καὶ τοιχίλων καὶ οὐδὲντε ταῦτ' ἐν τῇ τυραννομνῇ τοίς (VIII 568 D). 28 ἀναλίσκονται κτλ. Cf. VIII 568 D. 573 E 29 τῆς οὔσιας παραρέσεις κτλ.: 'encroachments on his capital' etc. (J. and C.), viz. to meet the moneylender's claims. See VIII 555 E. On ἐπιλίπη see VIII 568 E π. 30 ἀνάγκη μὲν κτλ. Bekker reads ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν with g and Flor. U: "recte, si cupiditates ipsis opponi sta- tuitmus. Sed nihil impedit, quo minus alteram necessitatem—quae postea hanc consequi particula δυν sic significat, iam hic scripторi obversatam atque hanc illi alteri oppositem putemus. Accedit quod si τάς μὲν ἐπιθυμιας scirpsisset, non τοὺς δὲ, sed αὐτοὺς δὲ dicturus fuisse videtur" (Schneider). We have no right to change τοὺς to αὐτοὺς as Stallbaum is fain to do. 31 ἐννεειστεπεμένας is copied, as Ast observes, by Longinus περὶ ὑφος 44 7. 32 κέντρων. The other desires (as well as the master Passion) are compared to goods. For the idiom ὅσπερ ὑπὸ κέν- τρων τῶν κτλ. cf. VIII 553 B π. 33 αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος κτλ. is not for τῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος κτλ., as Stallbaum seems to hold; for the ἔρως is itself an ἐπιθυμία: see 572 E ff. With δορυ- φόροις cf. VIII 567 D.
The civic parallel is in viii 568 D ff. 'libit' (in the sinister sense of 'give' or 'offer': cf. Laws 761 A). On the position of ἐπιγέμισθην see vii 532 C n. The words ἀξίωμα νεωτέροι ὑπὸ κτλ. correspond to viii 568 E ff., and ἐὰν—ἀναλώσῃ is subordinate to ἀπονειμένοι τῶν πατέρων ('his father's property'; not, of course, 'his patrimony': cf. viii 568 E).

The middle of ἀντεχόμενοι is in the sense of 'resist' is extremely rare; but occurs in Arist. H. A. vii 3. 583a 18, possibly in Xen. de Ven. 6. 6, and occasionally in later Greek: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. The presence of μαχόμενοι makes it unlikely that ἀντεχόμενοι means 'cleaving to' sc. in the attitude of supplication.

The adjective ἀναγκαῖος. The adjective ἀναγκαῖος throughout this sentence combines the two senses of 'necessary' ((superfluous,' and 'related by the ties of blood.' Bosanquet justly draws attention to the singular pathos and pietas of Plato's words: cf. V 470 D n. For the parallel in the State see viii 550 B.

574 C 17 πληγαῖς—δούναι. See viii 560 C n.

The present has better ms authority, and is intrinsically more appropriate than the aorist: 'nam et ei quod sequitur ἐνυελεγμένον ἔ magis respondet et eo ipso temporis puncto quo patrimonium deficiere incipit filium istum ad latrocinia et sacrilegia abripi accuratius significat.' (Heller Curt. Crit. p. 4). Contrast viii 568 E n.

23 ἐμφάσει: 'put himself in touch with' (sich in Berührung setzen, Schneider). The delicate euphemism is missed by the English translators.

24 ἵππον τι νεοκορήσει: 'will sweep out a temple.' The euphemism may be
illustrated by Cicero's jest about Verres, "sutura mit omnia verretert" (Quint. vi 3). Suidas has neokoros, ἴνότε ἀντὶ τοῦ ἑροῦλησα: κορές γὰρ λέγουσι τὸ κάλλους, τὸ σαρών ('sweep') καὶ ἕκαλλοισ. The explanation of the Scholiast is less accurate. See also Schick de Scholiis p. 34 and Photius i. 103 (ed. Parson) ἵμβαν τε νεοκοροσας εὐφημιστῶν ἄντι τοῦ ἑροῦλησας (as emended by Schneider). L. and S. say that neokoros does not mean 'temple-sweeper' till Philo, but the present passage shews that this meaning is at least as old as Plato.

δικαίας. The letters αι are written over an erasure in A, so that the scribe may have originally written ὄκας, which appears in all other mss. The Scholiast read δικαίας, as appears from his paraphrase τῶν δέον τῶν ἀγάθων, ἃ πᾶλιν ἔχειν, and no one, since Bekker, has adopted ὄκας except Stallbaum. τὰ δὲ ὄκας ποιομένας is indefensible, and χρηστὰς in 573 B, to which Plato here refers, proves δικαίας.

ποιομένας κτλ. ποιομένας = 'accounted'; see on vi 498 a. The words ἰκ διουλείας λεγομένα correspond to viii 567 ε. ἄναρ is an adverbial accusative: cf. vii 520 c n. The expression εὖ ἐπιφ., though excised by Cobet (V. L. 2 p. 525), is quite in keeping with Plato's earnest orations.

574 E 30 ἐν ἐαυτῷ. So also in 579 C. Herwerden calls for ἐν ἐαυτῷ, which, of course, only mean 'in his senses': see Blaydes on Ar. Ἐρωτ. 642.

30 γνώμονας κτλ. γνώμων (Richards in Cl. Κεφ. viii p. 23, following Ste- phanus) is a groundless conjecture. The tyrannical man must have reached this stage before he sticks at nothing. On βρώ- ματος see 571 D n.

575 B 2 ἀτε αὐτὸς κτλ.: 'being himself a monarch with sole sway will not only lead the man in whom he dwells as in a city unto every form of daring' etc. τε is used ἀνακολούθως: see on 11 373 B. The words ἀτε αὐτὸς ὃ μοναρχος suggest as the proper supplement of the τε clause something like 'but will also make him a tyrant too'; and the sentiment appears in a somewhat different form in 575 D, C (where see n.1). So Hoefcr (de part. Pl. p. 14) correctly explains the passage. Schneider understands κυβερνῶν or the like (to balance ὃν) after πολέω— an impossible solution, which he himself abandoned afterwards in his translation. Others cancel τε (g and Stallbaum), or suggest έχοντα τε καὶ τρίφοντα (Richards). Neither proposal is either necessary or probable. The words ὦσπερ πόλιν have also caused difficulty; and Vind. E offers the ingenious emendation πολών (eic). Should ὦσπερ πόλιν be connected with τῶν έχοντα τε αὐτὸν or with άξει? The latter view has hitherto, I believe, been held; but the introduction of the parallel is very awkward, and, in point of fact, neither ἔρως nor even the tyrant himself was said in Book viii to lead the city into daring deeds (viii 566 D ff., quoted by Stallbaum, is nothing to the point). On the other view ὦσπερ πόλις is natural and easy: if ὅ ἔρως is a μοναρχος, ὃ έχων τῶν έχοντα πόλις where he rules. Cf. έκεὶ ἐν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὦσπερ ἐν πολεῖ πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν 590 E.
546 c 15 ἐτεὶ τῶν — ἐαυτοῦ has been called a "nonsense" by Richards, who conjectures for καὶ ἐαυτοῦ either ἐαυτῷ, or καὶ ἐαυτῷ: Herwerden contents himself with deleting καὶ. The text is assuredly sound; and although Stallbaum is here at fault, Vermehren correctly explained the passage as long ago as 1870 (Pl. Stud. pp. 112 ff.). καὶ is quaque, and we should translate 'by means of the same dispositions in himself also' ("through dieselben Eigenschaften auch seiner selbst" Vermehren).

τῶν αὐτῶν sc. as those of his evil associates. The history of the State furnishes an exact parallel in the contrast between the foreign mercenaries and the emancipated slaves (viii 567 D, E). Jowett's translation is right, but in his edition he still takes καὶ as 'and.'

575 B 11 κλάπτων κτλ. recalls I 344 b (where see n.) and 348 D. From Xen. Mem. I 2. 62 and Symp. 4. 36 it would seem that these crimes were commonly cited as instances of ἀδίκεια in the Socratic school. Cf. also Ar. Theom. 817 ff.

575 c 15 ἐν—τοιοῦτον: is bracketed by Herwerden. The words are certainly difficult, if σμικρὰ γε κακὰ be taken as ironical, for we have no right to render ἐν by "even if": "a small catalogue of evils—(even) if there are only a few such men!" J. and C. But there is no irony. The meaning is 'True, they are small evils, if such men are few in number.' 'Yes,' said I, 'for small is small in comparison with great.' Adimantus' catoe prepares us for ὅταν γὰρ ἐν πόλει γένονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ἐξω-

17. ἵκταρ II: ἵκταρ Α.
The irony, which begins with Homer, is illustrated at length by Herderwen Mn. xix pp. 338 ff. The reference to ὄσπερ τούτῳ is to 574 θ. νέους is 'new' (Schneider), not 'young': cf. viii 568 Ν.ν., and νεωτί φίλης, νεωτὶ φίλον 574 Β. Θ. μητρίδα Photius (ed. Porson i p. 268) thus explains: μητρίδα τὴν μητρίδα.


499 b—502 c), the deepest darkness perhaps contained a promise of the dawn. See especially the striking passage in Laws 709 e—712 a. Aristotle seems to have understood him to mean this (ἐπεὶ κατ’ ἐκείνον δεί εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν δύοτην όντως ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀνεξετάζει καὶ κόσμοι i.e.), and criticises him accordingly from the facts of experience; but the succession of polities in the Republic is not intended to be in all respects, or even primarily and chiefly, historical (viii 543 a n.).

576 b—577 b What shall we say then about the happiness or unhappiness of the individual who is most depraved? As is the city, so will the individual be in point of happiness as well as virtue. And the city in which a tyrant rules is of all cities the worst and most unhappy. What of the tyrannical man? He that has lived with a tyrant, and is himself moreover capable of judging, will best decide. Let us pretend, says Socrates, that we ourselves possess these qualifications.

576 c ff. We have now discussed ὁ κάκος, and it only remains to compare him with ὁ ἄρσεν in respect of happiness and misery. The present chapter is introductory to the triad of arguments by means of which Plato proves that the victory rests with ὁ ἄρσεν. His description of the misery of the tyrant is based, as he virtually tells us, on the evidence of his own eyes (577 a, b ini.), but we should of course remember that in such cases we are apt to see what we wish to see, and Plato's description, regarded as a portrait of Dionysius I, though it doubtless possesses a certain historical value, may well be somewhat overdrawn.

576 c 18 τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς κτλ. = 'although the multitude are multitudinous also in their views' expresses the antithesis implied in the emphatic τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.
Herwerden's conjecture tos de pollois alla doketi is singularly feeble and inelegant. The Scholiast neatly remarks pollo doketi 'anti tou vekei': to yap gevdo polukhos, 'aplois d' o'mudo tis alytheias evo.' On Plato's contempt of the many see VI 494 A n.

This refers to the two questions, not to tois doketi. If otherwise, Plato would, I think, have written to00 here.

20 ὄμοιοτητι, though doubted by Ast, Cobet, Herwerden, and others, is sound enough: see on VIII 555 A.

576 D 23 ἀρετή. See er. n. The correct reading was first restored by Schneider.

26 εὐδαιμονίας—ἀθλιότητος κτλ. For the genitive see on V 470 A. μὴ ἐκπλητ.

τῷ μεθα = "do not let us be dazzled" (D. and V.): cf. 577 A. Jowett's "pain-stricken" suggests a wrong idea.

28 ἀλλ' ὡς κτλ.: 'but as it is necessary to go into and survey the entire city, do not let us give our opinion until we have crept into the whole of the interior and seen it.' It is best to make ὡς virtually causal, as it often is when dependent on imperatives or imperatival expressions (here ἀποφανωμέθα): cf. I 336 D, IV 420 E, Synap. 189 B et al. With εἰς διην τῆν πόλιν κτλ. cf. IV 471 B ἢ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τῆν πόλιν διην βλέπων δεσδικὸν κτλ. καταδύων playfully suggests that we mean to clude the tyrant's eye (cf. infra 579 B, Corg. 485 D). He shall not catch us if we can help it. For other views on this clause see App. I.

577 A 4 τής—σχηματιζόνται: 'circumstance and pomp of majesty, which they put on to the world outside.' Cf. προστέθασα δι' 599 A n. and (with Schneider) II 365 c. ἐπίθετα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα—περιγραφέων. Τῶν τυραννικῶν seems to be usually taken as masculine, in which case it might have been omitted without any loss to the meaning. I think it is the genitive of τὸ τυραννικόν: cf. β below ἐφ ὡς μαλακὰ γενόμεν ἀν ὀφθητι τῆς τραγικῆς σκέψεως. 5 ἢ ὡς ὥριν ὄνομαν κτλ. 'If then I should think it right for all of us to listen to the man who is both capable
of judging' etc. The dialogue form is strained almost to breaking in this remarkable sentence. We are all to be silent and listen to Plato himself. Plato might fairly claim from his psychological studies and experience as a teacher, to be δυνατός τῇ διάσκεψι ἣδε ἢδος διδάξειν and so δυνατός γίνει, and he had lived under the same roof with Dionysius I of Syracuse. The poet Gray was one of the first to observe that Plato is here meant.

577 B 8 ἐν οἷς = 'among whom' is surely better and more natural than ἐν αἷς, which Richards has conjectured. The tyrant lays aside the mask in his own family.

9 τραγικὴς σκεύης = 'theatrical garb' (D. and V.) again betrays 'a feeling of the kinship between the shows of tragedy and those of tragedy' (Bosanquet: cf. VIII 568 A n.). Dionysius I was himself a writer of tragedies, and notoriously jealous—so we are told—of his poetical reputation (Grote x pp. 302 ff.): but it would be frigid to suppose that this was in Plato's mind when he wrote the word τραγική.

ἀδ τοῖς was first conjecturally restored by Heindorf (on Soph. 262 A), following Ficinus, instead of the vulgate Ἀδ τοῖς. It has since been found to be the reading of most of the other MSS as well as A.

10 κελεύομεν. The singular κελεύομεν (q Flor. U) is still read by Stallbaum. There is surely no reason why Socrates should not associate Glauco with himself in this hypothetical invitation.

11 ὅρθοτατ' ἂν—προκαλοῦμαι forms the apodosis to what Socrates has said (cf. 582 b), but refers 'ad initium potius quam ad eiximation orationis Socraticae' (Schneider. Cf. v ἅθεν B n.). Glauco admits most fully the claim that Plato has earned a right to speak with authority on this subject.

12 προσποιησόμεθα κτλ. Plato cannot appear in propria persona, so that it is necessary for Socrates and Glauco to pretend that they also belong to the number of those 'who would be able to judge' and have met with τύραννοι and τύραννοι. The fiction is rendered necessary by the laws of dialogue as ὑποτασσόμεν traditionally states. We must be aware of supposing that it is Plato who 'pretends': Plato does not pretend, but is δυνατός μὲν κρίνει, διδυκρηκόμεν δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κτλ. (577 A). Richards objects to ἂν with δυνατῶν, and it is certainly unusual to find ἂν with an adjective in this way. But as δυνατῶν can itself take an infinitive, it hardly differs from the participle δυναμενών, and the suggestions δυνατῶν δύντων or δυνατῶν ἄν (ὅτως), are unattractive. I should add in conclusion that nearly all critics are now agreed in holding that Plato throughout the whole of this passage is referring to his own experience of Dionysius I: see for example Susemihl Gen. Enit. ii pp. 240, 294 ff., Teichmüller Lit. Zeit. i p. 110, Hiller Enst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Tel. pp. 667 ff., with Zeller i p. 413 n. 1. The date of Plato's first visit to the elder Dionysius was in or near 588 B.C. Compare Eph. vii 324 A—327 D. Whether this epistle be genuine or not, the visit is abundantly attested, as Zeller proves (I.c. pp. 413—415 n.), and it is strange that J. and C. should still have doubts upon the subject. See also on V 473 D, vi 496 B, 499 B and infra 579 B n.

577 B—580 C Like the city whose counterpart he is, the tyrannical man is in reality a slave, powerless to work his will, penniless and insatiate, full of fear and lamentation. A still greater depth of misery awaits him if he becomes a
tyrant. Imagine the pitiful plight of one who is suddenly transported into a solitary place where he is at the mercy of his own slaves, and surrounded by free neighbours who make common cause with them! Such is the position of the tyrant, a prisoner in his own palace, tormented by longings which he can never appease. To sum up, he is the supreme embodiment of vice and misery, and the longer he holds sway, the worse he becomes.

Let us now give judgment. In respect of virtue and happiness the different individuals stand as follows: (1) Kingly, (2) Timocratical, (3) Oligarchical, (4) Democratical, (5) Tyrannical. He who is most kindly is best and happiest, he who is most a tyrant over himself and city, worst and most miserable, whether their true character be hidden from men and gods, or not.

677 c f. The arguments by means of which Plato establishes his conclusion may be briefly described as the political argument, the psychological argument, and the metaphysical argument. The first (577 B—580 c) depends on the resemblance between the soul and the State, the second (580 c—583 a) on the threefold division of the soul into λογιστικά, θυματικά, and ἐνέργητικά, the third (583 B—587 B) on Plato's theory of Reality or Being. Now it is just these three methods of investigation, and these alone, which have been employed in the different parts of the dialogue, the political and psychological in II—IV and VIII—IX, the metaphysical in V—VII; and it is therefore altogether appropriate and right that Plato should bring them together now, and use their united forces in making up the last account. The sequence of the three arguments follows the usual Platonic way of progression from the exoteric to the esoteric, and as the ideal city culminated in metaphysical idealism, so it is a metaphysical argument that crowns our citadel of proof.

577 C 16 ἐκατόν κτλ. καθ' ἐκατόν = 'point by point,' 'in detail,' not 'singly' (D. and V.), which would be καθ' ἐκάτερον here, since only two objects of comparison are involved. ἐκατόρ.: sc. ἐκάτερον, viz. the city and the man (J. and C.). On ὃι πόλεως εἰσεῖν and ὃς ἐποίησε εἰσεῖν ('I might almost say') see I 341 b n.

577 D 21 ἀνήρ. See cr. n. I have followed the advice of a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermes. xxiv p. 256 and accepted Campbell's ἀνήρ. It is difficult to dispense with the article here: cf. τίς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός above.

24 ἀνελευθερίας κτλ. In ἀνελευθερίας there is here a strong suggestion of the etymological meaning ('Unfreiheit' Schneider). μικρόν, as J. and C. observe, is introduced to make the parallel between State and individual as complete as possible. From another point of view it might be held that the μικρόντατον in the tyrannical soul is not σμικρόν but πολύ (573 D—576 B).
577 D, E 29 καὶ ἡ τυραννομένη κτλ. There is no μοιχήσεις, in the true sense of that term, except τοῦ ἁγάθου: cf. 1 336 A with the Gorgias quoted ad loc. and Men. 77 c ff. Or in other words Virtue alone is free: cf. ἀρετή δὲ ἀδίστατον \(X\) 617 e with note ad loc. See also Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii 2 p. 317.

30 ὡς—ψυχῆς. The restriction (for which cf. 579 e) is necessary, for the μοιχήσεις part of the τυραννομένη ψυχῆς will have its way.


578 Α 1 ἄπληστον: like the sieve in Gorg. 493 A—D (Nettleship). Nothing can 'fill up the cistern' of his lust.

2 τῆν τε—πόλιν. I follow the Oxford editors in putting τε for γε (see cr. n.).

578 B 8 τῆν γε πόλιν. γε is restrictive: our verdict on the individual has still to be pronounced. Cf. 582 B, C. J. and C. are the only editors who retain τε here (see cr. n.), but the anacoluthon would be too harsh, and τῶν ἔξοντα τε in 575 A is different: see note ad loc.
13. τοιούτος μάλιστα: i. e. ἄλλος μάλιστα. The subject is ὅσος, and ὁ τοιούτος μάλιστα is in the predicate.

578 C 15 τυραννικὸς ὄν. "Have a care of inserting any negative particle here, as H. Stephanus would do, which wholly destroy the sense" (Thomas Gray). Cf. 575 C, D and 579 C.

16 δυστυχεῖς ἡ. Cobet (V. L. p. 534) revives Bekker's δυστυχεῖς: but the MS reading is preferable: "significatur infelicitatem ei qui tyrannus factus sit, usque adesse perpetuoque eum comitari" (Schneider). Cf. VII 561 A n. and δυστυχεῖς εἶναι ἐποδή.

18 ἀλλ' εἰ μᾶλλα κτλ.: but carefully study by means of argument the two individuals in question. τῷ τοιοῦτῳ is literally 'the two such people,' i.e. the two τυραννοί, viz. the τυραννοί who lives an ἄδειτς βίος, and the τυραννοί who becomes a τυράννος. It is the relative position of these two individuals in respect of misery which is the question before us now, and the rest of this chapter aims at answering it by argument: see 579 C, D, where the conclusion of the reasoning is given. No satisfactory explanation of the MS reading τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν (cr. n.) has yet been offered. Some hold that τοιοῦτῳ refers forward ('nach folgender Regel,' Schleiermacher, Frantl), but τῷ τοιοῦτῳ cannot be thus used, although τοιοῦτῳ by itself might be. Others translate "by the help of such a process of reasoning as we now employ" (J. and C. etc.). I doubt whether this meaning, which does not, by the way, furnish a sufficiently pointed antithesis to οἴσον, is easily conveyed by τῷ τοιοῦτῳ. The translations "bei einer solchen Untersuchung" (Schneider), "where the argument is of such a nature" (J. and C., comparing the altogether different τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς in 579 C), and 'in this high argument' are untenable on grammatical grounds; nor can we easily explain the dative as meaning 'in the interests of' ('videndum ne dativus eam rem significet, cuius gratia accurate quaerendum esse Socrates dicat' Schneider). The emendations proposed are (1) τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ (Stephanus), (2) τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ οί τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγῳ (Ast), (3) fortasse εἰ μᾶλλ' εν κτλ. (W. H. Thompson J. Ph. v. p. 218). Did Stephanus mean by τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ something like the δίκαιος and δάκτιος λόγος of the Clouds? τοιοῦτο could not convey so much, but Stephanus was, I believe, on the right track when he restored τῷ τοιοῦτῳ. The corruption was all the easier, because the dual is constantly corrupted in the MSS of the Republic: thus in III 410 Ε all MSS have ἄδικατερα, in III 412 Α ἐπηνευμένως was written by Α', in IV 432 Ε πολέμια is the reading of A, and in IV 444 D both A and Π give τῷ ἀρχομένῳ for τῷ ἀρχομένῳ. Cf. also III 395 A n. 579 D 23 οὖσα πλεούστων. We ought not, with J. and C., to understand οὖσα. The adjective logically belongs to ιδιώτων, but is idiomatically placed in the relative clause: see Kuhner Gr. Gr. II pp. 924 ff.
25 ικελών. On the transition from plural to singular see I 347 A n.
26 τι γάρ κτλ. ‘Why of course, what should they be afraid of?’ sc. in their slaves. τι is not ‘why,’ but ‘what,’ as οδέων shews: cf. V 440 B n. Campbell, making τι ‘why,’ translates οδέων by ‘Oh, for no reason,’ and refers to Prot. 310 B; but there too οδέων is ‘nothing’: see my note ad loc.

578 Ε 29 εἰ τις θεῶν κτλ. It is a mistake to suppose from this passage that the treatment of slaves in Athens or Greece generally was exceptionally cruel or unkined. Granted the existence of slavery at all, what Plato here says would nearly always be found true, especially where, as in Athens, the slaves belonged for the most part to an alien and inferior race. See Gilbert Gk Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 170—174. Fifty slaves would of course be more than the average number belonging to a single citizen. In Athens, during the fourth century B.C., the slaves were probably little, if at all, more numerous than the free-born population and metoecs (Beloch Die Bevolk. d. Gr.-Röm. Welt. p. 99).

33 ὁπόσημον. On ὁπόσημον following ποίω see I 348 B n.

579 Α 1 αὐτῶν τῶν δοῦλων. “Quinm ingenui desint, a quibus auxilium petat, nonnullis ex servorum ipsorum, quasi timet, numero adulata cognitur” (Schneider). This explanation, which Vermehren also approves (Pl. Stud. p. 114), exactly meets the case, and there is no reason either to change αὐτῶν to αὑ (with Stephanus) or to delete τῶν δοῦλων (with Ast and Herwerden).

2 οὖδὲν δειμένος: ‘when he needn’t.’ He is under no obligation to set them free: why then should he make them a present of their freedom? The innumendo is in Plato’s nearest style. For the language cf. (with Schneider) Plut. Tib. Gracch. 21. 2 δείκνυσι περὶ τοῦ αὐτὸς ἡ βολὴ γίνεται μηδὲν δειμένη πείμεν αὐτῶν εἰς Ἀσίλαν. The conjecture οὖδέν δειμένος (Groen v. Prinsterer Proop. Plut. p. 211, Ast, and Herwerden, who appeals in vain to Plut. Cato Maior 12. 3, Dem. 11. 9, and Isocr. Areop. 25) is, as Schneider shews, inept; for if the slaves do not need to be set free, because they are practically free already, “ne ero quidem opus est ut ad eos coerencdos illam aliamve ineat rationem.”

4 ἄλλους—γείτονας. These free-born neighbours in Plato’s simile repre- sent surrounding independent States, who detest tyranny, and help the tyrant’s subjects. See Newman’s Politics of Aris- totle II p. 315.
5 κύκλω κατοικίσεις γείτονας πολλοὺς αυτῷ, οὗ μὴ ἀνέχοιτο, εἰ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπότεων ἥξιοι, ἀλλ' εἰ ποῦ τινα τοιοῦτον λαμβάνοιει, ταῖς ἐσχαταῖς τιμωρίαν τιμωρίαις; Ἐπεὶ οὖν, ἐκεῖ, οἴμαι, μᾶλλον ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἰς, κύκλω φρουρούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων ἐπολεμῶν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσμοτηρίῳ δεδεται ὁ τοῦ τυράννου, φύσει οὗ οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρῶτων μεστὸς. Λόγῳ δὲ ὄντι αυτῷ τὴν ψυχήν μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὕτω ἀποδημήσαι ἔξεστιν οὐδαμώς οὕτω θεωρῆσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσίν, κατακεκυκλωμένοι δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γωνίας, φθονοῦ 1 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς 15 ταις, οὐκ ἐξίσου ἀποδημῆς καὶ τῷ ἀγαθὸν ὀρᾶ; Πανταπασίαν μὲν οὖν, ἐκεῖ.

VI. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρποῦταί ἄνθρωπος ἄν κακός εἰς ἐαυτόν πολεμούμενος, οὗ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἀδιλιτάτων ἐκρίνας, τῶν τυραννικῶν, ὡς μὴ ἰδιώτης καταβαθμίζω, ἄλλα ἀναγκασθῇ


569 B 8 ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμῶν: 'by none but enemies': cf. τὰς ἀγραίνας in vi 496 B. The tyrant’s splendid but awful isolation is admiringly brought out by Plato: see also on vii 507 B. In this respect Plato’s similitude faithfully reflects the position of Dionysius I in Sicily and indeed, except for the support which Sparta lent him, in the whole Hellenic world. See Grote p. 306 ff.

9 ἐν τοιούτῳ κτλ.: The picture which follows is no doubt also drawn from Dionysius I: see Grote X pp. 244, 328 n.n.

11 Λόγῳ "is the same with regard to the eye, that liquorishness is to the taste." (Thomas Gray).


13 οὕτω δὴ κτλ.: Such as the Olympic games etc.: cf. Xen. 1.c. τὰς κοινὰς πανηγυρίας ἔθη τὰ αὐξανεστάτα δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνθρώποις συναγείρεσθαι. Dionysius was represented at Olympia by deputy, as Hermann reminds us (Gesch. u. System p. 116). Cf. Grote Χ p. 303. The phrase ταῖς ἄγαθον ὀρᾶ, with which the sentence concludes, has a curiously modern sound.

17 οὐκοῦν κτλ.: "greater then, by evils such as these, is the profit which is reaped by the individual who" etc. (‘Um so grosse Übel reicher also ist der Mann’ Schleiermacher). τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is dative of amount of difference; cf. ii 373 E μείζωνος—οὕτω σμικρός, ἀλλ' ἄξιος στρατοπέδεια, vi 507 E οὐ σμικρό—ignore—τιμωτέρω καὶ Λατός 848 B (Schneider Addit. p. 71). The passage has been strangely misunderstood, Stephanus suggesting variously <ἐπὶ> or <πρὸς> τοῖς τοιούτοις οί τῶν τοιοῦτων, and Αστ <ἐπὶ> τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. Stallbaum comes nearer to the truth in his "per huius modi mala," but the dative is exactly as in τοιούτῳ πλείω. The view that the dative is merely one of ‘circumstance’—an alternative suggestion in J. and C.—cannot be upheld. See also on 578 C. The reference in νῦν δὴ is to 578 B.

19 ἦς μὴ κτλ.: I have returned to the text of A, ΙΙ, and nearly all the MSS. 1 with Stobaeus (Flor. 50. 50) has μὴ ὡς, and so Stallbaum and Bailer read. μὴ ὡς suits better with ἄλλα ἀναγκασθῇ, but the irregularity is slight, and, as Schneider observes, the sentence opens as if it were
meant to be positive and not negative, so that we μή is suited to what precedes. We may add that we μή ιδιωτής καταβίω is a clearer echo of μή ιδιωτήν Βίον καταβίω 578 c, which Plato wishes to recall.

579 D 27 κάν εἰ μή τῷ δόκει κτλ. Cf. v 473 A and (for καὶ) III 408 B n. The reading δοκύ (see εἰ. n.) is retained by Schneider, but ε and η are easily confused, and, even if we avoid sporadic instances of εἰ with the subjunctive in Attic, the analogy of v 473 A, as well as the sense, is in favour of δοκεῖ. There need not be a specific allusion in τῷ: for praises of tyranny and the tyrant’s lot were common enough in Greece: cf. I 344 B, VIII 508 A mn. The phrase τῷ ὑποτείνει us to understand τύραννος and δοῦλος in the fullest sense: cf. v 474 A n.

28 δοῦλος κτλ. I once too rashly placed καὶ κόλασις after δοῦλος, in order to obtain a chiasmus, understanding δοῦλειας τῶν ποιησάτων like δοῦλων δοῦλειας in VIII 509 c. Two inferior MSS have δούλειας καὶ θωτείας: but the inversion is not difficult, because the two notions are so closely allied: cf. (with Schneider) Euthyd. 301 B ‘ποτὲ τινα στροφήν ἐφευρέων τε καὶ ἐπιστρέφωμα (where Schanz’s brackets ‘nemini nocent’).

579 E 29 καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κτλ. Xenophon’s Hiero is in effect a diluted commentary on this sentence: cf. also Gorg. 524 E ff., and especially Shakespeare’s Macbeth IV 3. 50—99, V 3. 22—29.

32 σφαδασμοῦ = ‘convulsive movements’ is a rare word. The spelling σφάδασμος appears in no ms except A; but the iota is attested from other sources: see Stephanus-Hase Thea. s. v. The verb σφαδαζεῖν (μετὰ σπασμού πηδῶν Hesych.) denotes any nervous, twitching, convulsive motion, outside one’s own control, the result of excitement, fear, pain, disease etc. (Stephanus-Hase l. c.). For the sense of this passage cf. 577 E n.

580 A 2 τὸ πρότερον κτλ. The reference is to VIII 507 and supra 576 A. B. η ἑπότερον might of course have been spared, and Herwerden more suo cuts it out; but the sentence gains in weight by the addition.

22—2
5 καὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεὶ εἶναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτως ἀπεργάζεσθαι. Οὕδεις σοι, ἐφι, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερεῖ. "Ἰδί δέ μοι, ἐφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἦσθι ὦσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτὴς ἀρποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ ὄντως, τίς πρῶτος Β

580 Α, B 7 νῦν ἡδη ('nunc demum') is fully illustrated by Jecht de usu part. ἡδη in Pl. dialog. pp. 44 f. 8 ὦσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κτλ. The comparison is borrowed from the Athenian method of judging in musical or dramatic competitions. According to Petersen, who in his Dorpat program über die Freisrichter der Grossen Dionysien zu Athen (1878) has carefully investigated the whole subject, the mode of procedure was as follows. Some time before the festival a number of qualified persons were selected by the bouleutai in cooperation with the χορηγοί, and their names deposited in 10 urns, one for each φυλή. On the day of the contest, one name was drawn from each urn, and the ten judges thereby constituted, after witnessing the performance, each wrote down in his γραμματείων the order in which he arranged the several competitors. Of these ten judges five were next selected by lot, and the final verdict was given in accordance with the votes already registered by these five. The most important piece of evidence in support of this theory is furnished by Lyssias 4. 3 ἐβουλόμενος δ' ἀν μὴ ἀπολαχέων αὐτῶν κριτῆν Διονυσίατος, ἢ ἤθω φανερὸς ἐγένετο ἐμεί διηλλαγμένος, κρίνας τὴν ἐμὴν φυλὴν νικάν νῦν δὲ ἐγραφέ μὲν πωτά εἰς τὸ γραμματείον, ἀ πελάχη δέ. In none of the ancient authorities, which are fully cited by Petersen, do we find the expression ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής: but Petersen thinks the phrase may perhaps denote any one of the surviving five, who had lasted through all the stages, having been originally chosen by the Senate, and afterwards by lot on the two remaining opportunities. The singular number, according to Petersen, is generic, as in Laws 6:9 Α, B and elsewhere. It is true of course that the matter could not always be brought to an immediate issue in this way; for, to take a single instance, in a case where there were, let us say, three competitors, the votes of the five judges might result in a tie between two competitors for each of the three prizes. Thus we might have:

(1) 2nd Prize A B C C C
(2) 3rd Prize B A B A B
In such a case we must, I suppose, believe either that one of the five judges, who will then be ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής, had a casting vote, or else—and this is the more reasonable view—that C was held to be disqualified for the first prize, and fresh scrutinies began. Petersen's explanation is accepted in the main by Müller (Griech. Bühnenatt. pp. 369—372), and, though to some extent conjectural, appears to me the best available, except in one point. ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής can hardly be separated from ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών, a phrase which is quoted from Cratinus' Ἀνευδοτά (F. Fr. 157 Kock), and explained as ὁ ἔσχατος ἀγών in Bekker's Ἀνευδοτά p. 91. 10. The ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής must surely mean the judge of the διὰ πάντων ἀγών, and if so, διὰ πάντων should be similarly interpreted in both phrases. In διὰ πάντων ἀγών it cannot mean "der durch alle Stadien oder besser durch alle Collegien hindurchgegangen war" (Petersen I. c. p. 24), but may possibly mean the last and greatest ἀγών, as τὸ διὰ πασῶν is the greatest interval in a scale of one octave. The expression is strangely reminiscent of the musical terms διὰ πάντες, διὰ τέταρτους, διὰ πασῶν etc., and in a competition between χορηγοί, it is natural enough that musical analogies should provide a name for the decisive struggle in which the claims of the competitors as it were contend with one another for the final victory. It will be seen that I understand ἄγων in the quotation from Cratinus as referring, not to the actual dramatic or musical representation, but to the final struggle in which the lot arbitrates between the rival claims, the earlier ἄγων being presumably that which is decided by the votes of the ten judges: so that the upshot of the whole matter will be that Socrates appeals to Glauco, as the Archon might to one of the five judges in what we may be forgiven for calling the 'grand finale,'
calling on him to pronounce τίς πρῶτος κτλ. The word ἀποφαίνεσθαι is probably formal; cf. Lact. 659 B. and Dio Chrys. quoted by Petersen l. c. p. 7. For a further discussion of this passage see App. II [where see Mr F. Meyer's suggestion].

14. ὁ Α'ΠΙ: om. Α'.

both of men and of pleasures. If you ask any three men who represent these different classes, which of the three lives is the most pleasurable, each will pronounce in favour of his own. Which of them is right? The necessary requisites for deciding this, like every other question, are experience, intelligence or wisdom (φόρμαις), and argument. Now the lover of knowledge is the only one among the three in whom any of these qualifications is present, and he possesses them all. We therefore accept his verdict, and arrange accordingly, placing love of knowledge first, love of honour second, and love of money last.
25 Τώνα ταύτην: Τήμε. τρίων άντων τριτταί καὶ ἢδυναι μοι φαίνονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μία ἴδια, ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὁσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Τὸ μέν, φαμέν, ἢν διαμαύθαιε ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ θυμοῦται· τὸ δὲ τρίτων διὰ πολυνείδιαν εἰς οὐκ ἑσχομεν ὑσταμέν 1 προσεπείν ἴδιο γνώσι, ἀλλὰ ὁ μέγιστον καὶ Ε 30 ἵσχυρότατον εἰχέν ἐν αὐτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν· ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐκώδημ ἐπιθυμίων καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὤσα ἄλλα τούτων ἀκόλουθα, καὶ φιλοχρημάτων ὁ, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖς λοιπὴν 581 αἱ τοιαύτῃ ἐπιθυμίαι. Καὶ ἄρδος γ', ἔφη, 'Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλίαν εἰ φαίμεν εἰναι τοῦ κέρδους, μᾶλιστ' ἂν εἰς ἐν κεφαλαίοιν ἀπερειδομέθεα τῷ λόγῳ, ὡστε τοί ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς


(580 c). Cf. (with Stallbaum) Β 453 D οὐ γάρ εὐθὺς ἕοκεν καὶ Phaed. 66 εἰ τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει (unjustly bracketed by Schanz), where the subject similarly 'is an antegress.' Idiomatic expressions like ἡνίκαι (VI 497 c ii.), δεξιαι etc. belong to a somewhat different category. It is impossible to extract any satisfactory sense out of the passage if (with Schneider alone of all the editors) we retain τό λογιστικόν (see c. i.) or λογιστικῶν, the latter of which occurs before δεξεται in many mss. The Oxford editors, with much probability, suggest that λογιστικῶν is the relic of some such gloss on τρίχα as we actually find in Par. K, viz. λογιστικῶν. ἐπιθυμητικόν θυμικον (sic).

25 ἢδυναί κτλ. Hitherto in the Republican the words Pleasure and Desire have, with few exceptions (e.g. I 328 D, VI 435 D, VIII 554 E al.), had an evil, or at least unneutral, connotation. The view now put forward, viz. that each 'part' of soul has its own pleasures and desires differing in point of virtue and vice (cf. VI 505 C) like the 'parts' to which they belong, is related not only to the theory of the Philebus but also to the Aristotelian analysis of pleasure in Eth. Nic. X cc. 3—5.

26 ἴδια. Paris A has ἵδια—see c. i.—'multo minus concinne' (Schneider). Cf. ἴδια αὐτοῦ infra E.

27 ἄρχαι κτλ. Any one of the three may hold the rule in the soul. The reference in ἴδια is to I 436 A ff.

580 E 29 δ. μέγιστον κτλ.; viz. ἐπιθυμία. The words τοῦτο ἐπωνομάσαμεν mean 'we gave the name of ἐπιθυμία to this part,' when we called it ἐπιθυμητικον (ἐπιθυμητικόν γάρ κτλ.). Cf. (with Stallbaum) Theaet. 185 C φ' τὸ ἐκάσταν ἐπωνομαζεῖν, Crat. 420 B and elsewhere. J. and C. wrongly understand τοῦτο as instrumental. "The variant τοῦτο has little authority and is much inferior: still worse is τοῦτο which Madvig (Adv. C. 1 p. 431) suspicatur suisse.'

30 ἐπιθυμητικόν κτλ. IV 439 D. The lowest part of soul was called φιλοχρημάτων in IV 436 E et al.: see next note.

581 Α 4, εἰς ἐν κεφαλάιοιν κτλ. Plato recognised three varieties in τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, corresponding respectively to the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical man (VIII 528 D n.). In the present chapter these varieties again recede into the background. This apparent 'Inconsequent,' together with other reasons, led Krohn to suppose that the whole of this proof, as well as the next, was written at a different time from the rest of Books VIII and IX (Pl. St. pp. 221 ff. Cf. Pfleiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 75. Krohn has since retracted his view: see his Pl. Fr. p. 104). But the unity of the ἐπιθυμητικῶν as such has never been sacrificed, since each of its varieties are also expressions of desire; and Plato is therefore fully justified in setting it over against φιλοσόφον and τ λοιμωτικόν. To have compared each of its varieties separately with the two higher principles would have greatly lengthened and complicated Plato's proof; and he
reserves this point for another mode of treatment at a later opportunity (587 C. e.). Why does he select the word φιλοχρήματον (s. φιλοκερδές) to denote the επιθυμητά here? He wishes to find a single word to contrast with φιλόσοφον and φιλόνοκον (s. φιλότυμον). The word επιθυμητικόν itself is excluded, because we have agreed that the φιλόσοφον and φιλόνοκον have also επιθυμητικόν of their own (580 D), and, as φιλοχρήματον made its appearance in each of the three forms of επιθυμία (VIII 551 A, 553 C, 555 A, 558 D, 561 A, 568 D, IX 732 C, 737 D), it is the best summary description available. Plato himself claims no more for it, and that is why he says μάλιστα ἂν εἰς ἐν κεφαλαίον ἀπερευδοίμαθα. Cf. Grimmel dt. reip. Pl. comp. et unit. pp. 73 ff.

7 οὐ—μέντοι. See on I 330 b.

581 b 9 φιλόνοκον. For the spelling of this word see VIII 548 c n. and my note on Prot. 336 E. The present passage and also 586 c D below conclusively prove that Plato connected the word with νίκη and not with νίκεος, from which indeed it could not be derived without doing violence to the laws of the Greek language (cf. Schanz Vol. vi p. x). Now Plato certainly did not write νίκην, but νίκη; and it is therefore highly improbable that he wrote φιλόνοκος. φιλόνοκος has also considerable support from the inferior mss. of the Republic. The substitution of ει for long ε became extremely common in imperial times, especially in proper names derived from νίκη (Meisterhans p. 49), and even even kων and the like are also found on late inscriptions (e.g. CIG 1585). In the case of φιλόνοκος the error was apparently established by Plutarch’s time, see his Ages., 5. 4. The meaning ‘lover of strife’ is often unsuitable in Plato; where it suits, it is secondary and derivative, for the lover of victory must also love strife: non sine pulvere palma. For an exhaustive discussion of the question the student may be referred to Schmidt Ethisk d. alter Griechen 1 pp. 386—431. While admitting that ‘φιλόνοκος and its derivatives are far more frequent in Attic writers,’ Schmidt is inclined to admit the existence of φιλόνοκος as a separate word, connected with νίκη as a byform—so he thinks—of νίκεος; but νίκη, at least in classical Greek, is only a conjecture on Aeschylus Ag. 1378 and Eum. 903; and in Plato, at all events, there is, I believe, no case in which φιλόνοκος does not give the meaning required by the context.

12 ἡκίστα τοῦτων: ‘less than any of them,’ lit. ‘least of these’ three εἴς of soul. There is no good reason for suspecting the text; for although strictly speaking the φιλόσοφον can only care for σοφία, the φιλόσοφος, who presently (581 c ff.) takes the place of the φιλόσοφος, is not wholly indifferent to either (582 B, C); he merely cares much less for them than the φιλόνοκος and φιλοχρήματος do. τούτων is necessary to bring out the contrast: ἡκίστα alone, proposed by Baiter, or ἡκίστα πάντων (W. H. Thompson) would express too much.


γάρ εἰς μάλιστα οἱ προόχυτες (εἰς βίοι), ὃς τε νῦν εἰρήμενος (i.e. ὃς ἀπολαυστικὸς) καὶ ὃς πολιτικὸς (i.e. ὃς φιλότιμος hinc) καὶ τρίτος ὃς θεωρητικὸς.

Δέγμων κτλ. 'And for this reason we say that the primary classes of men are also three in number' etc.? Δέγμων (see cr. n.) is the reading of all MSS except AΠ, and Schneider is right, I think, in retaining it, not only because these three γένη have been named before (1443 ε), but still more because the classification was apparently a familiar one: see Stewart on Arist. l. c. For the orthographical error see Introd. § 5. I take τριτά as predicative: the hyperbaton is not, I think, a difficult one, because the stress of the voice falls on τριτά, and to my ear it sounds more idiomatic than τά πρώτα γένη τριτά εἰναι would be. A possible alternative would be to take εἰναί with φιλόσοφον κτλ. ('that the three primary classes of men are lovers of wisdom' etc.), but this is somewhat less natural and satisfactory, in view especially of καὶ ἠδονῶν κτλ. The words τά πρώτα mean 'the first' or 'original,' as in Aristotle's πρώτη ἡμήρα, the Stoic πρώτα ἄριστα and the like: it would be possible to subdivide each of these primary classes into δεύτερα γένη, τρίτα γένη etc. Jowett, reading Δέγμων, translates 'we may begin by assuming,' but it is harsh to separate τά πρώτα from γένη, and the adverbial τά πρώτα generally, if not always, refers back to something said or done 'at the beginning.' Cf. Shorey A. J. Ph. xiii p. 566.

18. ὑποκείμενα. The singular ὑποκείμενον (see cr. n.), retained by Schneider and all other editors except Baiter, is questionable Greek. In such cases the adjective, participle, or verb agrees with the whole and not with the part. ὑποκείμενα is little inferior to ὑποκείμενον in authority and the corruption was easy. Cf. ψ. 550 ε. n.


δ' γε. See cr. n. Hermann's conjecture is, I now think, right. We may perhaps explain τε as ἀνάκλονον (cf. 11 373 B. n.) and taken up in τι δ' ὁ φιλότιμος; κτλ., but γε is much livelier and better: 'the money-maker, at all events' etc. Cf. ψ. 550 Α. n. If γε is right, we should not, as Hermann does, make the sentence interrogative.

581 D 23 ἀργύριον τοιεί: 'produces money.' τοιεί (Badham) is a neat conjecture; but the text is sound: cf. χρήματα τοιείν Arist. Pol. A 9. 1258 τ. 11.

26 κατοι καὶ φιλαριάν. This contemptuous, half-proverbal, use of κατοι is illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. Clouds 320.

581 D, E 27 τον δ' ἐπίστολον κτλ. 'But the lover of knowledge, said I, what value shall we suppose that he assigns to the other pleasures compared with that of knowing how the truth stands and always enjoying a kindred sort of pleasure while he learns? Will he not think them very far away?' (viz. from ἦ τοῦ εἴδεναι
κτλ. The χρησιμοτυπούν of honour and learning οδηγεῖν αἴσθα, compared with his own; the φιλό
τυμος similarly, μιατισ μιατιστικώς; what then does the φιλόσοφος consider his
pleasures to be compared with the others? What are his pleasures? Let us see. He
either knows (i.e. has learnt) the truth in any given instance or is getting to know
(i.e. learning) it; his pleasures are therefore that of knowing and that of
learning, i.e. τωνότων τι τῆς ἡδονῆς, for the pleasures of learning are akin to those
of knowing. From each of these pleasures those of gain and fame are far removed.
With the general sense, cf. Phaed. 64 B: for the use of ἐν IV 439 C, D: for τοιοῦτον
τινὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς Xen. An. I 7. 5 in τοιοῦτον ἐναι τοῦ καθοῦν προσιόντος: and for the
position of τῆς ἡδονῆς Braun de hyperb. Pl. II p. 4, where many examples of similar
hyberbata are quoted. The ms read ποιμέα (see cf. n.), but Grasen's emendation
is in my opinion certainly right. I have taken τῆς ἡδονῆς with τοιοῦτον τινὶ: others wrongly, as I believe, join it to οὗ πᾶν πόρρω. See on the whole passage
App. III. 581 E 29 οὗ πᾶν πόρρω: sc. οἰω-
μεθα νομίζειν; as before.
30. αναγκαίας: necessaria, quippe
ceteris nihil indigentem nisi necessitas
cogeret (after Stallbaum). Hence τῷ
ὄρτι: see on VI 511 B.
31 διε τινα: we should not suppose
(οἰσθαί), but be sure of it. Badham's
conjecture δείκνυε (ad Euthyd. p. 98) is
wholly needless and inept.
32 ἀμφισβητοῦνται: 'are in dispute'
(Jowett). For this somewhat irregular
use of the passive cf. Cope's Rhetoric of
Aristotle 1 p. 299. It is tempting to
make the verb middle ('dispute with one
another'), as in Laco 957 D, and suppose
that the pleasures are personified, as the
two lives are in Prodicus' apologue of
Heracles at the cross-roads (Xen. Mem.
11 1. 21 ff.). οὗτῶν in τίς αὐτῶν will
then mean τῶν ηδονῶν, and not τῶν αὐ-
τῶν. But on such a theory, instead of
αὐτῶν ὁ βίος, we should rather have had
αὐτοὶ οἱ βίοι: and on the whole it is
doubtless better to acquiesce in the ordi-
nary interpretation, which is also more in
harmony with τῶν οὗτων τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ.
below.
582 B 9 τῶν ἑτέρων. "Glaucos
simul utrisque philosophum praefert
experimenta, quoniam Socrates quis omnium
experimentissimus esset voluptatum roga-
verat" (viz. in 582 A τριῶν οὗτων κτλ.)
Schneider. The English translators take
τῶν ἑτέρων as 'the other' (Jowett), viz.
'gain'; but that would be τοῦ ἑτέρου.
10 архимен: τώ δὲ φιλοκερδέω, ὡτι πέφυκε τα ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς γραμμεία ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι οὐδ' ἐμπείρω γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμομένῳ οὐ μίαών. Πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρει τού γε φιλοκερδούς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπείρια ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν. Πολὺ 1 μέντοι. Τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτήμου; C 15 ἄρα μᾶλλον ἀπειρός ἑστὶ τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ τιμάσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκείνοις τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν; ΑἈλλὰ τιμὴ μὲν, ἔφη, εάντερ ἐξεργάζονται ἐπὶ ὁ ἐκατοστὸς ἠμικη, πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἑπεται καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ ὁ σοφὸς· ἃστε ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὐν ἑστιν, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐμπείρων· τίς δὲ τοῦ ὑπότος 20 θέας, οίαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλω γεγένωσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλο-
σόφῳ. 'Εμπείρια 1 μὲν ἄρα, εἴπον, ἕνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν D κρίνει οὗτος. Πολὺ γε. Καὶ μὴν μετὰ τὸ φρονήσωσι μονός ἐμπείρως γεγονὼς ἑστη. Τί μὲν; 'ΑἈλλὰ μὴν καὶ δ' οὐ γε δεῖ

582 C 14 τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτῆμον; 'καὶ how does he stand in relation to the lover of honour?' Supply διαφέρει ο ἕλφας φοσος, or rather a more general idea of com-
parison out of διαφέρει: cf. 585 D and Χ 597 B. We must beware of translating "but what of the lover of honour?" (Δ. and Β.), as if τοῦ φιλοτῆμον were here equivalent to πει τοῦ φιλοτῆμον (v 570 A n.). This error caused Groen ν. Prinsterer (Προσφ. Pl. p. 210) to suggest ἄρα μᾶλλον ἀπειρός ἑστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἡδονῆς, ἢ ἐκείνοις τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι; with which the translation of Davies and Vaughan also agrees. The subject of ἀπειρός ἑστι is of course τὸ ἕλφας φοσος, and ἐκείνοις means ο ἕλφας φοσος.

18 ο ἀνδρείος represents ο ἕλφας φοσος: cf. άνδρεία 582 B and παλαισκό 583 A n.

19 τοῦ ὑπότος. The presence of such metaphysical terms in this and the suc-
cceeding proof is what chiefly encourages Pfeiferer (Zur Lösung etc. pp. 74 f.) and some others to maintain that §§ 580—
587 were written at a later period than the rest of this Book, most of which they believe to be earlier than V 471 C—VII
inclusive. See also on 581 A. Others with much more reason find in these ex-
pressions a strong argument in defence of the structural unity of the Republic; for it would seem that τῆς τοῦ ὑπότος θέας and the like presuppose the discussions of Book VII. See Zeller 11 p. 561 n.

582 D 22 κρίνει. Bekker's conjecture κρίνει is unnecessary.

μετὰ τῇ φρονήσεως corresponds to φρονήσει in 582 A. Plato is taking the three requisites in order. The ἐμπείρια of the ἕλφας φοσος is alone intelligent, and, without φρόνησις, ἐμπείρια is no more than a sort of ἄτεχνοι τριβή (Phaedr. 260 E: cf. Gorg. 463 B). It is indeed quite true, as Nettleship reminds us (Leit. and Rem. 11 p. 321), that the higher kind of man learns more from the experience which he shares with the lower kind without having to go through nearly the same amount of it.

23 ἄλλα μὴν κτλ. Bosanquet observes that "this is perhaps a good argument to prove that the man of culture is pre-
eminently competent to appraise the value of different ideals of life, but it is not a good argument to prove that he is a good judge of degrees of agreeable feeling in lives fundamentally different from his own" (similarly Nettleship 1. c. p. 321). True; but that is not the point. Plato is attempting to prove that the φιλό-
sофος is the best judge, not of the 'degrees of agreeable feeling' experienced, in one particular kind of life, but of the relative pleasure of three different kinds of life, and his reasoning, granted that pleasures can be compared at all, is per-
fectly legitimate. Each of the three men pronounces his own life not merely
pleasant, but *pleasinter* than those of the other two: how then are we to decide? Nothing but argument will help us, and the *philosophos* is the only one of the triad who possesses that weapon. It should be observed that throughout this part of the discussion Plato takes it for granted that some kinds of pleasure are in point of fact more pleasant than others. At present his object is to discover what these are, but in the argument which is still to come (584 B ff.), he grapples with the metaphysical question—for to him it was a question, not of psychology, but of metaphysics—and attempts to shew that pleasures contain more or less of pleasure according as there is in them more or less of truth.

26 ἐφαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 582 A. ἄγον means 'rational arguments,' 'reasoning' (cf. VI 511 B n.), and τοῦτο is of course τοῦ *philosophou*, not τοῦ κρι- nein, as Stallbaum thinks.

582 Ε 29 ἀληθετάτα here and in ἀληθετάτα ἐστι below contains a hint of the theory which is afterwards developed in 585 B ff., where the various kinds of pleasure are shown to be different in respect of reality and truth.

30 *philónikos*. See on 581 B.

31 ἄναγκη, ἐφή κτλ. supplies the apo- dosis to ἐπειδή—λόγῳ: cf. supra 577 B n.

583 A. 5 ὁ κριτής κτλ. ὁ κριτής is the *philosophos*, as aὐτό in the next sentence shews. There is therefore no reference to 580 B. For πολεμικοῦ Her- werden proposes *philónikos*, very arbitra- rily: see on 582 C. It is worth noting that the conclusion of this argument in- cidentally furnishes a further reply to the objection raised by Adimantis in IV 419 A ff., viz. that Plato's guardians cannot possibly be happy.

583 B—585 A Our third and crowning proof is as follows. All the pleasures except those of the wise (φιλόσωφος) are un- true and impure. We must recognise the existence of three distinct states, viz. Pleasure and Pain, which are positive and opposite, and the Neutral state, which is negative and intermediate. Men fre- quently identify the intermediate condition with Pleasure; but they are mistaken when they do so, for there are some pleasures, e.g. those of smell, which have a positive character of their own. Now bodily pleasures, so-called, together with the cor- responding pleasures of anticipation, are for the most part merely ways of escape from pain, and belong to the neutral
IX. Taúta méν τοίνυν οὔτω δ' ἐφεξῆς ἀν εἰη καὶ δις νενι.-Βιο κηκῶς ὁ δικαῖος τὸν ἄδικον· τό δ' ἄτρον Ὁλυμπικὸς τῷ σωτηρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὁλυμπίῳ Δι, ἄθρει ὃτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστίν ἡ τῶν

state. They are falsely judged pleasant through juxtaposition and contrast with positive Pain.

583 B ff. ὃ ταύτα μὲν κτλ. The political and psychological λόγοι have registered their votes, and it only remains for us to hear the verdict of the metaphysical, to which Plato characteristically assigns the greatest value (κατοι —πτωμάτων below). See on 577 C. Plato's theory of true or pure and false or impure pleasures reappears in the Philebus. Both dialogues teach (1) that Pleasure consists in πληροφορία, (2) that the majority of bodily pleasures are not pleasures at all, but only λοταν ἀπαλλαγι, and (3) that there are other—true or pure—pleasures (e.g. smell) which are not preceded or followed by pain. The last generation of scholars mostly placed the Republic after the Philebus. I am inclined to agree with more recent critics in thinking it earlier (see on VI 506 B and Jackson in Journal of Philology xxv pp. 65—82), but the greater degree of elaboration which marks the treatment of this subject in the Philebus may be and has been accounted for on either hypothesis. Aristotle also touches on the question of Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures in Eth. Nic. vii 12. 115 a ff., especially 115 a 35—115 b 7, ib. 15. 115 a 22—31 and again in x 2—5, especially 2. 117 a 22—20. The present section is further important in the history of ethics for its clear distinction between the μέγα κατά-στασις and the two extremes; a distinction already noted by the Cyrenaics (R.P.v. § 208 b) and afterwards adopted by Epicurus (ib. § 380 ff.).

