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THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

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ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONS
BOOKS VI-VIII—TEXT AND NOTES

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THE CONSTITUTIONS DEALT WITH
BY ARISTOTLE IN THE POLITICS.

We must not expect to find in the last three Books of the Politics a systematic description of the various forms of constitution dealt with in them and a complete estimate of their strength and weakness, their merits and defects. The object of these Books is rather a practical object, to teach statesmen how to frame, amend, and administer each constitution so that it may last. Aristotle is naturally led in the course of his inquiries on this subject to mark off the various forms and sub-forms of constitution from each other, and incidentally to throw much light on their nature and tendencies, but his paramount object is a practical object, to give guidance to statesmen, not to set before us a detailed picture of each constitution and its working. We gather from what he tells us that statesmen were not aware how many sub-forms of each constitution existed, and that consequently they committed errors both in introducing and in amending constitutions. They probably confounded the sub-forms, and gave one of them institutions appropriate to another. We gather also that they often introduced constitutions and sub-forms of constitution where they were out of place; that they often sought rather to make the constitutions they framed pronounced examples of their type than to make them durable; and that they commonly did not attempt to create by education and habituation an ethos favourable to the main-
tenance of the constitution. Aristotle seeks to enable statesmen to avoid all these errors. His object is to make the study of constitutions more thorough and detailed and more practically useful than it had been.

It has been said (vol. i. p. 485) that the Politics is in part a Statesman's Manual. The last three Books constitute such a Manual in an especial degree. Yet they are not a complete Statesman's Manual. They afford guidance both to the framers of constitutions and to administrators, but the guidance which they afford to administrators is mainly limited to one problem—how to administer the State so as to make the constitution last. Aristotle does not tell administrators in them how to make government efficient; he studies rather how to satisfy all classes of citizens or most of them, for his object is to make the constitution last. His treatment, indeed, even of the question to which he does address himself is incomplete. For instance, he says but little as to the way in which difficulties arising from differences of race among the citizens should be dealt with. He writes with a special view to the particular perils to which the Greek City-State was most exposed—those arising from the jealousies and discords of classes. He writes for States in which the relations between the rich and the poor were bad, and asks how constitutions are to be made durable where that is the case.

At the head of Aristotle's list of constitutions stand the two forms—the absolute kingship and the best kind of aristocracy—in which supreme power rests with men of fully equipped virtue, and the aim of the constitution is the realization of the most desirable life, the life which is lived in accordance with virtue—virtue not of one kind only, but of all—and with a full equipment of external and bodily goods. No constitution could fully satisfy Aristotle which stopped short of this aim. Holding as he did that the polis existed to guide men to the life of full virtue and happiness, he could not fail to hold that the constitution and laws of the polis must place supreme
power in the hands of men able and purposed to rule and be ruled in such a way as to enable the *polis* to discharge this function.

The absolute kingship exists where a man or a family of surpassing virtue and political ability (3. 13. 1284a 3 sqq.: 4 (7). 3. 1325b 10 sqq.) rules over men capable of being ruled with a view to the most desirable life, who gladly accept his or their rule.

Of the best kind of aristocracy there are, it would seem, two varieties:—

1. There is the variety in which the same men always rule, the ruled being always ruled and never succeeding to rule. Here the rulers must be capable of ruling with a view to the most desirable life, and the ruled must be capable of being ruled as freemen should be ruled with a view to the same end. This is the form described in 3. 17–18. We do not learn whether the rulers in this form are hereditary or elected by the ruled, nor whether they are controlled by law.

2. There is the variety in which the ruled succeed to rule on their attainment of a certain age and after a long period of military service, preceded by a careful education. This is the form described in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books. Here, as in the first-named variety, the rulers are capable of ruling, and the ruled of being ruled, with a view to the most desirable life. Both rulers and ruled are good men as well as good citizens, though the ruled are not good citizens and good men in the fullest sense till they reach the age at which they acquire moral prudence and become rulers. In this variety, as in the other, the rulers are apparently conceived by Aristotle as not numerous—not a multitude (πληθος). When a multitude rules for the common good, a polity exists, not an aristocracy (3. 7. 1279a 37 sqq.), and though the ruling class rules for the common good, it does not apparently rule with a view to the most desirable life.

Next to these ideal constitutions, but next after a great
interval, come constitutions in which rule is in the hands not indeed of men possessed of transcendent virtue and a full equipment of external and bodily goods and ruling with a view to the most desirable life, but of men of virtue whose rule is based on desert and is exercised for the common advantage of the citizens. Under this head fall (1) the forms of kingship other than the absolute form, and (2) the so-called aristocracies, with the exception of that form of the so-called aristocracy in which the elements mingled are merely wealth and free birth, and virtue is not one of them.

Kingship other than the absolute kingship is described by Aristotle in the Politics as a form in which one man rules with high and important powers (μετεξώνων κυρία, 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5 sq.) and rules for the common good and over willing subjects. It may be either hereditary (κατὰ γένος) or not (this is implied by the mention of αἱ κατὰ γένος βασιλείαι in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 sq.). It need not be for life. An elective sole ruler elected for only a few months is regarded by Aristotle as a king if his powers are large and his rule is willingly accepted by his subjects. In the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 10. 1295 a 7 sqq.) Aristotle denies the name of kingship to monarchies in which the monarch, though he rules in accordance with law and over willing subjects, rules despotically and as he pleases (κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην), and classes such monarchies as tyrannies, and even in the Third he does not seem quite certain that they should be called kingships, though he there classes them as such. Yet he classes the absolute kingship as a kingship, though the absolute king rules as he pleases (κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βουλήν, 3. 16. 1287 a 1). Kingship, we are told in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book, but not, I think, elsewhere in the Politics, is based on desert (κατ' ἄξιαν). The king, or in hereditary kingships the founder of the kingship, has won his throne by desert. He has been made king by the people because of his virtue or the virtue of his family, or else in return for benefits conferred, or in return for benefits conferred and the power to confer them. In the Third Book,
However (3. 14. 1285 b 4 sqq.), not all kingships are traced to this origin, but only the kingship of the heroic times. Aristotle was no doubt led to trace kingship, and especially the kingship of the heroic times, to this illustrious origin by the authority of Homer and of Greek historical tradition (see notes on 1285 b 6, 7). The halo with which he invests kingship, however, often did not belong to it. He himself tells us that in hereditary kingships the kings were frequently contemptible men (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 sqq.). Elsewhere (2. II. 1272 b 40 sqq.) he implies that not a few of the Lacedaemonian kings were insignificant men. Stories incidentally told by him of the Persian and Macedonian courts place them in an unfavourable light. Are contemptible or insignificant or vicious rulers by virtue of desert, and do they rule for the common good? If not, are they kings? Aristotle does not consider this question.

Aristotle’s account of kingship leaves us in the dark about many things. He nowhere even distinguishes between kingship in a City-State and kingship in a nation. Of the kingships of the nations bordering on Greece he tells us little. We do not hear much from him about the Macedonian or Molossian kingships, and he makes no mention of those of Thrace and Illyria. We should have been glad to learn how the Macedonian and Molossian kingships were administered. A kingship which governs through sub-kings, or hereditary chiefs of any kind, is very different from a kingship which governs through non-hereditary officials appointed by itself. We are told (3. 16. 1287 b 30 sq.) that kings made their friends partners in rule, and this statement is probably based both on Homer and on historical fact (see note on 1287 b 30). Were these ‘friends’ ever hereditary sub-kings? It is not even clear under which of Aristotle’s kinds of kingship the Macedonian and Molossian kingships fall.

One reason why Aristotle’s account of the actually existing forms of kingship is rather cursory is that he studies them in the Third Book on his way to the study
of absolute kingship, and in the Seventh (old Fifth) on his way to the study of tyranny.

Perhaps the best of his sayings about kingship is that 'the king is ideally a guard set to see that the rich suffer no wrong and the demos no insolence or outrage' (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.).

If it is doubtful whether kingship, or at any rate hereditary kingship, was always based on desert and whether it always ruled for the common good, the same doubt arises as to the so-called aristocracies. These so-called aristocracies stand on different levels.

1. In some of them not only was account taken of virtue as well as of free birth in the distribution of political power, but the promotion of virtue was made a matter of public concern (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). This was the case in the Lacedaemonian aristocracy, though we are told that it cared for only one kind of virtue, military virtue, and that it valued military virtue not for its own sake, but because it was thought to be productive of external goods and of empire (2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq.: 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40 sqq.).

2. There were so-called aristocracies in which the promotion of virtue was not made a matter of public concern, but account was taken of virtue in appointments to office, and the constitution had regard to virtue as well as to wealth and free birth. The Carthaginian aristocracy seems to have belonged to this class, though it is said to have honoured virtue less than wealth (2. 11. 1273 a 41 sqq.).

3. There were so-called aristocracies in which account was not taken of virtue in the distribution of political power, but only of wealth and free birth (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20 sqq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.). So-called aristocracies of this type differed from polities only in inclining more to oligarchy than polities did.

Even in those so-called aristocracies which belonged to the first of these three classes, much more in those comprised in the second, the kind of virtue for which the State cared was only virtue relative to the constitution, not absolute virtue (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 6 sq.); and we note that the
deviation-forms of constitution are advised by Aristotle to take account of virtue relative to the constitution in elections to office (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.). Are the so-called aristocracies, then, merely on the same level as the deviation-forms in this matter? No: virtue relative to the constitution is no doubt of a higher type in them than in the deviation-forms. One defect, however, seems to attach to all forms of the so-called aristocracy. The notables were indulged in them, and were allowed to encroach on the rights of other classes (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sqq.)

Notwithstanding this, Aristotle evidently regards all forms of the so-called aristocracy as normal constitutions, and therefore as existing for the common good of all the citizens. He probably thought that those in which account was taken of virtue in the distribution of political power, and still more those which made the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern, took the best security for government with a view to the common good; while those which took account only of wealth and free birth could at any rate plead that they associated more classes than one in power, and that in them the constitution was not dominated, as it was in the deviation-forms, by a single class ruling in its own interest. The same thing, however, might be said of the polity; and so-called aristocracies of this last type could claim no superiority over the polity. They were, indeed, more insecure than the polity, for they gave a superior share of power to the rich, a class at once weaker than the many and therefore less able to hold its own, and less inclined to rest content with the share awarded to it (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 12 sqq.).

If we ask how the so-called aristocracy is organized, we shall find that the same eclectic methods are to be followed in organizing it as in organizing a polity (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 1 Aristotel nowhere says that the bitter feuds which often arose within the ruling class in oligarchies, and did so much to weaken it, arose also in the so-called aristocracy; but he does not explain why they were absent in it, if absent they were.
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10 sqq.). It is oligarchical to appoint to magistracies by election, and democratic not to require a property-qualification; hence it is suitable to an aristocracy to combine the two systems, and to appoint by election without requiring a property-qualification (ibid.) 1. In democracy, again, all appoint to the magistracies out of all, in oligarchy some out of some; hence in an aristocracy all will appoint out of some, or some out of all (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 4 sq.: cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2 sqq.) 2. So again, an aristocracy will award office to men of virtue (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq.: 3. 5. 1278 a 18 sqq.), or at any rate to the notables (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq.), but it will divide deliberative and judicial authority between all and some (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.) 3. Aristotle does not explain why it is characteristic of aristocracy not to appoint to office by lot or to pay office-holders (2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.), but the reason probably is that to appoint to office by lot runs counter to the principle of appointing to office for virtue, while the payment of office-holders savours of democracy (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35 sqq.).

Aristocracy shows the same leaning to a midway course in its choice of a site for the city. While oligarchy favours a single lofty acropolis, and democracy a level site, aristocracy avoids both these extremes and favours a site comprising more strong places than one (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 17 sqq.). It is less easy to say why it is more suitable to an aristocracy to give certain magistracies the power

1 Thus, when in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6 sqq. and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. constitutions based on a property-qualification are referred to, polities and oligarchies are mentioned, but nothing is said of aristocracies. Yet that property-qualifications for office existed in some aristocracies appears from the reference to the aristocracy of Thurii in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27 sqq.

2 But though it is suitable to aristocracy that some should appoint the magistrates out of all, it appears from 2. 11. 1273 a 13 sqq. that to make powerful magistracies like the Pentarchies at Carthage self-elective is suitable to oligarchy, not to aristocracy.

3 It appears, however, from 2. 11. 1273 a 4 sqq. that an aristocracy goes too far in a democratic direction when it gives the assembly not merely the right to have decisions of the magistrates communicated to it, but the right to decide questions, and allows any one who pleases to speak in opposition to the proposals of the magistrates.
to try all lawsuits, as was done at Carthage, than to allow some suits to be tried by one magistracy and others by another, as at Sparta (2. 11. 1273 a 19 sq.).

The polity is described by Aristotle as a mixture of oligarchy and democracy (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 33 sq.), of wealth and free birth, and of the rich and the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 16 sq., 22 sq.). We naturally ask how it is that the mixture of two deviation-forms, oligarchy and democracy, results in a normal constitution. Would a mixture of all the three deviation-forms, oligarchy democracy and tyranny, result in a normal constitution? Apparently not. The badness of tyranny is said (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sqq.) to be due to the fact that it is a mixture of the worst points of extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy. The reason why the mixture of oligarchy and democracy in polity results in a normal form is that it mixes them in a special way. It fuses them in such a manner as to avoid the excesses and the one-sidedness of both, and to hit the mean between them (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.): if it borrows an institution from oligarchy, it borrows another from democracy to counterbalance it; if it gives an advantage to the rich with one hand, it gives an advantage to the poor with the other. It makes the moderately well-to-do class the arbitrator between the rich and the poor, and gives this class supremacy. Aristotle regards it as well fitted for rule, seeing that it is more ready to be guided by reason than the very rich and the very poor, and is free from the insolence of the former class and the petty misdoing of the latter; it is capable, unlike them, of both ruling and being ruled as freemen should be ruled.

We have seen that Aristotle describes the polity as a mixture of the rich and the poor. Is it really so? Is it not rather a mixture of two constitutions, oligarchy and democracy, than the association of rich and poor in rule? Does it give any power to the poor? If we press the account of polity which we find in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sq., where we are told that the polity should admit only the
possessors of heavy arms to a share of political power, we shall doubt how far it gave power to any poorer class than the possessors of heavy arms; but then it would seem from 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 36 sqq., that in a polity the poor would share at any rate in judicial functions. It is evident also from 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 38, προστιθέμενον γὰρ (τὸ μέσον) ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν καὶ κωλύει γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολὰς, that the poor are conceived by Aristotle to possess considerable power in a polity and to play an active part, the moderately well-to-do class giving its support to them or to the rich as it thinks fit. The extent of the power of the poor in a polity would evidently depend on the amount of the property-qualification on which the possession of political rights was made to depend; and as this would vary (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 2 sqq.), the polity would also vary in character, in some cases being more and in others less democratic. In 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10 we read of 'aristocratical polities'. A polity in which the ruling class consisted almost entirely of the moderately well-to-do would evidently differ much from one in which it included many poor. One in which the moderately well-to-do class was more numerous than rich and poor put together would also differ from one in which it was only more numerous than one or other of these classes 1. A numerous moderately well-to-do class was a guarantee for the durability of a polity. A polity would be all the better if the many were not only agricultural or pastoral by pursuit, but also lived at a distance from the central city, so that meetings of the assembly would not be frequent (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.).

Aristotle evidently takes it for granted that the moderately well-to-do class in a polity would hold together and act as a body, but is it not likely that it would be torn asunder, one section of it siding with the rich and the other with the poor? If this happened, it would obviously be

1 The moderately well-to-do citizens may well have been more numerous than the poorer citizens, or even than the rich and the poor put together, in more Greek States than we might expect, for in ancient Greece a large part of the working class consisted of slaves and metoeci, who formed no part of the citizen-body.
unable to exercise the controlling influence which Aristotle counts on its exercising. Is it certain that, if it held together, it would rule for the common good? Would not the moderately well-to-do class, no less than the rich and the poor, have sectional interests of its own and rule more or less with a view to them? Aristotle himself implies in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sqq. that the possession of a moderate amount of property is no security for well-controlled desires in the absence of a good system of education. We hear nothing of this in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book, though in the Seventh (old Fifth) we meet with somewhat similar teaching again (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.).

The institutions of a polity have been studied in vol. i. p. 508 sqq. One point should be noticed in connexion with them which has escaped mention there. In a polity the few (Aristotle probably means the magistrates) had a final voice in rejecting measures proposed to them, but not in voting affirmative resolutions. Such resolutions became valid only when they had received the assent of the many, or, in other words, of the assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 38 sqq.).

The so-called aristocracies and the polity are mixed constitutions. Aristotle means by a mixed constitution a mixture of two or more constitutions, i.e. of the principles characteristic of each (virtue, wealth, free birth), or of institutions characteristic of each, and therefore a constitution which associates two or more classes in supreme power.

His best constitution in its two forms, the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy, is not a mixed constitution, but his second-best constitutions are so. He appears to hold that if rulers of transcendent virtue are not obtainable, the next best thing is to place supreme power in the hands of the good, the rich, and the free-born mixed aristocracies’ and ‘well-mixed polities’; we shall not be wrong if we use it in giving an account of his views.

1 Aristotle nowhere uses the exact phrase ‘mixed constitutions’, but as he speaks of ‘mixing the constitution’ and of ‘well-mixed aristocracies’ and ‘well-mixed polities’, we shall not be wrong if we use it in giving an account of his views.
(6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19 sqq.), and the next best thing to that is to place it in the hands of the rich and the free-born, guided by the midway class. If supreme power is given to the rich and the free-born thus guided, it should be divided fairly between them, so that the advantages of the constitution may not be monopolized by one of the two classes (6 (4). 13. 1297 a 38 sqq.). The constitution will then be a broad and equal constitution \((κωνί καὶ ἵση πολιτεία, 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sq.),\) and the fairer it is, the more durable it will be (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 6 sq.).

It is not quite clear whether the \(συμβασμοὶ\) described in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq. are regarded by Aristotle as mixed constitutions. They are constitutions in which the three departments of the State, the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial, are not organized harmoniously, one of them, for instance, being aristocratically organized and the other two oligarchically or \textit{vice versa}, or some similar disharmony existing between the three departments. Perhaps they are to be considered mixed constitutions, for they combine institutions characteristic of more forms of constitution than one.

The milder forms of oligarchy are described by Aristotle as ‘well-mixed’ (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 35), because they were less narrow than the extreme form, and he would presumably apply the same epithet to the milder forms of democracy, but it is not likely that he regarded these forms of oligarchy and democracy as mixed constitutions.

Aristotle is content with any mixed constitution which gives a fair share of power to the three classes, the good, the rich, and the poor, or to the rich, poor, and \(μέσοι\). More than this he does not ask. The inquirers mentioned by him in 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. had held that the best constitution was a mixture of all constitutions, and Polybius praises (6. 3. 7) a mixture of all normal constitutions, or in other words of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. Aristotle does not accept either view. He does not insist that his mixed constitution should contain a monarchical
element (see vol. i. p. 264 sq.). Polybius (6. 10), followed by Cicero (De Rep. i. 45. 69), had held that a constitution composed of his three normal constitutions is free from the tendency to degenerate which besets the three normal constitutions when unmixed. In such a constitution, according to him, the king is checked by the demos and the demos by the few, and the whole fabric escapes degeneracy. Aristotle knows nothing of this. He holds that a well-framed mixed constitution is durable 1 not for the reason assigned by Polybius and Cicero, but because its internal equilibrium is perfect; it contents all classes by giving them a share of power, so that no one of them wishes for another constitution in its place (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 34 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 40 sqq. and 2. 9. 1270 b 21 sqq.).

We now pass on to the deviation-forms. Aristotle seeks to make them moderate and durable, or where they cannot be moderate, as little extreme as possible. A constitution might be tolerable even though it gave supremacy to a single class ruling for its own advantage, or to a single individual ruling in the same way. It might be dominated by the rich or the poor, but not so dominated as to deprive the less favoured class of all power and all advantage.

Aristotle evidently regards the deviation-forms as at their best when rule is least monopolized by the ruling class or individual and least exercised for the exclusive advantage of that class or individual. Oligarchy and democracy are according to him at their worst when they most nearly approach monarchy and cast off the rule of law, and this happens in a democracy when the ruling class is so poor as to be supported by State-pay and in an

1 When he implies in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 3 sqq. that aristocracies are unsafe constitutions, he probably refers to that variety of the so-called aristocracy which differs from the polity only in inclining towards oligarchy. Tacitus denied that the mixed constitution is durable (Ann. 4. 33; cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt: decl. ex iis et consociata rei publicae forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest), but the mixed constitution he has in view is evidently that of Polybius, not that of Aristotle.
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oligarchy when the ruling class is especially small and rich. Under such circumstances the ruling class has abundance of leisure, in a democracy because it has no property to distract its attention from politics, and in an oligarchy because the property of its members is so large that they can afford to neglect it. The richer and fewer the oligarchs become in an oligarchy, and the poorer and more numerous and less pure in extraction the demos becomes in a democracy, the more the ruling class claims to have everything its own way and to throw off the control of law.

Thus the more the ruling class in oligarchy and democracy approaches the mean in the amount of its property, the better and the less exacting it is, and the more ready to allow the less favoured class some share of power and advantage. Aristotle has, in fact, in the polity, in which the moderately well-to-do class rules, a standard for estimating the merits of the varieties of oligarchy and democracy (6 (4). 11. 1296 b 4 sqq.). Those varieties are the best which most nearly approach the polity. He has no faith in the rule of the very rich or the very poor; he prefers those oligarchies and democracies in which the ruling class most nearly resembles the moderately well-to-do class. It is evident that Aristotle's confidence in this class influences his estimate of the comparative merits of the varieties of oligarchy and democracy.

The question, however, may be raised, whether the badness of oligarchy and democracy is as closely connected as Aristotle thinks with the pecuniary circumstances of the ruling class. He himself mentions the case of an oligarchy at Erythrae, that of the Basilidae, in which a few, presumably very rich, men ruled well (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq.). The rule of a party-club, or of a handful of adventurers, revolutionists (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18 sq.), condottieri (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or returned exiles, would surely be worse than the rule of a few very rich men. And so again, bad as the rule of a pauper demos may be, the rule of a demos infuriated by oppression and elated by victory is probably worse. Aristotle no doubt would not
THE KINDS OF OLIGARCHY.

claim for his scale of oligarchies and democracies more than a broad and general truth.

OLIGARCHY.

Oligarchy according to the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.) is always the rule of a minority; in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq., however, it is said to exist whether the ruling class is a majority or a minority, if only this class rules because of its wealth.

Aristotle was not the first to recognize more kinds than one of oligarchy. The Theban orator in Thuc. 3. 62. 4 had already distinguished between an ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος and a δυνατεία, and Plato (Polit. 301 A) had already marked off oligarchy controlled by law, which he calls aristocracy, from oligarchy uncontrolled by law. Aristotle goes farther in the same direction. He describes the kinds of oligarchy in the fifth and sixth chapters of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book and elsewhere as follows:—

1. The first kind.

In this kind the property-qualification for office is not high, though high enough to exclude the poor, who are in a majority, from office. A distinction is made between the ‘merely necessary’ (ἄναγκαί) offices and the ‘more supreme’ ones (κυριώτεραι), and the property-qualification for the former is fixed at a lower amount than for the latter (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq.)—such an amount as will admit to political rights a sufficient number of persons belonging to the demos to make the privileged class stronger than those outside it. The acquisition of this property-qualification entitles to admission to the privileged class, no other condition being imposed, such as abstinence for a certain period from trading or industrial occupations or election by the privileged class. It would seem from 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq. that the deliberative in this kind of oligarchy would be an elective body, accessible to all possessing a comparatively moderate property-qualification and no further condition being imposed. But might it not also be a gathering of the whole privileged class, not an
elective body? No information is given us as to the nature of the judicial authority in this kind of oligarchy, but probably all members of the privileged class would have the right to serve on dicasteries. It would seem that in some oligarchies both rich and poor were eligible as members of dicasteries, though the rich were often forced by fines to attend and the poor were not, but stratagems of this nature would hardly be employed in a well-organized oligarchy of the first type.

The merits of this kind of oligarchy are (1) that a large proportion of the privileged class, like the ruling class in a polity, is neither very rich nor very poor, and therefore is free from the defects attaching to the very rich and very poor; (2) that admission to the privileged class is made comparatively easy; (3) that the privileged class is stronger, though less numerous, than those outside it; (4) that it is too numerous and too much occupied with the care of its property to throw off the control of law; (5) that, though the chief offices fall to the richer members of the privileged class, none of its members are without a share of political rights, all of them having access to the less important offices and the right of electing to the principal ones, while membership of the deliberative, and probably of the dicasteries, is open to all. Its main weakness is that the poor, though more numerous than the privileged class, are excluded not only from all offices (which is dangerous: see 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sqq.), but also from deliberative and judicial authority. Aristotle would probably recommend that they should be allowed a share of deliberative authority in one or other of the ways described by him in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq. Another of its weaknesses is that it is exposed to the risks to which all oligarchies based on a property-qualification were exposed (see note on 1306 b 6). For other weaknesses attaching to it see notes on 1305 b 30 and 1320 b 19.

The question may be raised, is the first kind of oligarchy oligarchy at all, if oligarchy is the rule of the few and the rich? It is rather the rule of a large well-to-do minority—a
THE KINDS OF OLIGARCHY.

fairly numerous bourgeoísie—than the rule of the few and the rich.

2. The second kind.

In this the privileged class is composed of richer men and is less numerous, a high property-qualification being apparently required for all offices, and admission to its ranks being made more difficult in other ways also, election by the privileged class being exacted in addition to the possession of the property-qualification. The privileged class, again, may elect the new members either from all possessing the property-qualification or from a specified section of them. The former plan has something aristocratic about it, the latter is more fully oligarchical.

In this kind of oligarchy supreme power rests with a small and very rich class which does not comprise all the very rich, inasmuch as the mere possession of the high property-qualification does not give admission to it, but election by the privileged class is also required. Its exclusion of a certain number of very rich men cannot fail to make it insecure. The privileged class in it also has the faults of a very rich class and cannot easily be made stronger than those outside it; the difficulty of obtaining access to it is a further defect; yet it is not small and rich enough to rule without law.

Aristotle does not include in his list of oligarchies a kind intermediate between the first and the second, one in which the property-qualification for office is high, but membership of the privileged class is open to any one who acquires it, no further condition being imposed.

3. The third kind.

In this the privileged class is still smaller and richer and more inaccessible, no one being admitted to it from outside, but sons succeeding fathers in their offices when they die. Yet even in this kind the law rules.

4. The fourth kind.

The fourth and last kind of oligarchy has all the characteristics of the third, and this in addition that the law no longer rules.
It should be added that the account given in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq. of the modifications of the deliberative in the various kinds of oligarchy is not quite in harmony with the list of oligarchies given in 6 (4). 5–6.

The four kinds of oligarchy enumerated by Aristotle are rather grades of intensity than kinds. They represent the steps by which in Aristotle's view oligarchy becomes more and more extreme. Incidental notices in the Politics enable us to construct a quite different list of the various forms assumed by Greek oligarchy.

1. First we have the form of oligarchy in which rule rested with a single gens—usually the royal gens. To this type belong the oligarchies of the Bacchiadae at Corinth and the Basilidae at Erythrae. When kingship fell or was reduced to sacred functions, the change often only meant that an annual magistrate took the place of the king, this magistrate being selected by the royal gens from its own members. Supremacy in the State passed, in fact, from the king to the royal gens.

2. There were oligarchies in which rule rested not with one gens only, but with a plurality of gentes, e.g. that of the Eupatridae at Athens. Compare the rule of the patricians at Rome. Aristotle does not appear to notice this kind of oligarchy.

3. There were oligarchies in which rule rested with the heads of the tribes. The oligarchy at Epidamnus mentioned in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21 sqq. seems to have been of this type.

4. There were oligarchies of knights (ιππείς) or rearers of horses (ιπποτρόφοι), i.e. of the richest families. In these rule perhaps rested not with all the families belonging to certain gentes or tribes, but with the richest of them. Oligarchies of γεωμοροι, or large landowners, may have been somewhat akin to these.

5. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to

1 Mr. L. Whibley, in his excellent essay on 'Greek Oligarchies, their character and organization', has anticipated me in distinguishing most of these varieties.
the original settlers and their descendants. In some colonies founded at a specially early date we find a royal gens in possession of supreme power (e.g. at Erythrae the Basilidae), but in colonies founded later (e.g. in Thera and at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf) office was accessible to all the original settlers and their descendants, not exclusively to the members of a royal gens. The descendants of the original settlers possessed a certain religious prestige, because it was from their ranks that the priests of the oldest worships were taken (Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 36 sqq.: see note on 1290 b 12). They had done much for the colony in its early and more struggling days, and it is not wonderful that they claimed a monopoly of office, though perhaps they were hardly wise in doing so. Their claim was analogous to that made on behalf of citizens who could count three generations of ancestors, but it went beyond that.

6. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to the descendants of particular individuals, not however to the descendants of the original settlers, but to those of persons who on their return from exile had fought against and conquered the demos (e.g. the oligarchy at Megara referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq.). Oligarchies of this kind rested on a far more invidious basis than those in which the descendants of the original settlers formed the ruling class.

7. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to a fixed number of persons (e.g. 600 or 1000). The fixing of the number of the privileged class prevented these oligarchies from changing into polities or democracies on the one hand, and into narrow oligarchies on the other. Their nature would vary according to the conditions under which access was obtained to the privileged class. If, as will often have happened, the right of co-opting new members rested with the privileged class, it might be allowed to co-opt any one it pleased; or its choice might be confined to certain tribes gentes or families, or to those possessed of a given property-qualification, or might be
subject to some other restriction. Oligarchies of this kind had the advantage that an assembly of the privileged class would probably exist in them, in addition to the smaller body which managed the current business of the State. The powers of this assembly would vary; at Massalia the assembly of the 600 timuchi apparently received envoys (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200), and may have had the right of concluding treaties of peace and alliance and of deciding questions of war and peace; but, whatever its powers were, an assembly of this kind must have served to some extent as a check on the governing council and the magistrates.

8. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to persons possessing a certain property-qualification, high or low, though never so low that the privileged class would be more numerous than the non-privileged (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.). In these oligarchies the possession of the property-qualification might or might not be the sole condition of access to office. Where it was not the sole condition, access to office might be made dependent in part on membership of certain tribes, gentes, or families, or on inclusion in a list framed by the privileged class. Where it was the sole condition, and the property-qualification was not high, or there were two property-qualifications—a high one for the major and a lower one for the minor offices—the first or most moderate kind of oligarchy would exist, nearly approaching polity. This kind of oligarchy has already been described. The fact that oligarchy in Greece sometimes assumed a form so moderate—we should not find many oligarchies of this type in mediaeval or modern Europe—shows that it was not unaffected by influences akin to those which moulded Greek democracy.

9. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to the members of certain clubs. A club was often grouped round a single individual; hence the power of individuals was great in this form of oligarchy. The decadarchies of Lysander were apparently of this type. The right of electing to the magistracies in these oligarchies would probably in
most cases rest with the class which was eligible to them, the members of the clubs (see note on 1305 b 30).

10. There were oligarchies in which eligibility to the magistracies was confined to a small class, to persons possessing a high property-qualification, or to the members of certain clubs, but the demos or the hoplites had the right to elect to them (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). Akin to these were oligarchies in which the dicasteries were recruited from a wider class than that which had access to office (1305 b 34 sqq.). As to the special perils to which oligarchies of these two types were exposed, see 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 sqq.

11. There were δυναστείαι, hereditary oligarchies in which the ruling class was very small and ruled uncontrolled by law. It might be composed of very rich men (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.), or of captains of mercenary troops (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or of the leaders in a successful revolution (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18 sq.), or of the holders of great offices for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq.).

12. There were oligarchies in which an attempt was made to conceal the oligarchical character of the constitution (3. 5. 1278 a 38 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 14 sqq.: 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq., cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.).

We do not hear of any oligarchies in Greece in which office was confined to families members of which had held office in the past, oligarchies like that which long existed at Rome. Nor does Aristotle notice the existence of oligarchies based on race, oligarchies in which men of one race ruled over men of another. Oligarchies based on religion did not of course exist in Greece in his day.

We must bear in mind, in reading what Aristotle tells us about Greek oligarchy, that he studied it in its declining days. He fully recognizes that in the early ages of Greece it was more in place than it came to be later on (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 25 sqq.). The reason which he gives for this is that the midway class was then small, and the hoplites were weaker and less well-trained than they afterwards became,
the cavalry being still the most important military force. But many other reasons can be given. The rule of the nobles did much for Greece in its early days. States grew greater and stronger and wealthier under it; commerce discovered new paths, and colonies were founded; temples were built, and music, choric singing, and lyrical poetry found a home in them. The nobles of those days had many claims to rule. They had leisure to practise military exercises, and even where the cavalry which they furnished to the State was not its most effective force, they were probably its best and most fully trained soldiers; they lived together in the cities, while the demos lived mostly scattered in country villages; they were supreme in the tribes phratries and gentes, and the priests of the chief public and private worship; they traced their descent from gods and heroes, or at any rate from families long settled in the State; if they called themselves ‘the good’ and ‘the notables’, their claims were not unsupported by public opinion, for they were commonly held to be raised by their wealth above many temptations to wrong-doing to which poorer men were exposed. They were at any rate usually more trustworthy as parties to a contract than the poor. Many members of the demos owed them money and stood in a dependent relation to them, for in the early days of Greece there were few rich metoeci resident in the State from whom money could be borrowed.

Thus their ascendancy was based on some moral and many material advantages. But even from the outset it was no doubt often abused. The rise of tyrannies in many States as early as the seventh century B.C. was probably to some extent due to misgovernment on the part of the nobles. Aristotle always regards the rich as ready to encroach whenever the constitution gives them a chance of

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1 Plut. De Musica, c. 27, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἢδη θείρον παρὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐκεῖνοις κατεσκευασμένον, ἀλλ' ἐτί τῆς μουσικῆς ἐν τοῖς λεπότεροι ἀναστρεφομένης, ἐν οἷς τιμήν τε τοῦ θείου διὰ ταύτης ἐποιούτο καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἑπαίνουν.
doing so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19 sq., 34 sqq.), and the very rich as unruly and content with nothing short of despotic authority (6 (4). ii. 1295 b 13 sqq.). The less secure oligarchies became, the more timorous and cruel and oppressive they grew. The Peloponnesian War redoubled their fears and their oppressiveness. Oligarchs and democrats came now to regard each other not only as rivals for power, but also as allies of a hated foreign foe. Each side could count on the support of a leading State, and the ruling class both in oligarchies and in democracies must have felt that, however badly it governed, it had protectors who would not allow it to be driven from power. Oligarchy was probably worst where it was most insecure and distrustful. After the close of the Peloponnesian War it was least secure in those regions in which democracy had prevailed under the Athenian empire—on the eastern and northern coasts of the Aegean and in the Aegean islands—and here from the time of the Athenian defeats at Syracuse and Aegospotami to the victory of Alexander on the Granicus in B.C. 334 its history was a history of vicissitudes. Its fortunes were equally varied in Greece Proper after the defeat of the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra in B.C. 371. For about forty years before the Politics was written, such oligarchies as existed in Greece Proper must have lived as threatened a life as the more eastern oligarchies had done from a still earlier date. Oligarchies were now often set up after a conflict with the demos and by returned exiles, and such oligarchies were sure to be oppressive.

Aristotle studied Greek oligarchy in its worst days, and its weaknesses, as it existed in his time, were many. Oligarchies were often too narrow; they often did not include even all the rich in the privileged class; they were often so framed that the moderately well-to-do class was not conciliated (6 (4). ii. 1296 a 13 sqq.), much less the demos, and no means were taken to secure that those who wished the constitution well should be stronger than those who did not. Admission to the ranks of the privileged class was often made difficult; sometimes admission was
obtainable only by those who, in addition to possessing a high property-qualification, were elected by the ruling class; sometimes not all those who possessed this high property-qualification were eligible, but only a favoured section of them; and sometimes the privileged class was an hereditary class, sons succeeding their fathers in office, and no one else being admissible to it. Nor was the smallness of the privileged class its only source of weakness. It was commonly unprepared by training for its position, and was often at once luxurious and grasping. It was also often divided against itself by feuds. These sometimes arose from inequalities of privilege, some families having access to the most important offices and others not, so that an oligarchy existed within the oligarchy, or from the fact that offices were tenable for life or for long terms, and that a cumulation or repeated tenure of them was allowed, so that they were practically monopolized by a few. Sometimes these feuds arose from quarrels about marriages, inheritances, or lawsuits, or from a factious persecution of some oligarchs by others, or from a rivalry in courting the hoplites or demos, where the hoplites or demos had the right of electing the holders of great offices. Another source of weakness in oligarchies was that the leading oligarchs often sought to make the oligarchy narrower. Oligarchies, again, no less than democracies, often failed to place the chief offices in the hands of their best and most trustworthy men; they were content if the holders of such offices were friendly to the constitution and skilful in the discharge of their official functions, and did not secure that they should be proof against temptation by requiring them to possess the kind of virtue suited to the constitution.

To these sources of weakness in oligarchies others were occasionally added. The tendency of oligarchies was to rule in a high-handed despotic way (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27 sq. : 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3 sqq.). They often also oppressed the demos, and failed to enforce purity of administration on the officials, though nothing angered the demos so much as to see the holders of offices from which it was
excluded plundering public property and taking bribes. The privileged class commonly sought to monopolize, not only office, but also honour and profit. Instead of resting content with claiming the most important offices for its members, and abandoning minor but lucrative offices to the demos, and giving an honorary precedence to the class less favoured by the constitution, it claimed for itself a monopoly of office, honour, and profit. That oligarchs were occasionally guilty of outrages on the poor, is clear from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 22, and such outrages must often have been fatal to oligarchies\(^1\). Narrow oligarchies, in fact, must have been almost as much exposed to overthrow as tyrannies, and yet they do not seem to have taken the elaborate precautions against overthrow which tyrannies did. We are told, indeed, that oligarchies often disarmed the many and expelled them from the central city, but we do not hear of the leading oligarchs being protected by a bodyguard, though they must often have needed one.

Unlike tyranny, oligarchy seldom brought glory or greatness to the States which adopted it, at any rate in the times of which we know most. It did not exist in any of the leading States of Greece. Corinth and Massalia were the greatest of the oligarchical States, and they were only second-rate States. Oligarchies can seldom have been strong from a military point of view, for their choice lay between arming the demos, a course which commonly involved the concession to it of a share of power, or employing mercenary troops and running the risk of their commander making himself tyrant. They were also often weak in light-armed troops. Nor can they have been strong financially, for they could hardly with safety impose heavy taxation on the demos.

And yet, notwithstanding all these weaknesses, there were States in which oligarchy long held its ground. Corinth, Epidaurus, Troezen, Phlius, the Arcadian Orcho-

\(^1\) Students of the Venetian oligarchy will notice how many of the rocks pointed out by Aristotle it succeeded in avoiding (see notes on 1308 a 10, 15, b 20, 28, 1309 a 21, 22, 23. 27).
menus, and Pellene in Achaia remained true to the Lacedaemonians, and probably to oligarchy, after Leuctra (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 78: vol. 10. 299). The fidelity of some of these States to oligarchy is no doubt attributable to their fear of the democracy of Argos, but we cannot thus account for its survival in those Achaean cities which were too distant from Argos to fear it. Oligarchy, however, was so little unpopular in Achaia that Epaminondas in B.C. 367, though the representative of a democratic State, abstained from overthrowing the Achaean oligarchies (Grote, 10. 365 sq.), and when Thebes later on reversed his policy and overthrew them, they were speedily restored (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 42 sq.). These oligarchies probably held their ground because they did not oppress or interfere with the demos (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 17 sqq.). The oligarchy of Massalia also was long-lived, and if we knew more than we do of the history of this State, we should know more than we do of the circumstances under which oligarchy tended to survive in Greece.

As to one important difference between Greek oligarchies we learn less from Aristotle than we could wish. We gather from what he tells us that there were oligarchies in which the magistracies were everything and the general body of the privileged class nothing, and also oligarchies in which the magistracies acted more or less under the control of the privileged class. In the former no assembly existed, the magistrates possessing not only administrative, but also deliberative and judicial authority (3. 1. 1275 b 7—17), while in the latter an assembly existed composed of the members of the privileged class (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq), which must probably have possessed some deliberative authority, and have operated to a certain extent as a check on the magistracies. In some cases we find, in place of an assembly, an elective body chosen by and from the privileged class (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq.) ; and here again some check on the magistracies would exist. A similar distinction is traceable in respect of the judicial authority of the State. There seem to have been oligarchies in which
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the magistracies constituted the judicial authority, and others in which dicasteries existed independent of the magistracies. In some cases these dicasteries were probably composed of members taken from the privileged class, while in others they were, nominally at any rate, composed of both rich and poor, though, as the rich were commonly fined for non-attendance, and the poor were not, the poor would seldom be present at their meetings (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq. : 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.). It is evident that oligarchies in which the magistracies constituted the judicial authority must have differed much from those in which they did not.

Both in oligarchies in which the magistracies combined deliberative and judicial with administrative authority, and in those in which they did not, the gerusia would usually be the most important of the magistracies, but we learn little from Aristotle as to its powers. It may probably have exercised some control over the other magistracies, a control which would be especially needed where no deliberative or judicial authority existed independent of the magistracies.

There is another point in connexion with oligarchy on which Aristotle perhaps hardly lays enough stress. He does not fully bring out how much support Greek oligarchies derived from the ascendency of the leading families in the tribes phratries and gentes. Cleisthenes found that he could not uproot oligarchical tendencies at Athens except by substituting wholly new tribes for the old ones. The fact that oligarchy could not be completely uprooted without a sweeping change of this kind must often have delayed or prevented its overthrow.

Aristotle fails to see how deeply rooted oligarchy is in human nature. He sees that men render willing allegiance to pre-eminent virtue (see note on 1284 b 32), but he does not see that they also willingly obey men of pre-eminent wealth and birth. Oligarchy, after all, had its strong points; it did not engender, as democracy often did, a tendency to indiscipline and anarchy, or a jealousy of superiority of all
kinds, or a belief in the equality of unequals, or a love of innovation for its own sake, or a repudiation of parental authority. The State was not ruled in oligarchies by popular assemblies and by demagogues more skilled in oratory than in war, as it was in many democracies, and the men at the head of oligarchical governments were usually men of pure local descent, untainted by alien or servile blood.

Aristotle's theory of oligarchy lags somewhat in the rear of the facts as to oligarchy which he incidentally reveals to us in the Politics. In oligarchy, according to him, the rich rule because of their wealth (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 14 sq.), and with a view to their own advantage. The rich may rule in other constitutions also, but not because of their wealth. Not only, however, do the rich rule in oligarchy with a view to their own advantage; they also rule with a view to their own enrichment, which is not quite the same thing. Oligarchy prizes wealth, not virtue (3. 15. 1286 b 15 sq.); it makes wealth its end (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 9 sq.) and its standard in awarding office (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 11). Yet oligarchies, in common with other constitutions, are advised in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. to require virtue relative to the constitution, as well as friendliness to the constitution and administrative capacity, in the holders of important offices. Thus even oligarchy, it would seem, cannot safely make wealth alone its standard in awarding office. Then again, does it make wealth its end? Aristotle inherits this view from Plato (Rep. 550 D sqq., 562 B), but he sometimes speaks as if the quest of gain were characteristic of democracy rather than oligarchy (e.g. in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq.: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sq., where the many are said to love gain more than honour).

We gather also that oligarchy regards those who are unequal in wealth as absolutely unequal (7 (5). 1. 1301 a 31 sqq.: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 22 sqq.), and holds that it is not just that those who possess nothing should have an equal share of political power with those who possess much (7 (5). 12.
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1316 b 1 sqq.), or that one who has contributed a mina to a common capital of a hundred talents should receive as much of the capital and profits as one who has contributed all the rest (3. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq.). So again in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 18 sqq. the partisans of oligarchy are represented as claiming that whatever commends itself to those who own a larger amount of property is just, a contention which, as Aristotle points out in 1318 a 21 sqq., exposed them to the retort that it gave any rich man who possessed more than all the rest of the rich put together a right to make himself tyrant. Elsewhere (3. 13. 1283 b 33 sqq.) Aristotle adds a further objection, that the many may be richer than the few rich, if the amount of property held by each of them is added together.

So far Aristotle regards the claims of oligarchy as based entirely on wealth. But he occasionally connects culture as well as wealth with oligarchy (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36 sqq.), and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sq.—if that passage is from his pen—he says that ‘oligarchy is defined by birth and wealth and culture’, so that a value for birth and culture, as well as wealth, is recognized as one of its distinguishing characteristics. And, in fact, we have seen that many forms of Greek oligarchy gave supreme power to birth—to the members of a single gens or of several gentes or tribes, or to the descendants of the earliest settlers, or to the sons of the oligarchs in a δυναστελα—so that in them wealth alone conferred no title to a share of power. Even in oligarchies based on a property-qualification the possession of the property-qualification was often not the only condition of admission to the privileged class. In oligarchies based on membership of clubs no one, however rich, could be a member of the privileged class without belonging to one of the favoured clubs.

It would seem, indeed, that if the account which Aristotle, following Plato, usually gives of the principle of oligarchy were correct, and oligarchy really looked to wealth alone in awarding political power, it ought not to place all the rich on a level and give them an equal share of power, but
should proportion political power to wealth, giving the richer more and the less rich less. Yet Aristotle praises oligarchies which place the privileged class as much as possible on a level in respect of political power (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 11 sqq.).

DEMOCRACY.

That two kinds of democracy were commonly recognized we see from 2. 12. 1273 b 38, where the mention of ἡ πάτρια δημοκρατία implies the existence of another kind of democracy, not πάτρια. Plato (Polit. 302 D sqq.) distinguishes two kinds of democracy, one in which law is observed and another in which it is not. Isocrates also (Areop. § 60: Panath. § 131 sqq.) recognizes two kinds.

Aristotle distinguishes in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20 sq. between ἐννομοι δημοκρατίαι and κύριοι δημοκρατίαι, and in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sq. between ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία and ἡ νεωτάτη, but in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book he goes farther and recognizes not two, but four, or even five, kinds of democracy—five in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30—1292 a 37, but four only in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 22—1293 a 10 and in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6, where the first two of the five are perhaps treated as virtually one.

Thus Aristotle distinguishes more kinds of democracy than Plato. But this is not the only difference between them. Plato had not explained why law is observed in one of his two kinds of democracy and not in the other. Aristotle, on the contrary, explains the origin of the differences which exist between his five kinds of democracy. The first four, he tells us, differ from the fifth because law is supreme in them over the resolutions of the assembly, and because the magistracies still retain considerable power, and they differ from each other because the demos which possesses access to office in each of them differs 1. In the first two kinds of democracy the class admissible to office

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1 In 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 22 sqq. he adds another source of difference. In some kinds of democracy more of the institutions characteristic of democracy are adopted and in others fewer.
and supreme over the constitution is the agricultural and pastoral class and those who possess a moderate amount of property, in the third those whose extraction is unimpeachable, and in the fourth all those who possess citizenship. It is not quite clear whether in each of these four forms only those are admissible to the assembly and dicasteries who are admissible to office, but, at any rate, in each of them the class which is admissible to office is supreme.

We obtain a glimpse of the organization of the first two forms in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq., where we are told that in the first, or most moderate, kind of democracy all the citizens have the right to act as dicasts, to elect to elective offices, and to review the conduct of office-holders, though the most important offices are filled by election, not by lot, and eligibility to them is confined to those who possess the requisite property-qualification, which increases with the importance of the office, or (without any requirement of a property-qualification) to those who are capable of filling them 1. It would appear from this that even in the first kind of democracy the less important offices would be filled by lot. The assembly does not meet often—it meets only when it must (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 28 sq.)—and the same thing probably holds of the meetings of the dicasteries. Still the powers of the assembly and dicasteries even in this kind of democracy are sufficient to ensure just and pure administration on the part of the richer citizens who hold the most important offices.

The main reason why the first kind of democracy (if we group the first two together) is the best is that the ruling class in it is most like that which rules in the polity and least disposed to make itself sole sovereign. It has property enough to distract its attention from politics. It is too busy with its own affairs, and the rural section of it lives

1 This does not altogether agree with the account of the first two kinds of democracy given in 6 (4). 4-6, for it would seem from it that in one of these forms no property-qualification for office exists and in the other only a small one.
too far from the central city, to attend frequent meetings of the assembly, and it cares more for its business pursuits than for a life of politics and office-holding; thus it rules in subordination to the law and leaves a share of power to the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich, and does not sacrifice them to demagogues. It does so not only because it has not leisure enough to do otherwise, but because it would not wish to do otherwise if it could.

It may be asked whether a constitution which makes only a part of the demos admissible to office is really a democracy. Aristotle so regards it because the majority is supreme in it (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 37 sq.), and because it admits to office all who acquire a certain property-qualification (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 30 sqq.). But if those who possess a moderate amount of property are supreme in it (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sq.), and democracy is a constitution in which the poor are supreme (3. 8. 1280 a 2 sq.), how can it be a democracy?

In the third and fourth kinds of democracy a wider and wider class comes to be admissible to office, the care for purity of extraction which still prevails in the third disappearing in the fourth, but Aristotle does not describe how their organization differs from that of the first and second. Evidently, however, the class admissible to office in them includes a larger urban element, and a larger element of traders, artisans, and day-labourers, and this element would desire, and be better able to attend, frequent meetings of the assembly (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 28 sqq.). Yet it would not have time either to hold office or to attend frequent meetings of the assembly in the absence of State-pay, and not much State-pay is forthcoming in these two kinds of democracy. Thus the law is still supreme in them, and the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich still enjoy a share of power, though probably a smaller share than in the first two kinds, and a more precarious share also, for they would be deprived of it if the State was large enough and rich enough to supply the ruling class with abundant State-pay.
Already in the fourth kind of democracy we trace the indifference to purity of extraction which was one of the most prominent characteristics of extreme democracy in Greece. Not only did it tend to place the poor man on a level with the rich, but it also often tended to place the semi-slave and the semi-alien on a level with the freeman and the citizen of pure descent.

In the ultimate kind of democracy every citizen was enabled by State-pay to take an active part in deliberative, administrative, and judicial work, and the full programme of Greek democracy was realized. The aim of democracy in Greece was not simply the supremacy of the poor, for the poor might be supreme, and yet their participation in political activity might be very limited. Its aim was rather the full participation of all in all forms of political activity. It was only in the ultimate democracy that this ideal was realized (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3 sqq.). In it not only was office open to all citizens, whatever their extraction and however small their means, but pay was freely forthcoming, owing to a great increase in the populousness of the State and in its revenues (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), and pay was given to the holders of offices and to the members of the assembly and dicasteries. The result was that the assembly and dicasteries met frequently, and an assembly which met frequently was apt to draw all decisions into its own hands (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.; 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.). The demos shook off the control of law; it came to be like a monarch and to wish to play a monarch's part. A monarch, however, needs flatterers, and so demagogues arose, whose interest it was to make the decrees of the assembly supreme over the laws. The authority of the magistracies was overthrown also; persons brought complaints against them, and appealed to the assembly for its decision. Thus under this form of democracy the State was ruled not by the universal principles embodied in the laws, but by successive expressions of the will of the majority of the assembly. The ultimate democracy was, in fact, hardly a democracy, for it was
hardly a constitution; a constitution exists only where laws rule.

Nor were these the only evils connected with it. Not only did decrees of the assembly override the authority of the laws and the magistrates, and demagogues take the place of the leading citizens, but the rich ceased to attend the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 6 sqq.). The care of their property made it impossible for them to attend frequent meetings of either (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq.), and thus the work of both the assembly and the dicasteries was less well done than it would otherwise have been (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq.). The poor, on the other hand, were pauperized by the system of State-pay, and their attention diverted from the trades which gave them the best chance of enriching themselves (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 7 sqq.). Nor was this all. Democracies of this type encouraged every one to live as he pleased (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.), so that the control of the law was not only thrown off in them by the assembly, but also by the citizens individually.

We see that Aristotle regards extreme democracy in Greece as the source of some evils which do not result from it in modern States. In our own days, no doubt, under an extreme form of democracy the rich tend to withdraw to some extent from active political life, the magistrates to adopt an attitude of subservience to the popular will, and demagogues to take the place of the natural leaders of the State, but the poor are not pauperized, nor is the control of law thrown off either by the deliberative or by the citizens individually. Aristotle, on the contrary, depicts the ultimate democracy as a mixture of tyranny and anarchy.

It is an interesting question how far Aristotle obtains his classification of democracies from a study of the history of the Athenian democracy. The first of his kinds of democracy seems to answer in many respects to the Solonian democracy, though it does not appear that in the latter the less important offices were filled by lot—i. e. by selection by
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lot out of all—as we gather from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30 that they are in the former. On the other hand, the rise of the ultimate form of democracy is connected by Aristotle with the provision of pay for the assembly (6 (4). 6. 1299 a 1-10: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38—1300 a 4: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30-35), but this step does not seem to have been taken at Athens till ‘soon after the archonship of Eucleides’, who was archon in B.C. 403 (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 290: 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41). It seems likely, however, from 2. 12. 1274 a 5-15 and 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20-24 (cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27. ll. 7-11) that Aristotle held that an ultimate democracy existed at Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B.C., or even earlier. If so, his account of the ultimate democracy does not in this particular closely reproduce the facts of the constitutional development of Athens. His language, again, suggests (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq.: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.) that in the ultimate democracy half-aliens were not excluded from citizenship; this may have been the case at Athens at certain times (cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 173 and Isocr. De Pace, § 88), but at any rate after the restoration of the democracy, citizenship was confined there to the sons of two citizen-parents (vol. i. p. 227). No close relation seems, therefore, to be traceable between the course of constitutional change at Athens and Aristotle’s series of democracies.

These four or five kinds, or perhaps rather grades, of democracy are far from exhausting its possible varieties, or even the varieties the existence of which is implied in the Politics.

Thus a form of democracy which is recognized in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 26 sqq. does not seem to be included among them. This is the form in which the ruling demos consists of cultivators and artisans, the day-labourers being excluded. This form approaches near to the first of Aristotle’s kinds, but does not fall within it, for artisans do not appear to find a place in the demos which bears rule in that form (8 (6). 4.
Again, a kind of democracy existed in which the ruling demos was composed of owners of land, whether cultivators and herdsmen or not. Phormisius, we know, proposed in B.C. 403 that the restored democracy at Athens should be of this type. Then again, there was the kind of democracy devised by Telecles of Miletus, in which deliberative authority mainly fell not to a numerous assembly, which might be guided by demagogues and might exalt itself above the magistracies and the law, but to successive sections of the citizen-body, each section being comparatively small (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 11 sqq.). In some other democracies (1298 a 13 sqq.) the assembly had little or nothing to do, and the real deliberative consisted of the council of magistrates (συναρχεία), to which all citizens had access in succession. There was also the kind of democracy which at one time existed at Mantineia. In this the assembly possessed deliberative authority, but the right of appointing the magistrates was reserved for persons 'elected by alternation out of all' (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.). We see, again, from 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq., that in some forms of democracy the poor and the moderately well-to-do outnumbered the rich, but not the poor taken by themselves, while in others the poor greatly outnumbered the rich, without the addition to their side of the moderately well-to-do. Democracies of the latter kind were far more short-lived than democracies of the former. There were democracies, again, in which the demos was largely composed of trireme-oarsmen, and others in which it was largely composed of the crews of merchant-ships or fishermen. The one sort must have differed considerably from the other (see note on 1291 b 18).

Democracies would of course differ also according to the circumstances under which democracy was introduced. It might be introduced suddenly in an extreme form—possibly after some victory, like those of Cnidus, Naxos, or Leuctra, or after some civil conflict—or it might develop gradually. At Athens democracy only gradually became extreme, and time was allowed for the growth of laws and customs
favourable to its maintenance. In the absence of such laws and customs extreme democracy did not commonly last long (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 3 sq.). The position and surroundings of the State, again, would exercise an influence on the character of its democracy. In a State like Argos, constantly in danger of subjugation by powerful neighbours who were champions of oligarchy, democracy would be very different from what it was in States less constantly in peril. Fear of treason on the part of the rich would make it suspicious and sanguinary. Democracies, again, in which a single demagogue stood at the head of affairs would be very different from those in which rival demagogues struggled for supremacy. The best days of the Athenian democracy were those in which it was guided, first by the Council of the Areopagus, and then by Pericles.

Aristotle connects the first appearance of democracy in Greece in one passage (3. 15. 1286 b 17 sqq.) with a reaction against the excessive concentration of power in the tyrannies, but in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 sqq. he connects it rather with an increase in the populousness of States and in the power of the hoplite force. It is likely enough that many early democracies originated in this way, for we learn from Aristotle (1297 b 24 sq.) that early democracies resembled what were afterwards called polities, and in polities the hoplites were supreme (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sqq.).

The demos which set up the earliest democracies was commonly an agricultural or pastoral demos resident in the country (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq.); hence the rise of these democracies indicates a tendency on the part of the rural citizens to assert their claims at the expense of the nobles, who dwelt for the most part in the central city. We may gather the aims of those who founded early democracies from the organization they gave them. When Solon, for instance, set up a democracy at Athens, he left the magistracies in the hands of the richer class, but he took pains to secure that this class should govern well by giving the
whole body of citizens the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office and by opening the dicasteries to all, thus placing an efficient check on the magistrates (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27—1319 a 4). It is likely, therefore, that, when the rural hoplites set up one of these early democracies which resembled polities, they did so with the view of controlling and improving the administration of the nobles. They probably, however, had another aim also. They sought to obtain for themselves the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance. They formed the most effective part of the army of the State, and their farms were exposed to the ravages of the enemy in case of war. It was natural, therefore, that they should claim this right, and none of the boons conferred by the early democracy can have been more highly valued by the peasant demos of those days than the right which it conferred on the assembly of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance.

It is interesting to note that the Lacedaemonian constitution, though it was not a democracy, went further than these early democracies. It opened the ephorate to the whole body of citizens. The poorest citizen might become a member of a powerful magistracy which checked and controlled the other magistracies of the State. The reason why the Lacedaemonian demos succeeded in acquiring this great privilege was probably two-fold. In the first place it was composed of citizens resident in Sparta, and not, like the demos of most States of early Greece, of citizens scattered over the territory, and next it was composed of citizens who were owners of land tilled for them by Helots, and who were not withdrawn by other occupations from political activity.

Not all early democracies, however, were as limited and moderate as the Solonian democracy or the democracies resembling polities to which reference has been made. Democracies introduced after a sudden revolution, especially if that revolution was provoked by oppression or originated in contempt, were probably more extreme. When the
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demos at Ambracia, for instance, apparently about B.C. 580, joined in expelling the hateful tyrant Periander, and set up a democracy (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 31 sqq.), the democracy set up will hardly have been as moderate as the Solonian. The same thing may probably be said of the democracy instituted at Erythrae 'in ancient times' (ἐν τοῖς δραχαίοις χρόνοις), when the demos changed the constitution in its indignation at the narrowness of the ruling class (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq.). It is not certain that the Heracleia referred to in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 31 is Heracleia on the Euxine, but, if this is so, as this colony was founded about B.C. 550, the democracy which was introduced there on its foundation was an early one, and yet of a pronounced type. The same thing may be said of the democracy which existed at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon. This appears to have been unruly and disorderly (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 31 sq.), and cannot have been moderate.

Aristotle is disappointingly silent as to the organization of the forms of democracy intermediate between the most moderate forms and the extreme form. We should know more than we do about the way in which Greek democracies developed if we knew more than we do of the way in which the powers of the Boulé developed. We know hardly anything on this subject as to other States than Athens, and even as to Athens we know but little.

From the first the Boulé stands in a close relation to the popular assembly. As soon as a popular assembly acquires the right of arriving at political decisions of moment 1, we find it placed in charge of a Boulé, much as a blind man is placed in charge of a dog. We might ask why a separate body was needed for this purpose—why committees of the assembly chosen by it from time to time should not have sufficed. The answer is that a body not intermittently, but permanently in existence was needed, capable of introducing measures into the assembly and of carrying its decisions

1 It is remarkable that Solon the assembly were very limited instituted a Boulé at Athens, (see note on 1281 b 32), though the powers which he gave
into effect (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 13 sqq.). This duty might no
doubt have been assigned to one of the ordinary magis-
tracies, but it was evidently thought better to assign it to
a body as little differentiated from the assembly and as
accessible to all the citizens as possible. The Boulê must
be a numerous body like the assembly and must be
annually appointed by lot, and just as the assembly con-
sisted of all the tribes, so all the tribes must have an equal
voice in the Boulê. We do not know how soon the rule
was introduced at Athens that no one could be more than
twice a member of the Boulê ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 62 sub fin.) ; one
effect of this rule, however, was that all the citizens came
once or twice in their lives to be members of the Boulê,
and that it consequently nearly resembled the small delib-
erative body planned by Telecles the Milesian (6 (4). 14.
1298 a 12 sqq.), of which all the citizens were to be members
in succession. Another result of the rule was that none of
the members of the Boulê could have more than two years' 
experience, so that there was no fear of its being a skilled
gathering capable of rivalling the assembly and dictating
to it. More care was taken at Athens to make the Boulê
an institution congenial to democratic feeling, and to pre-
vent its encroaching on the prerogatives of the assembly,
than to secure its efficiency. Its powers were probably
largely increased when those of the Council of the Areo-
pagus were curtailed ; how great they were at one time is
shown by the fact that it could sentence Athenian citizens
to imprisonment and death ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 45); yet it continued
to be appointed by lot, not by election. No doubt, indeed,
it was because the Boulê was appointed by lot and was the
reverse of a skilled magistracy that so little hesitation was
felt in adding to its powers.

Whether there were any democracies in which the Boulê
was appointed by election, we do not learn. In that
of Rhodes, however, the Boulê so far differed from the
Athenian Boulê that it was headed, and perhaps to a great
extent guided, by great magistrates, the six prytaneis
(Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 178). In that of Thebes (B. C.
366) the Boulé seems to have been joined with the magistrates for purposes of deliberation, and to have had the right to try murderers and to put them to death, or at any rate those whose guilt was evident (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 5 sqq.).

The Boulé played a great part in the democracies intermediate between the first and the last. But in course of time, at any rate in large and populous States, the revenues became sufficient to provide ample pay for the assembly, dicasteries, and magistracies, and when pay could be provided for the assembly and it came to meet frequently, the power of the Boulé began to decline (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.). The assembly now reserved all decisions for itself, and democracy assumed its ultimate form. Aristotle dates the decline of the power of the Boulé from the provision of pay for the assembly, and, as has already been pointed out, pay does not appear to have been provided for the assembly at Athens till after B.C. 403.

The increase in the revenue of the State to which reference has been made is regarded by Aristotle rather as the indispensable condition of the rise of the ultimate democracy than as its cause. He frequently traces in the Politics the way in which a moderate democracy passes into an ultimate democracy (2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq.: 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq.: 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.), and we gather that, at Athens at any rate, the change was due in part to the elation of the demos after their naval victory at Salamis, which had led to the foundation of the Athenian empire, and in part to the action of demagogues, who kept constantly adding to the power of the demos in the hope of winning its favour, till at last they made the assembly supreme over the law. In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq., where the experience of Athens may or may not be present to Aristotle's mind, the change is traced to the rivalry of competitors for office when the offices are filled by election without the safeguard of a property-qualification, and the demos elects. But perhaps we may infer from 6 (4). 12.
that the ultimate democracy would hardly come into being unless there was a great excess of artisans and hired labourers in the citizen-body, and that its rise was due in part to a change in the composition of the demos. It is implied in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. that the admissibility to office of citizens of not unimpeachable extraction was one of the concomitants of its rise. In 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27 a somewhat different account is given of the circumstances under which democracy became extreme at Athens, though here too 'the elation of the many' is mentioned as one of the causes of the change. The decision of the demos 'to administer the constitution itself', which probably marks the introduction of the ultimate democracy, is there connected not with the provision of pay for the assembly, but with the concentration of the citizens in Athens during the Peloponnesian War and with their receipt of State-pay for service in war. This account of the origin of the ultimate democracy at Athens does not quite agree with the account given in the Politics, which connects it with the provision of pay for the assembly.

That a change sometimes occurred in the opposite direction—that the ultimate democracy sometimes passed into the moderate forms—we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 21 and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 15 sq., but Aristotle nowhere gives us any account of the way in which this change commonly came about.

The special characteristic of the ultimate democracy was, according to Aristotle, that under it the decrees of the assembly became supreme over the law and that the authority of the magistracies was overthrown (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. : 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sq. : 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.). This would have been a great evil even if the meetings of the assembly had been attended by all the citizens, but, as a matter of fact, more classes than one were unable...
to attend them. The rich were often prevented by the claims of their property from attending the meetings either of the assembly or of the dicasteries (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 sqq.) ; they could attend occasional meetings, but not very frequent ones (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq.) ; and the rural citizens, some of whom must have lived, in Attica at all events, twenty or thirty miles from the place where the assembly met, were also often unable to be present. The result was that in the ultimate democracy supremacy over the law and the administration was exercised not by the whole citizen-body, but by the poorest class of urban citizens, those whose means were so small that the State-pay was a sufficient inducement to them to attend the assembly. Democracy in Greece, in fact, when fully developed, narrowed the class with which actual supremacy rested; we might have expected it to do the opposite. It culminated in a form in which the State paid the poorest and most ignorant class of urban citizens to attend the meetings of the assembly and did not enforce the attendance of other classes. Probably, however, other urban classes than the poorest did habitually attend the meetings of the assembly even in this form of democracy, for we read in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 14 sqq. that in democracies the moderately well-to-do class shared in office to a greater extent than in oligarchies, and this suggests that those of them who lived in or near the central city were not absent from the meetings of the assembly in ultimate democracies.

Aristotle makes various suggestions for the mitigation of the evils connected with the ultimate democracy. It was because the assembly met frequently in a democracy of this kind that it came to claim all power for itself (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.). Partly perhaps to check this abuse, as well as to lighten the pecuniary burden on the rich and to make it easier for them to attend, Aristotle recommends that the meetings of the assembly and the dicasteries should be made less frequent (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 22 sqq.). He recommends also that meetings of the assembly should not be held in the absence of the country citizens (8 (6). 4. 1319 a...
36 sqq.), and that its pauper members should be provided by States possessing surplus revenues with the means of engaging in agriculture or trade (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq.). This would make them less eager for frequent meetings of the assembly. Elsewhere (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.) Aristotle recommends that the rich should be obliged by fines (he says nothing about the country citizens) to attend the meetings of the assembly. He adds other suggestions in 1298 b 21 sqq. He may have been doubtful whether fines, however severe they might be, would suffice to enforce the attendance of the rich in an assembly in which they were greatly out-numbered, or he may have thought that the deliberative body would deliberate better if the numbers of the poor in it were less disproportionate than they usually were to those of the rich. At any rate he adds (1298 b 21)—'it is advantageous, again, that those who are charged with deliberative functions should be elected or taken by lot in equal numbers from the parts of the State' (i.e. the notables and the demos), 'and it is also advantageous, if the members of the demos are greatly superior in number to the men of political capacity' (i.e. the notables), 'either not to give pay to all, but only to a number proportionate to the numerical strength of the notables, or to exclude by lot those who are in excess of the proper number'. Aristotle does not make it clear by whom the deliberative body the appointment of which he here suggests is to be elected, if it is elected and not appointed by lot, but his meaning seems to be that half of it is to be elected by the notables and half by the demos. If this is so, his recommendation amounts to a recommendation of a representative deliberative body in which the number of the representatives of the notables and demos should be equal. He omits to arrange for the payment of the representatives of the demos, though this would evidently be necessary. He would not apparently be content with a paid representative body elected in each deme by the members of the deme or appointed in each deme by lot, though the substitution of a representative body of this kind for the popular assembly
would seem to a modern to be the true remedy for the defects of the popular assembly. Such a representative body would have been less likely than the popular assembly to encroach on the province of the law and the magistracies, and it would have been more acceptable to the demos than the kind of representative body which Aristotle suggests, one in which the representatives of the notables are equal in number to those of the demos.

It is evident from Aristotle's language in such passages as 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq. that ultimate democracies were often introduced in Greece. They must have existed in many States besides Athens, though we are not able to point with certainty to any existing elsewhere. Perhaps the democracies at Cos, Rhodes, Heracleia, and Megara mentioned in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 25 sqq. and the democracy at Cyrene mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22 sq. were ultimate democracies. Democracy was strong at Byzantium and Tenedos (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sqq.), but whether ultimate democracies existed there we do not know.

Some ultimate democracies were no doubt more tolerable than others. The burden on the rich was less where the State-pay was provided wholly or in part by special revenues derived from dependent allies, or an emporium, or mines, or some exceptional product like silphium, and not exclusively by taxes levied on the rich. An ultimate democracy introduced gradually was less oppressive than one which was suddenly introduced after a victory over the rich won by leaders embittered by exile at the head of a demos infuriated by oppression. An ultimate democracy in which the poor greatly outnumbered the rich without any addition to their numbers from the moderately well-to-do was worse than one in which their numbers were less.

It is evident that the ultimate democracy at Athens in the days before the rich were decimated by defeats on land (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 sqq.) and the whole State impoverished by the disastrous latter years of the Peloponnesian War, differed greatly from what it became in the fourth century before Christ. Isocrates tells us (De Antid.
§ 159 sq.: cp. § 142) that when he was a boy—he was born in B.C. 436—everybody was eager to be reputed rich, but that at the time at which he was writing (B.C. 353) it was more perilous to be thought rich than to be an open criminal, for criminals were let off with light punishments, whereas absolute ruin befel persons held to be wealthy.

Aristotle nowhere gives us in the Politics a full description in detail of the organization and working of democracy. What he tells us on the subject he tells us incidentally. His aim in the last three Books of the Politics, as has already been said, is a practical aim, to guide Greek statesmen and lawgivers in the construction and administration of the various constitutions, and it is from the remarks he makes in the course of pursuing this aim that we obtain his views on the subject of the organization and working of Greek democracy. Perhaps we learn from him more about its structure and institutions than about its life and working.

If we seek pictures of its life and working, we shall find more of them in the pages of Thucydides than in those of the Politics. Herodotus had already dwelt on the passionate vehemence of democracy in action (3. 81) and had pointed out how much it did at Athens, at any rate in its earlier days, to stimulate patriotic effort (5. 78). Thucydides tells us far more. His task compelled him to study the behaviour of the Athenian assembly in the many crises with which it had to deal in the course of the Peloponnesian War. We watch its behaviour to Pericles under the stress of cruel suffering. We see its hastiness and impulsiveness, its rapid alternations of severity and clemency, its susceptibility to excitement not only in an angry or vindictive direction, but also in the direction of mercy and sympathy\(^1\), its occasional recklessness and levity in dealing with important affairs, and other weaknesses which affected it.

\(^1\) Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 377, where Xen. Hell. 1. 5. 19 is referred to, and the behaviour of the Syracusan assembly under similar circumstances (Diod. 11. 92) compared.
We see that in the fifth century before Christ, when the Athenian democracy was at its best, it was a government of action as well as of open discussion, though the famous lines of Ion of Chios in praise of its rival, the Lacedaemonian State (Fragm. 63 Nauck), suggest that he regarded it as even then too much a government of words. The orations of Demosthenes complete the picture by setting before us the weaknesses of the Athenian democracy at a time when it had lost much of its original vigour.

Among the characteristics of democracy which had been already pointed out before Aristotle dealt with the subject the following may be mentioned:

1. its exercise of rule in the interest of a section of the citizens (Plato, Laws 715 A sq., 832 B sq.) and frequent oppression of the rich:

2. its passion for liberty and equality (Plato, Rep. 557 B, 558 C, 562 B sq.) and its jealousy of men of superior merit (see note on 1284 b 28):

3. its demand for equality of access to magistracies, and hence for

A. appointment to magistracies by lot, i.e. appointment by lot out of all, not out of selected persons (πρόκριτοι). This had been dwelt on by many from Herodotus' time onwards:


C. the multiplication of offices and the diminution of their powers, resulting in feebleness of action (Plato, Polit. 303 A). Herodotus (3. 80) treats the accountability of magistrates as one of the institutions characteristic of democracy.

4. its practice of referring questions to the whole citizen-body (Hdt. 3. 80 sub fin.) and of consulting the opinion of all (Eurip. Suppl. 424 sqq. Bothe, 438 sqq. Dindorf):

5. its aggrandizement of flatterers and demagogues (Aristoph. Eq.) and especially of some one individual (Plato, Rep. 565 C):
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6. Plato had hinted (Rep. 565 A) that the many were not eager to attend the meetings of the assembly unless they derived some profit from so doing, but he does not point out, as Aristotle does, the effect of State-pay in making democracies extreme:

7. the favour shown in democracies to low birth, poverty, and want of education (Aristoph. Eq., [Xen.] Rep. Ath.: see note on 1317 b 38-41):

8. the humouring in democracies of women, children, and slaves, and the license allowed to all to live as they please (Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq., 562 E sqq.).

The following, on the other hand, are some of the chief characteristics of democracy to which Aristotle, so far as we know, was the first to call attention:

1. His classification of the kinds of democracy is more careful and more complete than the received one, which distinguished only between the παμπλα δημοκρατία and the νεωτάτη δημοκρατία. That democracies vary in kind as the demos which bears rule in each varies we had not been told by any one before, nor does it seem that any one had dwelt on the merits of an agricultural and pastoral demos. The effect of abundant State-pay in making the extreme democracy possible is pointed out by him more clearly than by any one before.

2. In his picture of the institutions of an extreme democracy he dwells, as no one before him appears to have done, on its tendency to exalt the power of the assembly at the expense both of the law and of the magistracies, even the Boulé. His view that the extreme democracy resembles tyranny may possibly have been suggested by some lines of Aristophanes (see note on 1292 a 11), but had any one before him asserted the fact with equal clearness?

3. Aristotle was apparently the first to point out the tendency of the extreme democracy to make the citizen-body as large as possible, so that the demos might greatly outnumber the rich, and hence to extend citizenship even to illegitimate sons and the sons of
4. He was also the first, so far as we know, to dwell on the tendency of democracy to mingle the citizens together and to modify or do away with earlier sectional distinctions and worship.

5. The view that it is the tendency of democracy to assimilate the rearing, education, dress, and mode of life of rich and poor was apparently a common one (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.), but he seems to have been among the first to mention this view.

6. Had any one before him pointed out the tendency of democracy to restrict the term for which magistracies were tenable and to discourage a repeated tenure of magistracies, or drawn attention to the variations in the organization of the deliberative in democracies and in the extent of its powers?

7. Had any one before him pointed out that democracies were more secure and durable than oligarchies, or traced the various causes to which they owed this advantage?

8. We hear from no one else of the existence of democracies not of law, but of custom and training, or of democracies of law, but not of custom and training.

The first account given us in the Politics of the principle on which democracy rests is contained in 3. 9. 1280 a 7-25.

We are there told that the champions of the democratic view of what is just claimed an equal share—we do not distinctly learn in what, but probably in political power—for those who were equal in free birth (ἐλεύθερα). But who are equal in free birth? According to 3. 8. 1280 a 5 'all share in free birth', but yet we read in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sq. of 'the class which is not free-born by descent from two citizen-parents' (τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον), an expression which seems to imply that the sons of only one citizen-parent are not fully free-born, and in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17 sqq. it is implied that free birth is not possessed by Aristotles analysis of the principle of democracy.
all, for it is there distinguished from ‘numerical superiority’ as falling under the head of ‘quality’ (τὸ ποιότερον), whereas the latter falls under the head of ‘quantity’ (τὸ ποιότερον). So in 3. 15. 1286a 36 a demos consisting of the free-born is tacitly contrasted with a demos including other elements than the free-born. It seems clear, then, that democracy according to one conception of it claimed an equal share of political power only for those who were equal in free birth, not for any one and every one who might be made a citizen.

But this restriction appears to pass out of sight in other accounts of the principle of democracy, for instance in that contained in 8 (6). 2, where it is implied that democracy claims equality for all, not merely for all who are equal in free birth. Democracy is said to aim at ‘freedom and equality’ (6 (4). 4. 1291b 34 sqq. : 8 (6). 2. 1318a 9 sqq.), or at ‘freedom’ in its two kinds, freedom based on equality, which implies an interchange among the citizens of ruling and being ruled and the supremacy of the will of the majority, and freedom in the sense of living as one likes, which implies not being ruled at all, or, if that is impossible, an interchange of ruling and being ruled (8 (6). 2. 1317a 40—b 17). Elsewhere (7 (5). 9. 1310a 28 sqq.) democracy is said to be characterized by two things, the supremacy of the majority and freedom in the sense of living as one likes. Here freedom is distinguished from the supremacy of the majority, though this is regarded as a kind of freedom in 8 (6). 2. 1317a 40 sqq.

In these accounts of democracy it is implied that freedom and equality are conferred on all, both rich and poor. True, the rich will be in a minority, and as the majority is supreme, the poor will be supreme. But the rich will have a share of authority. It is on this principle that the first form of democracy is organized, that which is especially based on equality (ἡ λεγόμενη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἵσον, 6 (4). 4. 1291b 30 sqq.) In that form all share in the constitution alike.

But democracy is also the rule of the poor, whether in a majority or not (3. 8. 1280a 1 sqq.). Then it is not
necessarily the rule of the majority, nor is it based on equality for all. Here we have an account of democracy which conflicts with those previously given. What right on democratic principles have the poor to rule, if they are in a minority? A democracy which gives supremacy to a minority of poor would seem to sin against the principle of arithmetical equality, which is the basis of democracy according to 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.

It will be seen that Aristotle’s account of democracy is not free from inconsistencies. Nor are we yet at an end of them. Democracy tends to favour not only the poor, but also bastards, half-aliens, and half-slaves, and to admit them to citizenship (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sqq.). Thus democracy is something more than the rule of the poor; it is the rule of a demos possibly comprising half-alien and half-servile elements. Now at last we have sounded the depths of the democratic principle. Low birth and 

Another characteristic of democracy is the assimilation of the dress and mode of life of rich and poor, and of the rearing of their children (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.). This is in harmony with the conception of democracy according to which it is based on equality for all.

The inconsistencies which have been noticed in Aristotle’s account of democracy perhaps reflect real inconsistencies in democracy itself. It is perhaps true that democracy claims equality for all and the supremacy of the majority and an interchange of rule, but also claims supremacy for the poor and low-born. Its claims are thus not wholly self-consistent, but its paramount claim is supremacy for the poor and the full participation of the poor in all forms of political activity.

Its organization will evidently vary according as one or other of these conceptions of it predominates. Aristotle’s first form of democracy is based on the conception according to which democracy implies equality for all; the ultimate democracy on the conception according to which
democracy is the supremacy of the poor and the full participation of the poor in all forms of political activity. But even in the ultimate democracy the principle of the equality of rich and poor was not abandoned; the rich were legally possessed of all the political rights enjoyed by the poor, though they were commonly in too great a minority to exercise them with effect. There was a nominal equality, but a real inequality, in the position of rich and poor.

One characteristic of democracy meets with less notice from Aristotle than we might have expected. If it is the rule of the many and the poor, the many, we are told in 8 (6). 4. 1318b 16 sq., seek gain rather than honour, and gain, we might expect, rather than a barren liberty and equality, or even a barren rule of the poor, must be the aim of democracy. And, in fact, Aristotle implies in 8 (6). 7. 1321a 40 sqq. that one of the characteristics of democracy is that those who rule in it seek gain rather than honour. But nothing is said of this characteristic of democracy elsewhere. The aim of democracy is usually represented by Aristotle to be liberty, or liberty and equality, or the rule of the majority or of the poor, or the interchange of rule, not the gain of the ruling class. Yet perhaps his remark in 8 (6). 7. 1321a 40 sqq. is not without an element of truth. The dominant class in a democracy usually seeks not only to rule but to derive material profit from its rule.

Some light will be thrown on the characteristics of Greek democracy if we briefly note a few important points in which it differed from modern democracy.

The demos in a Greek State was only a section of the working class, for a large part of the working class consisted of metoeci and slaves. Hence the dominant class in a Greek democracy was less numerous and outnumbered the rich and the moderately well-to-do less, than in a modern democracy. Thus in 6 (4). 14. 1298b 23 sq. it is implied that the demos might not greatly exceed the notables in number. Nor was this all. The poorer class of citizens in a Greek democracy was itself a privileged
Greek and modern democracy. lix

class and had classes beneath it on which it looked down, metoeci and slaves. Not so the poor in a modern democracy.

The demos in a Greek State was not too large to be brought together in an open-air meeting for purposes of deliberation and discussion. A meeting composed of all the citizens of a modern city would often be unmanageably large, and a meeting composed of all the citizens of a modern State would be manifestly impossible. Hence a modern democracy cannot be ruled by the demos in person; it must be ruled by representatives, and an assembly of representatives is less likely to be able to make its momentary will supreme over the law and to overthrow the authority of the magistracies than an assembly composed of the citizens themselves. In a Greek democracy, on the other hand, it was comparatively easy for the whole citizen-body gathered in an assembly and headed by its demagogues to administer as well as to rule and to free itself from the restraints of law.

In a Greek democracy, again, the State was ruled from one centre, in modern democracies it is ruled from many centres, which check and balance each other. Its policy is shaped by representative bodies representing a number of widely scattered constituencies, no one of which is dominant over the rest. It is the result of discussion carried on by persons gathered from a very large area, whereas in the assembly of a Greek democracy the disputants would usually be citizens of a single not very large city. A modern democracy consequently stands far more in need of organizers and wire-pullers than a Greek democracy did, and these men play a far greater part in it. They are needed, indeed, not only to keep the various centres working together, but also to guide the many elections of officials and representatives which must necessarily take place. These are far more numerous in a modern than in a Greek democracy, because the lot is not now used in making appointments to offices.