δύο καὶ δις refer of course to the two preceding proofs 577 B—580 C and 580 C—583 A.

10 τό δ' ἄτρον κτλ. The libations at banquets (according to the Schol. on Phil. 66 D; cf. also Schol. on Charm. 167 A and on Pind. Isthm. 5. 7 with Hesych. s. v. τρίτον κρατήρ and Pollux vi 15, 100) were offered in the following sequence: (1) to Olympian Zeus and the Olympian gods, (2) to the heroes, (3) to Zeus Soter. Hence the proverb τό ἄτρον τῷ σωτηρί, with which Plato sometimes introduces the third or culminating stage in an argument, demonstration, or the like (Phil. and Charm. II. cc., Laws iii 652 a, Ἐρ. vii 340 A). In the present instance there is also an allusion to the Olympic games, as appears from Ὁλυμπικῶς ('Olympic-wise'). Stallbaum conjectures that competitors at Olympia were in the habit of making their third libation "non uni tantum Δι, sodēri, sed sicuti consentaneam fuit, τῷ σωτηρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὁλυμπίῳ Δι": but there is no authority for this idea. Is Plato thinking of the πινακῖς, in which it was necessary to win in three (probably leaping, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing) out of the five events in order to obtain the prize (see P. Gardner in J. of H. Studies i p. 217, where the evidence is quoted)? Schneider takes this view: but the words τῶν πτωμάτων below make it clear that the reference is only to wrestling. The point manifestly is, that as in wrestling the third throw decided the contest between two athletes (Schol. on Aesch. Eum. 592 et al.), so here the δικαιος wins after he has thrice defeated the ἄδικος (cf. also Euclid. 277 c). I think Ὁλυμπικας is intended to suggest that the contest between justice and injustice is the greatest of all moral, as the Olympic was of all physical, παλαισματα: the victors ἔρισαν τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου ὅπως ὁ Ὁλυμπιονικὸς ἐξαιρετικὸς (V 465 D. n.). Compare Pind. Æol. 256 B τῶν τριών παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὁλυμπιακῶν ἐν νικήπ. Plato adds the epithet τῶν Ὁλυμπίων ὑποσ: in an Olympic contest Zeus Soter is also in the truest sense Olympian too, although in banquets Zeus Olympius received only the first, and not also the third libation. With similar and even greater emphasis on the word Ὁλυμπικῶς Pindar prays for an Olympic victory for Phylaccidas in the words εἴπε τῷ ἄτρον ὑπέρ πολεμάντων Ὁλυμπικὸς Ἀγίων κάτα σπέρνησε μελη-φθόγγοις άσδαις (Isthm. l.c.: see Donald-son ad loc.).

11 οὖν παναληθής—καθαρά. In what sense is pleasure said by Plato to be pure and true? It is pure when unadulterated by pain, whether antecedent, present or consequent; and there is also perhaps in Plato's use of the epithet 'pure' a relic or hint of the old half-
ceremonial, half-religious idea of 'pure from taint': see App. III and Rohde *Psyché* II pp. 281 ff. al. But in its deepest signification the truth or purity of Pleasure involves the ontological theory that soul and its sustenance (knowledge etc.) have more part in Being and Truth than Body and its food: the spiritual and not the material is the true. See also on 586 E and especially Nettleship *Leet. and Rem.* II pp. 322—327, where the farther bearings of Plato's theory are admirably traced.

12 πλην τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου. Cf. *Phaed.* 69 b, C.

σκιαγραφήμενη. See on II 365 C. Bodily pleasure is σκιαγραφήμενη in the fullest sense of the word, because it depends on contrast and balance of pleasure with pleasure, and pleasure with pain (584 A), just as perspective produces its effect by the contrast of light and shade (586 B). Similarly in *Phaed.* 69 b Plato in the so-called virtue which consists in barding one bodily pleasure for another is σκιαγραφία τις—καλὸν οὖν ἑξῆς ἔξουσα, and ib. 81 B the soul is said to be γεγονειμένη ὅπ' αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ σώματος) ὑπὸ τὸ τῶν ἐπίθυμων καὶ θυμων. Cf. also *Iphi.* 44 c αὑτὸ τῶν αὐτής (sc. τῆς ἱδρυῆς) ἐπαγωγή γογγυμα, ἀλλ' οὖν ἱδρυῆ εἶναι. In each of these passages there is probably a conscious reminiscence of Orphic doctrines: see next note and App. IV.

13 τῶν σοφῶν alludes, I believe, to Orphic or Pythagorean ascetics, who preached the doctrine σῶμα σῶμα and regarded bodily pleasure as essentially false and impure: see especially Rohde *Psyché* II pp. 121—130, and 161—166. Evidence for this view is given in App. IV, where the other interpretations are also discussed.

14 καὶ ὅτι is hardly 'et vero' and 'surely' (as Kugler takes it *de part. vo* etc. p. 18, comparing *Gorg.* 452 E, *Theaet.* 187 c al.), but rather 'quamquam' and yet' (sc. 'strong as were the other two proofs,' or the like): "und das wäre doch wohl" Schneider.

583 C 17 τοῦ μὴ τεχαιρεῖν κτλ. Τὸ τρίττο διάθεσις is described in *Phil.* 32 E ff.: cf. ib. 42 E ff. and *Tim.* 64 C ff. 18 μεταξύ κτλ.: 'something which is intermediate between these two, a sort of repose of the soul so far as these are concerned.' Herwerden is fain to cancel either μεταξύ or ἐν μέσῳ: but the fulness of expression is characteristic. See *Introd.* § 5.

19 ἡσυχίαν: whereas λύπη and ἱδρυῆ are κινήσεις 583 E.

20 ἢρ ὅν. Three inferior MSS have ἢρ ὅν, which is easier; but ἢρ ὅν is much more lively, and not more abrupt than e.g. παρελειψαμένος τὸ μετά τοῦ, ὥραδ-κῶ; Π 373 E (quoted by Schneider). The stylistic effect is exactly like Lucius' 'Nonne vides' etc.: e.g. Π 263 al.
In Plato’s argument, as follows. While suffering pain, men are apt to look upon the ήσυχια from pain as the highest pleasure. Perhaps (suggests Glauco) at such a time the neutral state is in point of fact found positively pleasant and welcome by them. Socrates proceeds to show (by a seductio ad absurdum proof) that Glauco’s suggestion is untenable. ‘In that case,’ he argues, ήσυχια from pleasure will in like manner be positively painful: and thus the neutral state, which we declared to be between the two extremes, will upon occasions be both, viz. both pleasure and pain.’ Glauco allows that which is neither cannot become both, and Socrates proceeds: ‘In this instance the “both” is a κίνησις, and the “neither” a ήσυχια, and lies, as we have seen, between the two: so that it is wrong to identify the absence of pain with pleasure or the absence of pleasure with pain. Hence your suggestion is erroneous: οὐκ ἐστιν ἡ ἄρα τούτο, ἀλλά φαίνεται κτλ. See below on 584 A. The argument is really complete when Glauco says οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, but the words καὶ μὴν τὸ γε γίνοι introduce a new reason for refusing to identify ήσυχια with pleasure or with pain, by explicitly stating for the first time that pleasure and pain are each of them a κίνησις. ήσυχια and κίνησις are mutually exclusive notions. Cf. Phil. 43 D.—44 H, where the reasoning follows nearly the same lines. See also next note.
'The pleasures of the body, while others—the pleasures of knowledge, for example, according to Plato—do not (cf. Theaet. 184 E—185 E and generally Phil. 47 D ff.). Most of the former class—smell is an exception—and the greatest among them (τάφαρμαία Phil. 65 C) are only 
λυπών ἀπάλλαγαι (cf. Phaedr. 248 E, Phil. 45 A—47 B and Arist. Eth. Nic. VII 13, 1115a 33, 15, 1114a 26 ff.), and so 'mixed' and unreal: compare the picture of the χαράβρων βίος in Gorg. 494 B ff. The same is true of the pure spiritual pleasures and pains which come from the anticipation of these 'mixed' pleasures and pains. On the pleasures and pains of anticipation see Phil. 32 C ff.'
on καὶ αἰ ἑπὶ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγαντεύει προηγουμένων στήσεις ταύτα εἴησαι τῷ μὲν ἀνόω, τῷ δὲ κάτω, τῷ δὲ μέσῳ: "Ἐγγοι. Οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κατωτέρου καταλαμβάνειν: τὰ ταύτα ἐχοῦσιν; Κατὰ ταύτα.

X. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οἷαί εἰσιν 1 καὶ ὥμιλιστα ἐοίκαισιν; D Τῷ; ἐφη. Νομίζεις τι, εἰπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἴην τῷ μὲν ἀνόω, τῷ δὲ κάτω, τῷ δὲ μέσῳ; "Ἐγγοι. Οἰεὶ οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κατωτέρου καταλαμβάνειν: τὰ ταύτα ἐχοῦσιν; Κατὰ ταύτα τῷ δὲ μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορώντα οἶδαν ἐνυνεῖται, ἀλλάθη ποῦν ἀν ἐνεῖσθαι εἰην ἐν τῷ ἀνώ, μη ἐφορακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἀνώ; Μᾶ Δι' οὖν ἐγγοι, ἐφη, ἀλλως οἴμαι οἴηθήκαί οὖν τοιούτων. 'Αλλ' εἰ πάλιν γ', ἐφη, φέροιτο, 1 κάτω τ' ἀν ὀφεῖν εἴησαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴστου; Ε Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκόνοι ταύτα πᾶσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μη ἐμεῖρναι 30 εἰναι τοῦ ἄληθνου ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω; Δήλου δή. Θαυμάζοις ἄν οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἀπερικόν ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγείες δόξας ἐχοῦσιν πρὸς τε ἡδονήν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων ὀφεῖ διακειμέναι, ὡστε ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρόν φέρωσαι, ἀληθῆ τε | ὀφείται καὶ τὸ ὄντε λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ 585 ἡδονῆς ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴμαι πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονή γύρνεσθαι, ὡσπέρ δὲ πρὸς μέλαι φαιόν ἀποσκοπούντες

27. ἀλλος II: ἀλλ' ὡς Α. 30. κατῳ Α'ΠΙ: κατα (sic) Α'. 3. δ' εἰ: om. ΑΠ'.

19 προσθήκεις is a Platonic coinage not found elsewhere. The reading προσθήκεις (Σ and Vind. B) held its ground till Bekker; but προσθήκεις had already been conjectured by Floyer Sydenham (Lupton in Cl. Rev. 11 p. 228).

20 προλυπητέες: thus for example τὸ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν (sc. ἐπιπίπτουσιν) is φοβηρόν καί ἀληθείαν (Phil. 1. c.). If bodily pleasure is 'mixed,' the same must be true of bodily pain; and so the προλυπητέες as well as the προσθήκεις of anticipation are 'mixed' (κατὰ ταύτα ἐχοῦσιν). Fear for example (which is προσδοκία κακοῦ) is a 'mixed' pain: see Phil. 47 f.

584 D 22 νομίζεις κτλ. This is the popular conception of 'above' and 'below' held also by most of the philosophers, e.g. Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, the Atomists, (KIP. §§ 29, 68 A. 12, 125 b 14, 124 b 14), and even Aristotle (Phys. 14 4, 212a 24 ff.), and found also in the Phaedo (109 ff.). In the Timaeus, on the other hand, Plato takes a different and more scientific view: φύσις γάρ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τὸν δύο εἶναι διεξηγόμασι διχοτομίαν τῶν ἄνω κτλ. (62 c ff.).

It is possible (with Solomon Cl. Rev. 11 p. 418) to construe the divergence as "an incidental proof of the distance separating the Republic from the Timaeus," especially as the myth in Book X agrees with the view of Above and Below given here; but too much stress should not be laid on the present passage, which is intended only as an illustration and nothing more.

23 οὖν οὖν οὖν τινα κτλ. Cf. Phaed. 109 C.

584 E 31 εἰ καὶ κτλ.: 'if men also who are ignorant of truth' etc. καὶ sc. like δ' ἐμεῖρναι τοῦ ἄληθνου ἄνω τω κτλ. in our simile. Three deterioris matter MSS have ei καὶ οἱ ἀπειροι, and Hermann conjectures of for καὶ: but cf. the use of ei καὶ in x 597 A. The article is not necessary, and ought not to be introduced without better MS authority.

585 Α 2 πληρώσας prepares the way for the coming argument, in which Pleasure is viewed as πληρώσας, Pain as κέννασις (cf. Phil. 31 E ff.). So far, we have been told only that they are κέννασις (583 E).

3 ὡσπέρ δ' κτλ. The equations are of course Black = Pain, Grey = Absence.
of Pain, White = Pleasure. Plato's simile is particularly appropriate, because Grey is a mixture of white and black (Tim. 68 c φαιν δέ λευκού τε καὶ μέλανς sc. κράσει γχγετα), just as λυπής ἀπαλλαγή according to this discussion (584 c al.) may be regarded as a mixture of pleasure and pain (584 c, 586 b), or in other words only a 'mixed' pleasure. With the simile itself cf. Arist. Phys. v 1. 224 b 34 τὸ φαιν λευκον πρὸς τὸ μέλαν καὶ μέλαν πρὸς τὸ λευκὸν and ib. 5. 235 b 16 ff. The best MSS omit δε after ὠψερ, and all the MSS have καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀλυπον ὠψω λύπην instead of καὶ τὸ ἀλυπον ὠψῳ πρὸς λύπην (see cr. n.), but it is impossible to believe that they are right. On the text and other views of this passage see App. V.

6 ἔξει. There is slight MSS authority for ἔξω, which Neukirch (in Pl. Pol. quast. phil. 1 p. 47) and Richter (Fleck. 76. 1807 p. 147) approve. ἔξω is sound enough: cf. Prot. 315 E οὐκ ἄν θαυμάζωμαι, εἰ—τινεχόμεν ὁμ. 585 a—586 c Consider the question also in this way. Hunger, thirst etc. are modes of physical dejection; and Ignorance is a form of spiritual emptiness. He who partakes of food, and he who acquires Knowledge or Reason, are each 'filled'; but which of them is the more truly 'filled'? Knowledge and its kindred have more reality and truth than Food etc. Soul than Body: hence the acquisition of knowledge is a truer form of replenishment than the other. The resulting Pleasure will therefore be more true. Those who are strangers to wisdom and virtue know nothing of true delights, but fight with one another for delusive and unsatisfying joys.

585 a 6 ὥδε γʹ οὖν. "In his γε ψιμ. acutum vocabuli ὥδε, sed οὖν inservit continuandae argumentationi. Ferri non potest γων, quod ad universam sententiam pertinenter, habens illud vim asseverandi cum restrictione quadrum" (Stallbaum). Contrast 1 335 E, vii 527 D nn. Here most of the MSS appear to have γε οὖν.

οὐχὶ πείνα καὶ δίψα κτλ. For the sense cf. Phil. 31 E and (in general) vii 519 a, b nn. The form πείνα (see cr. n.) is supported also by iv 437 D; but πείνα is in itself legitimate and occurs tolerably often in Plato, as Schneider shews.

585 b 8 ἄρ' οὖν κενότης κτλ. Ignorance, as well as hunger, is κενότης (cf. 584 b n.); but whereas we are conscious of physical dejection and therefore suffer pain, we are not—speaking generally—conscious of intellectual dejection, so that Ignorance is not, as a rule, painful; and thus the pleasures of Learning—the πληρωσίς of that whereof Ignorance is the κενότης—not being preceded by pain, are pure. This conclusion is worked out in Phil. 52 A, B, but not here, where the argument takes a different course. ὅσοι 'acquire' 'get' see vi 511 D n.

14 τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθῶς κτλ. So in Phil. 60 D μὴν γινθήναι καὶ φιλοσοφήσαι καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας τιθέμενοι; cf. also ib. 19 D, 21 A, B, D. These objects are here conceived of as the τροφῆς of the soul, cf. Phaed. 84 B.
The following sentences are among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic, or indeed in the whole of Plato’s writings. That the reading of the MSS is corrupt has been admitted by the majority of critics, and will be proved in App. VI, to which I must refer for a full discussion on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage. Here it is possible only to set down what seems to me, after a review of all the conditions of the problem, the least unsatisfactory solution. The emendation in the text, which I printed in my Text of the Republic, has been approved by a critic in Hermathena xxiv p. 252. We have to discover whether food, drink etc. participate in pure Being more than true opinion, knowledge etc.; and the answer is arrived at by the following steps. (1) Which is more—that which is connected with the ever-like, the immortal and Truth, and which is itself of this nature, and found in something of this nature; or that which is connected with the never-like and mortal, and which is itself of this nature (never-like etc.) and found in something of this nature? That which is connected with the ever-like, says Glauco, is more. (2) Then does the Being of the never-like (αἰ̑̑δι οὐσίων = μὴ ἔστοτε οὐσία) participate in Being at all more than the Being of Knowledge does? Certainly not (οὐ) is strictly illative: if it is true that what is connected with the ever-like is more than what is connected with the never-like, then the Being of the never-like cannot be more than Knowledge is—for Knowledge of course ἔκτισα τού αἰ̑̑δι οὐσία. Knowledge is in short taken as a type of that which ἔκτισα τού αἰ̑̑δι οὐσία. (3) Or has the Being of the never-like more part in Truth than Knowledge has? To this the answer is no: [for that which is connected with the ever-like—and Knowledge is so—is connected also with Truth: see above το τού αἰ̑̑δι οὐσίον ἐχόμενον—καὶ ἀληθείας]. (4) And if it has less part in truth [as it has], it must also have less part in Being. (This deduces from step (3) the conclusion already implied in (2), and also paves the way for ὄντων ὄψιν—μετέχει]. (5) Thus—since what is true of Knowledge is true of all the spiritual γένη, and since food etc. are of course only particular examples of the αἰ̑̑δι οὐσίων or never-like], universally (ἷμα) those γένη which are concerned with the care of the body have less part in Being and Truth than those which are concerned with the care of the soul. For a further discussion of this passage and other suggested solutions and emendations see App. VI.

The whole of this passage presupposes, as Grimmelt shews (de reip. Pl. comp. et univ. pp. 74 ff.), the metaphysical theory of ν—vii. With τού αἰ̑̑δι οὐσίον cf. V. 479 A and VI. 500 C: with ἀληθέαν τοῦ VI. 485 B (ἐκεῖνα τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰ̑̑δι οὕσεις); and with καὶ ἀληθείας VI. 508 D. The last two words are rejected by Madvig and Baiter on the grounds that (1) we should expect an adjective, (2) καὶ ἀληθείας has no antithesis expressed, whereas αἱ οὐσίαι and ἀληθέαν have: (3) the words unduly anticipate τί δή; ἀληθείας; below. As I understand the passage, the mention of Truth is necessary—see above—just in view of τί δή; ἀληθείας; and there is little weight in Madvig’s first two arguments.

Is καὶ αὖτο κτλ. Is καὶ here and in καὶ αὖτο again below ‘and’ (Schneider) or ‘both’? The first view is perhaps more likely: for it is more in keeping with the somewhat loose structure of the argument throughout this passage, and καὶ in D below (καὶ αὖτο) is most probably ‘and.’

The soul is of the nature of το αἰ̑̑δι οὐσίον: see VI. 490 B, 508 D, and especially Phaed. 79 A ff.: the body on the other hand is never constant, for like everything material πλασταί τι ἐνεέσεως καὶ φθοράς (VI. 485 B).
ēfē, diaφerei to toú òrei ómoiou. 'H ouv òrei <āv>omoiōn ouvia ouvias to múllon ħ <ń> ēπιστήμης metēxēi; Ovďamōs. Ti δ; 20 álētheias; Οvû toúto. Ei òe álētheias ἦπτου, ou kai ouvias; D' AnáNkykh. Oúkouv ἵ ὅλος tâ peři tîn tōu sómacos thepañean gēνή tōn genōn αu tōn peři tîn tîs ψυχής thepañean ἦπτου álētheias te kai ouvias metēxēi; Polû ge. Ósma de autō ψυχής ouk oie ouvòs; 'Eμογε. Oúkouv tô tōn múllon ὄντων πληρούμενου kai 25 autô múllon ὄντως múllon πληροῖται ἢ tô tōn ἦπτου ὄντων kai autô ἦπτου ὄν; Πῶς ἄρα οὐ; Ei āra tô πληροῦσθαι tôν φύ̄sei προσηκόντων ἤπο έστι, tô δ’ ὄντως kai tôν ὄντων πληρούμενου múllon múllon 1 ὄντως te kai álēθεστέρως χαίρειν ἃν ποιοι ἰδονή álēthei, tô δ’ tōn ἦπτου ὄντων αμπελαμβάνον ἦπτου te ān 30 álēthōs kai bēβαιος πληροῖται kai ἀπιστοτέρας ἃν ἰδονή kai ἦπτου álēthōs metaλαμβάνον. Ἄναγκαιότατα, ēfē. Oi āra 586 φρονήσεως kai ἀρετῆς ἀπειρο, εὐφορίας δέ και τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεί ἐξουντες, κάτω, ὡς εἰςκεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταχέφρωνται τε καὶ ταύτη πλανώνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβιώνες δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ álēthōs ἄνω οὐτε ἀνέβλεψαν πάς τοὺς οὕτε ἴνεξήθησαν, οὐδὲ τόu; 19. ἂν <ἀν> omoiōn nos; ἂν ὄμοιον ΛΠΣ: ἢ ἐν τῷ μηθέστε ὄμοιον πρὸ ἡ ὄν ἂν ἄμοιον. In v et Flor. R legiur ἢ ὄν μὴ ἂν ὄμοιον κτλ. 20. <ń> nos: om. codd. 24. ψυχής Π: τῆς ψυχῆς, A, sed τῆς puncto notavit A².

19 ἡ οὖν ἂν ἄμοιον κτλ. These words have already been discussed: but it should here be remarked that the insertion of τοῦ before the adjective (Ast, Madvig etc., both here and in μηθέστε ὄμοιον above) is not necessary. On the connexion between ἐπιστήμη, οὐσία and álētheia see especially Thesell. 186 c, d. 585 D 24 σωμα—οὐτως: 'And don’t you think the same is true of the body itself as compared with the soul?’ For the sense cf. Phaed. 80 B, and with the genitive ψυχής s 82 c n. In this sentence Bosanquet remarks: ‘The only way to master this conception in its true light is to consider body and mind not as two things (body and soul) on a level or side by side, but, as daily experience really teaches us, under some such point of view as that of part and whole” (Companion p. 363). This point of view is suggestive, but it is scarcely that of the Républic, in spite of s 84 c; and the student will best apprehend Plato’s meaning both here and especially in X 608 D ff. if he carry his analysis no further than Plato himself does, and regard soul and body as two distinct and separate entities.

585 E 29 μάλλον μάλλον. The first múllon belongs both to τῷ ὄντι (=ὄντως) and to τῶν ὄντων; the second to ὄντως. After the stage of the argument reached in οὐκοῦν—ήπτον ὄν, it would have been enough to write here τῷ ὄντι πληροῖμεν μάλλον μάλλον ὄντως—ἀληθή, τὸ δὲ ἦπτον ὄντως πληροῖμεν ἀπιστοτέρας ἄν—METAλαμβάνον. Plato characteristically amplifies his conclusion, even at the risk of obscuring the relation between it and the preceding step. 586 A 2 κάτω κτλ. refers to the illustration in s 84 D ff. The meaning of μέχρι πάλιν is ‘as far as back again’ sc, to the intermediate point: cf. μέχρι βέβαιο, μέχρι ἑκτάδα, and other instances of the same usage in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. μέχρι and Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. II 1 p. 539 f. 3 πλανώνται. They are like ‘wan- derers’ who have lost the way: cf. the common use of πλανάθειν in the New Testament; e.g. Pet. II 2, 15.

τὸ ἀλήθος ἄνω refers to s 84 D: but 23—2
the words are intended also to suggest the deeper Platonic use of 'the true Above,' where Truth and Pureness dwell: see Phaed. 109 b ff., with vii 514 a n.

6 boskēmatōn dīkhν kτλ. Cf. Tīm. 91 e (the heads etc. of brute beasts are εἰς γῆν ἐλάλειαν in sympathy with their earthly souls) and vii 519 a, b nn. With κεκυφότες εἰς τραπέζας cf. the description of Syracusan gluttony in the seventh Platonic Epistle 316 b ff. χορταζόμενα (cf. ii 372 d) and διέχουσαι are properly used of brute beasts, and therefore suitable after boskēmatōn dīkhν. ένεκα τῆς τοιῶν πλεονεξίας is equivalent to ὡστε τοιῶν πλέον (sc. than others) ἔχειν.

586 b 9 σιδήροις κτλ. The epithet is significant and should be pronounced with emphasis. The horns and hoofs wherewith these human boskήματα 'kick and butt' are lethal weapons made of iron. Van Leeuwen's conjecture σκληροῖς for σιδήροις (Mmein. N. S. xxv Pt t) only emasculates a fine comparison. J. and C. aptly cite in illustration Aesch. Ag. 1115 ff. ὀπλαῖα may be said "with a glance at ὅπλοις" (J. and C.). War springs from the insatiate desires of the flesh (II 373 E n.): hence δι᾽ ἀληθείαν.

10 άτε οὐχὶ—πειπλάντες explains ἀπληστίαν. They cannot be 'filled' because that part of themselves which they fill is not the real, not the continent part, and that wherewith they fill it is not the real either. Bosanquet aptly compares "Whoso drinketh of this water shall thirst again." In οὔτε τὸ στέγον Plato doubtless has the mind in the story of the Danaids, in

which the πόθος τετρημένως was interpreted by certain 'wise men'—probably preachers of the Orphic-Pythagorean way of life: cf. App. IV—as the bottomless or incontinent part of soul: see Gorg. 493 a ff., especially the words τῶν δ' αμμηνίων τούτο τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥστε ἐπιθυμιαί εἰσι, τὸ ἀκάλπτον αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ στέγανον, ὥστε τετρημένον εἰς πόθον, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεκκαίησατε together with Rohde Psyche 1 pp. 326—329. Schneider makes a curious error when he says "τὸ στέγον hic corbmu quasi vas animi significare videtur."

12 χρησμωδεῖς refers to the half-oracular style of Socrates' description: compare for instance σιδήροις κέρασι τε καὶ ὀπλαῖα with the famous εὕλογον τ εἴχος in the oracle to the Athenians (Hdt. vii 141—144: see also id. i 55 al. for more examples).

14 ἐσκαγραφημέναι κτλ. See on 583 b. The words ὑπὸ τῆς—ἀποχρωματικέαν mean 'taking their colour from juxtaposition.' The word ἀποχρωνεῖα had also a more technical sense (τὸ τὰ χρωσθέντα ἐνσωματών τίμων ὑπερ. Π. s.v. χρωσθέντας), to which Plato alludes in Laws 769 a.

586 c 16 ὡστερ κτλ. The many σκεμασχοῦσι (vii 520 c) like the Trojans fighting for Helen's shadow in the fields of Troy.

17 Στησίχορος κτλ. See Phaedr. 243 A and Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr. 4 iii pp. 214 ff. There is no real ground for supposing (with Teichmüller Lit. Fehld. 1 pp. 113 ff.) that Plato intends an allusion to Isocrates' Helena, in spite of περιμάχητος
in Hel. 40 and the reference to Stesichorus ib. 64. Instead of τοῦ ἄλφην Floyer Sydenham conjectured τῆς ἄλφην (see Cl. Rev. II p. 229). It is more like Plato's suggestiveness to say 'the truth' than 'the true Helen,' which would moreover (as Lupton points out i.e.) rather be τῆς ἄλφην. 586 c—588 a The pleasures of anger, unless pursued in conformity with reason, are similarly unreal. We may even venture to say that it is only when obedient to knowledge that the desires of the two lower parts of soul can attain those pleasures which are in the highest sense their own and true—so far as it is possible for them to have true pleasures at all. Now the tyrannical desires are farthest from reason, so that the tyrant has least pleasure. By an elaborate calculation it is shown that the king lives seven-hundred and twenty-nine times more pleasantly than the tyrant; and if the just man so far surpasses the unjust in respect of pleasure, how much greater will be his transcendence in beauty and virtue! 586 c 20 ἔτερα τοιαύτα κτλ. The satisfaction of τὸ θυμοειδὲς is also no true pleasure, but only λύπης ἀπαλλαγῆς. See Phil. 47 E. αὐτῷ τούτῳ means τὸ τοῦ θυμοειδές. The verb διαπράττειν is used as in 4iv 440 D om λέγει τῶν γενεάων, πρίν ἄν ἡ διαπράττει ἵπτεὶ κτλ. φιλοσοφίαι, φιλοκυῖαν and δυσκυῖαν ('ill-temper' cf. 111 411 c) are particular forms of the principle which Plato calls τὸ θυμοειδές. Each of them is a κενώτης and painful. The κενώτης is filled, as the case may be, by τυχή, κοίησις, or θυμός (indulgence in anger): hence πλησμονή τιμῆς κτλ. On the spelling φιλοκυῖαν, which the present passage, like others in Plato, clearly points to, see 581 b n. 588 D 23 ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νου ἐστιν is emphatic, and prepares us for ταραροῦντες λέγομεν, κτλ., where Plato concedes after all a certain measure of reality and truth to the pleasures of the two lower parts of soul, provided they act in obedience to reason. That the φιλοκυῖαν should in any degree whatsoever participate in true pleasure, has been judged inconsistent with the previous argument (Krohn Pl. St. pp. 227 ff.), but is not so, if we fully appreciate the restrictions which Plato makes (cf. Grimmelt de rep. comp. et unit. p. 76), and also remember that in the perfect city, which is the counterpart of the perfect soul, the lower orders found their truest pleasure in working for the common welfare under reason as embodied in the Guardians. The gist of the present passage is well expressed by Nettleship, who in his Lectures and Remains II p. 331 remarks 'that in the most trivial satisfaction there may be a sense of serving something wider and higher than animal appetite: that this gives to the satisfaction of appetite a permanence and a satisfactoriness which by itself it cannot have.' Appetite, in short, behaves like a loyal citizen of the polis in τῇ ψυχῇ. Cf. IV 443 D, E. 26 αἱ μὲν κτλ. The antithesis is supplied in a different form by ὅταν δὲ κτλ. 587 A. Instead of ἐπουλών in line 29 Stephanus read ἐπομένα, without ms authority: but cf. (with Schneider) ὃς ἐμενὸν ὅραντι ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἔρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἷκεν ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ κτλ. 590 D. See note ad loc.
τῶν ἡδονῶν διώκουσι, ὡς ἄν τὸ φρόνιμον ἔξηγῆται, λαμβάνοντο, τὰς ἄλληστάς τε λήσοντα, ὡς οὖν τε αὐτῶς ἄληθεὶς λαβέιν, ἀληθεία ἐπομεών, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτὸν οἰκείας, εἰπέρ τὸ βελτίστον Ε ἕκαστον, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκείστατον; 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, οἰκείστατον γε. Τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἄρα ἐπομένης ἀπίσθης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἕκαστον τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἰς τὲ τὰλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίω εἰναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἐκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατόν | τὰς ἄληθεστάτας καρπούσθαι. 587 Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. "Ωστάν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἐτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκει τέ σὲ τὰ ἅλλα ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτριάς καὶ μὴ ἄληθθα ἡδονὴν διωκεῖν. Οὕτως, ἔφη. Τικόνον τι τὸ πλείστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου ἀφέστηκεν, μάλιστ' ἀν τοιαῦτα ἔξηγαγούσοι; Πολὺ γε. Πλείστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὖν ὅπερ νόμον τε καὶ τάξεως; Δήλον δῆ. Ἐφάνησαν δὲ πλείστον ἀφεσ- τῷσαι οὖν αἱ ἐρωτικαὶ τε καὶ τυχανικαὶ ἐπηθμιὰι; Πολὺ γε. Ἐλάχιστον δὲ αἴ βασιλικά καὶ τε κάσμιαι; Ναί. Πλείστον δὴ, 10 οὐκαί, ἀληθοὺς ἡδονής καὶ οἰκείας ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστῆξε, ὁ δὲ ὁλίγον, ᾗ ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ἀνέστατα ἄρα, εἴπον, ὁ τύραννος βιῶσεται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἡδισταῖ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Οἰσθ' οὖν, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, ὡσα ἀφίδεστερον θ' τύραννος βασιλεύει; "Ἀν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.

27. ἔξηγῆται Α'II: ἔξηγᾶται Α'. λαμβάνοντι Α'II: λαμβάνοντι Α'.

586 Ε 29 τὸ βελτίστον—οἰκείστατον. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. χ chapter 7 ad finem δέδει δ' ὅτι καί εἰναί ἔκαστος τοῦτο (sc. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν εἰς αὐτῶς), εἰπέρ τὸ κύρον καὶ ἄμεσον κτλ. The whole of the latter portion of that famous chapter, in which Aristotle comes nearer to the spirit of Plato than anywhere else throughout his writings, might be summed up in the pregnant saying τὸ βελτίστον ἕκαστον, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκείστατον—a saying which reaches to the very foundations of Plato's philosophy: for, if that which is best for each thing, is also most its own—most truly akin to it, part of its very being,—it follows that each thing truly is just in proportion as it is good. In other words the cause of all existence is the Good; see on VI 505 D, 509 B.

31 τῶν φιλοσόφων κτλ. τῶν φιλοσόφων is of course neuter, and not masculine. With μὴ στασιαζόντες κτλ. cf. IV 441 D—444 A. Soul attains its true unity (so far as is possible in this life: see on X 611 B) when the two lover 'parts' obey the highest; only then does a man become εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν (IV 443 E n.). δικαίω εἴναι: i.e. according to the definition of Justice in Book IV 1 C.
King and the Tyrant, should as it were be weighed in the balance. The importance of ἀριθμέων, μετρῶν, λογαριασμοῦ is constantly present to Plato's mind. See on 
X 602 D. (2) The Pythagoreans were in the habit of expressing virtues and other immaterial ideas in terms of numbers (see Zeller5 i pp. 389 ff.), and there is reason to suppose that the number 729 played a part in a Pythagorean calendar (588 A n.). Some of the terms employed by Plato, such as τρίγωνον and τρίγωνος, are also in all probability of Pythagorean origin. See App. I to Book VIII pp. 279 ff. (3) The arithmetical method of calculation enables Plato to set forth in a very striking and dramatic way his own dissent from the popular estimate of the tyrant's happiness (Schneider). (4) When all is said we must allow that some of the steps are arbitrary, and that Plato's main object is to reach the significant number 729, so as to indicate that the king has more pleasure than the tyrant every day and every night of his life. There is of course an element of playfulness in the episode, and we need not suppose that Plato set any particular store by his calculations: but neither ought we on the other hand to dismiss the whole reckoning as a meaningless and foolish jest. See also on VIII 545 C.

14 τριγωνόν κτλ. The three pleasures are those of the king, the timocrat, and the oligarch. The first variety is genuine, the second and third spurious: but the tyrant has "crossed the line into the region beyond the spurious," i.e. his pleasures represent a still lower depth (see 571 B ff.), being in fact only αἴδωλα twice removed of the oligarch's spurious pleasures (587 C). Schleiermacher made τῶν νόδων depend partitively on τὸ ἐπέκεινα ("so ist der Tyrann auf die jenseitige der mächtigen hinüber- gestiegen"). This view is linguistically defensible (c. Phaed. 112 B), and even attractive at first sight; but τῶν νόδων must be interpreted by δοῦν νόθαν, and δοῦν νόθαν certainly does not include the tyrant's species of pleasure. The feminine dual ending -αίν (instead of the commoner -αυ) is "magis elatioris quam vulgaris sermo." (Koepsel de dual. us. Pl. p. 6). Cf. IV 422 E n.

587 C 16 δορυφόροι ἡδοναῖς. These are described in 573 D ff.

17 οὐδέ should not be taken with εἰπεῖν. The hyperbaton is too difficult, and the meaning ("not even to express it." J. and C.) weak. We should translate 'and it isn't very easy, either, to say' etc., taking οὐδέ as 'also not,' a usage illustrated by Riddell Digest § 141. See on οὐδέ βασιλείς κτλ. 1328 C.

18 ὁ τύραννος. We might expect ὁ τυραννικός, but throughout the whole of this comparison Plato is content to take the tyrant—who is, we remember, τυραννικότατος 275 D—as the type of the tyrannical, and the king as the type of the kingly or aristocratic man. See above on 587 B and also below 587 E n.

19 οὐκοῦν καὶ ἠδονής κτλ. If the tyrant is third from the oligarch, his pleasure will also be, in respect of truth, third from the oligarch's, i.e. will be an image of an image (τρίτω εἰδῶλοι cf. X 597 E and 599 A, D) of the oligarch's pleasure.

587 D 21 οὖν εἰς ταύτον κτλ. See on IV 445 D.
The distance of the tyrant from true pleasure is measured first ἀρθμοῦ, i.e. "numero secundo longitudinem, numeros enim omnis quatenus monadibus constat, linene instar habendus" (Schneider 111 p. LXXXV. See also for ἄρθμος vii 526 C n. and cf. the expression γραμμικὸς ἀρθμὸς in the mathematical term ἐπίσευδον has a playful effect, both in itself and also because it sounds wilful and eccentric to express a number of one 'increase' (τὸν θυόν μῆκος άρθμοῖς) in terms of two. νῦν = δευτέρα αἴξη: cf. Tim. 54 B and Cantor Gesch. d. Mathem. p. 178. The first increase (viz. of the unit or point) was ὁ τοῦ μῆκος ἀρθμοῦ, i.e. in this case (1 × 9 = 9) by the second-and-third increases (on the same scale) we obtain 9 × 9 (second increase or δύναμις) × 9 (third increase or τρίτη αἴξη = 729. See App. I to Book VIII p. 279. Schneider's erroneous idea that the squaring of 9 has already been alluded to in ἐπίσευδον—ἐξίς leads him to take δύναμιν as merely 'power' and τρίτη αἴξη as "per epelexegesin ad δύναμιν additum." What motive induced Plato to cube the distance? Was it something purely fanciful, e.g. "in order to gauge the depth of the tyrant's misery" (J. and C.), or because the king and the tyrant are themselves solid creatures (cf. Arist. Quint. de Mns. III p. 89. 35 Jahn)? I think not. He probably intended to suggest that "the degradation proceeds by increasingly wide intervals" (Bosanquet), but the actual calculations are inspired by a desire to reach the total 729. See on §88 A.
28 metatrepheis: 'conversely' ("um-gekehrt") Schneider.

587 Ε 32 άμηχανον κτλ. I do not think there can be any doubt that Schneider is right in retaining καταπεφόρκας, which is found in all the best and also in a majority of the inferior MSS. The word has reference to the gigantic and tempestuous numeral ἐννεακαιεικισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισισि

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6. πλέον. See et. u. πλέων and not πλέον is the classical form, though both πλέον and πλέων were admissible (Meisterhans 3 p. 152). The diphthong ei (in A2 Π etc.) may therefore be held to favour the reading πλέον, which I formerly adopted; but the dative is undeniably awkward, and it is better to acquiesce in πλέον: cf. τοσούτων ἄδικα νῦν above.

588 A—589 B We are now in a position to refute the thesis that Injustice combined with a reputation for Justice is profitable for him who is unjust. The soul may be likened to a composite creature—part bestial, part leonine, part human,—wearing the outward semblance of humanity. He who maintains that Injustice profits a man, holds that it is profitable to starve the human element and make strong the rest, and encourage strife and sedition within the soul. The advocate of Justice on the other hand asserts that the human element should have the mastery and bring the others into harmony with one another and itself.

588 B 9 ἵνα δὲ ποιούμενον. The reference is to ΙI 361 A ff. For αὕτω ὁ Schmidt conjectured αὖ ὅσι, which I too hastily adopted in my edition of the text. Glauco and Adimantus are careful in Book ΙΙ to disclaim the views which they expound; and after ἵνα δὲ ποιοῦμεν it is easy to refer αὕτω to the hypothetical person (not necessarily Thrasymachus in particular: see ΙΙ 358 C and 367 A) for whom they speak: cf. ὁ ἐκεῖνος λέγων presently and ὁ περὶ τὸν τουκτόν λόγον λέγων (II 360 D), as well as φήσει λογεῖμενος (ib. 366 Α). See also on 590 Α.

13 οἰκόνα πλάσαντες κτλ. Cf. Tim. 69 D—70 E and the picture of the soul in Phaedr. 246 A, 253 D ff. We are told by Clement (Strou. ΙΙ 20. 1958 C Migne) that Basilides compared man to a wooden horse, peopled by a host of different spirits. The underlying idea of Plato’s similitude is that man is a compound of the mortal and the immortal, standing midway between corruptibility and incorruptibility: θυτήριοι καὶ αἰθανατοὶ φῶςκοι μεθόριον (Philo de mund. opif. 46). In the noble lines of George Herbert:

“"To this life things of sense
Make their pretence:
In th’ other Angels have a right by birth:
Man ties them both alone,
And makes them one,
With th’ one hand touching heav’n, with
th’ other earth.
In soul he mounts and flies,
In flesh he dies.
He wears a stuff whose thread is coarse
and round,
But trimm’d with curious lace,
And should take place
After the trimming, not the stuff and ground.”

Nettleship (Lect. and Rem. ΙΙ p. 333) justly observes “that it was no mere figure of speech with Plato to represent these psychical tendencies in man as animals, for he clearly believed that there was continuity between the different forms in which life appears; that somehow or other souls rose and fell in the scale of being according as they behaved in each form in which they were embodied; and that there was a real identity between certain elements in man’s soul and certain elements in other organic creatures.” See X 618 B ff., Phaed. 81 E ff.
C Poian tivá; ἡ δ'/ ὄς. Τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, οἴαι μιθο-15 λογοῦνται παλαιά γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἡ τε Σιμαῖρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλα τινὲς συχνὰ λέγονται ξυμπεφυκώντα ἰδέα τολλαί εἰς ἐν γενέσθαι. Δέχονται γὰρ, ἐφ. Πλάτε τοίνυν μιᾶς μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων δὲ θηρίων ἔχουσας κεφαλᾶς κύκλῳ καὶ ἄγριων καὶ δυνατοῦ μετα-20 βάλλειν καὶ φύειν εἴς αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα. Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἐφη, Δ τὸ ἐργον· 1 ὄμως δέ, ἐπειδή εὔπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω. Μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ἵδεαν λέοντος, μιᾶς δὲ ἀνθρώπου· πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ἔστω τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον τὸ δεύτερον. Ταῦτα, ἐφη, ῥάοι· καὶ τέπλασται. Σύναπτε τοῖνυν 25 αὐτά εἰς ἐν τρία ὄντα, ὡστε τῇ ξυμπεφυκώνει ἀλλήλοισ. Συνήππατα, ἐφη. Περὶπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἐξοθεν εὖνς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώ-Ε σου, ὡστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὄραν, ἄλλα 1 τὸ ἐξὸν μόνον ἔλυτρον ὀρνίτῃ ἐν ἔσον φαινεσθαι, ἀνθρωπον. Περὶπλαστα, ἐφη. Δέχομεν δή τὸν λέγοντα, ὡς λυσιτελεί τούτῳ ἀδικεῖν τῷ 30 ἀνθρώπῳ, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν οὐ ξυμφέρει, ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησὶν ἡ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐχοχοντεὶ ποιεῖν ἰχνηρῷ καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπου λιμο-Κτονείν | καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὡστε ἐκκεσθαι ὡστὶ ἀν ἐκεῖνον ὄποτερον ἄγη, καὶ μηδὲν ἐτερον ἐτέρῳ ἐμνεθέλειν μηδὲ φίλον ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' εἶν αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δάκνεσθαι τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἐσθελεῖν ἀλλήλα. Παντάπασι γάρ, ἐφη, ταυτ' ἃν λέγοι ὧ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπαινῶν. Οὐκοῦν

888 C 16 ξιμαῖρας κτλ. The Scho-llist thus explains: ἡ ξιμαῖρα τὸ εἴδος ἃτι "πρόσιθε λέον, ὅτιθεν δὲ ἄγρια, μέση δὲ ξιμαῖρα"—Σκύλλα δὲ—πρόσωπον ἔχουσα καὶ στέρα γνωστὰ, ἐκ λαγών ἔτι κυνῶν κεφαλὰς ἐξα καὶ πόδας δώδεκα—εἰς ἐξ αὐτὸς (Κέρβερος) τρεῖς μὲν κυνῶν κεφαλὰς, οὐρὰν δὲ ἄγριας, κατὰ νότον δὲ πανταῖοι ὄρεον εἰς κεφαλὰς. 17 καὶ ἄλλα τινές κτλ.: e.g. Hippo-centaurs, Gorgons, Pegasus (Phaedr. 229 d). The relational is succeeded, as often (Π 357 B n.).

19 θηρίου—πολυκεφάλου. Cf. Phaedr. 230 A θηρίον—"πυθοῦν πολυπλοκότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιπεδεμένον, Τίμι. 7ο E (the ἐπιπεθμητικος as a θρέμα άγριον) and Arist. Pol. 1Γ 16. 1287τ. 30 ὡς τι γάρ ἐπισυμ-μία τοιουτων (viz. θηρίων). For the epi-thet ποικίλων see VIII 557 C, 561 Ε and πολυκεφάλων in 580 D. ἡμέρων δὲ. Madvig would write ἡμέρων τε: but ἡμέρων—ἀγρίων is loosely treated as a new point in the description, although it only elaborates and explains πολυκεφάλων, and δέ does not balance the preceding μὲν. So also J. and C.

888 D 24 μέγιστον—τὸ πρῶτον. The ἐπιπεθμητικον is the largest part of soul: see IV 442 Α and II 379 C ν. 25 σύναπτε τοιουντ κτλ. Krohn finds fault with Plato for failing to preserve the essential unity of the individual throughout this comparison (Pl. Si. p. 229). But, according to Plato, the true unity of the individual is realised only through the subjection of the two lower "parts" of soul to the highest (586 E ν.); and this subjection is described in 589 Α,Β.
5 as is the dicta of the law, not the just part of law, but 10. 15 that he is the law, not of the law. The former is the correct view. Step- nus suggested the opposite: but "a just or unjust, or both, and therefore no command should be placed after it." Jowett's translation "he should watch over" is misleading.

589 A 6 of the unjust. "The genitive," say the Oxford editors, "may be governed by or may be taken partitively with it is unjust." The former is the correct view. Steph- nus was opposed to it. But "quae de imperio contendant, superlativus est habit." (Schneider). It is unjust, and therefore no command should be placed after it. Jowett's translation "he should watch over" is misleading.

589 B 7 after it. The subject is of course still it is unjust, and therefore no command should be placed after it. Jowett's translation "he should watch over" is misleading.

589 B 5-591 A The panegyrist of Justice is thus victorious on every count. His opponent will surrender when he understands that Virtue subjects the bestial to the human, nay rather to the element of God within us, while of Vice the opposite is true. Shall it profit a man to take gold unjustly and make his soul a slave? We may also define intemperance, self- will, discontent, cowardice, servility and meanness, and the vulgarity which we associate with mechanical pursuits, in terms of our comparison. The better must rule the worse—such is our principle, and it is in harmony with the aims both of law and of the government of children.

589 C 15 of the laws. We ought not to supply the laws for the laws is itself idiomatic for of the laws, (Schneider).

17 It is also the Socratic view: see II 382 A n.

589 D 19 of the laws. "Both Plato and Aristotle thought that there was in human nature a certain imperfect presence of God, and that it was this divine presence, however small, which made it specifically human nature." (Net- tleship, Lect. and Remains II p. 334). Cf. VI 501 B 9. With Tim. 90 A ff. (man is a fraud, or god, or human, or animal) and Arist. Eth. Nic. X 7. 1177b 30 ff. The doctrine of a theon thē theon was by no means new to Greek philosophical and religious thought (see Rohde Psyché II pp. 121, 184 ff., 207 ff.), but Plato gave it a far deeper meaning than it ever had before.
the form of the sentence beginning ei μὲν λαμβάνων κτλ. Cf. 1 336 Ε. Νο 589 Ε 25 έις ἀγρίων—ἀνδρῶν: sc. δουλειαν or the like (supplied from δου- λουσία) rather than οἰκίαν, which J. and C. supply. Cf. IV 425 Α. Ν. and for the genitive VII 569 Α.

370 A 2 "Ερυθία. Hom. Od. XI 326 f. Μαίραν τε Κλεμένθω τε ἰδων στεγηρὴν τ' Ἐρυθίαν, ᾧ χρυσὸν φίλου ἀνδρὸς ἐδέσατο τιμίωτα. Ἡ υπὲρ ἔκεινον. See 588 Β. Ν. Glauco will speak for the champions of Injustice in their surrender as well as in their attack.

6 τὸ δεινὸν, τὸ μέγα κτλ. "Socrates quasi monstrum conspicatus, quod τὸ δεινὸν θρέμμα appellaturns erat, denso descriptionem eius incipit et per asyndeton horridulam orationem facit" (Schneider). The asyndeton has a highly rhetorical effect: see the remarks of Longinus on rhetorical asyndeton combined with ἀναφορά and διατοπίωσι ('vivid description') in his περὶ υψών 20. Jowett and Campbell understand τὸ δεινὸν substantively ('the dangerous thing, viz. that great beast')—a most improbable view, as it appears to me. On the other hand, Stallbaum, writing τὸ δεινὸν τὸ μέγα κτλ. without any comma, compares Corpus 398 Ε in ε ἐκ ὑμετέρα πρώτης and other passages, none of which is parallel except (in some respects) Soph. O. Κ. 806 καγὼ τῶν ἐκτρέποντο, τῶν τροχήλατων παύω δι' ὀργῆς, and there a comma is required. We certainly should not (with Stephanus and Ast) read τὸ δεινὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα κτλ.

590 Β 8 οὖς ὑπερβαίνει οὖς. The serpentine element has not hitherto been mentioned, but (as Schleiermacher points out, Plato's
αὐξηταὶ καὶ συντείνηται ἀναμομόστως; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τρυφὴ δὲ Ἰο καὶ μαλακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ὁχλίσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποτῇ; Τὰ μὴν; Κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, ὑπὸ τὸ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιή καὶ ἕνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπλήστια προπηλακιζόμενον ἑβίζῃ ἐκ νέοι αὐτὶ λέοντος πιθηκόν 15 γίγνεσθαι; 1 Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Βανασία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ τὸ, οὐκ ἢ, οὐνεδος φέρει; ἢ δὲ ἀλλο τὸ φῆσομεν ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἴδος, ὥστε μὴ ἀν δύνασθαι ἁρχεῖν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θρεμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεῖτε ἐκείνα, καὶ τὰ θροπε-ματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν; Ἔοικεν, ἐφη. Οὐκὼν ὕπα 20 καὶ ὁ τοσοῦτος ὕπὸ ὁμοίων ἁρχηται οἰνουπὲρ ὁ βελτίστου, δοῦλον αὐτῶν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου 1 τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θείου ἁρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δοῦλον οἴμοιν δεῖν ἁρχεῖ-θαι αὐτῶν, ὡστε Ὀρασίμαχος ἵπτο τοὺς ἁρχομένους, ἀλλὰ ὅς ἀμενον ὅν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἁρχησθαι, μάλιστα μὲν

Staat p. 609) may well be included in τὰ περὶ τῶν Λέοντα 588 E. It symbolizes some meaner forms of the ἄρχων ὃς cannot well be attributed to the king of beasts, e.g. δυσκολία (III 411 C), per- fidiousness etc. Cf. Theogn. 501 f. έρει, θεωροῦν τε ἀνθρώπους ἀπαστεῖν καὶ ψυχρὰν δὲν κόλπῳ ποικίλον εἰχέν ὁμιῆν. Clement (Strato. IV 3. 1225 B Migne) is thinking of the Old Testament when he says ὁμιῆν ἀπαστεῖν, but the idea is also Greek. It should also be remarked that expansions and amplifications like the addition of ἄρχων ὃς in this passage are characteristic of the style of Plato: cf. for example Theat. 147 A. B and 161 C. The emendation ὄλικους, which Nettleter is supposed to favour (Lect. and Remains II p. 335), is excessively weak, and would moreover refer not to the θυμοειδὲς, but to the ἐπιθυμητοῖς (cf. τοῦ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ below). It seems to me clear both from λογισμῷ and from αὐτῶν τοῦτο below that at present Plato is thinking only of the θυμοειδὲς and its degenerate kind. We must therefore beware of referring ὄλικους to τοὺς φιλη- δόνους, τοὺς γαστρῖ καὶ αἰδιοῖς δουλεύοντας (Clement's interpretation of Matt. 3. 7: see Strato. IV 16. 1308 A). 9 τρυφῆ δὲ καὶ μαλακία κτλ. Cf. III 411 A. B. On πίθηκον see X 620 C. N. 690 C 15 βανασία. See on vi 495 D. 10 δύνηται has been suspected by Stephanus, Ast, and Herwerden. The word could well be spared, but, as it is in all the MSS., was read by Stobaeus (Flor. 9. 67) and is not in itself an error, we are hardly justified in resorting to exci- sion. The subjunctive depends of course on ὅταν, and καὶ connects δύνηται with ἔχῃ. By reading τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (not αὐτῷ) θρεμάτων, and making τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἴδος the subject to δύνασθαι and θερα- πεῖν; Schneider makes it rather easier to refer δύνηται to ὅταν τις: but on the whole it is more natural to retain αὐτῷ and make the subject of δύνασθαι the same as that of δύνηται, viz. the individual himself. Even at the cost of a little awkwardness, Plato prefers to make the sentiment expressed by καὶ τὰ βουτεύματα—μανθάνειν co-ordinate with, rather than a consequence of, ὅταν τι αὐθεντικό. For the imagery of the sentence cf. (with J. and C.) vi 403 A ff. ὕπα καὶ κτλ. is Plato's justification for assigning the farmers and artisans to a dependent position in his city. For the syntax of ὑπὸ ὁμοίων—οἰνουπὲρ see III 402 A ff. 590 D 23 ὡστε Ὀρασίμαχος ἵπτο. See I 343 A ff. 24 μάλιστα μὲν κτλ. A profluent and truly Platonic form of Hesiod's famous
591 A]  ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ 0

οἰκείων ἔχουτος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξοθεν ἐφεστῶσα, ὡς εἰς 25 δύναμιν πάντες ὄμοιοι ὄμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῶ κυβερνώμενοι;

Ε Καὶ ὠρθώς γ’, ἐφή. Δηλοὶ δὲ γε, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος, 1 ὅτι τοιοῦτον βουλεταί, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμαχοι ὡς, καὶ ἡ τῶν παίδων ἀρχή, τὸ μη ἔαν ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἐως ἢν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁσπερ

591 ἐν πόλει πολιτείαιν καταστήσωμεν καὶ τό βέλτιστον θεραπευ|σαντες 30 τῷ παρ’ ἡμῖν τοιοῦτο ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὄμοιον καὶ ἀρ-
χουτα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλευθέρον αἵρεμεν. Δηλοὶ γάρ, ἢ δ’ ὅς.

Π’ δὲ οὖν φησίμεν, ὁ Γλαύκον, καὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγῳ λυσιτελεῖ

ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀκολαστάινεν ἢ τὶ αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἢ δ’ οὐν ποιηρότερος 5

28. βουλεταὶ Σcum Stobaeo (Flor. 9. 67): βουλευταὶ ΑΠΕ1. q.

saying οὗτος μὲν πανάραστος ὃ αὐτῶ πάντα ὑπήργ. | οὕτως δ’ αὐτός ὄμοιος ὃ εἰ εἰσοχθνί πιθήκα (Ο. D. 293 ά), as quoted by Arist. Εἰθ., Νέυς 1. 2. 1092 b. b 11. Instead of

οὐκείων ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτῷ Madvig proposes to read οὐκείων ἐν οὐκείω. The emendation is neat and gets rid of the difficulty both in ἔχουσα and in ἐφεστῶσα: but ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτῷ appropriately recalls ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτῷ above, and the genitive absolute may be compared with ἀποκα

ραμένουν VII 538 D, ἐπομένων 556 D and δικαίωματων Axios 755 D. (Badham's δικαίωματα is of course only a conjecture.) Cf. Riddell Digest § 274.

25. ἐφεστῶσα is another independent genitive absolute. The double peculia-

rity is certainly unusual. Stephanus obliterates first one, and then both by suggesting (1) ἐφεστῶσα, and (2) ἔχουσα—

ἔχουσα (intended, I suppose, as neuter, but the neuter should be ἔφεστος: see Schanz Vol. Π π. xii). I believe the text is sound: there is hardly any limit—

except that required by intelligibility—of Plato’s rapid changes of construction, and they are especially common with partici-


590 E 28 βουλεταὶ κτλ. See cr. n. The reading βουλεταὶ is found also in 25, Flor. B, Flor. T, Stobaeus (Flor. 9. 67) and Iamblichus (Prot. Ρ 88 p. 33 Pistell). βουλευταὶ, which Schneider and Hermann, following the best MSS, still retain, is much more suitable, and the corruption is easy and tolerably fre-

quent: cf. (with Schneider) Phil. 35 D and 50 E. "ubl boulétebth et bouléomai

pro boulétebth et boulomai in quibus-

dam scriptum est." Plato means that the purpose, intention or meaning of

Law is that the better should rule the worse, and we may fairly appeal to the witness of Law on such a subject, for

Law does not, as Thrasymachus argued (1 343 c), hold a brief for δ' ρήτωρ, but is the ally of every class and individual in

the city without exception, πάσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμαχοι. Law is "the ally of everybody in the community without distinction, because the ally of that which is best in him" (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. Π π. 336).