We have seen that the deliberative in a Greek demo-
cracy, consisting as it did of the citizens themselves, not of representatives of them, stood in a different relation to the magistracies from that in which a representative deliberative body stands to the executive in a modern democracy. It was also less checked by the judicial authority than the deliberative in a modern democracy. The judges in a Greek democracy were not trained lawyers marked off by special knowledge from the common herd, but ordinary citizens grouped in large dicasteries, who shared the passions and the prejudices which prevailed in the deliberative assembly. In the ultimate democracy these dicasteries were paid, and consisted to a large extent of poor men, who were often only too ready to become the tools of the demagogues in their schemes of confiscation (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq.).

Another difference may be noted between the deliberative assembly in a Greek democracy and the legislature in a modern democracy. It was not a legislative body only, but both a legislative and a deliberative body, having power to decide some important administrative questions, such as those of peace, war, and alliance. Indeed, it had also power to decide some important judicial questions, for it had power to inflict on citizens the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation of property. Its powers, therefore, resembled those of the magistrates more than those of a modern legislative body do, and it was more easy for it to become a jealous rival of the magistrates, and ultimately to weaken their authority.

The poorer citizens in a Greek democracy, again, were more aspiring than the corresponding class in a modern democracy. They sought not merely for substantial gains or for a control of legislation and taxation in their own interest, but also for the gratification of their vanity; they wished to hold office and to act as judges and members of the assembly. They enjoyed having great men before them competing for their votes. In modern democracy this aim is still present, but as the sovereign people does not rule in person and cannot be gathered into one
all-powerful assembly, it is gratified in a less direct way. Modern democracy, though it demands a rotation of office (see note on 1317 b 17), seeks rather to regulate legislation and taxation in the interest of the labouring class than to give a turn of office to every poor man. Even in the ultimate form of Greek democracy, indeed, the poor did not claim to hold offices which demanded special experience and skill.

In ancient Greece, again, democracy, or at any rate extreme democracy, meant the supremacy of classes which were often in part of semi-alien or semi-servile origin. In many Greek cities the urban section of the demos contained a large admixture of elements of this kind. Democracy in most modern States brings no such consequences with it, though it is true that in the United States classes which are semi-alien, or even more than semi-alien, play a considerable part in politics.

Tyranny.

Aristotle does not always define tyranny in the same way. His earliest definition of it in the Politics makes it a form of monarchy in which rule is exercised for the advantage of the monarch (3. 7. 1279 b 6 sq.), but in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book he treats as forms of tyranny a despotic kind of kingship found in some barbarian nations and the aesymneteship of early Greece (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq.), though he does not appear to hold that either the barbarian king or the aesymnète ruled for his own advantage. His reason for classing these two forms of monarchy as tyrannies apparently is that both possessed large powers of arbitrary rule (1295 a 16 sq.). Viewed in this light, the name of tyranny may be given to any office exercising despotic authority; thus the ephorship was regarded by some as a tyranny (2. 6. 1265 b 40: cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 13 sq.). Thucydides seems to approach this view when he tacitly contrasts tyrannies with ‘hereditary kingships with fixed rights’ (ἐν τῇ ἰττοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, 1. 13).
Others found the distinctive mark of tyranny not so much in the despotistic character of its rule as in its not ruling in accordance with law. Thus Plato says in Polit. 301 B, ὅταν μὴτε κατὰ νόμους μὴτε κατὰ ἓθη πράττῃ τις εἰς ἀρχὰς... μῶν οὐ τότε τὸν τουοιτὸν ἔκαστον τύραννον κλητέον; Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1356 b 37, μοναρχία δ’ ἐστὶ κατὰ τοῦτομα ἐν ἑἰς ἀπάντων κύριος ἐστιν τούτων δὲ ἥ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεῖα, ἡ δ’ ἀριστος τυραννίς, and Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, τίν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πάλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο (sc. Σωκράτης), τίν ὃς ἀκώντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὁ ἀρχὴν βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα. In the passage last quoted we find a further characteristic added that the rule of the tyrant is exercised over unwilling subjects (cp. Thuc. 3. 37. 2).

Tyranny is also described as a kind of rule based on deceit or force (Diog. Laert. 3. 83, τυραννίς δ’ ἐστιν ἐν ἑὶ παρακρουσθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχοντα: cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10 and Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 9 sq., where see note).

Aristotle's prevailing tendency is to define tyranny, or at any rate that kind of tyranny which is thought to be especially tyranny (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.), as a form of monarchy in which the monarch rules irresponsibly over men as good as, or better than, himself for his own advantage, and consequently rules over unwilling subjects (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 19 sqq.). Tyranny is the perversion not merely of kingship (3. 7. 1279 b 4 sqq.), but of absolute kingship (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sqq.), and just as the absolute king is greatly superior to those over whom he rules and rules for the common advantage, so his antithesis the tyrant is the inferior, or at any rate only the equal, of those over whom he rules and rules for his own advantage. It follows that if a man is to possess absolute power and not to be a tyrant, he must not only rule for the common advantage, but also be greatly superior to those over whom he rules

1 In this kind of tyranny the tyrant possesses unlimited powers, but is there not a kind of tyranny in which the tyrant possesses only limited powers and uses them for his own advantage?
THE RISE OF TYRANNY IN GREEK STATES. lxiii

(4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq.). When the ruler possesses this transcendent superiority, men willingly accept his rule (3. 13. 1284 b 32 sqq.), and he is not a tyrant. Rule comes to the king by reason of his virtue, to the tyrant by reason of the power which enables him to make himself tyrant, whether that power is possessed by him as a king or as a great official or as a demagogue and general (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 14–31).

The first introduction of tyranny in the Greek world seems to have been due not to demagogues, but to kings or great officials who converted the positions legally held by them into tyrannies, and thus were the first to make the breach through which later on so many soldier-demagogues successfully passed. Tyranny was a legacy from the early incautious days in which kingships existed and great magistracies were held by single individuals. Even the soldier-demagogue, when he arose, commonly held some great military office before he made himself tyrant (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.).

In later days most tyrants, but not all, won their tyrannies as demagogues. Not all, for some won their tyrannies simply because they possessed an overpowering influence in the State (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), others because they were the holders of important offices for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.), others because they belonged to leading families in close oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22 sq.), others because they were captains of mercenaries (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 22 sq.) or 'neutral magistrates' (αρχωνες μεσίδωι, 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 26 sqq.). Another class of tyrants consisted of nominees of Persia or in later days of Macedon.

The rise of tyranny in ancient Greece was not, as it was in mediaeval Italy, a symptom of exhaustion and weariness of faction. It was often due rather to the difficulty which the demos experienced in overthrowing oligarchies which oppressed it. It could not easily overthrow these oligarchies unless it was headed by a man possessing both military and demagogic skill. In early oligarchies the demos was for the most part a rural demos, while the
oligarchs dwelt in the city. A demagogue at the head of a demos of this kind found himself in a difficult position. He had to defend in the city the rights of supporters scattered over the country, too distant and busy to give him effective support. He had to prosecute in oligarchical lawcourts rich men who had wronged poor men. We can readily imagine that he was almost driven by stress of circumstances to make himself tyrant (Plato, Rep. 565 D sqq.). He would obviously stand in great need of a bodyguard. That Cypselus, though the founder of a tyranny at Corinth, never had a bodyguard is mentioned as a remarkable fact (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27 sq.). This bodyguard he had to ask of the State, and Aristotle thinks (3. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) that the citizens would have been wise if they had done what was usually done when an aesymnete was elected, and had limited the numbers of the bodyguard, not allowing it to be stronger than the many, but this precaution was commonly neglected, no doubt because, when the bodyguard was granted, the demos felt unbounded confidence in its champion. The bodyguard of a tyrant was usually composed of aliens, notwithstanding that he had the support of the demos, and this was a sinister sign. It meant that he intended to be independent of the demos.

An alien bodyguard would be most easily hired in regions in which mercenary soldiers were easily obtainable. Thus Corinth Sicyon and Megara, the earliest homes of tyranny in Greece Proper, were close to Arcadia, where mercenary soldiers were always to be had. States bordering on regions peopled with warlike barbarians (for instance, States in Caria, Sicily, or Thrace), or near bodies of warlike slaves like the Penestae, were similarly circumstanced. It would be especially easy, again, to obtain mercenaries at the close of great wars, when large numbers of men had lost all taste and aptitude for peaceful pursuits. Thus the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse and probably that of Pherae arose at the end of the Peloponnesian War. It was no doubt a fortunate thing for Greece that these tyrannies enlisted so many turbulent
spirits in their service and drew them away to Syracuse and Pherae.

It was not always under oligarchy that the hostility between rich and poor arose from which tyranny usually sprang. It sometimes arose under a democracy. Herodotus (3. 82) describes tyranny as arising under both oligarchy and democracy. Plato, indeed, in the Republic (562 B sqq.) conceives tyranny as always arising under democracy, but that was evidently not the case. In his picture of the tyrant he clearly has Dionysius the Elder especially in view, and the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder arose under a democracy (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. 176 D).

The rise of tyranny seems to have been often connected with other than purely internal difficulties, though neither Plato nor Aristotle draws attention to the fact. Dionysius the Elder acquired his tyranny when Syracuse was fighting for its existence against a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily which had already proved fatal to several of its Greek cities. It is likely enough that the establishment of a tyranny at Corinth by Cypselus in B.C. 657 was connected with the revolt of Corcyra from Corinth and the sea-fight fought by their fleets in B.C. 664. So again the origin of the tyranny at Pherae was probably connected with the struggle of Larissa and Pherae for supremacy, which, beginning at the end of the fifth century B.C., ultimately resulted in the subjection of Thessaly to Philip of Macedon. At times of crisis, when the existence of the State was threatened by external foes, the concentration of civil and military authority in the hands of one able man had its advantages 1. This was especially felt in Sicily, which never forgot that a formidable Carthaginian invasion had been repulsed in B.C. 480 by the tyrant Gelon. If the invasion of Greece Proper by Xerxes had been repulsed under the leadership of tyrants, it is probable that tyranny would have won the prestige there which it enjoyed in

1 That the value of a single able ruler was recognized we see fromThuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. 1.

Sicily. No doubt tyrannies were often successfully set up at times when the State was not menaced by any external perils, and when the only thing that troubled its peace was internal faction. This was the case with the tyranny of Peisistratus among others.

The mere fact that tyrants needed a bodyguard made a considerable revenue a necessity of their position. Thus it was in wealthy States that tyranny was most at home. This large revenue was raised by taxation which was often oppressive. We gather from 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 14 that 'eisphorae and liturgies' were commonly exacted by tyrants from their subjects. We also hear of their receiving a certain proportion of the produce of the soil, often a tenth. The heavy taxes levied by tyrants were a characteristic feature of their rule, and were no doubt partly responsible for its commonly short duration. Free States appear to have intentionally abstained from following their example in this matter. Usually, however, tyrants were not satisfied with possessing a large revenue; they also sought to amass a treasure (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 10). The possession of a treasure enabled them to act more promptly in special emergencies than they could otherwise have done. They needed it, or thought that they needed it, to face the perils of their position, but it also added to these perils, for those whom the tyrant left in charge of his treasure, when he was absent from the city, often conspired against him (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 10 sqq.). It was easy for tyrants to amass a treasure, for, as their rise to supreme power was commonly opposed by most of the rich, they had abundant opportunities of enriching themselves by confiscation. The more the expenditure of the tyrant increased, the greater would be the temptation to plunder the rich, and his expenditure constantly tended to increase. Partly to keep his mercenaries employed, partly to win glory and popularity, partly to make himself indispensable to the State, the tyrant often made war. He would easily find excuses for war, for the great resources, political military and financial, which were at his disposal and the concentration of authority in his hands must have made all
neighbouring States distrustful of him and anxious, if not actually hostile. His own subjects were not sorry when he made war, for they knew that he would be obliged to arm them, and they hoped, when he had done so, to find some opportunity of dethroning him (Diod. 14. 45. 5, 14. 64. 4: Isocr. Hel. § 32).

The extent to which tyrants altered the laws and constitution of the State which they ruled seems to have varied. Mr. Freeman is probably right in saying (Sicily, 2. 53): 'It does not appear that the tyrant, as a rule, swept away the laws and constitution of the city. The forms of law might go on; it was enough if magistrates and assemblies practically did their master’s bidding. Whenever either silent influence or express command failed to secure obedience, the spearmen were ready to step in.' Still Herodotus (3. 80) says of the tyrant, 'he changes traditional customs' (νόματα κυρεί πάρμα), and it is clear from Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 17 sq. that the tyrants of Salamis in Cyprus at any rate, besides issuing their edicts (Isocr. loc. cit.: cp. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20), also revised the laws and tried and decided lawsuits in person.

Aristotle recommends the tyrant to win, if possible, the support both of the rich and of the poor, or, if not, the support of whichever of these classes was the stronger (7 (5). 11. 1315 a 31 sqq.). He implies that it was always open to him to win the support of the rich, but this it must have commonly been difficult for him to do. His taxation fell with especial severity on the rich. He dreaded those of them who ranked as notables, for conspiracies against him were for the most part their work, and he especially dreaded those who overtopped the rest (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 40). It cannot have been easy for him to employ the notables in the work of government, and yet, if they had no share in it, they were discontented. The tyrants seem to have brought into the administration of the State the methods by which the generals in command of besieged cities controlled them (see note on 1313 a 41), and these methods would be especially odious to the leisured class, the class
which set most store by freedom in social intercourse. Greek cities were commonly pervaded by a hum of discussion and talk, but a silence fell on them under a tyranny of the worse kind; the tyrant's spies made social intercourse dangerous; the citizens came not only to distrust each other, but to be unacquainted with each other. The poor suffered less under a government of this kind than the rich. The tax on the produce of the soil no doubt fell in part upon them, and the impoverishment of the rich must have cost them dear. Tyrants were also sometimes led by their fear of plots to discourage the residence of the poor in the central city and to keep them hard at work. Still they occasionally helped the poor with gifts or loans of money, and were often great builders, and therefore great employers of labour. The tyrants of Corinth and probably of Miletus \(^1\) founded colonies which must have given many poor men a chance of enriching themselves, and so did Dionysius the Elder. The luxurious court of the tyrant was partly supplied by alien handicraftsmen, but it was also a source of profit to the native poor, and many new arts were introduced and old ones developed under his rule.

Plato's sketch of the tyrant's career (Rep. 568 E), however, implies that a time often came in the course of it when he found that he had run through the property of the rich. He had now only poor men to tax, and his heavy expenditure had to be maintained at the cost of his early friends, the demos. He thus lost their good will, and it sometimes became necessary for him to disarm them and to win fresh supporters by emancipating slaves.

Even a short period of tyranny must have been injurious to a State. Many of its natural leaders would be put to death or exiled or stripped of their property, and however short a time a tyranny might last, it would be difficult, when it fell, to replace them in their position. A long continuance of tyranny, however, must have been far more ruinous. In the early days of a tyrant's rule the citizens would at any rate know what freedom meant, for they would

\(^1\) See as to the latter E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums, 2. 447.
have lived at one time under more or less free institutions; but as time went on and a generation grew up which had never known any government but tyranny, a visible deterioration of character must have set in. The best elements of the citizen-body would long have been weeded out and their place taken by the tyrant’s mercenaries, some of them probably not even of Hellenic extraction, and only those would have been left from whom the tyrant had nothing to fear. A general mediocrity would prevail. The citizens would not be as well acquainted with each other as they were in a free State, and would often lack confidence in themselves and in each other. A State thus morally enfeebled was fit for nothing but tyranny, and tyranny would find a more or less permanent home in it. This, at any rate, was the fate of Syracuse. Yet it was not the fate of all States long ruled by tyrants. At Heracleia on the Euxine, on the extinction of a tyranny which lasted for nearly eighty years, a democracy was set up which would seem to have been sufficiently well-ordered to last for more than two centuries, and which came to an end only when the city received its death-blow.

In the later years of Greek tyranny the tyrant was often not even a native of the State he ruled. He was frequently merely a captain of mercenaries unconnected with the State.

As in mediaeval Italy, so in ancient Greece tyrants do not all stand on the same level. Not only were some far better rulers than others, but some could point to public services which made amends to a certain extent for their usurpation of power. Gelon and Dionysius the Elder humbled Carthage and added to the greatness of Syracuse, while others could claim to have overthrown oppressive oligarchies.

Tyranny was less widespread in ancient Greece than in mediaeval Italy, and held its ground with more difficulty. In mediaeval Italy its rise often meant that the citizens were weary of the struggles of the factions which had torn the State asunder and had made material prosperity
impossible, or that they saw that the days of citizen armies were over and that the mercenary troops which had taken their place needed a strong hand to rule them. Its rise was often a symptom of exhaustion and decline. This was less the case in ancient Greece. The rise of tyranny there did not commonly betoken a diminution of political ardour in the minds of the citizens or a disinclination for military service. Citizen armies did not fall into the background in ancient Greece as much as they did in mediaeval Italy. Tyranny was less dictated by circumstances and was more reluctantly endured. One indication of this may be found in the short duration of most dynasties of tyrants in ancient Greece, and the long continuance of many such dynasties in mediaeval Italy. The establishment of a tyranny in ancient Greece often meant no more than this, that some clever and unscrupulous soldier-demagogue had succeeded in using for his own aggrandizement a moment of disunion or of internal or external crisis.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ζ' (Δ').

Ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς 1288 b 10 μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, ἀλλὰ περὶ γένους ἐν τι τελείας οὕσαις, μᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρήσαι τὸ περὶ ἑκαστὸν γένος ἀρμόττον, οἷον ἀσκησις σώματι ποιὰ τε ποίῳ συμφέρει καὶ τίς ἀρίστη (τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκότι καὶ κεχορηγημένῳ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἀρμόττειν), καὶ τίς τοῖς πλείστοις μία πᾶσιν (καὶ 15 2 γὰρ τούτῳ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔργον ἐστὶν) ἐτί d' ἐάν τις μὴ τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἐπιθυμῆ ὑπῆρ' ἔξεσθ' μὴ' ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν, τμῆδεν ἥττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι τε καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν. ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ λατρικῆν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγίαν καὶ ἐσθήτα καὶ 20 3 περὶ πάσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὀρθῶς συμβαίνουν, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἑστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἑστὶ, καὶ ποίᾳ τίς ἀν οὐσα μάλιστ' εἰν κατ' εὐχήν, μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός, καὶ τίς τῶν ἀρμόττουσαν· πολλοὶς γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἢσος ἄδυναν, ὡστε τὴν κρατὴ· 25 στὴν τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὅς ἄληθῶς πολιτικῶν· 4 ἔτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δυνάσθαι θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἀν γένοιτο, καὶ γενομένη τίνα τρόπον ἀν σῶσοιτο πλείστον χρόνον· λέγω δὲ οἷον εἶ τινι 30 πόλει συμβέβηκε μήτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύσεθαι πολιτείαν ἀχορηγητὴν τε εἰναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, μήτε τὴν ἐνδε- 5 χομήνην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλὰ τινα φαιλοτέραν. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὴν μάλιστα πᾶσαι ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρμότ·

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35 τούσαν δεῖ γνωρίζειν, ὡς οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας, καὶ εἰ τάλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, τῶν γε χρησίμων διαμαρτάνουσιν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν ἀρίστην δεἳ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ 6 καὶ τὴν δυνατήν, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν βραύ καὶ κοινοτέραν ἀπάσαις· νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολιτείας ἀναφέροντες πολιτείας τὴν Δακωνικὴν 1289 α ή τίνα ἄλλην ἐσαινοῦσιν· δρῆ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν 7 ἡν βραύς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ πεισθόσσονται καὶ δυνηθόσσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὥς ἦστιν οὐκ ἔκατον ἐργὸν τὸ ἐπιστρέφοσι πολιτείαν ἡ κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μετα- 5 μανθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν ἢ ἀρχῆς. διὸ πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχουσίαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ἐλέξθη καὶ πρότερον. τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον 8 ἁγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἔστιν εἴδη, νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρα- τίαν οἴονται τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν οὐκ ἔστι δὲ 10 τούτ' ἀληθεῖς. ὅστε δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς μῆ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν πολιτείων, πόσα, καὶ συντίθενται ποσακχῶς. μετὰ δὲ τῆς 9 αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμως τοὺς ἀρίστους ἱδείν καὶ τοὺς ἐκάστη τῶν πολιτείων ἀρμόττοντας' πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολι- τείας τοὺς νόμους δεὶ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς 15 πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἔστι τάξις ταῖς 10 πόλεωι ἡ περὶ τᾶς ἀρχᾶς, τίνα τρόπον νενεμμέναι, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστους τῆς κοινω- νίας ἑστίν· νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλοῦντων τὴν πολι- τείαν, καθ' οὖς δεὶ τοὺς ἀρχοῦσας ἄρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς 20 παραβαινούντας αὐτούς. ὅστε δήλον ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγ- 11 καίον καὶ τὸν ἀρίθμον ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις· οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐκ αὐτοὺς νόμους συμ- φέρειν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις, εἰπερ δὴ πλείους καὶ μή μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία 25 μόνον ἐστίν.

2. 'Επεὶ δ' ἐν τῇ πρώτη μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτείων διει-
λόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραννίδα μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίαν, δημοκρατίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας 30 εἰρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρήσαι ταύτο καὶ περὶ τούτων ἑστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὄνομάτων· βούλεται γὰρ ἕκατέρα κατ’ ἀρετήν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην), ἕτεὶ δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλοις ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία, καὶ πότε δὲι βασιλείαν νομίζειν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πο- 35 λιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευμένης ὑνόματι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημο- 2 κρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων τῆς χειρίστης καὶ δευτέρα τῆς. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρῶτης καὶ θειότατης παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρί- 40 στην’ τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον ἐχεῖν οὐκ οὖσαν, ὥς δὲ λοιπὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλευοντος· 1289 b ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὐσάν πλείστον ἄπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέ- στηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ 3 τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἢδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήματο καὶ τῶν πρὸ- 5 τερον ὥστος, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταύτο βλέψας ἢμιν. ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἐκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οὐδὲν ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστής καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστης δημοκρατίαν, φαίνει δὲ ἀρίστην’ ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἰσημαρτημένα εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ βελτίων μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλὸς ἢκει 10 4 λέγειν, ἢττον δὲ φαύλην. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρί- σεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαρετέον πόσαι διαφοραῖ πῶς πολιτείων, εἶπεν ἑστὶν εἰδή πλείονα τῆς τῆς δη- μοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐπειτα τῆς κοινοτάτης καὶ τῆς αἱρετωτάτης μετὰ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, κἂν εἶ τῆς ἄλλης 15 τετύχουσαν ἀριστοκρατική καὶ συνειστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλὰ ταῖς 5 πλείοσταις ἀρμόττουσα πόλεις, τῆς ἑστὶν ἐπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλ- λων τῆς· τίσιν αἱρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημο-
κρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῦ δὲ αὐτῆς μᾶλλον ἐκείνης). 20 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθ' ἐκα- στὸν εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας τέλος δὲ, πάντων τούτων 6 ὅταν ποιησόμεθα συντάμος τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρα- τέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραί καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτείων 25 καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρίς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταύτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

3 Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἰτίων ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείο πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμὸν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκίων συγκειμένας πάσας ὅρμουν τὰς πόλεις, ἐπειτὰ πάλιν τοῦτον 30 τοῦ πλῆθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δ᾿ ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν ὀπλιτικόν τὸ δὲ ἄνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δήμον ὅρω- 2 μὲν ὄντα, τὸν δ᾿ ἀγοράιον, τὸν δὲ Βάναυσον. καὶ τῶν γνω- ρίων εἰσὶ διαφοράι καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ἰπποτροφίας (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μέδιον μὴ πλου- τοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσας πόλε- 3 σιν ἐν τοῖς ἤποιοι ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχία παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν· ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἤποιοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυ- γειτόνας, οἷον Ἐρετρείας καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ Μαϊάνδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν). ἔτι πρὸς 4 40 ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοράς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ 1290 α κατ᾽ ἁρετήν, καὶ εἰ τι δῆ τουτόν ἔτερον εἰρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρους ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ πάσα πόλις. τοῦτον γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὅτε μὲν πάντα μετέχει τῆς πολιτείας, ὅτε δ᾿ 5 ἐλάττω, ὅτε δὲ πλείω, φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἰδεὶ διαφεροῦσα ἅλληλον καὶ γὰρ ταύτ᾿ εἰδεὶ διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξεις ἐστί, ταύτην δὲ διανέμομεν πάντες ἢ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀυτῶν ἰσότητα 10 κοινῆν (λέγω δὲ οἷον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων), ἡ κοινῆν
6 τιν' ἀμφοῖν. ἀναγκαῖον ἀρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς εἰσὶ καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων. μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσι εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δ' ἀλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, 15 δήμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. τὴν γὰρ ἀριστοκρατίαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος τιθέασιν ὅσ οὕσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν τινά, καὶ τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τῶν μὲν ξέφυροι τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὕρον. ὁμοίος δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας, ώς φασὶ τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ 20 τίθενται εἰδὴ δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ φρυγιστὶ, τὰ δ' ἀλλα 8 συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δάφρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. μάλιστα μὲν οὐν εἰόθασιν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν· ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, δυοῖν ἡ μιᾶς οὕσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκίας τὰς ἀλλὰς εἶναι 25 παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἀρμονίας, τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ διεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ' ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοκρατίας.

Οὐ δεί δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ εἰόθασι τινες 4 νῦν, ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὅποιν κύριον τὸ πλῆθος (καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλέον μέρος κύριον), οὔδ', ὁλι- 2 2 γαρξίαν, ὅποιν κύριοι ὁλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ εἴσαν οἱ πάντες χίλιοι καὶ τριακόσιοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ χίλιοι πλού- σιοι, καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἄρχης τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν 35 ἑλευθέροις οὕσι καὶ τάλα ὁμοίοις, οὔδεις ἀν φαίη δημοκρα- 3 τεῖσθαι τούτοις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πένητες μὲν ὁλίγοι εἶν, κρείττους δὲ τῶν εὐπόρων πλειών ὄντων, οὔδεις ἀν ὀλιγαρ- χίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὔδε τὴν τοιαύτην, εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔσι πλουσίοις μὴ μετείχεν τῶν τιμῶν. μᾶλλον τούτων λεκτέων ὃτι 40 δήμος μὲν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἑλεύθεροι κύριοι ὄσιν, ὀλιγαρχία 1290 b 4 δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι· ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει οὓς μὲν πολλοὺς εἶναι τούς δ' ὁλίγους· ἑλεύθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δ' ὁλίγοι.
καὶ γὰρ ἄν εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο τὰς ἄρχας, ὅσπερ
5 ἐν Ἀιλιοπόλει φασὶ τινες, ἢ κατὰ κάλλος, ὀλγαρχία ipp ἄν.
ολέγων γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν με-
γάλων, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον ἰκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι 5
tὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τῆς ὀλγαρχίας εἰσὶν, ἢ ἡ διαληπτεῖν ὡς ὦν' ἤν οἱ 10 ἐλευθεροί ὀλέγοι ὄντες πλείστοι καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἀρχωσι, ἰδίους, οὖν ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἰονίῳ καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ (ἐν τούτων γὰρ ἐκατέρτι τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἤσαν οἱ διαφέροντες καὶ εὐγένειαι καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποκιάς, ὀλέγοι ὄντες πολλῶν), οὔτε ἄν οἱ πλούσιοι διὰ τὸ 15 κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, ὀλγαρχία, οὖν ἐν Κολοφώνι τὸ πα-
λαιόν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκέκτητο μακρὰν οὔσιαν οἱ πλείους πρὶν
gενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδοῦς), ἀλλ' ἐστὶ δημοκρα-
tία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλευθεροί καὶ ἀποροὶ πλείους ὄντες κύριοι
tῆς ἄρχης ὄςιν, ὀλγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέ-
20 στεροὶ ὀλέγοι ὄντες.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν πλείους, καὶ δὲ ἢν αἰτίαν, εἰρήν-
tαί· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τέ,
λέγωμεν ἄρχην λαβώντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρόσερον. ὀμολο-
γούμεν γὰρ οὕς ἐν ἰμέρος ἀλλὰ πλεῖώ πάσαν ἔχειν πόλιν.
25 ὅσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῷον προηρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἰδή, πρῶτον μὲν ἄν 8
ἀποδιωρίζομεν ὑπὲρ ἀναγκαίον πάν ἔχειν ζῷον, οὖν ἐνια ἐν τῶν ἀισθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς προφήτης ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικὸν, οὖν στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κυνεῖται μορίοις ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα [εἰδή] μόνον, τούτων δ' εἶπεν 30 διαφοραί, λέγω δ' οὖν στόματός τινα πλείω γένη καὶ κοι-
lίας καὶ τῶν αισθητηρίων, ἢτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων, ὁ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιῆσει πλεῖον γένη ζῷον (οὐ γὰρ οὖν τῆς τούτων ζῴου ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς, ὡμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ὅταν), ὥστ' ὅταν λη-
35 φθόσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοὶ, ποιῆσουσιν εἰδή ζῷον, καὶ τοσαῦτ' εἰδὴ τοῦ ζῴου ὄσαπερ αἱ συζεύξεις
9 τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἔξ ἐνός ἄλλ' ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μερῶν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται πολλάκις. ἐν μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωρ-40 γοι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυσον (ἐστὶ δὲ τούτο τὸ περὶ 1291 αὐτὸν τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δει, τὰς δὲ εἰς τροφὴν ἢ τὸ καλὸς ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ' ἀγοραῖον (λέγω δ' ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὀνάς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ 5 κεφαλαίας διατρίβουν), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσαι, δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἤττον ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον 11 ὑπάρχειν, εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσει τοῖς ἐπιούσιν. μὴ γὰρ εἰς τῶν ἀνυμάτων ἰὶ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δουλήν αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δύολον οὐκ αὐτάρκες. διότεροι ὁ 12 ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψῷ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἰκανῶς δὲ εἰρηται. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλεων συγκεῖσθαι, λέγει δὲ τούτους ὑφάντην καὶ γεωργὸν καὶ σκυ-τοτόμον καὶ οἰκοδόμον' πάλιν δὲ προστίθησιν, ὡς οὐχ αὐτάρ-κων τούτων, χαικέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις βοσκήμα-15 σιν, ἢτι δ' ἐμποροῖ τε καὶ κάτηλον ταῦτα πάντα γί-νεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πάσαν πόλιν συνεπτυκυίαν, ἀλλ' οὗ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον, 13 ἵσον τε δεσμένης σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. τὸ δὲ προπολε-μοῦν οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδοσι μέρος πρῶτον ἢ τῆς χώρας αὐξο-20 μένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίων ἀπομένης εἰς πόλεων κατα-στώσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρες καὶ τοῖς ὀποσοιοίς κοινωνίων ἀναγκαῖοι εἰναι τινα τῶν ἀποδόσουντα και κρινόμενα 14 τὸ δίκαιον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ψυχήν ἀν τις θείη ζῴου μόριον μᾶλλον 5 ὑ σῶμα, καὶ πόλεως τὰ τοιαύτα μᾶλλον θετέον 25 τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν συντεινόντων, τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτως τὸ 15 βουλεύόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. καὶ ταῦτα εἰτε κεχωρισμένως ὑπάρχει τισίν εἰτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲν δια-
30 φέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον καὶ γὰρ ὅπλιστευει καὶ γεωργεῖν συμβαίνει τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολλάκις· ὡστε εἰτερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκείνα θετέα μόρια τῆς πόλεως, φαινέρον ὅτι τὸ γε ὅπλιστευει καὶ· ἀναγκαίον ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς πόλεως. ἐβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς εὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, δ καλοῦμεν εὐτάρειας. ὅγδοον δὲ τὸ δημουργ. 16

35 γικὸν καὶ τὸ περὶ τᾶς ἀρχὸς λειτουργοῦν, εἰτερ ἀνευ ἀρχῶν τῶν ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν. ἀναγκαίον οὖν εἶναι τινας τοὺς δυναμένους ἀρχεῖν λειτουργοῦντας ἡ συνεχῶς ἢ κατά μέρος τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ τῆς λειτουργίαν. λοιπὰ δὲ περὶ δὲν 17 τυγχάνομεν διωρίκτοις ἀρτίως, τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κρῖνον 40 περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητήσωσιν, εἰτερ οὖν ταῦτα δεὶ γενέσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ καλῶς γενέσθαι καὶ δικαίως.

1291 b ἀναγκαίον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναι τινας ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. τάς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν 18 ἐνδεχομαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἷον τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχνίτας, ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς βουλευο. 5 μένους τε καὶ κρίνοντας· ἀντιποιούντας δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες, καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχεῖν οἴονται δύνασθαι· ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα 19 μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄποροὶ. ἐτὶ δὲ δία τὸ ὦς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὁλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ 10 πολλοὺς, ταῦτα ἑνάντια μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὡστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τοῦτων καθιστάσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεία πολυκοῦν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας 20 15 αἰτίας, εἰρητεὶ πρότερον ὅτι ἑ' ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρατίας εἰδὴ πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, λέγωμεν. φανέρων δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἰδὴ γὰρ πλείω τοῦτ τὸ δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγο- 21 μένων γνωρίμων ἐστὶν, οἷον δῆμου μὲν εἰδὴ ἐν μὲν οἱ γεωργοὶ, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἀλλο δὲ τὸ ἄγοραίον τὸ περὶ 20 ὑφή καὶ πράσιν διατρίβοι, ἀλλο δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀλάταν, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πολεμικόν, τὸ δε χρηματιστικόν, τὸ δε πορ-
θ' ἀληθικῶν, τὸ δ' ἀληθικῶν (πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἐκαστὰ τούτων πολύσχλα, οἷον Ἀλείσι μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ, τριή-
ρικὸν δὲ Ἀθήνης, ἐμπορικὸν δὲ ἐν Ἀἰγίνῃ καὶ Χήρ, πορ-
θυμεικὸν ἐν Τενέδῳ), πρὸς δὲ τούτως τὸ χερνητικόν καὶ τὸ 25
μικράν ἔχων οὐσίαν ὡςτε μὴ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἔτι τὸ
μὴ ἐξ ἀμφωτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλέυθερον, κἂν εἶ τι τοιοῦτον
22 ἔτερον πλῆθους εἴδοσ· τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια,
ἀρετή, παιδεία, καὶ τὰ τούτως λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν
dιαφορὰν. δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη 30
μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἵσον. ἵσον γὰρ φησὶν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς
tοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς
ἀπόρους τοὺς εὐτύρους, μηδὲ κυρίου εἰναι ὀπτορευοῦσιν, ἀλλ'
23 ὁμοίους ἀμφωτέρους. ἐπερ γὰρ ἔλευθερία μάλιστ' ἐστιν ἐν δη-
μοκρατίᾳ, καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἴσοτης, οὕτως 35
ἀν εἴῃ μάλιστα, κοινωνοῦντων ἀπαίτων μάλιστα τῆς πολι-
teίας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δήμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν
24 τοῖς πλείσσων, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἐν μὲν οὖν
εἶδος δημοκρατίας τούτο, ἀλλο δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμη-
μάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὅτων, δεิ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ 40
ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν, καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ μετέχειν
ἐτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἀπαντας τοὺς πολίτας 1292 a
25 ὅσοι ἀνυπεθύνουν, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον ἐτερον δὲ εἶδος δη-
μοκρατίας τὸ πάσι μετείνα τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἶν πάντων ἡ πολι-
tῆς, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον ἐτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τάλλα
μὲν εἶναι ταύτα, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νό-5
μον τούτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν τὰ ψηφισματα κύρια ἡ ἀλλά
26 μὴ ο νόμος. συμβάινει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγογούς, ἐν
μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναι οὐ γίνεται δη-
μαγογός, ἀλλ' οἱ βλέπτουσι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσίν ἐν προεδρίᾳ
ὅποι δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἴση κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγο-10
γοί. μοναρχοι γὰρ ὁ δήμος γίνεται, σὺνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολ-
λῶν οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσίν οἷς ὁς ἐκαστὸς ἀλλὰ πάν-
27 τες. ὁμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι πολυκοιρανήν,
πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείουσ ὡς οἱ ἀρχοντες ὡς ἑκαστος, 15 ἀδηλον. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δήμος, ἀτε μόναρχοσ ὡς, ζητεὶ μο- ναρχεὶς διὰ τὸ μή ἀρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσπο- τικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἐντιμοῦν καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος δήμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἑδον τὸ 28 αὐτό, καὶ ἀμφω δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιώνων, καὶ τὰ ψη- 20 φίσματα ὁσπερ ἐκεὶ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγογὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δ' ἐκά- τεροι (παρ') ἐκατέρως ἵσχουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοὺς τυράννους, οἱ δὲ δημαγογοὶ τοὺς δήμους τοὺς τοιοῦτοι. αἵτιοι 29 δὲ εἰσὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους 25 οὕτω, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δήμον' συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλοις διὰ τὸ τῶν μὲν δήμου πάντων εἶναι κύ- ριοι, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δήμου δόξης τούτως' πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτου. ἐτὶ δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμον φασὶ 30 δεῖν κρίνειν, ὁ δὲ ἀσμένος δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν' ὡστε κα- 30 ταλόνται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί. εὐλόγοι δὲ ἀν δόξειν ἐπιτι- μᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν' ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐστὶν πολιτεία. δεὶ γὰρ τὸν 31 μὲν νόμον ἀρχεῖν πάντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἑκαστα τὰς ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὡστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία 35 τῶν πολιτείων, φανερῶν ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ἤ ψη- φίμαι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως' οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δη- μοκρατίας εἴδη διωφίζου τῶν τρόπων τοῦτον 5 Ἐλιγαρχίας δὲ εἰδη, ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι 40 τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων ὡστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεινά δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας' ἀλλὸ 1292 b δὲ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν οὐκ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἀἱρῶν- ται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἔλλειποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῖτο ποιώσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφορισμένων, ὠλιγαρχικὸν); ἔτερον εἶδος ὠλιγαρ- 2 5 χίας, ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίης τέταρτον δ', ὅταν
'Ολιγαρχίας μὲν οὖν εἰδή τοσαύτα καὶ δημοκρατίας· οὐ δὲ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλὰ κυριακόν ὅστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοσικήν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγανήν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοσικὸς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ’ ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολι-τείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ’ ἀγανή καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρ-χείσαν μᾶλλον, συμβαίνει δὲ τούτο μᾶλλον μετὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτείων‘ οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ’ ἄλλη-λοιν, ὡσ’ οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προπάρχοντες, κρα-τούν δ’ οἱ μεταβάλλοντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

"Οτι δ’ ἐστὶ τοσαύτα εἰδή δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλιγαρ-χίας, εἰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερῶν ἐστὶν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἡ πάντα τὰ εἰρήμενα μέρη τοῦ δήμου κοινοῦν τῆς πολιτείας, ἡ τα μὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικόν καὶ τὸ κε-κτημένον μετράμενον οὐσίαν κύριον τῇ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους· ἐχοῦσα γὰρ ἐγγυηθεῖσας ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὡστε τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσασθαι ἐκκλησίαζον τὰς ἀναγκαία ἐκκλησίας· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν, ὅταν κτῆσονται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διορισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ὅλως 30 μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξείναι πάσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξείναι (πᾶσι δημοκρατικόν).· διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησισμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν· σχολαζείν (δ’) ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδον οὐσίων. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ διὰ ταῦτα τὰς αἰτίας· ἔτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν, ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ πάσιν ἐξείναι 35 τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μὲντοι δυναμένους 4 σχολάζειν. διὸπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δημοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόμοι ἀρχοῦν, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον· τρίτον δ’ εἶδος τὸ πάσιν ἐξείναι,
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ζ (4'). 6-7.

ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ὄσι, μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι 40 μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προερπημένην αἰτίαν, ὅστ’ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον· τέταρτον δὲ εἴδος δημοκρατίας 5 1293 a ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μείζον γεγονέναι πολὺ τὰς πόλεις τῶν ἔτευραλα καὶ προσόδων υπάρχειν εὐπορίας, μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλῆθους, κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ 5 πολιτεύονται διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι σχολαζεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους λαμβάνοντας μισθὸν. καὶ μάλιστα δὲ σχολάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον 6 πλῆθος· ὡς γὰρ ἐμποδίζει αὐτοὺς οὔδεν ἡ τῶν ἱδίων ἐπιμέλεια, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει, ὡστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὔτε τοῦ δικαίου, διὸ γίνεται τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων 10 πλῆθος κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἱ νόμοι. τὰ μὲν οὖν 7 τῆς δημοκρατίας εἰδὴ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας ἐστίν· τὰ δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ὡς τὸν πλείους ἔχουσιν οὐσίαν, ἐλάπτω δὲ καὶ μή πολλὴν λίαν, τὸ τῆς πρώτης ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος ἐστίν· ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἐξουσίαν μετέχειν 15 τῷ κτωμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ 8 πολιτείματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον εἶναι κύριον· ὅσο γὰρ ἄν πλείου ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας, καὶ μήτε τοσαῦτην ἔχουσιν οὐσίαν ὡστε σχολαζεῖν ἀμελεύνητες, μὴθ’ οὕτως ὀλγήνως ὡστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, 20 ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξίων αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοὺς. ἕλλεν δὲ δὴ ἐλάπτως ὡσιν οἱ τᾶς οὐσίας ἔχοντες ἢ οἱ τὸ πρὸ- 9 τερον, πλεῖον δὲ, τὸ τῆς δευτέρας ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεται εἴδος, μᾶλλον γὰρ ἵσχυντες πλεονεκτεῖν ἀξιόσωσι· διὸ αὐτοῖς μὲν αἴρονται ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τούς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας, 25 διὰ δὲ τὸ μέτωπο ὀφθαλμὸς ἵσχυροι εἶναι ὡστ’ ἀνεν νόμον ἄρχειν, τῶν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον. ἕλλεν δὲ ἐπιτείνωσι τῷ ἐλάπτων 10 ὄντες μείζονας οὐσίας ἔχειν, ἡ τρέτη ἐπίδοσις γίνεται τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, τὸ δ’ αὐτῶν μὲν τὰς ἄρχας ἔχειν, κατὰ νό- μον δὲ τῶν κελεύοντα τῶν τελευτῶνν διαδέχεσθαι τοὺς 30 υἱέσι. ὅταν δὲ ἤδη πολὺ ὑπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς 11
πολυφιλίας, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ, ἀλλ' οὖν ὁ νόμος καὶ τὸ τέταρτον εἰδὸς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀντιστρόφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.

"Ἐτι δ' εἰσὶ δύο πολιτείαι παρὰ δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ὁλιγαρχία, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἔτεραν λέγουσι τε πάντες καὶ εἰρήται τῶν τέτταρον πολιτείαν εἴδος ἐν' λέγουσι δὲ τέτταρας μοναρχίας, ὁλιγαρχίας, δημοκρατίας, τέταρτον τῷ τὴν καλομένην ἀριστοκρατίαν. πέμπτη δ' ἐστιν ἡ προσαγορεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὅνομα πασῶν (πολιτείαν γάρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ 40 τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτείων εἰδῆ, καὶ χρωται ταῖς τέτταροι μόνων,
8 Λοιπὸν δ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς ὄνομαζομένης πολιτείας εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τυραννίδος· ἔταξαμεν δ' οὕτως οὐκ οὕσαν οὗτε ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὗτε τάς ἁρτὶ ῥηθέισας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι 25 τὸ μὲν ἅλθες πᾶσα διημαρτήκαι τῆς ὀρθότητος πολιτείας, ἐπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσὶ τ' αὐτῶν αὐταὶ παρεκβάσεις, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὴν εἶπομεν. τε-2 λευταίον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλόγον ἔστι ποιήσασθαι μενείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν 30 μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας. δι' ἥν μὲν οὖν αὐταν τέτακται τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ἐφηται· νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολι- τείας. φανερότερα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένης τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὥς 3 ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, εἰώθαι 35 δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀποκλινοῦσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρα- τίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδεῖν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις. ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὐποροὶ ὅπερ ἐνεκεν οἱ 4 ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν· οὗν καὶ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους 40 τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἁρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναι φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον. δο-5 1294 a κεῖ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρα- τουμένην πόλιν ἀλλὰ ποιηκρατουμένην, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀρι- στοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία τὸ εὖ κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους, μὴ πείθεσθαι δὲ. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν 6 5 ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τὸ πείθεσθαι τοὺς κειμένοις νόμοις, ἐτέραν δὲ τὸ καλὸς κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐμένουσιν (ἔστι γὰρ πεί- θεσθαι καὶ κακὸς κειμένοις). τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἁρίστοις τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς, ἢ τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἁρίστοις. δοκεὶ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς 7 10 τιμᾶς νενεμήσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν· ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὁρος ἀρετῆ, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλούτους, δῆμου δ' ἐλευθερία· τὸ δ' δι' τι 8 ἀν δόξη τοῖς πλείστοις, ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλι-
γαρχία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλείον μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τούτῳ ἐστὶ κύριον. 8 ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καὶ λεῖται (μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοιχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλοῦτον καὶ ἐλευθερίας· σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὐπόροι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσιν κατέχειν 9 καὶ τρὶά εστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς ἱσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὅ 20 καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσὶ· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένεια ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖς δυσὶν μίξις, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν 10 ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐτέρα πολιτείας 25 εἰδὴ παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, εἰρητὶ, καὶ ποιὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλοις αἱ τὰ ἀριστοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ πολιτείαι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πάρρῳ αὕτα ἄλληλως, φανερὸν·

Τίνα δὲ τρόπον γίνεται παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλι- 9 γαρχίαν ἡ καλομενή πολιτεία, καὶ τῶς αὐτῆς δεὶ καθιστά- ναι, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς τοὺς εἰρημένους. ἀμά δὲ δήλων ἐσται καὶ οἷς ὁρίζονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· η- πτέον γὰρ τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν, εἶτα ἐκ τούτων ἀφ᾽ ἐκατέρας 2 ὁσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετέον. εἰσὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς 35 τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως. ἡ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ληπτέον ἂ ἐκάτερα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἰον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοῖς εὐπόροις ζημίαν τάττουσιν, ἀν μὴ δι- κάζωσι, τοῖς δὲ ἀπόροις οὐδένα μισθὸν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρα- τίαις τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις μισθὸν, τοῖς δὲ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν· η· 40 3 μίαν' κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφότερα ταῦτα· διὸ καὶ πολιτικῶν, μέμικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοίν. εἰς μὲν οὖν οὕτως τοῦ 1294 b 22—1294 b 4. συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ μέσον λαμβάνειν δὲν ἐκά- τεροι τάττουσιν, οἰον ἐκκλησιάζειν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμῆμας οὐδεμὸς ἡ μικρὸν πάμπαμ, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ μακρὸν τιμῆματος· κοι-
5 νον δὲ γε οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων. τρίτον δ' ἐκ δυοῖν ταγμάτων, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλιγαρ-4 ρικοῦ νόμου, τὰ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ. λέγω δ' οἶνον δοκεῖ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν εἶναι κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἄρχας, τὸ δ' αἱρετὰς ὅλιγαρχικῶν, καὶ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν τὸ μη ἀπὸ 10 τιμήματος, ὅλιγαρχικόν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τιμήματος: ἀριστοκρατικὸν τικὸν τοίνυν καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸ ἐξ ἐκατέρας ἐκάτερον λαβεῖν, ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὅλιγαρχίας τὸ αἱρετὰς ποιεῖ τὰς ἄρχας, ἐκ δὲ τῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μη ἀπὸ τιμήματος. ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς 6 μίξεως οὕτως, τοῦ δ' εὐ μεμίχθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὅλιγαρχίαν 15 ὅρος, ὅταν ἐνδέχεται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὅλιγαρχίαν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο πάσχονσιν οἱ λέγοντες διὰ τὸ μεμίχθαι καλῶς. πέπονθε δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ μέσον· ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἁκρῶν. ὅπερ 7 συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν Δακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοὶ γὰρ 20 ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὕτως διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν, οἶνον πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τῶν παίδων· ὁμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τὸν τρόπον τούτον ὃν ἀν δύνατο καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παιδεῖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐχομέ- 25 νης ἡλίκιας, καὶ ὅταν ἀνδρεὶς γένονται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· οὐδὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλουσίος καὶ ὁ πένης· οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ταύτα πάσιν ἐν τοῖς συνστίοις, καὶ τὴν ἐσθήτα οἱ πλουσίοι τοιαύτην οἴναν ἃν τις παρασκευάσας δύνατο καὶ τῶν πενήτων ὀστισοῦν. ἐτὶ τὸ δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἄρχας τῆς 30 μὲν αἰρείσθαν τὸν δήμον, τῆς δὲ μετέχειν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέροντας αἰρόνται, τῆς δ' ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν. οἱ δ' ὅλιγαρ- χίαν διὰ τὸ πολλὰ ἔχειν ὅλιγαρχικά, οἶνον τὸ πάσας αἱρε- τάς εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κληρωτὴν, καὶ ὅλγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φύγης, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα πολλά. δει δ' ἐν 35 τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ μεμιγμένῃ καλῶς ἀμφότερα δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ μηδέτερον, καὶ σώζεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς καὶ μη ἐξωθεῖν, καὶ δι' αὐτῆς μη τῷ πλείους [ἐξωθεῖν] εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἰς
γάρ ἄν καὶ πονηρά πολιτεία τοῦ θ' ὑπάρχον) ἀλλὰ τῷ μηδ' ἂν βούλεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν μηδὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων ὦλως. τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτείαν, ὁμοίως 40 δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζόμενας ἀριστοκρατίας, νῦν εἰρήταιν*

Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἢμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὦς ἐνοῦ- 1295 ε. 10 σης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ ὡς οὖν λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτείων τι μέρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, εἶν οἶς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιού- 5 μεθά τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἀσύμφορος ἡ συμφέρει ταῖς πό- 2 λεσίν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς τυραννίδος δ' εἰδή δύο μὲν διελογοῦμεν εἶν οἶς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπε- σκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφότερα 10 ταίτας τὰς ἀρχὰς (ἐν τῇ γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τούτων αἱροῦν- ται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιόν ἐν τοῖς ἄρ- χαίοις" Ἐλλησιον ἐγίγνοντο τινες μονάρχοι τῶν τρόπον τούτον, 3 οὗς ἐκάλουν αἰσθήματα), ἐξουσίδε τίνας πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὐτῇ διαφοράς, ἢσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικὶ καὶ 15 διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἐκῶν ἑαυτῶν, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἀρχεῖν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ ἐκδός τυραννίδος, ἤπερ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννὶς, ἀντίστροφον οὖσα τῇ παμ- 4 βασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μο- ναρχίαν, ήτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἀρχεῖ τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιώνων 20 πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μη πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄρχομενων, διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὔδεις γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομε- νεὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν. τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἰδή ταύτα καὶ τοσοῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρήμενας αἰτίας·

Τίς δ' ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἀριστοσ βίος ταῖς πλεί- 11 σταῖς πόλεις καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἢ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηράς, μήτε πρὸς πολι- τείαν τὴν καὶ εὐχὴν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τὲ τῶν τοίς

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30 πλείστοις κοινωνήσαι δυνατόν καὶ πολιτείαν ἂς τὰς πλείστας πόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂς καλοῦσιν ἄριστο-2 κρατίας, περὶ ὅν νῦν εἴπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω πίπτοντι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γεγεννώσι τῇ καλομενῆ πολι- τείᾳ· διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὃς μίας λεκτέων. ἦ δὲ δὴ κρίσις περὶ
35 ἀπάντων τούτων ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ καλῶς 3 ἐν τοῖς ἥδικοῖς εἰρήται τὸ τῶν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσοτήτα δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσοτήτος· τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὅρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
40 καὶ πόλεως ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ πολιτείας. ἢ γὰρ πολι-
1295 β ἓ τεία βίου τίς ἐστι πόλεως. ἐν ἀπάσαι δὴ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐστι 4 τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως, οἱ μὲν εὐποροὶ σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ ἀπο-
ροὶ σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ τρίτοι οἱ μέσοι τούτων. ἐπεὶ τοῖς ὑμολο-
γεῖται τὸ μέσον ἀριστὸν καὶ τὸ μέσον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τῶν 5 εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτήσις ἡ μέση βελτίστη πάντων· βάστη γὰρ τῶν λόγων πειθαρχεῖν· υπέρκαλον δὲ ἡ ὑπερίχυρον ἢ ὑπερ-5 εγενην ἡ ὑπερπλοῦσιν, ἡ τάναντία τούτων, ὑπερπτπωκον ἢ ὑπερασθενὴ καὶ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τὸ λόγῳ ἀκολου-
θείν. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπάνηροι
10 μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπάνηροι λίαν· τῶν δ’ ἀδι-
κμάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δὲ ὑβρίς, τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. ἐπὶ δ’ ἡκισθ’ οὕτω φιλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ’ ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἐν 6 ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἵσχυος καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ φι-
15 λὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρχεσθαί οὔτε βούλονται
οὔτε ἐπίστανται (καὶ τοῦτ’ εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισῖν οὔσιν,
διὰ γὰρ τὴν τροφὴν οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς διδασκαλεῖσι ἀρχεσθαὶ σύνηθεις αὐτοῖς), οἱ δὲ καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐνείδια τοῖς ταπει-
νοι λίαν. ὅσθ’ οἱ μὲν ἀρχεῖν οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἀλλ’ ἀρχεσθαί 7
20 δουλικὴν ἀρχὴν, οἱ δ’ ἀρχεσθαί μὲν οὐδεμιᾶ ἀρχῆ, ἀρχεῖν
dὲ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν. γίνεται οὖν [καὶ] δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν
πόλεις, ἀλλ’ οὖκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φθονοῦντων τῶν δὲ
καταφρονοῦντων. ἢ πλείστον ἀπέχει φιλίας καὶ κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς· ἢ γάρ κοινωνία φιλικῶν· οὐδὲ γάρ ὀδού βουλουνται
8 κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἔχθροις. βουλεταί δὲ γε ἢ πόλις ἕξ ἵσων εἶναι 25 καὶ ὁμοίων ὃτι μάλιστα, τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστα τοῖς μέ-
σοις· ὁστ' ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐστίν ἕξ διὸν φαμέν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. καὶ
9 σώζονται δ' ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐτοὶ μάλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν. οὔτε γάρ αὐτοὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡσπερ οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὔτε 30
τῆς τούτων ἔτεροι, καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπι-
θυμοῦσιν· καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἐπιβουλεύειν ἀκινδύνως διάγονοιν. διὰ τούτο καλῶς ἥξιοτα Φωκυλίδης
10 "πολλὰ μέσοσιν ἀρίστα· μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι," δήλων ἄρα ὡς ἢ καὶ ἢ κοινωνία ἢ πολιτική ἀρίστη ἢ διὰ τῶν μέσων, 35
καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνδέχεται εὖ πολιτεύεσθαι πόλεις, ἐν αἰσ ἢ πολὺ τὸ μέσον καὶ κρείττων μάλιστα μὲν ἁμφότερον εἰ
δὲ μὴ, θατέρων μέρους· προστιθέμενον γὰρ ποιεῖ ἱσοτή καὶ
11 κωλύει γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ύπερβολάς. διόπερ εὐτυχία
μεγίστη τοῖς πολιτευομένοις οὕσιαν ἔχειν μέσην καὶ ικανήν, 40 ὅς ὅπου οἱ μὲν πολλὰ σφόδρα κέκτηται οἱ δὲ μηδὲν, ἢ δὴ-1296 α
μοι ἐσχατοῖς γίγνεται ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀκρατος ἡ τυραννίς δι'
ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ύπερβολάς· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς
νεανικήτατης καὶ εὖ ὀλιγαρχίας γίγνεται τυραννίς, ἐκ δὲ
12 τῶν μέσων καὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς πολὺ ἦττων. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν 5
ὑστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐρωύμεν.
ὅτι δ' ἢ μέση βελτιστή, φανερῶν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀστασίατος·
ὅπου γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσον, ἡκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις
13 γίγνονται τῶν πολιτῶν. καὶ αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἀστασι-
στότεραι διὰ τὴν αὐτήν αἰτίαν, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ μέσον· ἐκ δὲ 10
ταῖς μικρὰς ῥάδιῳ τε διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας, ὡστε μη-
δὲν καταλιπεῖν μέσον, καὶ πάντες σχεδὸν ἀποροῦ ἢ εὐποροῦ
14 εἰσιν. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλιγαρχῶν
εἰσὶ καὶ πολυχρονιώτεραι διὰ τους μέσους (πλείους τε γὰρ
εἰσὶ καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχουσι τῶν τιμῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις 15
C 2
20 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ζ' (Δ'). 11-12.

η ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις), ἐπει ὅταν ἀνευ τούτων τὸ πλῆθει ύπερ-
τεύνωσιν οἱ ἀποροί, κακοπραγία γίνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται ταχέως. σηµεῖον δὲ δεὶ νοµίζειν καὶ τὸ τοὺς βελτίστους νοµο-
15 θέτας εἰναι τῶν μέσων πολιτῶν'. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων
20 (δηλοὶ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως) καὶ Λυκούργος (οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασι-
λεύς) καὶ Χαρώνδας καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἄλλων.

φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ διότι αἱ πλεῖσται πολιτείαι αἱ μὲν 16
δηµοκρατικαὶ εἶσιν αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικαὶ διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ταύ-
25 ταις πολλάκις ὀλίγων εἰναι τὸ μέσον, αἰεὶ ὃποτεροί ἀν υπερέ-
χοσιν, εἰδ' οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες εἰδ' ὁ δήµος, οἱ τὸ μέσον
ἐκβαίνουσιν καθ' αὐτοὺς ἀγούσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὡστε ἡ δῆµος
γίγνεται ἡ ὀλιγαρχία. πρὸς δὲ τούτως διὰ τὸ στάσεις γίγνε-
17 σθαί καὶ μάχασ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ δήµῳ καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις,

ὅποτέροις ἀν μᾶλλον συµβῇ κρατῆσαι τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐ κα-
30 θιστάτασι κοινῆ πολιτείαν οὐδ' ἔσθην, ἀλλὰ τῆς νίκης ἄθλον τὴν

ὕπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν δηµοκρα-
τίαιν οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίαν 18

γενοµένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάτεροι πο-
λιτείαι ἀποβλέπουσι οἱ μὲν δηµοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
35 καθίστασαν οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίας, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμ-

φέρουν σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. ὡστε διὰ 19

ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἡ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολι-
τείαν ἡ ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγως' εἰς γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεπει-

σθῇ μόνος τῶν πρῶτερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονία γενοµένων ταύτην
40 ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξειν. ἥδη δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔθος

1296 ἡ καθέστηκε μηδὲ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἱσον, ἀλλ' ἡ ἄρχειν ἔτητειν ἢ

κρατουµένους ὑποµένειν. τὸς μὲν οὗν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ 20

τῶν αἰτίας, ἐκ τούτων φανερῶν τῶν δ' ἄλλων πολιτείων,

ἐπειδὴ πλείους δηµοκρατίας καὶ πλείους ὀλιγαρχίας φαµέν
5 εἶναι, ποιὰν πρῶτην δετέον καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν

τρόπον ἔχοµεν τῷ τὴν μὲν εἶναι βελτίῳ τὴν δὲ χείρῳ,

διωρισµένης τῆς ἀρίστης οὐ χαλεπῶν ἰδεῖν, ἂεὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον 21

εἶναι βελτίῳ τὴν ἐγγύτατα ταύτης, χείρω δὲ τὴν ἀφεστη-
κύιαν τοῦ μέσου πλείων, ἀν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ἵνα πολλάκις οὕσης ἀλής πολιτείας 10 αἱρετοτέρας ἐνίοις οὐδὲν κωλύει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

Τῆς δὲ πολιτείας τίς καὶ ποία συμφέρει ποιοῖς, ἔχο- 12 μενὸν ἐστὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν. ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταύτῶν· δει γὰρ κρείττον εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον 15 μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐστὶ δὲ πάσα πόλις ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. λέγω δὲ ποιοῦ μὲν ἔλευθεριάν πλούτου παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν 2 δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπεροχὴν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνεστήκει μερῶν 20 ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσὸν, οἷον πλείουσ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων τοὺς ἀγενείς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λεῖ- 3 πεσθαί τῷ ποιῷ. διὸ τάττα πρὸς ἀλλῆλα συγκριτέον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀνα- 25 λογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέρφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἐκατον ἐΐδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου, οἷον ἐὰν μὲν τὸ τῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερτείνῃ πλῆθος, τὴν πρώ- την δημοκρατίαν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μοισιαρ- νούντων, τὴν τελευταίαν, ὅρμως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς μεταξύ τούτων· ἵππον δὲ τὸ τῶν ἐνθερόν καὶ γνωρίμων μᾶλ- λον ὑπερετείνῃ τῷ ποιῷ ἢ λεῖστηται τῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκατον 4 ἐΐδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλῆθους. δεῖ δὲ 5 ἐὰν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μὲ- 35 σους· ἀν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοῦς τοὺς νόμους τιθῆ, στοχάζοντας χρή τῶν μέσων, ἐὰν τε δημοκρατικὸς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τοῦτοις. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων ὑπερτείνῃ πλῆθος ἢ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μοῦνον, ἐνταῦθ’ ἐν- 5 δέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον. οὐδὲν γὰρ φοβέρον μὴ 40 ποτὲ συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλουσίοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τοῦτοις.
οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλησονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἐτέροις, κοι- νοτέραν δὲ ἀν ἐξήγησιν, οὐδεμιὰν εὐφήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης. ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῆν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διανοητής, διανοητής δὲ ὁ μέσος. ὅσον δὲ ἂν ἀμείναιν ἡ πολιτεία μι-ὸς ἥθη, τοσοῦτοι μονιμωτέρα, διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλαμένουν ποιεῖν πολιτείας, οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πλείον νόμειν τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ παρακρούσθαι τῶν δήμου.

13 Ἐστι δὲ ὅσα προφάσεως χάριν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις σο- 15 φίζονται πρὸς τὸν δήμον πέντε τῶν ἀριθμῶν, περὶ ἐκκλη- σίαν, περὶ τάς ἀρχὰς, περὶ δικαστήρια, περὶ ὀπλισμοῦ, περὶ γυμνασίαν. περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν τὸ ἐξείναι ἐκκλησιάζειν πᾶσι, ζημίαν δὲ ἐπικείσθαι τοῖς εὐπόροις, εἶνα μὴ ἐκκλη- σιάζοσιν, ἡ μόνοι ή μείζων πολλῷ, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς 2 20 τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἔχοσι τίμημα μὴ ἐξείναι ἐξιμνυσθαί, τοῖς δὲ ἀπόροις ἐξείναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια τοῖς μὲν εὐπόροις εἶναι ζημίαν, ἂν μὴ δικαζόσι, τοῖς δὲ ἀπόροις ἀδείαν, ἦ τοῖς μὲν μεγάλῳ τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὀσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρών- δου νόμοις. ἐνίαχον δὲ ἐξεστὶ μὲν πάσιν ἀπογραψαμένοις 3 25 ἐκκλησιάζειν. καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπογραψάμενοι μὴ ἐκκλησιάζοσι μὴτε δικάζωσιν, ἐπίκεισθαι μεγάλα ζημίαι τοῦτοις, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τὴν ζημίαν φεύγωσι τὸ ἀπογράφεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀπογράφεσθαι μὴ δικάζωσι μὴθ ἐκκλησιά- ςαι. τοῦτον δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὀπλα κεκτῆσθαι 4 30 καὶ τοῦ γυμνάζοσθαι νομοθετοῦσιν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις ἐξεστὶ μὴ κεκτῆσθαι, τοῖς δὲ εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιοι μὴ κεκτη- μένοις. καὶ μὴ γυμνάζωσται, τοῖς μὲν οὐδεμία ζημία, τοῖς δὲ εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιοι, ὅπως οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ζημίαν μετέχωσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μετέχωσιν. ταῦτα 5
1297 a 2–1297 b 26.

νέπν οὐ διανύση τὰ διάφορα τῆς λογικῆς ἐν ἡ τας 35
dιδακτικά πρὸς τὴν ἀριτμολογίαν τοῖς πάντος
διάφορως μήδεν πολλάκις ἐκκλησίαν καὶ δίδακτος,
τῆς βασιλείας μηδεμίᾳ διακονίᾳ, δὲ τὰ μαθητήραν ἀναφέροντες γε 
καὶ τοῖς μᾶθησις πολλάκις τοῖς διδάσκοντες. Η μετέρωσις τοῦ ἐκτὸς 
τῶν ἑπάνω μαθητῶν, δὲ εἰ τὴν μαθητὴν εὐθεῖαν μετα- 
τὰ ὀπρέακτα μισθώσει, εἰκόνισα δὲ ἡ μετέρωσις τοῦ ἐκτὸς 
τῶν ἑπάνω μαθητῶν, δὲ εἰ τὴν μαθητὴν εὐθεῖαν μετα-
τὰ ὀπρέακτα μισθώσει, εἰκόνισα δὲ ἡ μετέρωσις τοῦ ἐκτὸς 
τῶν ἑπάνω μαθητῶν, δὲ εἰ τὴν μαθητὴν εὐθεῖαν μετα-
τὰ ὀπρέακτα μισθώσει, εἰκόνισα δὲ ἡ μετέρωσις τοῦ ἐκτὸς 
τῶν ἑπάνω μαθητῶν, δὲ εἰ τὴν μαθητὴν εὐθεῖαν μετα-
τὰ ὀπρέακτα μισθώσει, εἰκόνισα δὲ ἡ μετέρωσις τοῦ ἐκτὸς 
τῶν ἑπάνω μαθητῶν, δὲ εἰ τὴν μαθητὴν εὐθεῖαν μετα-
τὰ ὀπρέακτα μισθώσει, εἰκόνισα δὲ ἡ μετέρωσις τοῦ ἐκτὸς
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ζ’ (4’). 13–14.

εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον, ὡστ’ ὄλγαι τε ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι, διὰ τὸν μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τὸ 30 παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἐτεραι (δημοκρατία τε γὰρ οὐ μία τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως), ἔτι δὲ τῖνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τὴν αἱ πολιτείαι συμβαίνει, πρὸς δὲ τούτους τὸ ἄριστή τῶν πολιτειῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἶπεν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολισὶ πολὶς ἀρμόττει τοῖς πολιτείων, εἴρηται:

14 Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρίς περὶ ἕκαστης λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβῶντες ἄρχην τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τρία μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρεῖν τὸν σπουδαίον νομοθέτη τῆς ἐκάστης τῷ συμφέρον δὲν ἔχον· τὴν καλὸς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλὸς, καὶ τὰς 40 πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἐκάστον τούτων, ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ὡς καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον 2

1298 α περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἄρχας (τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ὡς δὲ καὶ τῖνων εἰναι κυρίαι, καὶ ποιαν τινὰ δὲ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τὸ τὸ δικάζων, κύριον δ’ ἐστὶ 3 τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ συμμαχίας καὶ 5 διαλύσεως, καὶ περὶ νόμων, καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ δημεύσεως, καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἱρεσεως καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀναγκαίον δ’ ἦτοι πάσι τοῖς πολίταις ἀποδεδώθαι πάσας ταύτας κρίσεις ἡ τις πάσας (οἷον ἀρχὴ τινὶ μιᾷ ἡ πλείοσιν, ἡ ἐτέραις ἐτέρας) ἡ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πάσι τινὰς δὲ τισιν. τὸ 4

10 μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἀπάντων δημοτικῶν τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ ἱσότητα ζητεῖ ὁ δήμος· εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντων πλείους, εἰς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντας ἄδρούς, ὁσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τηλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου (καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις βουλεύονται αἱ συναρχίαι συνιστώ. 15 σαὶ, εἰς δὲ τὰς ἄρχας βαδίζουσι πάντες κατὰ μέρος ἕκ τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων παντελῶς, ἐσο δὲν διέλθη διὰ πάντων), συνιέναι δὲ μόνον περὶ τε νόμων θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰ παραγγελλό-
5 μενα ἀκουσομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τῷ πάντας ἀθρόος, συμίναι δὲ μόνον πρὸς τε τὰς ἁρχαίρε-20 σίας [αἱρησομένους] καὶ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας καὶ περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας, τὰ 8 ἄλλα τὰς ἁρ-χάς βουλεύσθαι τὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τεταγμένας, αἰρετὰς
6 οὕσας ἐξ ἀπάντων ἡ κληρωτάς· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τῷ περὶ
tὰς ἁρχάς καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ἀπαντάν τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ 25 περὶ πολέμου βουλευσομένους καὶ συμμαχίας, τὰ 8' ἄλλα
tὰς ἁρχάς διοικεῖν αἰρετὰς οὕσας, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, τοιαῦ-7
tαι 8' εἰσὶν οὕσας ἀρχεῖν ἀναγκαίον τοὺς ἐπιστημένους· τε-
tαρτοὺς δὲ τρόπον τῷ πάντας περὶ πάντων βουλεύσθαι
συνιόντας, τὰς 8' ἁρχάς περὶ μηδενὸς κρίνειν ἄλλα μόνον 30 προανακρίνειν, διὸ περὶ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικε-
tαι τρόπον, ἣν ἀνάλογον φαμεν εἰναι ὁλιγαρχία τε δυ-
ναστευτική καὶ μοναρχία τυραννική. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι
δημοκρατικοὶ πάντες, τὸ δὲ τινὰς περὶ πάντων ὁλιγαρχι-
κόν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τούτῳ διαφορὰς πλείους. οὕτων μὲν γὰρ 35
ἐπὶ τιμημάτων μετριωτέρων αἴρετοι τε ὃσι καὶ πλείους
dιὰ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ τιμήματος, καὶ περὶ δὲν ὁ νόμος
ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κυνόσιν ἄλλ' ἀκολουθῶσι, καὶ ἐξή κτωμένῳ
tὸ τίμημα μετέχειν, ὁλιγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ
tοιαύτη διὰ τὸ μετριάζειν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλεύν-40
σθαί μετέχοσιν ἄλλ' αἴρετοι, κατὰ νόμον δ' ἀρχοσιν ὃς-1298 b

9 περ καὶ πρότερον, ὁλιγαρχικὸν· ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἴρωνται
αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλευσθαί, καὶ ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ
πατρὸς εἰσίγη καὶ κύριοι τῶν νόμων ὅσιν, ὁλιγαρχικὴν ἁγα-
10 καὶν εἰναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην. ὅταν δὲ τινῶν τινὲς, ὅσι
5 πολέμου μὲν καὶ ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες, τῶν δὲ ἄλ-
λων ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὕτοι αἴρετοι [ἡ κληρωτοί], ἀριστοκρατία
ἡ πολιτεία· εὰν 8' ἐνώπιον μὲν αἴρετοι ἐνώπιον δὲ κληρωτοί,
καὶ κληρωτοὶ ἡ ἀπόλω ἡ ἐκ προκρίτων, ἡ κοινὴ αἴρετοι
καὶ κληρωτοῖ, τὰ μὲν πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς ἔστι τούτων, 10
11 τὰ δὲ πολιτείας αὐτῆς. διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον.
πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτων τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖται ἕκαστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμὸν· συμφέρει δὲ δὴ· 12 μοκρατία τε τῇ μάλιστ᾿ εἶναι δοκοῦση δημοκρατία νῦν (λέγω 15 δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ᾧ κύριος ὁ δήμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἑστὶν) πρὸς τὸ βουλεύσεσθαι βέλτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὀπέρ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γὰρ ἐκείνα τούτοις οὐσ βουλουνται δικάζειν, ἵνα δικάζωσιν, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ με- 20 σθῶν τοῖς ἀπόροις), τούτο δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν· 20 βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινὴ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δήμος μετὰ τῶν γυναῖκων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τὸν πλῆθους· 13 συμ- φέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀιρετὸς εἶναι τοὺς βουλευόμενους ἢ κληροτοὺς ἴσως ἐκ τῶν μορίων· συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ὑπερβάλλος πολὺ 25 κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἢ μὴ πάσι· 25 διδόναι μισθῶν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅσοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τῶν γυνα- 14 ρίμων πλῆθος, ἢ ἀποκλήρου τοὺς πλείους· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρ- χίαις ἢ προσαιρεῖσθαί τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθους, ἢ κατασκευά- σαντας ἁρχείον οἴον ἐν ἑνίας πολιτείας ἑστὶν οὐσ καλοῦσι προβούλουσι καὶ νομοφύλακας, [καὶ] περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν 30 περὶ δὲν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλεύσωσιν (οὕτω γὰρ μεθέξει ὁ δήμος 15 τοῦ βουλεύσεσθαι, καὶ λέειν οὐδὲν δυνήσεται τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν)· ἐπὶ ἡ ταὐτὰ ψηφίζεσθαι τῶν δήμου ἢ μηδὲν ἐν· 35 αὐτίκα τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις, ἡ τῆς συμβουλῆς μὲν μεταδιδό- ναι πάσι, βουλεύσεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀντικε- 14 μενον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις γιγνομένου δὲ ποιεῖν· ἀπο- ψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον [ἐλθεῖ]· ὁ βουλεύομεν τὸ πλῆθος, κατα- ψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπαναγένσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τούς ἄρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνεστραμμένως 15 ποιουσί· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφίζομενοι μὲν κύριον, κα- 40 ταψηφιζόμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς 1299 αὶ πλείους αἰεί. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ βουλευόμενου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου ὅτι τῆς πολιτείας τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον· 15 Ἐχομένῃ δὲ τούτων ἑστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τούτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλάς δια-
1298 b 12—1299 a 37.

φοράς, πόσαι τε ἀρχαί, καὶ κύριαι τίνων, καὶ περὶ χρόνου, 5 πόσος ἕκαστης ἀρχῆς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ δὲ ἐλάττωνος, οἱ δὲ ἐνιαυσίας, οἱ δὲ πολυχρονιστέρας ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς), καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἁίδιους ἡ πολυχρονίους ἡ μηδέτερον ἀλλὰ πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτοὺς, ἡ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν διὸς ἀλλὰ ἀπὸς μόνον· έτί δὲ περὶ τὴν κα-10 τάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τίνων δεὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων 2 καὶ πῶς. περὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτων δεὶ δύνασθαι διελέιν κατὰ πόσους ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τρόπους, κάπετα προσαρ-μόσαι, ποίαις ποίαι πολιτείαις συμφέρουσιν, ἐστὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τούτο διορίσαι ἀδίδιον, ποίαις δεὶ καλεῖν ἀρχὰς· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπὶ-15 στατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται, διὸσπέρ πάντας οὕτε τοὺς αἰρετοὺς οὕτε τοὺς κληροτοὺς ἀρχούτας θετέον, οἷον τοὺς ιερεῖς πρῶτον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐτέρον τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς 3 θετέον. ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες· αἰρόνται δὲ καὶ πρεσ-βευταί. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελείων, ἡ πάν-20 τῶν τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς τινα πράξειν, οἷον στρατηγὸς στρα-τευμένων, ἡ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ὁ γυναικόνομος ἡ παιδονό-25 μος· αἱ δ' οἰκονομικαὶ (πολλάκις γὰρ αἰρόνται σιτομέτρας)· αἰ δ' υπηρετικαὶ καὶ πρὸς ἄσ, ἀν εὑροφθαί, τάττους δόυλους.

4 μάλιστα δ' ὃς ἀπλῶς εἰπεὶν ἀρχὰς λεκτέων ταῦτας, ὡσαίς 25 ἀποδέδοται βουλευσαθαι τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τούτῳ· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικῶτερον ἐστὶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρῆσεις οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν (οὐ γὰρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ τοῦ ὁνόματος), ἔχει δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν. 30 5 ποιαὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ καὶ πόσαι ἀναγκαίαι εἰ ἐσται πόλεις, καὶ ποιαὶ ἀναγκαίαι μὲν ὁ χρήσιμοι δὲ πρὸς σπουδαίαν πολι-τείαν, μᾶλλον ἂν τις ἀπορήσει πρὸς ἀπασάν τε δὴ πο-6 λιτείαν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς μικρὰς πόλεις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ δεὶ μιὰν τετάχθαι πρὸς 35 ἐν ἔργῳ (πολλοὺς τε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἀρχεία ἐνδέχεται βαδί-ζειν διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολιτάς, ὡστε τὰς μὲν δια-


λείπειν πολλὰν χρόνον τάς δ' ἀπαξ ἄρχειν, καὶ βέλτιον ἐκαστὸν ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης.

1299 b ἡ πολυπραγματούσης· ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραίς ἀνάγκῃ συνάγειν 7 εἰς ὀλίγους πολλὰς ἄρχας· διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὐ βαδίων ἔστι πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄρχασ εἶναι· τίνες γὰρ οἱ τούτοις ἑσονται διαδεξόμενοι πάλιν· δέονται δ' ἐνίστε τῶν 5 αὐτῶν ἄρχων καὶ νόμον αἱ μικραὶ ταῖς μεγάλαις· πλὴν αἱ μὲν δέονται πολλάκις τῶν αὐτῶν, ταῖς δ' ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τώτῳ συμβαίνει. διόπερ οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰς ἐπί- 8 μελείας ἀμα προστάτευτι (οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίσασθαι ἄλληλαις), καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ ἄρχεια οἴον.

10 ὀβελισκολύχνια ποιεῖν, ἐὰν οὖν ἔχομεν λέγειν πόσας ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν πάση πόλει, καὶ πόσας οὐκ ἀναγκαίον μὲν δεὶ δ' ὑπάρχειν, μάλιστα ἀν τις εἰδώς ταῦτα συναγωγοί ποίας ἀρμόττει συνάγειν ἄρχας εἰς μίαν ἄρχην. ἀρμόττει δὲ καὶ τούτῳ μὴ λεληθέναι, ποίων δὲι κατὰ τὸτον 9 ἄρχεια πολλὰ ἐπιμελείσθαι καὶ ποίων πανταχοῦ μίαν ἄρχην εἶναι κυρίαιν, οἴον εὐκοσμίας πότερον ἐν ἀγορὰ μὲν ἀγορανόμον, ἀλλον δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τόπον, ἡ πανταχοῦ τὸν αὐτῶν' καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πράγμα δεὶ διαἴρειν ἡ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δ' οἴον ἕνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ἡ παιδὸς.

20 ἀλλον καὶ γυναικῶν· καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δὲ, πότερον 10 διαφέρει καθ' ἐκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄρχων γένος ἡ οὐδὲν, οἴον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ πότερον αἱ αὐταί μὲν εἰσὶν ἄρχαι κύριαι, οὐκ εἶ ἢ ἢν ὧν δ' οὐδ' εἶ ὡς ὧς, ἀλλ' ἐτέρων ἐν ἐτέραις, οἴον ἐν μὲν 25 ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἔλευθέρων, ἡ τυχανοῦσι μὲν τίνας οὕτω καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς διαφοραί τῶν ἄρχων, ἄστι δ' ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ ὅπου διαφέρουσιν (ἐνθα δὲν γὰρ ἀρμόττει μεγάλας, 30 ἐνθ' δ' εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτὰς). οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδιαὶ 11 τίνες εἰσιν, οἴον ἡ τῶν προβοῦλων· αὐτή γὰρ ὁ δημοκρα-
In the following attempt to frame a text of 1300 a 23–b 5 the similar attempts of C. Thurot, Spengel, and Susemihl (see the critical
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Z' (Δ'). 15–16.