591 A 2 ἀντικαταστήσωμεν κτλ.: sc. as a counterpart or substitute for our own βέλτιστον (τῷ παρ’ ἡμῖν τοιοῦτῳ), by which he has hitherto been guided. Madvig’s conjecture ὅτι καταστήσωμεν is both unnecessary and inelegant. On the singular ἄρτω in spite of the plural παίδω

see I 347 A n.

591 A—592 B It is also better for

him who is guilty of injustice to be detected and punished than to escape. The wise

man will honour those studies which pro-

mote the welfare of his soul, and the same
great object will be his guiding principle in all that pertains to the body and its

date, as well as to the acquisition of riches

and honours. Will he fake part in politi-
cal life? Perhaps not in the land of his

birth, but in his own true city assuredly

he will. It may be that the perfect city is

an ensemble laid up in Heaven for him

who would plant a city in his soul.

5 ἀδικεῖν—ποιεῖν. It is more natu-

ral and better in point of literary effect to make the infinitives coordinate (with

the English translators) than to suppose (with Schneider) that ἡ—ἡ is 'either—or'

and ἀκολασταῖνεν and τι αἰσχρόν ποιεῖν

intended as different species of the genus
dōukia.
7 Πή α' αδικούντα κτλ. It was maintained in 11 361 A ff., 365 C ff. that Injustice could evade detection and punishment. So much the worse, says Socrates, for the sinner, who thereby forfeits his only chance of reformation, since Punishment is the appointed cure for Vice. It may be doubted whether so humane a view altogether corresponded to the actual administration of the Athenian or any other State; but to an idealist like Plato ‘is’ means ‘should be,’ and in so far as human laws fulfil their true function by reflecting the divine ordinances, we may truly say that punishment is remedial. See on the whole subject 11 380 B n.

591 C 17 ἀπεργάσεται κτλ. Editors rightly abandon the present ἀπεργάσεται (see cr. n.) as indefinable. Ἰψος is condemned by Cobet (V. L. 2 p. 610) as an interpolation, but some verb is needed, and Cobet himself allows that "ἡ ἴψω αποδεικνύει σεμελ et litterum comparat!" (e.g. v. 465 D, Ar. Plut. 265 and Fr. 408 Dindorf). Ἰψος (see cr. n.) can hardly be maintained in Plato, though not apparently, unknown in Ionic: see Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. 1 2, p. 436. The erroneous ψήν is clearly due to a misunderstanding of ὁ ψώς (non modo non).
ἀρμοττόμενος φανείται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἐάντερ μέλλῃ τῇ ἁλθεῖᾳ μουσικῆς εἶναι. Οὐκοίν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν εὐνυταξίν τε καὶ εὐμυθομίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ 25 πλῆθους οὐκ ἐκπληθτόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἤτειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπετέλεσα κακᾶ ἔχουν; 'Οὐκ οὖν, ἐφη. 'Αλλ' ἐ ἀποβλέποντι, εἶπον, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολεμίει καὶ φυλάττων, μὴ τι παρακινήα αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεί διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δὲ ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνοῦν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ὀσον ἢν ὅσο τ' ἦ. Ὀμοίως μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 'Αλλ' μὴν καὶ τιμᾶς γε, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀποβλέποντον, τὸν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεῦσεται ἕκον, ἢ ἂν ἠγιάζῃ ἀμείαν αὐτοῦ ποιήσειν, ἂς δ' ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἔξιν, φεῦξεται ιδία καὶ δησμία. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἐφη, τὰ γε πολιτικά ἐθελήσει πράξειν, ἐάντερ τοῦτο κηθίσαι. Νη τὸν κύνα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μίλα, οὐ μέντοι ἑσος ἐν γε τῇ 5 πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις εὐμυθῇ τύχῃ. Μανθίνω, ἐφη· ἐν ἢ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκεύοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη· ἐπεὶ γῆς Β γε ὑποδιομὸ ὁμιὰν ἑαυτὴν εἶναι. 'Αλλ', ἢν ἔγω, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἑσος

23. φανείται Iamblichus (Protrept. 90): φανείται ΑΠΕ: φανεύοτο. 29. πληθος Α β τ: πλῆθος ΑΠ."
himself" (["sich selbst begründen") Schneid-der, and so also Bosanquet]: cf. vi 496 c — 497 a. έαυτόν κατοίκις is a pregnant and powerful phrase, which involves not only the idea of the πόλις s. πολίτεας έν ημίν (cf. 590 Ε, 591 κ, X 602 b, 608 ι), but also perhaps a hint that the παρά- δείγμα έν οφραίῳ is as it were the μετρο- πολις from which our souls should be colonised. Jowett and Campbell under- stand ἐκείνων ἐν οίκον, while Richards thinks Plato may have written ἐαυτόν <αὐτός> or <εἰς αὐτήν> κατοι- κίζειν: but the word παράδειγμα, as well as τῷ βουλομένῳ ὑπὲρ καὶ ὑπονόμη, shows that the heavenly city is regarded as a model for the soul rather than as the place in which the soul should be planted. The conjectures αὐτῷ (sc. τὸ παράδειγμα) κατοι- κίζειν and ὑπότι πρὸς (s. εἰς) αὐτό κατοι- κίζειν (Herderden) do not merit refutation. What does Plato mean by ἐν οφραίῳ? It is surely something more than "harm- lose popular-theological Redeweise" (Pfeiderer zur Lösung etc. p. 33). The poet Gray (who aptly reminds us of Dio- genes Laeritus' εἰρήνα on Plato πόλι- ἡν ήν ποθ’ ἐαυτῷ | ἔκτισε, καὶ δαπάνην Ζημύς ἐνδότατο III 43) remarks "ἐν οὐ- ραίῳ, that is, in the idea of the divinity: see the beginning of the following book." Apparently he understood the words of the Heaven of Ideas, a view which has, with various modifications and qualifications, found favour also with other critics (see Steinhart Einleitung p. 244 and cf. Susemihl Gen. Entw. II 1 p. 248 ff. Pro- clus in Tim. 269 E seems to interpret the παράδειγμα as τὴν ἐν οφραίῳ πολίτεας τῆς ψυχῆς, but Plato is manifestly speak- ing of the πολίτεας τῆς πόλεως). Others have taken ἐν οφραίῳ of the 'Weltall' or Macrocosm, as if the Universe itself were one great ideal city, after whose pattern we should regulate the City of the Soul (see Steinhart I. c. and p. 270 with Timet. 47 b, 90 D); but, as Schneider points out, we can hardly reconcile such an interpre- tation with VII 529 c — 530 c, and άδειασί is also against it. The sentence may be compared with Pol. 297 c, Laws 713 B ff. and especially 739 B, E, where the polity of the Republic is thus de- scribed: η μὲν ἢ τιτανόν πόλις, εἰτὲ πον θεοὶ η παιδεῖς θεῶν αὐτήν οἰκουσί πλείον ένός, οὕτω διαφέρεισ εὑρεθεί- μερον κατοικοῦσι: ὡδ δέ παράδειγμα γε πολίτεας οὐκ ἄλλη χρή σκέπον, άλλ’ ἔχουσιν ταύτη τῆς δίκης έλίστα με ταύτην ζητέν κατά δύναμιν. We might employ this passage to explain ἐν οφραίῳ τοῖς παράδειγμα, but its tone is less elevated and impressive, and in particular it does not help us to understand τῷ βουλομένῳ ὑπὲρ καὶ ὑπονόμη. Plato's language is ex- traordinarily suggestive, and I confess that to me, as apparently to Susemihl (l. c. p. 249), these words suggest, not indeed the doctrine of Anamnesis in all its bear- ings, but something of the half-religious, half-poetical atmosphere with which Plato invests that doctrine in the Phae- drus. The mysterious and haunting phrase ἐν οφραίῳ παράδειγμα recalls the "imperial palace whence we came," and the whole sentence reminds us once again of that profound and inspiring doctrine ἐνθρώποι οὐραίοι φύσις, οὐκ έγγειοι, which, as I have often pointed out, underlies so much of Platonism. The sister-doctrine of Immortality seems also to be implied, and from this point of view the Christian parallels are highly remarkable and significant: see for ex- ample Philipp. 3. 30 ήμών γὰρ τὸ πολι- τεύμα ἐν οφραίος υπάρχει, and many other passages in the New Testament, e.g. Hebr. 11. 16, 12. 23, 13. 14: I Pet. 1. 4, 2. iii. 13. I do not venture to assert that Plato consciously and deliberately thought of Anamnesis and Immortality when he wrote ἐν οφραίῳ etc., but the words are steeped in the fragrance of these beliefs; and to regard the reference to heaven, "as a mere passing figure of speech" (Bosanquet) seems to me to do less than justice to the wonderful depth and fervour of this passage. 10 τὰ γὰρ ταύτης κτλ. See Nettle- ship Lect. and Rem. 11 p. 338 and Theeet. 173 c ff., quoted by him. Interpreted strictly and by themselves, the words of Plato would mean only that the philoso- pher will abstain from public and politi- cal life except when some 'divine chance' enables him to exercise his true vocation. But taken in connexion with ἐαυτόν κατοι- κίζειν they mean more. In founding the city within himself after the likeness of the heavenly city the philosopher is in
γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἄν πράξειν, ἄλλης δὲ οἶδεμιᾶς. Εἰκὸς γ', ἔφη.

τέλος πολιτείας θ'.

reality a true πολιτικός, because he is thereby faithful to the principles of the true and perfect State: even while he lives, he is already in a sense a citizen of Heaven, for the Kingdom of Heaven is reproduced within him. In existing cities the truest politicians are sometimes those who abstain from politics altogether, according to Gorg. 521 D ff. I agree with Steinhart (Einleitung p. 254) and Christ (Gr. Literaturgesch. p. 348 n. 6) that Plato now speaks much less hopefully than before of the prospects of realising his ideal city upon earth: see on V 470 E, VI 499 C and 502 C. It is possible to force some of the earlier allusions into a sort of harmony with the words of this passage (see for example Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. pp. 637 ff.); but we cannot help feeling that the tone and atmosphere are very different. Steinhart (l.c. p. 703 n. 264) traces the difference to Plato’s disappointed hopes of the younger Dionysius. The conjecture is interesting, but even without this stimulus Plato may well have come to feel that his καλλίστος is hardly of this world (cf. Laws 713 B), and that its true value lies in the religious, political, and moral ideals which it holds before mankind.
APPENDICES TO BOOK IX.

I.

IX 576 D, E. ἀλλ' εἰδαμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὑσαύτως ἡ ἀλλως κράνεις: καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττόμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἕνα ὀντα βλέπωντες, μηδ' εἰ τινες ὀλγοι περὶ ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ὡς χρη ὀλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἀπασαν καὶ ἰδόντες, οὕτω δόεαν ἀποφαῖνώμεθα.

The difficult clause ὡς χρη—θεάσασθαι has hardly received sufficient attention at the hands of editors. There is no variant of any consequence in the mss.

The chief trouble lies in determining the precise force of ὡς χρη.

Is ὡς (1) 'sicut,' introducing an analogy, or (2) simply 'ut,' i.e. 'as,' or (3) a causal particle?

The first of these views is apparently held by Schleiermacher and Schneider. The former translates "sondern wie man sich eine Stadt ganz beschauen muss, wenn man hineinkommt, so lass uns überall herumsteigen und zusehn und dann unsere Meinung abgeben." Schneider's version is "sondern so wie man den gesammten Staat zu sehen in ihn hineingehen muss, in das innere des ganzen eindringen, und wenn wir ihn gesehen haben, unsere Meinung aussprechen."

Schleiermacher seems to suppose that there is a comparison between what is necessary in order to see the sights of a town, and what is necessary in order to pronounce judgment on the τυραννουμένη πόλις: in either case we must get 'inside' the city. This explanation is attractive, and can be made very plausible; but (a) we should expect ὀσπερ in place of ὡς: (b) the present χρη suggests something which is our duty here and now, rather than what would be necessary in a hypothetical case: (c) the antithesis between seeing with the eye, and seeing with the mind, is not sufficiently brought out by merely setting θεάσασθαι over against ἰδότες: and (d) it is not natural that the illustration should be confined to the tyrant's city, as it manifestly is by the words ὀλην τὴν πόλιν. For these reasons I cannot bring myself to agree with Schleiermacher, alluring as his view is.

The second explanation gives a thoroughly natural and easy meaning to ὡς χρη. But how are we to explain the remainder of the clause, ὀλην—θεάσασθαι? We cannot, surely, supply θεσαμενοι (with J. and C.) before ὡς, nor would the resulting sense be satisfactory if we could. Two explanations may be suggested. We may suppose, on the one hand, that ὀλην—θεάσασθαι is merely explanatory of ὡς χρη ('as is right,'
APPENDICES TO BOOK IX.

viz. that we should go into and see the whole city, 'let us' etc.). It is however, an objection to this theory that it makes ὅλην—θεώσασθαι almost entirely otiose, and Jowett, in point of fact, practically omits the words from his translation ('let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about'). On the other hand, it may be argued that ὃς γρηγορεῖον, though in itself, strictly speaking, parenthetical, is allowed to affect the construction in much the same way as ὃς εἶκεν, ὃς ἐπικροτεῖ sometimes are (see for example Soph. Τριάδ. 1238 ἀνήρ ὃς, ὃς ἐκκείν, ὃν νεμέων ἔμοι κτλ. with note on I 347 A). But there is apparently no other example of this kind of attraction on so extensive a scale, and ὅλην—θεώσασθαι is still nearly, if not quite, superfluous.

The view that ὃς is causal presents the fewest difficulties, and for that reason I have adopted it in the notes. It is held also by Ast and Davies and Vaughan. The text may be corrupt, but it has not, so far as I know, been hitherto suspected. If ἀλλὰ were read before καταδύντες and not before ὃς, all difficulty would disappear. 'Do not let us be dazzled by looking at the tyrant, who is but one man among many, or at a few persons in his retinue, for it is the entire city which we must go in and view; but let us' etc. The corruption, however, is not easy to explain, and it is safer and wiser to follow the MSS.

II.

IX 580 A, B. ἢθι δὴ μοι, ἐφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἦδη ὥσπερ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ ὑπό, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ τὴν σὺν δόξαν εὐδαίμονι καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξῆς πέντε δυτικά κρίνε, βασιλικῶν, τιμοκρατικῶν, ὧν γαρ ὄντος ὅσοι τιμωρυξτικῶν, τυραννικῶν.

The general meaning of this passage is clear, but it is difficult to determine the exact force of διὰ πάντων κριτῆς. There is no reason to suspect the text, although the phrase is apparently not found elsewhere; nor would Orelli's conjecture διαφάνειαν deserve to be accepted, even if διὰ πάντων were corrupt.

In the program cited in the notes, Petersen has collected and discussed most of the available literary evidence on the Athenian method of judging in dramatic and musical contests. None of the passages quoted by him throw any direct light upon the words διὰ πάντων: but it is possible to construct from these passages a reasonable theory of the whole subject, in which ὃ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς receives what is at least a plausible explanation. I have adopted the substance of Petersen's theory in the notes, but not his view of the particular phrase διὰ πάντων κριτῆς.

The other prima facie evidence, which Petersen does not discuss, is as follows:


Hesychius: διὰ πάντων κριτῆς. Βοσθόδος φησὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι ὧν νομοθέτης ἐκέλευσε τοὺς κρίνουσι γράφειν τὰ κεφάλαια ἐκαστον.
APPENDICES TO BOOK IX.

CIG 1585, 1586, 1719, 1720.

An inscription found at Nysa and published in Bull. Hell. ix 126 l. 55 τετειμφησθαί τε αὐτὸν ἀναγορ[ήν] χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἐν ταῖσ τοῦ διὰ πάντων ἀγώνιος ἱερουργίαις τε καὶ στούναις, and other inscriptions cited in Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopädie etc. s.ν. ἀγών.

The remark of Boethus preserved by Hesychius merely alludes to the regulation that the judges were to make use of a γραμματείαν. This is abundantly attested from other sources (see Müller Griech. Bühnenalt., p. 371 n. 2), and does not, so far as I can see, help us to interpret διὰ πάντων. Cratinus' fragment, on the other hand, is important; for it shows that there was a διὰ πάντων ἀγών before the time of Plato.

The first of the inscriptions, CIG 1585, gives a list of victors in a musical contest at Thespiae, ending with διὰ πάντων (sc. ἵνικα) Εὐμάρων Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἐπετείου, who is also mentioned at the beginning as the author of the successful προσόδιον. The second inscription, found on Mt Helicon, is similar; and in CIG 1719 and 1720, both of which were discovered at Delphi, we meet with διὰ πάντων—though in 1719 πάντων has to be supplied by Boeckh—and ὁ διὰ πάντων, in the sense of ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών (as in the inscription from Nysa). According to Boeckh on CIG 1585, ὁ διὰ πάντων (νικών) is "victor inter victores," the winner of the prize given for the one best production of all the successful pieces in the different kinds, like the prize for 'the best animal in the yard' at an agricultural show; and this interpretation is supported by the fact that the winner of the διὰ πάντων in that inscription has already secured the prize for the προσόδιον. A less probable theory understands τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων rather than τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν after διὰ πάντων, and takes ὁ διὰ πάντων νικών as "wer in mehreren Productionen zwar nicht den Sieg errungen hatte, aber doch ihm am nächsten gekommen war": such a person "verdiente seiner Vielseitigkeit wegen schon einen Preis" (Kayser quoted in Grasberger Erziehung u. Unterricht iii p. 15). It will be observed that neither explanation makes the διὰ πάντων ἀγών a competition involving distinct and separate performances of its own.

As the διὰ πάντων ἀγών must necessarily have been decided last, and always, I think, comes at the end of the list of victories, the usage of the inscriptions is not inconsistent with the explanation of διὰ πάντων ἀγών as ὁ ἐγχατος, given in Bekker's Anecdota l.c. And, since it is obvious that if the Greeks could use the expressions ὁ διὰ πάντων νικών and ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών, they may well have spoken of the judge in the διὰ πάντων as ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής, it may seem that a satisfactory explanation of the Platonic phrase is possible by the aid of the Inscriptions.

But neither Kayser's nor Boeckh's interpretation of the insessional use of διὰ πάντων is in the least degree suited to the situation in the Republic. Glauco is invited to arrange the competitors in order of merit, and not merely to decide which is first; nor are the βασιλικός, τιμο-κρατικός, ὀλιγαρχικός etc. in any sense competitors in different departments, like the πιθανής, ῥαψωδός etc. of the Inscriptions; they are all from beginning to end candidates in one and the same contest for one
and the same prize. The hypothesis proposed by Kayser is still less
apposite: for Plato’s βασιλικός is anything but ‘many-sided,’ and has
never been beaten in any contest at all.

For these reasons I cannot see that the Inscriptions hitherto dis-
covered give us any real assistance in attempting to elucidate the
sentence of Plato, and it should be further remarked that they are all
of them as late as the days of the Empire. There is nothing relevant
to our purpose in the large collection of inscriptions contained in Reisch
de musicis Graecorum certaminibus (1855).

It may be well to mention some of the different views which have
been held by Platonic scholars on this difficult phrase. Ficinus
translates “quemadmodum index omnia circumspiciens de singulis
iudicat”; Schleiermacher “wie, wer in irgend einer Sache über alle
durchweg richten soll, sein Urtheil abgibt,” confessing however (Platons
Staat p. 603) that he finds the sentence obscure; Schneider “der
Richter, der über alle entscheidet,” i.e. “der welcher das Urtheil fällt,
allen die in einem musikalischen Wettstreit um den Preis
cämpfen, ihre Leistungen vollendet haben” (p. 312 of his Trans-
lation); Prandl “der Alles umfassende Richter”; Müller “der Richter,
der das Ganze zusammenfassend sein Urtheil abgibt,” i.e. “der ver-
ständige Richtende, der bei Abgabe seiner Stimme nicht einzelnes,
sondern den ganzen Thatsbefand ins Auge fasst”; Jowett “as the
general umpire in theatrical contests”; and Davies and Vaughan “the
judge who passes sentence after going through the whole case.” In
most of these versions διὰ πάντων is construed as if it were not a
technical expression at all, but merely equivalent to διὰ πάντων διεξελθόν
or the like (cf. vii 534 c). To me, on the other hand, it seems certain
that ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής is an essential part of Plato’s comparison, and
would at once suggest to Plato’s readers some particular judge or judges
in musical or dramatic competitions. Jowett and Campbell think
the words may mean: (1) the judge who decides the prizes of all
the different kinds of contests; (2) or all the prizes, e.g. first, second,
third in the same contest; (3) the judge who gave the final decision in
some musical pentathlon. I have already given my grounds for
rejecting the first suggestion; the second makes διὰ πάντων practically
otiose, for it is obvious that all the prizes in the same contest must be
awarded by the same authority; the third is more reasonable, although
I cannot agree that “πέντε ὀντος conveys an allusion to the pentathlon.”
The words πέντε ὀντος refer of course to the competitors, βασιλικόν etc.,
and not to five different subjects of competition.

Sir Richard Jebb suggests another view, which appears to me
deserving of consideration. He writes as follows:—

“A clue to the sense of διὰ πάντων here is given by those phrases in
which διὰ with the genitive denotes the range of a comparison or a
competition: e.g., Ἰλιάδ οἰκότιοι ἔρετε καὶ διὰ πάντων (‘among all’):
Herod. 1 25 θεὸς ἄξιον διὰ πάντων τῶν ἁναθημάτων: id. vi 63 εὐδοκιμέντι
διὰ πάντων. The phrase ὁ διὰ πάντων ἄγων may be a terse expression
(‘the contest from among all,’ = ‘the contest of those selected from
among all’ or ‘distinguished among all’) for that contest in which the
competitors were of διὰ πάντων εἰδοκιμήσαντες, those who had done best among all the competitors,—having vanquished their respective opponents in the preliminary contests. διὰ πάντων ἀγών would thus be what the old interpreter calls it, ὥσχατος, the final contest. For example, in the dithyrambic ἀγών at Athens there were ten choruses, one for each tribe. We will suppose that these ten competed, to begin with, in pairs. Then διὰ πάντων ἀγών would be the final contest between the five choruses left in after the preliminary contests. διὰ πάντων κριτῆς would be any one of the (five) judges in διὰ πάντων ἀγών. It seems possible that the illustration from the final decision in the contest of dithyrambic choruses may have struck Plato as having a special fitness because five competitors are in question here."

III.

IX 581 D, E. τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἢν ὦ ἐγὼ, τὶ οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἱδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τάλαντας ὡς τὰ έχει καί ἐν τοιούτῳ τινι ἀδρί εἶναι μανθάνοντα τῆς ἱδονῆς; οὐ πάνυ πόρρω, καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίας, ὡς ὑδαίν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ αὐτάκη ἦν;

In this difficult passage all the MSS have ποιώμεθα instead of τὶ οἰώμεθα. In other respects the text which I have printed agrees with Α and Π; nor is there any important variant in the inferior MSS, except νομίζειν οὗτον (for νομίζειν) in Ε and a few of its congeners.

ποιώμεθα was read by Schneider, whose translation is as follows:—

"Von dem Wissenschaftliebenden aber, sagte ich, sollen wir nicht glauben dass er die andern Annehmlichkeiten in Vergleich mit der das Wahre wie es ist, zu erkennen und immer lernend auf solche Weise beschäftigt zu sein für sehr entfernt vom angenehmen hält und sie in der That nothwendige nennt, als der der andern nicht begehren würde, wenn es nicht nothwendig wäre?" Schleiermacher had already taken the passage in this way, except that he fell into error over οὐ πάνυ πόρρω. The objections to Schneider's view have been pointed out by Stallbaum and others. They are briefly these: (1) ποιεῖσθαι by itself cannot mean 'existimare,' 'statuere'; (2) ποιώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας νομίζειν—

τῆς ἱδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω is not equivalent to ἄρι οὐ ποιώμεθα—τὰς ἄλλας νομίζειν—τῆς ἱδονῆς πάνυ πόρρω, which is that which Schneider translates. See also Graser Spec. advers. in serm. Pl. pp. 19—23. Jowett attempts to evade the second of these objections by translating "may we suppose that the philosopher regards the other pleasures in regard to the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding always, not so very far from the Heaven of pleasure, and that he calls" etc., and making τῆς ἱδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω slightlyironical, as if "intended to express that the philosopher has in knowledge the true pleasure." This explanation is, to say the least, obscure; if I understand it rightly, 'regards' means 'values,' and ποιεῖσθαι τὶ πρὸς τι surely cannot mean 'to value one thing in regard to another.'

In his published translation Jowett had acquiesced in Graser's τὶ
οἰώμεθα, which a large majority of critics have approved (Müller, Prantl, Hermann, Baiter, Madvig, Campbell). This emendation, which is easy enough, τί and π being nearly identical in uncials, removes all difficulty in the earlier part of the sentence, and is much nearer than Stallbaum's μὴ οἰώμεθα. It is also an argument against μὴ οἰώμεθα that it requires us to read νομίζειν οὐδὲν for νομίζειν: while, on the other hand, as soon as τί οἴωμεθα was corrupted into τοῦ οἴωμεθα, the οὐδὲν which we find in Ξ etc. may have been introduced into the text to go with πρὸς in the sense of 'nothing' (i.e. 'of no account') 'in comparison with' etc., exactly as in τί οἴωμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ήδονῶς νομίζειν πρὸς of the original uncorrupted text.

Critics have also differed widely about the words μαθᾶνοντα—πόρρω. Does the sentence contain two questions or only one? Of those who accept the conjecture τί οἴωμεθα, Graser and Müller suppose that there is only a single question. The former (l.c.) bids us construe τῆς ἡδονῆς κτλ. as "quo in studio a voluptate tam prope abest, ut illas etiam revera necessarias appellet" etc., taking καὶ καλεῖν for ὅποτε καὶ καλεῖν. The latter invites us to carry on the τοῦ of τοῦ εἶδον not only to εἶνα (to which of course it also belongs), but even to καλεῖν. Each of these explanations is equally unsatisfactory in point of meaning and of grammar.

Those who hold that there are two questions have hitherto made the first end with μαθᾶνοντα (Prantl, Hermann, Baiter, Campbell). According to their view, the meaning is 'And what, are we to suppose, is the philosopher's estimate of the other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the truth as it is, and being evermore engaged in such an intellectual pursuit? Must we not think that he accounts them far removed from true pleasure?' etc. (Campbell). To this there are two objections. τῆς ἡδονῆς is not by itself commensurate with 'true pleasure,' either here, or (as Shorey seems to hold A. J. Ph. xvi p. 230) in Phil. 44 c (γοητευμα, οὐ̣χ ἡδονή): and in any case (though this consideration is less weighty) it should follow rather than precede οὐ πάντα πόρρω. The first objection is met by Campbell's conjecture τῆς ἀληθείας, or by τῆς ἀληθείως ἡδονῆς. There is, however, no sign of corruption, except the three dots placed over τῆς ἡδονῆς by a later hand in A, and that is insufficient, although Baiter brackets the offending words. Madvig (Adv. Crit. 1 p. 431) would emend to τὸν δὲ φιλοσοφόν—τί οἰώμεθα—πρὸς τὴν—μαθᾶνοντα ἡδονῆν, observing quite truly that "reliquae ήδοναι non videntur philosopho τῆς ἡδονῆς (universae) πάνυ πόρρω, sed longe ab ea, quam ipse percipti." The solution which I propose in the notes has some affinity in point of meaning with that of Madvig, but requires no alteration of the text. It seems to me to be free from all the difficulties which are inherent in the above explanations.

[In 1918, Mr E. Meyrick suggested the following interpretation: "An ordinary κριτῆς has to award, say, three prizes to ten competitors; he therefore selects the first, second, and third prizewinners, and leaves the rest undiscriminated. The διὰ τῶν τῶν κριτῆς goes right through all the competitors, placing all in order, down to the last, as in a school class, from first to tenth. This is exactly the meaning required by the context. In reading... I was struck by the felicitous expression of the Greek, and the absence of a correspondingly convenient phrase in English." A. M. Adam.]
IX 563 R. ἄθρει ὅτι αὐὰς παναληθῆς ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἱδρώῃ πλὴν τῆς τῶν φρονίμου αὐὰς καθαρά, ἀλλὰ ἐσκαϊαγραφημένη τις, ὥς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκροαῖναι.

Who are τῶν σοφῶν? Stallbaum's answer is "Verba ὃς ἐγὼ δοκῶ— ἀκροαῖναι, nisi fallor, ad Philebus ipsius Platonis referenda sunt." Apart altogether from the disputed question as to the priority of the Philebus, it is very unlikely that Plato should refer to himself as τῶν σοφῶν, and none of the other passages where such a phrase occurs lends any support to this explanation. Schleiermacher (Platons Staats p. 604), Susemihl (Gen. Entw. II p. 242), and Zeller1 (II p. 548 n. 2), hold that the entire argument presupposes the Philebus, but do not discuss the words τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς. It is tolerably clear, as Schneider points out on p. 312 of his translation, that τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς is one of those who in Phil. 44 ff. are said to consider the so-called pleasures of the body merely λυπῶν ἀσφυγμαῖ. The passage in question is as follows:

Σω. Ὁπτως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλίβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις. Πρω. Ἀλεξίης δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας; Σω. Καὶ μάλα δειγμόνες λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οὐ τὸ παράπαν ἃδινας οὐ φασίν εἶναι. Πρω. Τί μὴν; Σω. Λυπῶν ταῦτας εἶναι πάσας ἀσφυγμαῖς, ἃς τίνοι περὶ Φιλίθουν ἃδινας ἐπονομάζουσιν. Πρω. Τούτοις οὐν ἡμᾶς πότερα πιθεσθαί ἐξεμποιλεῖσθαι, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σῶκρατε; Σω. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ μάταις προσχρήσθαι τις, μαντευμονάς οὐ τήρην ἄλλα τινὶ δυσχερεῖσι φύσεωσι οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς, λίιν μεμενχησάν τὴν τῆς ἃδινας δύναμιν καὶ νευμίκοστοι οὐδὲν οὐκιε, ὥςτε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἃδινας εἶναι κτλ.

Schneider's identification, so far as it goes, has been generally accepted by recent critics; and the parallels are too close to admit of doubt: note in particular γοήτευμα as compared with ἐσκαϊαγραφημένη. But there is little agreement on the question who these haters of pleasure are, and they have been variously explained as: (1) Antisthenes and the Cynics (Urban ib. die Erwähnungen d. Phil. d. Antisthenes in d. Pl. Schriften p. 28 and Zeller1 II p. 306 n. 6); (2) "probably Pythagorising friends" of Plato's, "who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards τὰς ἃδινας τῶν ἀσχημόνων" (Grote Plato II p. 610 n., and to somewhat the same effect also Prantl in his Translation of the Republic p. 422 n. 311); (3) Democritus and his adherents (Hirzel Unters. zu Cicero's philos. Schrif. I pp. 141—152, and Natorp in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. III pp. 522—528, and in Die Ethika d. Demokritos pp. 164—179). The respectful tone in which Plato, both in the Philebus and in the Republic, mentions the authors of these anti-hedonistic theories does not permit us to suppose that Antisthenes is intended. It is moreover inconsistent with the grossness which pervaded the Cynic philosophy to suppose that they looked upon the unseemly pleasures as delusive and false; nor was Antisthenes in any sense of the term δεῖνος λεγόμενος τὰ περὶ φύσιν.
'These reasons, which are to my mind conclusive, are urged by Grote, and supplemented with great ability by Natorp.

I agree with von Arnim, who in his review of Natorp (Gött. gel. Anz. for 1894 p. 889) emphatically rejects the attempted identification of these pleasure-haters with Democritus and his followers. The founder of Hedonism could surely never have totally denied the existence of pleasure (τὸ παράπτων ἡδονᾶς οὐ φασιν εἶναι Phil. l.c.) and Plato (in spite of Hirzel l.c. pp. 146 ff.) was not likely to treat the Arch-materialist with so much consideration and respect. Natorp's elaborate comparison of Democritus' ethical fragments with the writings of Plato involves many highly speculative combinations, and the two writers seldom if ever touch one another except in moral and political common-places and maxims for which parallels can readily be quoted from the other remains of pre-Socratic literature.

There are, I think, strong positive reasons for holding, in virtual agreement with Grote, that Plato has in view preachers of the Orphic-Pythagorean moral and religious school.

In the first place, we find other passages in which Plato alludes to this class of moralists as σοφοὶ. They were Plato's precursors in asserting the doctrine of individual immortality and transmigration; and in the Meno (81 A ff.) Plato refers to them in this connexion by the words αἰκήσα τοὺς αἰώροις τε καὶ γυναικῶς σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα κτλ. The famous passage of the Gorgias (492 Ε ff.) where the Orphic-Pythagorean view of the body as a tomb—σῶμα σῆμα—is expounded, begins σεπ ἡδη τοῦ ἐγώνες καὶ ἵκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τεθναμέναι, καὶ τοῦ μὲν σῶμα ἐστὶν ἡμᾶς σῆμα κτλ. It is even possible that of σοφοὶ was a recognised way of describing—sometimes not without irony—the representatives of the Orphic brotherhood. Dieterich in his Νεκύια (pp. 124, 133) cites in support of this contention Sophocles El. 62 ἡδή γὰρ εἶδον πολλάκις καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς | λόγῳ μάτην θυσίαςκετας, and Euripides Hyl. 513 f. λόγος γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔρως, σοφῶν δὲ ἐπος, | διανῆς αὐτάχθων οὐδεν ἀναμείναι πλεών. The sages who reappeared after they were supposed to have died—Pythagoras, Zalmoxis, Aristaeus etc.—are generally connected with the Orphic cult (Rohde Psyche 11 pp. 28 ff. 90 ff.), and the power of Αὐτάχθων was a characteristic feature in the same creed (Dieterich l.c.). Another place in which σοφοὶ has the same reference, according to Dieterich, is Aesch. P. V. 936 οἱ προσκυνοῦντες τὴν Ἀδραστεαν σοφοῖ. The goddess Adrasteia plays a large part in the Orphic theology (cf. Thompson on Pl. Phaedr. 248 c), and Aeschylus’ line certainly gains additional point if we agree with Dieterich, although in this particular instance I cannot regard the reference as proved. Miss Harrison has supplied me with two other passages to the same effect, one in Eur. Ion 1139 οὐς λέγοντων οἱ σοφοὶ, where the allusion is to some numerical measurements according to which a ritual tent has to be built, and another in Eur. Fr. 938 Dindorf καὶ γαία μὴτερ, Ἐστὶν δὲ τοί σοφοὶ βροτῶν καλῶσων. In the last of these instances οἱ σοφοὶ undoubtedly means the Pythagoreans; see Pl. Phaedr. 247 λ and Thompson ad loc.

Secondly, the conception of the unreality and ‘impurity’ of bodily

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pleasure has the closest affinity with the doctrine of the *Phaedo*. It is implied in the *Phaedo*, as it is here (οὐδὲ παναληθῆς), that the pleasures of sense are not, strictly speaking, pleasures at all (τούτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἀληθῶς τὴν ὕδωρ, δὲ οὐ τὰς ἱδρυάς καλοῦμένας τὰς τουίδε, οἷον σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν κτλ. 64 D: cf. also 69 B and 81 B quoted in the notes); and just as sensual pleasure is here declared to be ‘impure’ (οὐδὲ καθαρά), so also the *Phaedo* constantly insists on the need of purification (καθαρίας) from the body and its lusts (66 A—68 B, 69 B, C, 80 E ff., 82 D, 108 B, 114 C). Now it is precisely these and such-like views on sin, the relation of body and soul, etc., which formed the kernel of the Orphic-Pythagorean morality (Rohde l.c. ii pp. 121—136, 160—170), and Plato himself does not desire to conceal the source from which he derived his inspiration (see Crat. 400 c and other evidence in Stallbaum-Wohlrab on *Phaedo*. 62 B and Rohde l.c. ii pp. 265—295). See also on IX 586 B.

The words δεινοὶ λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν in the *Philebus* seem to show that Plato is there thinking in particular of certain pythagorising Orphics. The Pythagoreans “might well be termed δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν. They paid much attention to the interpretation of nature, though they did so according to a numerical and geometrical symbolism” (Grote l.c.). The expression ‘symbolism’ is however incorrect, if—as I think with Burnet *Early Greek Phil*. pp. 312 ff.—the Pythagorean numbers, at all events in the original form of the theory, were spatial, in which case δεινοὶ τὰ περὶ φύσιν is even more appropriate as a description of the Pythagoreans). In the present passage there is nothing (beyond the parallel with the *Philebus*) to indicate any special reference to Pythagoreans, although, as Rohde has shewn, the moral and religious teaching of Orphics and Pythagoreans was for all practical purposes the same.

V.

IX 584 E—585 A. In this difficult passage the reading of Paris A and all the best mss is ὁσιρὴ πρὸς μέλαν φαιν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρία λευκὸν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυτον ὦτο λῦτην ἀφορμῶντες ἀπειρία ὕδωρ ἄπατωνται; 

In the text I have followed Schneider in reading, with q and Flor. U, ὁσιρὴ <δὲ> instead of ὁσιρὴ, and Schleiermacher in printing τὸ ἄλυτον ὦτο πρὸς λῦτην for πρὸς τὸ ἄλυτον ὦτο λῦτην, which is in all the mss.

I will deal first with ὁσιρὴ—ἀπειρία λευκὸν. The structure of the clause proves that it is mainly intended to balance and illustrate καὶ—ἀπειρία ὕδωρ. That being the case, is it possible to dispense with δὲ after ὁσιρὴ, for which the authority is very slight?

In his *In Plat. Pol. quaest. philol.* i pp. 46 ff. Neukirch remarks “verba ὁσιρὴ πρὸς—λευκὸν, describentia eos, quibuscum illi, de quibus in antecedentibus sermo est, comparantur, ita accedunt, quasi absolvant comparationem; quam ut magis perspicuam et perfectam exhibeat, addit praeterea scriptor καὶ πρὸς—ἀπατωνται, nullam iam habens rationem eorum, quae ante ὁσιρὴ posita sunt,” comparing (for the use
of ὀστέρ) III 413 D, IV 432 D, E, VIII 557 C, X 625 E, 611 C, D and Phaed. 60 e—61 a. Hermann also agrees with Neukirch in excluding δέ. It is certainly true that ὀστέρ cun asyndeto may be thus used (see on vi 497 B), but inasmuch as ἀπατώνται furnishes the antithesis to σφόδρα μὲν οἴνοιται, we cannot here dispense with δέ. With Schneider and the other editors, I am therefore reluctantly obliged to desert the best MSS in this passage.

There is less unanimity among critics about καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπτον οὕτω λύπην. As the words stand in the MSS, Painlessness is equated with Black, Pain with Grey, and Pleasure with White. In point of fact, however, Black should correspond to Pain, and Grey to Painlessness. The second hand in q tried to avoid the difficulty by advising the transposition of μὲναν and φαῖον, and so Jowett translates, “they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white” etc. But ἀπεφρα λευκὸν is not ‘instead of white’; and, as Schneider observed, q is certainly wrong, for however ignorant you are of white, you do not mistake black when contrasted with grey. Schneider himself, followed by Stallbaum and the other editors, is content to obey the MSS “quia per codices mutare non licet.” His explanation, like that of Stallbaum (“res codem redit, sive dolor iuxta doloris vacuatum, sive doloris vacuata iuxta dolorem spectari dicatur”), is fatal to the balance of the two clauses ὀστέρ—λευκὸν καὶ—ηδονή: nor is it permissible, with the Oxford editors, to defend the ms reading by calling that a chiasmus which in reality involves an erroneous identification.

For these reasons, the MSS are, I believe, wrong. There is little to choose between Schleiermacher’s two conjectures τὸ ἄλυπτον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην and πρὸς λύπην οὕτω τὸ ἄλυπτον, the second of which was afterwards repeated by W. H. Thompson (J. of Ph. v p. 218). With Richards (Cl. Rev. viii p. 294), I rather prefer the first, chiefly on account of the chiasmus.

VI.

IX 585c. Ὡ ὁὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίων οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἤ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Ὅθομὼς. Ὁ ὁδός ἢ ἁληθείας; Οὐδὲ τὸῦτο. Ἔι δὲ ἁληθείας ἤττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; Ἄναγκη κτλ.

Such is the text of all the best MSS. There is nothing in any of the others to indicate the presence of corruption, for the variants μὴ ἀεὶ ὁμοίων (v Flor. R) and τοῦ μυθέστε ὁμοίων (q and a Florentine ms) are obviously only attempts at emendation.

The traditional reading is maintained by Schneider and the Oxford editors. On grammatical grounds it is clear (1) that Ὁ ὁδός ἢ ἁληθείας; Οὐδὲ τὸῦτο stands for Ὁ ὁδός; <ἡ ἀεὶ ὁμοίων οὐσία> ἁληθείας <τι μᾶλλον ἤ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει>; Οὐδὲ τὸῦτο: also (2) that Ἔι δὲ ἁληθείας ἤττον stands for Ἔι δὲ ἁληθείας ἤττον <μετέχει ἤ ἀεὶ ὁμοίων οὐσία>. We have no right (with Schneider) to explain Ὁ ὁδός ἢ ἁληθείας as Ὁ ὁδός, <ἡ> ἁληθείας, or to understand only <μετέχει τι> after Ἔι δὲ ἁληθείας ἤττον.
Jowett and Campbell do not explain the construction, but apparently regard the introduction of ἐπιστήμη as otiose and irrelevant. “For the sake of his” (Plato’s) “argument it would have been sufficient to obtain the admission that truth and essence go together: that the pleasures of the body, being less true, are also less real.” It appears to me quite clear that the mention of ἐπιστήμη plays an important part in the argument. Surely it must refer to, and be interpreted by, ἐπιστήμη already mentioned in τὸ δύσης τε ἀληθῶς εἴδος καὶ ἐπιστήμη μης κτλ.

Is it possible to reconcile the grammatical construction of the ms text with such an interpretation of ἐπιστήμης? Let us try.

The Being of the ever-like, as appears from Glauco’s πολύ διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἂν ομοίον taken in connexion with the previous sentence, has more Being and more Truth, than the Being of the never-like has. If therefore the Being of the ever-like has as much part in Knowledge as it has in Being and in Truth (ἡ οВиде—Οὐδὲ τοῦτο), we may infer (since μετοχή is reciprocal) that Knowledge also has as much part in Being and in Truth than has the Being of the never-like. (The inference is just, but Plato does not draw it, and his way of expressing himself certainly does not invite us to do so. If we could make ἢ ἐπιστήμης = ἢ ἐπιστήμης οὐσία, which is barely possible, or if we read ἢ <ἡ> ἐπιστήμης sc. οὐσία, or ἐπιστήμη instead of ἐπιστήμης, this explanation becomes easier in itself, and the inference is also easier to draw.) But the words εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἦττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσία; present an insuperable difficulty. They cannot be made to suit with this interpretation unless we make the subject of ἦττον <μετέχει> either (α) ἐπιστήμη (οἱ ἢ ἐπιστήμης οὐσία), or else (β) τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίον (ορ τὰ οὐν σίτου κτλ.); and the only possible grammatical subject, so far as I can see, is ἢ ἂν ὁμοίον οὐσία.

For these and other reasons, some of which are urged by Vermehren Plat. Stud. pp. 114 ff., the text must, I fear, be pronounced corrupt.

The emendation which I have ventured to print supposes that the error lies in the subject of μετέχει. By reading ἂν ἀναμοίον (μηδέποτε ὁμοίον) instead of ἂν ὁμοίον, and ἢ ἐπιστήμης sc. οὐσία instead of ἐπιστήμης, it is possible to introduce the necessary contrast in respect of Being and Truth between the never-like (to which such γενί as food etc. belong), and Knowledge, which belongs to the ever-like. R. G. Bury’s emendation proceeds upon essentially the same principle. After an acute analysis of this passage (Cl. Rev. xiii pp. 289 ff.) he proposes to write: ἢ ο Vide ἂν ὁμοίον σίτα μάλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμη μετέχει; This suggestion regarded in itself is more attractive than that which I have adopted: for it contrasts the particular, instead of the general, with the particular, and thus makes ἄλος doubly appropriate. But on the one hand, throughout the whole of this argument Plato uses the word μετέχει only in connexion with Being and Truth: whereas Bury connects it with the ‘ever-like’; and on the other hand it is extremely unlikely that ἢ ο Vide ἂν ὁμοίον σίτα—ἐπιστήμη should ever have been corrupted into ἢ ο Vide ἂν ὁμοίον οὐσία οὐσίας τι—ἐπιστήμη. Bury’s explanation of the error involves one dittotherapy and four subsequent adaptations or ‘corrections.’ If we were dealing only with an emended ms like q, such a restoration might
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be possible—probable it could not even then be called: but I doubt if there is a single instance in which it can be shewn that Paris A has suffered to this extent in this particular way. I should however be only too glad to accept a convincing emendation on the lines indicated by Bury, and I have spent no small amount of time in trying to devise one, without attaining any more satisfactory result than that which he has reached. Possibly άεί ὦμοιον has replaced a word denoting some particular kind of food.

Meantime the reading given in the text, though less pointed, appears to me less improbable. άεί ἀνομοίον, which gives the same sense as θ's τοῦ μηδέποτε ὦμοιον, might readily pass into άεί ὦμοιον under the influence of άεί ὦμοιον just before; and the addition of <ή> after <ή> is scarcely a change.

The other conjectures are these: (1) έν ὦν ἀνομοίον οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον έπιστήμης μετέχει; (Hermann, followed by Müller): (2) έν τοῦ ἀνομοίον κτλ.; (Stallbaum, who adds "nolumus tamen in re incerta quidquam in oratione Platonis, qualem codd. plurimi optimique exhibent, immutare"): (3) έν γούν ὦν ἀνομοίον οὐσία ὦμοιας τι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; "Hat denn zum Wenigsten das ungleiche Wesen einen grösseren Antheil am Wissen als das gleiche? Keineswegs. Und wie, an der Wahrheit? Auch das nicht. Wenn aber einen minderen an der Wahrheit, weil am Wissen, dann nicht auch am Sein? Nothwendig" (Vermehren l.c.). (4) Madvig (and after him Baiter) postulates an extensive lacuna. He first ejects καὶ ἀληθείας just before, and after writing with Ast το <τοῦ> μηδέποτε ὦμοίον, continues as follows: Η έν έν τοῦ ἀεί ὦμοίον οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τι δ', ἀληθείας; Οὐδέ τούτο. Η δ' τοῦ ἀνομοίου οὐκ ἐπιστήμης ήττον μετέχει ή τοῦ ὦμοίου; Πώς γὰρ οὖ; Εἰ δ' ἐπιστήμης, καὶ ἀληθείας; Καὶ τοῦτο.>

The possibility of a lacuna must be allowed, as well as the counter-possibility that έν ὦν—ἀνάγκη is a clumsy attempt (modelled perhaps on Theae. 186 c, d) on the part of some scribe to show that Being and Truth go together, so that where there is less of the one, there is also less of the other; but neither solution is probable. It will be observed that all these attempts at correction agree in working in ἀνόμοιον (in some form or other) as the subject to μετέχει, although they are, I think, wrong in leaving ἐπιστήμης as it stands. It may be added that the brief account of Plato's third argument in Proclus Comment. 11 p. 82 ed. Kroll is of no use in trying to interpret or emend this difficult sentence.
695 A—597 E. On a retrospect of our city, says Socrates, we can now see even more clearly than before that we did right in excluding imitative Poetry. What is Imitation? Examine it in the light of the Ideas, and you will find that it is the production of images or appearances which are third in order from Reality and Truth. There are, for example, three beds: (1) that which is in Nature, made, as we may say, by God; (2) that which the carpenter manufactures; (3) that which is the product of the painter’s art. The first is, and must be, one; for there cannot be two Ideas of bed. We have thus two makers in connexion with the notion of bed: (1) a Nature-maker (φερομορφός), who is God; (2) a manufacturer (δημομορφός), viz. the carpenter. There is also (3) an imitator, i.e. the painter. Imitation is therefore concerned with a product third in sequence from Nature, and the tragic poet, among other imitators, is third from Royalty and Truth.

595 A ff. Book X falls into two divisions, the first (595 A—608 B) dealing with Poetry, the second (608 C—621 D) with Immortality and the rewards of Justice both here and hereafter. The second half of the Book forms a welcome supplement to Plato’s treatment of the main thesis of the Republic (see on 608 C); but the first division is of the nature of an episode, and might have been omitted without injury to the artistic unity of the dialogue (cf. Hirzel Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 623). It is in no sense, as supposed by Schleiermacher (Einleitung p. 52) and apparently also by Hirzel (der Dialog p. 237 n.), a fulfilment of the promise held out in 392 C; nor ought we to construe (νοών δὲ καὶ πάθη εἰς τοῦτον III 394 D as a hint that the subject of Poetry is to be resumed: see note ad loc. Why then is the episode introduced at all? The choralists (such as Siebeck Unters. zur Phil. d. Griech. pp. 142 ff., Pileiderer zur Lösung etc. p. 34 and Brandt zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre d. Seelenlebens p. 27), relying partly on the tone of the exordium, partly on ἀπολελογισμῷ 607 B, assert that Plato is replying to certain comic poets (Pileiderer), or to Antisthenes (Brandt), who had presumably fallen foul of Plato’s treatment of Poetry in Books 11 and 111. Cf. also Zeller 4 H. p. 526 n. 2. But apart altogether from the question whether the Republic was issued en bloc or piecemeal, there is no actual evidence to support the presumption on which this theory rests (cf. 598 D, 607 B n. m.). The Platonic dialogue, like actual conversation, is at liberty to recall, modify, and expand the results of a discussion apparently finished (cf. Hirzel I. c. pp. 228—230, 236); and we have already had an incidental recurrence to the subject of Poetry in VIII 608 A—D. Granted that Plato wished to justify his exclusion of the Muses by metaphysical and psychological as well as moral and pedagogic arguments, the beginning of Book X is his best, and indeed, as Hirner shews (I. c. p. 625), his only opportunity; see on 595 B. He may well have wished to do so: for his dethronement of the great educator of Greece (606 E) would be sure to arouse wide-spread hostility, and Plato almost seems to feel that it needs further justification even to himself (595 B n.). Cf. Hirner I. c. pp. 614—628 and see also on 598 D, 607 B.

The student will find an excellent and exhaustive account of Plato’s theory of Aesthetics in Walter Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum (1893) pp. 168—476. His attitude towards Poetry and Poets is...
very fully discussed by Reber Platon u. die Poesie (1864). Heine de rer. quae Platonis cum poet. Gr. interredit, etc. (1886), and more recently by Finshler Platon u. die Aris. Poetic (1900) and Sthörn Die Stellung d. Poesie in d. plat. Phil. (1901). Following on the path marked out by Belger in his dissertation de Arte etiam in arte poetica Platonis dixitp. (1872), Finshler has succeeded in showing that Aristotle's debt to Plato in his Theory of Poetry is far greater than is commonly supposed; and although the treatment of Poetry in Book X of the Republic must be confessed to be inadequate and unjust, Plato himself, as Walter and Sthörn have recognised, furnishes us elsewhere with the materials for constructing a truer and more generous theory. See also on 598 E. It may be added that a study of the Poetics of Aristotle side by side with 595 A—608 B will enable the student to understand both Plato and Aristotle better than if he confines himself to either alone. See also Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, pp. 115 ff.

595 A 3 ενθυμηθεῖς περὶ ποιήσεως. II 377 B—III 403 C.

II καὶ τὸ μισάμ demanded—μιμητική. See III 394 B—398 B. Plato speaks as if he had taboos all mimetic poetry, but it is clear from 111 396 E compared with 397 D, 398 B and 401 B—402 C that he did not condemn poetic and artistic imitation as such, but would have admitted it where the model imitated was good. See also on 595 C, 607 A, 608 A infra.

595 B 5 επιθύμηθεῖ—εδήπ: viz. in Book IV and also throughout VIII and IX. The psychological theory of these books is laid under contribution in 602 C ff.; see note ad loc. It may seem strange that Plato makes no reference to the metaphysical doctrine of V—VII, since he derives his first argument (596 A—601 B) from the theory of Ideas: but it was unnecessary for him to refer to it in this connexion, because the theory is itself expressly re-enunciated (eidos γάρ που κτλ. 596 A) before the argument begins.

II καίτοι φιλία γε—λέγειν. Plato speaks with real feeling: no one who had so much of the poet in himself could be insensible to Homer's charm, and nearly every dialogue of Plato bears evidence of the affectionate admiration in which he held the first of tragic poets.' See Heine de rer. quae Platonis cum poetis Grac. interredit pp. 8—15. The ancient classed Plato and Homer together: δῷ γὰρ αὐτὰ ψευδα λέγειν γενέσθαι παναρμόνως, says Olympiodorns (vitr. Pl. 6): and Longinus remarks that of all Greek writers Plato was Ὀμηροκάτατος—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀμηροκάτοι κείνων νάματος εἰς αὐτῶν μυρία ὁδοι παρατραπάσα ἀποχειρουόμενοι (περὶ ὄψεως 13. 3). See also the admirable remarks on Plato's imitation of Homer in James Geddes's essay On the Composition and Manner of Writing of the Ancients pp. 180—200, and Proclus' much less sound and instructive article ὅτι διὰ πάσης τῆς ἐναυτῶν συγγραφῆς Ὀμηρον ἱλιατίς ἐστίν ὦ Πλάτων ταῖς λεκτικαῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ ταῖς πραγματικάς in his in

A. P. II.
There isn't a direct translation of the text due to its complexity and the need for specialized knowledge. The text appears to be a philosophical discussion, possibly related to the works of Plato or Aristotle, involving concepts of ethics, imitation, and the role of the artist. The discussion seems to involve a debate on whether the artist is copying reality or creating something new. The text also touches on the nature of art and its relationship to reality, as well as the ethical implications of creating art.
596 a 5 εκ τῆς εἰσοδίων μεθόδου κτλ. As in v 476 a (see note ad loc.), so here, Plato does not try to prove the Ideal Theory, but treats Glauco as already a loyal Platonist. The account which Plato here gives of his Ideas has been widely canvassed from many different points of view. Bosanquet (Comptes rendus pp. 381 ff.) appears to me to err by interpreting it throughout only in terms of modern life and thought. Others refuse to regard it as serious. In view of the inherent difficulties, and because of Aristotle's remark διά θ' ου κακών ὁ Πλάτων ἐφή δι' εἰδή εἰσιν ὑπόσα φύσει Met. A 4. 1070 a 18: cf. also A 991 b 3 ff. with Bonitz's note. Others, again, like Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 242 ff.), hold that the Ideal Theory in BK x is inconsistent with the theory expounded in v—vii, where we do not hear of Ideas corresponding to concrete and artificial objects, but only of Ideas of qualities (such as Justice) and the like. In reply to the last school of critics, we may point out that Plato is not bound to give an exhaustive account of the Ideal theory whenever he has occasion to make use of it. On the previous occasion he confined himself to Ideas of the virtues etc., because they only were relevant to his immediate purpose (see on v 476 a and cf. Grimmel de reip. Pl. comp. et unil. pp. 81 ff., Hirmer l.c. pp. 646 ff. and Dümmler zuv Comp. d. Pl. St. p. 14), and it is exactly the same reason which makes him cite Ideas of concrete and artificial objects in Book x. The view that Plato should not be taken seriously is as old as Proclus, who (in Tim. 104 F) observes ό γάρ κατά τινα Ιδέαν ὁ τεκτίτης ποιεῖ ἀ ποιεῖ, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν ὅ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ εἰρημένα παράδοξαματο ἐφύστα χάριν καὶ οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν, but, apart from other considerations, the recurrence of the same form of the theory in other dialogues (see on 596 b, c) justifies us in taking Plato here also at his word. The history of the controversy is ably reviewed by Dr Beckmann (Nous Plato artes Hector ideas statuarit, Bonn 1886), with whom and with Zeller² 11 pp. 666, 701 al. I agree in believing this passage to be an authoritative exposition of the Ideal theory on one of its many sides.