τες ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ (καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἡ ὡς ἀνὰ μέ-
25 ρος, οἶνον κατὰ φυλᾶς καὶ δήμους καὶ φρατρίας, ἐως ἄν
dιέλθη διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἡ ἂεὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων), καὶ
ἡ τὰ μὲν οὐτὸ τὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνως· πάλιν εἰ τινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες, 18
ἡ ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἡ ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέ-
σει ἡ ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, ἡ τὰ μὲν οὐτὸ τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, λέγω
30 ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ. ὡστε δωδέκα
οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν, τούτων δ' 19
αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικά, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων
αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ γίνεσθαι ἡ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς
δ' αἱρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας ἀμα μὲν καθ-
35 στάναι, ἐξ ἀπάντων δ' ἡ ἐκ τινῶν, ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ αἱρέσει ἡ
ἀμφοῖν, ἡ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν. ἀμφοῖν
(τὸ δὲ ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει), πο-
notes on this passage) have been kept in view. Added words are
printed in thicker type, and omitted words are placed within square
brackets:—

ἡ γάρ πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἡ πάντες ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ (καὶ [ἡ] ἐξ ἀπάντων ἡ ὡς ἀνὰ μέρος, οἶνον κατὰ φυλᾶς καὶ δήμους καὶ φρατρίας, ἐως ἄν
dιέλθη διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἡ ἂεὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων), [καὶ] ἡ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν
αἱρέσει ἡ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ ἡ τὰ μὲν οὐτὸ τὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνως· πάλιν εἰ
tινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες, ἡ ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἡ ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν
αἱρέσει ἡ ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, τὰς μὲν οὐτὸ τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, λέγω τὰς μὲν ἐκ
πάντων αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ.
ὡστε δωδέκα οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. τούτων δ' αἱ
μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικά, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ [γίνε-
σθαι] ἡ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας
ἀμα μὲν καθιστάναι, ἐξ ἀπάντων δ' [ἡ ἐκ τινῶν], ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ αἱρέσει ἡ ἀμφοῖν,
ἡ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ αἱρέσει ἡ ἀμφοῖν (τὸ δὲ
ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει), πολιτικά· καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων
τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ [ἡ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἱρέσει, ὀλγαρχικοῖς], ὀλγαρχικόστερον δὲ, καὶ τὸ εξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν
ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἡ αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ
τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ὀλγαρχικῶς, καὶ
tὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, [ἡ γνώμην] δ' ὀμοίωσι]; καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν
ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἀπάντων τὸ τὲ ἐκ τινῶν πάντας αἱρέσει ἀριστοκρατικῶς.
1300 a 24—1300 b 29.

20 λιτικών. καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει καθιστά-
ναι τὰς δὲ κλήρω ἡ ἁμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἱρέ-
σει, ὀλιγαρχικῶν ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἁμφοῖν. 40
τὸ δὲ τᾶς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τίνων πολιτικῶν ἀρι-
21 στοκρατικῶς, ἡ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τὸ δὲ τὶ-1300 b
νὰς ἐκ τίνων ὀλιγαρχικῶν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τίνων κλήρῳ,
μὴ γινόμενον δ' ἁμοῖος, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τίνων ἁμφοῖν.
τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἀπάντων, τὸ τε ἐκ τίνων αἱρέσει πάντας
22 ἀριστοκρατικῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἄρχας το-
5 σοῦτοι τὸν ἁριβόμον εἰσι, καὶ διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας
ὅπως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς κα-
ταστάσεις, ἀμα ταῖς δυνάμεις τῶν ἄρχων, [καὶ] τίποτε εἰσίν,
ἐσται φανερῶν. λέγω δὲ δύναμιν ἄρχης, οὖν τὴν κυρίαν
tὸν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς ἀλλο γὰρ τὸ
εἴδος δυνάμεως οὖν στρατηγίας καὶ τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγο-
ράν συμβολαίων κυρίας.

Δούπον δὲ τῶν τριῶν περὶ δικαστηρίων εἰπεῖν. ηπητέον 16
δὲ καὶ τούτοις τοὺς τρόπους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ἐστὶ
dὲ διαφορὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν τρισὶν ὄροις, ἐξ ὅν τε καὶ 15
περὶ ἐν καὶ πῶς. λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὅν μὲν, πότερον ἐκ πάν-
tων ἡ ἐκ τίνων· περὶ ὅν δὲ, πόσα εἰδὴ δικαστηρίων· τὸ δὲ
2 πῶς, πότερον κλήρῳ ἡ αἱρέσει. πρῶτον οὖν διαιρείσθω πόσα
εἰδὴ δικαστηρίων. ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν ἁριβῶν ὅκτω, ἐν μὲν εὐθυν-
τικῶν, ἀλλο δὲ εἰ τίς τι τῶν κοινῶν ἀδίκει, ἔτερον οὖσα εἰς 20
τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, τέταρτον καὶ ἄρχουσι καὶ ἰδιώταις ὁσα
περὶ ξημιώσεων ἁμφισβητοῦσι, πέμπτον τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων
συναλλαγmátων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος, καὶ παρὰ τάυτα
3 τὸ τε φοινικὸ καὶ τὸ ἕξενικὸ. φοινικὸ μὲν οὖν εἰδὴ, ἢν τ'
ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἢν τ' ἐν ἄλλοις, περὶ τε τῶν ἐκ 25
προνίασ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκούσιων, καὶ οὐσα ὀμολογεῖται μὲν,
ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, τέταρτον δὲ ὁσα τοῖς
φεύγουσι φόνου ἐπὶ καθόδρο ὑπερθέρεται, οὖν Ἀθήμησι λέγε-
ται καὶ τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ δικαστήριον, συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ζ' (Δ'). 16—Η' (Ε'). 1.

30 ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὅλιγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσι τοῦ δὲ ἐξεικόν ἐν μὲν ἔξειοι πρὸς ἔξειοι, ἀλλὰ ἐξειοὶ πρὸς 4 ἀστοὺς. ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὡσα δραχμαία καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρὸ πλεῖονοι· δει γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν, οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλήθος. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων 5 ἀφέισθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐξεικών, περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ δὲν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ κινήσεις. ἀνάγκη δ' ἦτοι πάντας περὶ πάντων κρίνειν τῶν διηρημένων αἰρέσει

40 ἤ κλήρῳ, ἢ πάντας περὶ πάντων τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δ' αἰρέσει, ἢ περὶ ἐνών τῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν κλήρῳ τοὺς δ'.

1301 οὕτως. οὕτως μὲν οὐν οἱ τρόποι τέταρται τὸν ἀριθμὸν, τοῖς οὕτως δ' ἔτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τινῶν καὶ οἱ δικαζόντες περὶ πάντων αἱρέσει, ἢ ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων κλήρῳ, ἢ τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δ' αἰρέσει, ἢ ἐνια δι-

5 καστήρια περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ κληροτῶν καὶ αἰρετῶν. οὕτως μὲν οὐν, ὡσπερ ἔλεχθησαν, οἱ τρόποι . . . τοῖς εἰρημένοις· ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ συνδυαζόμενα, λέγω δ' οἴον τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάν-7 των τὰ δ' ἐκ τινῶν τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, οἶον εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δικαστηρίου εἰλιν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πάντων οἱ δ' ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ ἦ

10 κλήρῳ ἢ αἱρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν. ὡσοῦς μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τρόποις 8 εἶναι τὰ δικαστήρια, εἰρηται· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πρώτα δη-

μοτικά, ὡσα ἐκ πάντων [‡] περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, ὡσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ τρίτα ἀρι-

στοκρατικά καὶ πολιτικά, ὡσα τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰ δ' 15 ἐκ τινῶν.


√

Η' (Ε').

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἄν προειλομέθα σχεδόν 20 εἰρήται περὶ πάντων ἐκ τινῶν δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολι-

τείαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων, καὶ τίνες ἐκάστης πολιτείας
1300 b 30—1301 b 12.

33

fθοραί, καί ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται, ἔτι δὲ σωτηρία τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστης εἰσὶν, ἐτὶ δὲ διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σάξοιτο τῶν πολιτείων ἐκάστη, σκε-2 πτέων ἑφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν 25 τήν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηται πολιτεία πάντων μὲν ὀμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτῳ

3 δ' ἀμαρτανότων, ὡσπερ εἰρηταὶ καὶ πρότερον. δήμος μὲν γάρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσουν ὅτιοι ὄντας οἰκεθαι ἀπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλευθεροὶ πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι 30 νομίζουσιν), διλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἐν τι ὄντας ὀλος εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ’ οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες 4 ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). εἰτα οἱ μὲν ὦς ἴσοι ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἄξιοβόι μετέχειν, οἱ δ' ὦς ἄνισοι 5 ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ἥξτοισιν· τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον! ἔχουσι 35 μὲν οὖν τι πάσας δίκαιοιν, ημαρτημέναι δ' ἀπλῶς εἰσὶν· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἢν ἐκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας, 6 στασιάζουσιν· πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα μὲν ἂν στασιάζοντες, ἢκιστα δὲ τοῦτο πράττουσιν οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες· μᾶ- 40 7 ξιστα γὰρ εὐλογον ἀνίσους ἀπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον. εἰσι 1301 b

δὲ τινες οἱ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχουσιν οὐκ ἄξιοβοι τῶν ἴσων αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ἀνίσοτητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δο- κοῦσιν οἶς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλούτος. ἀρχαῖ 5 μὲν οὖν ὦς εἰσέπειν αὐταὶ καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεων εἰσὶν, δὲν 8 στασιάζουσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται διχῶς· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκώς ἄλλης μεταστήσωσιν, οἰον ἐκ δημοκρατίας διλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίαν ἢ διλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐκ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἢ σκείνοι· ὅτε δ' οὗ πρὸς τὴν καθε- 10 στηκώς πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτὴν, δ' αὐτῶν δ' εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἴον τὴν

1 The insertion here of c. 3. 1303 b 3, στασιάζουσι δὲ ... 7, ὄντες is suggested in the critical note on 1301 a 39.

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σοι δε καὶ οἱ ἄρχον· ὁ γὰρ τὸ κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέα καὶ Παυσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα τὴν ἐφορείαν καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδαμνῷ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ κόριον, ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων θυλήν ἐποίησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκες ἐστίν 11 ἐτὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἁρχὰς, ὅταν 25 ἐπιστηρίζεται ἠρχὴ τις, ὁλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ εἰς ἡν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ· πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνίσον ἡ στάσις· οὐ μὴν (ei) τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (άιδιος γὰρ βασιλεία ἀνίσος, ἐὰν ἡ ἐν ἰσοίς·) ὡς γὰρ τὸ ἰσον ἐποιηντες στασιάζουσιν. ἔστι δὲ δίδῳ τὸ ἰσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12 30 ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἄξιαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀρίθμῳ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἡ μεγέθει ταύτῳ καὶ ἰσον, κατ' ἄξιαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον ἐπερέχει κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἰσον τὰ τρία τοῖν ὑποῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέταρτα τοῖν ὑποῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός· ἰσον γὰρ μέρος τὸ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ 35 τὸ ἐν τῶν ὑποίν· ἀμφω γὰρ ἡμίσῃ. ὁμολογούντες δὲ τὸ 13 ἀπλὸς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἄξιαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἔλεχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἢν κατὰ τὴν ἰσοὶ ὅπως, ὡς ἰσοὶ νομίζοσιν εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὅτι, ἢν κατὰ τὴν ἰσοίοι, πάντων ἰσοίων ἐξοίσουσιν ἑαυτοῦς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται 14 40 πολιτείαι, δῆμος καὶ ὁλιγαρχία· εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ 1302 ἐν ὁλέγοις, ταῦτα δ' ἐν πλεῖσσον· εὐγενείς γὰρ καὶ ἀγα- θοὶ οὐδαμοὶ ἑκατῶν, εὐποροὶ δὲ πολλαχοῦ. τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς πάντη καθ' ἐκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ἴσοτητα φαύ- λου. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τοῦ συμβαλλόντος· οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος 5 ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτείων, τούτου δ' αἰτίον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ 15
1301 b 13—1302 a 38

τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου μὴ ἀπαντᾷν εἰς τὸ τέλος κακῶν τι. διὸ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ ἱσότητι ἔφη σοῦ, τὰ δὲ τῇ καὶ ἄξιαν. ὃμως δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ ἀποσαίσατος μᾶλλον ἡ δημοκρατία τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίζονται δύο, ἣ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑοι ἰσοτίμων καὶ εἰς ἡ πρὸς τὸν δήμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μόνον, αὐτῶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὥς τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπέν, οὐκ ἐγγίζεται τῷ δήμῳ στάσει. ἐτὶ δὲ ἢ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἡ ζήτων ὀλιγών, ἦπερ ἑστὶν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτεῶν. Ἐστὶ δὲ ἐκ τίνων καὶ ταῖς στάσεις γίγνονται 2 καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ληπτέον καθόλου πρώτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ σχέδου ὡς εἰπέν τρεῖς τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ὃς διοριστέοι καὶ αὐτὰς τύπῳ πρῶτον. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν πώς τε ἑξοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ 20 τίνων ἐνεκέν, καὶ τρίτων τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτειῶν τῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. τοῦ μὲν ὅρων αὐτοὺς ἑξειν πως πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μᾶλλον θετέαν περὶ ἣς ἢ παραγέναις κηρατές, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἱσότητος ἐφίεμοι στασιάζουσιν, ἂν νομίζως ἐλαττῶν 25 ἑξειν ὄντες ὡς τοὺς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἁνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς, ἂν ὑπολαμβάνως ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ τῷ 3 πλεόν ἑξειν ἀλλ’ ἵσοιν ἐλαττῶν (τοῦτων δ’ ἐστι μὲν ὄρε- γεσθαι δικαιῶν, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως)· ἐλάττωσιν τε γὰρ ὄν- τες ὅπως ἵσοι δσι στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἵσοι ὄντες ὅπως μεί- 30 ξους. πῶς μὲν ὅρων ἑξοντές στασιάζουσιν εἰρηται· περὶ δὲ πι στασιάζουσιν, ἐστὶ κέρδος καὶ τιμή καὶ τάναντια τοῦτοις· καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμῶν φεύγουσιν καὶ ξημιᾶς, ἢ ύπερ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν 4 φίλων, στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι’ αἱ δ’ αἰτίαι καὶ ἄρ- χαι τῶν κωνῆσεων, θεν αὐτοὶ ἐς διατίθενται τῶν εἰρημένον 35 τρόπων καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἐστι μὲν ὡς τῶν ἀριθμῶν 5 ἐπτά τυγχάνουσιν οὔται, ἐστι δ’ ὡς πλείους. ἂν δὲ μὲν ἐστὶν ταύτα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὀσιτως· διὰ κέρδος γὰρ D 2
καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνουνται πρὸς ἄλληλους οὐχ ἴνα κτή-
40 σωνταί σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὦσπερ εἰρηταὶ πρότερον, ἂλλ' ἐτέ-

1302 b ρουσ ὀρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας
tούτων' ἔτι διὰ ὦβριν, διὰ φὸβον, διὰ ὑπεροχὴν, διὰ καθαρότηταν, ἔτι δὲ
ἀλλον τρόπον δι' ἐριθείαν, δι' ὁλογραψίαν, διὰ μικρότητα,
3 δι' ἀνομοίότητα. τούτων δὲ ὦβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι
δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἰτία, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ φανερὸν ὕβρισκότων
tε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαίς καὶ πλεονεκτοῦντων στασιάζουσι
καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς διδούσας
tὴν ἔξοουσίαν' ἢ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
10 ἰδίων, ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμή, καὶ 2
τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμα-
ζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλοις ὀρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν ταῦτα
dὲ ἀδίκως μὲν γίνεται, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἢ τιμῶνται
τινες ἢ ἀτιμάζονται, δικαίως δὲ, ὅταν κατὰ τὴν ἀξιαν.
15 δι' ὑπεροχὴν δὲ, ὅταν τις ἢ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων, ἢ εἰς ἡ 3
πλείους, ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτε-
ματος· γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἰσθέν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μοναρχία ἢ
dυναστεία. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ εἰώθασιν ὀστρακίζειν, οὗν ἐν Ἀργεί
καὶ Ἀθηναίοι· καίτοι βέλτιον εἴς ἀρχής ὀρὰν ὅποι μὴ ἐνέ-
20 σονται τοιούτων ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἐάσαντας γενέσθαι ἱάσθαι
ὑστερον. διὰ δὲ φὸβον στασιάζουσιν οὐ τε ἡδικηκότες, δεδιό-
tες μὴ δῶσι δίκην, καὶ οἱ μέλλοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι, βουλὸμε-
νοι φθάσαι πρὶν ἀδικηθήναι, ὦσπερ ἐν 'Ρόδῳ συνέστησαν
οἱ γνώριμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δήμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφοβομένας δίκας.
25 διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται, οὗν 5
ἐν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ὄσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχον-
tες τῆς πολιτείας (κρέιττους γὰρ ὄσιν εἶναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς
dημοκρατίαις οἱ εὐποροί καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ
ἀναρχίας, οὗν καὶ ἐν Θῆβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰλιοφύτοις
30 μάχῃς κακῶς πολιτευόμενον ἢ δημοκρατία διεθύρη, καὶ
ἡ Μεγαρέων δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἣτηθέντων, καὶ ἐν
Συρακώσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνας τυπαννίδος, καὶ ἐν 'Ρόδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἑπαναστάσεως. γίνονται δὲ καὶ δὴ αὐξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολὴν τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὡσπερ γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δὲι αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνά-35 λογον, ἰνα μὲν ἡ συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μὴ, φθείρεται, ὅταν δὲ μὲν ποὺς τεττάρουν πηχῶν ἢ τὸ δ' ἄλλο σῶμα δυνῶν σπι- θαμαίν, ἑνίστε δὲ κἂν εἰς ἄλλον ἥλιου μεταβάλλαι μορφῆς, εἰ μὴ μένων κατὰ ποσὸν ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποὺὸν αὐξά- νοιον παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται ἐκ 40 μερῶν, ὅν πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αὐξανόμενον, οἶδον τὸ τῶν ἀπὸρων πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις. 7 συμβαίνει δ' ἑνίστε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τόχους, οἶδον ἐν Τάραντι ἤπηθεντὼν καὶ ἀπολομένων πολλῶν γνωρίμων ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰαπύγων μικρὸν ὑστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο 5 ἐκ πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀργεὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἀπολομέ- νων ὑπὸ Κλεομένου τοῦ Δάκωνος ἡμακάσθησαν παραδε- ξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς, καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχοῦντων πεζῇ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττουσι ἐγένοτο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου 8 στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Δακωνίκων πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δὲ 10 τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, ἤττον δὲ πλεῖώνων ἅρ τῶν εὐτόρων γνωριμῶν ἢ τῶν ὀὐσίων αὐξανόμενων μετα- βάλλουσι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δυναστείας. μεταβάλλουσι δ' οἱ πολιτείαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως διὰ τὰς ἐριθείας, ὡσ- περ ἐν Ἡραίᾳ (ἐξ αἱρετῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρω- 15 τᾶς, ὅτι ἤροντο τοὺς ἐριθευςμόνοις), καὶ δὲ ὀλιγωρίαν, ὅταν ἐάνσωσι εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τᾶς κυρίας παριέναι τοὺς μὴ τῆς πολιτείας φίλους, ὡσπερ εἰν Ὁμηρῷ κατελυθή ἡ ὀλιγαρχία τῶν ἀρχῶντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεισάρους, δὲ εἰ ὀλιγαρχίας 10 πολιτείαι καὶ δημοκρατίαι κατεσκέυασε· ἐτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ 20 μικρὸν· λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρὸν, ὅτι πολλάκις λανθάνει με- γάλη γνωμένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παραρρόσι τὸ μικρὸν, ὡσπερ εἰν Ἀμβρακία μικρὸν ἢ τὸ τύμημα, τέ- λος δ' (ἀπ') οὐδενὸς ἤρχον, ὃς ἐγγυς ὃν ἡ μηδὲν διαφέρον τοῦ
25 μηδὲν τὸ μικρὸν. στασιωτικὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ μη ὁμοφυλὸν, ἐως 11 ἀν συμπνεύσῃ (ὁσπερ γὰρ οὖδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλῆθους πόλις γέγνεται, οὔτως οὖδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ)· διὸ ὅσοι ἕδη συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλείστοι διεστάσασαν, οὖν Τροιζήνηοι Ἀχαιοὶ συνάκησαν Σύβαριν, εἰτὰ πλείουσι οἱ 30 Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Τροιζήνους, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις· καὶ ἐν Θοῦριοι Συβαρίται τοῖς 12 συνοικήσασιν (πλεονεκτεῖν γὰρ ἄξιοντες ὥς σφετέρας τῆς χώρας ἐξέπεσον): καὶ Βυζάντιοι οἱ ἐποίκοι ἐπιβουλεύοντες φαραθέντες ἐξέπεσον διὰ μάχης· καὶ Ἀντισσαιοὶ τοὺς Χίων 35 φυγάδας εἰσδεξάμενοι διὰ μάχης ἐξέβαλον, Ζαγκλαίοι δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοῖς· καὶ Ἀπολ. 13 λωνίαται οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐδείνῳ πόντῳ ἐποίκους ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐστασίασαν· καὶ Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς ἐξόνες καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίασαν καὶ 1363 b καὶ οἱ μάχης ἠλθούν· καὶ Ἀμφιπόλιται δεξαμενοί Χαλκιδέων ἀποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν. [στασιάζουσι 14 δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς διηγαρχίαις οἱ πολλοί ὡς ἄδικοιμενοί, ὅτι 5 οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἵσων, καθάπερ εἰρητὶ πρότερον, ἵσοι ὄντες, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ γνώριμοι, ὅτι μετέχουσι τῶν ἵσων οὐκ ἴσοι ὄντες.] στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίστε αἱ πάλεις καὶ διὰ 15 τοὺς τόπους, ὅταν μὴ εὐφύος ἔχῃ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τὸ μίαν εἶναι πόλιν, οὖν ἐν Κλαξομεναῖς οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ πρὸς τοὺς 10 ἐν νήσῳ, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς· καὶ Ἀθήνησιν ὅχι ὤροις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δημοτικοί οἱ τῶν Πειραιαί οἰκοῦν· τῶν τὸ ἅστυ, ὁσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβά- 16 σεις τῶν όχετῶν, καὶ τῶν πάνυ σμικρῶν, διασπώσε τὰς φάλαγγας, οὔτως ἐοίκε πάσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάστασιν. 15 μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἵσως διάστασις ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία, εἰτὰ πλούτος καὶ πενία, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐτέρα ἐτέρας μᾶλλον· ἄν 4 μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἔστιν. γίγνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ αἱ μικραὶ ἑσύπονοι, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις
γένωνται, οἷς συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις 20 χρόνοις: μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ δύο νεανίσκων στα- σιασάντων, ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὅντων, περὶ ἐρωτικῆν αἰτίαν. 2 θατέρου γὰρ ἀποδημούντος ἑταῖρος ὦν τις τὸν ἐρώμενον αὐτοῦ ὑπεποίησατο, πάλιν ὦ ἐκεῖνος τούτῳ χαλεπῆς τὴν γυ- ναίκα αὐτοῦ ἀνέπεισεν ὅς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν· ὅθεν προσλαμβά- 25 3 ὕρτες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασάσαν πάντας. διὸσπερ ἀρχομένων εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ διαλύει τὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις: ἐν ἄρχῃ γὰρ γίγνε- ται ἡ ἁμάρτημα, ἡ δ’ ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἢμισυ εἰναι παντός, ὡστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἁμάρτημα ἀνάλογον ἔστι πρὸς 30 4 τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. ὅλως δὲ αἱ τῶν γνωρίμων στά- σεις συναπολαυένει ποιοῦσι καὶ τὴν ὅλην πόλειν, οἷον ἐν Ἐστιαία συνέβη μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, δύο ἀδελφῶν περὶ τῆς τῶν πατρῴων νομῆς διενεχθέντων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώτερος, ὡς οὐκ ἀποφαίνοντος [θατέρου] τὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν 35 ὁν εὑρέθη ὁ πατήρ, προσήγετο τοὺς δημοτικοὺς, ὁ δ’ ἔτερος ἔχων 5 ὁμοίων πολλῆς τοὺς εὐπόρους. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γε- νομένης διαφοράς ἀρχῇ παύσῳ ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεις τῶν ὑπερ- νησίων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰωνισάμενος τι σύμπτωμα, ὃς ἦλθεν 1304 α ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην, οὐ λαβῶν ἀπῆλθεν, οἱ δ’ ὃς ὑβρισθέντες ἐνέβαλον τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων ὕθουσος, κάπετα σὺς ἱερό- 6 πυλῶν ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ περὶ Μιτυληνῆς δὲ εἰς ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχῇ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ 5 πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐν ὧν Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν· Τιμοφάνεις γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπώντος δύο ψυχάτερας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβῶν τοὺς νυσίαν αὐτοῦ Δέξανδρος ἦρετε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοῦ τοῖς Αθηναίοις παράξειν, 7 πρόβειον ὦν τῆς πόλεως. καὶ ἐν Φωκείσιν εἰς ἐπικλήρους 10 στάσεως γενομένης περὶ Μνασέαν τῶν Μνάσωνος πατέρα καὶ Εὐθυκράτη τῶν Ὄνομάρχου, ἡ στάσις αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου κατέστη τοῖς Φωκείσιν. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἐπι- δάμῳ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν· ὑπομνηστευσάμενος γάρ
15 τις Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃς ἔξησεν αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ ὑπομνηστευθέντος πατήρ γενόμενος τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄτερος συμπαρέλαβε τούς ἐκτὸς τῆς πολιτείας ὡς ἐπηρεασθείς. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὅλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκιμήσας τι ἀυξηθήναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως, οὗν ἦν Ἀρείων πάγω βουλή εὐδοκιμήσασα εν τοῖς Ἔθελοις ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὅχλος γενόμενος αἵτίος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἥγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀναμινὸν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυρότεραν ἐποίησεν, 25 καὶ ἐν Ἀργειοι οἰς εὐδοκιμήσαντες περὶ τῆς ἐν 9 Μαντινεία μάχην τὴν πρὸς Δακεδαιμονίους ἐπεχείρησαν καταλύειν τὸν δήμον, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δήμος αἵτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους εκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν, καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξων 30 τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γυνώρμων ὁ δήμος ἀνελὼν εὐθὺς εἰχετο τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ πάλιν ἡσαύτος Περίανδρον συνεκβάλων τοῖς ἐπιθεμένοις ὁ δήμος τῶν τύραννον εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιέστησε τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ ὅλως δὴ 10 δεῖ τούτο μὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς οἱ δυνάμεως αἵτιοι γενόμενοι, 35 καὶ ἰδιώται καὶ ἀρχαί καὶ φυλικαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ ὁποιονδήποτε πλῆθος, στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τοῦτοι φόβουντες τιμωμένοι ἁρχοῦσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐθένουσι μέειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵσων, κινοῦνται δὲ αἱ πολιτείαι 11 καὶ ὅταν ταναντία εἰναι δοκοῦνα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἴσας 1304 ἀλλήλοις, οὗν οἱ πλοῦσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, μέσον δὲ ἦ τις μηδὲν ἢ μικρῶν πάμπαν· ἀν γὰρ πολὺ ὑπερέχῃ ὅποτερον τῶν μερῶν, πρὸς τὸ φανερὸς κρείττον τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ θέλει κινδυνεύειν. διὸ καὶ οἱ καὶ ἀρετῆς διαφέρουντες οὐ ποιοῦσι στάσιν καὶ καὶ ἀρχαί καὶ αἰτίαι τῶν στάσεως καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τούτων ἔχουσι τῶν τρόπων· κινοῦσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας ὅτε μὲν διὰ βιάς ὅτε δὲ δι’ ἀπάτης,
1304 α 15—1305 α 2.

διὰ βίας μὲν ἡ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡ ὑστερον ἀναγκάζουσε.
13 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττῆ ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἴθ’ ὑστερον βίᾳ κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἶνον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τῶν δη-
μον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκουσε τὸν βασιλέα χρῆματα παρέ-
ζειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Δακεδαμονίους, ἱενο-
μενοὶ δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρώντω τὴν πολιτείαν ὅτε δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡ πεῖσαντες καὶ ὑστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων ἐκόντων ἁρχο-
σιν αὐτῶν. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων συμβέβηκε γίγνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολᾶς.
Καθ’ ἐκαστὸν δ’ ἐίδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων μερίζονται 5
τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεὶ θεωρεῖν. αἰ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία μᾶ-
λιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν αὐλγειαν.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἴδια συκοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς οὐσίας ἐχοντας
συστρέφουσιν αὐτοὺς (συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθιστῶς ὁ κοινὸς
φόβος), τὰ δὲ κοινῇ πόληθος ἐπάγοντες. καὶ τούτῳ ἐπὶ
2 πολλῶν ἀν τις ἰδοι γιγνόμενον οὕτως. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῆ
δημοκρατία μετέβαλε ποιηρῶν ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν
(οἱ γὰρ γνώριμοι συνέστησαν) καὶ ἐν Ἱlocs μισθοφοράν
τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπόριζον, καὶ ἐκάλυνον ἀποδιδόναι
τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριπάρχοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερο-
μένας δίκας ἥγαγκάζοντας συστάντες καταλύει τὸν δή-
3 μον. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἰρακλεία ο δῆμος μετὰ τὸν
ἀποκισμὸν εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἅδικούμενοι γὰρ
ὑπ’ αὐτῶν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐξέπιπτον, ἐπειτά ἀδροισθέντες οἱ
4 ἐκπίπτοντες καὶ κατελύοντες κατέλυει τὸν δῆμον. παρα-
πλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐν Μεγάραις κατελύθη δημοκρατία οἱ
35 γὰρ δημαγωγοὶ, ἵνα χρῆματα ἔχωσι δημεὺειν, ἐξέβαλλον
πολλοὺς τῶν γυνορίμων, ἐσος πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν τοὺς φεύγο-
ντας, οἱ δὲ κατιόντες ἔνικησαν μαχόμενοι τὸν δήμον και
κατέστησαν τὴν όλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δὲ ταύτην καὶ περὶ
Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἢν κατέλυε Θρασύμαχος. 1305 α
5 σχεδόν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὗ τὰς ἰδοι θεωρῶν τὰς με-
ταβολάς τούτον ἔχοισας τῶν τρόπων. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ, ἵνα χαρίζωνται, ἀδικοῦντες πρὸς γνωρίμους συνιστάσιν, ἥ τάς οὐσίας ἀναβάστων ποιοῦντες ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὅτε δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἦν ἔχοισι δημεῦειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγω-γὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγονατεῖν. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γέγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μή, ὅτι τότε οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγοῦντων (οὐ γὰρ τῶν δεινοῦ ἰσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ρητορικῆς ἥξιμηνεις οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦντες μὲν, δὲ ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται, πλὴν εἰ που βραχύ τι γέγονε τοιοῦτον. ἐγένετο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχαὶ ἐγχειρίζεσθαι τισιν, ὡστερ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας πολλῶν γὰρ ἦν καὶ μεγάλων κύριος ὁ πρῶτος ἐτενίσεως. Ετι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τότε πάλιν, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν τὸν δήμον ἁγχολον ὅντα πρὸς τοῖς ἑργοῖς, οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου, ὅτε πολεμικὸν γένοιτο, τυραννίδι ἐπετίθεντο. πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδραν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες, ἢ δὲ πίστις ἢ ἢ ἀπέχθεια ἢ πρὸς τόσο πλουσίους, οίον Ἀθηναῖοι τε Πεισίστρατος στασίασας πρὸς τοὺς πεδικοῦς, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγά-ροις τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβων παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπινέμοντας, καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφνιάων καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἡξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἐξήραντο πιστευθεῖς ὡς δημοτικὸν ἐν. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην ὅποιν γὰρ αἰρεταί 30 μὲν αἱ ἀρχαὶ, μὴ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δὲ, αἱρεῖται δὲ ὁ δήμος, δημαγογοῦντες οἱ σπουδαρχιῶντες εἰς τοῦτο καθιστάσιν ὡς κύριον εἶναι τὸν δήμον καὶ τῶν νόμων. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἦ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἀρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δήμον, τῶν μὲν οὖν δή-42 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η’ (Ε’). 5-6.

35 μορατιῶν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται πάσαι σχεδὸν διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας·
Αφ’ όλιγαρχίας μεταβάλλουσι διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρόπους τούς φανερωτάτους· ενα μὲν ἔαν ἀδικώσι τὸ πλῆθος (πάς γὰρ ἱκανὸς γίνεται προστάτης, μάλιστα δ’ ὅταν εἰς αὐτῆς συμβῇ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεσθαι τὸν ἥγεμόνα, καὶ θάπερ ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις, δς καὶ ἐτυράννησεν υστερον τῶν Ναξίων· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχῇ στάσεως διαφο-1305 b
ράς· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ εἰς αὐτῶν τῶν εὐπόρων, οὐ τῶν ὄντων ὦν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, γίγνεται κατάλυσις, ὅταν ὀλίγοι σφόδρα ὄντι οἱ ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς, οἴον ἐν Μασσαλία καὶ ἐν Ἰστρῷ καὶ ἐν ᾿Ηρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀλλαῖς πόλεσι συμβέβη-3 kev· οἱ γὰρ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκίνουσι, ἐως μετέλαβον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πρότερον τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ύστερον δ’ οἱ νεώτεροι πάλιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀρχοῦσιν ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν ἀμα πατήρ τε καὶ νόσος, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος καὶ ὁ νεώτερος ἀδελφός· καὶ ἐνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία, ἵνα ἐν Ἰστρῷ δ’ εἰς δῆμον ἀπετελεύτησεν, ἐν ᾿Ηρακλείᾳ δ’ εἰς 4 ἑλπιστόνων εἰς ἐξακοσίους ἦλθεν· μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Κνίδῳ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία στασιασάντων τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους μετέχειν καὶ, καθάπερ ἐιρηταὶ, εἰ πατήρ, νόσος μὴ μετέχειν, μὴ δ’ εἰ πλείους ἀδελφοί, ἀλλ’ ἐν τὸν 15 πρεσβύτατον, ἐπιλαβόμενοι γὰρ στασιαζόντων ὁ δῆμος, καὶ λαβὼν προστάτην ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐπιθέμενος ἐκράτησεν, 5 ὁ δὲ εὐθείας γὰρ τὸ στασιασάντων. καὶ ἐν ᾿Ερυθραῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Βασιλείων ὀλιγαρχίας ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοι, καὶ περι καλῶς ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ὁμοί διὰ 20 τὸ ὑπ’ ὀλίγου ἀρχεσθαι ἀγανακτῶν ὁ δῆμος μετέβαλε τὴν πολιτείᾳ. κινοῦται δ’ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ 6 διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων· ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διίτη, ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις (ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς κἀν πάντω ὀλίγοι δῶσιν, οἴον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα ᾿Αθηναίοιν οἱ 25 περὶ Χαρικλέα ἐσχύναν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγούντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχου τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἡ ὁταν τὸν ὄχλον δημαγωγῶσιν οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὄντες,
ὁ ἔν Δαρίση ὁ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτοῦς
30 τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγγόγουν, καὶ ἐν ὀσιαὶ ὁλιγαρχίας οὐχ οὗτοι
αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ δὲν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσίν, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν
ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσίν ἡ ἐταιρία, αἱροῦνται
δ' οἱ ὑπλῖται ὁ δῆμος, ὅπερ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ συνεβαίνειν, καὶ 7
ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐστίν' δημαγω-
35 γοῦντες γὰρ πρῶς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν,
ὅπερ καὶ ἐν 'Ηρακλεία ἐγένετο τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ' ἐτι δι'
οταν ἐνιού εἰς ἐλάπτους ἔλκωσι τὴν ὁλιγαρχίαν· οἱ γὰρ τὸ
ἐσον ζητοῦντες ἀναγκάζονται βοηθὸν ἐπαγαγόθαι τὸν δή-
μον. γίγνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὁλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν 8
40 ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἑδια ἠρωτεῖς ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι
καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἡ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ ἢ
1306 κατασκενάζονσι ἔτερον, ὡσπερ Ἰππαρίνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συ-
ρακούσαις, καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπολείᾳ, ὃ ὅνομα ἦν Κλεότιμος, τοὺς
ἐποίκους τοὺς Ἀλκιδέων ἡγαγε, καὶ ἐλθόντων διεστασίασαν
αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ἐν Ἀἰγύπτῳ ὁ τὴν πραξίν τὴν
5 πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μεταβάλειν τὴν πολιτείαν
διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· ὅτε μὲν οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπιχειροῦσι τι κινεῖν,
ὅτε δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινὰ, ὅθεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς στασιάζουσι
ἡ οὕτω οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχαίρες κλέπτονται, ὅπερ ἐν Ἁπολλωνία
συνέβη τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ, ὀμονοοῦσα δὲ ὁλι-
10 γαρχία ὡς εὐδιάφθορος ἢς αὐτῆς. σημεῖον δὲ ἢ ἐν Φαρ-
σάλῳ πολιτεία· ἐκείνοι γὰρ ὀλγοῦν ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοι εἰσὶ
diὰ τὸ χρῆσαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλὸς. καταλύονται δὲ
καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ ὁλιγαρχίᾳ ἐτέραν ὁλιγαρχίαν ἐμποιοῖσιν,
tοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος τῶν
15 μεγίστων ἄρχων μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ ὀλίγοι πάντες, ὁπερ ἐν
"Ἡλιδι συνέβη ποτέ' τῆς πολιτείας γὰρ δι' ὀλγῶν οὕσης
τῶν γερόντων ὀλίγοι πάμπαν ἐγίνοντο διὰ τὸ ἀδιόν εἰναι
ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, τὴν δ' αἱρεσίν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ
ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν Ἀδεδαίμονι γερόντων. γίγνεται δὲ με-
20 ταβολὴ τῶν ὁλιγαρχίων καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνη,
ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δήμον ἀπιστίαν στρατιωταίς ἀναγκασμένων χρῆσθαι (ὅ γὰρ ἄν ἐγχειρίσωσιν, οὕτος πολλάκις γίγνεται τύραννος, ὡσπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ Τίμοφάνης· ἄν δὲ πλείους, οὕτωι αὐτοῖς περιποιοῦνται δυναστείαν), ὅτε δὲ ταῦτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόσα τῷ πλῆθει τῆς 25
13 πολιτείας διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ χρῆσθαι· ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώτασι καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ, διὰ ἐνίοτε γίγνεται κύριος ἀμφότεροι, ὡπερ συνεβή ἐν Δαρίῳ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευσάδων ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Σίμων καὶ ἐν 30
14 Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐταιριῶν ὃν ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου, γίγνονται δὲ στάσεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιστεῖσθαι ἐτέρους ύφ' ἐτέρου τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασιαζοῦσθαι κατὰ γάμους ἡ δίκας, οὖν ἐκ γυμνῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημέναι πρότερον, καὶ τὴν ἐν 'Ερετρίᾳ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἑπταέτευχος 35
15 πέων Διαγόρας κατέλυσεν ἄδικηθεὶς περὶ γάμον, ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως ἡ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ στάσις ἐγένετο καὶ ἐν Θήβαις, ἐν' αἰτίας μοιχείας δικαίως μὲν στασιωτικός δὲ ποιησαμένων τὴν κόλασιν τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κατ' Ἐὔρυτίωνος, τῶν δ' ἐν Θήβαις κατ' 'Αρχίου ἐφιλονείκησαν γὰρ 1306 b αὐτοὺς οἱ ἔχθροι όστε δεθῆναι ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ κύρῳ.
16 πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ὀλιγαρ-χίας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τινῶν δυσχερανάντων κατελύθησαν, ὡσπερ ἡ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία. 5 γίγνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς καλομενῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ἐν ὅσιας ἀπὸ τιμήματος βουλευοῦσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχαὶ
17 ἄρχουσιν. πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρῶτον τίμημα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας καιροὺς, ὡστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ το ὀλίγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, εὐτηρίας γιγνομένης δι' εἰρήνην ἡ δ' ἄλλη τιν' εὐτυχίαν συμβαινεῖ πολλαπλασίον γίγνεσθαι τιμήματος ἁξίας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὡστε πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὡτε μὲν ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ
15 κατὰ μικρὸν γινομένης τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λανθανούσης, 
ὅτε δὲ καὶ θάττων, αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχία ἡ μεταβάλλουσι 18 
καὶ στασιάζοντι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας (ὅλως δὲ καὶ αἱ δη-
μοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι εξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς 
ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλὰ εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἶον 
20 ἐκ τῶν ἐννόμων δημοκρατίων καὶ ὀλιγαρχίων εἰς τὰς κυ-
ρίων καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκεῖνας).

7 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίγνονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν 
διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν, ὅπερ εἰρήται κινεῖ καὶ 
tὰς ὀλιγαρχίας διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν 
25 εἶναι ποσ ἐν ἀμφότεραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἁρχοντες, οὐ μέν-
tοι διὰ ταύτων ὀλίγοι, έπει δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταύτα καὶ ἡ 
ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι. μάλιστα δὲ τούτο συμβαίνειν 2 
ἀναγκαίον, ὅταν γα καὶ τοῦ πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς 
ὅμοιον κατ ἀρέτην, οἶον ἐν Δακεδαίμονι οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρ-
θενίαι (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γαρ ἤσαν), οὕς φαράσαντες ἐπιβου-
λεύσαντας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς, ἢ ὅταν τινὲς ἀρι-
μάζονται μεγάλοι ὄντες καὶ μηδενὸς ἡπτοὺς κατ ἀρέτην 
ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐντιμοτέρων, οἶον Δῶσανδρός ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων, 
ἢ ὅταν ἀνδράδης τις ὃν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἶον Κι-
35 νάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγγειλάνδου συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς 
Σπαρτιάτας, ἐτί ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀπορῶσι λίιαν οἱ δ' εὐπο-
ρώσιν (καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τούτο γίνεται) συνέβη 
δὲ καὶ τούτο ἐν Δακεδαίμονι ὑπὸ τῶν Μεσσηνιακῶν πολέ-
μοι. δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τούτο] ἕκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς κα-
4 1307 a λουμένης Εὐνομίας· θλιβόμενοι γὰρ τινες διὰ τὸν πολέμο 
νξίουν ἀνάδαστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν· ἔτι εὰν τις μέγας ἢ 
καὶ δυνάμενος ἢ ἐπὶ μείζον εἶναι, ἐνα μοναρχῆς, ὁσπερ ἐν 
Δακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Παυσανίας ὁ στρατηγὴς κατὰ τὸν Μη-
5 δικὸν πολέμον καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἀννων. λύνονται δὲ μά-
λιστα αἱ τε πολιτείαι καὶ αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ 
tη πολιτείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἁρχὴ γὰρ τὸ μὴ με-
mίχθαι καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλι-
γαρχίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταῦτα τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο· λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δήμον καὶ ὀλιγαρ-το χίαν· ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τε πειρώνται μεγύνει καὶ 6 αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὄνομαζομένων πολιτείων αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτοι, καὶ διὰ τούτῃ εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἦπτον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμα αὐτῶν· τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινοῦσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀρι-15 στοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλήθος πολιτείας· διό- περ ἀσφαλέστεραι αἱ τοιαύται τῶν ἐτέρων εἰσὶν· κρείττων τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἵσον ἔχοντες, 7 οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἄν ἡ πολιτεία διδὼ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ὑβρίζειν ἤπονσι καὶ πλευκτεῖν. διὸς δὲ ἐφ' ὁπότερον οἱ 20 ἐγκλώη ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ ταῦτα μεθίσταται ἐκατέρω τὸ σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἷον ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δήμον, ἀρι-8 στοκρατία δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἡ εἰς τάναντια, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δήμον (ὡς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περισσῶσιν εἰς τούναντιον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι), αἱ δὲ πολιτείαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν 25 (μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἵσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ 9 αὐτῶν). συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλεῖον τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἐλαττὸν μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχέα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ πο-30 λιτείᾳ ὀλιγαρχικοτέρα ἤν, ὡστε ἐδύναντο πλευκτεῖν) . . . ὁ δὲ δήμος γυμνασθεὶς εν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο κρείττον, ἐως ἀφείσαν τῆς χώρας ὅσοι πλεῖω ἤσαν ἔχοντες. 10 ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχι-κὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον πλευκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν 35 Ἀκεδαίμοιν εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται· καὶ ἔστει ποιεῖν δ τι ἄν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτι θέλουσιν, διὸ καὶ ἡ Δοκρῶν πόλις ἀπόλεστο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας, δ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὔδ' ἂν 11 ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὐ μεμιγμένη. μάλιστα δὲ λαυθάνουσιν αἱ 40 ἀριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσι τῷ λύσθαι κατὰ μικρὸν,
 revoked

οπερ είρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν
πολιτειῶν, ὅτι αἴτιον τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἔστων
ὅταν γὰρ τι προώνται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο
καὶ ἄλλο μικρὸν μεῖζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσιν, ἐστὶν ἀν
πάντα κινήσει τὸν κόσμον. συνεβῇ δὲ τούτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων 12
πολιτείας. νόμον γὰρ ὄντος διὰ πέντε ἑτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γε-
νόμενοι τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει
tῶν φορουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς
10 πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥαδίως κατασχήσειν, τούτων τῶν
νόμων λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὡστ' ἐξείναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς
συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὀρθύνες τὸν δήμον αὐτοὺς χειροτον-
νόντα προθύμως. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχῶν-13
των, οἱ καλόμενοι σύμβουλοι, ὀρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἑναν-
τία τούτων συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τούτων κινήσαντας
tῶν νόμων ἐάσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν, ὅστερον δὲ βουλήμε-
νοι κωλυέναι ἄλλων κινούμενων οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὐδὲν,
ἄλλα μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πάσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυνα-
stειαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεοτέρίζειν. πάσαι δ' αἰ πολι-
14
teiαi λύονται ὅτε μὲν εἰ αὐτῶν ὅτε δ' ἐξοδεῖαν, ὅταν ἑναν-
tiα τοια πολιτεία ἡ θ' πλησίον ἡ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν.
ὁπερ συνεβαίνει εἰς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δακεδαμιονιῶν ὀμ μὲν
γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι πανταχῶς τὰς ὀλυγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Δάκωνες
tοὺς δήμους κατέλυσαν, οὐδεὶς μὲν οὖν αἰ μεταβολαῖ γίγνονται
25 τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἰρήται σχεδὸν.

8 Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστης πολι-
teῖας ἐξόμενον ἐστίν εἰσεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δήλου ὅτι, εἰπτε
ἐξομεν δι' ὃν ἐφεβρόνται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἐξομεν καὶ δι' ὃν
σώζονται τῶν γὰρ ἑναντίων τάναντα ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ
30 σωτηρία ἑναντίων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολι-
teiαiως ωσπερ ἀλλο τι δει τηρεῖν ὅτως μηδὲν παρανομάζοι,
καὶ μᾶλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν λανθάνει γὰρ παραδο-
μένη ἡ παρανομία, ὡσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα
ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον. λανθάνει δὲ ἡ δαπάνη 3
διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἰ διά-35
νοια ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος εἰ ἐκαστὸν μι-
κρόν, καὶ πάντα. τούτο δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς οὐ τὸ
γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ
4 μικρῶν. μιᾶν μὲν οὖν φιλακὴν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν
dει ποιεῖσθαι, ἐπειτα μὴ πιστεύει τοὺς σοφίσματος χάριν 40
πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος συγκειμένοις, ἔξελεγχεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν 1308 a
ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγουμεν τῶν πολιτείων σοφίσματα, πρὸ-
5τερον εἴρηται). ἐτὶ δ’ ὥραν ὅτι ἐνιαὶ μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀρι-
στοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι
τὰς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εἰδ. χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρ-5-
χαῖς γινομένους καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ
πολιτεύματί, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
tῷ τοὺς ἡγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ
tοὺς μὲν φιλότιμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς
eἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρῆσθαι
το
6 ἀλλήλοις δημοτικῶς. ὦ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ
dημοτικοί τὸ ίσον, τούτ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον
ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν. διὸ ἔχων πλεῖος ὅσιν ἐν τῷ
πολιτεύματί, πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημά-
tων, οἷον τὸ ἐξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἡνα πάντες οἱ 15
ὁμοίοι μετέχοσιν ἐστὶ γὰρ ὡσπερ δήμος ἢ ὁ ὁμοίοι
(διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῦτοι ἐγγίγνονται δημαγογοὶ πολλάκις, ὡσπερ
7 εἰρηται πρότερον). ἐπειδ’ ἢττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν οἱ
ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ράδιον κα-
kουργήσαι ὁλίγων χρόνων ἀρχοντας καὶ πολλών, ἐπεὶ διὰ 20
τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίγνονται τυ-
ραννίδες δ’ ἡ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν ἐκατέρα ἐπιτίθενται τυρα-
νίδι, ἐνθα μὲν οἱ δημαγογοὶ ἐνθα δ’ οἱ δυνάσται, ἡ οἱ τὰς
8 μεγίστας ἔχοντες ἀρχὰς, ὅταν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἀρχοσιν). σώ-
ξονται δ’ αἱ πολιτείαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν 25
dιαφθειρότων, ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς’ φοβοῦμενοι
γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν· ὡστε δεῖ
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τούς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα
φυλάττωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύσωσιν ὀσπερ νυκτερινήν φυλα-
κήν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρο ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν.
ἐτὶ τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν 9
νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἑξῷ τῆς φιλο-
νεικίας οὔτας, πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, ὡς τὸ ἐν
ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακὸν γνώναι ὡς τοῦ τυχόντος ἄλλα πολι-
τικοῦ ἀνδρὸς. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα γιγνομένην 10
μεταβολὴν εἶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ
τοῦτο μενῶντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τιμημάτων εὐπορίας δὲ
νομισμάτως γιγνομένης, συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκο-
πεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθὸν, ἐν δὲσις μὲν
40 πόλεις τιμῶνται καὶ' ἐνιαυτόν, κατὰ τοῦτον τῶν χρόνων
1308 b ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἡ πενταετηρίδος, καὶ ἡ
πολλαπλασίον ἡ πολλοστηρίδον τοῦ πρότερον, ἐν δι' αἱ τι-
μήσεις κατέστησαν τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμή-
ματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἐπιτείνου-
5 τας κατὰ τὴν πολλαπλασίαν, ἐὰν δ' ἐλλείπῃ, ἀνιένας
καὶ ἑλάτω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλι-
11 γαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις μὴ ποιοῦντων μὲν ὑπὸς ἐνθὰ
μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαι εὕθα δὲ δυναστεῖαν γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει,
ἐκείνος δὲ ἐκ μὲν πολιτείας δημοκρατίαν, ἐκ δ' ὀλιγα-
ρίας πολιτείαν ἢ δῆμον, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ καὶ ὀλι-
12 γαρχίᾳ [καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ] καὶ πᾶσῃ πολιτείᾳ μὴν αὐξάνειν
λίην μηδένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πει-
ρᾶσθαι μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμᾶς ἢ ταχύ
μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν ὦ παινδὸς ἄνδρός
15 εὐτυχίάν), ἐι δὲ μῆ, μῆ τοι γ' ἀδρόας δόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
πάλιν ἄδροας, ἀλλ' ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ μάλιστα μὲν
πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ὑπὸς ἀγεῖν ὡστε μηδένα εὐγγενεῖσθαι
πολὺ ὑπερέχουσα δυνάμει μῆτε πίλον μῆτε χρημῶν,
ἐι δὲ μῆ, ἀποδημητικὸς ποιεῖται τὰς παρατάσεις αὐτῶν;
20 ἐπεί δὲ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἱδίους βίους νεωτερίζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν 13
άρχήν τινα τήν ἐπονομαίην τοὺς ἡσυχάσοντες ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς τήν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν' ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων ἐκάστη. καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ τῆς πόλεως

14 ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· τούτου δὲ ἀκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς (λέγω δὲ ἀντικείσθαι τοῖς ἐπεικείστηκι τῶ πλήθει καὶ τοὺς ἀπόροις τοῖς εὐπόροις) καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι ἡ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων ἡ τὸ μέσον αὐξεῖν· τούτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ 30 τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις. μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἀλλη λοικομία ὦτω τετάχθαι ὡστε μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν. τούτῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς 35 ὀλιγαρχικαῖς δεῖ τηρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγανακτοῦσι εἰργόμενοι τοῦ ἀρχείν οἱ πολλοὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρουσιν εάν τις ἐὰν πρὸς τοὺς ἰδίους σχολάζειν, ὥστε εάν οἴωνται τὰ κοινά κλέπτειν τοὺς ἀρχούντας, τότε δὲ ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τὸ τε 40 τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν. μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδεχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσεις τις· ἐνδεχόμενο γὰρ ἄν καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἑχειν ὄρωσεται ἀμφότερους. 1309 a 5 ὑπὸ τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑξείναι πάσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι εἰν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικοῖς, τούτῳ δ' ἐσται ὅταν μὴ ἤ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν' οἱ γὰρ ἀποροί οὐ βουλήσονται ἄρχειν τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ εὐπόροι δυνὴσονται διὰ τὸ μηδένος προσδείσθαι τῶν κοινῶν· ὡστε συμβῆσεται τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις γίγνεσθαι εὐπόροις διὰ τὸ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς ἐργοῖς, τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. 10 19 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἡ παράδοσις γιγνεσθοῦν τῶν χρημάτων ἰπάροντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντιγραφα κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλᾶς τιθέσθοσαν· τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν τιμᾶς εἶναι δεῖ νευμοθετημένας
τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. δεὶ δ’ ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν 15 εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀνα- δάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρποὺς, ὃ ἐν ἑνόισ τῶν πολιτείων λανθάνει γιγνόμενον βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας, οἷον χρησίματι καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὀσαι ἄλλαι τοια̂- 20 ταί τέν δ’ ὀλιγαρχία τῶν ἀπόρων ἐπιμέλειαι ποιεῖσθαι πολλήν, καὶ τᾶς ἀρχὰς ἀφ’ ὅν λήμματα τούτοις ἀπονέ- μειν, καὶ τὶς υβρίσθι τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπίτιμα εἶναι ἢ ἀν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας μὴ κατὰ δόσιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, μηδὲ πλείονων ἡ μιὰς 25 τῶν αὐτῶν κληρονομεῖν’ οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὄμαλώτερα αἱ οὐνίας ἐξεν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἃν καθίσαντο πλείους, συμφέρει δέ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν 21 ἄλλων ἡ ἱσότητα ἡ προεδρία νέμειν τοῖς ἤτοι κοινολοιποὶ τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν μὲν δήμῳ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐν δ’ ὀλιγαρ- 30 χίᾳ τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὀσαὶ ἄρχαι κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας, ταύτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγχειρίζειν μόνοις ἡ πλείονων. 9 Τρία δὲ τινα χρῆ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀρξεῖν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχὰς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν 35 πολιτείαν, ἑπειτα δύναμιν μεγιστὴν τῶν ἐργῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς, τρίτον δ’ ἀρέτην καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν’ εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταύτων τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς. ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ ταύτα 2 40 πάντα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, πῶς χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν· 1309 b οἷον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μὲν τὶς εἰς, πονηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῆς πο- λιτείας φίλος, ὃ δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος, πῶς δεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν; ἐοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τῶν πλείουν μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἐλαττον. διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν 3 5 εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρέτης’ ἐλαττον γὰρ στρα- τηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δ’ ἐπιεικείας πλείον’ ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ
καὶ ταμεία τάναντία: πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἢ ὅσην
4 οἱ πολλοὶ ἐξουσὶν, ἢ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πάσιν. ἀπορήσειε
δʹ ἀν τις κἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία, τι δει τῆς ἀρετῆς; ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο, 10 ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχωντα ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι, ὡστε καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰστε καὶ φι-
λοῦντες αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὔθεν κωλὺει ἔχειν
5 ἔνιοις; ἀπλῶς δὲ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέ-
γομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἀπαντα ταῦτα σῶξει τὰς πολιτείας, 15 καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρήμενον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ
6 μὴ βουλομένου. ↑ παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεί μὴ λανθάνειν, ὃν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυιας πολιτείας, τὸ μέσον
πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκοῦντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρα-
20 
7 τίς καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. οἱ δʹ οἴομενυ
ταῦτην εἶναι μιᾶν ἀρετὴν ἑλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν,
ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι καθάπερ ρῖς ἔστι παρεκβεβηκυία μὲν τὴν
ἐὑθύτητα τὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμόν, ἀλλ' ὁμοσ ἔτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν δύνα, οὐ μὴν 25 ἄλλα ἐὰν ἐπιτείνη τις ἔτι μάλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, πρω-
tον μὲν ἀποβαλεὶ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ μορίου, τέλος δʹ οὕτως ὡστε μηδὲ βίαν ποιήσει φανεροθα διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλεψιν τῶν ἐναντίων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ
8 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, συμβαίνει δὴ τούτο καὶ περὶ τὰς 30 ἄλλας πολιτείας. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἔστιν ὡς' ἐχεῖν ἰκανός, καίπερ ἐξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίωτης
τάξεως' ἐὰν δὲ τις ἐπιτείνη μᾶλλον ἐκάτεραν αὐτῶν, πρῶ-
tον μὲν χείρω ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δʹ οὔδὲ πολι-
9 τείαν. διὸ δεῖ τούτῳ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πο-
35 λιτικὸν, ποιὰ σῶξει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποία φθείρει τὴν
dημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν
ἀνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁμαλότης
40 γένηται τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν, ὥστε φθείροντες τοὺς καὶ ὑπερχών νόμοις φθείρουσι τὰς πολιτείας. ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ εν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ εν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγωγοὶ, ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων· δύο γὰρ 5 ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ τὴν πόλιν, μαχόμενοι τοῖς εὐπόροις, δεὶ δὲ τούναντίον αἰεὶ δοκεῖν λέγειν ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς, καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους ἐναντίους ἢ νῦν ὁμολαχεῖν τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν 11 ἐναίας ὁμολαχεῖν "καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακούνοι ἔσοντες καὶ βουλεύσασθαι ὅτι ἐν ὑπὸλαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τούναντίον, ἐπισημανομένους ἐν τοῖς ὄρκοις ὅτι "οὐκ ἀδικήσω τὸν δήμον." μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὰς πολιτείας, οὗτοι ὀλιγωρούσι πάντες, τὸ παιδεύοσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. ὃφελος γὰρ οὐδέν τῶν 12 ὀφελημοσύνων νόμων καὶ συνδεδοξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πολιτευμένων, εἰ μὴ ἐσονται εἰδισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοὶ, δημοτικῶς, εἰ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ, ὀλιγαρχικῶς. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστίν ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἄκρασία, ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ παιδεῦ- 13 σθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τούτῳ, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρομεν οἱ ὀλιγαρχοῦντες ή οἱ δημοκρατίαις βουλομένοι, ἀλλ' οἷς δυνημένοι εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι εἰρημένοι οἱ δὲ δημοκρατείσθαι. νῦν δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων υἱὸ τρυφώσι, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων γγυνοται γεγυμνασμένοι καὶ πεπονησότες, 14 διότι καὶ βούλονται μάλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτερίζειν· ἐν δὲ 15 ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκοῦσαι δημοκρατικῶς τούναντίον τοῦ συμφέροντος καθέστηκεν· αὐτίνι δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι κακῶς ὀρίζονται τὸ ἐλευθερον. δύο γὰρ ἐστίν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεί ὧρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλείον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ 16 ἐλευθερίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἢσον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἢσον δ' ὃ τι 15 ἀν δόξῃ τῷ πλῆθει, τούτ' εἶναι κύριον, ἐλευθερον δὲ καὶ ἢσον τὸ ὃ τι ἄν βούληται τις ποιεῖν· ὥστε ἔγεν τὰς τοιαύ-
1309 b 40—1310 b 25.

ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκαστὸς ὡς βούλεται, καὶ εἰς ὁ χρῆσις,

16 ὡς φησίν Εὐριπίδης: τούτο δ' ἐστὶ φαίλον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
οἷς οὐκ ὄντες δουλεῖαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ 35
σωτηρίαν. εἴ ἦν μὲν οὖν αἱ πολιτείαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ
φθείρονται, καὶ διὰ τίνων σώζονται καὶ διαμένουσιν, ὥς
ἀπλῶς εἶπεν τοσαῦτα ἔστιν·

Δεῖ πεπεράντειν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας, εἴ δὲν τε ἁθείρεται καὶ δι᾽ ἰδίων σώζεσθαι πέρψκεν. σχεδὸν ἐπὶ παρα- 40
πλῆσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμ—1310 b

2 βαίνοντα περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας. ἢ μὲν
γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ τυραννίς
ἐξ ὁλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑπάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας:
διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐστίν, ἀτε ἐκ δυὸν 5
συγκειμένη κακῶν καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀμαρ-

3 τίας ἤροτα τὰς παρ’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτείων. ὑπάρχει
δ’ ἡ γένεσις εὐθὺς εἴ ἐναντίων ἐκατέρα τῶν μοναρχῶν·
ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δήμον τοῖς
ἐπιεικέσι γέγονεν, καὶ καθίσταται βασιλείας ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν 10
cαθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἡ πράξεως τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ
καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν τοιοῦτον γένους, ἢ δὲ τύραννος ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ
tοῦ πλῆθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γυναῖκες, ὡς ὁ δήμος ἀδικήται μη-

4 δὲν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων’ σχεδὸν
gὰρ οἱ πλείοτοι τῶν τυράννων γεγονόσιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν 15

5 ὡς εἶπεν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γυναῖκες. αἱ
μὲν γὰρ τούτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων, ἣδὲ
τῶν πόλεων ἀνθρώπων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἐκ τοῦ τῶν βασι-

λεών παρεκβαίνοντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ διεσποτικοτέρας ἄρχης
ἀργομένων, αἱ δὲ τῶν αἰρέτων ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἄρχας 20
(τὸ γὰρ ἄρχαν οἱ δήμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τὰς
δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας), αἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν ὁλιγαρχῶν

6 αἰρουμένων ἐνα τινὰ κύριον ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἄρχας. πάση
gὰρ ὑπήρχε τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ κατεργάζεσθαι βαδίως,
εἰ μόνον βουληθεὶεν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν προϊπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν 25
56 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η’ (Ε’). 10.

βασιλικής ἀρχῆς, τοῖς δὲ τήν τῆς τιμῆς, οἶνον Φείδων μὲν περὶ Ἀργος καὶ ἑτεροί τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλεῖας ὑπαρχούσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τήν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δ’ ἐν Λεοντίνου καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ
30 καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθῆνης καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις καὶ ἑτεροί τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν 7 εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τήν ἀριστοκρατίαν.
κατ’ αξίαν γάρ ἔστιν, ἡ κατ’ ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἣν κατὰ γένους, ἥ κατ’ εὐεργεσίας, ἥ κατὰ ταύτα τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἀπαν- 8
35 τες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἡ δυνάμειον τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἐθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἑτύχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ 8’ ἑλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κύρος, ἡ κτίσαντες ἡ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Δακεδαμινών βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ
40 Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δ’ ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ
1311 α μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηδὲν ἀδικον πάσχοσιν, ὁ δὲ δήμος μὴ υβρίζηται μηδέν’ ἢ δὲ τυραννὶς, ὥσπερ εἰρηταὶ πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινὸν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὕφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἥδυ,
5 βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν, διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ 10 μὲν χρήματα τυραννικά, τὰ δ’ εἰς τιμῆ βασιλικὰ μᾶλλον’ καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτική, τυραννικὴ δὲ διὰ χένων. ὅτι δ’ ἡ τυραννίς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δη-11 μοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερὸν, ἐκ μὲν ὀλι-
10 γαρχίας τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμέ-
νειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τὴν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφήν) καὶ τὸ πλῆθει μηθὲν πιστεύειν, διὸ καὶ τὴν παράρειον ποιοῦνται τῶν ὄπλων’ καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὀχλὸν καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεος ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφότερον κοινὸν, καὶ
15 τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος’ ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ 12 πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθείρειν λάθρα καὶ φα-
νέρως καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὧς ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίους’ ἐκ γὰρ τοῦτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς
ἐπιβουλάς, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεῖν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μηδενεύειν. ὃθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρον πρὸς Ὄρασιβουλον συμ-βουλευμά ἑστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων σταχύων κόλουσι, όσ δέον αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναίρειν. καθάπερ οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεὶ νομίζειν περὶ τε τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρ-χίας διὰ τέ γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ διὰ κατα-25 φρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοί τῶν ἀρχομένων ταῖς μοναρ-χίαις, τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας μάλιστα δι’ ὑβριν, ἔνιστε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἱδίων στέρησιν. ἐστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταυτά, καθά-περ κάκει, καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας· μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλοῦτος καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις, 30 ὅν ἐφένται πάντες, τῶν δ’ ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα γίγνονται τῶν ἀρχόντων, αἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν 15 δι’ ὑβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα, τῆς δ’ ὑβρεως οὕσης πολυμεροῦς, ἐκαστόν αὐτῶν αὐτίων γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δ’ ὀργιζο-μένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλ’ 35 οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προ-πηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἀρμοδίον ἀδελφήν, ἐπηρεάσας δ’ Ἀρ-μόδιον’ ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφήν, δ’ Ἐρ-16 στογείτων διὰ τὸν Ἀρμόδιον’ ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάν-δρος τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίπτοντα μετὰ 40 τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτήσαι αὐτῶν εἰ ἴδῃ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύει· ἡ δ’ 1311 b 26—1311 b 11. 57 26 Ἐρίκλης τῆς Φίλιππος ὑπὸ Παυσανίου διὰ τὸ ἐάσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ “Ἀτταλοῦ, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Δέρδα διὰ τὸ καυχησάσαθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐνοοῦχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ’ διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα 5 17 παρελέσθαι τῶν ύιῶν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολ-λαὶ δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχυ-ναί τῶν μονάρχων τινάς, οἷον καὶ ἡ Κραταιός εἰς Ἀρχέ- λαον’ αἰεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἶχε πρὸς τὴν ὀμιλίαν, ὡστε ἴκανή καὶ ἐλάττων ἐγένετο πρόφασις, ἡ διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδε- 10 μίαν ἔδωκεν ὀμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν,
κατεχόμενος ύπο πολέμου πρὸς Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον, ἐδοκεῖ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἐλλείμας, τὴν δὲ νεωτέραν τῷ νείτε Ἀμύντα, οἶμένος οὕτως ἃν ἐκεῖνον ἥκιστα διαφέρεσθαι 15 καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας· ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριώτητος ὑπήρξεν ἄρχῃ τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν χάριν. συνεπέθετο δὲ καὶ Ἐλλανοκράτης ὁ Δαρκείας διὰ 18 τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· ὡς γὰρ χρόμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐ κατήγεν υποχόμενος, δὲ ὑβριν καὶ οὐ δὲ ἐρωτικὴν ἐπι- 20 θυμίαν ἔστε εἶναι τὴν γεγενημένην ὀμιλίαν. Πάρρων δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Αἰνοὶ Κότου διεφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τί- μωροῦντες, Ἀδαμᾶς δ’ ἀπέστη Κότους διὰ τὸ ἐκτητήριον παῖς ὧν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὡς ὑβρισμένος. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ 19 εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκισθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν διέ- 25 φθειραν οἱ δ’ ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς ύβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ 29 τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας, οἷον ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ 30 τοὺς Πενθιλίδας Μεγακλῆς περιοντας καὶ τύπτοντας ταῖς κορύναις ἐπιθέμενος μετὰ τῶν φιλῶν ἄνειλεν, καὶ ὑστερον Σμέρδις Πενθιλὸν πληγᾶς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἐξελκυσθεὶς διεφθειρεν. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δε- 20 κάμνιχος ἄγεμόν αὐξητὸν, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶ- τος· αἰτίων δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ὡς αὐτὸν ἐξεδοκεῖ μαστιγώσαι Ἐφριπίδη τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δ’ Ἐφριπίδης ἐχαλάσατο εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσῳδίαν τοῦ στόματος. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ 35 διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἱ μὲν ἀνήρρησαν οἱ δ’ ἐπεβουλεύθη- σαν. ὄμοις δὲ καὶ διὰ φόβον· ἐν γάρ τι τούτῳ τῶν αἰτίων 21 θν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας, οἷον Ἐφρίππῳ Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δα- ρείων, ὃ ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσατο Ἐφρίβου, ἀλλ’ ὁ ὁμόμενος 40 συγγνώσεσθαι ὡς ἀμυνόμοις διὰ τὸ δειπνεύν· αἱ δὲ διὰ 112 καταφρώνησαν, ὥσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον ἱδιῶς τις ξαίνοντα 1312 μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν (ἐὰν ἄληθῆ ταῦτα οἱ μυθολογοῦντες λέγουσιν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου γε ἃν γένοιτο τούτῳ ἄληθές), καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ υστέρῳ Δίων ἐπέθετο διὰ τὸ 23
1311 b 12—1312 a 35.

καταφρονεῖν, ὃρδώ τοὺς τε πολῖτας οὕτως ἔχοντας καὶ 5 αὐτὸν ἀεὶ μεθύοντα. ... καὶ τῶν φίλων δὲ τινὸς ἐπιτίθένται διὰ καταφρόνησιν. ... διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν 24 ὡς λήσοντες. καὶ οἱ οὗμενοι δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τρόπον τινα διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐπιτίθενται ὡς δυνάμενοι γὰρ καὶ καταφρονοῦσι τοῦ κινδύνου διὰ τὴν δύ- 10 ναμιν ἐπιχειροῦσι ράδιος, ὡσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοὺς μο- νάρχοις, οἴον Κύρος Ἀρσαγέα καὶ τοῦ βίου καταφρονοῦν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως διὰ τὸ τῆν μὲν δύναμιν ἐξηγητείναι, αὐτὸν 20 δὲ τρυφάν, καὶ Σέψδης ὁ Θράξ Ἀμαδάκω στρατηγὸς ὁν. 25 οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ πλεῖον τούτων ἐπιτίθενται, οὗν καὶ καταφρο- 15 νοῦντες καὶ διὰ κέρδος, ὡσπερ Ἀρισταρχάνη Μιδριδάτης. [μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐγχειροῦσι οἱ τὴν φύσιν μὲν θρασεῖς, τιμὴν δὲ ἔχοντες πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοὺς μο- νάρχοις. ἀνδρία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος εἶστιν, δι' ἃς ἀμφοτέρας, ὡς ράδιος κρατήσοντες, ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις.] 20 τῶν δὲ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἐτερος τρόπος εἴστι τῆς 26 αἰτίας παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους πρότερον. οὐ γὰρ ὡσπερ ἔμοι 25 τοῖς τυχόνοις ἐπιχειροῦσι ρώμηπες κέρδη τε μεγάλα καὶ τιμᾶς μεγάλας οὕσας αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλο- τιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἐκαστός προαίρεται κινδυνεύειν ἀλλ' 25 ἔκεινοι μὲν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, ὡσπερ δ' ὡσπερ καὶ ἀλλὴς τυχὸς γενομένης πράξεως περιττής, καὶ δι' ἡν ὑνο- μαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς μονάρχοις ἐγχειροῦσι, οὐ κτήσασθαι βουλόμενοι 27 μοναρχίαν ἀλλὰ ἤξειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐλάχιστοι γε τὸν 30 ἀριθμὸν εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὀρμώντες ὑποκεί- σθαι γὰρ δεὶ τὸ τοῦ σωθῆναι μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἀν μὴ 28 μέλλῃ κατασχῆσαι τὴν πράξιν. οἵ άκολουθεῖν μὲν δεὶ τὴν Δίωνος ὑπόληψιν, οὐ ράδιον δ' αὐτήν ἐγγενέσθαι πολ- λοῦς· ἔκεινοι γὰρ μετ' ὀλέγων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Διονύσιον 35

1 The insertion here of 17, μάλιστα δὲ . . . 20, ἐπιθέσεις is suggested in the critical note on 1312 a 6.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η' (Ε'). 10–11.

οὗτος ἔχειν φάσκων ὡς, ὅποιν περ ἀν δύνηται προσελθεῖν, ἵκανον αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον μετασχεῖν τῆς πράξεως, ὁδὸν εἰ μι-

κρὸν ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς εὐθὺς συμβαίνῃ τελευτήσαι, τούτων καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον, φθείρεται δὲ τυραννίς ἐνα

40 μὲν τρόπων, ὡσπέρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη πολιτείας, ἐξω-

1312 ἦν ἐναντία τις ἡ πολιτεία κρείττων (τὸ μὲν γὰρ

βούλεσθαι δῆλον ὡς ὑπάρχει διὰ τὴν ἐναντίότητα τῆς

προαίρεσεως: ἀ δὲ βούλεσθαι, δυνάμενοι πράττοντες),

ἐναντίας δ᾿ αὐτί πολιτείαι, δῆμος μὲν τυραννίδι καθ᾽ Ἑσίο-

5 δον ὡς κεραμές κεραμεῖ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τε-

λευταία τυραννίς ἐστιν), βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία διὰ

τὴν ἐναντίότητα τῆς πολιτείας (δὶ Δακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας

κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας καὶ Συρακούσιοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ὃν

ἐπολιτεύοντο καλῶς): ἕνα δ᾿ ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες

31 10 στασιάζοσιν, ὡσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν

περὶ Διονύσιον, ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος Ἑρασίβουλου τοῦ Ἑρώνος

ἀδελφοῦ τῶν νῦν τοῦ Γέλωνος δημαγωγοῦντος καὶ πρὸς ἡδο-

νᾶς ὁμοίως, ἐν` αὐτὸς ἄρχη, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων συστησάντων,

ἔνα μὴ τυραννὶς ὅλως καταλυθῆ ἀλλὰ Ἑρασίβουλος, οἱ

15 δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν, ὡς καιρὸν ἔχοντες, ἐξέβαλον ἄπαντας

αὐτοὺς` Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεσθῆ ὁμ, καὶ 32

προσλαβὼν τὸν δήμον, ἐκείνου ἐκβαλὼν διεσβάρη. δύο δὲ

οὐσῶν αὐτῶν δι` ἀρκεῖος ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι, μί-

σους καὶ καταφρονήσεως, βάτερον μὲν δεὶ τούτων ὑπάρχειν

20 τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μίσος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι πολλαὶ

γίνονται τῶν καταλύσεων, σημεῖον δὲ τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτη-

33 σαμένων οἱ πλείστοι καὶ διεφύλαξαν τᾶς ἀρχᾶς, οἱ δὲ

παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπολλύσαι πάντες` ἀπο-

λαυστικός γὰρ ἡγίοντες εὐκαταφρονήτοι τε γίγνονται καὶ

25 πολλοὺς καιροὺς παραδιδόσας τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις, μόριον δὲ

ti τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὄργην δεὶ τιθέναι τρόπον γὰρ τινὰ

τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτία γίνεται πράξεων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρα-

34 κτικότερον τοῦ μίσους' συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται διὰ τὸ
1312 a 36—1313 a 21.

μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος (μάλιστα δὲ συμβαίνει τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὑβρίν, δι’ ἥν αἰτίαν ἢ τε 30 τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων κατελύθη τυραννίς καὶ πολλαὶ τῶν 35 ἄλλων): ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης πάρεστιν, ὡστε οὐ βρίθιον λογίζεσθαι, ἢ δ’ ἔχθρα ἀνευ λύπης. ὥς δὲ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπείν, ὅσα αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν τῆς τε ὀλυγραξίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας καὶ τῆς 35 δημοκρατίας τῆς ἐσχάτης, τοσαῦτα καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος ἑτέον· καὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ τυγχάνονσιν ὡσπο διαιρεῖται τυραν- 36 νίδες. βασιλεία δ’ ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐξοθεν ἡκιστα φθείρσαται, διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνιος ἐστιν· ἐξ αὐτῆς δ’ αἱ πλεῖσται φθοραὶ συμβαίνουσιν. φθείρσαται δὲ κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἕνα μὲν 40 στασιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, ἄλλον δὲ 3131 a τρόπον τυραννικότερον πειραμένων διοικεῖν, ὅταν εἶναι κύριοι 37 πλειόνων ἀξίωσι καὶ παρὰ τῶν νόμων. οὐ γίγνονται δ’ ἐτε βασιλείαι νῦν, ἀλλ’ ἀν ἔνα γίγνονται, μοναρχία καὶ τυ- 38 ραννίδες μᾶλλον, διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐκούσιν μὲν ἀρχὴν 5 εἶναι, μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, πολλοὺς δ’ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὡστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέ- γεδο καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὡστε διὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐκόν- τες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν’ ἀν δὲ δ’ ἀπάτης ἀρξῇ τις ἡ βίας, 39 ἢδ’ δοκεὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βα- 40 τος χίλειας τιθέναι δεῖ τῆς φθορᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέ- ναι καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς εὐκαταφρονήτους, καὶ τὸ δύ- ναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν ἀλλὰ βασιλικὴν τιμὴν ὑβρίζειν· μῆδ’ δὲ γὰρ ἐγίνετο ἡ κατάλυσις· μὴ βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύω, ἀλλ’ ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ 15 βουλομένων. φθείρονται μὲν οὖν αἱ μοναρχίαι διὰ ταύτας καὶ τοιαύτας ἐτέρας αἰτίας·

Σῶρονται δὲ δῆλον ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῶν 11 ἐναντίων, ὅσ δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τῷ τάς μὲν βασιλείας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριάτερον. ὅσο γὰρ ἐν ἐλαττώνῳ ὁσὶ κύριοι, 20 πλεῖώ χρόνον ἀναγκαίον μένειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν· αὐτοὶ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η' (Ε'). 11.

...
1313 a 22—1314 a 5.