εἴδος γὰρ ποιοι κτλ.: 'for we are, as you know, in the habit of assuming a certain idea—always one idea—in connexion with each group of particulars to which we apply the same name': lit. 'an Idea, one each' i.e. each being one. There cannot be two or more Ideas of Bed for example: cf. 597 c. Unnecessary trouble has been raised about the translation of this sentence by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 249), whose version "in Bezug auf jedes der vielen Dinge nehmen wir je eine Einheit als eiδὸν τι an" is both strained and inaccurate. For the statement itself cf. v 476 a, 479 a, b, e, 480 a, VI 493 e and VII 507 b n. Plato might have written any of the foregoing passages without believing in Ideas of anything beyond qualities and attributes: but that he did believe in other Ideas also is evident not only from Book x, but also from Phil. 15 a, 16 c, d and many other places quoted by Zeller² 11 p. 701 n. 1.

8 πολλαὶ πού εἰσί καλοὶ κτλ. Why does Plato select examples of artificial objects, when the Painter can equally well paint the features of Nature, as is virtually allowed in c? One reason is that otherwise he could not have constructed the descending scale θέλων, κλωστῶν, ζυγάρων 597 b ff. Had he selected e.g. mountains, it would be difficult to specify the middle term. Moreover in Soph. 266 b ff. we have a distinction drawn between θέλων and ψυχρωτύπων εἰσώνωσι, the first producing likenesses of natural objects by natural agencies, the

25—2
second likenesses of artificial objects by artificial means, and Painting is there also classed under the second head: ti de tην ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ’ οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομική φόρμαν ποιεῖν, γραφική δὲ τιν’ ετέραν, οἷον ὁμ. αὖθις ἐννοόν ἔγγραφον ἀπειργασμένην; (266 c). Inasmuch as σκευαστά are elsewhere credited with less reality than φωτείνα (see on νι 532 β, C μιλ.), the choice of these examples is also specially appropriate to Plato’s main object, that is to say, the depreciation of imitative art.

596 β 9 ἄλλα ἑδεα κτλ. For ideas of σκευαστά cf. especially Crat. 389 α—390 α, a passage which forms an admirable commentary on this. The anecdote about Plato and Diogenes in D. L. vi 53 (Πλατωνός περί ἑδεων διαλεγομένων, καὶ ὀνομάζοντος τραπεζῆ τητα καὶ κυνάθτητα κτλ.) is pointless unless Plato believed in ἑδή των σκευαστῶν.

11 οὐκόν—κατά ταύτα. Cf. Crat. 389 α ff. πόι βλέπων ὅ τέκτον την κερίδα ποιεῖ; ἄρ’ ὁ πρός τοιούτων τι ὁ πέρυκε κερικῇ; Πάνω γε. Τι δὲ; ἂν καταγγ. αὐτῷ ἡ κερίς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιησῇ ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατασχαίν βλέπων, ἡ πρὸς ἐκείνο τό ἐδος, πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἡν κατάει ἐποίει; Πρὸς ἐκείνο, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. οὐκόν ἐκείνο δικαίωται ἂν αὐτῷ δὲ ἐστὶ κερίς καλέσαμεν; ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. The Idea is conceived as a paradigma: cf. vi 500 ε—501 C and see on ν 476 D. Borrowing the ontology of the Philebus, we might say that the carpenter has an ἄπειρον of wood, into which he introduces πέρας after the model of the Idea of Bed or άφθια, thereby manufacturing a μμετόν or material bed (Schmitt die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil. p. 25 n. 68). We are not entitled (in view of 597 β and the phraseology of the present passage) to take ἑδεας merely as the plan or form of bed in the mind of the carpenter: the Ideas of σκευαστά must be credited with the same attributes—transcendence, self-existence, etc.—as appertain to those of abstract qualities and φωτείνα (see on ν 476 Α), although the difficulties which such a view involves are undeniably greater in the one case than in the other. If we put ourselves in Plato’s position—and Socrates is here speaking as one Platonist to another (εἰδώλαι κατὰ λέγειν)—it becomes correct to say that the carpenter is looking at the Idea rather than at his own νόμα, for the νόμα is sought apart from its object, the νοστόν (cf. ν 476 ε ν.), i.e. the self-existent Idea of Bed, without which all the νόματα in the world would be powerless to generate a bed because it is the αὐτό δ ἐστι κλη, and no mere νόμα, which is the true and essential cause of all material κλίναι. See also on 597 β.

596 C 15 καὶ τόνδε—δημιουργόν: i.e. καὶ τόνδε τον δημιουργόν τινα καλείς, sc. as well as the δημιουργός ἐκατέρω τοῦ σκευοῦς. Baiter ought not to have printed Vernhemmen’s pointless conjecture καὶ τόνδε τινα καλείς των δημιουργῶν (Pl. Suid. p. 118): for Plato is leading up to 597 β ἡγανόρας δῆ, κλινοῦσιν, θέος, τρεῖς οὖντες ἐπιστάται τριαὶ εἰδεῖς κληνῶν, and he again calls the painter a δημιουργός in D and E: so also χειρότεχνης just below.

16 δό—χειρότεχνων. Cf. Soph. 233 ε—

234 C, where the same conception is worked out in almost exactly the same way.

17 τάξα here means ‘soon,’ and not ‘perhaps’: cf. with Schneider Crat. 410 ε.
μάλλον φήσεις. ο αυτός γάρ ούτος χειροτέχνης ού μόνον πάντα
οίός τε σκευή ποιήσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἀπαντα
ποιεῖ καὶ ξίφα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τὰ τε καὶ εαυτὸν, καὶ πρὸς 20
τὸ τούτοις γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεοῦ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ
Δεν "Αλίδου ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἐργάζεται. Πάνω θαυμαστὸν, 
ἐφη, λέγεις σοφιστήν. 'Απιστεῖς; ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μοι εἰπὲ, τὸ παράπαν
οὐκ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτος δημιουργὸς, ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ
γενέσθαι ἂν τούτων ἀπαντῶν ποιητῆς, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν; ἢ οὐκ 25
αἰσθάνει, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς οἶος τ' εἴης πάντα ταύτα ποιήσαι τρόπῳ
γέ τιν; Καὶ τίς, ἐφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος; Οὐ χαλεπός, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ,
ἀλλὰ πολλαχῆ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργοῦμενος· τάχιστα δὲ δίπου, εἰ
'θέλεις λαβῶν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ ταχὺ μὲν ἡλίον
ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆ, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτὸν τε 30
καὶ τάλλα ξών καὶ σκέυη καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα ὡσα γίνω δὴ ἐλέγετο.
Ναὶ, ἐφη, φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὡτα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Καλῶς,
ἤν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δεόν ἔρχεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν τοιοῦτων γάρ, οἴμαι,
δημιουργῶν καὶ ο ζωγράφος ἐστίν. ἢ γὰρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; 'Ἀλλὰ
21. πάντα Α'Π: punctis notavit Α''.

20 καὶ ξαυτόν presents no difficulty: cf. ταχὺ δὲ σαυτὸν in E below. It is diffi-
cult to imagine why Liebhold proposed τὰ κατ’ ἐναυτῶν (Philolog. for 1850 p.
168). Perhaps he thought the δημιουργὸς was ὁ θεός, an extraordinary error, which
Peipers and others (see Zeller4 11 p. 711
n. 4) perpetrated, making God his own
creator, and drawing some profound and
far-reaching metaphysical lessons from their
mistake.

καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κτλ. Soph. I.c. καὶ
πρὸς γε τὰ λαλάττησι [καὶ γῆς] καὶ οὐρανοῦ
καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄνωτάτων. The
words in brackets occur only in Ξ, and were
possibly introduced from this pas-
sage.

21 πάντα has two (not, as Baiter as-
serts, five) dots over it in Α, but is in all
the MSS and should not (with Baiter) be
bracketed. It is important, in view of
508 c ff., to insist that there is nothing
which the Painter and Poet cannot
'make': hence the emphasis.

22 ἐν' Ἀιδοῦ should also of course be
kept, though cancelled by Herwerden.
Polynotus' famous picture of τὰ ἐν' Ἀιδοῦ
at Delphi may serve as an illustration
(Paus. x 28—31).

598 D 23 σοφιστήν: used as in Symp.

203 D δεών γῆς καὶ φαρμακεύς καὶ σο-
φιστής. Plato may also mean to hint that
the Painter and Sophist are birds of a
feather: for in Soph. 233 ε ff. a definition
of the Sophist in the ordinary sense of
the term is evolved out of just such an
account of painting as we find here.

25 ποιητῆς. The Greek idea of the
Poet as a 'maker' lends additional flavour
to ποιεῖν and ποιητής throughout this
argument.

28 δημιουργοῦμενος is suggested of
course by δημιουργὸς just before: cf. III
395 b. The combination of this verb
with τρόπος has a playful mock-heroic
air.

29 κάτοπτρον κτλ. On the view of
Painting here involved see 598 A. n. It is
usual to compare Shakespeare's "hold
the mirror up to nature," but (as Bosan-
quett points out) there is more in Shake-
peare's saying than in Plato's.

598 E 33 τῶν τοιούτων—ζωγράφος
ἐστίν. The Painter will copy with less
accuracy than a mirror, so that according
to Plato's way of reasoning in this pas-
sage Photography is superior in point of
truth to Painting (Reber Plato u. die
Poesie p. 23). See however on 598 A.
38 οὗ—μέντοι. 1 339 B n. ἢρτι refers to 596 B.
597 Α 7 εἰ καὶ τότῳ κτλ.: sc. as well as the κλημη made by the painter.
597 Β 9 ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τούτων κτλ. For εἰπε see on ν. 475 Α. τούτων in τὸν μιμητὴν τούτον ("hunc, quem quaerimus" Schneider) was found by Dübner to be the reading of A as well as the rest of Bekker's MSS, and Schneider restores it in his Addit. p. 77.
10 οὐκόνων κτλ. For γίγνονται see on viii. 156 Α. With ἐν τῇ φύσει cf. infra 597 Ε, 598 Α. Phaed. 103 Β and Parm. 132 Ε τὰ μὲν εἴη ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει. Each of these passages brings ἡ φύσις into connexion with the Ideas: cf. also ν. 476 B, ν. 501 B, Crat. 389 Β ff. and infra 597 Β. E. In the phrase ἐν τῇ φύσει, the expression ἡ φύσις means 'Nature' i.e. rerum natura (cf. R. G. Bury in Cl. Rev. viii. p. 299), but for Plato rerum natura, strictly interpreted, is the Ideal World. Plato's nomenclature is in harmony with the traditional usage of Greek philosophy, for "in Greek philosophical language, φύσις always means that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative, and transient" (Burnet Early Greek Phil. p. 11). Now in Platonism the primary, fundamental, persistent, is the εἴδος: and hence the φύσις or 'nature' of anything means its Idea (e.g. Phaedr. 254 Β ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἄριστη), and the φύσις or nature of all things (rerum natura) becomes an expression for the World of Ideas ('regio idearum, οὐ πάντως τότος' Schneider). Bosanquet would like to render φύσις by 'evolution,' "without understanding any definite theory of origins." Such a translation would be, in my judgment, not only gravely misleading, but linguistically wrong; for ἐν τῇ φύσει οὕσα cannot mean 'which evolution has produced': the force of ἐν must be local—figuratively so, of course—exactly as in ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει referred to above. So also J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. x. p. 121. To Krohn, φύσις appears to be "die allgemeine Gesetzlichkeit des Universums, die dem δημοφυσίς die Musterbilder liefert." (Pl. St. p. 249). This is nearer the truth, but we must not surrender the self-existence of the Ideas. See also on 597 D.
11 ἢν—θεὸν ἐγράψαταί. "Occurrit, ut videtur, quasi ex improviso Platoni, Deum Idearum autorem appellare" says Pansch (de deo Platonis p. 45), truly enough, in the restricted sense that we ought to lay no stress on this passage by
itself as evidence for the origin of the Ideas. But, if God and the Idea of Good are the same (see on VI 505 a ff.), Plato is merely saying in theological language what he formerly said in philosophical, when he derived the ωσία of all other Ideas from the Idea of Good (VI 509 b). See Krohn Pl. St. p. 242, where the same explanation is given, and Zeller4 II p. 666. It is not, I think, quite correct to dismiss theos as merely "a mythic Ausdrucksweise" (Hirm er Entlehnung u. Komp. etc. p. 647), and Susseimh (Einleitung p. 262) is certainly wrong when he takes it to mean 'a god.'

The sentence has been much discussed in connexion with the theory that Plato's Ideas are 'thoughts of God'; see for example Hermann de loco Plat. de rep. VI 505 sq. p. 5 with Bonitz's reply Diss. put. Pl. diona p. 33 and Hermann's rejoinder Vindit. disp. de id ea boni pp. 39 ff., and cf. Zeller I. c. pp. 664— 670. I have already said in App. III to Book VII that Plato himself says nothing to shew that he viewed his Ideas in this light; and it is only by reading into his words much more than they are naturally fitted to convey, that the present passage can be made to support the identification.

597 C. 19. εί δυὸ κτλ.: not of course 'if God had made' etc. (D. and V.), but 'if he should make' etc., referring to the future, in harmony with εστει μὴ φωςιν. The words δυὸ μόνας mean 'no more than two,' "auch nur zwei" (Schneider). Even two (not to speak of more) would involve a fresh idea. Cf. Tim. 31 a τὸ γάρ περείχον πάντα οὐδὸν νοητὰ θ' ελεφαντοστόλον ἄλλον κύριον τοῦ κυρίου υἱόν, μὲν ἐπάρτεον διάνοιαν νῦν τοῦ ποτὸ εἰς πάλιν γάρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. 'The sentence has been much discussed in connexion with the theory that Plato's Ideas are ‘thoughts of God’; see for example Hermann de loco Plat. de rep. VI 505 sq. p. 5 with Bonitz's reply Diss. put. Pl. diona p. 33 and Hermann's rejoinder Vindit. disp. de idea boni pp. 39 ff., and cf. Zeller I. c. pp. 664—670. I have already said in App. III to Book VII that Plato himself says nothing to shew that he viewed his Ideas in this light; and it is only by reading into his words much more than they are naturally fitted to convey, that the present passage can be made to support the identification.

597 D. 14. μιὰν φύσει κτλ.: 'created it, in its essential nature, one. So it appears. Shall we then call him the Nature-maker of bed, or something of the sort? It would at all events be fair to do so, since he has made both this and all besides in their essential nature.' Connected with the notion 'bed' (observe the neuter τοῦτον, there are two makers: (1) its φυτογραφός, who makes ἡ φύσει κλίσιν, (2) its δημιουργός, who makes κλίσιν τις, a particular material bed. The first is God—the φυτογραφός not only of bed but of all else: the second a carpenter. φυτογραφός is used by Plato in the peculiar sense of ὁ φύσει-τι τοῦτον, the maker of e.g. the bed-by-nature, the table-by-nature, etc.; and the peculiar form of Glauco’s answer (διακαίων χοῦν κτλ.) shows that he was sensible of the linguistic experiment. Plato's meaning would have been easier for us to catch if (using substantives instead of pronouns), he had said μιὰν φύσει κλίσιν ἐφούνε (created one bed-by-nature, cf. VI 501 B τὸ φύσει διακαίων and ἐπειδήπερ καὶ φύσει-κλίσιν καὶ φύσει-τάλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν, but what he does write is much
25. He is of the opinion that the material, as it were, the Idea of the thing in question, is the essence of the process of creation (cf. infra 598 C. and 593 D., which reference is made also to Boanquet's ingenious, and, as I believe, wholly mistaken view).

597 E 30. The imitators: (1) the poet, (2) the painter, (3) the imitator of 'bed.' The two former are each of them (in the wider sense) ὅμιμοιροφοι of 'bed.' It will be noticed that 'bed' is treated pro tentore (from bovθεί οὐν τὸ ὑπολογίκα-νεν) as a single undifferentiated notion, because the contrast is shifted from the three beds to those who are concerned in their production. Αγ 598 Α ἐστιν ὅ μοι κτλ. Plato again differentiates the notion, in order to make it clear that the Painter imitates only the material, and not the Ideal, bed.

31. This is the principle that the Idea of the thing in question is the essence of the process of creation (cf. infra 598 C. and 593 D., which reference is made also to Boanquet's ingenious, and, as I believe, wholly mistaken view).

33. Since the tragic poet is an imitator, he too will be τοῦ τρίτου γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, or in other words, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως κτλ. Baiter's text is misleading because he prints no comma after μιμητὴς εἶστι. That Tragedy is a branch of μιμητική, was universally allowed; see above on 593 C. Plato's procedure in reasoning from Painting to Poetry (cf. infra 598 C. and 593 D.) may be illustrated by Simonides' remark that 'Poetry is vocal Painting,' as 'Painting is silent Poetry' (ὁ Σίμωνις τὴν μὲν χρωματικὴν ποιήσιν εἰς ψυχομαι προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν χρωματικὴν λαύον Plut. de gloria Ath. 346 E) — a saying which Lessing appropriately cites in the preface to his Laocoon.

πρίτως τις κτλ.: as it were third from King and Truth. The metaphor is a genealogical one (cf. Πιθανός, κυριακετάτω τε καὶ τρίτον ἀπὸ Δίας), and the King corresponds of course to the φιλοτογορός or God. On the one hand, we have (1) God, (2) the τέκτων, (3) the μιμητὴς: on the other (1) the αὐτὸ ὅ ὁμοί ζῶν, (2) a material κλῆς, (3) a picture of a material κλῆς: and just as the picture is τοῦ τρίτου γεννήματι ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, so the imitator is 'third in descent' (πρίτως — περιφύσεως) and consequently two degrees removed from ὅ μοιος. The propriety of the term βασιλέως will be seen if we translate Plato's theological phraseology into its philosophical equivalent. When he tells us that God constructs the Idea of the Bed, he means that the Idea of Good is the source of that Idea (597 Β εἰς), and the Idea of Good is King of the Ideal World; see VI 509 D. This is the application of the phrase: but it is possible enough that the expression itself was half-proverbial in Plato's time, and referred originally to the person who stood next but one in order of succession to the Persian throne. See App. 1. The general sense is well illustrated by J. and C. from Dante In-
ferno ii. 105 SI che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote, i.e. Art is Nature's daughter, as Nature is God's: 'so that your art is as it were the grandchild of God.' It should be noticed that the drift of Plato's meaning can be expressed in terms of the simile of the line. The αὐτὸ δὲ ἐστὶ κλίνη, for example, belongs to EB (see Fig. 1 on p. 65), the material κλίνη to DC, and the picture of a bed to the realm of ἑλέους, that is to say ΑΔ. Similarly we may suppose that the state of mind of the carpenter is πίστις, and that of the Painter εἰκασία. See below on 601 B and cf. App. i to Book vii. Other views of the phrase τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως are discussed in App. i.

598 A—598 D Moreover it is not the Idea which is copied by the Painter, but only the manufactured objects, and even of these he copies only one particular aspect or appearance. Hence Imitation is far removed indeed from the Truth; and only a simpleton will be beguiled by it.

598 A I πότερα εἴκειν—ἐφη. In holding that the Art of Painting degrades it to the level of photography, and the painter himself to a mere mechanical copyist, whose intelligence does not rise above εἰκασία (in the sense of vi 511 e: see note ad loc. and App. i to Book vii). Yet the highest art has in every age claimed to portray, not the so-called actual, but the Ideal: see for example Arist. Poet. 23. 6 and 17: "It may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the reality'" (Butcher's translation), and the recent development of this idea by W. J. Court hope, Life in Poetry and Law in Taste pp. 152, 165, 196 ff. and passim. In the present passage, Plato bases his unfavourable verdict on what must be admitted to be a narrow and scholastic interpretation of his own ontology, but in view of Books ii and iii as well as 605 c—607 a below, we can hardly doubt that his attitude was determined in the first instance by educational rather than by metaphysical considerations, and that throughout the whole of Book x he was thinking less of the inherent possibilities of Art, than of actual Greek Art and Poetry considered as the exponents of a moral and religious creed which Plato himself emphatically disowns. See also on 607 A. In any case, the objections which he here urges do not touch the real essence of any form of Art except pure and undulterated realism. Elsewhere throughout the Platonic writings there are not wanting indications of a juster estimate of the artistic faculty and its possibilities (see for example ii 401 b—403 c, and especially 472 B, and cf. Walter Gesch. d. Ästhetik im Altertum pp. 441 ff., 459 ff. and Stahlin Stellung d. Poesie in d. Plat. Phil. pp. 56—65), and the sympathetic student of Plato will find it easy to construct a nobler and more generous theory of Aesthetic Art out of the doctrine of Ideas together with its corollaries of ανάμμεσις and pre-existence. It is also a historical fact that Plato's own conception of a transcendent self-existing Beauty, αὖ δὲ καὶ ὅπως γιγάντιον ὁπῆτε ἀπολυμενὸν ὁπῆτε ἀλλαμομενὸν ὁπῆτε φειδων, ἐπεὶ τινὶ μὲν καλὸν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρῷ, ὁπῆτε τοτὲ μὲν, τοτὲ δ' ὅ, ὁπῆτε πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλὸν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν (Symp. 211 A), has proved an inexhaustible fountain of inspiration to some of the greatest artists, notably, for instance, in connexion with the Platonic Academy at Florence in the days of Michel Angelo: see Symonds, Renaissance in Italy ii pp. 295, 297, 247, 323 ff. Those who have caught the spirit of Plato's teaching will agree with me when I say that the famous lines of Wordsworth on King's College Chapel

"They dreamt not of a perishable home, Who thus could build," are more truly and characteristically Platonic than Plato's attack upon poetry and painting in this passage.

3 ἀρα ὦν ἐστιν κτλ. The painter, as Bosanquet reminds us, operates in two dimensions, and so cannot copy the material bed "in its solid completeness, but
only his partial view of it" i.e. the bed as it appears to him from one point of view, a particular φαντάσμα of bed. His work, in fact, is σκηνογραφία (11 365 c. n.). It will follow that Painting is a stage lower than ‘third from truth,’ but Plato does not press the point, and in 599 A and B Poetry—the sister art to Painting—remains as before only τρίτον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας. See also on μυθική in B below.

598 B σεποιήτης is passive, not middle, as J. and C. strangely imagine. Cf. 605 A ὁ δὲ μυθικὸς ποιητὴς—οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέριπλοκότα τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀρκεῖον πέρπηγην.

9 πρὸς τὸν: not of course in the metaphysical sense, but in the sense in which e.g. the material bed ‘is’ as opposed to its φάντασμα, which only φαίνεται, and which is all that the painter copies. An apologist of Art might fairly reply to Plato that in another and profounder sense it is just because Art does ‘imitate’ the φάντασμα and not the material reality that her creations frequently possess a measure of ideality and truth beyond and above what Plato assigns to them here. Cf. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry etc. pp. 127 ff., 157—162. For the construction see on 111 407 B.

11 ἡ μυθική. In this particular instance the inference from Painting to the whole of imitative art is hardly to be justified: for Sculpture, which is certainly, in the Greek way of thinking, a branch of μυθική, cannot be said to copy only a φάντασμα of the material object to the same extent that Painting does. See however Soph. 235 E, 236 A.

12 διὰ τοῦτο—εἰδώλων: 'what enables it to manufacture all things is that it lays hold of but a little part of each, and even that is unsubstantial.' πάντα ἀπεράγεται recalls 596 C, E, while preparing us at the same time for πάντα ἐπισταμένως τὰς ἐνδυμαγίας κτλ. below in c. In συμφωνία τινα ἐκάστον ἐφ' ὑπάτειαν καὶ τοῦτο εἰδώλων. οἷον ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ζωγραφίζει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, περὶ
598 D] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ I

598 C το γράφας—τέκτωνα είναι. The same idea recurs in Soph. 234 B. The subject of δοκεῖ (ơpinaĩ) is παίδας της τεκνίας (Richards). I now believe that Prantl's view, with which Stallbaum also agrees, is correct and therefore withdraw my former conjecture τεκνίας. That τεκνίας is sound appears also from αὐτὸς τε οὐκ ἑπαύν περὶ συντομίας in δόλο. A II.

598 D 22 ὑπολαμβάνειν δι' τ' τοιήτου. 'we must reply to'—(or 'retort upon') 'such a person': cf. (with J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rec. X p. 110) Prot. 32o C πολλα ὁν ἀφτ' ὑπέλαβον κτλ. The antecedent of τ' τοιήτου is ταύ. The words have been strangely misinterpreted by Schneider ("beden mus mannehmen etc.") and others, forgetful of the parallel expression in the Protagoras. Vermehren actually goes so far as to conjecture ἅν τοιήτου (Plat. Stud. p. 119).

23 γοπτι τυλ. Cf. Soph. 234 C.

598 D 24 διά το αὐτός κτλ. In agreement with Dümmler (Antisch. pp. 23 ff.), Stählin (Stellung d. Poete etc. p. 26) takes this as a specific reference to Antisthenes. Antisthenes, in the first place, denied the Ideal theory and held that there could be no knowledge except of particulars: so that Plato might well insinuate that he was incapable of distinguishing knowledge from ignorance: cf. v 476 D n.

In the second place, Antisthenes was a champion of Homer, and discovered a sort of moral philosophy in his works (see Frag. 24—28 in Winckelmann Antisch. Frag. and Zeller 11 pp. 330 ff.). On the strength of these two facts Stählin has evolved the ingenious theory that Plato's motive throughout this part of the discussion is a purely polemical one, and that he did not seriously consider Poetry only 'third from Royalty and Truth.' Plato, thinks Stählin, says in effect: 'Antisthenes holds that poets have knowledge of and copy particulars; but there is no knowledge of particulars, and particulars are copies of Ideas, so that on Antisthenes' own shewing Poets are igno- rant, and Poetry is thrice removed from Truth; whereas Antisthenes thinks Homer was omniscient.' The dagger is only lath: for Antisthenes was not an Idealist. Yet it is tolerably clear that Plato is re- futing a view of poetry which found enthusiastic advocates in his own time, and Antisthenes may have been one of these, though the evidence falls far short of proof (see next note): but the purpose of this investigation is certainly not polemical and nothing more, and in spite of other passages in which Plato takes a more generous view of Poetry (see on 598 B), there is no good reason to suppose that his hostility is otherwise than serious here. See also on line 28.

598 D 20—601 B We hear it said that tragedians, including Homer, have know- ledge of that whereof they write; but it is not so. No one would seriously give him- self to the production of copies if he could make originals. If the poet possessed true knowledge of what he imitates, he would rather do great deeds than sing of them; and Homer rendered no services to his fellow men in the sphere of action,
intention, or even education, as the neglect he suffered in his own lifetime abundantly proves. The fact is that the Poet writes without knowledge. His productions are but images of images, and owe all their charm to their poetical setting.

In the Republic Plato suggests that he himself will, like the dramatists of the Doric Age, take for his theme the true life of the soul: for he had early intuitions of the vast possible range of the poetic imagination. The discovery of this range was in each case an individual process. Homer’s masterpiece was the Iliad; Sophocles, the Antigone. It was more than artistic originality this, it was a gift for the very serious business of life. Homer and Sophocles are called heroes by Plato, and for the same reason. As heroes they gave to their age and country an idea of the true life of man, which the common run of men could not have conceived for themselves. Plato, in like manner, through his Theaetetus, gives to the world a standard of the true life of philosophy which no one who has ever deeply studied philosophy can ever completely realize. To this list we may add, as the greatest of modern poets, Shakespeare: his works have supplied the language of our age. A picture of man’s life is really a picture of God’s word in the soul of man, for God is a poet (Test. Fermi, 247 B). There is something almost pathetic in Dionysius’ inability to understand and appreciate Plato when he assures us with monotonous and feeble iteration that there was, there really was in Plato’s nature, with all its excellences, something of vainglory. He shewed this particularly in his jealousy of Homer, whom he expels from his imaginary commonwealth after crowning him with a garland and anointing him with ‘myrrh’ (Letter to Pompeius § 756, translated by Roberts).

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vagrant to suppose that such views were actually maintained in Plato's time, though Pericles for example had a different criterion of strategic ability when he told Sophocles that he 'knew how to write poetry, but not how to command an army.' (Περιελήθη τοις μὲν ἐπὶ, στρατηγεῖς δὲ όνειπάσαθαι Ἀθηναῖς. ΧΙΙ 604 D). Cf. Ιουν. 540 B—542 B and Stahlin Stellung d. Poesie etc. p. 25 n. 3. 'The public,' remarks Stählin, 'whose views Plato here combats, allowed the authority of the poets to extend even to the domain of the particular arts. It was Plato who broke through this magic circle which surrounded Poetry.' Aristotle followed in the same path, refusing to allow that a mistake in respect of some particular art is necessarily a flaw in the poetry: see Ποιητ. 25. 1460b 20 ff., 33 ff. Plato himself, of course, holds that poets are destitute of scientific knowledge, and compose their poems ὀφείλον, ἀλλὰ φάτει τινι καὶ ἐνθουσιαζόμεν Αρπ. 22 C: cf. also Pheadr. 245 A, Ιουν. 533 Bff. Laws 719 C and Μοῦ. 95 C. The true Poet, according to Plato, is a seer: knowledge he has none, but instead of it intuition, enthusiasm and inspiration: he is in short ἑνθος, because ἐπείπον ὡς καὶ κατεχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (Μοῦ. i.c.). This view of Poetry is of course earlier than Plato: we meet with something like it in a striking fragment of Democritus ap. Dio Chrys. ΛΙΠ. 274 (quoted by Stahlin Lc. p. 12) Ὑπαργυρός φέτως λαχῶς θεα-ζούσις ἐπέγνως κόσμον ἐκτιμάτω παροιμιω, and Pindar likes to represent himself as the inspired mouthpiece of the Muses and Apollo. We cannot attain to a correct conception of Plato's aesthetic unless we are careful to remember that, although he refused to allow that the poet has knowledge, he did not deny him genius and inspiration. See also on 598 Α supra.

32 πότερον μυθότατο κτλ.: 'whether these men whom they have met are imitators, by whom they have been deceived' etc. μυθότατο is of course predicative, and that is why τοῦτο has no article. We certainly ought not (with Richards) to change τοῦτο into τοιμός. Cf. 436 D n.

599 A I προτά—ονῦς: 'are three stages removed from Truth.' One of Schneider's MSS has πράτα (sic), and Herwerden conjectures πράτε, comparing πρά-τος ἀπ' τῆς ἀληθείας in D. Possibly Proclus also read πράτα: see the critical note in Kroll's edition of the in remp. 1 p. 105. 22. If the numeral is an adjective agreeing with ἑπργα, we must certainly read πράτα, but it may be an accusative of extent, i.e. τὰ πράτα ἀπέχοντα. I therefore think it safer to retain the MS reading, especially as πράτα was more likely to be corrupted into πράτα than conversely.

3 δειμούργημα—ποιόταιν: 596 E.

3 ἢ τι καὶ κτλ.: 'or whether again there is something in what they say.' ἢ καί is sometimes thus used instead of ἢ, from a feeling that it introduces something additional, viz. an additional alternative. Cf. (with Schneider) Hom. II. 11 238 and Pl. Laws 744 A. The force of ἢ καί in Ἀρ. 27 E, Phaedr. 269 A and infra 602 D, 605 D is nearly, but not quite, the same.

6 ἐπὶ—δειμούργημα depends on σπουδαζεῖν, rather than on ἀφειναί. The word σπουδαζεῖν is emphatic: he might occasionally παίζειν ἐν τοῖς τοιμοίζεσι, but he would never make it the serious business of his life: cf. infra 602 B, ΠΙ. 546 C N. and Phaedr. 275 C ff. The whole of this passage reminds us very strongly of the depreciatory estimate of written books in the Phaedrus. Cf. 599 B n.

7 τοῦτο—ἐχοντα: 'set this in the forefront of his life as his best possession,'
in accordance with the maxim τα καλά τρέφαι εξω in Pind. Pyth. 3. 83, προστήρασθαι is used like πρόστασις in ΙΧ 577 Α, and προστηράσμοι in VII 531 Β is not very different. Others (Schneider, Stallbaum, etc.) think προστήρασθαι κτλ. means ‘to set before his life’ as an aim or goal. In itself, this rendering is unexceptionable; but it does not suit with ὃς βέλτιστον ἔχων. The word ἔχων cannot be equivalent to ἣγούμενον ‘considering’ (in spite of the exceptional phrase ἐνίμως ἔχειν VII 528 Β n.); nor is it easy to accept the version of Schneider ‘und dieses als das beste war er konnte.’ The emphasis requires us to take ἔχων in its full sense (‘alsdasbestewaserhabe’ Schlieimmeracher). Stallbaum conjectures ὃς βέλτιστον ἔχων, but the text is sound. For βέλτιστον instead of τὸ βέλτιστον cf. (with Schneider) μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν in I 330 B.

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599 B 9 ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἐπὶ for ἐν is called for by Herwerden, but cf. Λαως 834 Β τὰς σπουδὰς—τὰς τὰς ἔν τῇ τροφῇ καὶ τὰς πΕΡΙ ἀγωνίαν αὐτῶν. ἐν ἔργοις there is combined the twofold sense of ‘deeds’ and ‘originals’ (μυῆμata: the originals of dramatic μιμησὶς are actions (603 C n.).

11 καὶ εἶναι—ἔγκωμιᾶς. He would rather be Achilles than Homer. There is another side of the question, represented by Pindar’s βῆμα δ’ ἔργαματο χρο-νιστέρον βισεσές (Νειμ. 4. 6), and by Plato himself very forcibly in Symp. 209 D, and it is certainly unfair to insinuate that no one would write good poems if he were capable of doing great deeds. Some of Plato’s expressions in this passage almost suggest the tone of a man of letters pining for a life of action: cf. VI 406 ΔΗΝ 13 ὑφελα: not simply to the agent himself: cf. σφάς ὑφεληκέναι 599 Ε.

599 C 15 ἔρωταντες κτλ. Cf. Ion 537 Β ff., Αρ. 22 Α—ος, τοῖς ἐγκωμίοις are of course the Asclepiadæ: see on ΙΙΙ 405 Δ.

599 D 24 ἔρωτάμεθα κτλ. See 597 Ε ff. From ἄλλα καὶ δεδέρωσι we may infer that “the actual law-giver, in Plato’s view, is second from reality” (Ibosanquet).

26 τίς τῶν πόλεων κτλ. Contrast Symp. 209 C ff. where Homer and Hesiod
are linked with Lycurgus, Solon, and Alcmaeon, all of whom are mentioned by Plato, though frequently by Aristotle: see Scriboni and Hicken on Arist. Pol. A. 2. 152b 14. The date of Charondas is probably after the sixth century B.C.: see Nieze in Pauly-Wissowa ad Charondas, where the authorities relating to this early legislator are cited and reviewed. It is worth noting, in view of Tryck here and elsewhere in Plato (Laws 777 c, Thuc. 20 A: cf. also Laws 659 B), that an argument against the genuineness of the seventh Platonic Epistle has been derived from the fact that it mentions Italy (326 B, 359 D), that is, according to Hermann, Gesch. d. System p. 251 n. 213.

32 'Ompyrhous: 'votaries of Homer,' 'Homer's devotees.' So the word is rightly explained by Henn (de rat. quae Pl. i. poet. Gr. intercendit pp. 18—22), and also by Jebb (Homer p. 78). Cf. 'Ompyrhous kai aediphas 606 B and the use of 'Ompyrhous in Ion 530 E, Pla. 252 B. The original meaning of 'Ompyrhous is discussed by Jebb loc. cit.

600 A 3. εἰς τὰ έργα should be connected with σοφός. The omission of εἰς in A 3 (see c. n.) is apparently accidental, for it occurs in all other MSS.


8 δέδον τινα—βίου 'Ομπηρηκήν. Yet in another and wider sense Homer was the founder of a 'way of life,' and the δόδο 'Ομπηρηκή, which Plato so strongly condemns in Books II and III, was in fact the δόσεις 'Ελληνική (Reber Platon u. die Poesie p. 25). From this point of view Plato's antagonism to Homer is only a symptom of his profound dissent from much that we are accustomed to regard as essentially characteristic of the Greek view of life. See on v. 470 E and Bohne Wir gelangt P. zur Aufstellung s. Staatsideen, etc. p. 39.
10 οἱ υπ'τεροι ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν Πιθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐποιεῖτον τού βίου διαφανεῖς τῷ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις: Οὐδ' αὐ, ἐφι, τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρέωφυλος, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἦσσως, ὁ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἑταῖρος, τοῦ ὄνοματος ἀν γελοιότερος ἐτὶ πρὸς παιδείαν φανεῖ, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περί Ὀμήρου ἄλληθν. λέγεται γὰρ ὁς 15 πολλὰ τις ἀμέλεια | περὶ αὐτῶν ἦν ἐτ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνῳ, ὅτε ἔγαθ. 

IV. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἢ ν' ἔγαθ. ἄλλ' οἰεῖ, ὁ Ἐλαίκων, ἢ τοὺς ὑπὲρ οἴος τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπως καὶ βελτίως ἀπεργάζεσθαι ὁ Ὀμήρος, ἢτε περὶ τούτων ὑμνεῖσθαι ἄλλα ἡγεσότεραι δυνάμεις, ὡς ἢρ' ἃν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποίησατο καὶ ἐτίματο καὶ ἡγατάτο 20 ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἄλλα Πρωταγόρας μὲν αρὰ ὁ 'Ἄβδηριτής καὶ Πρόδικος

600 B 10 Πιθαγόρειον τρόπον—τοῦ βίου. The aim of the Πιθαγόρειος βίος was ἐποιεῖτο λέγεται, and the rules of abstinence etc. by which its votaries sought to follow God made them conspicuous (διὰφανεῖς) among the Greeks. See Rohde Ψυχέις 11 pp. 159—171.

12 ὁ γὰρ Κρέωφυλος κτλ. Κρέωφυλος was read before Ast on slight MS authority, and gives an excellent sense to τοῦ ὄνοματος—φανεῖ; but Κρέωφυλος is confirmed by all the best MSS, as well as by Callimachus (Ἐπίστ. 6 αρ. Strabo XIV 638 Κρέωφυλος πόσος εἶμι κτλ.) and others: see Pape-Benseler s.v. Plato speaks of him as Homer's friend or disciple (for ἑταῖρος has this meaning here: cf. ἑταῖρος in C and Ὁρ. 210 Λ ἑταῖρον —τῶν ἀμφύ Παρμεύδων κτλ. with Bonitz Ind. Arist. s.v.): others, including the Scholiast, say he was his son-in-law. The Epic poem Οἰχαλλαί ἀνείας was ascribed to Creophylus by Callimachus (I.e.): but according to another tradition, Creophylus received the poem from Homer himself in return for hospitality (Suidas s.v. Κρέωφυλος).

13 τοῦ ὄνοματος—ἐξή. Cf. Cic. de repub. IIII Frag. 38 Noble Sardanapalis ille vitio multo quam nomine ipsos defectur (as Σαρδαναβαλλος). Κρέωφυλος (from κρέας and φυλόν = 'Carnigena' 'Fleischgeburt,' suggests Schneider) is an ἄνδρα γέλουν πρὸς παιδείαν: for Bcep suggests anything but culture. "I am a great eater of beef, and I believe that does harm to my wits" (Twelfth Night 1.3.90). The Greeks had the same feeling: cf. Plato's remarks on the effects of over-much feeding and athletics in III 411 C—Ε μυσώλογος δῆ, οἰμαί, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐγγείρεται καὶ ἄμοςος, and EURIPIDES Frag. 284 Dindorf, with the comic fragment παχεία γαστήρ Λεπτών οὐ τίκετο νῦν. Plato means that the proof of the pudding is in the eating: Homer must have been a poor teacher if his disciples (including Creophylus) learnt so little. Had he taught them successfully they would have proved their παιδεία by treating their master more respectfully: cf. θερ. 519 C, D, where we are told that if teachers of διακοσμοῦντο do not get paid by their pupils, it only shews that they have failed to teach their subject and therefore deserve no fees. Λέγεται—ἐγαθ means 'for it is said that he was much neglected even in his own age, when he was alive,' whereas it is precisely during his lifetime that he would have been most respected if he had taught to any purpose: witness the enthusiasm aroused by Protagoras, Prodicus and other teachers! Thus understood, ὅτε ἐγαθ has a strong rhetorical emphasis and ought not to be discarded (with Cobet, Baiter, and Herwerden). For ἐκείνων after αὐτὸν referring to the same person cf. VII 538 B and Kiddell Digest of Platonic Idioms p. 143 § 49. If we adopt Ast's conjecture and read ὅτε 'αὐτὸν ἐκείνων, the passage gains a little in point, because αὐτοῦ ἐκείνων will then refer to Creophylus: but it is difficult to make the subject of ἔγαθ different from the antecedent of αὐτοῦ ἐκείνων, and on the whole I no longer think there is any good reason for desverting the MSS.

600 C 16 ἄλλ' οἰεῖ κτλ. For οἰεῖ thus used cf. Men. 93 C with Heindorf on Thaet. 147 B.

20 Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἀρὰ κτλ. With
ο Κέιος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοὺς ἑφ’ ἐαυτῶν παριστάναι

Δ ἐδώ. Ἐξυγυγιμοῦνει, ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἶον τ' ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφέως αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὔτω σφόδρα φιλούνται, ὡστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσι αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐταίροι. "Ομήρου δ' ἄρα 25 οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εὗπερ οἷος τ' ἦν πρὸς ἁρέτην ὄνυνάι αὐνθρώπους, ἥ Ἡσίοδον βαφθοῦντες ἀν περιοῦσα εἰών, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἀν αὐτῶν ἀντίχειρο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἱππακκαζοῦ παρὰ σφίνοι οἶκοι ἦν, 1 ἢ ἐν ηὐχ' ἐπείθουν, αὐτοῖς ἀν ἐπιασάμονοι ὅπως ἦσαν, ἔως ἱκανὸς παιδείας μεταλαβοῦειν; Παντάπασιν, ἐφ' ὅθεν, δοκεῖς μοι, ὅς 20 Σάκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Οὐκούν τιθώμεν ἀπὸ Ὀμήρου ἀρξαμένους


the structure of the sentence cf. (with Stallbaum) Crit. 50 E and Prot. 325 B, C, where ἄρα occurs, as here, in both clauses. See also on 1 336 E and App. IV to Book I. Prodicus survived to 399 at least, but Protagoras seems to have died about 411; so that if the date of action of the dialogue is 410, the reference to Protagoras as apparently still living may seem an anachronism. But the slip is a trifling one in any case; and Socrates might quite well have spoken as he does even if either or both of the persons had recently died. See Introd. § 3.


25 ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέροντες: 'carry about shoulder-high,' ('auf den Händen tragen,' Schneider). Ast quotes Dio Chrys. Or. IX p. 141 A δύφηλον φρέματον ὑπὸ τοῦ δχλου, and the imitation of this passage by Themistius Or. XXI p. 254 A ὃν ἡμεῖς διὰ ταύτην τὴν ψαντασίαν μόνον οὖν ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρομεν. It is clear that the phrase has a honorific meaning, so that it cannot be, as Erasmus (quoted by Ast) imagined, "translatam—a matribus ac nutritibus, quae infantulos cunis impositos capite portant," whether children were thus carried in antiquity or no.

26 ὄνυναια. See cr. n. I agree with Hermann, Bletter and the Oxford editors in preferring ὄνυναια to ὄνυναι (so Bekker and Schneider on slight ms. authority) or ὄνυναι (Stallbaum, after one MS of Aristides 11 p. 432). ὄνυναι is a very dubious formation, and the present gives a better meaning than the anast. The error arose from lipography of ἀνα— and ὄνυναι, ὄνυναι look like attempts to make the residue into an infinitive.

600 Ε 28 παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι: 'to be with them in their homes,' παρὰ σφίσιν οἷκοιν, which Cobet (V. L. 2 p. 534) and Herwerden desire to read, would not necessarily mean more than 'to dwell in their country.' With the sentiment cf. Men. 89 B (quoted below).

29 αὐτοὶ ἀν ἐπιασάμονοι: 'they would have made themselves their tutors and escorted them' etc. παιδαγωγεῖν is used in the same playful way in Alc. I 135 D κυνινεύσαμεν μεταβαινόμεν τῷ σχῆμα, ὃ Σάκρατες, τὸ μὲν σον ἐγώ, σὺ ἐν τοίχοις ὃν ἔραν ἄνω ὁ παιδαγωγῷς σε ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμέρας σεν, δὲ ἐν' εἴμοι παιδαγωγεῖς. The proverb ὅτι παιδεῖς οἱ γέρωνες perhaps lends an additional point to ἐπιασάμονοι, as in Soph. Fr. 623 Dindorf = Eur. Bacch. 193 γέρων γέρωνα παιδαγωγεῖς σ' εἴγος.

30 μεταλάβοιεν. The regular sequence would be μεταλαβόν, but cf. Men. 89 B οἱ ὡςιεῖς ἐν—ἔρυθλατομεν ἐν ἀνάκριτε, κατασκημανεῖσιν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσόν, ἦν μηδενε ἀυτοῖς διεξεῖσθαι (διαφέρεται in conj. Madvig), ἢλεπί τειχόν ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἥλικια, χρῆσεις γηγοροῦν ταῖς πόλεσιν. The difference is the difference between 'should' and 'should have.'
The Rhythm and Pitch are the two elements of Music: see III 598 D n. The words ἀπὸ ταῦτα mean 'just these' and no more: viz. Metre and Music. For the sense cf. (with Ast) Isocrates Enrug. 8—10.

601 B 9 ἔχειν. ἔχει was read till Bekker, apparently without any ms authority. The influence of φήσομεν is still felt.

οὖν γυμνωθέντα—φαίνεται. Cf. Isocr. Lc. 11 ἤ γάρ τις τῶν ποιητῶν τῶν εἰδοκομοιών τὰ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλήπτη, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διάλυσι, φανερότατο πάλι καταδελτέρα τῆς δόξης ἡς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Pl. Gorg. 502 C, Symposium 205 C, Phaedr. 235 D ἐν μέτρῳ ὁς ποιητής, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς Ἰδίωτης. A cursory inspection of these passages of Plato might lead one to suppose that he defined poetry as no more than λόγος ἔχων μέτρον, but we can see from other passages in his writings that it was not the μέτρον, but the μῦθος which appeared to him to be the most essential part of poetry (e.g., Phaed. 61 B ἐννοοῦσα δέ τοῦ ποιητῆς δεός, εἶτε μέλλων ποιητή εἶναι, ποιεῖν μῦθος ἄλλον λόγον: cf. Arist. Poet. 9. 1451 B 29 τοῦ ποιητῆς μᾶλλον τῶν μῦθων εἶναι δε ποιητή ὧ τῶν μέτρων. See also Walter Gesch. d. Aesthetik im All. pp. 460, 463). Whether Plato would have spoken of a prose romance as a poem, is another question, and the passages to which I have referred make it unlikely that he would have done so. Aristotle seems to attach less importance than
Plato to the metrical form: see Phot. 1. 144 b 17 ff. οἰδήν δὲ κοινὸν ἐστὶν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἔμπηδοκλῆι πλὴν τοῦ μέτρον· διὸ τῶν μὲν ποιητῶν δίκαιοι καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φαινολόγον μάλλον ἡ ποιητὴν κτλ. and ib. 9. 1451 b 2 ff.: but it is doubtful whether even Aristotle could have said with Sir Philip Sidney 'One may be a poet without versifying,' although he would certainly not quarrel with the converse statement that 'one may be a versifier without poetry.' See on the whole subject Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry which pp. 143 ff. and Courtlife Life in Poetry etc. pp. 68 ff.

11 τεθέασαι γὰρ ποι. An example is afforded by III 393 B ff., but the reference is more general. 12 έοικεν—προλεῖται. Aristotle cites this as an example of an ἐκείνω (Rhet. III 4. 1406 b 30 ff.).

601 b—602 b The condition of Imitative art in respect of knowledge may be apprehended in the following way. In connexion with every object we can distinguish three arts, that which uses, that which makes, and that which imitates it. The user alone has knowledge of the object; the maker, when the user instructs him, has correct opinion; but neither knowledge nor correct opinion can be attributed to the imitator. He merely copies what appears to be beautiful to the ignorant multitude.

601 b 14 άπὶ δή, τόδε ἀθέτει κτλ. Plato has already proved that Imitation is ‘third from Truth’ εκ τῆς εἰσόδους μεθόδου (560 A), i.e. from the ontological standpoint provided by his own Ideal Theory. The following argument takes up a different standpoint, according to which knowledge is defined as ἐμπείρα or practical familiarity (601 c, d, 602 a).

The attitude assumed throughout this section resembles in some respects that of the historical Socrates (601 d n.). Can the two points of view be reconciled? Bosanquet makes an interesting attempt to do so (pp. 379, 389 ff.), but his misconception (as it seems to me) of Plato’s Ideas renders his conclusions less valuable than they might otherwise have been. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 255) professes himself unable to effect a reconciliation. We must admit that Plato himself does not, as a matter of fact, endeavour in this passage to connect the two arguments. Had he chosen to make the effort, I think a careful study of Euthyd. 188 E—290 D and Crat. 390 B—E will shew on what lines he might have proceeded (see on μεθοδοτάτων in 601 d), but it is safer to suppose that he has shifted his ground, and is applying a new and less strictly scientific μέθοδος to shew that the Imitator is third from knowledge, as Imitation is from truth.

601 c 16 ἡμίσεως—ηθένως. See on 601 E. ἡμίσεως or ἡμίσως, in whichever way accented, is surely a full adverb, and not “the genitive used adverbially” (J. and C.) like ἄλλως, πολλοῦ, etc., although there is good authority for the genitive in ἐως from ἡμίσως (see Lobeck Plurum. p. 247). Stephanus preferred ἡμίσως; but the adverb follows the accent of the genitive plural (ἡμίσως), and ἡμίσως: ἐπιρρήμα. Πλάτων Πολιτείας ἐκπαιδεύσει (Ant. in Bekk. Anecd. 98. 30)—a note which certainly refers to this passage: see Introd. § 4—supports the ms accentuation (Schneider). Liebholt’s conjecture ἐπὶ μωῆς needs no refutation.

26—2
If Plato had intended us to pursue this vein, he would, I think, have furnished us with some hints in the course of the argument itself. See also on 601 B.

28 οία—χρήσι: 'what are the good or bad points of the instrument he uses when he uses it,' lit. 'what good or bad things that which he uses does'—we cannot like the Greeks say 'makes'—'in use.' This interpretation, which is Schleiermacher's ("wie sich das war er gebraucht gut oder schlecht zeigt in Gebrauch"), seems to me the natural and obvious meaning of the Greek. In agreement, apparently, with Schneider's version, Campbell proposes 'what specimens of that which he (the user) employs, the maker makes that are good or bad in actual use," remarking that "the correlation of singular and plural arises from the collocation of particular and universal. The instrument (sing.) is good in some cases, but bad in others (plur.)." Campbell's solution has the advantage of referring ποιεῖ to ποιήσι, and corresponds more exactly with χρησιμοὶ καὶ ποιηματαί αὐλῶν in E. The grammatical difficulty is however, I think, insuperable. If the subject to ποιεῖ must be ποιήσι, it would even be easier to make ἡ χρήσι = τοῦτῳ ὑπὸ χρήσις—a rare form of attraction illustrated on ν. 462 D: but there is a certain elegance in applying ποιεῖ also to the instrument, which is in its way a 'maker too' and one by whose ἐργα the other maker must be guided. Herwerden remarks "expectabam potius οία ἄγαθα ἢ κακά (sc. ἐστί) ἐν τῷ χρείᾳ ὑπὲρ τῶν οἰς κτλ." It is well that his expectations have been disappointed.
en τῇ χρείᾳ ὥ χρῆται. οἷον αὐλητῆς ποιοῦ ἕξαγγέλλει 
Ἐ περὶ τῶν ἁυλῶν, οἳ ἄν υπηρετῶσιν | ἐν τῷ ἁυλεῖν, καὶ ἕπιταξίαν ἓν ὁ ὑπηρετήσει. Πῶς δ' οὖ; Ὅικουν ὁ μὲν ἐδῶς ἕξαγγέλλει περὶ χρήστον καὶ ηπηρείαν ἁυλῶν, ὁ δὲ πιστεύων 
ποιήσει; Ναί. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστις ὁρθὴν ἔχει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ ποιησάς, ἐξουδ' τῷ εἰδότι καὶ 
ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν | παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁ δὲ χρῶμενος ἐπὶ 35 
στῆμιν. Πάνω γε. Ὅ δὲ μιμητής πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρήσαι ἐπι-
στήμιν ἔχει ὅν ἄν γράψῃ, εἰτε καλὰ καὶ ὥρθα εἰτε μη, ἢ δόξαι ὁρθὴν διὰ τοῦ ἔξ ἀνάγκης συνειναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἑπιτάπεταιναι ὁτα 
χρὴ γράφειν; Ὅδετέρα. Οὔτε ἀρχαὶ ἐσται ὤτε ὥρθα δοξάσαι 5 
ὁ μιμητής περὶ ὅν ἄν μιμητῆ πρὸς κάλλος ἡ ποιησάς. Οὐκ 
ἔσκειν. Χαρίεις ἀν εἰ ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν

29 ἕξαγγέλλει. Bekker and others write ἕξαγγέλλει both here and in Ε below. The present echoes ἄγγελον γίγνοσθαι, and I agree with Schneider that change is needless, in spite of ἐπιταξίαν and ὑπη-
ρετήσει: cf. κείσαθαι—ἐσεβαίναι v 478 D. For the meaning cf. Crat. 390 B.

30 οἷ ἄν ὑπηρετῶσιν κτλ. I take this clause as a sort of parenthetical ad-
junct or characterisation of ἁυλώις: 'thus the fluteplayer informs the flute-
maker about his flutes—the persons who are his servants in the art of fluteplaying—
and he will give orders how they should be made, and the flutemaker will serve 
him.' The liberty is great, but hardly 
greater than Plato allows himself else-
where in the Ἐρευνα: cf. III 411 C ἀκράπολος οὖν καὶ ὁργή λανθασμένου ἀνεξίσεως νεώτερον ἀριστοκρατείαν ἔχει τοιαῦτα, IV 425 C ὡς ἀποκαλομένους, οἷον ἄν τοῦτο ὄρα, VI 496 C, D, 1 347 A H.: and the break afforded by the interposition of this clause makes the difference of tense between ἕξαγγέλλει and ἐπιταξίαν seem easy and natural. To 
the ordinary interpretation, which makes 
ἂνών the antecedent to οἷ ἄν, it is a 
serious and I think fatal objection that 
the verb ὑπηρετῶσιν is used immediately 
afterswards of the flutemaker in a way 
which seems to imply that it has been 
used of him before: and it is also very 
strange and unnatural to speak of flutes as ὑπηρετῶτι ἐν τῷ ἁυλεῖν. Jowett's 
translation 'which of his flutes is satis-
factory to the performer,' though Schleier-
macher, Schneider and Prantl take much 
the same view, cannot be fairly extracted

from οἷ ἄν ὑπηρετῶσιν. Many inferior 
mss read οἷα for οἷ: and Richards con-
jectures οἷα παύξον οἷα ἀποτελοῦσαν, 
but the change is much too great. I once 
suggested ὑπερέχωσιν for ὑπηρετῶσιν, but 
now believe the foregoing interpretation 
to be right.

601 Ε 32 ἕξαγγέλλει. See on ἕξα-
γγέλλει in D above.

πιστεύων. In the language of the 
Line, his state of mind is πίστις (cf. πίστιν 
ὅρθον below) see App. I to Book VII. 
In 596 B on the other hand the ὅμοιωρα πρὸς τὴν ἱδέαν βλέπει. Plato does not 
try to reconcile the two points of view 
(601 D H.): but he might say that the 
objective reality of that which guides the 
ὅμοιωρα is always the Idea, whether he 
acts on his own initiative or under the 
direction of another. See on 596 B. It 
should be noted that Poetry and the other 
imitative arts are placed higher, and not 
lower, than ὅμοιωρα in Παρακλ. 248 Ε. Here, 
however, Plato's purpose is a 
narrower one, viz. by means of an illustra-
tion derived from the mechanical arts to 
complete the proof—hitherto only ἁμαρτε 
ῥηθέν 601 C—that the Imitator does not 
eἰδῶν τινῶν, as many assert (595 B), but 
is in reality third from knowledge.

602 A 3 δόξαν ὅρθον. See IV 430 
B H.

5 οὔτε—ποιησάς. The word ἐκα-
aia, though not here used, represents the 
Imitator's state of mind: see on VI 511 E 
and App. I to Book VII.

7 ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς. Stall-
baum remarks 'cave unam poesim intelli-
perĩ ὡν ἄν ποιῆ. Οὐ πάνω. Ἄλλ' οὖν ἥ δὴ ὁμος γε μιμήσεται, ἃ oὐκ εἰδῶς περὶ ἐκάστου, ἵνα πονηρὸν ἡ χρηστόν ἄλλ', ὡς ἐοικεν, 1ο οἶον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδέν εἰδόσιν, τούτο μιμήσεται. Τι γὰρ ἄλλο; Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὡς γε φαίνεται, ἐπτεικώς ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τὸν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι αἰξίον λόγον περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἄλλ' εἰπεῖν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μιμήσιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιῆσεως ἀποτομένους ἐν ιαρβείοις 15 καὶ ἐν ἐπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἴον τε μάλιστα. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

V. Ἡ πρὸς Δίος, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτου μὲν τι ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἥ γὰρ; Ναὶ. Πρὸς δὲ

gas"; but ποίησις is certainly 'poetry' and nothing else, as Schneider shews, throughout the whole of this episode. It is poetical μιμήσις with which the discussion is primarily and chiefly concerned; hence this passing exclamation—for it is nothing more; witness the asyndeton. With χαρίες (ironical, of course) followed by οὐ πάνω, in which the irony disappears, cf. I. 426 a, b (J. and C.). <οἴκου> χαρίες (Richards) is an unnecessary conjecture. The reading μιμήσει for ποίησε (and some other MSS) is tautological and absurd.

602 B io οἴον φαίνεται—εἰδόσιν. He will copy τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλά νῦμμα καλόν τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (v 479 D).

τοῦτο μιμήσεται κτλ. τοῦτο is surely not "a cognate accusative" (J. and C.): see on μιμήται εἰδὸλον 600 e. For παύδια τινα see on 599 a, and on ἐν ἐπεσι 598 c n.

602 C—603 B Consider, again, what is the part of our nature to which imitation appeals. Painting depends for its effect on the optical delusions to which we are subject, and against which the arts of measurement, counting etc., are our only safeguard. The rational part of soul applies these arts, and proves itself the best by accepting their results. The opposing part is therefore one of the baser elements within us; and base will be the brood that springs from its union with imitative art, in Poetry as well as Painting.

602 C ff. The reasoning from here to 607 A has been supposed to rest on a psychological theory irreconcilable with that of Book IV, to which the discussion expressly alludes (in 602 k). See for example K rohn Pl. St. p. 255 and Pfeiderer Zur Lösung etc., p. 38. It is true that Plato is here content, in view of his immediate purpose, with a twofold division of soul into (1) a rational and (2) an irrational, ἀλήθιον (604 D, 605 B), or lower element. But the resemblance between the two theories is greater than the difference, for (a) the λογιστικὸν is common to both, and (b) on its moral side the irrational element appears sometimes as the ἑπιθυμητικὸν (606 D) and peri ἀφροδισίων — and peri πάντων τῶν ἑπιθυμητικῶν κτλ.), sometimes as a degenerate form of the ἑθικοεδές (604 E, 606 A: cf. ἐθικavored 606 B). What is new is the assignment to the ἀλήθιον of a certain quasi-intellectual power—viz. the power of forming false opinions (603 A, 605 C); but there was no occasion to raise this point in the earlier psychology, which was intended as a foundation for Plato's theory of the virtues. It becomes necessary to touch upon the question now, because imitative art aims at producing false opinions, and Plato accordingly assigns them to the ἀλήθιον.

602 C 17 πρὸς Δίος κτλ. The logical sequence is "iam vero hæc imitatione non solum futila efficit, sed etiam futilum ani- mai nostri partem afficit " (Schneider). There is a certain awkwardness in making the transitional sentence interrogative in form, but the extreme animation carries it through. We cannot (with Stephanus) cancel ω and print a colon after ἀληθείας, for the interrogation is asked by πρὸς Δίος.

18 μὲν τι. μὲν of course balances δὲ in πρὸς δὲ κτλ., and μὲντοι (Stallbaum with some διότως notae MSS) is not so good.
D ev plàvnnv tìs òyseos, kai òpàsà tìs τaraxhì dìhì òymì ènòusà àuptì òn tì òyvkhì: ó òh òymì tò pàthhmà tìs òpòwos è h skìa-25 gráfìa èpìthèmènì ògòttèias òudèn àpòlèite, kai è h òhàvmatòpòia kai àì àlalì òoállà òoiàtàtì òuxhànài. 'Arìpò. 'Arò òun ou tò metrèvva èn àriðmièvva èn èstàì òohtèhètì òhàrìstàtì àpro àvta èfàvnnasa, èsìtè mi àrçhèn òn òymì tò fàvòvnon àmeizòv òh òlattòv òh òpèòv òh òbávtoùvòv, òllà tò òlogìsmàvnon èn èmtrìsaì àì kai 10 ò Sòtòvav: 'òìs òáv ou; ' 'Àllà òmhìn tòutò ýe tòò lòugòstìkoì èv èìì tòò òn òyvkhì òårgòn. Tòutòv òáv ouv. Tòutì òè òolàkkìs èmtrìsanì èn èmtrìsanì àmeizò åttà èìì àì òlattòv ètèrà ètèron òh èsà tàvntàì òfàvnetì àmà pèrì tàvntà. Nàì. Òúkòvòv

19. Íta A*: ab A2 òw sùper òòwì, tò pro tàw àsptìa legìmùs. Pro tàwì, quod pàrebet etiam q sed omisit Ë, legìtur in II òv. 25. àyòv II: àyòv Æ.
'And to this principle, when it has measured and signifies that some given objects are greater or less than or equal to some others, the contrary appearances are often presented in connexion with the same objects at the same time.' τάναντια is 'the contrary,' i.e. not 'opposite appearances' in general, but the contrary (in any given instance) of the impression formed without the aid of measurement: cf. τάναντια in v 453 C, Euthyphr. 6 A et al. The object A, for example, which is nearer and smaller, appears larger than B: but the λογιστικὸν discovers after measurement that A is smaller and reports accordingly. We have thus two contrary coexisting impressions of the same object. One of the two impressions belongs to the λογιστικὸν: does the other also? No, because, as shewn in iv 436 A—C, it is impossible for the same faculty to hold contrary opinions simultaneously in relation to the same objects. Hence the part of soul which δοξάζει παρά τὰ μέτρα is not the same as that which δοξάζει κατὰ τὰ μέτρα (i.e. the λογιστικὸν). And as the part which believes λογισμὸς (viz. the λογιστικὸν, cf. 604 D. 605 B) is the best, that which opposes it will be τῶν φαινόν τὶ ἐν ἡμῖν. J. and C. follow Schneider in translating τῷ αὐτῷ as instrumental ('with the same faculty to form opposite opinions at the same time'); but it is much more natural to make it the dative with infinitive after δοξάζων, in view especially of τὸ—δοξάζων τῆς ψυχῆς immediately following. Rightly understood, iv 436 B is also in favour of taking τῷ αὐτῷ in this way. For other views of this difficult passage see App. II.

603 A 5 ἐλεγον: viz. in πρὸς Δόσις—ἐξει 602 C, although Socrates reads more into πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποιον—ἐξει than the mere words by themselves convey.

603 B 7 τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν κτλ. See on 602 C.

9 φαύλη—μμητική. Cf. vi 496 A. 11 ἡ καὶ ἡ. See cr. n. "Inter ἡ et ca facile καὶ ἡ excidere potuit" (Schneider).

603 E—605 C If we examine Poetry on its own merits, apart from the sister-art of Painting, we observe that Poetry imitates action. Now in action we often fluctuate between two impulses. When a great calamity befalls us, we are tempted to give way to grief, before the eyes of others; but Law bids us refrain, and try to cure the wound instead of hugging it. That which is best within us readily obeys; whereas the part that tempts us to dwell upon our sorrows is irrational, indolent, cowardly. Yet it is just this peevish, querulous side of human nature which most lends itself to imitation, and whose portrayal in dramatic art the vulgar most readily understand. Poetry is thus the counterpart of Painting; its products are low in point of truth, and it feeds our lower nature. We exclude the Poet from our city on both grounds.

603 B 12 μὴ τοίνυν κτλ. In 605 A Plato seems to think that his procedure
in arguing from Painting to Poetry (597 E n.) needs a word of explanation and defence. The following argument incidentally furnishes such a defence by deducing from an independent treatment of Poetry the conclusions to which we have already been led by τὸ εἰκῶς έκ τής γραφικῆς. 

603 C 15. άδι άδη προθυμῆθα; 'let us put it before us in this way. In the object is easily supplied, and in other respects προτυποθαίνα is used as in I. 375 D, Phil. 36 E and elsewhere: so that there is no good reason for suspecting the text. ὑπόθυμηθα (Richards) has a different and less suitable meaning.

16 πράττοντα κτλ. Cf. Aristotle's definition of tragedy as μῆπας πράξεως κτλ. (Poet. 6. 1449 β 24) and Plato Laws 817 Α ff. See also Stählin Stellung d. Poesie etc. pp. 35 ff.

19 μὴ τι—παῦτα; 'It was nothing be-
yond this, was it? I have adopted Ast's conjecture (see cr. n.), which Schneider also adveys, in preference to omitting ὑ with q and two other MSS, Stallbaum, and Baiter. The imperfect may be a re-
miniscence of III 399 A—C. The different usages of μῆ with the subjunctive have not yet been thoroughly explained (see Cl. Rev. x pp. 150—153, 239—244), but it seems clear that μῆ cannot in interrogative sentences with the 3rd person subjunc-
tive mean 'num,' and the meaning 'perhaps' (as in μῆ ἅλθης ὑ) is unsuitable. The only exact parallel to this idiom in Plato is Parm. 163 D where Heindorf similarly restores ὑ, apparently with Waddell's approval. See however on the other hand Goodwin ALT. p. 93.
though supported by most MSS and retained by Bekker and others, cannot, I think, be right. "Nescias to cum υόν construendum, an per se pro τοῦ to ac- cipiendum sit. Hoc communi, illud Platonicae loquendi consuetudini repug-

V. Οὐκόμην τὸ μὲν ἀντίτεινεῖν διακελέουμενον λόγος καὶ ἀπό τὸ πάθος; Ἀπειθή. Β 'Εναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γεμομένης εν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτό ἀμα τύ διό φαμεν εν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκόμην τὸ μὲν ἑτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἑτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ἢ ὁ νόμος ἐξήγεται; Πῶς; Λέγει του ὁ νόμος, ὅτι κάλλιστον ὁ τῇ μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἁγείν ἐν ταῖς ἔξωφοραι καὶ μη ἀγανακτεῖν, ὅσ οὔτε δηλον ἄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιοῦτων, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδέν

2. ἀντίτεινεῖν q; ἀντίτεινεῖν ΑΠΕ. 10. εν q; om ΑΠΕ.

604 b 8 αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος: "the affliction itself" (D. and V.): "das Leiden selbst" (Schneider), objectively understood: not "perturbatio" (Ficinus) or "Leidenschaft" (Schleiermacher). See Krohn Pl. S. p. 256.

dio is of course neuter, but δο τει (q Flor. U.) hardly makes the gender clearer and ought not to be preferred.

eν αὐτῷ. See cr. n. αὐτῷ, which Schneider and others retain, has a great preponderance of ms authority, but is not sufficiently precise: for the two principles do not merely belong to the man, but are in him: cf. 603 B. This kind of error is a common one in Paris A: see Introd. § 5. Morgenstern's conjecture αὐτῷ, which Burnet adopts, would refer "ad proxime commemorata τάδεστοι καὶ λόγους, quae diversa et duo esse Socrates iam supra posuit, non nunc demum colligit" (Schneider). φαμεν need not be parenthetical: for εἰναι can be omitted as well as εἰσθαι, and its presence would have been awkward here, on account of the εἰναι to which δο is subject. See Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. pp. 33 f.

II τῷ νόμῳ. Richards proposes τῷ λόγῳ in view of λόγος καὶ νόμος above and λογίσμῳ 604 b. This conjecture would introduce a false and unpleasing contrast between τῷ λόγῳ and ὁ νόμος. The repetition of ὁ νόμος is for emphasis.

C probaiven to το χαλεπός φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων 1 ἄξιον 15 ἐν μεγάλης σπουδῆς, ὅ τε δει ἐν αὐτοῖς τι τάχιστα παραγίμνευσθαι ἡμῖν, τοῦτο ἐμπιστ. γιγνόμενον τὸ λυπεῖσθαι. Τινι, η' δ' ὅς, λέγεις; Τῷ βουλευέσθαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονός καὶ ὡςπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγματα, ὡς ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἀν ἔχειν, ἄλλα μὴ προσπαί- 20 σάντας καθάπερ παιδάς ἐχόμενον τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοῶν διατρίβειν, ἄλλα αἱ ἐθίσεις τὴν ψυχήν ὃ τι τάχιστα ἱγνέσθαι

1 πρὸς τῷ λάσθαι τι καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τι καὶ νοσήσαι, ἱατρικὴ θηριμοδίαν ἀφανίζουσα. Ὁρθότατα γοῦν ἄν τις, ἐφι, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὕτω προσφέροιτο. Οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον 25 τοῦτο τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἐπέσθαι. Δῆλον δὴ. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄγων καὶ ἀπλή- στως ἔχον αὐτῶν ἀρ' οὐκ ἀλόγιστον τα φησίσεσθαι ἐκάλ οργήν καὶ δειλίας φιλοῦ. Ψήσομεν μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μιμήσιν Ε καὶ ποικίλην 1 ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτικόν: τὸ δὲ φρονίμου τε καὶ 30 ἱσύος ἱδίος, παραπληγίσαι ὃν ἂν αὐτῷ αὐτό, οὔτε ῥέδιον


15 οὔτε τι κτλ. The sentiment is repeated and expanded in Laws 803 B ff. 604 C 20 ο λόγος αἰρεί. Cf. ΙV 440 Β and infra 607 Β. The origin of this frequent phrase is, I think, to be sought in the legal rather than, as Schneider supposes, in the military meaning of αἰρέω. Cf. "voluptatem—convictum superiore libro" in Cic. de Fin. III 1. Badham (on Phil. 35 D) strangely conjectures that the figure is "borrowed from the draught-board."

ἄλλα μὴ προσπαίταινας κτλ. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Dem. Phil. 1. 140. The curious error πληγέντος for πληγέντος, found in several MSS besides A, is perhaps due to a reminiscence of ιγρέννον.

604 D 23 πρὸς τῷ λάσθαι κτλ. See cr. n. In Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. πρός it is said that it γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τι = "occupatum esse circa aliquid vel in aliquo vel in aliqua re," but no certain examples are given. I agree with the Oxford editors in thinking the dative right as against the accusative, which the German editors retain. Cf. ΙVIII 567 Δ. τεσσ. The conjecture πταίσων (Herwerden Μν. IX p. 340) is worse than unnecessary, ἀφανίζουσα agrees of course with the subject of ἐθέλει, which is singular, in spite of προσπαίταινας. We need not (with Apelt Obs. Cr. p. 12) write ἀφανίζουσα οἱ ἀφανίζουσαν: see on 1 347 Α.

24 ἱατρικὴ κτλ. Stallbaum reads τὴν θηριμοδίαν with q (see cr. n.). "In dictione poetica articulum etiam minus desidero" (Schneider). The article would be comparatively tame.

26 τοῦτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ means the λογισμὸς expressed in λέγει σου τὸ νόμος (II) —ἀφανίζουσα (D). Stallbaum was the first to restore λογισμῷ (from ΑΠΙ etc.) for the λογισμῷ of inferior MSS.

604 E 30 ἔξει κτλ. ἔξει = ἐνδιδῆται, as often. The Euripidean drama forcibly illustrates what Plato here says. τὸ ἀγανακτικόν may be regarded as a degenerate variety of the ὑμεῖςδέ: cf. ΙII 311 A—C and supra 602 C Ο.
22 μιμούμενον. See cr. n. μιμούμενον, if it could be taken as passive, would be better and more pointed; but there is apparently no other example of the present participle of this verb used passively, and we are hardly justified in reasoning from the perfect (μεμιμημένα Crat. 425 D) etc. to the present. Schneider thinks μιμούμενον may be active, ‘the imitator’ being said instead of ‘the imitation’ (‘nor is it easy to understand one who tries to imitate him’ J. and C.). But we cannot help feeling that εὐπτεῖς as well as ἐπίκοιν ought to agree with ἡδον. I therefore follow Stallbaum in preferring the genitive absolute μιμούμενον, which has the authority of q and several other MSS in addition to II.

32: μιμούμενον. See cr. n. μιμούμενον. Thus, if it could be taken as passive, would be better and more pointed; but there is apparently no other example of the present participle of this verb used passively, and we are hardly justified in reasoning from the perfect (μεμιμημένα Crat. 425 D) etc. to the present. Schneider thinks μιμούμενον may be active, ‘the imitator’ being said instead of ‘the imitation’ (nor is it easy to understand one who tries to imitate him’ J. and C.). But we cannot help feeling that εὐπτεῖς as well as ἐπίκοιν ought to agree with ἡδον. I therefore follow Stallbaum in preferring the genitive absolute μιμούμενον, which has the authority of q and several other MSS in addition to II.

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VII. Οι μέντοι πω το γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αυτής.
Το γάρ και τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἰκανούν εἶναι λοξῆσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνω τινῶν 20 ὀλγῶν, πάνωντον πνοῦ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλει, εἴπερ γε δρά αὐτῷ;
Ἀκοῦσαν σκότει. οἱ γὰρ ποῦ βέλλιστοι ἦμᾶς ἀκροομένοι Ὄμηρου

d) ᾿Αλλοῦ τίνως τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν 1 μυμομένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν
πένθει ὑντα καὶ μακράν ῥήσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἦ καὶ
ἀδυνατας τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ' ὧτι χαίρομεν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες 25
陴μας αὐτῶν ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν

17. εἰδωλοποιοῦντα q2; εἰδωλοποιοῦντι ΑΠΕγ1).

605 C 17 εἰδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα κτλ.
See εἰ. n. εἰδωλοποιοῦντα seems also to have been the reading of the first hand in Vind. F. The dative εἰδωλοποιοῦντι is retained by Schneider, who makes it agree with τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ and regards ἀφεστάως as neuter plural. This interpretation, though grammatically tenable, is otherwise unsatisfactory. Plato (in 605 a) has just correlated Poetry with Painting because Poetry also (a) produces φαύλα πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and (b) consorts with φαῦλον τι τῆς ψυχῆς. On both grounds, he concludes, Poetry must be proscribed: for (b) τοῦτο εὔξει—τοῦτε δὲ σμικρά, and (a) εἰδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦνται. The chiasitic sequence is usual in Plato. If we read εἰδωλοποιοῦντι, Plato assigns only one of his two main reasons for the exclusion of Poetry, viz. (b), and the correspondence between this and the preceding sentence disappears. On this account Stallbaum and others are, I believe, right in restoring the accusative, and making ἀφετέωντα, as well as εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, agree with τῶν μιμητικὸν συνηγήμ. The error—an easy one after διαγραφόκοιται καὶ ἡγομένως—affected ἀφετέωντα also in at least one ms, for Ε has ἀφετέωντι.

605 C—607 A. But the most serious count in our indictment is that Poetry is capable of corrupting, with few exceptions, even men of character and virtue. Tragedy stirs in us just those emotions which we are ashamed to indulge when suffering misfortunes of our own, and the consequence is that we succumb more readily in the hour of trial. The same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of comedy also. We shall therefore decline to model our lives after Homer, and refuse to surrender our city to the rule of Pleasure.

605 C 19 αὐτής. That is, τῆς ποιή-

605 D 23 τίνα τῶν ἡρώων κτλ. Cf.

611 387 D. In ῥήσιν—κοπτομένους the

contrast is between a ῥήσις or set speech,

spoken and not sung, "quales multae in

tragediis, Euripidis praesertim" (Cas-

aubon apud Stallbaum), and κομμοὺν,

which are sung. Hence ἦ καὶ—κοπτο-

μένους, 'or if you like singing and beating

the breast,' is perfectly accurate, and we

ought not to change καὶ ἀδοῦντας into

κλάοντας or κλάοντας (with Ast, Cobet,

Baiter) or ἀδοῦντας into ἀλάοντας (with


The readings τίνα—ὀντας—ἀποτείνωντας

in q and some other ms are only attempts to

obliterate the common irregularity of a

singular (τίνα etc.) passing into a

plural: see on I 347 A. Richards 'sus-

pects' that Plato wrote μυμομένου—ἀπο-

tείνωντας—κλαοντος—κοπτομένου. The

conjecture is as unnecessary as it is bold.

25 χαίρομεν κτλ. Pity, according to

Aristotle, as well as Plato, is aroused by

Tragedy: see Poes. 6. 1449 b 27. With

συμπάσχοντες κτλ. cf. Arist. Poes. 6. 330 a

d ἦτε δὲ ἀκροομένοι τῶν μιμητῶν

γίνοντα πάντες συμπάσχεις, and with

ἐπαινοῦμεν—διὰ Ἡλεύτης 800 D δ' ἦν

δικαιρούμενος μᾶλιστα τὴν θυσίαν παραχρήμα

ποιῆσαι πόλει, οὔτος τά μεγάλα σεβέσθη, Phil.

48 A τάς γε τραγωδίας θεωρῶντες, ὅταν ἀμα χαίρομεν κλάοντες κλάωντες and Ion 535 E.

See also on 606 b and 111 395 D.
606 A 1 nai kte. It is unreasonable to take pleasure in and praise such exhibitions; for the appetite to which they minister is one which in the case of our own individual misfortunes we are careful to repress. Jackson points out that nai ("ganz recht" Schneider) assents to what Glaucos has just said, viz. ouch eulogos eisken, and does not mean nai, euilogois eisken, as J. and C. suppose, taking nai as the equivalent of the French si.

2 katechomenon tote: viz. ouden oikein tivn hemas khoros generai (605 D).

5 tote estin touto kta.: 'is on those occasions the part of our nature which the poets satisfy and please.' touto is the subject, and repeats to bia katechomenon kta., while to—xairon is in the predicate. A difficulty has been felt because tote now refers to poetical exhibitions, whereas the other tote had a different reference; but the emphatic place of the second adverb seems to place it in opposition to the first, and mistake is made impossible by the presence in the one case of ev tais oikelas symforait, in the other of upo toiv poi-
tov. Cf. also the double reference of aut—adv in 606 C. Madvig conjectures aut esti touto, Richards tout estin auth. I once read tou touto estin with q and Flor. U., but there is not sufficient reason for deserting the best MSS. On the theory of Tragedy involved in this sentence see 606 B n.

7 tou thernoudos toutou. See on to agaranthikton 604 E.

606 B 8 eautou. "Plato passes from the rational part of soul to the man himself" J. and C. Hence katafroneias below. The antithesis with alles anw makes the meaning clear; and a similar transition occurs, as Schneider points out, in vi 456 A: see also note ad loc.

11 katafroneias—poihtai. He cannot bring himself to despise the whole poem; yet that is the only safe thing to do. From this point of view Plato's own katafroneias dhias tis poihtai is in itself the strongest testimony to the hold which Poetry had on him. See on 595 B.

12 apostolaien—oikeia. Cf. 111 395 C ff. and Latoes 656 B.
13 ἑρεφαντα—κατέχειν. Plato and Aristotle agree in holding that Pity is one of the principal emotions to which Tragedy ministers. The point at which they part company is where they begin to discuss the effect produced upon human life and conduct by the indulgence of this emotion in the mimicry of that stage. According to Plato, the emotion grows by what it feeds upon, and becomes more and more troublesome and deleterious in real life, the more we indulge it at the theatre: according to Aristotle, tragedy effects the 'purification' of pity and its kindred emotions and tends to free us from their dominion in matters of more serious moment (Poet. 6. 1449b 27 et al.). Aristotle hopes to effect by means of theatrical stimulation what Plato would attain by starving the emotions even in play. It is obvious that the Aristotelian theory of the drama was in this important respect developed in direct and conscious antagonism to the Platonic, to which, in other particulars, it owes much: see Finsler Platon u. die Arist. Poetik pp. 96 ff. I think it may fairly be argued that Plato's view is not less true to experience than that of Aristotle; for a spectacle which 'purges' the ἑλέους in one man may strengthen it in another and make him more than ever inclined to self-pity. On the contrast between the Platonic and Aristotelian views see Butler Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. pp. 237—263, especially 241 f., and for Aristotle's debt to Plato in his definition of tragedy consult the excellent essay of Siebeck Zur Katharsisfrage in his Unters. zur Phil. d. Gr. pp. 165—189.

14 ἑλέους. ἑλέους and not ἑλευς is the Platonic form of this word: see Schanz Phaedo p. vii.

606 C 15 ἀρ' ὄνχ κτιλ. Cf. III 383 E.

16 ὅτι κτιλ.; lit. 'that whatever jests you would be ashamed to make yourself, but which you are mightily pleased to hear in comic representations, or it may be in private life, and do not hate as bad, you do the same thing' etc. 'Whatever' is treated as equivalent to 'if any': see Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 945. I have followed Schneider in writing ἄν or ἄν instead of ἄν (see cr. n.), although he gives no other instance where ἄν appears to do double duty in this fashion. The usage, however, ought not on that account to be pronounced impossible; for cases in which a single relative pronoun forms, as here, the object of two opposing clauses, one representing a hypothetical, the other an actual situation, are extremely rare. We should also remember that ὅσ is occasionally used instead of ὅς ἄν with the subjunctive, even in classical prose, according to the best ms.: e.g. Laws 737 b: see also Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 206. A sentence like the present is made easier by the mere existence of such an exceptional liberty of style. For the corruption of ἄν to ἄν cf. (with Schneider) Gorg. 486 E. All other attempts at emendation—and they are numerous—involve too much change: see App. III.

17 ἒια: i.e. "intra privatos parietes et ab ipsis, qui artem non profentur" (Schneider). The word has been held to refer to writings in prose: but see on 11 363 E.

18 ἄν κατείχες. ἄν is "item, ut antea ἥρμοδες" (Stallbaum). Madvig's conjecture ἄν should not be adopted. The second ἄν (τῶν' ἄν) points the contrast between κατείχες and ἄνεις: cf. 606 a n.
606 D 21 καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων κτλ.

Cf. 111 389 D ff., and (for the psychological theory of this passage) supra 602 C. φτι, which depends on ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, is easy enough if we retain ὀτι in c; cf. vi 510 D οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀτι κτλ. and infra 613 D καὶ αὐτό καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλαβόντες μιαθείτων καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τοῦ ποιητῆς πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου κατασκευασμένον ἥν, | φιλεῖν μὲν χρή καὶ 607 ἀστίσεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύναται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν "Ομηρον ποιητικῶτατον εἰναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδοσιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ, ὅτι ὁσον μόνον ὤμοις θεώς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν: εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν

See on 595 C.

4 ὤμοιος—ἀγαθός. In Laws 801 E —802 A the same exceptions are allowed. Even religious hymns would fall under the heading of ἔνδοξοι, according to Plato's definition of the term: so that it is once more clear that his real quarrel is not with Imitation as such, but only with Imitation of the false and immoral. See on 595 A. For the construction cf. (with Stallbaum) Ἴημπρ. 194 D τοῦ ἐγκύκλου τῆς Ἐρωτότι. In pp. 55—59 of his Stellung d. D. in der pnl. Phil. Stählin gives an interesting sketch of the kind of Poetry which Plato would have admitted in the Republic.

5 ἡδυσμένην. The same word is used by Aristotle in a narrower sense, with specific reference to what he considers the ἐλάφωτα or seasoning of poetry, viz. metre and melody; see Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. p. 1.46 n. 1. Here ἡδυσμένην points the way to ἡδυνή; and for that reason 'pleasant' is a more suitable translation than 'honeyed' (Jowett) or 'highly-seasoned' (D. and V.), although the epithet also suggests a comparison with cookery (cf. δόξων ὣναι Theaet. 175 E). For the sentiment cf. 111 395 b f. αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐστηρότερῳ καὶ ἄγαθεστέρῳ ποιήσει χρῆσθαι κτλ.

607 A 3 πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδο-

ποιῶν. See on 595 C.
7 τοῦ κοινῆ—λόγου: 'the principle which the community shall in every instance have pronounced to be the best.' See 607 B—D, where one example of such a λόγος is provided. For λόγος in this sense cf. (with Schneider) Crit. 46 π ἐν—διὰ ποιότος ὁδὸς τῶν εἰμῶν μονῆι άλλω πειθείση ἡ τῆς λόγοι, δι’ ἣν μοι λογισμόντων βελτιστοσ φαίνεται. In his second edition Ast wished to place a comma after βελτιστος ('that which has ever been judged best by all, viz. reason'). This interpretation lends a certain weight and dignity to the clause; but the other is easier and more natural. Cf. Shorey in A. J. Ph. XIII pp. 364 ff. Plato else¬where provides against what he takes to be the antimonic tendency of Poetry by enacting that the Poet shall παρά τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα καὶ δικαία ἡ καλὰ ἡ ἄγαθα μονὴν πειθείσῃ ἀλλο, and submit all his works to a state censorship (Laws 681 c, d), although in a striking passage of the Politicus (299 B. E) he himself insists that freedom is the very life of poetry and every other art. See Reber Plato u. die Poesie p. 71.

607 B—608 B The quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry is nothing new; but, for our own part, we are will¬ing to let Poetry return, as soon as she is proved to be not merely pleasant, but profitable. Till then, we shall use our argument as a charm to protect ourselves against her fascina¬tions; for the issue at stake is greater than it appears.

607 B 9 ἀπολογησθῶ κτλ. See cr. n. The reading ἀπολογησθῶ—cuncterata sinto or, according to Hermann, singulatim exprima sinto—though retained by Hermann and Bäiter, is much less appropriate than ἀπολογησθοῦ: for the whole of the preceding episode is an ἀπολογία or defence of Plato's attitude towards Poetry in Books II and III (295 A n.). ἀπολογησθῶ is also more in accordance with ὅτι εἰκότως ἀπετέλλομεν: and the words ὃ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἔριε. προσεῖτομεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καὶ τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῖν καὶ ἁγοροίην καταργῆτο, ὃ ταλαι μὲν τὶς διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητική. καὶ γὰρ ἡ

λακέρυξα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων ἐκείνῃ κραυγάζουσα, καὶ
15 μέγας εἰν ἀφρόνοιν κενεαγορίας, καὶ ὁ τῶν Λιαν σοφὸν
ὄχλος κράτων, καὶ οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες ὧτι ἀρα πένονται, εἰ
καὶ ἀλλὰ μυρία σημεία παλαιὰς ἑναντίοσεως τούτων: ὦμος δὲ

15. Μαν Ηρωδέν: διὰ Α.
16. κράτων nos: κράτων codd.
20 καταδεχόμεθα ΔΠ: κατα punctis notavit Α₂.

20 καταδεχόμεθα. καταδέχεσθαι is 'to receive home from exile': cf. κατέλειψαν below. δεχόμεθα, which Baiter reads on insufficient authority, is much less expressive and appropriate.

ἐξυπηρέτησιν γε κτλ. See on 595 B.

607 ἐπὶ 24 ἀπολογισμάτιν. Plato is hardly likely to let Poetry return on the promise of an ex post facto ἀπολογία; she must surely make good her defence before the decree of banishment can be repealed. Hence ἀπολογισμάτιν, which Schneider and the Oxford editors adopt, is right as against the ἀπολογισμὸν of Α₂ and a few inferior mss (followed by Bekker and others).

607 ε 30 εἰ δὲ γε κτλ. The words from ἕμ ἡμῖν το ἡμῖν have been found on one of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, without any difference from the text of Α except οὔτω for οὔτως and ἐγγεγονότα for ἐγγεγονότα (Grenfell and Hunt, Vol. 1 p. 52).

33 τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν. Σ has καλῶν, oblivious of the irony.

608 Α 5 ἀκροασόμεθα δ' οὖν κτλ. 'We shall listen, I say, in the conviction that this kind of poetry should not be taken seriously' etc. A majority of mss, including Α and Π, read αἰσθάνεμα instead of ἀκροασόμεθα (see cr. n.): but the present αἰσθάνεια was not used in classical Greek, as Stallbaurn successfully proves in his elaborate note (cf. also Kühner-Blass Gr. Gr. 1 2. p. 354), and if it were, the meaning would still be unsuitable. Neither of the two variants, αἰσθάνεμα and εἰσόμεθα has any great ms authority, or is at all likely to be right. I formerly adopted Madvig's conjecture ἀφήμεθα, which is in harmony with the Greek tendency to drop the preposition in repeating the
idea of a compound verb (ἐπίδοστες and ἐπιπούντες), and suits the situation fairly well, if we regard ὦς on σπουδαστέων—dedari as virtually embodying the ἔργον of which Plato speaks and depending directly on φόμευσα ('we will say over to ourselves that etc.'). φόμευσα is both a better and an easier remedy than Stallbaum's ἀλεθάναιμεθα, but the objections to it are that it involves the rejection of ὦν, for the 'participial clause ἐνλαβομένοι—ἐρωτα is hardly enough to justify the resumptive δ' ὄν' (J. and C.), and also the rejection of ὦν after ἐλαβητέων αὐτῆς (with Stallbaum and Baiter). For the omission of ὦν, we have the authority of II and several MSS besides: but ὦν is in all the MSS except 8 and Flor. RT. (Vind. F has ὦν.) The suggestion ἐπερεθέσθαι, which Campbell appears disposed to make, has little probability. ἀκροασμέναι seems to me to give exactly the meaning which we require without involving any further change in the reading of the best MSS. I have printed my conjecture because I think it more probable than any other; but it involves too much departure from the MSS to be considered certain. For the sentiment cf. 595 B 2 n.

6 τι τοιαύτη τοιχίσει: viz. the ἄνθος-μενή Μοσχα of 607 Α. The emphasis on τῇ τοιαύτῃ τοιχίσει implies that there is another sort of Poetry which Plato would not exclude. See on 595 A and 607 Α.

7 ἐλαβητέων—ὁν. ὦν is omitted by Stallbaum and Baiter (with ὦ and two

Florentine MSS). The word must, I think, be rejected, if we read ἀλεθάναιμεθα, αἰσθάναιμεθα, or φόμευσα: for with each of these verbs ὦς—dedari must be regarded as the direct object of the verb: but with the reading ἀκροασμένοι there is no difficulty about ὦν. The meaning is 'We will listen, I say, in the belief that such poetry etc., and that the listener must be on his guard against it etc., etc.'

606 B 8 τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείᾳ. See 605 B 2 n.


606 B C D. The greatest rewards of virtue have still to be described. We will first prove that the soul is immortal.

606 C 15 καὶ μὴν κτλ. The main thesis of the Republic—that Justice alone and by itself is better than Injustice alone and by itself—was finally demonstrated in Book IX. But Justice and Injustice do also, in point of fact, involve consequences: and it is necessary to take these into account, if we are to make the comparison between Virtue and Vice in all respects perfect and complete. Cf. 612 Β 2 n.

17 τῶν εἰρημένων. Nettleship (Leet. and Rem. II p. 325) thinks τῶν εἰρημένων can only refer to 'the rewards of justice on earth,' in which case we must suppose that this passage and the argument for Immortality which it introduces were written by Plato after 612 Α—613 Β, where he describes the rewards of virtue and vice while we are still alive. But there is no
reason why τῶν εἰρήμενων should not, like έκείνως in 612 B, refer to what Plato in 614 A calls 'those goods which Justice by herself supplied' (ἐκείνως τοῖς ἀγάθοις οίς αὐτή παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη): and it is much more natural to assign this meaning to τῶν εἰρήμενων than to suppose 'that Plato had two plans in his mind as to how to finish the Republic.' I can find no sufficient evidence to justify any such idea.


οἷς ἠθέθηκα κτλ. 'Have you not observed' etc. The light and airy tone with which Plato introduces this momentous topic has often been remarked upon; and we can hardly help feeling that οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν is too audacious to be taken seriously, in spite of Plato's immoveable conviction of the immortality of the soul (see on vi 498 D). The doctrine itself had of course long been an article of the Orphic and Pythagorean creeds (see Rohde Psyche II pp. 1 ff. and Laudowicz Præexistenz d. Seele u. Seeleentw. in Gr. Phil. pp. 1—29), and we must not suppose (with Thomas Gray) that it is the novelty of the idea which occasions Glauco's wonder. Glauco regards the originally half-theological doctrine of the immortality of the Soul with the same sort of well-bred incredulity which it inspired in most of Plato's contemporaries (cf. vi 498 D with i 330 D, E and Phaed. 69 E, 70 A, 80 D), and is astonished that a well-balanced mind should treat it seriously as a philosophical dogma capable of being established by rational argument.

25 εἰ μὴ ἀδικώ γε. See on iv 430 D.

608 D—611 A Everything, which suffers destruction, is destroyed by its own peculiar evil or disease, and that which cannot be destroyed thereby is indestructible. Now the evil which is peculiar to the soul is vice, and vice is powerless to slay the soul. We must beware of supposing that the soul is destroyed by bodily disease, unless it can be proved that bodily disease engenders within the soul its own specific evil; and if any one has the boldness to assert that the souls of the dying do actually become more vicious, he must be prepared to shew that vice, alone and by itself, is fatal to its possessor, which is far from being true. Vice would lose its terrors if death were the end of all things. We conclude that the soul is immortal, since neither its own nor any alien evil can destroy it.

608 D ff. Socrates has already expressed his belief in the immortality of the soul in vi 498 D: cf. also ib. 496 E and i 330 D, E. The proof which Plato gives here has been widely discussed and severely, though often unfairly and unintelligently, criticised by many critics, to some of whom reference is made in the
course of the notes. Plato does not stop to define what he means by ‘soul,’ nor the different senses in which he employs the word ‘death,’ and the consequence is that superficial inspection of his reasoning often sees a fallacy where there is only an ellipse. The best preparation for a study of this argument is a careful examination of the proofs in the Phaedo, to which Plato himself appears expressly to allude in 614 B: see note ad loc. It will be easier to understand the reasoning of Plato if we bear in mind the following considerations. (1) The duality of soul and body is assumed throughout the whole discussion. (2) It is the individual immortality of the soul which Plato wishes to prove. (In his excellent monograph Unsterblichkeitslehre Plato’s, Halle, 1878, Bertram appears to me to have conclusively and once for all established this point as against Teichmüller Die Plat., Fr. pp. 1—23. Cf. Simson Der Begriff d. Seele bei Plato pp. 126—143). (3) The conception of soul as the principle of life, though not expressly enunciated here, is present to Plato’s mind (609 b 11). The question whether immortality (in the fullest sense of the term) belongs to the entire soul, or only to part of it, is not raised in the course of the proof itself, but from 611 b—612 a, it would seem that the logastikón alone is indestructible (611 b 11). At each successive incarnation the logastikón is defined as θα τοις οὕς ματας κοινωνίας, and (according to Phaed. 81 B ff.) the pollution frequently adheres even after death, causing the soul to seek re-incarnation. The ultimate aim is apparently to be delivered from bodily existence altogether, and live οὕς ματας το περίπατον ἐἰς τὸν ἐπιτοχα χρόνον (Phaed. 114 c), but even then the soul would not—so at least I think—seem to Plato to lose its essential individuality and become absorbed. See on the whole subject Simson I.c. pp. 144—154 and cf. 611 b 11.

608 Ε 31 κακόν—λέγει; Richards would add ιδιον or οἴκειον after λέγεις, comparing (for ιδιον) 610 B, and (for οίκειον) 609 c, 610 E. It is easy to understand ιδιον: ‘do you say that each thing has a particular evil and a particular good?’ See Schanz Νέον. Comment. P1, P. 33.

609 Α 5 διεξαγαγεῖ καὶ ἀπώλεσαι. Throughout this argument, as throughout the Phaedo, destruction means dissolution (διέξαγαγεῖ).

14 ἀδικία—ἀμαθία. Vice is the evil peculiar to soul: cf. IV 444 C, Tim. 86 b ff. and Soph. 227 e.

609 C 18 ἀλλ' ὅσε ποιεῖ. poiei means 'picture,' 'represent,' ποιεῖ which Liebhold conjectures (Philol. 1880 p. 169), is wholly inapposite; for the sense requires an imperative. Ast suggests νοέη or σκότει, but the text is sound: see on vi 498 A.

609 D 24 ἐως ἣν—χωρίσῃ. θάνατον must here be understood of the soul's death, otherwise the parallel with ὀπίσ Invoke breaks down, and the reasoning becomes not merely fallacious, but absurd. We have, in fact, to distinguish between the death or dissolution of (a) the body (as described in c above ὀπίσ Invoke σώμα—eis τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἰναι), (b) the soul, (c) the σώματος, or body plus soul. If the soul is mortal, the moment at which it is dissolved and perishes is when the σώματος dies. i.e. (Phaed. 64 C, 67 d) when soul is separated from body (cf. Phaed. 70 A, 77 B, D, E, 80 D and 84 B). Plato reminds us of this by saying ἐως ἣν ἐνθανάτω ἀγαθόν ποιήσαντος χωρίσῃ instead of merely ἐως ἣν ἐνθανάτων ἄγαθον. Cf. 610 D n.

25 οὐδαμῶς—τούτῳ γε. It is strange that Glucho should assert so readily. He is apparently thinking (as in 610 E) of the activity and vitality which wicked men so frequently display; but we may fairly ask 'Why should soul be the only thing which is incapable of being destroyed by its own vice?' It would surely be more true to hold that vice is able to kill the soul just because it is able ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακίαν (609 b), and Panaetius actually made use of a similar argument in order to prove the soul mortal ("nihil esse, quod doleat, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit, quod autem in moribus cadat, id etiam interiturum; dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire" Cicero Tusc. Disp. 1 79). Is ἐως ἐνθανάτῳ—χωρίσῃ intended as an appeal to experience? Even if we allowed that experience is the proper tribunal, our experience of the effect of injustice on a human soul is limited to a single life; and why should not one soul wear out many bodies and perish at last through its own vice καὶ ἡ αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον ψυχῆς σκέπασε (cf. Phaed. 87 B, 91 D. See also Deichert Plato's Beweise s. die Unsterblichkeit d. Seele pp. 46—48). These difficulties are serious, and possibly fatal: they have even led some critics to question the whole argument as a petita principii (e.g. Brandt Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre v. d. Seelentheilen p. 29). Plato does not attempt to solve them here; but
made to ékeíno ge Áλογον, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τινὶ μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλειναι τι, τινὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ μὴ. "Δὲν φαντάζομαι ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἢ ἰδαίς μοι, ὧν υπὸ τῆς τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἢ ἅν ἢ αὐτῶν Ε ἐκείνων, εἰτε παλαίτετε εἰτε σαπρότετε εἰτε ἦτισον δύνα, οὐκ 30 οὐράμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπολλυσθαι. ἀλλ' ἦν μὲν εἰμποίη ἢ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων τῷ σώματι σῶματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκείνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσις ἀπολλυσθαίναι. ὑπὸ δὲ σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλου ὅντων ἄλλο | ὅν τὸ σῶμα, ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων 610 κακῶν μὴ ἐμποιήσατο τὸ ἐμφύτου κακὸν, οὐδέποτε αξιώσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι. Ὁρθότατα, ἐφη, λέγεις.

X. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἢν μὴ σῶματος 5 πονηρία ψυχῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποίη, μὴ ποτὲ ἀξιώσων ὑπὸ ἀλλοτρίου κακού ἀνεῦ τῆς ἰδίας πονηρίας ψυχῆς ἀπολλυσθαί, τῶν ἐτέρων κακῶ ἑτεροί. "Εχει γὰρ, ἐφη, λόγον. Ἡ τοιών ταῦτα ἐξελέγξομεν ὧτι ὅπως λέγομεν, ἢ ἐως ἃ ἢ ἀνέλεγκτα, μὴ Β ποτὲ φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μὴ, ἢν ὑπ' ἀλλής νόσου μὴ, ἢ ἦν ὑπὸ 10 σφαγῆς, μὴ εἰ τις ὁ τι σμικρότατα ὄλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι,


a. comparison of the present argument with Phaed. 93A—94B helps at all events to explain his position. Soul is always soul, and no soul is more a soul than any other (Phaed. 93B); hence the soul which is made evil by vice retains its vitality unimpaired. It is in fact the conception of soul as the principle of life which explains (from the Platonic point of view) Glauco's emphatic od wrestling. Cf. I 353 D τί δ' αὖ τὸ γεγορωμένος; Μάλαλα γ', ἐφη, with note ad loc. It is on the essential connexion between 'soul' and 'life' that Plato builds his crowning argument for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo (100 B ff., and especially 105 C). Cf. Zeller 11 p. 527 and infra 610 D n.

609 B. 30 αὐτῶν—τῶν σιτίων. Her- element (following Ξ.) would omit τῶν σιτίων, but the contrast with σῶματος μοχθηρία is improved by the presence of these words. αὐτῶν is 'ipseum' exactly as in ἀνθέων (kithar above: 'of food itself') 1 A. 32 ὑπὸ δὲ σιτίων κτλ. Cf. 609 A, B. It is difficult to see where the ἐμφύτου κακὼν comes in when the organism is destroyed by violence. Surely lire destroys wood without using σημεδών as its instrument. The fact is that Plato's theory of a ἐμφύτου κακοῦ by which and which alone each object is destroyed, if destroyed it be, does not apply except where the object is independent of external influences, and such, throughout this proof, he supposes soul to be. Cf. 608 D n. and Brandt I.c. p. 29.

610 A 3 ὅρθότατα. See cr. v. Vind. F has ὅρθότατ' ἀν, Vind. E ὅρθότατ' ᾳ: otherwise there is no variant. Schneider alone retains ἄν—λέγεις, but fails to justify the solecism. ὅρθότατ' ἀν—λέγεις, which Hermann and Stallbaum take from Ξ. and Flor. V, does not suit the situation here, as κάλλωτα ἄν λέγεις does in Laws 507 ε. Both here and in Laws 652 A (where A has ὅρθοτα τα λέγεις) the simplest correction is ὅρθοτα τα λέγεις. For the error see Introd. § 5.

8 ἐξελέγξομεν. Richards proposes ἐξελέγχησαν, but the hortatory subjunctive is quite out of place with the passive here. See also on 711 534 C.

610 B 10 ὅ τι σμικρότατα is more idiomatic than εἰς ὅ τι σμικρότατα, which 1 and C. suggest: cf. vi 509 D and Synmp. 191 D.
610 C 18 ómōse—iōnai: 'dares to close with the argument' not 'with us in argument' (one of J. and C.'s alternatives). Cf. Euthyd. 294 δ ómōse ἤγνω τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, Euthyphr. 3 c and Thead. 16: ε.

λέγειν ὡς ποινρήτεροι κτλ. I think it was Dr Johnson who said 'Every man is a rascal when he is sick.' For the omission of the copula with ὁμολογεῖν cf. II 374 A n.

610 D 22 αὐτοῦ τοῦτο. See cr. n. The reading αὐτοῦ τοῦ, which has most of the MSS in its favour, is kept by Schneider, Stallbaum and Burnet ("ab ea, utpote suapte vi et natura perimente") Schneider). Hermann and Jowett and Campbell read αὑτοῦ τοῦ, which is intrinsically far better ('this itself' 'just this' as opposed to the external agencies mentioned below), and might easily have been corrupted into ἀυτοῦ τοῦ.

ἀποθνῄσκειν—οἱ ἄδικοι. If Injustice kills the soul, which is the principle of life (609 δ n.), the wicked should die of their own wickedness; for they cannot of course continue to live on after their soul expires. As it is, however, they have to be put to death by others, and (according to Glaucos) their wickedness rather increases than diminishes their vitality. The argument may not be conclusive (609 δ n.); but we are surely not justified in charging Plato (as Brandt apparently does I.c. p. 29) with confounding either here or in 609 δ the two notions of physical death and death of the soul.

24 ἀλλὰ μὴ ὤσπερ κτλ. For the construction cf. III 410 B n. διὰ τοῦτο. See cr. n. Schneider defends διὰ τοῦτο by Aesch. Ag. 447 πεσών ἀποθνῄσκει διὰ γνωσάκιον: but Aeschylus regards Helen as an agent in the death of the fallen Greeks, and the meaning 'on account of' is even more necessary here than in 609 δ δὲ ἐκέινα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ κακίας. Cf. VIII 562 Β n.

25 οὐκ ἁρα—κακῶν. Cf. Phaed. 107 C ei μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ δαίμον τοῦ πάντοτ ἀπάλ. λαγη, ἐρμαίων ἀν ἂν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀπαθανασίᾳ τοῦ το ἐσώματοι ἀπὶ ἀπηλλάκτηκαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. The thought expressed in these two passages contains the germ of a new argument for immortality. It might be urged that a future existence is necessary in order that the wicked may pay the penalty for their sins, so that Immortality would become a "postulate of the moral government of the universe" (Deichert I.c. p. 48). Plato
is content merely to suggest this argument: neither here nor elsewhere does he place it in the forefront of his dialectical proof of immortality.

610 ε 29 καὶ μάλα ζωτικόν κτλ. Glauco is thinking of the extreme activity and vitality sometimes displayed by the more aggressive kind of villain. A good example is furnished by the career of Dionysius I of Syracuse. With ἀγρυπνον Stallbaum compares "ut lugulent homines surgunt de noete latrones" (Hor. Ep. 1. 2. 32)—an instance on a small and petty scale of the sort of thing which is in Plato's mind.

611 α—612 α It follows that the number of souls is always constant, each of them retaining its individuality throughout. We have hitherto represented soul as a composite substance; but the composite cannot easily be immortal; and if we would see the soul as it really is, we must view it apart from the body and those material accretions with which in human life it is clogged and enumbered. Then only shall we be able to see its true nature.

611 β 4 δεὶ ἄν ἐδέν ἂν αὐτῶι: 'it will always be the same souls that are in existence.' αἱ αὐτῶι is the subject, not the predicate (as Teichmüller translates Plat. Fr. p. 7). Although oúte γάρ—πλείους justifies δεὶ ἄν ἐδέν ἂν αὐτῶι only in so far as concerns the total number of souls, αἱ αὐτῶι by itself means more than this, and implies the personal identity of each individual soul throughout all the vicissitudes of its endless existence. The conviction that the life of each particular soul is a continuous sequence of cause and effect stretching from eternity to eternity was firmly held by Plato, and he briefly reminds us of it here because the theory of future rewards and punishments, which he will presently describe, rests on that hypothesis and no other. For the history of this belief before the time of Plato see Rohde Psyche ii pp. 134—136.

5 ὁποίοι—ἀδάνατα. All things are either mortal or immortal: hence the immortal, if increased at all, must be so at the expense of the mortal, which will accordingly in course of time be exhausted. Cf. Phaed. 7ο ο 7ο ε. especially 72 b ff., where a similar train of reasoning is employed to prove έκ τῶν τεθνεῶν τῶν σώματος γέγενοσαί καὶ τά τῶν τεθνεῶν ψεύδα εἰναι.

611 β 8 τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσι κτλ. In its true and essential nature soul is akin to the simple and incomposite: see Phaed. 7ο β—81 α.
καὶ ἀνομοιότητος τε καὶ διαφοράς γέμειν αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτό. Πῶς ἰο
λέγεις; ἐφ. Οὐ ἔδιδον, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἅδιδον εἶναι σύνθετον τε ἐκ
πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλιστῇ κεχρημένου συνδέσει, ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν
ἐφάνη ἢ ψυχή. Οὐκον εἰκός γε. "Ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἄθανατον
ψυχῆ, καὶ δ’ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἂν· οἶον δὲ ἐστὶν
τῇ ἀλήθεια, οὐ λειταθημένον δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι 1 ὑπὸ τῇ τῆς τοῦ 15
σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, ὡσπερ νῦν ἡμῖν θεώμεθα,
ἄλλ᾽ οἶον ἐστιν καθαρὸν γεγομένου, τοιοῦτον ἰκανὸς λογισμὸς δια-
θετεῖν, καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὐρίσκει καὶ ἐναργιστέρον δικαιο-
σύναι τε καὶ ἄδικαις διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἡ ἄνω τιμήσωμεν. νῦν
dὲ εἴπομεν μὲν ἄληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ, οἶον ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται. 20


10 αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ goes with ἀνομοιό-
tητος—diaphoras: cf. διαφερεθαι πρὸς αὐτὸ and the like. The translation 'viewed by itself' (D. and V.) is quite wrong.
12 ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἢ ψυχή refers to the tripartite division of soul in IV 435 a ff.: cf. (with Campbell) infra C νῦν δὲ εἴπομεν κτλ., 613 a νῦν δὲ—διελ-
θόθαμεν and (for the use of νῦν) ὡσπερ νῦν in VI 504 D and III 414 b ἰ. It is much less natural to connect the clause with
ἄιδεν ("eternal as we have just proved the soul to be") D. and V., with whom Jowett and apparently also Schneider agree. Prantl and others take the right view. Now that he has proved the soul to be immortal, Plato takes the opportu-
nity to suggest a revision of the psychology of Book IV, in which soul was treated as composite (435 a ἰ.): for nothing that is composite can well be immortal (cf. Phaed. 1.c.). According to the theory which is rather suggested (612 a) than
fully worked out in this chapter, the so-
called lower ‘parts’ are not of the essence of soul at all, but only incidental to its association with body, and consequently permissible. Cf. Phaed. 66 c ff., 79 c, δ and the θεύμεν εἰσὸς ψυχῆς of Tim. 69 c ff. Plato expresses himself with some reserve (612 a), but apparently intends us to be
believe that soul in its truest nature is
λογιστικόν, and that the λογιστικόν alone is immortal (so also Simson Begriff d. Seele bei Plato p. 128: cf. also Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et uniti. p. 94 and
Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 357).
14 οἱ ἄλλοι. The reference is gene-
rally supposed to be to the arguments of
the Phaedo. Krohn however (IV. St. p.
266) compares παλαιός—λόγος ὑπὸ μεμνῄ-
σθα (Phaed. 70 c), where Plato is think-
ing of Orphic and Pythagorean beliefs,
and suggests that οἱ ἄλλοι should here be
interpreted in the same way; while
Pfeiderer (Zur Lösung etc. p. 41) sees
an allusion to the Phaedrus and Meno.
That the arguments of the Phaedo are
included in the reference, is extremely
probable both on other grounds, and also
on account of the remarkable affinity
between that dialogue and the whole of
this section; but Plato's words are wide
enough to cover all the proofs of im-
mortality current in the Platonic school,
whether published or not.

ἀναγκασαν ἄν. See on VI 490 c.

611 c 17 καθαρὸν: sc. from body and
its attendant evil; cf. Phaed. 81 b ff.
18 ἐφήσει: sc. τις, which is easily
supplied after the verbal διαθετεών; cf.
(with Schneider) Eutklad. 299 d ὅνοιν
dὲ δὲ αὐτὸ ἔχειν—ἐν ἐαυτῷ; καὶ ἐδὴ ἂν
evadaimenestatos, εἰ ἔχω τοῦ.

ἐναργιστέρον—διόψεται. The theory of
Justice and Injustice in Book IV rested
on a psychology which explained
soul not as καθαρὸν, and by itself, but
present in body (cf. 612 a). Plato hints
that the new psychological standpoint
will give us a new and higher concep-
tion of Justice. I agree with Hirzel (der
Dialog I pp. 237 f.) in holding that this
higher conception can only be the Idea.
The plural refers to different conceptions
of Justice and Injustice, rather than to
"their various forms" (as J. and C.
explain).
21 τὸν βαλάττιον Γλαύκον. Glaukos, who had originally been a fisherman himself, when transmuted into a sea-god, became a patron god of sailors and fishermen. See Koscher Lex. d. Myth. s.v. and Fauser on Paus. ix 22. 7.

611 D 23 τὰ τα παλαιὰ— ἀλλα δὲ. For τε followed by δὲ cf. ii 367 C μ. 

611 E 29 ἐγγυνεῖ τινι. Cf. Phaed. 79 D ὅταν δὲ τὰ αὐτή καὶ τὰς αὐτῆς ἐκδότης ἐκεῖ ἀρχέταις δὲν τὰς ἀρχαῖας ἐκείνων ἐκείνων τὸν ἰδίον καὶ τὸν παλαιόν καὶ τὸν νεόν καὶ τὸ διὸ παλαιὸν καὶ τὸ νεόν ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, ἀλλὰ δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὅστε τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὡστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ ἑοίκεναι οἷος ήν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἠμείς θεόμεθα διακειμένην ὑπὸ μυρών κακῶν. ἀλλὰ δὲι, ὅ Γλαύκων, ἐκεῖνε βλέπειν.

23. ἐκκλάσθαι Π: κεκλάσθαι Α.

the light of 611 B,C we may suppose that when the soul altogether follows after the divine it shakes itself clear of the body and the lower parts of soul associated therewith, and appears in its true unity as pure logistikos. Cf. Grimmelt I. c. p. 94 and 608 D μ.

31 τοῦ πόντου— ἡπτίν. The imagery, which is of course suggested by the comparison with Glaukos of the sea, reminds us of Phaed. 110 B—110 Π.

32 περικρουσθεῖσα is used with exactly the same meaning and construction as περικρύστερα in vii 519 Α. The word is particularly appropriate here, because it might well be used of striking a vessel of any kind in order to shake off the integuments with which it has become incrusted in the depths of the sea. Cf. also the metaphorical use of circumcisus in Cic. de Fin. i 44—παρακρουσθεῖσα (Morgenstern) gives a wrong meaning, and περικρουσθεῖσα, which Liebhold suggests, is tame and inadequate.