ὁτακουστὰς ἐξέπεμπεν Ἰέρων, ὅπου τις εἰς ἐνυποσία καὶ σύλ-
λογος (παρησιαζόταν) τε γὰρ ἢττον, φοβοῦμεν τοὺς τοιού- 15
8 τοὺς, καὶ παρησιάζωταν, ἱανθάνουσιν ἢττον) καὶ τὸ δια-
βάλλειν ἀλλήλους καὶ συγκρούειν καὶ φίλους φίλοις καὶ
τὸν δήμον τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τὸ
πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους τυραννικὸν, ὅπως μήτε φι-
λακή τρέφηται καὶ πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες ἀσχολοὶ 20
9 δοσὺν ἐπιβουλεύειν, παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων αἱ τε πυραμίδες
αἱ περὶ Ἀγνύττων καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελίδων καὶ τοῖς Ὥλυμπίοις ἡ οἰκοδόμησις υπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων,
καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμων ἔργα Πολυκράτεια (πάντα γὰρ ταύτα
10 δύναται ταύτων, ἀσχολίαν καὶ πενίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων) καὶ 25
ἤ εἰσφόρα τῶν τελῶν, οἶ δὲ Συρακούσαι ἐν πέντε γὰρ
ἐτεσίν ἐπὶ Δειονὺς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασάν εἰσεννηχέναι συνέ-
βανεν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποῖος ὁ τύραννος, ὅπως δὴ ἀσχολὶ
τε ὅσι καὶ ἡγεμόνων ἐν χρέα διατελῶσιν ὄντες. καὶ ἡ
μὲν βασιλεύα σώζεται διὰ τῶν φίλων, τυραννικὸν δὲ τὸ 30
μάλιστ' ἀπίστευν τοῖς φίλοις, ὡς βουλομένων μὲν πάντων,
11 δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρα-
τίαν δὲ γιγνόμενα τὴν τελευταίαν τυραννικὰ πάντα, γυ-
ναικοκρατία τε περὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ἴν' ἐξαγγέλλοις κατὰ τῶν
ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δοῦλων ἀνεσις διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν οὕτε γὰρ 35
ἐπιβουλεύουσιν οἱ δοῦλοι καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς τυράννοις,
eὑμερούντας τὰ ἀναγκαίον εἴνοι εἶναι καὶ ταῖς τυραννίσι
καὶ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἰναι βούλεται
12 μόναρχος. διὸ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐντιμὸς, παρὰ
μὲν τοῖς δήμοις ὁ δημαγωγὸς (ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ δημαγωγὸς τοῦ 40
dήμου κόλαξ), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τυράννοις τοὺς ταπεινῶς ὁμιλοῦντες,
ὅπερ ἐστίν ἔργον κολακείας. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ποιηρὸβιλον 1314 a
ἡ τυραννίς κολακεύομενοι γὰρ καίρους, τούτο δ' οὖν ἂν εἰς
ποιήσει φρόνημα ἔχων ἐλεύθερον, ἀλλὰ φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἐπιει-
13 κεῖς η' οὐ κολακεύοντας. καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ ποιηροὶ εἰς τὰ πο-
νηρά. ἥλιο γὰρ ὁ ἴλος, ὡς περὶ ἡ παροιμία. καὶ τὸ μῆ-5
δεν χαίρειν σεμνῷ μηδ' ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικῷ· αὕτων γὰρ
eίναι μόνον ἀξίωτοι τοὺς τύραννος, ὁ δ' ἀντισεμνύνομενος
καὶ ἐλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσπο-
tικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος· μισοῦσιν οὖν ὡσπέρ καταλύουτας τὴν
10 ἄρχην, καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι συσσίτοις καὶ συνιστοῦντας ἔχειν· 14
κοῖς μάλλον ἡ πολιτικῖς τυραννικῶν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολε-
μίους τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀντιποιούμενοι. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυ-
ραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτηρία τῆς ἄρχῆς, οὐδὲν δ' ἔλλειπτε
μοιχηρίας. ἐστὶ δ' ὃς εἰπεῖν πάντα ταῦτα περιειλημένα
15 τρισὶν εἴδεσιν. στοχάζεται γὰρ ἡ τυραννίς τριῶν, ἐνδὲ μὲν 15
tοὺς μικρὰ φρονεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄν μικρόψυ-
χος ἐπιβουλεύσεις), δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστείν ἄλληλοι· οὗ
καταλύεται γὰρ πρόσερον τυραννίς πρὶν ἡ πιστεύσοσι τινες
ἐαυτοῖς· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτείκεσθαι πολεμοῦσιν ὡς βλαβεροῖς
20 πρὸς τὴν ἄρχην οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίων ἀρχεῖ τω
διεπτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πιστοῦ τοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς
ἀλλοὶς εῖναι καὶ μὴ καταγορεέων μῆτε ἑαυτῶν μῆτε τῶν
ἀλλων. τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ 16
ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις, ὡστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ
25 δυνάμεως ὑπαρχοῦσης. εἰς οὗς μὲν οὖν ὄρους ἀνάγεται τὰ
βουλήματα τῶν τυράννων, οὕτω τρεῖς τυχεῖν οὐντεῖς
πάντα γὰρ ἀναγάγοι τις ἃν τὰ τυραννικὰ πρὸς ταῦτα
tὰς ὑποθέσεις, τὰ μὲν ὅπως μὴ πιστεύσωσιν ἄλληλοις, τὰ
δ' ὅπως μὴ δύνανται, τὰ δ' ὅπως μικρῶν φρονόσιν. ὃ μὲν 17
30 οὖν εἰς τρόπος δὲ οὐ γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι τοιοῦτος
ἔστιν, ὁ δ' ἐτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἀναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις
tὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἔστι δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς 18
τῶν βασιλείων· ὡσπέρ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας εἰς τρόπος τῆς
φθορᾶς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἄρχην τυραννικοτέραν, οὗτο τῆς τυ-
35 ραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικοτέραν, ἐν φυλά-
tοντα μόνον, τὴν δύναμιν, ὅπως ἄρχη μὴ μόνον βουλομέ-
νων ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ βουλομένων· προϊέμενος γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο
προίτεται καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν. ἀλλὰ τούτο μὲν ὡσπέρ ὑπόθε-
σιν δεὶ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρινόμενον τῶν βασιλικῶν καλῶς, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν 40 φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν, μήτε δαπανώντα (eis) δορέας τοιαύτας 1314 b ἐφ' αἰς τὰ πλῆθη χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅταν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὲν λαμβάνοντα ἐργαζομένων καὶ πονοῦντων γλύσχρως, διδώσι δ' ἐταίραις καὶ ἐνώπιοις καὶ τεχνίταις ἄφθονως, λόγῳ τε ἀποδιδόντα τῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ δαπανομένων, ὅπερ 5 ἦδη πεποιήκασί τίνες τῶν τυράννων (οὗτο γὰρ ἀν τις διοι- 20 κών οἰκονόμος ἀλλ' οὗ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειες' οὐ δεὶ δὲ φο- βεῖσθαι μή ποτε ἀπορήσῃ χρημάτων κύριος ὅπ' τίς πό- λεως' ἄλλα τοῖς γ' ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας καὶ συμφέρει τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἡ καταλιπτεὶν ἄθροίσαντας' ίο ἦπτον γὰρ ὃι φιλάπτοντες ἐπιτιθείντο τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερότεροι τῶν τυράννων τοῖς ἀποδημούσιν οἱ φιλάπτοντες τῶν πολιτῶν' οἱ μὲν γὰρ συναποδημοῦσιν, οἱ 21 δὲ ὑπομένουσιν'). ἔστειτα τὰς ἐλεφόρας καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας δεὶ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἕνεκα συνάγοντα, κἂν 15 ποτε δεηθῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καρποὺς, ὡς τε αὐτῶν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν ἄλλα μὴ ὡς ἵδιων' καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπῶν ἄλλα σεμνῶν, ἐτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὡστε μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας 22 ἄλλα μᾶλλον αἰδείσθαι' τοῦτον μὲντοι τυγχάνειν οὐ ῥᾴδιον 20 ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον, διὸ δεὶ κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρετῶν ἐπιμελεῖαν ποιῆται, ἄλλα τῆς πολεμικῆς, καὶ δόξαν ἐμ- ποιεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην' ἐτι δὲ μὴ μόνον αὐτῶν φαί- νεσθαι μηδένα τῶν ἀρχομένων ύβρίζοντα, μήτε νέον μήτε 23 νέαν, ἄλλα μηδ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡμοίως 25 δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἐχειν γυναίκας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ὡς καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὃβρεις πολλαὶ τυραννίδες ἀπολώλασιν' περὶ τέ τὰς ἀπολάύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς τοῦναντίον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν (οὗ γὰρ μόνον ἐυθὺς ἐσθεν τοῦτο δρῶσιν, καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἄλλα 30 καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἐν VOL. IV. F
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η’ (Ε’). 11–12.

ός ειδάμνονα καὶ μακαρίων θαυμάσσων), ἀλλὰ μάλιστα 24 μὲν μετριάζειν τοὺς τοιούτους, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ γε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀλλοις διαφέρει (οὕτε γὰρ εὐεπίθετος οὐτ’ εὐκατα-
35 φρόντιστος ὁ νήφων, ἀλλ’ ὁ μεθύων, οὐδ’ ὁ ἄγρυπνος, ἀλλ’ ὁ καθεύδων). τούναντίον τε ποιητέων τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων
σχεδὸν πάντων· κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεὶ καὶ κοιμεῖν τήν
πόλιν ὡς ἐπιτροπὸν ὑπτα καὶ μὴ τῦραννον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς 25
tοὺς θεός φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζουσα διαφερόντως (ἡττὸν τε
40 γὰρ φοβοῦνται τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων,
1315 οὖν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζοισι εἶναι τῶν ἀρχοντα καὶ φρον-
tιζέιν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἦττον ὡς συμμάχους
ἐχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς), δεὶ δὲ ἀνευ ἀβελτορίας φαίνεσθαι 26
tοιούτων· τοὺς τε ἀγαθοὺς περὶ τι γεγονόμενοι τιμᾶν οὖτως
5 ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν ἄν ποτε τιμηθήναι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν πο-
λιτῶν αὐτονόμων ὑπῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμᾶς ἀπο-
νέειν, ταῦτα δὲ κολάσεις δι’ ἐτέρων, ἀρχόντων καὶ δι-
καστηρίων. κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ πάσης μοναρχίας τὸ μηδένα 27
ποιεῖν ἑνὰ μέγαν, ἀλλ’ εἶπερ, πλείον (τηρήσουσι γὰρ ἀλλή-
10 λος). οὖν δ’ ἀρα τινὰ δὲν ποιήσαι μέγαν, μὴ τοῦ τε γε
ἣνος ὑρασύν (ἐπιθετικώτατον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦδος περὶ
pάσας τὰς πράξεις), κἂν τῆς δυνάμεως τινα δοκῇ παρα-
lυειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς τούτο δράν καὶ μὴ πάσαν ἀθρόον
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἔτι δὲ πάσης μὲν ὑβρεως εἰργε- 28
15 σθαι, παρὰ πάσας δὲ δυνῆν, τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα [κο-
λάσεως] καὶ τῆς εἰς τὴν ἥλικιαν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτῃ ποιη-
tέου τὴν εὐλάβειαν περὶ τοῦ πολιτίμους τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς
tὰ χρήματα ὀλγοφριάν οἱ φιλοχρήματοι φέρουσι βαρέως,
tὴν δ’ εἰς ἀτιμίαν οἵ τε φιλότιμοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν
20 ἀνθρώπων. διότι η μὴ χρῆσθαι δεὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἦ τὰς 29
μὲν κολάσεις πατρικῶς φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦμενοι καὶ μὴ δι’
ὀλγοφρίαν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἥλικιαν ὀμιλίας δι’ ἐρωτικὰς
αἰτίας ἀλλὰ μὴ δι’ ἐξουσίαν. οἶχος δὲ τὰς δοκοῦς ἀτι-
μίας ἐξωνεῖσθαι μεῖξοι τιμαις. τῶν δ’ ἐπιχειροῦντων ἐπὶ 30
1314 b 32—1315 b 16.

τὴν τοῦ σόματος διαφθορὰν οὗτοι φοβερῶτατοι καὶ δέονται 25 πλεῖστης φυλακῆς, ὅσιοι μὴ προαιροῦνται περιποιεῖσθαι τὸ 31 ζήν διαφθείρατε. διὸ μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεὶ τοὺς ὑβρι- ἐσθαι νομίζοντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ δὲν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν ἀφειδός γὰρ ἑαυτῶν ἐχοῦσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες, καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἶπε, χαλεπὸν φάσκον εἶναι 30 32 θυμὸν μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀνείσθαι· ἠπεί δ’ αἱ πόλεις ἐκ δύο συνεστήκασι μορίων, ἐκ τε τῶν ἀπόρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν δεὶ σώζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέ- ρων ἀδίκεσθαι μηδὲν, ὅποτεροι δ’ ἄν ὁσὶ κρείττους, τοῦτοι 35 ἰδίως μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὡς, ἣν ὑπάρχῃ τοῦτο τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔτε δούλων ἐλευθέρων ἀνάγκη ποιεῖσθαι τὸν τύραννον οὔτε ὀπλῶν παραίρεσιν· ἵκανον γὰρ θάτερον μέρος πρὸς τῇ δυνάμει προστίθεμεν, ὥστε κριστιῶν εἶναι 33 τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων. περίεργον δὲ τὸ λέγειν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τῶν 40 τοιοῦτων· ὁ γὰρ σκοπὸς φανερὸς, ὅτι δεὶ μὴ τυραννικῶν ἀλλ’ οἰκονόμοι καὶ βασιλικῶν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀρχό- 1315 b μένους καὶ μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπίτροπον, καὶ τὰς μετριό- τητας τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μὴ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν 34 γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαίον οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλιό καὶ 5 ξηλωστέραν τῷ βελτίων ἀρχεῖν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένων μηδὲ μισούμενον καὶ φοβούμενον διατελεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρωνιστέραν, ἔτι δ’ αὐτὸν διακείσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἥθος ἦτοι καλὸς πρὸς ἑρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὑπατα, καὶ μὴ ποηνήσον ἀλλ’ ἠμιπῶνην. 10

[Kαίτων πασῶν ὀλιγοχρονιώτεραι τῶν πολιτείων εἰς ἑαυτῶν ἁλλ’ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς. πλείστων γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον ἡ περὶ Σικυώνα τυραννίς, ἡ τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παῖδων καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὀρθαγόρου· ἤτη δ’ αὐτὴ διέμεινεν ἐκατόν. τοῦτο δ’ αἰτιῶν ὅτι τοῖς ἀρχιμένοις ἔχρωντο μετρίως καὶ πολλὰ τοῖς νῦ 15 μοι ἐδούλευν, καὶ διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενέσθαι Κλεισθένης

F 2
οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἐδημαιγόγον. λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης τὸν ἀποκρίναντα 2 τῆς νίκης αὐτῶν ὡς ἑστεφάνωσεν· ἔσει δ’ εἰκόνα φασίν
20 εἶναι τοῦ κρίναντος οὗτῳ τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἁγορᾷ καθήμενον. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισιστρατον ὑπομείναν ποτὲ προσκληθέντα δίκην εἰς Ἀρειον πάγων. δευτέρα δὲ περὶ Κόρων-3
θον ἡ τῶν Κυψελίδων· καὶ γὰρ αὐτή διετέλεσεν ἐτῇ τρία καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ ἐξ μὴνας· Κύψελος μὲν γὰρ ἐτυ-25 ράννησεν ἐτῇ τριάκοντα, Πειρανδρος δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ
τέτταρα, Ψαμμίτειχος δ’ ὁ Γορδίου τρία ἐτη. τὰ δ’ αἰτία 4
tαυτὰ καὶ ταύτης· ὃ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος δημαιγωγὸς ἦν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἁρχὴν διετέλεσεν ἀδορυφόρητος, Πειρανδρος
δ’ ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικός, ἀλλὰ πολεμικός. τρίτη δ’ ἦ 5
30 τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν Ἀθήνησιν, οὐκ ἐγένετο δὲ συνεχῆς· δἰς
gὰρ ἐφυγε Πεισιστρατος τυραννῶν, ὡς’ ἐν ἔτεσι τριάκοντα καὶ τρισίν ἐπτακαίδεκα ἐτῇ τούτων ἐτυραννευσεν, ὀκτωκαί-
deκα δὲ οἱ παῖδες, ὡστε τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο ἐτῇ τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ περὶ Ἰέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα περὶ
35 Συρακούσας. ἐτῇ δ’ οὐδ’ αὐτῇ πολλὰ διέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ 6
σύμπαντα δυοῦν δέοντα εἰκοσι· Γέλων μὲν γὰρ ἐπτὰ τυ-
ραννεύσας τῷ ὄγδῳ τῶν βίων ἐπελεύθησεν, δέκα δ’ Ἰέρων, Ἡρακλήσβουλος δὲ τῷ ἐνδέκατῳ μὴν ἐξέπεσεν. αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ
tῶν τυραννιδῶν ὀλιγοχρόνια πᾶσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς.] 40
Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς μο-7
ναρχίας, ἐξ ὃν τε φθειροῦντα καὶ πάλιν σαόνται, σχεδὸν
1316 a ἐρημαῖ περὶ πάντων· ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ
tῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται κα-
λώς· τής τε γὰρ ἁρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης ὁσῆς οὐ
λέγει τῇ μεταβολῆν ἰδιώς. φησι γὰρ αἰτίων εἶναι τὸ μῆ 8
5 μένειν μηδὲν ἄλλ’ ἐν τινι περίδοο μεταβάλλειν, ἁρχὴν δ’
einai tōtōn dōn ἑπίτριτος πυθμήν πεμπάδι συγγεις δύο
ἀρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος
ἀριθμοῦ τούτου γένηται στερεός, ως τῆς φύσεως ποτε φυσικης
φαίλοντι καὶ κρείπτοντι τῆς παίδειας, τούτῳ μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ λέγον ἵσως οὐκ θὰ. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἰναὶ τινας οὔς παί- 10 δευθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνδρας ἀδύνατον· ἀλλ' ἀυτή τι ἀν ὅδος εἰς μεταβολὴ τῆς υπ' ἑκείνου λεγομένης ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ή τῶν ἅλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν γεγομένων πάντων; καὶ διὰ γε τοῦ χρόνου, δ' ὃν λέγει πάντα μεταβάλλει, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἁμε ἀρξάμενα γίγνεσθαι 15 ἀμα μεταβάλλει, οὗν εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς τροπῆς, ἀμα ἁρα μεταβάλλει· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Δακωνικῆς μεταβάλλει; πλεονάκις γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἑναίτιαν μεταβάλλουσι πάσαι αἱ πολιτείαι ἡ τὴν σύνεγγυς. ὁ δ' αὐτός λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἅλλων μετα- 20 βολῶν ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Δακονικῆς, φησὶ, μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα 11 δὲ εἰ δημοκρατίας. καίτοι καὶ ἀνάπαλιν μεταβάλλουσιν, οὗν εἰ δῆμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ εἰς μοναρχίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὔτ' εἰ ἐσται μεταβολή οὔτ' εἰ μὴ 25 ἔσται, (οὔτ', εἰ ἔσται,) διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν καὶ εἰς πολλαν πολιτείας, τούτου δ' αἰτίαν ὃτι οὐ βρέθη ἃν εἰς ἑλε λέγειν' ἀριστον γάρ, ἐπεὶ κατ' ἑκείνον δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρὸσην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην οὔτω 12 γὰρ ἐν ἐγίγνετο συνεχῆς καὶ κύκλος. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὦσπερ ἡ Σικυωνός ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος 30 εἰς τὴν Κλευσθένους, καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὦσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἢ Ἀντιλέοντος, καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὦσπερ ἡ τῶν Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὦσπερ ἡ 13 Χαριλάου ἐν Ἀσκεδαίμονι καὶ... ἐν Καρχηδόνι. καὶ εἰς τυ- 35 ραννίδα μεταβάλλει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὦσπερ ἐν Σικελία ὀι σχέδον αἱ πλείσται τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἐν Λεωντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναίτιου τυραννίδα καὶ ἐν Γέλα εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου καὶ ἐν Ῥηγίῳ εἰς τὴν Ἀναξιλάου καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν 14 ωσαύτως. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰεσθαί εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν διὰ τούτο μεταβάλλειν ὦτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταῖ οἱ 40 ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ' οὖχ ὦτι οἱ πολύ ὑπερέχοντες ταῖς 1316 b
ούσιας ού δίκαιον οὖνται εἶναι ἵναν μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοῦς κεκτημένους μηδὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις· ἐν πολλαῖς τε ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐκ ἔχεστι χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσίν οἱ 5 κοινώντες, ἐν Καρχηδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένῃ χρηματίζονται καὶ οὖν ποιεῖται χρηματίζονται, ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι 15 δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίκην, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων, τί γὰρ αὕτη μάλλων τῆς Δακωνικῆς πέποθεν ἢ ὁποιασόν τὸν ἄλλης, οὗ μὴ πάντες κέκτησαν ἵνα ἢ μὴ πάντες ὤμοιος 10 εἰσὶν ἀγάθοι ἀνδρεῖς; οὐδένος δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου ἢ πρὸτε- 16 ρον οὖδὲν ἢττου μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς δῆμον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἄν γένονται πλείους ἡ ἁποροι, καὶ ἐκ δῆμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, εἶναι κρείττουν ἢ τοῦ πλῆθους τοῦ εὔπορον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἁμελῶς 17 15 ὄν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαί, οὐ λέγει ἄλλα μίαν, ὅτι ἁσω- τευόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι γίγνονται πένητες, ὅς ἢ ἡ ἁρχή πλουσίων ὤμων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ φεύ- 5-17 20 δος, ἄλλα ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡμερῶν τινὲς ἀπολέοσοι τὰς οὐσίας, κανονομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲν γίγνεται δεινόν, καὶ μεταβάλλοντοι οὐδὲν μάλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δῆμον 18 ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τίμων μὴ μετέχοσοι, καὶ ἄδικωνται ἢ ὑβρίζονται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ μὴ καταδαπανήσοι τὴν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐξείναι ὁ τι ἄν βούλωνται ποιεῖν· οὐ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἑλευ- 25 θείαν εἶναι φησιν. πλείουν δὴ οὐσῶν ὀλιγαρχίων καὶ δη- μοκρατίων, ὅς μιᾶς οὕσης ἐκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς ὁ Σωκράτης. . . .

Θ' (Ζ').

Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραί καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἁρχὰς τάξεως, καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποιὰ πρὸς ποιαν συντετακται πολιτείαν, ἐτὶ δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολι-
1316 b 2—1317 a 27.

τείνων, ἐκ ποιῶν τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἰρήται 35 2 πρότερον· ἐπεί δὲ τετύχηκεν εἰδὴ πλείω δημοκρατίας ὄντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτείων, ἁμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἰ τι λοιπόν, οὐ χείρον ἐπισκέψαθαι, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν 3 συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέων πάντων 40 τῶν τρόπων ταύτα γὰρ συνυνάξομεν ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας 1317 a ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅστε ἄριστοκρατίας τε ολιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ 4 πολιτείας δημοκρατικωτέρας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνυνάσμους, οὐς δὲι μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν, οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δ’ εἰσὶ νῦν, οὸν ἄν τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιεσίας ολιγαρ- 5 χικῶς ἡ συνυπεγμένοι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστηρία ἄριστο- κρατικῶς, ἡ ταύτα μὲν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ολι- γαρχικῶς, ἄριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιεσίας, ἥ καὶ’ ἄλλων τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συνυβῆ τὰ τῆς πολι- 5 τείας οἰκεία. ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποιῶν ἁμότ- 10 τει πόλιν, ὡστοὺς δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ολιγαρχῶν ποιῶ πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτείων τὰς συμφέρει τίςν, 6 εἰρήται πρότερον. ὅμως δὲ, (ἐπει) δεὶ γενέσθαι δήλον μὴ μόνον ποία τούτων τῶν πολιτείων ἀρίστη ταις πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πῶς δεὶ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τας ἄλλας, ἐπέλ- 15 θωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας εἰσῳμεν ἀμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης πολιτείας φαινον, 7 αὕτη δ’ ἐστιν ἣν καλοῦσι τινες ολιγαρχίαν. ληπτέοιν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ δημοτικὰ καὶ τὰ δο- κοῦνα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἀκολουθεῖν’ ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντι 20 θεμένων τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας εἰδὴ γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ 8 πλείους δημοκρατίας μίας εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γὰρ εἰσιν αἰτίαι δ’ ἀστερ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους εἰσὶ, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ λεχθεῖσα πρότερον, ὅτι διάφοροι οἱ δήμοι (γίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος, τὸ δὲ βάναυσον καὶ θητι- 25 κὸν’ ὁν τοῦ πρῶτον τῷ δευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου πάλιν τοῖς ἁμφότεροι, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίω
καὶ Χείρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μη τὴν αὐτὴν· δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἢς νῦν λέγομεν τὰ γὰρ ταῖς 9 δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεία ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττῳ, τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δ' ἀπαντα ταῦτα. χρήσιμον δ' ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρὸς τε τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἣν ἀν τίς αὐτῶν τύχῃ βουλόμενος, 35 καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ξητούσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας 10 καθίσταντες ἀπαντὰ τὰ οἰκεία συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σοφισίας τῶν πολιτείων εἰρηντι κεπτρονερ. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἡθη καὶ ὅν ἐφείνυτε λέγωμεν.

2 'Τπόθεσις μὲν ὅμων τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἑλευθερία (τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν, ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ 1317 θαύτῃ μετέχοντας ἑλευθερίας· τοῦτο γὰρ στοχαζόμεθα φασὶ πάσαν δημοκρατίαν): ἑλευθερίας δὲ ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ 2 ἵσον ἐχεῖν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀρίθμον ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοῦτο δ' 5 ὅντος τοῦ δίκαιου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον, καὶ δ' τι ἐν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείσσοις, τούτ' εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος καὶ τούτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον' φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἵσον ἐχεῖν ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτῶν ὡστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων· πλείονον γὰρ εἰσί, κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς 10 πλείοσί δάξαν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἑλευθερίας σημείων τοῦτο, διὸ 3 τίθενται πάντες οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὄρον, ἐν δὲ τὸ ζήν ὁς βούλεται τις· τούτῳ γὰρ τῆς ἑλευθερίας ἐργῷ εἶναι φασὶν, εἰπέρ τοῦ δουλεύοντος τὸ ζήν μή ὡς βούλεται. τῆς 4 μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὄρος οὕτως δεύτερος, ἐντεύθεν δ' ἐλή- 15 λυθε τὸ μή ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ μηδενός, εἰ δὲ μῆ, κατὰ μέρος. καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἑλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἵσον. τούτων δ' ὑποκειμένων καὶ τοιαύτ- 5 τῆς οὕσεις τῆς ἀρχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα δημοτικὰ, τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων, τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν
1317 a 28—1318 a 10.

ἐκάστου ἐκαστον δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων, τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ πάσας ἡ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης, τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος μηδενὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ὅτι μικρότατον, τὸ μὴ διὸ τῶν αὐτὸν ἀρχεῖν μηδεμίαν ἡ ὀλιγάκις ἡ ὀλίγας ἐξῳ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ πάσας ἡ ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δικάξεων πάντας 25 καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἡ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, ὅτι περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων, τὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων (ἡ τῶν μεγίστων), ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν

ν 6 μηδενὸς ἡ ὅτι ὀλιγάκις[ἡ τῶν μεγίστων] κυρίαν (τῶν δ' 30 ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον βουλή, ὅπως μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν ἐναυδάθα γὰρ ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν δύναμιν εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δήμος εὐπορῶν μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἰρήνει πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ 7 ταύτης), ἐπειτὰ τὸ μισθοφορεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκ-35 κλησίαν δικαστῆρια ἀρχὰς, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ δικαστηρία καὶ βουλή καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὰς κυρίας, ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη συνσυνεῖν μετ' ἄλληλων [ἐτὶ ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται, τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τάναντι τούτων εἶναι, ἀγένεια πενήν 40 8 βαναυσία] ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν ἄλλων εἶναι, ἐάν δὲ τὰς καταλειψθείς εἴ τὰς ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς, τὸ γε πε-1318 a μιαρείσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ εἴ οἱ αἵρετων κληρωτοὺς 9 ποιεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταύτ' ἐστὶ, συμβαίνει δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἰσον ἔχειν ἀπαντᾶς κατ' ἀριθμῶν) ἡ μᾶ-5 λίστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δήμος ἰσον γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἀρχεῖν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπορούς, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐς ἱσοῦ κατ' ἀριθμῶν· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν ὑπάρχει νυμίζοιει τὴν τ' ἱσότητα τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.
3 Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἔγονε τὸ ἱσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμῆματα διελεῖν χιλίους τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἱσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οὐχ οὐτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἱσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὖτως, ἐπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἱσον λαβὸντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἱρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων. πότερον οὖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ 2 τὸ δημοτικόν δίκαιον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος; φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἄν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείσσιν, 20 οἱ δὲ ὅλιγαρχικοὶ δὲ τι ἄν δόξῃ τῇ πλείων οὐσίᾳ κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὕσια φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν. ἔχει δὲ ἀμφότερα 3 ἀνισότητα καὶ ἀδίκως εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἄν οἱ ὅλιγοι, τυραννίς (καὶ γὰρ ἕαν εἰς ἐχῖν πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐτάραχων, κατὰ τὸ ὅλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιον μόνον), εἰ 25 δὲ τι ἄν οἱ πλείσσις κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, ἀδικήσουσι δημεύστε τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἑλαττών, καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον. τίς ἄν οὖν εἰ ἡ ἱσότης ἢ ὁμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτέον 4 ἔξ ἄν ὁρίζονται δικαίων ἀμφότεροι. λέγουσι γὰρ ὅσ τι ἄν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείσσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τούτ’ εἶναι δεῖ κύριον. 30 ἐστώ δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι πάντως, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τετύχηκεν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πόλις, πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες, ὃ τι ἄν ἀμφότεροι δόξῃ ὃ τοὺς πλείσσι, τοῦτο κύριον ἐστώ, ἐὰν δὲ τάναντι δόξῃ, ὃ τι ἄν οἱ πλείσσι καὶ ὅν τὸ τίμημα πλείον, οἴον εἰ οἱ μὲν δέκα οἱ δὲ εἰκόσιν, ἐδοξὲ δὲ τῶν μὲν πλουσίων 5 35 τοῖς ἐξ, τῶν δ’ ἀπορωτέροι τοῖς πεντεκαίδεκα, προσγεγεννυται τοῖς μὲν πένησι τέτταρες τῶν πλουσίων, τοίς δὲ πλουσίοις πέντε τῶν πενήτων· ὅποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμομένων ἀμφότεροι ἐκατέρως, τοῦτο κύριον. ἐὰν δὲ ἤ ἵσον συμπέσωσι, κοινὴν εἶναι ταύτην νομιστέον ἀπορίαν ὥσπερ 40 νῦν, ἐὰν δέχα ἡ ἐκκλησία γένηται ἢ τὸ δικαστήριον· ἢ 1318 b γὰρ ἀποκληρωτέον ἢ ἀλλ’ τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱσον καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, κἂν ἢ πάνω χαλεπῶν εὑρείν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὀμος βάσιν τυχεῖν ἢ συμπείσαι
1318 a 11—1318 b 36. 75
tοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν· ἂεὶ γὰρ ἡτοῦσι τὸ ἱσον καὶ τὸ
δίκαιον οἱ ἡττούς, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδέν φροντίζουσιν· 5
Δημοκρατίων δ᾽ οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη μὲν ἡ πρώτη 4
τάξει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦτον ἐλέξθη λόγοις· ἐστὶ δὲ
καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὐτῆς. λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὡσπερ ἄν
τις διέλοι τοὺς δήμους· βέλτιστος γὰρ δήμος ὁ γεωργικὸς
ἐστιν, ὡστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδεχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ζῷ τὸ 10
2 πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἡ νωμῆς. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολ-
λὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἀσχολοῖς, ὡστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησίασουσιν·
diὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τάναγκαία πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατριβοῦσαι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ἱδίων αὐτοῖς
τὸ ἐργαζόμεθα τοῦ πολιτευόμεθα καὶ ἄρχειν, ὅπου ἄν μὴ · 15
3 λήμματα μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μάλ-
λον ὄρεγόνται τοῦ κέρδους ή τῆς τιμῆς. σημείον δὲ καὶ
gὰρ τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας
ὑπομένουσιν, ἐὰν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργαζόμεθα μὴ κωλύῃ μηδεν
 ἀφαίρηται μηδέν· ταχέως γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν, 20
4 οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν. ἐτι δὲ τὸ κυρίος εἶναι τοῦ ἔλεον καὶ
εὐθύνειν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν ἐνδειαν, εἰ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν,
ἐπεὶ παρ᾽ εὐνόις δήμοις, καὶ μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς αἱρέσεως
tῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλὰ τινος αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων,
ὡσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ βουλεύομεθα κύριοι ὅσιν, ἰκανῶς 25
5 ἔχει τοὺς πολλοῖς. καὶ δεὶ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι σχήμα
tι δημοκρατίας, ὡσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ᾽ ἤν. διὸ δὴ καὶ
συμφέρον ἐστι τῇ πρότερον ῥηθεὶσσα δημοκρατία καὶ ὑπάρ-
χειν εἰσθήναι μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ δικάζειν πάντας,
ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας αἱρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ 30
τιμημάτων, τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἡ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμη-
6 μάτων μὲν μηθεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ
πολιτευόμενοι οὕτω πολιτεύομεθα καλῶς (αἱ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ
αἱ ἀνεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοὺς
ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος) καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις 35
ἀρκοῦσαν εἶναι ταύτῃ τὴν τάξιν· ἀρξοῦνται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπε
άλλων χειρόνων, καὶ ἀρξοῦσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους ἐτέρους. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι, καὶ μὴ πάντως ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὁ τι ἂν δόξῃ, συμφέρον ἐστὶν· ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία τοῦ πράττειν ὁ τι ἂν ἔθελη τις ὡς ὄντα ται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν 1319 α ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαίλων. ὁστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν ὤπερ ἐστὶν ὀφελημοτάτον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἀρχεῖν τους ἔπιεικεῖς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας, μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ πλήθους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὐτὴ τῶν δημοκρατίων ἀρίστη, φανε-8 5 ῳν, καὶ διὰ τὸν αἰτίαν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ποιὸν τινα εἶναι τῶν δήμων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργίαν τῶν δήμων τῶν τε νόμων τινῶν τῶν παρὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς κειμένων τὸ ἀρ-χαῖον χρήσιμου πάντες, ἢ τὸ ὅλως ἐξεῖναι κεκτήσαι τελεῖ τὴν γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τινὸς τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ 10 καὶ τὴν πόλιν· ἢν δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι 9 νευμομοθημένου μηδὲ πολεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοὺς πρῶτους κλῆρους, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ἤξιόνον νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτον τι δυ- νάμενος, τὸ μὴ δανείζουν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐκάστῳ γῆς· νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθῶν καὶ τῷ Ἀφίταιῶν νόμῳ· 15 πρὸς γὰρ ὃς ἐλέγομέν ἐστι χρήσιμος. ἑκεῖνοι γὰρ, καίστερ 10 ὅστε πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὡμοὶ πάντες γεωρ- γῶσιν· τιμῶνται γὰρ οὖν ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τηλικάτα μόρια διαιροῦντες ὡστ' ἐχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμῆσαι καὶ τοὺς πένητας. μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος 11 20 βέλτιστος δῆμος ἐστὶν ὅπου νομεῖς εἰσὶ καὶ ζῶσιν ἀπὸ βο- σκημάτων· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις μάλιστ' οὔτοι γεγυ- μαςμένοι τὰς ἐξεῖς καὶ χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα καὶ δυ- νάμενοι θυραυλεῖν. τὰ δ' ἀλλὰ πλῆθη πάντα σχεδὸν, ἔξ 12 25 ὅπως ἀι λοιποί δημοκρατίαι συνεστάσεται, πολλὸς φαυλότερα τούτων· ὃ γὰρ βίος φαίλος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς ὃν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τε τῶν βανάσσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικὸν. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ 13 περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίσθαι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
1318 b 37—1319 b 22.

γένος ὤς εἰπεῖν ῥαβδίως ἐκκλησιάζει· οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ 30 τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὐτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὐθ' ὁμοίως
14 δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὡστε τὴν χώραν πολὺ τῆς πόλεως ἀπηρτήσατο, ῥάβδιον καὶ δημοκρατίαν ποιεῖσθαι χρηστὴν καὶ πολιτείαν ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν 35 ἀγρῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, ὡστε δεῖ, κἂν ἀγοραῖος ὀχλος ἦ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκκλησίας ἀνευ
15 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθος. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευάζει τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρῶτην δημοκρατίαν, εἰρηται φανερὸν δὲ καὶ πῶς τὰς ἄλλας' ἐπομένων γὰρ δεὶ παρεκ-40 βαίνει καὶ τὸ χείρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χαρίζειν· τὴν δὲ τελευ-1319 b ταίν, διὰ τὸ πάντας κοινωνεῖν, οὐτε πάσης ἐστὶ πόλεως φέρειν, οὔτε ῥάβδιον διαμένειν μὴ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἐθε- σιν εὐ συγκειμένην· ἢ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἰρηταὶ πρότερον τὰ πλείστα 5
16 σχέδων. πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ τὸν δήμον ποιεῖν ἵσχυρὸν εἰδώθαι σιν οἱ προεστώτες τὸ προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλεῖστος καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον τοὺς γνησίους ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς νόδους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὀποτερονοῦν πολίτου, λέγω δὲ οὖν πατρὸς ἡ μητρὸς· ἀπαν γὰρ οἶκεοι 10
17 τοῦτο τῷ τοιοῦτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον. εἰδώθαι μὲν οὖν οἱ δημα- γοιοὶ κατασκευάζειν οὕτως, δεὶ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν μέ- χρι ἀν ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέ- σων, καὶ τοῦτον μὴ πέρα προβαίνειν' ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ ἀτακτότεραν τε ποιοῦσι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους 15 πρὸς τὸ χαλεπῶς ὑπομένειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν παροξύνουσι μᾶλλον, ὡπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἰτίων γενέσθαι περὶ Κυρήνην· ὅλιγον μὲν γὰρ ποηρὸν παρορᾶται, πολὺ δὲ
18 γυνόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλον ἐστὶν, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα κατασκευάζαμα χρῆσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν 20 τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷς Κλεισθένης τε Ἀθήνησιν ἐχρῆσατο βουλευ- μενος αὐξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ περὶ Κυρήνην οἱ τὸν
δήμον καθιστάντες. φυλαί τε γὰρ ἑτεραὶ ποιητέαι πλείους 19 καὶ φρατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἵδων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὁλίγα
25 καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον ὅπως ἀν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνα-
μιχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις, αἱ δὲ συνῆθεια διαζευγόςωσιν
αἱ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάζομα 20
δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δ' οἷον ἀναρχία τε δούλων
(αὐτὴ δ' ἀν εἰ ἡ μέχρι του συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
30 παιδῶν, καὶ τὸ ἥν ὅπως τις βουλεύει παρορᾶν (πολὺ γὰρ
ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν' ήδιον γὰρ τοῖς πολ-
λοίς τὸ ἥν ἀπάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως).
5 Ἐστὶ δ' ἔργον τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλομένων συν-
ιστάναι τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ καταστήσαι μέγιστον
35 ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅπως σῶζῃται μᾶλλον' μίνας γὰρ
ἡ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας οὐ χαλέπων μεῖναι πολιτευόμενοις
ὠπωσοῦν. διο δει, περὶ ὄν τεθεωρήσῃ πρότερον, τίνες σωτη-2
ῥία καὶ φθορᾷ τῶν πολιτείων, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατα-
σκευάζειν τὴν ἁσφάλειαν, εὐλαβομένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα,
40 τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς
1320 ἀ γεγραμμένους οἱ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σώζοντα τὰς
πολιτείας, καὶ καὶ νομάζειν τοὺτ' εἶναι δημοτικῶν μηδ' ὀλι-
γαρχικῶν ὁ ποιήσῃ τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατεῖσθαι
ὅλιγαρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' 3 πλείστων χρόνων. οἱ δὲ νῦν δή-3
5 μαγγοὶ χαρίζομεν τοῖς δήμοις πολλὰ δημεύσουσι διὰ
tῶν δικαστηρίων. διο δεὶ πρὸς ταύτα ἀντιπράπτειν τοὺς κη-
δομένους τῆς πολιτείας, νομοθετοῦντας μηδὲν εἶναι δημοσίων
tῶν καταδικαζομένων καὶ φερόμενον πρὸς τὸ κοίνων, ἀλλ'
ιερῶν οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες οὐδὲν ἦττον εὑλαβείς ἔσονται
10 (δημιούργουσι γὰρ ὁμοίως), δ' ὦ δῆχος ἦττον καταψυχεῖ-
tαι τῶν κρινομένων, λήψεσθαι μηδὲν μέλλων. ἔτι δὲ τὰς
4 γενομένας δημοσίας δίκας ὁς ὀλιγάστας αἰεὶ ποιεῖν, μεγά-
λοις ἐπιτημοῖς τοὺς εἰκῆ γραφομένους καλύνοντας· οὐ γὰρ
tοὺς δημοτικοὺς ἀλλὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἰλάβασιν εἰςάγειν; δεὶ
15 δὲ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὐνοὺς εἶναι τοὺς
πολίτας, εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοι γε ὡς πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς
κυρίους. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ τελευταίαι δημοκρατίαι πολυάνθρωποι
τε εἰσὶ καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκκλησίαζειν ἀμίσθους, τούτῳ δ' ὥσπερ
πρόσδοχον μή τυγχάνουσιν οὔτε πολέμου τοῖς γνωρίμοις
(ἀπὸ τε γὰρ εἰσφορᾶς καὶ δημεύσεως ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι 20
καὶ δικαστηρίων φαύλων, ἀ πολλὰς ἡδή δημοκρατίας ἀνέ-
τρεψεν), ὅπου μὲν οὖν πρόσδοχον μή τυγχάνουσιν οὔτε, δεὶ
ποιεῖν ὀλγάς ἐκκλησίας, καὶ δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλή-
6 γας δ' ἡμέραις (τούτῳ γὰρ φέρει μὲν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μή φο-
βεῖσθαι τοὺς πλουσίους τὰς δαπάνας, εἰδὰν οἱ μὲν εὐποροὶ μή 25
λαμβάνοσι δικαστικῶν, οἱ δ' ἀποροὶ, φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ
κρίνεσθαι τὰς δίκαι πολὺ βέλτιον' οἱ γὰρ εὐποροὶ πολ-
λὰς μὲν ἡμέρας οὐκ ἔθελουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων ἀπεῖναι, βρα-
7 χὺν δὲ χρόνον ἔθελουσιν), ὅπου δ' εἰσὶ πρόσδοχοι, μή ποιεῖν δ
νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν (τὰ γὰρ περίοντα νέμουσιν· ἠμι-
30 βάνους δὲ ἁμα, καὶ πάλιν δέονται τῶν αὐτῶν· ὁ τετρήμε-
νος γὰρ ἔστι πίθος ἢ τοιαύτη βοήθεια τοῖς ἀπόροις). ἀλλὰ
δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινὸς δημοτικὸν ὄραν ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν
ἀπὸν ἢ τούτῳ γὰρ αἰτίων τοῦ μοχθηρᾶν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρα-
8 πίαν. τεχναστεόν οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος. ἐπεὶ 35
δὲ συμφέρει τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν προσ-
όςσιν γνώμονα συναθροίζουσα ἄθροι χρὴ διανέμειν τοῖς
ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μὲν εἰ τις δύναται τοσούτων συναθροίζειν ὅσον
εἰς γηθίου κτῆσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ
9 γεωργίας, καὶ εἰ μὴ πάσι δυνατὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φυλάξ ἢ 1320 b
τι μέρος ἐστον ἐν μέρει διανέμειν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τὰς
ἀναγκαίας συνόδους τοὺς εὐπόρους εἰσφέρει τῶν μισθῶν, ἀφε-
μένους τῶν ματαίων λειτουργίων. τοιούτων δὲ τίνα τρόπον
Καρχηδώνιοι πολιτεύομενοι φίλον κέκτησιν τὸν δήμον. ἀεὶ 5
γάρ τινα ἐκπέμπουσα τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοκίδιας ποιοῦσιν
10 εὐπόρους. χαριέντων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων καὶ
dιαλαμβάνως τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν
ἐπ' ἐργασίας. καλὸς δ' ἔχει μμείσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων·
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Θ’ (Ζ’). 5-7.