πέτρας— ὅστε is bracketed by Herwerden and Richards, the latter proposing as an alternative to insert καὶ before ἐν νή. The image is scarcely bolder than τὰς τῆς γενεσεως ἐγγυνής ἐστίν παλαιός καὶ νεός διὰ τοῦ πάλαιον καὶ τοῦ νεόν ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, and the comparison with Glaukos easily carries it through. 'Stripped of stones and shellfish—the numerous and wild accretions of earth and stone which in consequence of these "happy" feastings as they are called have fastened themselves about her in her present state, because it is on
earth that she feasts.' Liebhold's conjecture γυνήν εστιωμένη and Madvig's γυνή εστιωμένη or γυνή εσφραίμενη may be taken as indications of how far these critics are qualified to deal with the text of Plato. Plato means of course that the soul which feeds on earth becomes of the earth, earthly. Man is an οἰκόνοια φυτόν (Tim. 90 a) and should draw his sustenance from Heaven. The best commentary on the whole passage is VII 519 A, B, with the extracts from the Phaedo cited ad loc. : cf. also IX 586 A, B nn. For the 'happy feastings' see on IV 421 B.

612 A 3 e'ite—ὁπώς. For this formula cf. Phaed. 100 D and Laws 890 B. Plato seems clearly to imply that soul in its true nature is μονοειδής, although he refrains from dogmatising on the subject here. See on 611 B.

612 A—613 E. Now that we have proved Justice to be in itself, apart from all consequences, best for the soul, we may safely dwell on the rewards of Virtue both in life and after death. We revoke the concession which, for the sake of the argument, we formerly made, and restore to Justice the appreciation which in point of fact she does receive from gods and men. The just are dear to the gods and the special object of their providence, but it is otherwise with the unjust. Among men too, Injustice, though for a time it may run well, breaks down before the race is finished; whereas Justice reaches the goal and wins the crown. The honours and prizes which Glauco claimed for successful Injustice fall to Justice, and it is the unjust who suffer the insults and torments which he foretold for the just.

612 A, B 7 οὐκοί O κτλ. 'Well then,' said I, 'did we not in our discourse clear away the imputations against Justice and abstain from bringing forward the wages,' etc. Jackson is inclined—perhaps rightly—to make the sentence categoric and not interrogative. In τά ἀλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα the word ἀλλα refers to the other points raised by Thrasymachus (I 337 A ff.), Glauco and Adimantus (II 358 E ff.), besides the complaint that Justice is usually recommended not on its own merits, but for the sake of its results (II 362 E ff.). For ἀπελυσάμεθα cf. VI 490 E ἀπολύομαι τῆς τῆς φιλομαθίας διαζολήρ, Ap. 37 B, Phaedr. 267 D, Arist. ἑθ. 114. 1415 b 37, 15. 1416 a 5 al. Other explanations of this difficult word and the variant ἀπελυσάμεθα are discussed in App. V. Instead of ἐπηνέκαμεν, I formerly read (with Cobet, Baiter and J. and C.) ἐπηνέκαμεν. The scribe of Paris A (see cr. n.) seems to have had both readings before him, but to have finally decided in favour of ἐπηνέκαμεν, which is in exact correspondence with μαθευσοῦ δὲ καὶ δόξα πάρεις ἀλλοο ἐπαινεῖν 11 357 D. All the other MSS. read ἐπηνέκαμεν except Par. K, which has ἐπενθέσαμεν. ἐπηνέκαμεν should probably be preferred, both on account of the MS evidence, and still more because the aorist seems necessary to balance ἀπελυσάμεθα and ήρομεν. There is no special reason why the word ἐπαινεῖν in 11 357 D should be echoed here: and it is not employed of Homer and Hesiod in 11 363 A, to which ἐπαινεῖται refers. For the confusion cf. (with J. and C.) Pol. 307 A, where some MSS read ἐπηνέκαμεν, and others ἐπηνέκαμεν.

9 αὐτῷ δικαίος ὁμήρου. See on II 363 A.


11 τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον. II 359 C. n.
12 Αίδος κυνή. See II. v. 844 f. αὐτάρ Ἀθηνήν | δῶν | Αίδος κυνῆν, μὴ μω τὸν ἐξερευνήσας Ἀρσ. with Leaf ad loc. Leaf observes that "the name Αἴδος here evidently preserves something of its original sense, the Invisible (Ἀίδος)." For other examples of the proverb see Blaydes on Aτ. Λεκ. 390.
13 νῦν ἡδή ἄνεπιφθοιν. We may without prejudice consider the question of rewards, now that we have judged virtue and vice upon their merits; and it is even necessary to do so, if we are to take account of all the circumstances of the case. See on 608 C.

πρὸς ἑκείνους: sc. τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἷς αὕτη παρεῖχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, as it is more fully expressed in 614 A.

612 C 19 ἥγεσθε—κρῖθεθι represents the general substance, though not the precise form, of the demands put forward by Glauco and Adimantus in II 356 A—D, 367 B. The reference is not more inexact than other cross-references in the Republic (see on 502 D 1), and Siebeck is hardly justified in suggesting that Plato's recollection of Book II had grown faint by the time he wrote Book X (Untersuch. zur Phil. d. Griechen p. 144). The reading ἥγεσθε (see cr. n.) has some little support from the inferior MSS as well as from A. It is defensible in itself, and (as Campbell observes) "agrees better with ἔσωσε and δοτέω and with ἀπαίτω in the following sentence." But ἥγεσθε is on the whole more natural with δοτέων εἰναι and ought probably to be retained. An unfortunate misprint in my edition of the Text of the Republic (1897) assigns to Π the reading ἥγεσθαι (sic), and the error is repeated by Burnet in his apparatus criticus. In reality Π has ἥγεσθαι.

καν εἰ. See on III 408 B.

20 τάυτα: viz. Justice and Injustice. 612 D 22 ἐπειδῆ τοίνυν κτλ. See cr. n. The reading in the text has the approval of Schneider and others. It involves less departure from Π and Α than either (a) ἐπειδῆ τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ὅτε ἐγὼ, πάλιν ἀπαίτω κτλ. (Hermann), or (b) ἐπειδῆ τοίνυν, ὅτε ἐγὼ, κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἐγὼ πάλιν (Ast, Stallbaum), or (c) ἐπειδῆ τοίνυν, ὅτε ἐγὼ, κεκριμέναι εἰσί, πάλιν ἀπαίτω κτλ. (Batter, J. and C., Burnet). There is no authority for (c) except a marginal annotation in A, although Burnet erroneously attributes this reading to Vind. F and Stobaeus. See (for Vind. F) Schneider's note and (for Stobaeus) Flor. I p. 402. 22 f. Hense. To (a) and (c) it may also be objected that the contrast between Socrates on the one hand, and Glauco and Adimantus on the other, requires the presence of ἐγὼ as the subject to ἀπαίτω: and in (b) the jingle ὅτε ἐγὼ—ἐγὼ πάλιν "valde insuave est" (Schneider).

24 ἡμᾶς. The reading ὑμᾶς, which Stallbaum adopts, has little authority,
and is a needful change, for "Socrates ipse adhuc una cum reliquis iustitiam male audire et deos homines secus de ea statuere t112 λόγου ἔνεκα postuerat" (Schneider).

26. 31 κατ' ἀρχας ὁμολογοῦμεν. I 32 2 b.
27. ὅ γαρ δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄθεου κτλ. Cf. (with Morgenstern de Plat. rep. comment. p. 141) Ἀρ. 41 c. D and, for a proof of the divine Providence, Laws 809 D ff.

613 B 14 ὅσοι ἄν—μὴ κτλ.: "who run well from the lower end of the course to the upper, but not from the upper to the lower" etc. (J. and C.). Plato is thinking of the δίας, and calls the outward and homeward journeys respectively ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω and ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνω. We must suppose, although there seems to be no other authority for the supposition, that the end from which the competitors started was spoken of as 'down' and the other end as 'up.' Schneider suggests that the outward limit may have stood higher, but Greek stadia seem always to
have been level. The use of ἀνω and κάτω is as in peripatētῶν ἀνω κάτω (Ar. Lys. 705), εἰρή ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω (Eur. H. F. 953), and other examples quoted in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. ἄνω p. 1063. The subject of ἀποπηδώσει is not ὁ δρόμος, but ὁ δεινὸς τε καὶ ἄδικος: so that ὅτι μὲν πρῶτον corresponds roughly to ἀπὸ τῶν κατώ, and τελευτώτες to ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω. This interpretation is that of Schneider and the other editors. A wholly different view is taken by Riddell (Digest § 111) and Marvig. They understand τα κάτω of the lower, and τα ἄνω of the upper parts of the body ("who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies—head, neck, arms—in bad form") Riddell l.c. For the use of ἀνότα cf. Latus 705 ii, 832 ε and Xen. Reρ. Lec. 5, 9). But an allusion to the physiology of bad running is not in place here, and it is difficult to resist the impression that ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω and ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω are significant parts of the comparison. On Riddell's view they are not, for there is nothing in the career of the clever and unjust which can well be illustrated by 'running fairly with their legs' etc. The point is, as τὸ μὲν πρῶτον—ἀποπηδώσει expresses expressly states, that they do well at first, but collapse before the end, like runners who run well as far as the καβατήρ, but break down in the second half of the ἄνδολος. For the illustration from the games cf. v 465 D II.


21 ἔλεγς. Π 362 B.

613 D 25 ἄνθλοι προτηπλακικοῦται: "are insulted in their misery." (D. and V.). ἄνθλοι is not altogether predicative ("are miserably insulted") J. and C., although it goes more closely with προτηπλακικοῦται than with γένωτες γέγονειον. Schneider translates "und Greise werdend bittere Schmach er dulden müssen."
συν. ἀλλ' ὁ λέγω, ὅρα εἰ ἀνέξει. Καὶ πάνω, ἐφη: δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις.

XIII. "Α μὲν τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ζωτί τινδ' ἰδίαίῳ παρὰ θεῶν
614 τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων | ἄθλα τε καὶ μισθοῖ καὶ δώρα γιγνεῖται πρὸς
ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἄμαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρεῖχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ' ἄν εἶπ.
Καὶ μᾶλ', ἐφη, καλά τε καὶ βέβαια. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ,
οὐδὲν ἐστι πλήθει ὦποδε μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκείνα, ἢ τελευτήσαντα ἐκά-
τερον περιμένει. χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκούσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν 5

5. ἐκάτερος Σ2: ἐκάτερον ΑΣ' γ.

"quia nec tempus antecedentibus congruunt, nec sententiae ratio Socratem singula
supplicia enumere patitur" (Stallbaum). The passage to which the words refer runs
as follows: μαστηγώσται, στρεβλώ-
σται, διδόσται, ἐκκαθήσται τόφωραλιμ
(II 351 ε): and ἐστὶ διδόσται ("after
that"—i.e. after they have been scourged
—'they will be racked' etc.) is probably
a marginal note intended to remind us of
the further tortures specified in the earlier
passage. Schneider and the Oxford
editors retain the words as a parenthesis,
which is, to say the least, exceedingly
awkward.

613 E—616 B But what we have
hitherto recounted is as nothing compared
with the wages of Virtue and Vice here-
after. Let us hear the vision of Er,
the son of Armenius. For twelve days he
lay in a trance, during which his soul
travelled to a meadow, where he heard
the narrative of their experiences from
other souls that had fulfilled the millennial
period of reward or punishment. In most
cases the recompense for good and evil
actions was tenfold; but certain crimes
were punished yet more sternly, and for
some incurring sinners there was no hope
at all.

614 A 5 χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκούσαι κτλ.
The Νέκυα of the Republic is one of the
earliest extant Apocalypses, and many of
its features reappear in later apocalyptic
literature, including that of the early
Christian era. See James Apocrypha
Anecdota in Robinson's Texts and Studies.
A careful comparison of the myth in
the Republic with those of the Phaedritis,
Gorgias, and Phaedo shows that in spite
of discrepancies in detail, the four dia-
logues conspire to produce what is on the
whole a tolerably consistent picture of the
destiny of the human soul—a kind of
ancient 'Divina Commedia,' as Döring
points out (Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos. vi
pp. 475—490). The sources and affinities
of Plato's eschatological myths have been
much discussed. Besides the article by
Döring on Die eschatologischen Mythen
d. Plato (Archiv l.c.) the student should
consult Ettig Acheruntica (Leipziger Stud.
XIII 1891, pp. 251—402, especially 284 ff.),
Norden Vergilstudien (Hermes xxviii
1893, pp. 350—406), and especially
Dietrich Νέκυια (Leipzig 1893), where
the common features in ancient represen-
tations of the underworld are clearly
exhibited. There are traces of Νέκυια
before the time of Plato, and the investi-
gations of Dietrich and others have made
it clear that the materials of Plato's picture
are derived in large measure from Orphic
or Pythagorean traditions (Dieterich l.c.
pp. 128 ff.; cf. also Norden l.c. p.
374, Rohde Psyche 2 II pp. 91 ff., and
Zeller 5 i. p. 450). Dietrich may be
wrong in some of his conjectures, as
F. Weber tries to shew in his inaugural
dissertation, Platonische Notizen über
Orpheus München 1899 p. 20 n., but
the broad outlines of his theory are in my
opinion established beyond reasonable
doubt. Evidence of Pythagorean and
Orphic affinities will be cited in the notes.
Cf. Iproclus in repm. II p. 110 Kroll escort
d' ε' εχεί τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας οὕτως εἴτε καὶ
μή, ἔτειν ἄτοπον, τοῦ Πλάτωνος τά
τοιάυτα πλάττωντος μὲν οὖδαμῶς,
kata δὲ τὴν χρείαν τῶν προκείμενων ἀεὶ
παραλαμβάνοντο καὶ χρωμένον πάσα μετὰ
tῆς προσφύσης περιβόλης καὶ οἰκονομίας,
ὡς καὶ τῇ Μαντινηκῇ ἐξῆν καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὸν
Πορού οἰκοροῦν διηγήματι καὶ τῷ κατὰ
tοῦ 'Απατλοκτοῦ λόγῳ καὶ πάσα τοῦ
ὁμοίως. We may well suppose, however,
that the imagination of Plato dealt freely
with his materials, and the myth of the

A. P. II.
Republic bears the unmistakable impress of Plato's own genius in its artistic finish no less than in its religious and moral teaching.

\textit{\textcopyright}. See cr. n. The accusative appears to be in all MSS except \textit{v} K and Ξ. 6 ἀκόουσαι is doubted by Stephanus, and bracketed by Asl, Stallbaum, and Baiter. There is nothing offensive in the repetition ἀκόουσαι—ἀκόουσαι (cf. vi 511 e n.), and the second ἀκόουσαι is welcome, if not necessary, as defining the exact nature of the debt ('due to hear,' i.e. 'due to be heard,' like καλὸς ἰδέαν and the like). "The debt which has been incurred in words (ἀ ἐδαρελεσαθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ 612 c) "has to be paid in words" (J. and C.). ἦτο depends on ὑπελοίμενα rather than on ἀκόουσαι. J. and C. take ἀκοοσαι as = to have related concerning them," comparing ἀκοοσαι σφικματα vi 196 a and Lys. 207 a; but it is more natural to give the word the same meaning as it bears just before.

614 B. 8 Ἀλκινόου—ἀπόλογον. Books ix—xii of the \textit{Odyssey} were known as \textit{Ἀλκινοῦ ἀπόλογοι} the \textit{tales to Alcinous}; see Ael. Var. Hist. XIII 14 \textit{Ἀλκινοῦ ἀπόλογον} [καὶ] Κυκλοῦσσαι καὶ Νεκλαν καὶ τὰ τῆς Κιρης. Cf. Arist. \textit{Poet.} 16. 1455a 2 and \textit{Rhet.} III 16. 1417a 13, from which it appears that the whole four books were also called collectively Ἀλκινοῦ ἀπόλογοι. There is doubtless an allusion, as the Oxford editors remark, to the \textit{pena} of Od. xi, which is itself one of the \textit{tales to Alcinous}; but the expression has also a proverbial application, being used of a long and tedious story (ἐκ τῶν φλυαρουστῶν καὶ μακρὸν ἀποτελοῦστων λόγων Suidas s.v. Ἀπολογος \textit{Ἀλκινοῦ}. Other authorities will be found in Leutsch u. Schneidegewin \textit{Parem. Gr.} i p. 210, II p. 13.) For the paronomasia \textit{Ἀλκινοῦ—Ἀλκινοῦ} see Riddell \textit{Digest} § 332.

Ἡρός τοῦ Ἀρμενίου κτλ. The names point to the East. Ἡρὸς ὀνομα κύριον Ἑβραίκων, says Suidas, and Er is one of the ancestors of Joseph, the husband of the Virgin Mary: see St Luke 3. 28. By some of the ancients, including Clement (\textit{Strom.} v 157 Migne), Er was identified with Zoroaster (Proclus l.c. p. 109). \textit{Ποῦ} Ἀρμενίου is of course 'son of Armenian,' not 'the Armenian,' as some ancient expositors imagined (see \textit{Proclus in remp.} ii p. 110). Plutarch \textit{Symp.} ix 740 B appears to have read Ἀρμονίου, a reading which was known to Proclus (l.c.), and which commended itself also to the poet Gray: but Ἀρμονίου has no MS authority. Proclus himself adopts the same reading as that of our best MSS, and explains the passage quite correctly in p. 110. 19 ff. 10 δεκατάων. The occurrence of the number 10 and its multiples is one of the Pythagorean elements of the story: cf. infra 615 A, B ἐνεάτε ἐν τῷ πορετῶν χαίτητ (10 years)—ὑπέρ ἐκατόν δεκάκις—ὡς βίου ὁκτώ τοσοῦτον (10 years) τοῦ ἀνθρω- πίνων καὶ εἰκοστὴν in 620 B. See also on 614 c.

12 ἀναβοῦς δὲ—ἰδοι. Other miraculous stories about the dead or seeming-dead returning to life again and describing what they have seen are given by Proclus l.c. pp. 113—116, 122. Cf. also Rohde \textit{Psych.} II pp. 90—101.

14 ἀφαιρέσθαι. In \textit{Phaed.} 107 δ and 113 ὁ each soul is conducted by its δαίμων to the place of judgment.
614 C τῶν τινὰ δαίμόνιον κτλ.
The situation may be seen from the accompanying plan. \(AB\) is the τῶν τινὰ δαίμονιον or λειμῶν (614 E) in which the judges sit. \(BC, AC\) represent the two ways by which the souls when they are judged depart to receive their rewards or punishments. \(DA\) and \(D'B\) are the two ways by which the souls return to the meadow to be reincarnated, after their period of reward or punishment is complete. (Ast makes a grave error when he writes "duo ostia, alterum, per quod animae descendunt in corpore, alterum, per quod e vita redeant." None of the four χάσματα represent the way by which the souls arrive at the meadow immediately after they leave the body.) The τῶν τινὰ λειμῶν appears also in the Phaedo and the Gorgias: εἰς ὅ τινα τῶν τινὰ διακόσιον ἄνδρου πορευόμεθα (Phaed. 107 D); ὅτι δὲ τῶν συλλεγέντας διακόσιον εἰς ἄνδρον πορευόμεθα (Plat. Gorg. 524 A). Ettig l.c. p. 306 is inclined to derive the idea from Homer's ἀσφάδελος λειμῶν. We find traces of a λειμῶν also in Empedocles ν. 23 Karsten ἄτρεις ἐν λειμών (apparently of the Earth) τε καί ἐκ τῶν ἡλίασκονιν, and in Orphic fragments (e.g. Fr. 154 Abel): cf. also Plut. de fac. orb. Lusace 943 C ἐν τῷ πραγματίῳ τῶν ἀδερσ, δὴ λειμῶνας Ἀίδον καλοῦν, and Plat. Phaedr. 248 Β (the 'meadow' or 'plain of Truth'). In none of these passages is the meadow a place of judgment for departed souls; but πεδίον ἀνθρώπων is used of the judgment-place in the Athischos (371 Β), a dialogue full of Orphic influence; and it is therefore probable that Plato borrowed the meadow from some Orphic or Pythagorean dogma. We ought, I think, to conceive the meadow as situated somewhere on what Plato in the Phaedo calls ἡ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων γῆ, meaning the real surface of the earth as opposed to the misty hollows in which we live: see below on 616 Α and cf. Sussemlil Gen. Entwiek. p. 270. Some of the speculations of the Neoplatonists on this subject are given by Proclus l.c. pp. 128—136: but they are altogether fantastic and useless.

15 χάσματα. Roepert (de dual. usw Plat. p. 29) would read χάσματα ("id est, ut me monuit Usenerus, χάσματα 'ἐχομένων, a librarium male suppletum"). The dual is also found in ὕ and Flor. U; but there is hardly sufficient ground for deserting the best MSS: cf. 111 395 Α ἡ ω μαμάτα ἀρτι τοῦτο ἐκάλεις; Lach. 187 Α εί δ' αὐτὸν εὑρέται γεγονότε (so B) τοῦ τοιοῦτου, and other passages in Roepert l.c. Proclus also has χάσματα ἐχομένων (l.c. p. 136. 17). With the two ways (Β',Α') by which the souls depart after judgment cf. Gorg. 524 Α εν τῇ τριβῷ εξ ἑς ἑρετόν τῷ ὄνω, ἡ μὲν ἐν μοίραν νήσους, ἢ δ' εἰς ἀληθέων: also Phaedr. 249 Α. The 'two ways' were a familiar feature in Orphic-Pythagorean pictures of the other world: for illustrations see Dieterich l.c. pp. 191 ff. and Rohde Psyche ν. p. 220 ν. 4.

17 εἰς δεξιάν. The way to the abode of the blest was generally figured as εἰς δεξιάν: see Rohde l.c. and Dieterich l.c. p. 83 ν. 2, where Dieterich quotes from an Inscription found in a grave in the district of Thurii χαίρε χαίρε δεξιάν δύοιστι πάντες ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τοιοῦτοί λειμώνες τε ἐρείπας κατὰ τ' ἄλεσα ἄφρεσαν ψευδέως. The whole of this Inscription, according to Dieterich, be-
trays Orphic and Pythagorean influences. Cf. 617 c n. The other features (ἀνω, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἐς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἐν τῷ ὅπισθεν) are also in keeping with Pythagorean notions: see Arist. Frag. 195 (1125 Β 24 ff.) τοῦ ὅπισθεν καὶ ἀνω ἐν τῷ ἁμαρτείον ἄγαθον ἐκλάνει. τὸ δὲ ἀριστερόν καὶ κάτω καὶ ὅπισθεν κακῶν ἔλεγον, ὡς αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐστιν ἡ ἡμέρα τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀρεσκεύων συναγωγή. 18 διὰ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ. Presumably they passed up through the heavens to the outer surface of the heavenly sphere, as described in Phaedr. 247 b ff. Cf. also Proclus l.c. p. 160. 10 ff. πολλὰ δὲ ἐπιφέρων ἄνων κατὰ τοῦ ὅπισθεν ἀναστρέφοντας τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὁμοιότηταν, —clearly a reminiscence of Plutarch. 246 e ff.

614 C. 1 σημεία κτλ. Cf. Gorg. 226 b. κατὰ is fully explained in the myth of the Phaedo 111 c—114 c. Cf. infra 615 b. 20 πάντων ἐν τῷ ὅπισθεν from its correspondence with τῶν ἀριστερῶν above suggests that our own actions are our doom.

21 καὶ διακελεύωτον = 'and that they exhorted' corresponds of course to καὶ διακελευωμέθα of the oratio recta. Stallbaum's explanation ('optativus ponitur loco accusativi cum infinitivo') is untenable; nor is there any good reason for suspecting the text or writing διακελευσαί with Eusebius (Vigae. Ev. xi 35. 5) and others. The optative is much more dramatic and realistic. Cf. viii 569 A n. 22 ταύτα μὲν is explained by καθ' ἐκατέρων—γῆς i.e. (see the figure on p. 435) BC and AC. Comarini conjectured καθ' ἐκατέρων μὲν τῷ ἄσμα, but ἐκατέρων is much more elegant, and forms a better balance with κατὰ δὲ τῷ ἄσμα (viz. D'B and DA).

23 ἐν τῇ γῆς is not in course 'from earth' (D. and V.), but 'out of the earth' ('ans der Erde' Schneider). They have suffered punishment εν τῷ ὕπο τῆς γῆς πορείᾳ (615 A) 'in their sojourn underground', i.e. in the bowels of the Earth, as explained at length in Phaedr. 113 E—114 B.


vi 748 ff. has omnes, ubi *mille* rotam volvere *per annos* | Lethaenum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno. There is little doubt that both Virgil and Plato took the period of 1000 years from some Orphic or Pythagorean source: see Dieterich Lc. pp. 116 ff. It will be observed that the thousand years do not, in the Republic, include the lifetime of the soul on earth, which Plato estimates at 100 years (615 B). In the Phaedrus on the other hand the entire interval from birth to birth is reckoned at 1000 years (249 D ff., compared with 248 D, E).

3 *eítpátheias—kállos* suggests the beatific visions of the Phaedrus (247 A ff.).

4 *pollóu chrónou*: sc. ἐστή, as in *Laus IV 758 D* χρόνου πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλεστον (Stallbaum). It is worse than needless to insert δεί (with Liebholt) after χρόνου.

5 *δοσα—ζήδικαι*. In Plato, as in Dante, doing wrong to others is the great sin.

7 *tou̱to d’ einaí ktl*. 'that is,' said he, 'once in every hundred years,' *tou̱to d’ einaí* (’namely’) explains ύπερ ἐκάστου δεκάδος. This view is simpler and more idiomatically than (with Schneider) to make του̱το = τὸ δίκην δοῦναι εὑρέτερ ἐκάστου.

615 B 8 *dóntos tosoúntos*. The same duration of human life is postulated also in *Phaedr.* 248 D ff., but retribution in that dialogue appears to be *éνάκει*, and not *dékaides* as here; cf. 256 E with 248 E. The number 100 is the square of the Pythagorean ‘perfect’ number 10, so that Pythagorean influence is doubtless at work again. See App. I to Book *viii* p. 301, and cf. 614 B 11. It should also be remarked that the Greeks, like other races, had many stories to tell of the *mákróbios* of early days, and the ‘Naturvölker’ of historic times were also credited with preternaturally long lives: see the evidence collected by Rohde *Griech. Roman* pp. 218, 236, 247 nn.

9 *kal oivon ktλ*: 'and for example if' etc. *κομισαντο* depends of course on *ώρα* Plato somewhat awkwardly co-ordinates his illustration with the principle itself (*Ivα—ἐκτίνευς*): but there is not sufficient ground for expunging καὶ (with q², Stephanus and others).

*Pollówn*. See cr. n. *Par. D*—followed here by *Burnet*—has *πολλα*,, "quod propter pluralem thvάντων ferri nequit." (Schneider). The passage quoted by J. and C. in defence of *pollówn* from *Laus IX 870 D* τοὺς οὖν τῶν μηνίων ἀναρωτεῖν, *thvάντω* is not quite parallel.

10 *πόλεις προδότες κτλ*. So in *Vig. Asc.* vi 620 vendidit hic auro patriam. *Antiphon* (de *Her. Caed. 10*) names as the three chiefest sins τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὸ ἱεροσεῖλεν καὶ τὸ προδίδαιναι τῇ πόλιν. Cf. also Dieterich *Nek. pp. 66 ff. *eis douleias émbeβληκτόres* is parallel, as Schneider points out, to αἴτιον and not to προδότες.

12 *kal aú—κομισαντου*. It is not at first sight clear whether this applies to those who have come ἐκ τοῦ ὄφρανον, or to those who, though condemned on the whole account, have done some good actions in their lives, and occasionally shewn themselves just and pious. The latter view is supported by *Phaed. 113 D* ἑκεῖ (in Acheron) οἴκοποι τε καὶ καθαρό-
16. αὐτόχειρος Ἀστ: αὐτόχειρας κοῦδ.
but has a solemn, half-tragic or poetical effect. There is the usual supply of emendations, such as οὐδ’ αὐτήν ἤξει (Madvig) οὐδ’ ἤξει (Herwerden), οὐδὲ μὴ ἤξει (Cobet), οὐδὲ δὴ ἤξει (Richards); but the idiom is sufficiently well established (see on VI 492 C), and, as Turner remarks, the variant ἤξει (in Ζ and three other MSS) is itself also evidence in favour of ἤξει.


ἳσαν δὲ καὶ κτλ.: not “erant vero etiam aliqui privati ex eorum numero, qui magna perpetraverant facinora” (Stallbaum), but “erant vero etiam nonnulli privati et quidem de genere magnorum peccatorum” (after Schneider). With ήσαν cf. Phaed. 59 B ἦν δὲ καὶ Κύθνιππος et Prot. 315 A.

616 Ε 29 ἐμύκατο. Cf. Arist. an. post. 11. 11. 94 B 33 βροτα—ὡς οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι φασίν, ἀπελθὼν ἑνεκε τού εν τῷ ταραγῷ, ὅτις φοβοῦται (quoted by Zeller² I p. 451 n. 3). See also Plut. de gen. Soci. 591 C. The remarks of Proclus on this part of the myth deserve quotation: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα φρικώθησι μὲν ποιεῖς τὰ ποιεῖς καὶ ἀπαρατήσῃς, ἀνυπερβλήτους δὲς τὰς μοχρόνες δείκνυσι καὶ τὰς κολαζουμένους, εἶπε καὶ τὰ ἄνθρακε τὴν ἀφίζον ἐμφάνιζε καὶ καὶ τὰ κολαζόμενα φάσματα δυσανίσθετα καὶ τὰ δεσμωθηρία ἀφύκτα (loc. p. 186).

29 ἀνάωτας ἐχόντων. Cf. Phaed. 113 E ὦ δ’ ἂν δώξων ἀνάωτας ἐχειν διὰ τὰ μεγάλη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων κτλ. See on Η 380 B.

31 ἀνδρεῖς—ἀγριοὶ κτλ. These are the prototypes of the κολαζόμενα καί. In later apocryphal literature: see for example Petri Afr. vv. 21, 23 (Dieterich Nek. pp. 4 and 60). Cf. also Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIII 13. 5.

ἡφυ: sc. ὁ ἐρωτώμενος (supra D).

32 τοὺς μὲν—ηγον. διαλαβένη παλαιστρικόν τι (Hesychius). The word is explained in Bekker Anecd. 36 as τὸ κατατρώμενον τινος λαβέθαι. Cf. Hdt. IV 68 διαλελαμμένος ἄγετα, I 114 al. Some malefactors they seized in this forcible way and marched off direct to Tartarus (see on 616 A); others, and among them Ardiaeus, they tortured first, and utilised as παραδείγματα (infra 616 A n.). Schneider translates “die nehmen die einen und führen sie abseits,” understanding διαλαβένη as ‘take aside’: a usage for which the lexica rightly or wrongly quote Aesch. F. L. 41 διαλαμβάνων γὰρ ἐκατον ἤμων ἐν μέρει. The variants ἴδια λαβεῖτε (Ξ and some other MSS), ἴδια παραλαβεῖτε (Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIII 13. 5 and Clem. Strom. V 133 Migne) etc. point to a similar but not identical interpretation: cf. also Proclus l.c. p. 182. δι. διαλαβεῖτε γὰρ ἄραν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι: τοῦτο γάρ τὸ διαλαβεῖν, οίνω διανείμασθαι τὰς καλοσίς. But τοὺς μὲν seems clearly to refer to some of the ἀνάωτας ἐχόντες, and none of this class of likely to have met with gentle treatment at the hands of the ἀνδρεῖς διάτυροι. In Phaed. 113 E all the incurables are thrown εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅπερ οὕποτε ἐκβαλλοῦσιν. It may be noted that the reading διαλαβένης is confirmed by Plutarch’s imitation τούτων ἥ Δίκη διαλαβόσα (de ser. num. vind. 505 A).
κεφαλήν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, ἐξελκὼν παρὰ τὴν ὀδὺν ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ αὐσπαλάθων κνάπτοντες καὶ τοὺς ἂεὶ παρισοῦν σημαίνοντες, ὃν ἐνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμενοι ἁγωνιοῦσι. 5 ἐνθα δὴ φόβῳ ἐφὶ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσιν γεγονότοι τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ γένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα, ὅτε ἀναβαίνων, καὶ ὑπομενόστατα ἐκάστῳ συγγάσιον ἀναβάναι. καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας 1 τινὰς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὰς εὐρεγείσας B

3. κνάπτοντες Ση: κνάμπτοντες A: κνάπτονται satis trito errore pro κνάπ- τοντες q1.
4. ὅτι εἰς Ση: εἰς δ', τι A. 6. τοῦτον Α2 (addito ο super posterius ο a manu rec.) et q: τούτων Α'Σ.

616 Α 3 ἐκτός: i.e. outside the στόμων. It seems to me quite clear from this passage that the δαιμόνιον τόπος is not in the aether, as Proclus appears to suppose (i.e. pp. 128 ff.), but somewhere on the true surface of the earth as described in Phaed. 109 ε' ff.

ἐπὶ ἀσπαλάθων κνάπτοντες. ἐπὶ κνά- 

φον ἐξελκὼν = διασφίσασθαι τὸ γὰρ πρότερον οἱ γραφεῖς ἀκανθῶν ὑφὸν συστρεφό- 

ντες, τὰ ἱμάτια ἐπὶ τοῦ σωροῦ ἐκπαίναν ὁ δὲ σωρὸς ἐλεύθη γράφοι. ὁ οὖν Κρόους τὸν ἐχθρὸν περείβανε ταῖς ἀκανθῖς καὶ ὀφέλους ὑφέσθεν (Hesychius, with reference to Hdt. 1 92). In the Apocalypse of Peter v. 30 we read of χάλκια δότερων ξιφῶν καὶ παντὸς ὀβελίου, πεπυρωμένου, καὶ γυναικεῖα καὶ ἄρδες βάκχη ῥυτίσα τα ἐνε- 

dυμένοι ἐκκυλοῦν ἐπί αὐτῶν κολαζόμενοι. The form κνάπτοντες appears in A (see cr. n.) and several MSS, but κνάμπτω is a bye-form of γράμπω and means not 'card' but 'bend' (Stephanus-Hase s.v.).

τοῖς ἄλλῳ παρισοῦν κτλ. According to Norden Ic. p. 393 the idea that incurable sinners serve as παραδείγματα in Hades is probably Orphic or Pythagorean. It meets us also in Pindar (Pyth. 2. 21 ff., of Ixion) and in Virg. Aen. vi 618 ff. Phlegyasque miserrimus omnes Admonet, et magna testatur voces per umbras 'Dis- 

cite iustitiam moniti, et non tenemis 

divos.' The fullest exposition of the theory is to be found in Gorg. 525 B—D.

4 ὅν ἕνεκα τε κτλ. The words ταῦτα ἐπιθέθηκεν, which Schneider still retains after ἕνεκα τε, have scarcely any MS support and are an obvious gloss. The construction is ὅν ἕνεκα τε ἅγωνιτο καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσοῦμεν ἁγωνιοῦσι. 

ὅτι εἰς. See cr. n. I formerly, with Hermann and Baiter, read εἰς δ', regarding τὸν Τάρταρον as a gloss. But there

is reason in Richards' remark that δ or δτοι would be more natural than εἰς δ τι: and in any case it is hardly likely that Plato would have omitted to specify the destination of these sinners by its name. Cf. Phaed. 113 ε (quoted above on 615 ε) and (for Plato's conception of Tartarus) ib. 112 A ff.

σφίσιν: i.e. to ὃ ὑπερβάλλει and his comrades.
6 τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν. The words τὸν φόβον, which Σ and other MSS add after ὑπερβάλλειν, may be genuine, but as they are absent from A, q and several MSS besides, it is perhaps safer to omit them.
7 καὶ τὰς μὲν κτλ. At this point Er's own narrative is resumed.

616 Β 8 τὰς εὐρεγείας: 'the blessings which they received.' This clearly refers, as Proclus also believed (i.e. p. 185), to the souls ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ. See on 615 Β, and compare Matthew Arnold's well known poem 'Saint Brandan.'

616 Β—617 D After spending seven days in the meadow, the souls that had returned from the journey of a thousand years rose up and departed, accompanied by Er. On the fourth day they reached a place from which they beheld a straight light, like a pillar, stretching through all Heaven and Earth, and after a day's journey they saw at the middle of this light the extremities of the chains of Heaven, and stretching from these extremities the spindle of Necessity with its eight concentric whorls, the circles of whose rims as they revolve carry with them severally the fixed stars and all the planets in their order. On each of the eight whorls is perched a Siren, uttering a single note, the eight notes thus produced result-
ing in a single 'harmony' or mode. Meanwhile the three Fates, as they assist in the revolutions, keep singing to the Sirens' music, Lachesis hymning the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future.

616 b ff. The astronomical difficulties in this part of the Republic have occasioned a great deal of controversy and discussion. Besides the various editions and translations of the Republic in English and German, and the commentaries of Proclus and Theo, the writers whom I have chiefly studied are Grote (Plato on the Earth's Rotation), Boeckh (Kleine Schriften iii pp. 206—329), Donaldson (Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, x pp. 305—316), Susemihl (Gen. Entw. ii pp. 273—278), Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 278—289) and Zeller 1 pp. 434 f. nn. Donaldson's article, to which Dr Jackson first called my attention, although it lacks consistency and clearness, and passes over many difficulties, contains the germ of what I now believe to be the correct theory of the straight light. But nothing that has hitherto been published on the subject supplies at once a full and satisfactory explanation of the difficulties, and it is only through the kind cooperation of Professor Cook Wilson that I have at last been able to form a definite view as to the meaning and solution of this extremely complicated problem. From 616 b to the middle of 617 b my commentary is mainly based on the exhaustive criticisms and investigations which he has sent to me.

The general scope and purpose of the astronomical part of the myth would seem to be set before the souls a picture of the 'harmonies and revolutions of the Universe' in conformity with which it is their highest duty and privilege to live. Cf. Tim. 90 c, D τὸ δ' ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον ἔγγενες εἰσὶν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοηθέντας καὶ περιφεραὶ ταύταις δὴ εὑρισκόμενον ἐκαστὸν δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆς ἐν τῷ κεραλῆ διεφθαρμένα ἡμῶν περίοδους ἐξορθοβούστα διὰ τὸ καταμαθαίνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀριστογίας τέ καὶ περιφεραὶ τὸ κατανοομένον τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξορθοβούσαν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαλαίν φύσιν, δημιουργόντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῷ ἀριστὸν μίου πρὸς τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἐπειτέρων χρόνων. It will facilitate the study of the details if we observe in advance that Plato's description falls into two well-marked divisions or sections, viz. from ἀφικνεθέντας πετασμοὺς down to τὴν περιφορὰν (616 b, c), and from ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων (616 c) to the end of the myth. In the first section we have a representation of the outermost or sidereal sphere, girdled by a circle of light, which is prolonged through the poles into a column or shaft of light spanning the Universe from pole to pole and symbolizing to all appearances the cosmical axis. See on line 14 below. In the second section the scene is shifted, and we are introduced to a new picture of the celestial system, including the fixed stars, but without the encompassing girdle of light, assimilated to the poetical and suggestive figure of Necessity and her spindle, the shaft of which again represents the axis of the Universe. The details are fully discussed in the notes, where it is shown that the two parts of the description cannot from their very nature be combined into a coherent and consistent whole, and that in consequence of their essential inconsistency Plato's passing attempt to reconcile them inevitably fails. See on ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων κτλ. 616 c and App. VI.

If the question is asked, 'Does Plato's description embody a serious astronomical theory of the visible heaven and its machinery?' what answer should be returned? The following remarks will indicate the kind of reply which seems to be in harmony both with Plato's general attitude on astronomical questions and with the special peculiarities of the myth, before us: (1) The visible heavens, according to the Republic, are not the object of true Astronomy. The true Astronomer is concerned with διὰ τὸ ἐν τάχος καὶ ἐν ὃν τινα βραδύτητα ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πάσι τοῖς ἀληθείσι σχήμασι φορᾶς τὲ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἕφεσιν καὶ τὰ ἐνθύτα φεβεί (vii 529 D. See note ad loc.). We may therefore expect imagination and idealism to play a large part in Plato's astronomical pictures, more especially when they form part of a myth. (2) The greater portion of this passage is in reality a similitude representing the celestial system under the figure of the spindle of Necessity.
Now it is clear that Plato deliberately sacrificed the reality of the sidereal sphere when he found it inconsistent with the figure which he had chosen (see on κύκλος κτλ. 616 D). And if he could concede so much to his comparison, the question arises, 'Are we justified in regarding any of the machinery as seriously expressing Plato's real conception of the mechanism of the heavens?' It will be found on reflection that the only satisfactory and safe reply is that all the machinery, including the material whirls and axis of the spindle, is poetical throughout. This does not of course exclude the suggestion that some of the details of Plato's imagery are borrowed from earlier astronomical fancies, and it is highly probable that here, as elsewhere in the myth, he takes something from the Pythagoreans: see on 616 C, D, 617 B. (3) The entire description should in all probability be regarded as "essentially a symbolic representation and not an attempt at scientific explanation" (Cook Wilson). But 'a symbolic representation should stand in some relation to the thing signified,' and in this case all we can reasonably infer from Plato's symbolism is that, according to his belief, the Earth is in the middle: the Sun, Moon and Planets revolve round the Earth at different distances from the centre and with different velocities, participating in the general movement of the heavens and at the same time having a contrary movement of their own. As for the fixed stars, it would seem from the first part of Plato's description that he supposed them to be fixed in the outermost sphere of the Universe, round which he plainly supposes that the circle of the Milky Way extends. See also on 616 C, 617 A. 616 B 11 καὶ ἄφικενθεῖтαι κτλ. 'And on the fourth day they arrived at a point from which they des cribed extending from above through all the heaven and earth a straight light, like a pillar, resembling the rainbow more than anything else, but brighter and purer.' The souls see the light for the first time on the fourth day after they begin their march, and consequently on the eleventh day from Er's arrival at the meadow. The remaining incidents occupy one day, and it is on the twelfth that Er revives (δυσκεκαταίον — ἀνέβεθεν 614 E). See on ἀνέβεθεν in 621 B. As far as the Greek is concerned, ἀνέβεθεν may be construed either with καθορᾶν or with τεταμένων. In the former case, we should probably have to suppose (with Bockh l.c. p. 299) that Er's point of view is outside the Universe; but it will be shewn in Appendix VI that there are serious difficulties in the way of this supposition, and the second alternative is to be preferred. It has already been remarked that Plato in all probability thinks of the λευκῶν as somewhere on the true surface of the Earth described by him in the myth of the Phaedo (614 e n.), and it is apparently along this surface that the souls progress until they come in view of the light. As regards the shape and position of the light, Plato's language is clear and precise. The light is 'straight, like a pillar,' and 'stretched through all the heaven and earth.' The only natural interpretation of these words is that a column or shaft of light spans the entire Universe, like the diameter of a circle, and passes through the centre of the Earth, which, according to Plato, is situated in the middle of the whole (Plaed. 108 E f., Tim. 40 B). With διὰ πάντος—τεταμένων we may compare Tim. 40 B τὸν διὰ πάντος πόλων τεταμένων (of the axis of the Universe). The words μάλιστα τῇ ἰώδει προσφερέωι refer, not of course to the shape, but to the colour of the light, as appears from λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον. The correction of προσφερήν to προσφερέω in A (see cr. n.) is late, but προσφερέω is intrinsically a better reading, and might easily have been altered to προσφέρει under the influence of κιόνα. In defence of προσφερή Schneider cites ἀπαχτευμένων in VI 485 D, but the two cases are not exactly parallel: see note ad loc. Other views on this passage are discussed in App. VI. 13 εἰς δ' ἄφικενθεῖται κτλ. 'At this light they arrived after a day's march forward, and there, at the middle of the light' etc.
Instead of προελθόντας, Α and other mss have προελθώντες (see cr. n.), which Schneider defends by saying that the nominative refers not to all the party, but only to Er and his immediate companions. But even in that case the accusative would be more correct, and in point of fact it is clear from what follows that Er is accompanied throughout by all the souls about to be born again. A few other mss besides q have the accusative. If the light is ‘straight, like a pillar,’ and stretches ‘through all the heaven and earth,’ it follows that as the Earth is in the middle of the Universe, the ‘middle of the light’ will be at the centre of the earth. See fig. 1 on p. 443. No other interpretation of κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς is either natural or easy; see App. VI. It would seem therefore that at the end of the fourth day after leaving the meadow the souls are at the central point both of the Universe and of the Earth, as is maintained by, among others, Schneider and Donaldson (l.c. p. 307); and this view is also in harmony with some of the most important features in the remaining part of the narrative: see on 617 B, 621 A, B.

14 καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν κτλ. ‘and there, at the middle of the light, they saw, extended from heaven, the extremities of its chains; for this light chains the heavens, holding together all the revolving firmament, like the undertakers of men of war.’ The pronoun αὐτὸν is ambiguous, and as far as concerns the grammar may be referred either to τοῦ ὀραματος or to τὸ φῶς. If we choose the former alternative, αὐτὸν will be an objective genitive, denoting that which is bound; if the latter, the meaning, as Professor Cook Wilson points out, is ‘its chains,’ ‘its bands,’ i.e. ‘the chains of which the light consists,’ for in the next clause the light is said to be a chain (ἐν κάθεμα). The second of these views is on grammatical grounds somewhat more natural than the first; but whichever alternative we adopt, it is clear from the explanatory clause εἶναι γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον, not only that the chains are the binding chains of heaven, but also that it is the light itself, and nothing else, which fulfils the function of binding the Universe together (εἶναι γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ φῶς ἐξανάδεσμον τοῦ ὀραματος). In what way the light performs this office, Plato indicates by the much-disputed words ὅλον τὰ ὑποξύματα τῶν ῥημάτων. The evidence on the subject of the ‘undergirders’ of ancient men of war has been collected and discussed by Boeckh Urkunden über d. Seewesen des Attischen Staates pp. 133–138; see also J. Smith Voyage and Shipwreck of St Paul pp. 210–215 and Breusing Nautik d. Alten p. 170–184. It may be taken as established that the ὑποξύματα were ropes and not planks, as some of the ancient commentators supposed (e.g. Proclus in remp. II p. 200. 25, a Scholast quoted by Kroll Lc. II p. 381, and Suidas s.v. ὑποξύματα, who follows a scholium on Ar. Knights 279), and also that they were fastened round the outside of the vessel; but on the question whether the ὑποξύματα ran round the ship in a horizontal direction, or were passed under the hull, there is more room for difference of opinion. The former view is maintained by Boeckh and Breusing, the latter by J. Smith (l.c. pp. 108 f., 115, 210–215), who reminds us that a similar process, known by the name of ‘frapping,’ is still occasionally resorted to in the case of wooden ships during a storm at sea (pp. 108 f.). The evidence bearing on this matter has recently been investigated by Professor Cook Wilson (see Report of the Proceedings of the Oxford Philological Society for Hilary Term 1902 in Cl. Rev. XVI p. 234), who will shortly publish a detailed discussion of the whole subject. In the meantime he writes to me as follows:—‘After careful reading of all the passages quoted by the authorities I feel sure (what one might infer a priori from the mechanical conditions) that this method [i.e. frapping] ‘was known to the ancients, and was the method used in an emergency at sea, as e.g. in St Paul’s ship. I conjecture also that these undergirders first had the name ὑποξύματα, and that if the belts or girdles supposed by Boeckh had this name, it was transferred to them from the true undergirders, which were probably the first and primitive form and remained in use always, even after the trireme belts had been invented.’ The evidence in short, points to two kinds of ὑποξύματα (Cl.
Rev. l.c.), the first employed occasionally under exceptional circumstances, and passing under the hull of the vessel, the second (see Boeckh l.c. p. 137) forming part of the regular equipment of a war-ship, attached before she went to sea, and running horizontally round the hull. The second variety is clearly represented on a bronze relief of the forecast of a war- vessel, said to date from Roman imperial times, and now in the Berlin Museum. The sketch of the relief on p. 443, fig. ii is from a photograph in the possession of Professor Cook Wilson. There is also a (somewhat inaccurate) drawing of the relief in Beger ‘Thesauri regii et electoralis Brandenburgicii’ Vol. II p. 406. (Some writers, and among them J. Smith, have maintained that the longitudinal bands in Beger’s picture are only ornaments, and not ropes; but it is quite clear from the photograph that they are really ropes and serve as ὑποζώματα of the horizontal kind.)

To which of the two varieties does Plato here allude? The words οἶον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριτρόφων, οὕτω πάσον συνέχει τὴν περισσοράν, seem clearly to regard the ὑποζώματα as permanent σκεύη of warships, holding the hull together in ordinary circumstances, and not merely resources to be employed in times of difficulty and danger; and since the light whose action the ὑποζώματα serve to illustrate is (in Plato’s view) an essential part of the Universe, the illustration is better and more pointed if the ὑποζώματα are also of the more permanent sort. It may also be noted that if Plato had meant the undergirders which pass under the keel he would probably have written ὑποζώματα τῶν νεῶν, and not ὑποζώματα τῶν τριτρόφων, for the vertical ὑποζώματα were not confined to triremes. For these reasons it would seem that Plato has in view such ὑποζώματα as are described by Boeckh, viz. girdles running round the hull from stern to stem outside the vessel. It is clear, therefore, that the light not only passes through the centre of the Universe, but also, since it holds the heavens together, like the undergirders of men of war, round the outer surface of the heavenly sphere.

I have tried to represent the kind of picture in Plato’s mind by fig. i on p. 443.

The sphere of the heavens—represented by the circle d’d’, which is a section of the heavenly sphere—is virtually compared to a ship. The North pole, which is at b, corresponds to the stem, and the South pole, which is at c, to the stern of the vessel. The circular light cabc corresponds to the ὑποζώματα, cab being that part of the light which corresponds to the ὑποζώματα on the port side, and cab the portion which corresponds to the ὑποζώματα on the starboard side. As the light in Plato’s description passes through the centre of the Universe as well as round its exterior, the comparison of the light to horizontal ὑποζώματα would be all the more apposite if we might suppose that these ὑποζώματα were brought inside from stem to stern lengthwise and parallel to the ship’s length, in a manner corresponding to the position of the straight part of the ‘binding light.’ But for this supposition there is no evidence, and it is clear from fig. ii that the lower ὑποζώματα at least could not have been brought inside, for they are below the water line. We must accordingly suppose that the comparison with ὑποζώματα extends only to that part of the light which surrounds the surface of the heavenly sphere. That the ends of the light are brought inside the sphere in Plato’s picture is clear from the fact that the light stretches ‘through all the heaven and earth’ as well as round the Universe, and also because the soul’s see the ‘ends of its chains’ or bands at the middle of the light itself, which is also the centre of the Universe and Earth. We may presume that the ἀκρα τῶν δειμφῶν meet together at the centre, so that be forms one continuous pillar of light stretching from pole to pole. See fig. i on p. 443.

The light was interpreted by some ancient commentators as the axis of the Universe, or a cylinder of aetherial fire surrounding the axis (Theo p. 143 Hiller, Suidas and Photius s.v. τεταμένον φῶς: cf. also Proclus in rep. II p. 199. 31 ff.). by others as the γαλαξίας κόκλος or Milky Way: see Proclus l.c. pp. 130. 4, 194. 19 ff. and Cicero de rep. vi 16. According to the view given above, the column of light follows the direction of the axis of the Universe, if, as we may reasonably
suppose, $b$ is the pole, and although Plato nowhere actually calls it the axis, we may fairly suppose that this is what it symbolises. I have found no parallel in ancient astronomical theories to this conception of a light stretching from pole to pole. The curved part of the light is no doubt suggested by the Milky Way, which was regarded by the Pythagoreans as either identical with, or an emanation from the circle of fire which, according to them, held the Universe together (Zeller* I p. 435 n. 2). I have sometimes thought that the soul with which in the Timaeus the Creator wrapped the body of the Universe without has reference also to the Milky Way as girdling the World; for the Pythagoreans called the γαλαξίας κύκλος the τόπος ψυχών. Plato's words are (Tim. 34 B) ὡς χρών δέ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεία ἡ παρά τούτος τε ἑτερικεῖ καὶ ἐντὸς τῶν σώων αὐτῆς περικήλαψις. The parallel is certain noteworthy, although περικήλαψις in the Timaeus rather points to a complete envelopment of the heavens, and διὰ παράτος to the universal diffusion of the world-soul throughout the Universe.

616 C 17 ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων κτλ.: 'and from the extremities they saw extended the spindle of Necessity, by which all the revolving spheres are turned. The shaft and hook thereof are made of adamant, and the whorl partly of adamant, and partly of other materials.' With this sentence we pass to the second part of Plato's description, in which he tries to depict the movements of the celestial bodies by a new image—that of Necessity and her spindle. Regarded in itself, this image is tolerably clear and coherent, if we are willing to allow a large admixture of supernatural mechanics; but Plato fails to shew how it is to be reconciled with what has just preceded, and no one has hitherto succeeded in effecting the reconciliation, without doing violence to the Greek. See on 616 D, E and App. VI. The rapid imagination of the writer has already escaped from the earlier picture and fallen under the spell of a new conception, and we shall best apprehend his meaning if we consider what the peculiar nature of that conception demands. The ordinary spindle was shaped somewhat as in figure iii on p. 444, in which $a$ is the shaft, and $c$ the whorl.

(There is no hook in the figure: but its position would of course be at $a$.) The fibres were attached to the hook and twisted into a thread by the revolutions communicated to the spindle by the finger and thumb; see Blümmer Technologia, etc. I pp. 109—120, from whom the figure is borrowed. It is essential to the notion of a spindle that the hook should be fastened to the fibres which are to be spun. For this reason Plato finds it necessary, in using the similitude of a spindle, to attach the hook (ἀκριστρόν) to something which may correspond to the fibres; and he accordingly fastens it to the ends of the chains of light depending from the heavens in his previous image, at the point where the ends meet the ends from below, κατά μέσον τὸ φῶς. If we treat this construction as a piece of serious mechanics, Plato's device is open to many obvious criticisms. In fastening the spindle to the ἄκρα τῶν ἄκρων from above, he forgets or ignores the ends from below. It will further be observed that he says nothing about the direction of the spindle: it is merely 'stretched from the ends' of the chains. We shall presently see that the shaft of the spindle symbolises the axis of the Universe, so that—if we are to connect the two images in Plato's mind—it is natural to suppose that the spindle extends downwards, following the line of the light. Here again there are difficulties, the most serious of which perhaps is that, as the axis of the Universe must go through the earth, the effect of attaching the spindle 'at the middle of the light' will be to depress the earth itself below the centre of the whole. But it should be remembered that Plato's object in this passage is not to furnish a scientific account of the celestial mechanism: see below on 616 D, E, 617 A. We are dealing with a work of literature and not of science, and the machinery of a myth ought not to be rigorously scrutinized from the scientific point of view. Inconsistencies of this kind are found to be inseparable from such poetical representations of the Universe. In the present case they arise chiefly from the juxtaposition of two essentially irreconcilable conceptions—that of a sphere girdled and traversed by light, and that of Necessity and her spindle. See on 616 D, E. For the rest, it should
be noted that adamant symbols τος ἄθανάς καὶ ἀδάμαστον (cf. Proclus l.c. Π209, 22), and is the appropriate material for the ἡλακτή, since in Plato's picture the ἡλακτή stands for the axis of the whole. ἡλακτή is not elsewhere found in the sense of the shaft of a spindle: ordinarily it means 'distaff.' See on 616 D. E below. Plato does not inform us in what way the whorl is μείκτων ἐκ τοῦ πλεούν (I.e. ἀδάμαστον) καὶ ἀλλων γενόν. But I think he means that while the outermost circle, which is the circle of τρούτων (Τίμ. 36 c), is composed of adamant, the others, which form collectively the circle of βατέρων, are made, either in whole or in part, of less durable stuff. Herderen rejects the preposition before ἀδάμαστος, without any reason that I can see.

616 C. D 21 τὴν δὲ τοῦ σφυρίδου φέσιν κτλ. The whorl of Necessity's spindle is a composite structure, consisting of eight concentric hemispheres, fitted into one another like a nest of boxes: see below on 616 E. The adverb διαιμέρισθα should be construed with εἰς-εγειμένων.

616 D. E 27 κύκλων κτλ. : lit. 'showing their rims as circles above' ("so dass sie ihre Ränder oben als Kreise zeigen" Schneider). Cf. 616 E τοῦ τῶν χείλους κύκλων. The translation "each concentric circle shewing its rim above the next outer" (D. and V.) betrays a complete misapprehension of the whole passage. Donaldson (l.c.) gives the sense correctly: "showing their rims on the surface like so many circles." The words χείλους—ἐλάδασθαι mean 'forming a single whorl, with a continuous surface, round the shaft, which is driven right through the middle of the eighth,' not "and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl" (Jowett). "Néon is regularly thus used of the upper surface of an object: cf. for example Phaedr. 247 B ἢ ἐνωθήσατο ἄραμμα ἐπὶ τοῦ τοῦ οἰκονομοῦ κέντρου. It is important to observe that there is no interval between the different lips: cf. Proclus l.c. Π216, 15 ff. ἡ συνέχεια τῆς ἐναρμονίας διὰ τὸ μὴ παραμετρίτως κενὸν συνεχεῖς ποίεῖ τὸ εἰς πάντων νώτων ἐννοούμενον νῦτον ἀπὸ κυρίης εἰς κυρίης δυσκ, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάθαρτης ἐπὶ τῆς πρωτότητας, and see on 616 E below. On ἡλακτή Proclus remarks ἢ δὲ διαιμέρισθα ἐλάδασθαι διὰ πάντων φθονὸν τῆς ἡλακτῆς, αὐτόμας καὶ τὴν αὐτίαν εξεφερὲν, ἢ ἢ ἡλακτῆς τῶν ἄξονα προσείρηκεν, καὶ ὑπὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐλάδασθαι (l.c. p. 214, 26 ff.). As the usual meaning of ἡλακτή is 'distaff' and not the shaft of a spindle, I think it not unlikely that Proclus is right in this suggestion. For other verbal plays in the myth cf. 620 E ff.

In the rinds of the different whorls are set the fixed stars and planets in the following order, beginning from the outside (see figure iv on p. 444):

In the first. The fixed stars.

" second. Saturn.
" third. Jupiter.
" fourth. Mars.
" fifth. Mercury.
" sixth. Venus.
" seventh. The Sun.
" eighth. The Moon.

Cf. Tim. 38 c.f., where also, as here, Plato is following the Pythagorean order of planets: see Zeller 2 pp. 426 f. and (on the whole subject of ancient arrangements of the planets) Hultsch in Pauly-Wissowa, art. Astronomie and Schaubach Gr. Astron. pp. 396 ff. Some later authorities make Plato place Venus before
Mercury (see for example Diels Doxogr. Gr. p. 345), but the order which I have given is in accord with [Epin.] 986C—
987C, and with the views represented by Proclus l.c. p. 219. 3 ff.

This conception of close-fitting concentric whorls, carrying the heavenly bodies in their rims or 'lips,' appears to be unique in ancient astronomy. How was Plato led to devise so original an idea? Possibly in this way. It would seem that the Pythagoreans had already developed the astronomical doctrine of Anaximander into a theory of celestial spheres, maintaining that the stars were "fastened in transparent circles or spheres, and turned round by the revolution of these circles on their axes" (Zeller 1 p. 418). In order to suit his image of the spindle and whirl, Plato apparently takes these Pythagorean spheres, and cuts them in half, producing a series of hemispheric cups or whorls, in the circular 'lips' of which the celestial bodies are fastened or bound (εινεδέμενα, says Theo 150. 14 Hiller; cf. also Proclus l.c. 219. 24).

So far as the Sun, Moon and Planets are concerned, the resulting picture is clear and intelligible, but it is impossible to conceive of the fixed stars as occupying the 'lip' of one of the hemispherical whorls in the way in which the Sun for example may be supposed to do so. Whatever view we hold of the rest of the picture, it is likely that in this particular at least Plato himself did not think his comparison adequate to exhibit the phenomena: for in C above he has already represented the outermost heavens, in which dwell the fixed stars, not as the lip of a hemispherical shell or hollow, but as an actual sphere (πά
cσαν συνεχόν τὴν περιφοράν). (The inconsistency is noteworthy as shewing that the two images employed by Plato are fundamentally irreconcilable. See on 616 C.) By this and other indications we may be led to suspect that the whole theory of hemispherical whorls is only a device rendered necessary by Plato's similitude. If he had any opinion on the subject at all, he may have accepted the Pythagorean doctrine of spheres; but no conclusion on this matter can be drawn from the Republic. Cf. 617 A. n.

616 E 30 τῶν μὲν οὖν πρωτῶν τε καὶ εξωτάτων σφωνύλου πλατύτατον τῶν 30

According to this reading, which was known to Proclus (l. c. pp. 218 ff.) and is found in all our MSS without any important variation except the omission of ἐκτοῦ (line 31) in Vat. 6, the order of the different whorls in respect of breadth of rim, beginning with the broadest, is as follows:—

1. Whorl of Fixed Stars (first)
2. , Venus (sixth)
3. , Mars (fourth)
4. , Moon (eighth)
5. , Sun (seventh)
6. , Mercury (fifth)
7. , Jupiter (third)
8. , Saturn (second).

See fig. iv on p. 444. (This figure, which is a simplified form of a drawing in Professor Campbell's Plato's Republic, published by Murray 1902, is intended to illustrate the upper surface of the whorl of Necessity's spindle. The small disc in the centre represents a section of the shaft, and the order of breadths of rim is indicated by the arabic numerals.) What does Plato mean us to understand by the different degrees of breadth of rim? On this subject I formerly wrote:—"The simple and natural explanation is that the breadth of the rims represents the size of the different planets. Each rim must of necessity be broad enough to contain the planet which resides in it, and no reason can be conceived why it should be any broader" (Cl. Rek. xV p. 392). In maintaining this view, I supposed that the surfaces of the different whorls were separated from one another by an interval representing the distances between the several planets, interpreting νῶτον in 616 E (with Jowett) as the lower and not the upper side of the entire whorl. But, as Professor Cook Wilson points out, the Greek does not allow of this interpretation, for ἀρμότων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἄλληλοις ἀρμότοπτες, and νῶτον συνεχὲς ἐνὸς σφωνύλου ἀπεργαζομένους περὶ τὴν ἡλικάτην (616 D, E) shew conclusively that the individual whorls are fitted closely into one another like a nest of boxes, their upper surfaces forming one continuous plane. Cf. Proclus
From the outer planet to the centre whorl, the moon will always remain touching the earth. Moreover, the outer planet will be continually grazing a fixed star” (Cook Wilson). These considerations are fatal to the view which I advocated; and I take this opportunity of retracting it. The theory which has most in its favour, as I now see, is that “the breadth of the rim is intended to signify the supposed distances of the orbits from each other” (Jowett and Campbell). “It would be extraordinary,” writes Professor Cook Wilson, “that Plato in representing the heavenly system by his whorls should not have represented somehow the distances between the orbits of the heavenly bodies, and the obvious way to do this was by making the thickness of the spheres to which they are attached, or (as he prefers whorls on account of the distaff of Necessity), the breadth of the rims of the whorls, symbolise these different distances.” On this view the natural position of the planet will be “close to the outer edge of its rim, and touching the outer surface of its hemisphere.” For a further discussion of this subject see App. VI.

The reading in the text is described by Proclus (I. c. 11 pp. 218–222) as δευτέρα καὶ νεώτερα, κρατοῦν δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκολισμένοις (κεκολισμένοις, conjectures Pitra) ἄντιγράφοις. Proclus tells us that there was also another reading, πρώτερα καὶ ἄρχονται, which we can see from his description to have been as follows:—

τῶν μὲν οὖν πρῶτων τε καὶ ἐξωτάτων αφοῦ δυνατὸν πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχει, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδόμου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὄγδοου, περὶπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἔβδομον, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὄγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποικίλον, 35 τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδόμον λαμπρότατον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ὄγδοου τὸ χρόμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔβδομον ἔχει | προσλάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ 617 πέμπτου παραπλησία ἀλλιόν, ξανθότερα ἔκεινων, τρίτον δὲ λευκότατον χρόμα ἔχει, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρθηρον, δευτέρου δὲ λευκότητι τοῦ ἐκτον. κυκλείσθαι δὲ δὴ στρεφομένου τὸν ἀτρακτον

l. c. 216. Σ μεθόδος γὰρ ὅτι κενὸν μεταξὺ τῶν ἐνημοσυνῶν σφονδύλων κτλ. From this it follows that, if the breadth of a rim is equal to the diameter of its planet, “planets in the same part of their orbit will touch one another, and if we carry out the principle to the centre whorl, the moon will always touch the earth. Moreover the outer planet will be continually grazing a fixed star” (Cook Wilson). These considerations are fatal to the view which I advocated; and I take this opportunity of retracting it. The theory which has most in its favour, as I now see, is that “the breadth of the rim is intended to signify the supposed distances of the orbits from each other” (Jowett and Campbell). “It would be extraordinary,” writes Professor Cook Wilson, “that Plato in representing the heavenly system by his whorls should not have represented somehow the distances between the orbits of the heavenly bodies, and the obvious way to do this was by making the thickness of the spheres to which they are attached, or (as he prefers whorls on account of the distaff of Necessity), the breadth of the rims of the whorls, symbolise these different distances.” On this view the natural position of the planet will be “close to the outer edge of its rim, and touching the outer surface of its hemisphere.” For a further discussion of this subject see App. VI.

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34 τῶν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου: sc. σφονδύλων χείλους-κύκλων.

ποικίλων. The epithet ποικίλων means ‘spangled,’ rather than “exhibiting a variety of colours” (D. and V.). The reference is to the heavens stellis ardentibus aptum’ 10; cf. Proclus l. c. 222. 29 φησὶ ποικίλων μὲν εἶναι τὸν τοῦ μεγίστου διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἀστέρων ἐν ἑκάτεροι τῷ κύκλῳ ποικίλαις and VII 529 c ff.

35 τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδόμου κτλ. The attributes which belong to the planets are poetically transferred to the rims which they inhabit.

tὸν δὲ τοῦ ὄγδοου. We infer that Plato believed the moon to be an opaque body fastened in the eighth rim and lightened by the Sun. The discovery that the moon shines with borrowed light was ascribed to Anaximenes (Zeller 8 1 p. 248).

617 

617 Α 1 τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου κτλ. The second and fifth are Saturn and Mercury, or Φαίδων and Στιλβων, as they were sometimes called, with reference to their brightness or colour. See the de mundi 2. 392 a 23 ff. Yellow, according to Plato, is a mixture of white and red (7 Tim. 65 b). The third (τρίτον δὲ) or Jupiter was known also as Φαίδων, and the fourth, or Mars, as Ἰπποτις. Venus, which is the sixth, and comes next to Jupiter in whiteness, had the name Φωσφόρος (de mundi l. c.). Cf. [Epin.] 986 e ff. and Diels Dox. Gr. 344. 4 κυκλεύσθαι δὲ δὴ κτλ. Cf. 7 Tim. 36 c, 1. The whorl of the fixed stars revolves from East to West, bearing with
it in its revolution the other seven whors. In this way Plato portrays the apparent daily revolution of the stars and planets. In order to represent the movements of the Sun, Moon and planets in their own particular orbits, Plato says that each of the seven inner whors is all the while pursuing on its own account a motion in the opposite direction, viz. from West to East. The revolving whors in the words of Proclus, ‘carry round the stars’ (περιάγοντοι τοὺς ἀστέρας l.c. p. 226. 12) which are situated in their rims.

Would the mechanism of Plato's picture really produce the movements which it is intended to portray? The question may be interesting, but is irrelevant. Imaginary machines have imaginary properties; and Plato himself invokes the assistance of supernatural beings to carry on the movements (617 c). The important point to keep in mind, as Professor Cook Wilson observes, is that “Plato has realised that the apparent phenomena are what we call a composition of movements (or velocities). This composition of movements he is not attempting to explain, by giving the sort of machinery which he thought really produced it, but he is endeavouring to make us understand what the movements are (not how they originate), by putting the objects concerned in an imaginary machine, the movements of which we can represent to the senses, and which would produce such movements in the objects as they actually have.” For similar reasons it is impossible to draw any inference from this passage as to the question whether Plato believed in the daily revolution of the Earth. In the Timaeus, according to Grote (Plato on the Earth’s Rotation, pp. 13 ff.), the cosmical axis is "a solid cylinder revolving or turning round, and causing thereby the revolution of the circumference or the sidereal sphere," and

naturally also carrying round with itself the Earth, which is massed or globed round the axis of the whole (εἰςλαμάνυν περὶ τοῦ διὰ παντὸς πλανηταμεν Τιμ. 40 b. ‘Massed’ or ‘packed’ is Boeckh’s interpretation of εἰςλαμάνυν, with which Grote also agrees; but whether the word really bears this meaning, is another question, which we need not here discuss.) In support of his explanation of the passage in the Timaeus, Grote appeals to the myth of the Republic; and the appeal would be justified if Plato’s figure of Necessity’s spindle were intended to explain the cause, and not merely to represent the form, of the celestial motions. As it is, the Republic does not warrant any conclusion either way. Cf. 616 d, e n. 7 τάχυστα μὲν κτλ. Cf. Tim. 38 c, d, 39 c, 40 b and [Epin.] 986 E ff.

617 B 8 ἀμμα ἄλληλοις. Πλάτων καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λεγοντεσκειν ην τὸν ἑλίου, τὸν ἑωσφόρον (Venus), Στιλβώνα (Mercury): see Diels Dox. Gr. 346 and cf. Tim. 36 d. [Epin.] 986 E and Proclus l.c. 226. 21. Plato’s language certainly means that these three bodies travel at the same pace, and if their speed is the same, obviously they cannot complete their orbits in the same period. But it is doubtful whether the contradiction was present to Plato’s mind, and Proclus may be right in holding that Plato was really thinking of the periods of the planets (l.c. and in Tim. 259 C). See also on 617 B below.

τρίτον δὲ κτλ. See cr. n. The article, which was first rejected by Schleiermacher, is probably a dittographical mistake. Schneider, Hermann and Baiter retain it, despite the ambiguity.

9 ἐπανακυκλούμενον. The revolution, relatively to that of the whole, is retrograde: hence ἐπανακυκλούμενον.

11 'Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν. Plato means us to imagine Necessity as seated in the centre of the Universe. The notion is

29—2
"And bid the bass of heaven's deep organ blow!"

12 φωνήν μιαν, ἐνα τόνον: 'a single sound, a single musical note.' "Addi-
tum ἐνα τῶν per copenhagen est" (Stall-
baum). Cf. Proclus l.c. 236. 27 ff. ἡ μὲν
gάρ μια φωνή ὅπλη τὴν ἀμικτάβολον τοῦ
tῆς ἐνεργείας εἴδους εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μελος
ὑπαρχει, ὡς ἐκάστης Σειρήνοι δὲ τὴν
ἀυτὴν ἑλεσθε φωνήν· ὁ δὲ εἰς τόνον τὴν
ποιὰν φωνήν ἐδήλωσεν εἰς ὑπόστησιν καὶ
διογμον ταῦτα καὶ ὑπαρξιν καὶ ὑπαρξιν τῶν.
There is also perhaps a slight rhetorical effect,
though less than in τὸ δείκτω, τὸ μέγα 11
590 A. The reading ἐνα τόνον is con-
firmed by Plut. de anim. praor. 1059 C
and Proclus in Tim. 259 C and in την,
I.c. et al. It is difficult to understand
ἀνα τόνον, which Hermann and Baiter
read, following q and a few inferior
Mss. ἀνα τόνον could hardly mean 'one
note each,' as Hermann supposes. With
regard to the ἀρμονία itself, the pitch of
the several notes will of course be de-
termined by the speed of the different
whorls (cf. VII 330 B ff.), so that if we
express the notes by the names of the
circles which produce them, the ἀρμονία
will be:

Circle of the Fixed Stars (νῆτη)

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it is by no means improbable that in speaking of the speed of the planetary movements, Plato really had in his mind the time occupied by the orbital periods and not the rate of progression of the planets themselves. See also above on ἀμα ἀλλήλως. In that case the octave will be complete, because in order to complete their orbits in the same time, the Sun, Venus and Mercury will have to travel at different rates of speed. Later writers knew all about the Music of the Spheres, and a choir of eight Neo-Pythagoreans would have had no difficulty in rendering it on a small scale: see for example von Jan's *Mus. Scr. Gr.*, pp. 241 ff., 271 ff., 418 ff. Cf. also Zeller's *I.* pp. 429—434.

617 C 15 Μοίρας, λευχεμούσας. Etting l.c. p. 309 n. 3 thinks this an Orphic trait, comparing Frag. 253 Abel Μοίρας—λευχοστόλως.

16 ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν. These words are bracketed by Herwerden, on the ground that περὶ τὰς κεφαλάς would alone be good Greek, an opinion which few scholars will share.

17 Δάχεσιν μὲν κτλ. Lachesis is the Fate of the Past, Clotho of the Present, and Atropos of the Future: cf. *Laws* 960 c, where Plato approves of the ancient tradition Δάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθός δὲ τὴν δεύτερα, τὴν Ἀτροπόν δὲ τρίτην and Proclus l.c. 244. 20 ff. The positions of Lachesis and Atropos were sometimes interchanged, as for example in Arist.] de mamm. 7. 401 b 15 ff. τέτακτα δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονός μιὰ τῶν Μοίρων, Ἀτρόπος, ἐπὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἀπερεπτά ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Δάχεσις (εἰς πάντα γὰρ κατὰ φόμοι μένει λάβεις), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὸς Κλωθός, συμπεραινούσα τῇ καὶ κλουθοῦσα ἐκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεῖα: cf. also Proclus l.c. 244.

19 τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ. The right hand is reserved for the outermost whorl, or circle of the Same, which is the more honourable, and itself, according to *Tim.* 36 c, moves ἐπὶ δεξιά: the left for the less honourable circle of the Other, which moves ἐπὶ ἀριστερά (ib.). Pythagorean influence is doubtless at work again here: cf. 614 c n.

**συνεπιστρέφειν:** "cum mater simul vertere" (Ficinus).

20 τὴν ἐξω περιφορὰν κτλ. The circle of the Same may be taken as the type of that which 'is': hence it is entrusted to Clotho, the Fate of τὰ διότα. The courses of the Planets or 'wandering' stars are symbolical of the unknown and (as it seems to us) uncertain Future, so that they are appropriately given to the Fate of the Future, i.e. Atropos. *διαλείπουσαν χρόνων* means 'leaving intervals' i.e. 'from time to time.' Clotho leaves off occasionally to make room for Lachesis, as Plato explains in τῷ δὲ Δάχεσιν below. Similarly also Proclus l.c. 252. 8.

21 ωσαύτως: i.e. *διαλείπουσαν χρόνων*.

617 C. D 21 τῷ δὲ Δάχεσιν κτλ.: "while Lachesis lays hold of either in turn, the one with the one hand, the other with the other" ("abwechselnd einen mit der einen, den andern mit der andern angreifend" Schneider). She turns the circle of the Same with her right hand, the others—here treated as a single περιφόρα as in *Tim.* 36 c—with her left. The translation "laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other" (Jowett) is not, I think, what Plato means: for it would seem from what is said of Clotho and Lachesis that the right hand is appropriated to the circle of the Same, the left to that of the Other: see also 617 C. The words ἐν μέρε— if my view is right—belong only to ἐκατέρα ἐφαπτεθαυ and not also to ἐκατέρα τῇ χειρὶ. As the fate
Past, Lachesis fitly contributes to both revolutions: for on the Past depends both the Present and the Future. A similar lesson is conveyed by representing the lots and samples of lives as lying in the lap of Lachesis: cf. also 620 A kata

\[\text{συνθέσαι—αιρέσθαι and δοξαι.} \]

617 D — 619 A. As soon as they arrived upon the scene, the souls were called upon to choose new lives. The order of choosing was determined by lot; but there were many more samples of lives than lots, and every soul was made responsible for its own choice. The moment of choice is the supreme crisis of our fate, and it behoves us to spare no effort to equip ourselves for resisting the attractions of wealth and power, and selecting the better life, that is, the life of virtue.

27 'Ανάγκης κτλ. Proclus' remarks on the style of this speech deserve attention: πανταχοι μεν ὁ Πλάτων νοῦς ἤγε-

\[\text{μόνα προσηθήκων ὄν φεύγεται νοεῖν ὄνως ἔταξα φηδέγατε θειμάτων—όταν δὲ καὶ τὸν κρίτην ἰσωμένῳ ἰδεῖ

\[\text{καὶ σοφοὶ ἐνθαῦσθησαν προσεκίναν καὶ τὸν τοῦ σωζομένον μεμειτε, ἰδέωτα ἀριστείς ἔως-}

\[\text{περ βέλην νῦν γέμων καὶ υψίην ἐπι-

\[\text{βολῶν.} \]

\[\text{συνεξορωμένης δὲ αὕτη τὸς ἐρωμένης τὰς νοήσεις ἀκαλλάτιστος συνετριμ-

\[\text{μένος μὲν χρησταὶ φεύγομεν, ἀπολευκένα δὲ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ διάστησεν τὴν ἄπο-

\[\text{λυτον μοίραιον δείον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπ’ ἄλλων ἐπ’ ἄλλα πῆδος: οὐ καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐργάσεται τῶν τοῦ προφήτης ἱλων,}

\[\text{ἐν ἐλαχιστοῖς μὲν ἀπειράγησεν κοιμάτα συκλαισιῶν, ἀνεύσετα δὲ τὰ πλείονα φεύ-

\[\text{γέομεν, συστήφεσε δὲ τὰ κώλα τοῦ αἰνη-

\[\text{μασιν παραπλησίας (l.c. 269). The omission of articles also adds dignity and impressiveness: cf. \text{VII 518 A al.}} \]

\[\text{ψυχὰ κτλ. Plato loosely calls the souls ἑφήμεροι, because their connexion with body is transient. In themselves of course, they are immortal—ψυχὴ}

\[\text{πᾶσα ἄθανατος (Phaedr. 245 C). The explanation of Proclus is somewhat different, and, as often happens, too re-

\[\text{condite: τὰς μὲν ἄνθρωπινας ψυχὰς, οὐτὶ}

\[\text{γε πᾶσας, ἀλλὰ τὰς γενεσεως ἐπορευομένας ἂν ἐκαλύπτησε, ὃς ῥεῖνων καὶ ἐφι-

\[\text{μέρων ἀποτελεῖται (l.c. 270). period of means of course τῆς ἀπό γενεσεως ἑτε}

\[\text{γέσεων περίοδο, viz. 1100 years (supra \text{615 A} n.); and 

\[\text{theocracy, 'fraught with death,' 'death-bringing' agrees with πε-

\[\text{ρίον.} \]

617 D, E 28 οὐχ υμᾶς—εἰρήσετε. Cf. infra \text{620 D, E δὲ \text{Pleistos δαίμων—φώλακα ἐξιπνεύειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποσημαντητέων τῶν}

\[\text{αἱρετέων. Each individual soul is accompanied throughout its life on earth by a δαίμων of its own. This δαί-

\[\text{μῶν is the personification of its destiny through-out that particular life—its genius in short, \text{albus or ater (Hor. Epp. II 2. 189),}}

\[\text{according as the soul is ἐνδαίμονος or κα-

\[\text{κοδαίμων. There are not a few traces of this belief before the time of Plato, e.g. in Heraclitus' famous saying ἢδος}

\[\text{ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (Fr. 121 Bywater) in Pind. \text{Ol. 13, 28 Ἡδὸν πάτερ—Ἀσφαλέστως εὐθυνε δαίμονος ὅφροι, and often in 

\[\text{Euripides (examples in Nägelsbach Nachhom. \text{Theol. p. 113}); and Döring (l.c. p. 489) is no doubt right in holding that the doctrine was not exclusively Orphic or Pythagorean. According to the popular view, which Plato himself is content to make use of in \text{Phaed. 107 D ὁ ἐκάστον δαίμων, δόπερ ἕξε-}

\[\text{χια, we do not choose our δαίμων, but are rather allotted to it: cf. \text{Theocr. 4. 40 at τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος, δὲ με}

\[\text{λέλογχως, and the fine lines of Menander ἀπαντά δαίμων ἀνδρὶ εὐπάρσαται καὶ ἐδόδοι γενεσιῶν, μυταγωγῶς τοῦ βίου (Mein. \text{frag. Com. Gracc. IV p. 238), together with 

\[\text{Homer \text{II. XXIII} 79 (κύρ) ἄπερ λάχει γενεσεως περ. In the emphatic οὐχ υμᾶς δαίμων ἔχεται, Plato proclaims his 

\[\text{disinheritance from the popular view: the individual is himself responsible for his destiny (ἄλλῳ υμῖ—αἱρέσθαι). Hence 

\[\text{αἰτία ἐλομένων τῆς ἀνάστωσις. On later, especially Stoic, developments of the doctrine of a δαίμων see Rohde \text{Pysche} II p. 316 n. See also on \text{620 D.}} \]
29 πρώτος—βίον. See on 618 A πολύ πλείω τῶν παρόντων.

30 εἰς ἀνάγχης. The choice, though free, is irrevocable: ἐνδύσατο γάρ καὶ ἄλλων βιῶν ἦν, ἄλλα πρὸ τῆς αἵρεσιν, μετὰ τῆς τὴν αἵρεσιν ἀδύνατον (Proclus l.c. 275).

ἀρετή ἐς ἄδεσποτον. "Mortals that would follow me, Love Virtue, she alone is free" (Milton Comus 1018 ff.). On Platonic principles, a thing is in so far as it is good (VI 509 B ff.), so that our truest individuality is nothing more or less than that which is the best and highest part of our nature: cf. the words of Aristotle, who in Eth. Nic. X 7. 1178a 2 πλατωνίζει as follows: δύνεις ὅ' ἐν καὶ εἴναι ἀκατό τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ), εἰπέρ τὸ κόρον καὶ ἀμέσων. We therefore attain our fullest development and enjoy our only true liberty as individuals by becoming servants of Virtue. In the words of Goethe, "Das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben." Proclus' comment, though true and instructive as far as it goes, does not exhaust the significance of Plato's saying: ἄδεσποτον δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἦν μόνον, ἀλλ' διὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλευθερά ἀποτελεῖ τῶν πικροτάτων διεσποτῶν, οὐ δ' ἀυλοῦντον ἀναφερέται εἰς τοὺς συνειδήμονας πάντων (l.c. 276. 5 ff. Cf. also Pl. Rep. I 329 C and especially Xen. Mem. IV 5. 3—5).

The germ of the Platonic doctrine of moral freedom is to be found in the Socratic ὄφεις ἐκών πονηρός (see on IX 577 D, E): for its sequel, we should look to the Stoic theory of the freedom of the wise man (ἐλευθερός τοùς στοιχείους μόνον Zeno ap. D. L. VII 33): see especially Epicurus Gnom. Epist. Stoë. 31 ed. Schenkl ἐλευθερία καὶ δούλεια, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῆς δοῦμα, τὸ δὲ κακίας and the chapter περὶ ἔλευθερος in Dissert. IV 1. 32 αἰτία—ἀνάγχης. Cf. II 375 B ff. and Tim. 42 D. The whole of Lachesis' speech is frequently quoted or referred to by later Greek writers (see the references in Schneider's note), and these words in particular became a kind of rallying-cry among the champions of the freedom of the will in the early Christian era (Dietrich, N.T. p. 115 f.). A bust of Plato found at Tibur and dating from the first century B.C. bears the inscription αἰτία ἐλευθερίας (sic). Θεος ἀνάγχης, together with ψυχῆς πόσα ἀδάνατος (from Phaedr. 245 C). See Kaibel IGIS 1196 quoted by Dietrich l.c. With the sentiment itself cf. Laws 904 B—D.

618 A 2 πολύ πλείω τῶν παρόντων. Cf. 619 B, 620 C. The combination of κλάφωσις and αἱρέσις, which appears also in Phaedr. 249 B, is according to Thompson "a mythical mode of reconciling freedom and necessity—choice being left free under limiting conditions." I think the introduction of the lot is rather intended to account for the conspicuous inequalities between different men in respect of accidents of birth, fortune and the other ἀδιάφορα προγήματα (to use a Stoic term). Ceteris paribus, a soul would presumably select a μετρίως κεχαραγμένον βίον: where it does not, we may suppose, in general, that the κλάφωσις compelled it to choose late. Cf. Plot. Enn. 11. 13. ọi κλάφωσις τίνες;—τὸ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὸ δῶμα καὶ τῶν ἡμῶν γονέων καὶ ἐν τούτοις τούτοις γίνεσθαι, καὶ δόμος, ὅσος ἐστιν, τὰ ἕξω. This interpretation is supported also by the case of Odysseus below (620 C). See also on 619 D.
3 ἡμῶν τε γὰρ κτλ. Did Plato seriously believe in the transmigration of the soul? Teichmüller summarily dismisses the entire theory as unplatonic (Die Plat. Frage pp. 1—20), while Susemihl, in harmony with certain ancient writers (see the references in Simson Der Begriff d. Seele bei Platón p. 152 n.), takes Plato at his word so far as concerns the passage of the soul into new human bodies, but refuses to allow that he could have believed in transmigration into the forms of the lower animals (Genet. Entwick. II p. 275). Plato's language is however quite explicit, and there is the less reason for resorting to an allegorical interpretation, because the doctrine was already familiar in Greek philosophical and religious thought (see F. Laudowicz Wesen u. Ursprung d. Lehre v. d. Præexistenz d. Seele etc. pp. 12—29 and Rohde Psych. II pp. 162 ff.), and is itself in general conformity with Plato's own conception of immortality. The doctrine of transmigration meets us frequently in Plato's dialogues, e.g. in Men. 81 A ff.; Phæd. 81 E ff., 113 A; Phædr. 240 B; Tim. 42 B ff.; cf. 91 D ff. Most if not all of these passages have a mythical colouring, and should therefore be read in the light of the caveat which Plato subjoins to the eschatological myth of the Phædo: τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διασχισθέντα οὕτως ἔχων, ὃς ἔγω διελθῆτα, ὑπὸ πρέπει τοῖς ἄνθρωποις δότε μέντοι ητα ˈταύτ ˈι ητα ˈταὐτˈ ἀττά περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν—ἐτείπερ ἀθάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαινεται οὕτω, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἔχων κυνωνεύεται οἰκείως οὕτως ἔχειν (114 D). That soul is immortal, Plato is firmly convinced; and transmigration he regards as probable, to say the least. Cf. 608 D n.

5 διατελεῖς. This word, for which Cobet proposes διά τέλους, is extremely rare in classic Greek, occurring only here and in Soph. Ο. Ζ. 1514.

6 Ὑς πενίας κτλ. "Expectes els φυγάς τε και πενια καὶ εἰς πτωχείας κτλ." (Herwerden). The text may well stand. Plato contrasts poverty and exile (πενιας καὶ φυγας) with beggary, presumably at home (καὶ εἰς πτωχείας).

618 B 10 ψυχής δὲ ταύτων—γίγνεσθαί. Cf. Hom. Od. XVIII 136 f. τοῖς γάρ νοσὶν εὕτως ἐπιμεθυμευτός ἄνδρως | ὁιον ἐπὶ ήμαρ ἐγγισι πατήρ ἄνδρων τε θεῶν. τε, XVIII 3221, and Empedocles 310 f. Karsten ὄσσον γάρ ἄλλως μετέφην, τόσον ἄρα σφήνα αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλως παρέστατο μετά Karsten ad loc. See also on 1 335 B.

II τὰ δ ἄλλα: sc. except ψυχής ταύτων. In τὰ ἄλλα are included κάλλος, προγόνοι ἀρεταὶ etc.

13 μεσοῦ τοῦτων: i.e. μεσοῦτα εἶναι τοῦτων, viz. πλούσιων καὶ πενίων, νόσων καὶ ρήγειων. Cf. 619 A τὸν μέσον—τῶν τοιούτων βιον.

618 C 15 τοῦ μαθημάτως καὶ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξερευνεῖν are bracketed by Herwerden. The emphatic pleonasm is thoroughly Platonic. Cf. V 472 C et al.
καὶ ἔξευρεν, τὸς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ ποιηρὸν διαγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίως ἐκ τῶν δυνάτων ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρέσθαι, ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, καὶ γινοντιζείμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα, πρὸς ἀρέτην βίου 20 πῶς ἔχει, καὶ εἰδέναι τῇ κάλλος πενία ἡ πλοῦτος κραθέν 1 καὶ μετὰ πολίας τῶν ψυχῆς ἔξεως κακῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τὶ εὐγενεῖαι καὶ δυναγεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθενεῖαι καὶ εὐμαθίας καὶ δυσμαθίας, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχῆς ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἑπικτητῶν τῆς ἐγκεφαλοῦμένα πρὸς 25 ἀλληλα ἐργάζεται, ὡστε ἐξ ἀπαντῶν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι συναγωγόμενον αἰρέσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέπουτα τὸν

Ε τε χείρω καὶ τῶν ἀμείων βίων χείρω 1 μὲν καλοῦτα δὲ αὐτὴν ἐκείσε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ ἀδικοτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείων δὲ ὡστὶ εἰς τὸ δικαιοτέραν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἔσσει· εἰσφάκαμεν γὰρ, 30 ὅτι χαίρετε τε καὶ τελευτήσαντε αὐτὴ κρατίστῃ αἰρέσει. ἀδαμαντί

619 | νως δὴ δεὶ τούτην τὴν δόξαν ἐχοντα εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἴεναι, ὅπως ἄν ὥ ἡ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀνέκπληκτος ὕπο πλούτων τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσῶν εἰς τυραννίδας καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας πράξεις πολλά μὲν ἐργάσηταί καὶ ἀνήκεστα κακά, ἐτί δὲ αὐτὸς μείζων πάθη, ἄλλα γνῶ τὸν μέσον ἀεὶ τῶν τοιούτων βίων αἰρέσθαι καὶ φεύγειν τὰ 5 ὑπερβάλλοντα ἐκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁδὸ τῶ βίω κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν

Β καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἐπείτη· οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδαιμονεστάτους 1 γίγνεται ἀνθρώπως.

XVI. Καὶ δὴ ὅνυ καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκείθεν ἀγγελος ἰγγελλὲ τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν· καὶ τελευταῖα ἐπιώντι, ἔξων ὑπὸ ἐλομένῳ, 10


21 καὶ εἰδέναι. See εἰρ. ο. καὶ is found in several ms besides Ε and q. Hermann removes the καὶ before ἐξυνθημένα and places it before ἀναλογιζόμενον, but ἀναλογιζόμενον "necessary cum aiceiēs Κoharet" (Schneider).

618 D 27 αἱρεῖσθαι κτλ. αἱρεῖσθαι 'to make his choice' is used absolutely as in 630 A. πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κτλ. means 'defining the worse and the better life with reference to the nature of the soul, calling that worse' etc. (So also Schneider.) The two parts of τὸν τε χείρω καὶ τῶν ἀμείων βίων are after wards taken separately in χείρω μὲν and ἀμείων δὲ, as with so-called 'partitive apposition': cf. 611 D and IV 431 A n. Others take αἱρεῖσθαι with τὸν τε χείρω καὶ τῶν ἀμείων βίων, but αἱρεῖσθαι is different from διαμερίσθαι and the possibility of a zeugma is excluded because τὸν χείρω precedes τῶν ἀμείων and not vice-versa.

618 E 29 εἴκειται looks forward, of course, to εἰς τὸ ἀδικοτέραν γίγνεσθαι. Herwerden's εἰκετ (=ἐν "Αἰδού") is both needless and wrong: for the soul becomes ἀδικοτέρα, if at all, during its life on earth: in Hades it is purged.

30 έκεῖ. Ε and δ, followed by editors before Schneider, have εάν. The future is easy if the sentence be made independent.

619 B 10 ἔξων νῦ. On ἔξω see IV 474 E n.
II συντόνως ἤτοι: according to the motto (ἀπλοὺς καὶ ἄτεχνης (VIII 547 E). συντόνως ἤτοι, which Herderwen conjectured, appears in q and Flor. U; but the reading of A is far more characteristic and significant.

619 B—620 D Many were the instances of hasty and foolish choosing; and many the changes resulting both from choice and from the action of the lot. He who is ever faithful to the life of true philosophy, and whose lot does not fall out among the last, will be happy throughout all time. The spectacle was indeed one fitted to move pity, smiles, and wonder. In most cases, the souls chose in conformity with their previous lives—Orpheus, for example, selecting the life of a swan, Ajax that of a lion, and so on. It chanced that Odysseus had drawn the last lot of all, and after long search he found and joyously laid hold of the peaceful life of a private individual, for he was weary of all his labours. There were changes from beasts to men, and from men to beasts, and every form of permutation.

619 C 21 ἦθα ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας κτλ. Cf. Phaed. 82 f. εἰ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρέταν ἐπιτετησθενότας, ἢ δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ ἰδοὺ τε καὶ μελέτη γεγοναί ἄνευ φιλο-

σοφίας τε καὶ ροῦ, and see also on vi 500 D, 506 C. It is interesting to observe that philosophic virtue is not a sine qua non for admission to the Platonic heaven. Throughout the whole myth, rewards and punishments are distributed for good and bad actions rather than for knowledge and ignorance (cf. 615 B ff.); and correct opinion or 'Orthodoxy,' in Plato's sense of the word, provided the lines have fallen to it in pleasant places, may well have been both blameless and beneficent on earth. But in the moment of supreme peril (618 B), when we have to choose another life, it is Knowledge, and not 'Orthodoxy,' that prevails. In the Phaedo I.c. Plato says that the 'orthodox' probably enter as before εἰς τοιοῦτον—πολιτικὸν τε καὶ ημερὸν γένος, ἢ τοὺς μελίτους ἢ σφήκας, ἢ μυριμέχαι, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταῦτα γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ ἰδρύσανε εἰς αὐτῶν ἀνόδος μετέρωσαν.

619 D 22 ὡς δὲ καὶ ἔπειτα: not "according to Er's account" (D. and V.), but "as one might say," "broadly speaking," i.e. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. Cf. Laws 639 E (εἰπ-

polllais ton wuvhov ntvnevathai kai dv.ti av tov klhrou tvxhov. eepei ei tis de, otopote eis ton exvade hio avfiavvto, ymio wio filo-
E sofioi, kai o klhros autw tois aiproswos mi ev televtaios pippou, kivndvnei ek ton ekteven apagvelloymeno ou monon exvade evda-30
mouv en av, alla kai tiw evdenve ekesei kai deyvou pillen porveian ouk av thdovn kai traveian porvevthei, alla leian te kai ovpri-
vian. taqth ton yap de eph tiw thean aqian eina idein, av ekasteai
620 aiv wuvhai hrovuto tovsi bious. eleeinthei to yap idein eina kai
gelovn kai thvamvian. kata svnihteviin yap av ton protorou bious
ta pollia aireithei. idein men yap wuvhov eph tiw potote 'orfeos
nevromeniv kuyvnon bion airovmenvi, misi sei ton mynatkeiou genous dia
to up' ekeweiv thvaton ouk evelousan ev mynaii vneytheian 5
genevthei. idein de tiw Tavmyron anhdovos eloymenvi idein de kai
kuyvnon metaaballonta av aivropinwv bion airevi, kai alla zwa
B mouvika wsvatois. eikosth de lavourh wuvhov elvthei leoutos
33. taqth -mivvsathai (620 D) om. q. 8. wsvatois. eikosth Vind. F: wsvatois elkv, tr. Av: wsvatois, av to ekwv tr. Z.

27 kai dva—tvxhov 'as well as by the fortune of the lot' is doubted by Her-
werden, while Richards calls for kai
<ov> dia, relying on 619 B kai telev-
taiv—adyneiav, av rov 'the drift of the whole passage.' In point of fact, how-
ever, Plato nowhere denies that the fortune of the lot affects the issue. On
the contrary, his whole theory supposes that it does, for those souls who choose
late few lives to choose from: see
617 f., 618 a, 620 c. o televtaiv, it is
true, need not despair (619 b), but none
the less is the lot likely to produce meta-
bolh twn kawv kai twv agadwv. Cf.
Procl. l.c. 302. 15 ff. toutoim xrivia diewv,
env mev twv vpo kripwv kai periv to ameion
kai khevov twn protevmodwn bivn, etpoe
de twv twv klhron mi ev twv xhaktov
pistewv: ti yap ei kai o airovmeniv eivei
peripl kripw aifalh, alw ois protevmod-
wein biv ein de de twv aitiai ois tvxhites
eivei. See also on 618 a and following
note.
28 epi ktl. The connexion of ideas
is: The fortune of the lot, and our individ-
al choice, are the two influences that
affect our destiny: for if our lot is
reasonably early and we choose as befits
philosophers, it will be well with us,
epi "reedit rationem ante dictorum" (Schneider). The sense is surely both
plain and satisfactory, although Richards
asserts that "etpi has no meaning, unless
there was an ov precedeing."
619 E 32 oiv av thdovn—ophra-
viav is explained by 614 B—d: see notes
ad loc. In the Phaedrus those souls
which choose the philosophic life three
times successively are "excused from
seven of the ten millennial probation
through which the rest have to pass"
(Thompson on 249 A).
33 yap is resumptive. For examples
of this usage see Shilleto on Dem. F. L.
107.
620 A 2 kata svnviavian ktl. Cf.
Phaed. 51 E F. evwvovetai de, dierp eivos,
eis toivatai uth, poti ati av mevelhtvnaiv
tiowos ev twv biv ktl.
6 Tavmyron. Thanysis and not Tha-
myras was the usual form of this name,
but Plato prefers Tavmyras: cf. fouv 533 C
i peri Tavmyrou i peri 'orfeos. Lattw
819 f. twv Tavmyron te kai 'orfeovn
yvovn. The meaning of taw polla ('for
the most part') will be seen from the
case of Odysseus below (620 c f.).
620 B 8 wsvatois. eikosth ktl.
The reading eikosth is confirmed by
Plut. Conv. Disp. viii 1 5—739 E f. (diav ti
Platov eikosth ephwvov tov Dianv tae
ti twv klhron elthei) as well as by Proclus
l.c. 265. 20 and elsewhere. It appears
from these passages that some of the ancients found a subtle significance in εἰκοστή: but the particular number is probably only a circumstantial detail intended to add verisimilitude to the narrative. See also on 614 B. Herderwen conjectures ὡστώς, ὥστε τὸ <εἰκός> . . . . εἰκοστὴν δὲ κτλ., and inserts between εἰκός and εἰκοστὴν the words καὶ εἰ τῶν ἄλλων—μίγνυσαί from 620 D. There is however nothing to indicate that the text has suffered dislocation; see on 620 D below.

λέοντος βιον. Etigg (Achernuntica l.c. p. 310) explains the choice of Ajax by referring to Tim. 91 E τὸ δὲ αὖ πεῖν καὶ θηρίδες γεγονέν ἐκ τῶν μηδὲν προσχωρεών φιλοσοφία, but the conspicuous feature in Ajax was τὸν ἀθικόν, and that is why he selects the life which typifies τὸ θυσιεῖς: see IX 588 E. Cf. Proclus l.c. 316. 31 ff. ἡ μὲν Ἀλαγος ζητήσαν δὴλοι ζωὴν ἀνδρίκην μὲν, πλουτώνας δὲ κατὰ τὸν θυσίαν διὰ δὴ τιμά φιλωνίκου πολιτάς ἢ γὰρ δῶθαντι εἰς αἰτίας ἀνδρῶν μὲν ἐν ζωὴν ἀλλογόνων. Empedocles, as we are told, held τὸν ἀρίστων εἶναι μετοίκησαι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὲν εἰς ζωὴν ἢ λήξις αὐτῶν μεταγάματο, λέοντα ἐγκρατεῖ, εἰ δὲ εἰς φιλίαν, δάφνην (Ael. Hist. An. XII 7): see Karsten on vv. 382 ff. of the περὶ φώτου.

620 C 16 Θηρίτου. Thersites is the type of the ποιητὸς ἴδιωτης in Gorg. 525 E. Here, as often in later Greek writers, he stands for the buffoon (παγ-γέλους ἀνθρώπως διάστροφος τὸ σώμα καὶ λευκωμένοις Lucian adv. ind. 7). Cf. also Soph. Phil. 142 ff., Theopomp. Fr. 262 in Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. I p. 323 and Pythag. Simil. 32 in Mullach Fr. Phil. Gr. I p. 489, in the last of which passages Thersites and Achilles stand for two opposite types. The different varieties of lives which are illustrated in this passage (λουσικός, πολεμικός, βασιλικός, γυμναστικός, τεχνικός, μυστικός) appear also (as Proclus observes l.c. 310. 25 ff.) in Phaedr. 248 D, E. See also Empedocles vv. 354—380 and Karsten ad loc.

πῖθηκον. Cf. IX 590 B.

19 ἀπράγματος. Eusebius (Præp. Ev. xiii 16. 11) has καὶ ἀπράγματος, which occurs also in one of the Vatican MSS. Cobet would alter ἀπράγματος to ἀπράγματον. The text is quite satisfactory: for ἀνδρός ἰδιωτὸς is virtually a single word: cf. ἀνδρὶ—σοφίτη Ἰον. 312 ὑπὲρ ἄνδρος θητὸς ἀνδρὰ προβήσαι πατέρα Εὐσημήν. 15 D, ἄνθρος μανθίς, ἀνάμενε, ἀνόρεσι δικαστάι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν τοιούτῳ ἀνθρώποιν (Schneider).

620 D 22 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων—μίγνυσαί. See on 620 B. Herderwen's transposition is the lessdefensible because the words καὶ πᾶσας μίζες μίγνυσαί form an appropriate ending to this part of the picture.
...wea...eis an...rotous...einei kai eis...alla...ta...eis...ta...agria...ta...de...deika...eis...ta...meta...meta...ta...pasas...mikes...migynw...epieid...oun...pasas...ta...psi...kai...woun...yris...ay...aspe...elaxou...en...ta...pro...ta...Dae...ekin...E...ekasto...ou...eilet...daim...to...to...filaka...xi...pme...1...tou...bion...kai...apop...ap...tou...ai...re...en...pros...to...Kl...kai...eine...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...x...
δρον τε καὶ ὃσα γῆ φυει. σκεύασθαι οὖν σφάς ὅθη ἐσπέρας 5 γεγομομένης παρά τὸν 'Αμέλητα ποταμον, οὐ τὸ ὕδωρ ἄγγειον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἄναγκαιον εἶναι πιεῖν· τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σφαζόμενος πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρου· τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ πίνοντα πάντων ἐπιλαυναντείβα. ἔπειδη δὲ κοιμηθήναι Β καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντὴν τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ 10 ἐντεῦθεν ἐξατήνης ἄλλον ἄλλη φέρεσθαι ἀνώ εἰς τὴν γέφυραν, ἀττοῖς ὀσπερ ἀστέρας. αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος κωλυθήναι

5 'Αμέλητα ποταμόν. Cf. Virg. Aen. vi 714 f. Lethaei ad fluminis undam Securus laetces, et longa oblivia potant. Many other parallels are quoted by Dieterich Λεκ. pp. 90—94. As the πεδιὸν Λήδης has its counterpart in the πεδιὸν 'Αμρελίας, so also we find traces in Greek legend of a ὕδωρ Μνημωνίου as well as the ἄνω ἄγγειος (Paus. ix 38. 9).

7 τοῖς δὲ—μέτρου is missing in g and several other MSS. "Fortasse super- vacanea areole inepta haec videbantur alicui, qui statim quemlibet postquam bibisset omnia obliviscens videret. Sed oblivionis vis et pertinacia varia est. Qui nimirum bibit, in perpetuum oblivisci, qui moderate, discere aliquando seu recordando scientiam repertere potest." (Schneider). μάθησις, we remember, is ἀνάμνησις (Phaed. 76 a; cf. also 75 b and 76 b). It is likely enough that the Platonic doctrine of ἀνάμνησις was suggested by earlier Pythagorean beliefs of the same kind (Dieterich l. c. p. 122: cf. also Rohde l. c. p. 136 n.).

621 Β 8 ἐπιλαυναντείβαι. There is no good reason for transferring to this place the clause αὐτός—πιεῖς as Herwerden wishes to do. In treating of this passage, Proclus quotes an interesting fragment of Aristotle's dialogue 'On the Soul' (l. c. 349. 17 ff. = Rose 1480b 5 ff.): ἠγατί ὄνων (sc. ὅ Ἀριστοτέλης) καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ μὲν ὑγείας, ἐλ ὧν ὑγείας Ἰάκης πεπίπατε καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ὅτι ἐμαθηκας, ἐκ νόσου δὲ ἐς ὑγείαν ὅντα μεδενα πάποτε τοῦτο πάσχειν. ἔσκανε δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄνευ σώματος χωρίς τῶν χυμάτων κατὰ φύσιν οὐσίαν ὑγείαν, τὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι, ὡς παρά φύσιν, νόσω; ἄν γὰρ εἰκεν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτάς, ἐντεῦθε δὲ παρά φύσιν ὡστ' ἐκεῖστο συμβάλλειν τὰ μὲν ἐκείνων ἑπιλαυναντείβαι τῶν ἐκεί, τὰς δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἐκείστε ἐκταῖς διαπίστωμαν. Cf. Timon of Athens i 11: 'my long sickness Of health and living now begins to mend, And nothing brings me all things.'

9 μέσας νύκτας. The plural, in which νύκτες according to Heidorn on Prot. 310 D signifies hórae nocturnae, is regular in this and similar expressions, e. g. πόρρω των νύκτων (Symp. 217 D) etc. γενέσθαι—γενέσθαι. "Is Plato really responsible for the clumsy and ill-sounding repetition of γενέσθαι?" Richards, who would omit the first γενέσθαι and write κατὰ μέσας for καὶ μέσας. A similar correction had already been suggested by Herwerden. Plato himself is not in the least averse to echoes of this kind: see on VI 511 E.

10 ἄνυ. It follows that the souls just before their reincarnation are under-ground: see on 'Ἀνάγκης γόνισαν 617 b and διὰ καύματος κτλ. 621 a and Virg. Aen. vi 748 f. Has omnis—Lethaeae ad fluvium deus evocavit agmine magno: Scilicet immemores superf erut convexus revisant, Rursus et incipient in corpora velle reverti.

eis—ἀστέρας is an instance—rare in Plato—of an apparently accidental iamb. See Arist. Rhet. iii 8. 1408b 33 f. ο δ' ἢμος αὐτῇ ἑστιν ἢ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων λαμβάνει φθέγγοντας λέγοντες και Cope ad loc. For souls conceived as stars cf. Ar. Peace 833 b. οὐκ ὄν ἀρ' οὖθ' δ' λέγονας κατὰ τῶν ἀέρα | ὡς ἀστέρας γεγόμενοι, ὅτι τιν ἀστάδιαν | καὶ Plut. de gnu. Socr. 591 D πολλοὶ στάτες περὶ τὸ χάσμα παλλομένου (said of disembodied souls) and 591 f. Similarly the Milky Way which, in the words of Milton, is 'powdered with stars' (Par. Lost vii 581: cf. Arist. Meteor. i 8), is the abode of certain souls, according to a tolerably widespread tradition, which meets us also in antiquity: see for example Cic. de repub. vi 15. 16 and Manil. I 753—

804. Cf. also Ettig Acharment. l. c. p. 348 n. 2 and Rohde Psychê ii pp. 95, 213 nn.
πιεύν· ὅπῃ μέντοι καὶ ὑπὸς εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ ἔξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἔσθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ.
καὶ οὕτως, ὢ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ὡμᾶς ἁν σώσειν, ἀν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τῶν τῆς Λήβης ποταμῶν ἐν διαβρόσυμεθα καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ μανθησόμεθα. ἀλλ’ ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα, νομίζωτε ἀθάνατον ψυχῆν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθὰ, τῆς ἀνὸς ὄδον ἀεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονίσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ ῥμῶν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνδάδε, δοκεῖν τά ἄθλα 1 αὐτῆς κομιζόμεθα, ὡσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιαγειρόμενοι, καὶ ἐνδάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιετείᾳ πορείᾳ, ἶνα διεληλύθαμεν, ἐν πράττομεν.

τέλος πολιτείας Ι. 13. έσθεν ΑΕξγ: γρ ἄνωθεν in marg. A.2. κείμενον ΑΕξγ: ήδη κείμενον Α. 22. χιλιετείς ΑΕξγ: χιλιετείς A. Cf. 615 A.

13 έσθεν. ἄνωθεν (see cr. n.), which appears also in η, is approved by Richards, but adds nothing to the meaning. έσθεν is of course the morning of the twelfth day as μέσας νύκτας above was the midnight of the eleventh: cf. δωδεκαταίοι—ἀνέβη τις δι中俄 614 B and 616 B n.
κείμενον. See cr. n. ήδη is inappropriate in itself, and has little authority besides Α.2.
14 μῦθος—οὐκ ἀπώλετο. A Scholiast remarks: τοὺς μὲν οὖν πολλοὺς προστιθέναι τοῖς μύθοις έδόθη ήν, ὅτι μῦθοι ἀπώλετο, δεικτόναι βουλομένους ἃ ἀρα οἱ μύθοι λέγουσι μὴ δύνατα, καὶ ἀρα ἑρρίθησαν καὶ οὐκ εὐλα.
(Δ. Θεσαλ. 164 D and Phil. 14 Α.) Πλάτων δὲ τοιαύταν πανταχοῦ σωφίζεται τε καὶ σφίζειν φησι τοὺς μῦθον τούς πάρα αὐτῷ, μᾶλλα γε εἰκότως τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἐόντων ἐξεσεργασάτε, καὶ ὠφέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο. (The Scholium is from Πολιτικής ι. c. 354. 24 ff.). Plato means that the story of Er is οὐκ ἄναρ, ἀλλ’ ἄναρ ἀναθένα. A similar play on the proverb occurs also in Λαο. 645 B.
621 C 15 ἂν σώσειν. Cf. III 417 A n. The suggestion ἄν σώσει (Richards) is unnecessary: see Kühner Gr. Gr. 11 p. 977 b.
621 C, D 20 αὐτοῦ τε—ἐν πράττομεν. I agree with Richards in taking τε as 'both,' not 'and,' and the καὶ before ἐνδάδε as 'and,' not 'both.' Schneider holds the opposite view, urging that "qui praemia virtutis reportat, cum inter re-
portandum et sibi et diis amicum esse oportet. Eo igitur tempore sibi diisque amicus ut sit, contendere non magis potest, quam ut vincat, quam palamm fert victoriae." This is true enough, but a similar objection may be made against Schneider's own solution, which makes Plato say ἡν, ἐπειδὰν—κομιζόμεθα—ἐν πράττομεν: and, with Schneider's construction, the repetition καὶ ἐνδάδε is also, as Richards says, 'veery weak.' Beginning as if he would say 'both here and hereafter' Plato elaborates the 'hereafter' into ἐπειδὰν—κομιζόμεθα, not without some sacrifice of logical coherence.
22 περιαγειρόμενοι: i.q. περιόμισται καὶ ἀγέλεσμοι. Cf. Tim. Lex. Plat. s.v. περιαγειρόμενοι νικηφόροι and Ruhnken's note. ἐπαγερμός was the name for this kind of 'stipis collectio.' The poet Gray proposed περιαγέμον, but the text is sound. For the imagery from the games see on ν 465 D n.
23 διεληλύθαμεν. J. and C. think there is 'a playful suggestion of our having made the pilgrimage ourselves.' I do not believe Plato means more than merely 'we have described.'
24 εν πράττομεν. On εν πράττομεν see the third Platonic epistle ad init. and Bernays Lucian n. die Kyniker pp. 3, 88. The Republic fitsly ends with an adaptation of Plato's favourite phrase of salutation and farewell.
APPENDICES TO BOOK X.

I.

X 597 E. τοῦτο ἀρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδοποῖος, εἴπερ μυητῆς ἦσθι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τίς ἀληθείας πεφυκὼς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μυηταὶ.

Schleiermacher and Stallbaum offer no explanation of the difficult phrase τρίτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως. The words are translated by Prantl "in dritter Linie vom Königlichen," and explained by Müller as third, counting from the man "der nach seiner Befähigung, seiner Vorbildung und seinem Berufe vor Allen im Besitze der Ideen ist." According to Schneider the King is "der im neunten Buche als Besitzer der wahren Lust dargestellte Gerechte, der hier als wahrhaft seierender der Wahrheit selbst gleich gesetzt wird" (Translation p. 314). Jowett and Campbell remark "God is here represented as a King. The word is borrowed from the language of the ninth book in which the imperfect shadow of the king is δημοκρατικός, διλαγιρικός, as here of God the shadows are ξωγράφας, κλινοποιος etc." Other suggestions are that the phrase means "third in descent from the sovereign" (D. and V.), that the τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως is a sort of stage king ("tragic mimicry, as exhibited in the stage king, is at a third remove from the king and the truth, i.e. from the ideal king" J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. x pp. 112, 245), and finally, that there is a reference to "the Oriental degrees of rank. The painter is not even like the vizier, or the immediate heir to the throne, δευτερος ἀπὸ βασιλεώς" (Campbell in Cl. Rev. x p. 246). It will be seen that there is little agreement of opinion as to the precise significance of this remarkable expression.

As regards the application of the phrase, it is quite clear, in the first place, that βασιλέως is intended to correspond to God. In the descending scale of 'makers' we have (1) the φιλοσοφός, who is God, (2) the δημοσιοφαγός, and (3) the μυητής: so that the μυητής is τρίτος ἀπὸ φιλοσοφοῦ. Since Plato calls him τρίτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως, we are bound to identify the βασιλεώς with the φιλοσοφός, unless we suppose that the expression is lacking both in propriety and point. There are also other passages in Plato where God is spoken of as a King, e.g. Crat. 396 a, Laws 924 a. In the second place, it is equally clear that τρίτος ἀπὸ implies that the imitator is removed by two degrees from 'the King.' Compare Stobaeus Eclog. i 178 p. 78 Wachsmuth Ποιητῶν τρίτης ἀπὸ Δίως (sc. την εἰμαρμέρην)· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δευτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ
A careful study of the words employed by Plato will moreover lead us to suppose that the figure is that of a genealogical tree. Thus we have

(1) God
(2) Carpenter
(3) Painter

correlating with

(1) The Idea of Bed,
(2) A material bed,
(3) A picture of a bed;

and just as the picture of a bed is a τρίτον γένειν μακ. απὸ τῆς φύσεως, so the Painter is τρίτος απὸ βασιλέως πεφυκώς, that is, 'third in descent from the King.' For these reasons the supposed allusion to the βασιλείας of ix 587 B ff. cannot, in my opinion, be admitted: nor indeed would such an allusion be appropriate on other grounds, for there is no kind of analogy between the μυθής and the διεγερχικός, who in 587 C is said to be τρίτος απὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ. The translation of Davies and Vaughan 'third in descent from the King' is correct, and the meaning of the phrase is exactly reproduced in the passage cited from Dante in the notes. In illustration of the word βασιλείας we should quote, not ix 587 B, but vi 509 D, where the Idea of Good, or God (vi 505 A n.), is said to be the king of the intelligible sphere. We have already seen that the Idea of Good is the maker of all the other Ideas, and among them of the αὐτός ὁ ἐστὶν κλάση (vi 509 B n., x 597 B n.), which according to the present passage is constructed by God. Compare Philo de mund. orif. § 23 πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν ἀψίδα παραπεμφθεὶς τῶν νοητῶν ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἔδωκε τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα: and ib. § 50.

So much for the application of the phrase and its propriety as used by Plato here. As regards its origin, Campbell's suggestion is in my opinion not improbable, provided we suppose that the allusion is to the third in descent from the king. Although the expression does not appear to be found elsewhere in Greek literature, except with more or less explicit reference to this passage of the Republic, the words sound half-proverbial, and the omission of the article with βασιλέως suggests, though it does not necessitate, a reference to the Persian monarchy. Cf. Menex. 241 D, 244 D, 245 B, 246 A and Alc. i 123 B, c, e al. The conjecture of Campbell derives some additional probability from the favourite Stoic comparison between προηγμένα and those who stand next to the King in honour and esteem, although the Stoic comparison does not involve the idea of any genealogical connexion: see Cic. de finibus iii 52 ut enim, inquit (Zeno), nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem—id est enim προηγμένων—sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primario loco sunt, sed ea quae secundum locum obtinent. προηγμένα, id est producta, nominentur, with other passages quoted by Pearson Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes p. 171. Cf. also Philo vii p. 190 ( Lipsiae 1828) νῦν δὲ υπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐξ ψευδαγασθέντες λαμπρότητος, ἀτε νοητόν φῶς ἰδεῖν ἀδυνατώτες, πλαζόμενοι διετέλεσαν τὸν αἰώνα: πρὸς μὲν τὸν βασιλεὰ λογισμὸν φθάσας μὴ δυνη-θέντες, ἄρχε δὲ τῶν προτυπαίων μόλις ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ τῶν ἐπί θύρας ἀρέτης, πλούτων τε καὶ δόξαν καὶ νόημαν καὶ τὰ συγγενή τεθωρακότες προσεκίνουν; προσέκινουν.

A. P. H.
II.

X 602 E. Τούτω δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἡ ἐλάττω ἐτερών ἡ ἵσα τάναντία φαίνεται ἁμα περὶ ταῦτα.

This is the text of Α, to which Schneider and all succeeding editors adhere. The variants τούτω for τούτω, δέ for δὲ have little authority, and give us no assistance. The view which I have given in the notes assumes that τάναντία means the opposite of τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἡ ἐλάττων κτλ. in d above. The article is significant; otherwise Plato would hardly, I think, have added it here and omitted it immediately afterwards in ἐναντία. I formerly thought it necessary either to excise the first ἁμα περὶ ταῦτα, or else to add after φαίνεται the words οὕτω ἐναντία φαίνεται, in order to make the reference in τάναντία still more clear; but if ταῦτα is understood as the same objects about which we already have the false impression, the difficulty disappears.

It may be urged that σημαίνοντι represents the λογιστικόν as the vehicle of a communication to the soul, and not as itself forming a judgment. Plato himself, however, appears to fluctuate between the two points of view; and the reason is that according to his own psychological theory τὸ λογιστικόν is not merely τὸ μετρών, but the part of soul which κατὰ τὰ μέτρα δοξάζει,—μέτρῳ τε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεύει (603 λ. See also 605 b, c).

Schneider translates as follows: "huius autem partis ope saepenumero menso alicui, quum illa (pars) maiora quaedam vel minora vel paria esse significat, contraria simul de iisdem videntur." The sense is satisfactory, except that we should have expected Plato to attribute the measurement to the λογιστικόν itself (in harmony with τούτῳ—ἐργον), instead of to the individual making use of the λογιστικόν. But it is grammatically impossible to sever τούτῳ from μετρήσαντι and connect it again with σημαίνοντι, while if (with Müller) we make σημαίνοντι also refer to the individual, we offend against the plain and obvious meaning of the word (cf. vii 524 λ).

By Jowett and Campbell τούτῳ is rightly made to agree with the participles, but wrongly separated from φαίνεται. "The dative"—say they—"is in a loose construction with the whole sentence, like a genitive absolute, and is not to be taken with φαίνεται. It would not be in accordance with Plato’s use of language, or with the context in what follows, to speak of the contradictions of sense as having anything to do with the rational element of the soul." True; but Plato does not so speak of them, if my view of τάναντία is right. He merely says that the rational element takes the opposite view of an object from that which is at the same moment entertained by the irrational element. Nor can the dative be employed with the force of a genitive absolute, as is virtually the case according to Jowett and Campbell’s explanation.

Two other interpretations have been proposed. According to Stallbaum, the λογιστικόν is divided into two parts, one of which τῷ λογισμῷ πιστεύει, while the other is led astray. Hence it is possible—he thinks—
for Plato to speak of the λογιστικών as having contrary impressions at one and the same time. But we cannot possibly identify τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα δοξάζων τῆς ψυχῆς with part of the λογιστικών: the main purpose of the argument, indeed, is to prove it totally distinct therefrom. Cf. Schultess Plat. Forsch. pp. 42—45. Davies and Vaughan translate "But when this element, after frequent measuring, informs us that one thing is greater or less than or equal to, another thing, it is contradicted at the same moment by the appearance which the same things present." This explanation, which appears to be unique, wrongly joins πολλάκις with μετρήσαται and is certainly fallacious in other respects also.

Schleiermacher suspected corruption, and read τῷ δὲ for τοῦτῳ δὲ, translating "Wenn einer aber auch noch so sehr gemessen hat, und nun bestimmt" etc., but σημαίνειν is not 'bestimmen.' The conjecture τοῦτου—μετρήσαντος—σημαίνοντος—due to Richards—removes all difficulty, on the assumption that τάναντία means—as it is capable of meaning—the same as ἐναντία i.e. ‘opposites’ and nothing more. I cannot, however, but think such a change far too drastic; and it is reasonable to suppose that the article in τάναντία means something. The text may of course be corrupt—I do not believe it is—but, if so, it still awaits the healing hand.

III.

Χ 606 c. 'Ἀρ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου, ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοι γελοωτοποιῶ, ἐν μιμητῇ δὲ κωμῳδῇ ἥ καὶ ηδὰ άκούων σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς ὥς πωμηρά, ταύτων τοιεῖς ὀπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεοις;

All the mss have ἀν in place of ἂν. There are several other variants in Π and the inferior mss, but all of them useless for purposes of interpretation or emendation.

That the text has suffered corruption is admitted by all editors, and nearly all critics. By writing δὲ τι ἂν, and transferring the mark of interrogation from ἔλεοις to γελοίου, it is possible to make sense of the passage, if we are willing to allow the common change from δὲ τι singular to τοιηρὰ plural. Cf. Neukirch in Pl. Pol. quaeest. phil. i p. 48. But the double use of ἂν remains; and ὅτι (not δὲ τι) is proved to be genuine by ὅτι τοιαύτα—ἐφαγάζεται in D below: see note ad loc.

The following emendations, which are all of them later than Schneider, appear to me inadmissible on other grounds, and also because they involve the change of ὅτι. (1) ἄρ' οὐχ—γελοίου, ὅ τι ἂν—γελωτοποιῶν; ἐν μιμητῇ δὲ—ακόουν <ἀν> σφόδρα κτλ. (Stallbaum): (2) ἄρ' οὐχ—γελοίου; ὅτιν, ἂν—γελωτοποιῶν ἐν μιμητῇ δὲ κτλ. (Madvig, Baiter): (3) ἄρ' οὐχ—γελοίου; ὅτιν τι ἂν αὐτὸς—γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμητῇ δὲ κτλ. (proposed by me in Cl. Rev. iv p. 357): (4) ἄρ' οὐχ—γελοίου; ὅ τι ἂν—αἰσχύνη κτλ. (D. and V. with Stephanus). Hermann conjectures (5) ἄρ' οὐχ—γελοίου, ὅτι, ἂν—γελωτοποιῶν ἐν μιμητῇ δὴ—ακόουν <ἐάν> σφόδρα κτλ., but this has little probability. Although they print the emendation of Schneider, the Oxford editors remark that the simplest change is to
read (6) ἀρ' οὐκ—γελοιον, ὅτι ἄν <ἀ> αὐτὸς ἀισχύνω <ἄν>, ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. The last suggestion is an ingenious one, and improves both sense and grammar; but the threefold error (omission of ἀρ and ἄν and corruption of δὴ to δὲ) is hardly probable, and the sentence becomes very cumbrous. It should be remarked that the absence of μὲν after αὐτὸς is no reason for suspecting δὲ: see on i 340 D al. (7) Turner's conjecture ἀρ' οὐκ—γελοιον, ὅτι ἄν <ἀ> ἄν > αὐτὸς—ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. is in principle the same as that of Jowett and Campbell. I have sometimes thought that ποιεῖ should be substituted for ποιεῖς ('that jests, which etc., have the same effect as etc.' etc.), in view of ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἣ ποιητική μίμησις ἐγγάζεται in D. (It should be observed that Ξ and some other MSS read ποιεῖς.) ποιεῖς is however supported by ἐν τοῖς ἑλέους as well as by the explanatory ὁ γὰρ—γενέσθαι. If the difficulty about ἄν is held to be insurmountable, one might suggest ἄν <ἄν> αὐτὸς ἀισχύνω κτλ., regarding ἄν as virtually a single word; but to this and all the other corrections hitherto offered I still prefer Schneider's solution.

IV.

Χ 607 B. ὁ τῶν λιν σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν.

The reading of the two best MSS (A and Π) is ὁ τῶν Δία (or rather διὰ) σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν. Most of the inferior MSS read διὰ σοφῶν, but a few have διασοφῶν (sic).

Those who adhere to Paris A offer one of the two following interpretations: either (1) "der Gottweisen herrschendes Volk" (Schleiermacher, Stallbaum etc.), or else (2) "the crowd of philosophers overmastering Jove" (J. and C., with Schneider). To the first solution it may be objected that κρατῶν remains obscure, that Δία σοφῶν 'wise as to Zeus' is a difficult construction, and that the sentiment itself—unless we suppose it ironical—is rather a compliment to philosophy than otherwise.

Schneider construes κρατῶν with Δία, supposing that the object of the poet's invective is, as before, "sapientia Jovi adversaria et ἀθεος." The order of the words, he thinks may be excused, "in lyrico poeta, quum etiam Plato Leg. L. vii 824 A ἡ τῶν διαπαύματα πώνων ἔχονσα dicere ausus sit." To me, as to many others, the harshness appears too great, even for poetry: it is certainly much greater than ἵδων τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῶν τινα Διόνων and the like in Herodotus (i 84 al.). The text of the passage in the Laws has been disputed. If it is sound, we ought perhaps to print a comma after τῶν, and take the article not with πόνων, but with the following participle χειρομενέων.

There is, as usual, no lack of emendations. Sydenham (see Cl. Rev. ii p. 229) altered ὁ τῶν to ὅτων, with what purpose it is difficult to see. The suggestion ὅ καὶ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν (Bywater) keeps both Δία and κρατῶν. Others retain κρατῶν, but not Δία, proposing instead of Δία σοφῶν either διασοφῶν (C. Schmidt, Hermann etc.—but the word lacks authority), or ἄκρασοφῶν (a conjecture of Bergk's, afterwards apparently withdrawn: see his Poet. Lyr. Gr. 4111 p. 731),
or ἰδία σοφῶν (Hermann Gesch. u. Syst. p. 329 n. 305), or λίαν σοφῶν (Herwerden, Richards). If we read λίαν σοφῶν and leave κρατοῖν alone, the participle is very obscure, and Richards hints at the possibility of κρατοῦν. I have also thought of κράζων (‘the croaking rabble of the overwise’).

The view which is taken in the notes has been objected to on the ground that ‘like caput, κάρα and κεφαλῆ cannot be, or rather never are, in classical Greek, used for the seat of intelligence—for the ‘head’ of modern parlance—the reason being that popular opinion among the Greeks and Romans connected intelligence with the heart or midriff, not, as among us, with the head’ (Hermath. xxiv 255). I think that I have answered this objection in my commentary, but, if any one thinks differently, I would recommend as a δεύτερος πλοῖς that he should provisionally restore the ms reading and interpret it in Schneider’s way.

V.

X 612 A. Ὀθκοῦν, ἡν οὗ ἐγὼ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὗ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς ὀδας δικαιουσύνης ἐπηνέγκαμεν κτλ.

ἀπελυσάμεθα is the reading of Stobaeus (Flor. 9. 66) and all the mss except four, viz. ΞΠωμ and Cesenas M. These have ἀπεδουσάμεθα.

ἀπεδουσάμεθα can hardly be right. The form is rare in Attic, though tolerably common in later Greek: nor is it by any means obvious what ἀπεδουσάμεθα would signify in this connexion. The usual translation is ‘we divested ourselves of’ (as in τὴν γνώσιν ἀποδουσάμενος Clem. Alex. Str. v 8. 84 c Migne), and γυμνωτέος ὃς πάντων πλῆν δικαιουσύνης (Π 361 c) is quoted in its support. But (as Schneider points out) Socrates could hardly have identified himself with the just man in this way, and, even if he did, to what does τὰ ἄλλα refer? What are ‘the other things’ of which he divests himself in addition to μισθοῖ καὶ ὀδας δικαιουσύνης? To this question no satisfactory answer appears to be possible: none, at least, has yet been given.

Schneider himself reads ἀπεδουσάμεθα, but gives a very different explanation, holding that τὰ ἄλλα means the description of τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθῃ τε καὶ εἰδὴ ψυχῆς in the preceeding books, and apparently taking ἀπεδουσάμεθα as ‘we have exposed to view.’ For ἀπεδουσάμεθα in this sense we might compare ἀπεδούσαμεν in Charm. 154 ε: but the middle remains a difficulty.

If ἀπελυσάμεθα on the other hand is sound, it must, I think, be explained as in the notes. The view of the Oxford editors is not very different. Ast’s translation ‘se liberare’ ‘defungi’ can scarcely be justified on linguistic grounds, and “addito τὰ ἄλλα minus convenit” (Schneider), for it was no part of Socrates’ obligation to dwell on the wages of virtue: quite the contrary, in fact. No one is likely to accept the extremely subtle and difficult explanation of Richter (Fleck. Ἀθ. 1867 p. 149) “haben wir nicht das Übrige durch unsere Darstellung erlöst—namlich von den Banden, welche die Materialisten der Tugend auferlegen—ohne Lösegeld hinzubringen?” The possibility of cor-
AVNNPENDINGICES TO BOOK X.

ruption must be allowed, but the conjecture ἀπεωσάμεθα (Richards, comparing 11 366 A τὰ δ' ἐξ αὐτικῶς κέρδη ἀπωσάμεθα) is otherwise unsatisfactory, and fails, like ἀπεδωσάμεθα, to explain τὰ ἄλλα. Some may think of ἀπελογοσάμεθα. It is best, however, to follow the MSS, in the absence of any convincing emendation.

VI.¹

Χ 616 b—617 b. 'Επειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμώνι δωντο ἐφάπτεσθαι.

With the exception of the 'older and earlier' reading described by Proclus (see pp. 475 ff. below), there is hardly a trace in this passage of any variant affecting the sense.

A few emendations have been proposed. Thus Schleiermacher conjectures τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν; taking τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ as 'the poles of heaven,' and the chains as the Milky Way (Translation p. 621), while Krohn suggests φῶς ἐν τῷ, for φῶς εὐθὺς, and the transposition of ἀπερ κόνων to follow ἀτρακτῶν (Pl. St. p. 283). It is hardly necessary to say that alterations of this kind are in my judgment totally inadmissible: they only reveal the weakness of the interpretation which necessitates them.

The only safe principle of interpretation in this, as in other similar passages of Plato, is to adhere to the natural meaning of the Greek, and abstain from wresting or rewriting the language in support of any preconceived view about the consistency and coherence of the picture as a whole.

I now think it clear that Boeckh's interpretation is irreconcilable with the language employed by Plato. The article in which Boeckh developed his views most fully was originally published in reply to Grote's pamphlet entitled Plato's Doctrine respecting the Rotation of the Earth (1866), and is reprinted in his Kleine Schriften iii pp. 294—320. The essential features of Boeckh's view, which Zeller¹ 434, 435 nn. in the main accepts, are as follows.

The Straight Light is the Milky Way, running round the outer surface of the Heavens, like the undergirders of a trireme. To the question, Why is the light said to be 'straight like a pillar,' when it is in reality circular?, Boeckh replies that it appears to be straight from the standpoint of the souls. Er and his companions are, according to Boeckh, outside the world, somewhere beyond the North Pole, and see only the nearer half-circle of the Milky Way: "ein Halbring erscheint aber in der Entfernung dem, welcher ihn von aussen in der selben Ebene stehend sieht, als eine gerade Säule" (l.c. p. 306). What is the meaning of διὰ πατος του οὐρανοι και γῆς τεταμένον? Boeckh's explanation is that the light "verbreite sich durch den ganzen Himmel und die Erde, d. h. über die Erde, wenn man will mit einem leichten Zeugma, durch welches διὰ auch den Genitiv γῆς regiert: vewohl ein

¹ This Appendix is the result of prolonged discussions with Professor Cook Wilson, and freely reproduces nearly all his most important arguments.
Zeugma anzunehmen nicht einmal nöthig ist, wenn man nur das δύα auf Verbreitung, nicht auf Durchdringung bezieht" (ib. p. 305). The middle of the light is accordingly in Boeckh’s opinion at the Pole, and it is from the Pole outwards that ‘the extremities of heaven’s chains’—ἀφινω he refers to ουφαρω—‘are extended.’ The ‘chains of heaven’ include not only the light itself, but also two other great circles, viz. the equinoctial and solstitial colures (ib. p. 307). ‘To the ends of these chains is attached the spindle of Necessity, which extends downwards from the North Pole, its shaft representing the axis of the Universe. The meaning to be attached to the breadth of rim in the various whorls of Necessity’s spindle is not discussed by Boeckh.

Such, in its main outline, is Boeckh’s explanation. It will be observed that he endeavours to combine into a single harmonious whole the two figures employed by Plato—the sphere surrounded by a circle of light, and—the spindle of Necessity. But he makes no attempt to shew how the outermost whorl, in which the fixed stars are placed, can coexist along with the revolving sphere (πᾶσαν—τὴν περιφοράν 616 c), so that the fundamental inconsistency of the two images still remains; and even if we should allow, which is far from being the case, that in other respects Boeckh provides us with a single coherent picture, he “does violence to the language” (as Cook Wilson remarks) “at nearly every step.” The light, says Plato, is straight, like a pillar. According to Boeckh, it is not straight, but curved: only it appears straight if seen from a certain point of view. If this was Plato’s meaning, why should he not have put it into words? No one will deny that the natural meaning of the words he does employ is that the light not merely appears, but is straight; and he could have had no object in thus leading us on a false scent. Nor is there any indication to make us suppose that the Souls are outside the World. On the contrary, it is tolerably clear that the λέιμων from which they start upon their four days’ journey (616 e) is on the ideal surface of the Earth (614 c n.), and the natural inference is that they march along that surface until they come within view of the light (616 b n.). If they travelled upwards to the supracelestial regions, they would have to pass through the very ring of light which Boeckh makes them see for the first time not from below, but from above. ‘That the Souls are in the middle of the Earth, and therefore of the World, at the end of the fourth day after they have left the meadow, is clear from 617 D, 620 E, 621 A, B (φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν), and it is at the end of the fourth day that they reach the middle of the light (616 B). The conclusion is inevitable that the middle of the light is in the centre of the Universe, and nowhere else. Not less arbitrary and forced is the explanation which Boeckh gives of διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐφαροῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον. The phrase τεταμέν διὰ surely means to ‘stretch through’ and not to ‘stretch over,’ and the plain meaning of the Greek is confirmed by the close parallel in Tim. 40 b τὸν διὰ παντὸς πολον τεταμενον. Other objections might be mentioned, but enough has been said to shew that Boeckh’s explanation cannot be fairly evolved from the language of Plato, to which, indeed, it is sometimes in direct contradiction.
APPENDICES TO BOOK X.

Of the other views, that of K. E. Ch. Schneider, the editor and translator of the Republic, has met with some acceptance, and appears to be favoured, in part, at least, by Jowett and Campbell. The straight light, in Schneider's opinion, stands for the axis of the World, or a cylinder enclosing it. From the comparison of the light to ἐποξώματα Schneider is inclined to infer that the ἐποξώματα stretched from stem to stern inside the vessel; but the evidence would seem to be conclusive that the ἐποξώματα were applied outside. The chains of heaven he thus describes: "ad medium axem, h. e. ad centrum terrae idemque mundi (cf. άνω p. 621 b) pertinentia vincula—ab extremis sphaeris radiorum instar ad fusum Necessitatis circa centrum stantem porrecta et utrinque nexa, quorum vinculorum ope vertente fusus totus mundus cum omnibus sphaeris convertatur." Apparently he distinguishes between the light and the chains, although Plato clearly means them to be identical: κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ ὄφρανον τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τετειμένα· εἶναι γὰρ τούτο τὸ φῶς ἐξυπνάσμον τοῦ ὄφρανον. On the subject of the breadth of rims Schneider has no view: "über die Breite fehlt noch der befriedigende Aufschluss, und es ist leichter zu sagen, was sie nicht bedeuten kann, als was sie bedeutet" (Translation p. 316).

In the notes, the breadth of rims has been taken to mean the distances between the planets. Against this interpretation it might be urged that a wholly different account of these distances is given in the Timaeus. In Tim. 36 d Plato writes: μιᾶν γὰρ αὐτὴν (i.e. τὴν ταθτον καὶ ὁμοίον περιφοραν) ἀσχυστὸν εἰςε, τὴν δ' ἐντὸς σχῆμας ξαχῆ, ἐπτὰ κύκλους ἀνίσους κατὰ τὴν του διπλασίον καὶ τριπλασίον διάστασιν ἐκάστην, οὔσων ἐκατέρων τριῶν κτλ. What he means (according to Zeller 11 p. 779 n.) is that if the distance of the Moon from the Earth is counted as 1, the distances of the other planets from the Earth will be:—Sun 2, Venus 3, Mercury 4, Mars 8, Jupiter 9, Saturn 27. (Cf. Macrobius in somn. Scip. II 3. 14, where it is said that the 'Platonic' used 'dupla et tripla intervalla' in such a way as to produce these distances: Moon 1, Sun 2, Venus 2 x 3 = 6, Mercury 6 x 4 = 24, Mars 24 x 9 = 216, Jupiter 216 x 8 = 1728, Saturn 1728 x 27 = 46656.) Thus according to the Timaeus the Moon, Sun, Venus and Mercury will be at the same distances from one another, Mercury will be as far from Mars as the Earth from Mercury, Mars and Jupiter will be as near together as the Sun and Moon, and the distance between Jupiter and Saturn will be enormously greater than that which divides any other pair of planets. Between this scale of distances and Plato's arrangement of the whorls according to the breadth of their 'lips' in the Republic, there is no kind of affinity: the rim of Saturn's whorl, for example, if it measures his distance from Jupiter, ought to be the broadest of all the rims, instead of being, as Plato here says it is, the narrowest.

In spite of the interval of time which may be supposed to separate the Timaeus from the Republic, this discrepancy might fairly cause a difficulty if it could be shewn that Plato's representation of the distances between the planets in these two dialogues was based upon empirical data or observation. But in point of fact, in both dialogues
the principle of Plato's arrangement is a certain \textit{a priori} numerical relation, which has nothing to do with facts or probabilities. In the \textit{Timaeus} Plato starts from the two Pythagorean \textit{τετρακτύς}, viz. 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27, and arbitrarily disposes the planets in accordance with these numbers. His method resembles that of the \textit{τώ δει αστρονομικός} inasmuch as he 'dispenses with the starry heavens' (\textit{vii} 530 \textit{b} \textit{nn.}) and regulates the distances by certain 'mathematical numbers,' which he finds ready to his hand. (See App. \textit{ii} to Book \textit{vii}, \textit{p. 166}.) The method which he follows in this passage of the \textit{Republic} is analogous, although the actual numbers are different. In a note contributed to Jowett and Campbell's commentary, Mr W. A. Craigie first drew attention to the fact that a numerical principle underlies Plato's order of arrangement of the planets in respect not only of their distances from one another, but also of their colours and velocities, and Professor Cook Wilson has corrected and explained Mr Craigie's law in \textit{Cl. Rev.} \textit{xvi} pp. 292 f. The law is that each of the three enumerations is "based on combinations which rest on the number 9" (Craigie l.c.).

Let us take first the 'breadth of the lips' of the whorls, i.e. (according to our theory) the distances of the several orbits from one another.

A. "If we write down" (I quote from Cook Wilson's article) "the numbers which express the order of the whorls, and, under each, set the number which its rim has in the order of breadth, and then join 'those \textit{σφοινδυλοι} whose united numbers produce a sum of 9, we have a symmetrical figure with its centre between the 4th and 5th,' thus:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of \textit{σφοινδυλοι}</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Order of width of rim</td>
<td>8 7 3 6 2 5 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Next, take the order of the colours.

"If we write down the numbers of the whorls in the order in which Plato mentions them when describing their colours we get:—

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 7 & 8 & 2 \\
5 & 3 & 4 & 6 \\
\end{array}
\]

and there is here also a symmetry of arrangement with regard to the centre (and the centres of the two halves)."

C. Finally, let us consider the order of velocities.

The figure given by Cook Wilson is:—

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 8 & | & 7 \\
5 & 3 & | & 4 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
= 9, \quad 9 \times 2, \quad 9.
\]

In this figure the order of velocities is observed; "the group 1 + 8 (= 9) is correlative to the group 4 + 3 + 2 (= 9)," and the number 9 occurs twice in the central group, the members of which, being equal in respect of velocity, "may be considered to have no order."
"If we ask what was the reason of this curious arrangement," continues Professor Cook Wilson, "a not improbable answer seems to be that it was to effect a kind of equable distribution of the magnitudes along the series of the whorls. Now if this were so it would be best not merely to arrange two correlative pairs, as 7 and 2, 8 and 1, symmetrically with regard to the centre, but to make the order in magnitude of the numbers of one pair the reverse of that of the other. Thus in

```
  7 1 8 2
```

the distribution is more equable than in

```
  7 8 1 2,
```

for in the latter we have the two larger numbers on the same side of the centre. Similarly the arrangement

```
  7 2 centre 1 8
```

is more equable than

```
  7 2 centre 8 1,
```

and

```
  7 1 2 8
```

than

```
  7 8 2 1."

A glance at diagrams A and B will shew that in respect of the breadths of the rims and their respective colours "this rule of equable distribution is exactly carried out, and the order in magnitude of the numbers in one pair is the reverse of the order in its correlative pair.... In the case of the colours there is an addition to the equableness of the distribution in so far as the sum of the numbers in the first half is equal to the sum of the numbers in the second half." If this arrangement were found in only one of the three groups, we might reasonably judge it to be merely accidental; but the possibility of accident is almost excluded when we see that the rule is accurately observed in two cases out of the three, and also, with some unessential modifications, in the third. We must therefore suppose that Plato's representation of the planetary distances in the Republic deliberately follows an a priori principle of symmetry and number, selected chiefly in view of the particular image to which he here assimilates the celestial motions, and suggestive of the balance and equilibrium which ought to prevail in the celestial system. In the Timaeus his procedure is essentially the same, but there he accommodates the actual distances to the numerical fancies of the Pythagoreans. The discrepancy between the two dialogues in this particular ceases to surprise us as soon as we realise the way in which Plato went to work (cf. Book vii App. II pp. 166 f.), and in criticising Plato's physical theories generally, we should above all things bear in mind the warning which he himself
The parts of his commentary which chiefly concern us are as follows:

1. Dūtē ὅ ἐστὶν ἡ γραφή τῆς ταύτης τὰ βάθη διωρισμένης λέξεως. καὶ ἢ μὲν προτέρα καὶ ἀρχαίοτέρα τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀκόλουθεῖ τῶν καθ’ ἐκάστην σφαίραν ἀστέρων, τῆς μὲν μείονα περιεχομένης μείζον τὸ βάθος λέγουσα, τῆς δὲ ἐλάσσονα ἐλάσσον. οἷον μετὰ τὸν ἐξωτάτῳ σφόνικαλλοῦν, οὐς ἐστὶν ὅ τις ἀπλανοῦ—μετὰ τούτον ὃ ὅν τοῦ ἀπλανή κύκλων πλατύτατον ὄντα—τὸν τοῦ ἡλιακοῦ σφονύλου τῶν λοπῶν ἐβδομάτω ὡς τὰ πλατεῖα διαφέρει—ἐπειτα <τὸν> τοῦ σεληνικοῦ—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ τοῦ Ἀρείκοι—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ τοῦ Δίου σφονύλου καὶ ἐξῆς τὸν τοῦ Κρονίου, καὶ τελευταῖον εἶναι τὸν τοῦ Ἐρμαίκοι· καὶ ἀπλὸς κατὰ τὰ μέγεθη τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ τοῦ σφονύλου ἐχειν τὸ πλάτος. ἡ δὲ δευτέρα καὶ νευτέρα, κρατοῦσα δὲ εἰς τοὺς κεκωλισμένους (κεκολασμένους coniect Pitra) ἀντιγράφους μετὰ τῶν ἐξωτάτων σφονύλου κτλ. (Kroll II 218. 1 ff. The reading which Proclus proceeds to describe is that found in our mss.)

2. καὶ ἢσος οἱ οὗτοι λέγοντες (i.e. the adherents of the ‘newer’ text) ἐβλεπαν εἰς τὰ ἀπόγεια καὶ περίγεια κυψήλα τῶν ἀστέρων, καὶ ἐφ’ ὅν πλείον τὴν διαφοράν εὑρον, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ βάθος ἐθεντό πλεῖον τῶν σφαιρῶν—ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν προτέραν ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἐγκρίνου τις γραφῆς, οὐ πάντως συναναφάσαν ταῖς τῶν μετὰ ταύτα τηρήσασιν μᾶλλον δὲ ὅμοιο ἢ μὲν δευτέρα συμβαίνει τῇ τοῖς τὰς ἀνελίττουσι εἰσαγαγοῦσιν, ἢ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφρέσι ἐχεις, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀποδοθεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεδεμένοις ἐν ταῖς σφαιραῖς ἀστέρων ταῖς ἐν τοῖς βαθείοι διαφοράς, πλὴρ ὅτι τῆς σελήνης ἡ Ἀφροδίτη μείζον, εἰ καὶ τὸ φαιόμενον ἀπ’ ἐναντία ἐχεῖ παντελῶς τῶν κατ’ ἕκεινόν τοῦ χρόνον ἀστρονόμου τοῖς φαιόμενοι ἀκολουθησάντων ὡς τὸ εἰκός καὶ ταύτη καὶ τὰ βάθη διαστησάντων ἀπ’ ἄλληλον (ib. 219. 11 ff.).

3. τῶν μὲν προειρημένον γραφόν ἡ προτέρα, καθάπερ εἰσορομεν, εἰς τὰ μεγέθη τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τοῖς πλατέσαν ἀστέρων βλέπει καὶ οὐδὲ τῶν τούτων μεγέθη διώρισε τός τοῖς ύπερτον ἐδοξεί· ἢ δὲ τῶν μετὰ ταύτα τηρήσι τοῖς ἀπογείοις αὐτῶν ἐχρήσατο καὶ περιγείοις εἰς ἔθελον τοῦ πλάτος τῶν σφονύλου, οὐδὲ τοῖς ύπερτον τῆς τούτων καταλήψεως ἰκανοῖς πεσθεῖσι (ib. 221. 28 ff.).

From the first of these extracts we are enabled to reconstruct what Proclus calls the ‘older reading.’ The text of which he speaks must have run:

τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτον τε καὶ ἐξωτάτῳ σφόνυλου πλατύτατον τοῦ τοῦ χείλος κύκλων ἐχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδομοῦ δευτέρου, τρίτον δὲ τοῦ ἀγνόου, τέταρτον δὲ τοῦ τοῦ ἐκτὸν, πέμπτον δὲ τοῦ τοῦ τετάρτου, ἐκτὸς δὲ τοῦ τοῦ τρίτου, ἐβδομον δὲ τοῦ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὁγδοον δὲ τοῦ τοῦ
APPENDICES TO BOOK X.

πέμπτου. (See my article in Cl Rev. xv pp. 391 ff.) According to this reading the order of the whorls, in respect of breadth of rim, will be:—

The whorl of the Fixed Stars (no. 1)

" " " Sun (no. 7)

" " " Moon (no. 8)

" " " Venus (no. 6)

" " " Mars (no. 4)

" " " Jupiter (no. 3)

" " " Saturn (no. 2)

" " " Mercury (no. 5).

It will be convenient to discuss, first the meaning, and afterwards the value, of this 'older' text.

What, then, is the interpretation?

We note, in the first place, that the order in which the planetary whorls are arranged according to breadth of rim (Sun, Moon, Venus, etc.) corresponds with tolerable exactness to the order of the planets in respect of apparent size, and that the lip of the outermost whorl may be the broadest because of the number as well as the magnitude of the stars which it contains (cf. Proclus l.c. 218. 6 ff. δ τῆς ἀπλανοῖς, περιέχουσιν τόσούτον πλῆθος ἀστρῶν κατεσπαρμένον κατὰ πᾶν αὐτὸ τὸ βάθος, ὅν ἕκαστον ἄποδείκνυσιν ὁ λόγος μειώνα τῆς γῆς). Secondly, it is clear from what Proclus himself says that the order of breadth of whorl-lips in this 'older' text was really supposed to depend upon the size of the ἐνδεδεμένοι ἀστέρες (τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἄκολουθεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκάστην σφαίραν ἀστέρων 218. 2 et al.).

In these circumstances our first impulse is to suppose that the planetary lips are just broad enough to accommodate their planets and no broader, so that the breadth will be in each case exactly equal to the diameter of the planet. In this way I interpreted Proclus' 'older' text in Cl. Rev. xv pp. 391 ff.

But there are strong reasons in favour of supposing (with Cook Wilson) that the advocates of this text in antiquity did not make the breadth of the whorl-surfaces equal, but only proportionate, to the sizes of the planets. Of the 'earlier' reading Proclus remarks (l.c. II 219. 23) ἦ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἔξαι. Now it was perfectly understood by Proclus that the surfaces of the whorls are contiguous (II 216. 8 ff.), and knowing this, he can hardly have failed to recognise that if the planets fill the entire rims they will sometimes touch one another, and the Moon and the Earth will always be in contact. This arrangement is certainly not 'natural,' and we are led to suspect that Proclus had in mind another interpretation of the 'older' reading when he used this epithet, and one in which the orbital distances of the planets would be somehow represented. Now in discussing this subject, Proclus nowhere says that the rims are exactly equal in breadth to the sizes of the planets, and his language is always consistent with the theory that the relationship is one of proportion and nothing more (τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἄκολουθεὶ II 218. 2, εἰς τὰ μεγέθη τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τοῖς πλάτεσιν ἀστέρων βλέπει ib. 221. 29 et al.). Such a theory might well be
described as 'natural,' for it provides for the orbital distances on a principle which is reasonable enough in such a priori physics. "The principle," writes Professor Cook Wilson, "would be a sort of equable distribution of planetary mass, allowing the greater body more space. It would come to allowing the same average of linear dimension of planetary mass to each unit of distance between orbits throughout the system."

Another argument in support of this interpretation of Proclus' 'older' text may be derived from the treatise of Theo. Theo has our text of Plato (see on this subject p. 479 below), and introduces his quotation of the passage in these words: δηλοὶ δὲ τὴν τάξιν τῶν σφαιρῶν διὰ τε τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἀστρων ἐκάστου καὶ διὰ τοῦ χρώματος ἐκάστου καὶ ἐπὶ διὰ τοῦ τάχους τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ἑνναῖα τῷ παντὶ φορᾶς (143. 14 ff. Hiller).

It is clear from this sentence that Theo inferred the size of the different bodies from the breadth of the lips, so that he must have made the breadths of the planetary whorl-lips either equal or proportional to the diameters of the planets. That he interpreted them as equal is very unlikely, for he had before his mind in this part of his work the conception of orbital distances (see e.g. 141. 6), and could hardly have failed to remark on so extraordinary a peculiarity as the absence of any provision for representing those distances, if he really supposed that Plato had not represented them. It is the more improbable that Theo should have passed over in silence so strange a feature because he wrote at a time when the prevailing doctrine was that of a system of spheres whose radii were orbital distances from the centre (i.e. the Earth), and shews himself acquainted with this doctrine in other portions of his commentary, e.g. on pp. 181 ff. The more natural supposition therefore is that Theo, like Proclus, regarded the relationship between the breadth of the lips and the size of the planets as one of proportion and not of equality.

Finally, this interpretation of the 'older' reading throws light on some passages of Proclus' commentary which are otherwise obscure. In 219. 27 ff. παντελῶς τῶν κατ’ ἐκέινον τῶν χρόνων κτλ. (quoted above at the end of the second extract) Proclus implies that the astronomers of Plato's time made the depths of the planetary spheres dependent on the apparent sizes of the planets. Whether the implication itself is true or not, it is unlikely that Proclus would have imputed to any astronomers the complete neglect of orbital intervals, and the only interpretation of the 'older' reading which allows for these intervals is to make the breadth of the lips proportionate to the sizes of the planets. And in 219. 11 ff. (καὶ Ἑσυς οἱ ὀφθεῖς λέγοντες κτλ.) Proclus suggests that the 'older' reading was altered to our text in order to represent the differences between the planets in respect of apogee and perigee. The suggestion seems clearly to imply that he found the orbital distances of the planets represented in the 'older reading,' for "if the χαλή were only equal to the diameters of the planets, how could it be relevant to widen them to allow for apogee and perigee? Clearly it could only be relevant to the correction of a magnitude already representing differences of orbital distances" (Cook Wilson).
These considerations make it highly probable, if they do not absolutely prove, that Proclus' 'older reading' was understood to make the breadth of the different whorl-surfaces proportionate, and not equal, to the diameters of the planets.

We have now to consider the value and authority of this reading as compared with the text of our mss.

The one reading is described by Proclus as προτέρα καὶ ἀρχαιοτέρα, the other—that which I have adopted—as δευτέρα καὶ νεωτέρα, κρατοῦσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκωλασμένοις ἀντιγράφοις.

The word κεκωλασμένοις, which is a ἀπαξ εἰρημένον, can refer only to the arrangement of the ms in κόλα to facilitate study and reading aloud: see Dziatzko in Pauly-Wissowa iii p. 960. 27 and Birt Ant. Buchwesen pp. 18o ff. But as there seems to be no other evidence of the division of Plato's dialogues into κόλα (see Birt l.c.), Pitra's conjecture κεκωλασμένοις 'castigatis' 'corrected' 'edited' may be right.

If Proclus wrote κεκωλασμένοις, it would seem that a recension of Plato's text was made about his time, and the 'newer' reading deliberately adopted in place of that which had hitherto held the field. As this 'newer' reading is found in all our mss, we might even suppose that this recension originated the Archetype, from which according to Schanz (Stud. zur Gesch. d. Plat. Textes pp. 23—45), our mss are all descended, and which Schanz places not earlier than 400 A.D. But even if we should grant all these hypotheses, it by no means follows that the 'older' reading is that which Plato wrote. Against the possibility that the reading of our mss was a deliberate emendation on the part of the editors has to be set the rival possibility that it rested upon the authority of mss which were judged by them to be more trustworthy than the authorities for the vulgate text. We have no evidence as to the critical principles followed by the authors of the recension—if recension there was; and in the absence of such evidence, the question between the two readings must be determined by the internal probabilities.

The balance of probability is in favour of the reading of our mss, as will appear from the following considerations.

In the first place, our text was felt to be the lectio difficilior. This appears from the fact that Proclus found it difficult to discern a principle in the 'newer' reading (καὶ ἐνως οἱ οὖτως λέγοντες κτλ.), whereas the 'older' seemed to him easy and natural (ἡ δὲ προτέρα το αὐτοφυὲς ξέι).

Secondly, it is clear that, whichever text was the original one, it must have been altered into the other by deliberate emendation in order to satisfy some astronomical preconception. And it is much easier to conjecture why the 'newer' reading should have been changed into the 'older' than conversely.

Suppose, on the one hand, that the 'older' reading represents the truth. Why was it emended into our text? The motive cannot have been in order to reconcile the account of the planetary distances in the Republic with that which we find in the Timaeus; for the 'newer' reading makes the discrepancy between the two dialogues as great as
before. Or was it, as Proclus suggests, to make provision for the apogee and perigee of the planets? This is also improbable, because even a careless reader of the Republic (and, we may add, of the Timaeus) would hardly fail to see that Plato’s general conception of the celestial motions leaves no room for apogee and perigee; and on this account so violent a dislocation, even if it were once made, would be very unlikely to establish itself.

If we suppose, on the other hand, that our text is that which Plato himself wrote, a plausible account can be given of the origin of the ‘older’ reading. The theory that the breadths of the rims should be proportioned to the size of the planets was considered to be natural (ἡ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἔχει), whereas the existing text appeared difficult and perplexing: and hence the ‘emendation.’ Of this hypothesis we have strong prima facie confirmation in the treatise of Theo, who retains what (according to our supposition) was the original text, that of our mss, and nevertheless explains the breadths as depending on the size of the planets. Theo’s evidence thus supplies the missing link. The next step would be to alter the text in conformity with the explanation given (though not necessarily originated) by Theo: for if Theo’s explanation was once accepted, it would soon be felt that the order of magnitude of the heavenly bodies in the received text was absurd. The corruption may therefore be assigned with probability to the time between Theo and Proclus.

An advocate of Proclus’ ‘older’ reading must on the other hand suppose that Theo’s citation of Plato (p. 145 Hiller) has been tampered with. This is of course possible, but much less probable than the rival view.

Finally, the strongest argument in favour of our text is that it conforms to the numerical principle explained above (see pp. 473 ff.).

It is highly probable that any alteration of the original text would violate this principle, and in Proclus’ ‘older’ reading it is violated, for the order of breadth in the προτέρα γραφή is

\[1\ 7\ 8\ 6\ 4\ 3\ 2\ 5.\]

And it is in the last degree improbable that an emendation of the ‘older reading’ would obey the ‘rule of nines’ which holds good in the enumeration both of the colours and of the velocities of the heavenly bodies. As our text does obey this law, the probabilities are that it is no emendation, but proceeds from Plato himself.
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Paronomasia. See Assonance etc.


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Passive voice, noteworthy uses of 337 A, II 269, 581 E

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Plural number:—plural of abstract nouns 373 D, 511 B. See also Concord

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P repositions:—dropping in repeated idea of compound verb (e.g. εἰςαραφάνεω—αιραφάνεω) 336 E, 452 A, 533 A, cf. 608 A: force of, carried on from one sentence to another 428 C, perhaps from one word to another (ἐγμ-μαξίαν τε καὶ φλοκνίκιαν) 555 A, cf. 546 A: ideologically omitted, as in ἐν ἀσσαν ὥστι 402 A, 373 E, 421 A, 520 D, 526 A: do. in similes with ὥστε, ὅπερ and the like (e.g. ὥστε περί μνήσεως τῆς χάρας) 553 B, 414 E al.: other cases of omission 393 B (τῶν ἐν Ἰδακ καὶ ἄλγος ὄνοσα θαυμάζων) 526 D: repetition of 395 B, 618 A: used with adverbs (μέχρι, δεύτερο etc.) 586, 519 A, B, II 181

Prepositions, various remarks on:—ἀπὸ 365 E, confused with ἐπὶ 361 C: διὰ with acc. versus διὰ with gen. II 309 N 1; διὰ with acc. 410 B, 466 B, 563 B; with gen. (in διὰ τῶν ἄνδρων) II 375: διὰ and acc. confused with διὰ and gen. 562 B, 610 D: εἰς = 'in respect of,' with ref. to, 'as in tέλες εἰς 360 E, 495 B, 600 A; εἰς with acc. understood 580 E: εἶν εἰ σαντόν and εἶν εἰσάρυτε 574 E, in πετεία εἰς λόγους 487 C, in εἰν φαρακίου εἰδε 378 D: διὰ with gen. as in εἰ' εἰμι = 'in my case,' 475 A, 524 E al., as in τοὺς εἴπι τῶν
MIXED—READINGS

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παγμάτων 460 B; with dat. 342 A, 374 B, 455 E, 462 C (Λέγειν τι ἐπὶ τίνι, cf. 470 B); with acc. as in ἐπὶ πάντας 491 A, 508 C; force of ἐπὶ in compound verbs 372 B: κατά in compound verbs 401 E, 607 C: μετά 560 D: παρά with dat. 439 E; with acc. II 77, 514 A: περὶ 360 D (περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον λέγουν λέγων), 562 C (ἀγώνες περὶ ἄλληλων), anastrophe of 479 C, 531 B, often separated from its noun 598 C; with acc. 527 D: πρὸς with dat. in γλυκεσσαίᾳ or εἶναι πρὸς τινι 564 D, 567 A; with acc. = ad in ad normam 542 B, in musical sense (πρὸς αὐτὸν λακεῖν etc.) 397 B, in the phrase τίθεσαι τα δὲ παρὰ πρὸς 440 E; force of πρὸς in compound verbs 375 E, 521 D; adverbial πρὸς 559 A: σὺν rare in Attic, used by Plato in modal phrases, or to denote intimate connexion, especially in elevated passages 424 D, 518 C, used in quoting from a poet 407 A: pres. corrupted into fut. 408 C, 559 C: pres. subj. corrupted into aor. subj. 574 D

Proclus on the style of Plato 543 D, 595 B, 617 D


tion, and the individual pronouns in Index I

R

Readings adopted in the text of this edition, but not found in any of the collated mss of the Republic:

Reading adopted

Reading of Paris A

I 333 E ἐποιήσας (Schneider) ἐποιήσας

337 E αὐτῷ [εἰν] (Brems) αὐτῷ εἰν

349 B αὐδὲ τῆς <πράξεως τῆς> δι- αὐδὲ τῆς δικαλας

καλας (Adam)

II 358 E αὐθὺς τε τι (Adam) τὶ δν τε

359 A δοκεῖν (Ast) δοκεῖ

361 C ἀπ' (Ensebus) ὑπ'

364 C περὶ (Madvig) πέρι

', ἄδοντες (Mureitus) δίδωντες

377 B τόνῳ (H. Richards) τύπος

III 387 C τοις (Hertz) ποιεῖ καὶ ὁλεται

387 E διδότεαι, φέρει (Stallbaum) διδότεαι, φέρειν

388 C δ τέ (Leaf) δτε

390 A παρὰ πλεῖα (Adam) παραπλεῖαι

391 E οἱ Ζηνὸς (Bekker) Ζηνὸς

392 B γρηγοροὶ (Stallbaum) ἐξηγοροῦμεν

396 E ἀπλῆς διηγήσεως (Adam) ἄλλης διηγήσεως

398 A αὐτ' (Adam) οὐκ

401 C τις προσβάλη (Adam) τι προσβάλη

407 E ὃ τοιοῦτος ἦν καὶ αἱ παῖδες μεταχειρίζονται (Galen)

μεταχειρίζεται

ἀμφότεραι

καὶ ὁμαλὰ ἐκεῖνον

410 B καὶ καλέσασθαι (Schneider) καὶ ὁμαλὰ ἐκεῖνον

412 D καὶ ἐκεῖνον (Hermann) βουλομένη

IV 428 C βουλομένην (Heindorf) βουλομένη

Λ. P. II.

34
Reading adopted

IV 428 D ὑντῶν ἄν (Ast) ὑντῶν ἄν (Ast)
429 C αὐτῆς (Adam) αὐτῆς (Adam)
430 C μόνιμον (Stobaeus) μόνιμον (Stobaeus)
431 C παίζει (H. Wolf) παίζει (H. Wolf)
432 C μετρίως (H. Richards) μετρίως (H. Richards)
432 D λοι λοι (Adam) λοι λοι (Adam)
437 B ἄν ἄλληλοις (Baiter) ἄν ἄλληλοις (Baiter)
437 D ἐν λόγῳ (Cornarius) ἐν λόγῳ (Cornarius)
439 B πράττει (Ast) πράττει (Ast)
439 C ἐγγένεται (Schneider) ἐγγένεται (Schneider)
440 D ἡ (Ast) ἡ (Ast)
442 A προστάσετον (Bekker) προστάσετον (Bekker)
443 C ωφέλει (Ast) ωφέλει (Ast)

V 454 D λατρείων (Adam) λατρείων τῷ θυμῷ (Ast)
457 B γελοῖον (J. G. S. Schneider) γελοῖον σοφίας (Adam)
459 C ἡγούμεθα (Adam) ἡγούμεθα εἶναι (Adam)
461 B δι' ἄφθονον (Eusebius) δι' ἄφθονον (Eusebius)
461 C μηδὲ εὗ (Cobet) μηδὲ εὗ ζ' εὗ (μηδὲ ζ' εὗ Α')
462 C τῷ αὐτῷ (Wyttenbach) τῷ αὐτῷ (Wyttenbach)
468 A ἔλοσα (J. van Leeuwen) θέλουσι (J. van Leeuwen)
477 B αὐτήν τῷ (C. Schmidt) τῷ αὐτῇ (C. Schmidt)
478 A δοξάζει (Adam) δοξάζει (Adam)

VI 493 B ἐκάστας (van Prinsterer) ἐκάστας (van Prinsterer)
494 B παίσιν (de Geer) παίσιν (de Geer)
499 B καθήκον (Schleiermacher) καθήκον (Schleiermacher)
500 A τῷ οὐ (Baiter) τοί (Baiter)
501 D ϕύσει (Adam) ϕύσει (Adam)
503 C ἐπεται καὶ νεανίκοι τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοιας (Adam)

18 φύσεθαι (Adam)
504 A ἀλλοί (Orelli) ἀλλοί (Orelli)
504 E ἑφη (Ast) ἑφη (Ast)
507 B καὶ (Adam) καὶ (Adam)
508 E γιγνωσκομινην (Adam) γιγνωσκομινην (Adam)
510 O ἐτερον (Ast) ἐτερον (Ast)

VII 514 B αὐτοῖ (Hirschig) αὐτοῖ (Hirschig)
516 E ἄν αἵρεσιν (Baiter) ἄνα αἵρεσιν (Baiter)
517 A καὶ ἀσκητικῶν αἰ ἀσκητελειναι (Adam) καὶ ἀσκητελειναι, ἀσκητελεύναι αὐ (Adam)

532 A ὅμω (Ast) ὅμω (Ast)
532 B έτι ἄδιναμία (Iamblichus) έτι ἄδιναμία (Iamblichus)
533 A δει (Picinus) δει (Picinus)
537 E ἐκοσιετῶν (Schneider) ἐκοσιετῶν (Schneider)
544 B τῷ δ' αὐ, τῷ (Schneider) τῷ δ' αὐ (Schneider)

VIII 547 E κεκτημένη (Bekker, ? with v) κεκτημένη (Bekker, ? with v)
551 C ὅτουν (? Picinus) ὅτουν ἢ τινός (Picinus)
551 D ἀνάγκη (Ast) ἀνάγκη (Ast)
554 B ἐπιστημόντα καὶ ἐπίμα μάλιστα. ἐπιστημόντα καὶ ἐπίμα μάλιστα.

Eö (Schneider)
559 E ὄλγαρχίας — ὄλγορκαταί (Adam)
562 B δ (Adam) δ (Adam)
564 E βυλιτεί (Adam) βυλιτεί (Adam)
568 D καλ ὑ (Baiter) τά (Baiter)
568 E ἐφην ἐγώ (Adam) ἐφην δ' ἐγώ (Adam)
READINGS—VERB

Reading adopted
IX 577 D ἄνηρ (Campbell)
578 C τῷ τοιοῦτῳ (Adam)
580 D δὲ δὲ (Adam)
581 D τί οὐδεμία (Graser)
585 A τὸ ἅλυσων οὕτω πρὸς λύπην
(Schleiermacher)
585 C δὲλ ἀνυμοίου (Adam)
'' ἡ ἐπιστήμη (Adam)
588 A πλεον (Adam)
591 D φανεῖται (Iamblichus)
x 600 D ὀνόμα (Matthäi)
603 C ἡ (Ast)
604 D ἑατρικί τηρηματίαν (Stobaeus)
606 C ἰ (Schneider)
607 B Ναυ (Herwerden)
'' κράτων (Adam)
608 A ἄρχοσόμεθα (Adam)
610 A δρόθησα (Stephanus)
615 C αὐτόχειρος (Ast)

Recurrence of the same word at the end of two successive clauses (e.g. εἰναί, — εἰναί) 518 B, 511 E, 614 A, 621 B

Redundancy, pleonasm, fulness of expression etc., features of Plato’s style:—
329 C, 337 D, 339 A, 341 C, 358 A,
374 D, 421 D, 432 C, 434 C, 462 C,
472 C, I 356, 416 D, 490 A, 505 B,
517 A, 534 A, 555 B, 574 D, 580 A,
583 C, 587 E, 604 A, 618 C

Repetition of a word, unnecessary 601 A.
See also Index I ἐφη, ἡ δ' δ', ἡν δ', ἐγώ, ὡς
Replies, inexactness in 465 E al., 408 D,
577 B

Revision, imperfect, possible instances of
341 D, 413 C, 549 D, 558 A, cf. II 313 F.
Rhythm as an element of ὑπο 560 B:
some instances of, in Plato’s style 401 C,
432 A, 545 C ff., 560 B, D, E, 573 D

S
Sarcasm 568 A: expressed by participial apposition 498 A
Satire 474 D, E, 529 B, C, 557 E, 568 A
Sigmatism 399 D
Simile treated as a reality 515 E
Singual number, generic use of 510 D,
580 A, B. See also Concord
Sound answering to sense 399 D, 432 A
Style, the, of Plato, not a mere copy of the vernacular, but a literary language
330 B: traces of a universal style, or dialect (κοινὴ διάλεκτος), in the fifth century, ib.
Subject:—change of 414 D, 492 C: latet in

antegresis 329 C, 580 D: supplied from a cognate word 345 A
Subjunctive:—after εl 579 D: after δς 606 C: governed by ὁδε in a previous sentence 540 E: sometimes combined with fut. ind. after δοός 591 B: horatory, in 1st person 372 E: do. after λῆγε 457 C: do. with ὡς ἦκε 473 B: subj. corrupted into ind. II 412: do. into opt. 472 D, II 53. See also Index I δοός, ὡς
Superlative, idiomatic use of 472 E
Symmetry in arrangement of arguments
332 B. See also Chiasmus

T
Tautology. See Redundancy
Tenses. See Present tense, Future tense etc.
Terminology, Plato’s 508 E, 533 D
Transition from a faculty or part of the individual to the individual himself
(e.g. ἐ—ὑπάρχει διανοια oἷν τὲ ὡς τοι ὑπήρ): 486 A, 606 B, cf. 573 B, 620 B

V
Verb:—ellipse of 510 B, 515 B, 531 E,
551 C, 582 C, 585 D, see also Copula, θέτεν omitted with ὡς ποίην ἐλ et al. and the like 368 D: one verb sometimes does double duty e.g. δοκεῖ 334 B, 493 A, φανεῖται 517 B, προσήκειν ἐλ ἐπὶ 528 B: verb supplied from cognate noun 435 B: positive supplied from negative verb
374 B, cf. 532 B, C
Verbals in -&omicron;os:—construction of 400 D, 421 C, 460 B, 467 C: combined with διαν 535 A

W
Words, supply of 475 E, 507 D, 508 D, 589 E, 611 C: words supplied from part

of a preceding word (e.g. μθος from μθοροθ) 377 C, cf. 421 E. See also Index I δει

Z
Zeugma 330 = 344 B, 367 D, 423 E, II 184