10 ἐκείνοι γὰρ κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα τοῖς ἀπόροις ἐπὶ τὴν χρήσιν εὐνοῦν παρασκευάζουσι τὸ πλῆθος· ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς 11 πάσας ἐποίησαν διπτὰς, τὰς μὲν αἱρετὰς τὰς δὲ κληρωτάς, τὰς μὲν κληρωτάς ὅπως ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν μετέχῃ, τὰς δ’ αἱρετὰς ἵνα πολιτεύωνται βέλτιον. ἔστι δὲ τούτο ποιῆσαι καὶ 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτούς τοὺς δ’ αἱρετούς. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς δημοκρατίας κατασκευάζειν, εἰρήται?

6 ῾Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας πῶς δεῖ, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. ἐκ τῶν ἑνάντιων γὰρ δεῖ συνάγειν ἐκάστην ὀλι-
20 γαρχίαν πρὸς τὴν ἑνάντιαν δημοκρατίαν ἀναλογιζόμενον, τὴν μὲν ἑὐκρατοῦν μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχῶν καὶ πρῶτην—
αὕτη δ’ ἔστιν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ δεῖ τὰ 2
tιμήματα διαίρειν, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω τὰ δὲ μείζω ποιοῦντα, ἐλάττω μὲν ἄφ’ ὄν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μεθέξουσιν ἀρχῶν,
25 μείζῳ δ’ ἄφ’ ὄν τῶν κυριωτέρων· τὸ τε κτωμένῳ τῷ τί-
μηρα μετέχειν ἐξείναι τῆς πολιτείας, τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένους
tοῦ δήμου πλῆθος διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος, μεθ’ οὐ κρείττονες ἐσον-
tαι τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων· ἀεὶ δὲ δεὶ παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ 3
βελτίονος δήμου τοὺς κοινωνοὺς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην
30 ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐπιτείνουσα δεῖ μικρὸν κατασκευάζειν. τῇ δ’
ἀντικειμένη τῇ τελευταίᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ, τῇ δυναστικωτάτῃ
cαὶ τυραννικωτάτῃ τῶν ὀλιγαρχῶν, ὅσον περὶ χειρίσθη, το-
σοῦτο δεὶ πλείονος φυλακῆς. ὡσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εὗ σώματα 4
διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν
35 καλῶς ἔχοντα· τοῖς πλωτήροις ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἀμαρτίας
ὡστε μὴ φθείρεσθαι δι’ αὐτὰς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα τῶν
σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκκελυμένα καὶ πλωτήρον
tετυχηκότα φαύλων οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς δύνανται φέρειν ἀμαρ-
tίας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτείων αἱ χειρίσται πλείστης δέονται
1321 α φυλακῆς. τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὄλος ἡ πολιανθρωπία 5
σώζει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν
ἀξίαν· τὴν δ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν δήλον ὅτι τούναντιον ὑπὸ τῆς
εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας.
1320 b 10—1321 a 37.

'Επεὶ δὲ τέταρτα μὲν ἐστὶ μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλῆθους, 7 γεωργικὸν βαναυσικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν, τέταρτα δὲ τὰ χρή- σιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ἰππικὸν ὀπλιτικὸν ψυλὸν ναυτικόν, ὅπου μὲν συμβεβηκε τὴν χάραν εἶναι ἰππάσιμον, ἐντάθα μὲν εὐφυὸς ἔχει κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἵσχυράν (ἡ γάρ σωτηρία τοῖς οἴκοις διὰ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, 10 αἱ δ' ἰπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἶσιν), ὅπου δ' ὀπλιτικήν, τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὀπλι-
2 τικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ἀπόρων)· ἡ δὲ ψυλὴ
dύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοτικὴ πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὐν ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἔστιν, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολλάκις 15 ἀγωνίζονται χείρως δεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φάρμακος παρὰ τῶν
πολεμικῶν λαμβάνειν στρατηγῶν, οἱ συνυδάσκουν πρὸς τὴν
ἵστασιν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν τὴν ἀρμόττουσαν τῶν
3 ψυλῶν. ταύτη δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δήμοι
tῶν εὐπόρων ψυλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἰππικὴν καὶ ὀπλιτικὴν 20
ἀγωνίζονται βαθίως, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι ταὐ-
tὴν τὴν δύναμιν ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ ἐστὶ καθιστάναι, δεὶ δὲ διηρη-
μένης τῆς ἥλυκίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρεσβυτέρων τῶν
dὲ νέων, ἐτι μὲν ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν νείς διδάσκομαι
tάς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψυλὰς ἐργασίας, ἐκεκρεμένους δὲ ἐκ 25
4 παῖδων ἄθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων. τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν
gίνεσθαι τῷ πλῆθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ήτοι, καθάπερ εἰρηται
πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις, ἢ, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις,
ἀποσχημένοι χρόνων τινά τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων, ἢ, καθά-
περ ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ, κρίσιν ποιομένους τῶν ἀξίων τῶν ἐν τῷ 30
5 πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἑξώθεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄρχαις ταῖς
κυριώτάταις, ἃς δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεί
προσκείσθαι λειτουργίας, ἐν' ἐκών ὁ δήμος μὴ μετέχῃ καὶ
συγγενώμην ἔχῃ τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς ὡς μισθὸν πολὺν διδοὺς τῆς
6 ἄρχης. ἀρμότει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγα-35
λοπρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ
tὰς ἐστιάσεις μετέχουν ὁ δήμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὀρῶν κοσμο-
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μένην τὰ μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομήμασιν ἀσμενὸς ὅρα μένονσαν τὴν πολιτείαν· συμβῆσται δὲ καὶ τοῖς γνω- 40 ρίμοις εἶναι μηνειαία τῆς δαπάνης. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ νῦν οἴ περὶ 7 τὰς ὁλιγαρχίας οὐ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοιούτιοι· τὰ λήμματα γὰρ ὑποτίθην ὦν ήττον ἡ τὴν τιμήν, διόπερ ἐν ἔχει λέγειν 1321 ὅταντα εἶναι δημοκρατίας μικράς. τῶς μὲν οὖν χρῆ κα- ὁιστάναι τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰς ὁλιγαρχίας, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτων·

8 Ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τὸ διηρήσθαι καλῶς 5 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἁρχὰς, πόσα καὶ τίνες καὶ τίνων, καθάπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἁρχῶν χω- ρίς ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κό- σμον ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. ἦτι δ' ἀναγκαίον ἐν μὲν 2 ταῖς μικραῖς ἐλάττους εἶναι τὰς ἁρχὰς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγα- 10 λαίς πλείους, ὡσπερ τυχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον· ποῖας οὖν ἀρμόττει συνάγειν καὶ ποῖας χωρίζειν, δεὶ μὴ λανθά- νειν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν 3 ἁγορᾷν, ἐφ' ἦ δὲ τινὰ ἁρχὴν ἐτίνην ἐπὶ ἐφορώσαν περὶ τε 4 τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον 15 πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ μὲν ἄνειδον τὰ δὲ πωλεῖν πρὸς 5 τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν, καὶ τούτ' ἐστὶν ὑπογιοίτα- τον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, δι' ἦν δοκοῦσι εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν 6 συνελθεῖν. ἐτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐξομιμή νται καὶ 4 σύνεγγυς ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸ ἀστυ δημοσίων καὶ ἰδίων, ὅπως 20 εὐκοσμία ᾦ, καὶ τῶν πιπτότων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὁρίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπως ἀνεγκλήτως ἐχοσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἄλλα τῆς ἐπί- μελείας ὑμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δ' ἄστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν 5 τοιαύτην ἁρχὴν, ἔχει δὲ μόρια πλεῖον τῶν ἀριθμῶν, δι' 25 ἐτέρους ἐφ' ἐτέρα καθιστᾶσιν ἐν ταῖς πολυναθρωπότεραις πόλεσιν, οἰον τειχοποιούς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων φύλακας. ἀλλή δ' ἀναγκαία τε καὶ παραπλησία ταύτη' 6 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γὰρ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐστὶ καὶ [τὰ] 7 περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἀστεως· καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἀρχαντας τούτων
οἱ μὲν ἀγρονόμους οἱ δ' ὑλωροῦσ. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί 30 εἰσὶ τούτων τρεῖς, ἀλλὰ δ' ἀρχῆ πρὸς ἦν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν κοινῶν ἀναφέρονται, παρ' ὧν φυλαττόντων μερίζονται πρὸς ἑκάστην διοίκησιν' καλοῦσι δ' ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας. 7 ἐτέρα δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἦν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τὰ τε ἱδία συμβόλαια καὶ τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων' παρὰ δὲ τοῖς 35 αὐτοῖς τούτοις καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰς εἰσαγωγάς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν μερίζοσι καὶ ταύτην εἰς πλείους, ἐστὶ δὲ μία κυρία τούτων πάντων' καλοῦνται δὲ ἱερομνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστάται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις ἄλλα ὄνομα σύνεγγυς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαῖο-40 τάτη δὲ σχέδιον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἑγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων. 1322 a

9 χαλεπὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν, ὡστε ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἐστὶ κερδαίνειν, οὔτ' ἄρχειν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὴν οὔθ' ὑπομείναιτες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· ἀναγκαία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὀφελὸς γίνεσθαι μὲν δικαίς περὶ 5 τῶν δικαίων, ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὅστ' εἰ μὴ γιγνομένων κοινωνείν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ 10 γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μὴ μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀλλ' ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ὀφαύτως πειρᾶσθαι διαρέειν, ἐτὶ δ' 10 ἐνια πράττεικα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τὲ ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων ἐτέρας καταδικασάσης ἐτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, ὅσον ἀστυνομοὺς τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἐτέρους. δόσο γὰρ ἄν ἐλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνῇ τοῖς πραττομένοις, 15 τοσοῦτος μᾶλλον λήψονται τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάσαστας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλῆ, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν, πολλαχοῦ δὲ διηρήται καὶ ἡ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν πραττο- 12 μένην, οἷον Ἄθηνην (ἢ) τῶν ἐνδεκα καλομένων. διὸ βέλτιον 20 καὶ ταύτην χειρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σύφισμα ἐπειδὴ καὶ περὶ ταύ-

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την. ἀναγκαία μὲν γάρ ἔστιν οἷς ἦττον τῆς εἰρήμενης, συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς φεύγειν μάλιστα ταῦτην τῆν ἀρχὴν, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς ποιεῖν κυρίους· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ δέονται φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἢ φυλάττειν ἄλλους δύνανται. διὸ δὲι μὴ μίαν ἀποτεταγμένην ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρὸς αὐτοῖς, μηδὲ συνεχῶς τὴν αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων, ὅπου τις ἐφήβων ἢ φροντιῶν ἐστὶ τάξις, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲι κατὰ μέρη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέρους. ταῦτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ός ἀναγκαιοτάτας θετέον εἶναι πρῶτας, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτας τὰς ἀναγκαίας μὲν οὖν ἦττον, ἐν σχήματι δὲ μειώσον τεταγμένους· καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς. τοιαύτα δὲ εἰεν ἂν αἱ ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν σέρεισ. δεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ πυλῶν τε καὶ τεῖχων φυλακῆς ὁμοίως ἐπιμελητὰς εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν, ἐνθα μὲν οὖν ἔπι πάσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσίν, ἐνθα δὲ ἐλάττωσιν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσι μία περὶ πάντων. καλοῦσι δὲ ἐπὶ τητηρητὸς καὶ στρατηρῶς 15 

1322 b τοὺς τοιούτους. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὸν ἑπεῖς ἡ ψυλλὶ ἡ τοξῶται ἡ ναυτικῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐκάστων ἐνίοτε καθίστασαι ἀρχαί, αἱ καλοῦνται ναυαρχίας καὶ ἰππαρχίας καὶ ταξιαρχίας, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αἱ ὑπὸ ταῦτας τριφαρξίες καὶ λοχαγίαι 5 καὶ φυλαρχίαι καὶ ὅσα τούτων μόρια· τὸ δὲ πάν ἐν τι τού- 

tων ἐστὶν εἰδὸς, ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτην 16 

tὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τῶν τρόπον τούτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνιαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, 

eι καὶ μὴ πάσαι, διαχειρίζουσι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ἑτεραν εἰναι τὴν ληψαμένην λογισμόν καὶ προσευθ- 

10 νοῦςαν, αὐτὴν μηδὲν διαχειρίζουσαν ἑτερου· καλοῦσι δὲ το- 

tους οἱ μὲν εὐθύνους, οἱ δὲ λογιστὰς, οἱ δὲ ἐξεταστάς, οἱ δὲ 

συνήγοροι· παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταῦτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάλιστα 17 

κυρία πάντων ἐστὶν· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ 

τὴν εἰσφορὰν ἢ προκάθηται τοῦ πλῆθος, ὅπου κυρίοις ἔστιν ὁ 
15 δήμος· δει γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συναγόν τὸ κυρίον τῆς πολιτείας, 

καλεῖται δὲ ἐνθα μὲν πρόβουλοι διὰ τὸ προβουλεῖν, ὅπου
1322 a 22—1323 a 10.

18 δὲ πλήθος ἐστι, βουλή μᾶλλον. ἀι μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσαυταῖ τινές εἶσιν, ἀλλὰ δ” εἶδος ἐπιμελείας ἦ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, οἶον ἰερεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσαί τά πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσα τέτα-19 κται πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἶον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσιν, ἐνια-χοῦ δὲ πολλαῖς καὶ κεχωρισμέναι τῆς ἰερωσύνης, οἶον ἱερο-ποιοῖς καὶ ναοφύλακας καὶ ταμίαις τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων, 20 ἔχομεν ἡ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφορισμένη τὰς κοι-νὰς πάσας, ὡς μὴ τοῖς ἰερεῖσιν ἀποδίδοσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμὴν· καλοῦσι δ’ οἱ μὲν21 ἀρχονταὶ τούτοις, οί δὲ βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαίαι ἐπιμέλειαι εἰσὶν περὶ τούτων, ὡς εἰσεῖν συγκε-30 φαλαινωσμένοις, περὶ τε τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικά καὶ περὶ τὰς προσόδους καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναλισκόμενα, καὶ περὶ ἄγοραν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἐτι22 τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ συναλλαγμάτων ἀναγραφὰς καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλακᾶς καὶ ἐπιλογισμοῦς τε καὶ ἐξο-35 τάσεις καὶ προσευθήνας τῶν ἀρχῶντων, καὶ τέλος αἱ περὶ22 τὸ βουλευόμενον εἰσὶ τῶν κοινῶν. ἱδιαὶ δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικω-τέραις καὶ μάλλον εὐθερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἐτι δὲ φροντιζοῦ-σαις εὐκοσμίας, γυναικονομία νομοφύλακα παιδονομία γυνασιαρχία, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἄγωνας ἐπιμέλεια γν-1323 a23 μικοῦς καὶ Διονυσιακοῦς, κἂν εἰ τινὰς ἐτέρας συμβαίνει24 τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δ” ἐνιαὶ φανερῶς εἰσὶν οὐ δημοτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οἶον γυναικονομία καὶ παιδονομία· τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισίν524 ὁσπερ ἀκολούθοις διὰ τὴν ἄδουλλαν. τριῶν δ” οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν καβ’ ἂς αἰροῦνται τίνες ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίους, νομοφύλακων προ-βοῦλων βουλῆς, οἱ μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρατικοί, ὁλιγαρ-χικῶν δ” οἱ πρόβουλοι, βουλή δὲ δημοτικών. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἰρηταὶ περὶ πασῶν...
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BOOK VI (IV).

1288 b 16. ἐγὼν Π¹ Vat. Pal. marg. Π⁴ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk. 18. τῷ μὴ δὲν ἦττον . . . 19. δύναμιν] There can be little doubt that these words have come down to us in a corrupt and probably imperfect form. Bekk.² reads ὄννεν in place of μὴ δὲν. Te can hardly be right. Π¹ marg. Π⁴ have ἔτι in place of ἔστι (Vat. Pal. εὖτεν). Possibly we should read ὄννεν ἦττον τοῦ παιδοτρῆσαι τε καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι καὶ ταύτην ἔστι τὴν δύναμιν, but it is difficult to be certain how the text originally stood. 24. ἀρμόστουσα Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ἀμόξοουσα Π⁴ Sus. and possibly Γ. See critical note on 1338 b 3. 27. ἀγάθον Π¹ Vat. Pal. marg. Π⁴ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk. 29. εἴ ἄρχις τε πῶς ἰν γένοιτο] 'γένοιτο?' Sus., but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 8, ἀλλ' ἔκειν ἵκον ἐννοεῖτε πῶς ἰν τοῦτο γένοιτο. 32. τε] See explanatory note on 1288 b 30 sqq. 33. παρά πάντα δὲ ταῦτα] See critical note on 1282 a 40. 36. Vet. Int. adds lamen before his equivalent for τῶν γε χρησίμων.

1289 a 1. ἐπανοδοσίν Bekk. Sus., ἐπανοδοσί Π² corr. Π¹: ἐπανοδομεῖν Γ Μ pr. Π¹. 3. κοινονεῖν Π² Bekk. Sus.: κινεῖν Μ⁴ pr. Π¹: Vet. Int. has prosequi, and I am not certain what this represents. 5. τοῦ Π² Bekk.: ή Π¹ Sus. A word is sometimes displaced in Π¹ by another word wrongly repeated from a neighbouring line, and here ή from the preceding line has probably displaced τοῦ. 8. δὲ Π² Bekk.: γὰρ Γ Μ⁴ Sus., γὰρ δὴ Π¹. 11. μετὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. 17. ἐκάστοις Γ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. singulis): ἐκάστης Μ⁴ Π² Ar. Bekk. less well. τῆς κοινωνίας] z has communio- nis, which sometimes represents κοινωνίας in the Vetus Vetus Version (e.g. in 1252 a 7) and may possibly be right: the other MSS. have communio- nis. 24. Vet. Int. does not translate δὴ after εἶπερ . . . did Γ omit it? πλείους Π⁴ corr. Π² Bekk. Sus.: πλεῖος Π³ C⁴ Π² pr. Π¹: see explanatory note on 1289 a 24. 26. περὶ om. Π¹. 33. κεχορηγημένων] Vet. Int. diffusam, which might suggest that he
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misread the word as κεχωμένη, were it not that he has distributores for χωρηγοι in 1299 a 19.

1289 b 1. τοῦ βασιλεύσεως] Vet. Int. regis, but we must not infer any difference of reading in Ρ, for in 1291 b 4 Vet. Int. has agricolas for γεωργοῦται, in 1298 b 22 consiliarios for τοὺς βουλευ-μένους, in 1304 a 3 sacrificialorem for βουνος, in 1305 a 31 demagogi for δημαγωγοῦτες, in 1306 a 8 fures for κλέπτουτας, and in 1319 a 30 terrae cultores for όι γεωργοῦτες. The reverse inexactness also occurs: thus in 1320 b 29 we have communicantes for τοὺς κοινονίους. 13. Π1 Sus. add εἰσιν or εἰσαν after πολιτείαν. 25. ἐκάστου Μ5 Ρ1 Bekk. Sus.: ἐκάστου Ρ5: Vet. Int. uniuscuiusque leaves it uncertain which reading he found in Ρ. ταύτα Π1 Bekk. Sus.: ταύτα Ρ2 Ar. 32. δὲ ἄνυσπολον Ρ5 Bekk.: δὲ ἄνυσπολον Μ5 Ρ1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. adem sine armis which reading he found in Ρ. ἄνυσπολον ‘seems to be a later and less correct form, v. Dind. Steph. Thes. s.v.’ (Liddell and Scott s.v. ἄνυσπολο): still it may be right here, for in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 b 12 all MSS. have the form ἄνυσπολος. The form ἄνυσπολος occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 299 B, though we find the form ἄνυσπολον in Protag. 320 E and 321 C, where the word is used in a wider sense than in the Euthydemus. 38. πολέμους Γ Bekk.2 Sus. (Vet. Int. bella): πολεμίους Π Bekk.3 As to the second πρὸς see explanatory note. 39. ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρῳ] Vet. Int. sub Macedono probably represents ἐπὶ Μαυάνδρῳ, for in 1306 b 35 ἐπὶ Ἀγασιλάω is rendered sub Agesilaos, and in 1271 a 39 ἐπὶ τοὺς βασιλεύσι πολεμίου sub regibus.

1290 a 1. καὶ εἴ Ρ2 Bekk. Sus.: καὶ εἴ Μ5 Ρ1 and possibly Ρ, for Vet. Int. has et si, but et si seems sometimes to represent καὶ εἴ in Vet. Int. (see critical note on 1278 b 7). δὴ Ρ1 Bekk. Sus.: δὲ Μ5 Ρ2 (corrected in Ρ4 and in ink which may or may not be that of the MS. in Ρ5). 2. διειλήμεθα Ρ4 Bekk.: Vet. Int. divisimis, which represents διείλημεν in 1290 a 24 and 1295 a 8, but διείλημεθα in 1289 a 26, so that we cannot be certain which reading Vet. Int. found in his text: διείλημεν over an erasure Ρ4: διείλημην Μ5 Ρ2 3 6 etc. Perhaps the chances are in favour of διείλημεν, the reading of Göttling and Sus., as Γ Π have διείλημεν in 1290 a 24. See critical note on 1257 b 33. 18. δημοκρατίας Γ Π Bekk. Sus.: δημοκρατίας Lamb. Schn. Cor., but not, I think, rightly. 21. Qb, a MS. of little authority, followed by Bekk., adds τῇν before φρεγαστί. 32. οὐδ’ . . . 33, ἐλέγοι τῆς πολιτείας is placed after 37, τοίτους, in Ρ5 6 Qb Ub Vb Ls Ald., marg. rec. Ρ5, and pr. Ρ4, and
after 39, προσαγορεύσειν, over an erasure in pr. P³, so that only Π¹ and marg. P⁴, and probably Vat. Pal., place these words in their right place. We may infer this as to Vat. Pal., for, though the fragment preserved by it begins only with 36, ἄμοιος (see vol. i. p. viii), we note that it does not give the words either in 37 or in 39: therefore it probably placed them rightly in 32. Γ Μ⁸ and marg. P⁴ place ὀδύνη after τῆς πολιτείας.

1290 b 2. παλλοῖς Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: πλείους Π¹ Sus. 15. ἀλγαρχία Bojesen, Sus., Welldon: δήμος Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk. ἄν is added after ὅν in Π³ Vat. Pal., but is omitted by Π¹ Bekk. Sus. and expunged by corr. P⁴. It probably comes from the preceding line. 19. ἀλγαρχία Π¹ Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus., but χι is over an erasure in Π¹: ἀλγαρχία Π². 22. Vet. Int. has et plures for πλείους, but he sometimes adds et where no καὶ existed in his Greek text (see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32).

25. προπρομέθεα Π² Vat. Pal. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. vellimus): προπρήμεθα Μ⁸ and perhaps pr. P¹, for in Π¹ προ is over an erasure. πρώτον μὲν Π¹ Sus.: πρωτόν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk. 26. ἀπερ Γ Π Bekk. Sus. Richards would read οὐσαπέρ or ἀπέρ. 29. εἰδὴ Γ Π Vat. Pal. is probably a repetition of εἴ δή, unless it is repeated erroneously from τοσαῦτ' εἰδη, 36 (see critical notes on 1298 b 35 and 1309 a 29). Or should εἰδη be read in place of it? Supply μόρια with τοσαῦτα from μοριάς, 28. As to εἰ δή see explanatory note. 33. ταὐτόν Π²³ Vat. Pal. etc.: ταὐτό Μ⁸, ταῦτο Π¹: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. ‘Forma generis neutrius ταὐτόν saepe legitur non solum ante vocales, verum etiam ante consonantes’ (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16). So in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 39 all MSS. have ταὐτόν before καὶ. 39. μερῶν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: μορίων Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. partibus leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. Μορίων is perhaps here repeated from two lines above, for this kind of error occurs occasionally in Π¹.

1291 a 1. τὸ after τοῦτο is omitted in Π³ Bekk., but Π³ often omit the article, e.g. in 1291 b 3, where these MSS. omit τοῦ before προπολεμηφήσεις, in 1292 a 22, 1297 a 35, and 1305 b 10. 4. τρίτον ὁ ἄγοράιον Π Vat. Pal.: Γ probably read τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἄγοράιον (Vet. Int. tertia autem quae circa forum). But the article is often expressed and omitted irregularly in enumerations: see critical note on 1317 b 37, Riddel, Apology of Plato, p. 211 (§ 237 F), and Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, critical note on c. 1. § 1.

7. τὸ προπολεμηφήσον] Vet. Int. quod propugnans, but we must not
infer a difference of reading in Ρ, for in 1291 a 23 Vet. Int. has reddentem et indicantem for τὸν ἀποδώσαντα καὶ κραυγάτα and in 1298 a 19 audientes for ἀκουσμένους, though he renders the future participle correctly in 1298 a 21, 26. 8. Vet. Int. has si deberei non servire invadentibus, which probably stands for εἰ μελλοντεi μή δουλεύοντα τοῖς ἐπιοῦσι, for in 1283 a 6 we have si differat for εἰ διαφέρει and in 1331 b 25 civilatem quae debeat esse beata stands for τὴν μελλονταν έσεθαν πόλιν μακαρίαν. μή γὰρ ἐν τῶν ἄδεινατων ζ [Vet. Int. nihil enim minus impossibilitum quam: it is difficult to guess what he found in his Greek text. 11. κομψῶς] Vet. Int. levier: he probably misread κομψῶς as κούφως. 14. αὐτάρκων] Vet. Int. necessariis, which probably comes from necessaria a little further on. Whether the error is that of Vet. Int. or of his Greek text, it is impossible to say. See critical note on 1336 b 7. 17. τε Ρ², Ρ³ Vet. Pal. Bekk.² Sus., τε Ρ¹, το Μ⁸, γε Ρ³ Bekk.¹ Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. 21. τῆς is not rendered by Vet. Int. and may have been omitted in Ρ, but see critical note on 1306 a 30. αποτοµέν Ρ¹ Bekk. Sus.: αποτοµένον Ρ² Ρ³ Vet. Pal. 29. Vet. Pal. agrees with Ρ¹ in adding γὰρ after οὐδὲν, but probably wrongly. For other passages in which the MSS. differ as to the insertion or omission of γὰρ, see critical notes on 1272 b 36 and 1324 a 22. 34. δ Ρ² Vet. Pal.: ὅπερ Μ⁸ Ρ¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. quam which reading he found in Ρ, for he often fails to render ἐπερ. 35. τὸ περὶ τὸς ἄρχας λατουργοῦντας ζ has here rightly quae circa principatus administrat: other MSS. aministrat or amministrat. 39. ἄρτιας] Vet. Int. perfecte. Did he misread ἄρτιας as ἀρμιζώς? Βουλευόμενον Ρ² Ρ³ Vet. Pal. Bekk.: Βουλευόμενον Ρ¹ Sus. κρίνων Ρ³ Bekk., κρίνων Ρ²: κρίνων Ρ¹ Vet. Pal. Sus., κρίνων Μ⁸, κρινονων Ρ (Vet. Int. communicat.). 41. γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. fieri, which often stands for γενέσθαι (e.g. in 1340 b 25). καλῶς γενέσθαι Schn. Bekk.² Sus. probably rightly: καλῶς γένεσθαι Ρ² Ρ³ Vet. Pal. and probably Ρ (Vet. Int. fieri). 1291 b 1. ἀρτῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν] Richards would add τῆς after ἀρτῆς. 3. τοὺς before προσπολεμοῦντας om. Ρ³, but see critical note on 1291 a 1. 6. ἀρχας om. Ρ³ (Ρ² however has τὰς πλεῖστας ἄρχας over an erasure), but not Ρ¹ or Vet. Pal. 8. οὶ before ἀποστολοὶ is omitted in pr. Ρ¹, but it is inserted in both these MSS. in the same ink as the MS. 12. καθιστάσαι Ρ¹, Ρ² Bekk. Sus., καθιστασιν Vet. Pal., καθιστάσει Ρ⁴, καθιστάσθαι Μ⁸. Vet. Int. has consistat, which probably represents καθιστάσαι, for consistere stands for καταστήσαι in 1287 b 11 and for καθιστάναι in 1321 a 21. I do not think with
Sus. that consistant here necessarily represents καθίστασθαι. 16. τοῦτο καὶ Γ π² Bekk.: τοῦτο Μ* Ρ¹: καὶ τοῦτο Sus. El is absent in z and in the edition of the Vetus Versio contained in the Works of Albertus Magnus, ed. Lyons, 1651. 24. πορθμεντικων Camerarius (Interp. p. 150), Bekk., Sus.: πορπικων Π: Vet. Int. transvectivum leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. All MSS. of Vet. Int. have transvectivum autem, but whether he found δὲ in Γ is doubtful (see critical notes on 1308 b 28 and 1318 a 35). 27. μὴ Π² corr. Ρ¹: μὲν Γ Μ* pr. Ρ¹ (for the ἢ of μὴ in Ρ¹ is over an erasure).

28. ἔτερον Ar. Bekk. Sus.: ἔτερον Γ Π Ρ Βατ. Bekk.¹ (Vet. Int. alterius). 29. τὰ τοῦτοι λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφορὰν] Vet. Int. his similia dicta secundum eadem differentiam, where similia probably represents a gloss ὅμων which the translator renders as part of the text. The same thing happens in 1318 a 17: see also 1287 a 10. 32. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς εὑρόροις] Vet. Int. nihil magis existiere egens vel divinitibus (τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς εὑρόροις Γ?). As to ὑπάρχειν see explanatory note. 40. βραχέων δὲ] Vet. Int. et brevibus, but see critical notes on 1274 b 40 and 1311 a 37.

1292 a 3. τὸ πᾶσι μετείναι] ταλλαμεν εἰναι Vet. Pal., and probably τάλλα μὲν εἰναι pr. Ρ¹, for τὸ πᾶσι is over an erasure and εἰναι is corrected from εἰναι: Vet. Int. has αλία quidem esse, if we follow b g k l m z, or αλία quidem esse eadem, if we follow a c h, so that Γ will have had either τάλλα μὲν εἰναι or τάλλα μὲν εἰναι ταῦτα. This erroneous reading evidently arises from the substitution of words from 4-5 for the true reading. 4. δὲ is added after ἔτερον in Γ Ρ¹ Lº Ald. 6. τοῦτο] z has hoc, the other MSS. of Vet. Int. haec. 13. ἀγαθὴν Μ* pr. Ρ², and probably Γ (Vet. Int. bonam), followed by Sus., ἀγαθὴν Ρ¹, ἀγαθὴν Vet. Pal.: ἀγαθὴν Π³ Bekk. and corr.¹ Π³ (i. e. a correction in these MSS. in the ink of the MS.). 17. Vet. Int. has quare et for ὅστε, but see critical note on 1290 b 22. ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος Π² Vet. Pal. Bekk.: ὁ δῆμος οὗτος Π¹ Sus. Compare the readings in 1332 b 40. 22. (παρ') ἐκατέρωσις] ἐκατέρωσις Π Ρ Pal.: Vet. Int. απὸ utrosque (παρ' ἐκατέρωσις Γ?). Παρ' is added by Vict. Bekk. Sus., probably rightly, for all MSS. have παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις or παρὰ τυράννοις: the dative without παρά, however, is not perhaps impossible, cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28, Θσβάιους, and Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 17. 478 b 27 sq. and 18. 479 b 3 sq. (compare with the two latter passages Plato, Rep. 546 A). It is not certain that Vet. Int. found παρ' in Γ, for he has απὸτραποσ ταῖς in 23 for τοῦς δῆμοι τοῖς
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toúalpha, where no MS. has παρά and where it may well be dispensed with. τῶις is omitted before τρύπαινοι in Qb Vb Ald. Bekk. and pr. P4, but see critical note on 1291 a 1. 29. πρόκλησιν Π2 Bekk.: προσκλησιν Vat. Pal., πρόσκλησιν Π1 Sus. (P1 however has a dot under the first σ of πρόσκλησιν to expunge it; see Sus.1). See explanatory note. 33. εκαστά or εκαστον Vat. Pal. 35. ἐν ἐν ἡ ψηφίσματι πάντα διακείμενοι Π1 perhaps had ψηφίσματα in place of ψηφίσματι, for Vet. Int. has in quia sententiae omnia dispensant, and in Π1 the αι of ψηφίσματι is over an erasure.


19. μικρά] Vet. Int. paulatim, which stands for κατὰ μικρὰν in 1278 a 32 and 1307 b 1. In 1314 a 16 μικρὰ is rendered modica.

29. ἀναγκαία] Vet. Int. necessarissimas, but he is not always exact in rendering degrees of comparison. 30-33. I follow Rassow and Sus. in their reconstitution of the text. Π2 omit δώ πάσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν, and Π1 place these words after νόμου, 30, but Rassow and Sus. are probably right in adding δημοκρατικῶν after ἔξεστι (I prefer to add πάσι δημοκρατικῶν), and in inserting δώ ... μετέχειν after δημοκρατικῶν. It then becomes necessary to add δ' after σχολαζεῖν, 33. I prefer this reconstitution of the text to any other which has been suggested, but it is less doubtful that a lacuna exists after the second ἔξεστι than that no more has dropped out than δημοκρατικῶν or πάσι δημοκρατικῶν, and it must also be admitted that it is not easy to see why it is a democratic course to give access to office to all who possess a certain property-qualification, seeing that the first form of oligarchy goes as far as that (1293 a
1292 a 29—1293 b 17.

14 sq.). Κτησαμένος in 32 is the reading of all the MSS. which do not omit διό ... μετέχειν (Vet. Int. has possidentibus, which probably represents it): κτωμένος Vict. Bekk. 31. μεν after το is omitted in Π, but Bekk. and Sus. retain it. δε δι[ ] Vet. Int. autem: see critical note on 1286 a 38. 35. διαφέρον[ ] See explanatory note. 36. δυναμένον[ ] δυναμένον Π2 Ald. corr. P1 Bekk.: δυναμένον the rest followed by Sus. 39. όσοι ὁν] Vet. Int. quinque: so we have quinque excesserint (without any utique to represent δν) for ὁπότεροι ὁν ἵπτερες σοι in 1296 a 24 (cp. 29). Sus.1 adds utique here without necessity.

1293 a 3. προσόδον[ ] πρόσόδον Π2, προσόδον apparently pr. P1, corrected to προσόδων in the ink of the MS. και is added before εἰντριας in Π Μ2 pr. P1. 7. οὗ γάρ Π2 Bekk.: οddit γάρ Π2 Sus. 9. οdit Π: oddit Bekk.Sus. Stahr retains odit (see his note in his edition of the Politics). See critical note on 1257 b 12, and compare, in addition to the passages there referred to, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 15 sq.: Demosth. De Fals. Leg. cc. 159, 160: see also Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 536. 2 b, where reference is made, among other passages, to Lys. Or. 16. pro Mantith. c. 3, οὗξ ἵππεον odt' ἵππεδήμων ἐπὶ τῶν τρικοντα, Isaeus 8. 1 (οὐκ...οdit), and Plato, Rep. 398 A. 12. τὸ δὲ Γ Π Bekk.: τάδε δὲ Bojesen, Sus. 18. ἀμελούντες Spengel, Sus. (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 863, Obs. 9): ἀμελούντες Π2 Bekk. 21. ἦ οἳ Π1 Bekk. Sus.: eι μὲν P23 pr. P4 etc. τὸ om. Π2 P1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. quam qui prīnis). 24. ἄλλων Π2 Bekk.: πολλῶν Π1 Sus. 25. δὲ om. P2334 etc. 26. τὸ Π2, τὸ Π Bekk.: τὸ Π1 Sus. 28. αὐτῶν Γ P1, αὐτῶν Μ2 P2334 Ald. Γ P1 make a similar correction in 1274 a 23, 1302 a 33, 1308 a 10, 1312 b 9, and 1314 b 17, 23, and P1 in 1293 b 7, 1303 b 25, 1305 b 22, and 1315 a 28. See also Susemihl's apparatus criticus in 1301 b 3 and 1312 b 39. In 1252 b 28 Γ P1 have ἥδη rightly, all the other MSS. ἦ δῆ or ἦ δὲ. μὲν om. Γ Π2 Sus.: it is supplied in P1 in the ink of the MS. 37. τέταρα Π2 Bekk. Sus.: τέταρα Μ2 P1: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain.

1293 b 8. καὶ καλοῦνται ἀραστοκρατία] See explanatory note. 10. γε] γάρ Μ2, but no weight attaches to the unsupported testimony of Μ2. Vet. Int. has vero, which probably represents δε here, as it does in 1299 b 26 and 1323 a 9, though δε is usually rendered autem. In 1286 b 22 vero stands for δε δῆ: it frequently stands for μέντοι. 11. αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία] See explanatory note. 17. εἰς ἄρετήν τε Π2 Bekk.: εἰς τε ἄρετήν Μ2 P1 Sus. We cannot tell from Vet. Int. ad virtutem which reading he found in Γ. See critical note
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on 1277 b 29. 22. ὄνομαζομένης Π¹ and corr. Π⁴, followed by Bekk.³ Sus.: νομαζομένης Π²-³ etc. Bekk.¹ and pr. Π¹. 24. ἄρτη ἑρθείσας Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἄποδοθείσα Π³. 32. φανερωτάτη Π² Bekk. Sus.: φανερωτάτη Π¹. See critical notes on 1299 a 27 and 1315 b 11. 39. καγαθῶν Γ Π² Bekk. Sus.: καλὸς Π¹ (corrected in Π¹ in the ink of the MS.). 11. δ τι ἄν δεξίον] Vet. Int. quod-cunque videatur (see critical note on 1287 a 27). 18. As to the absence of τῆς before τῶν καγαθῶν see explanatory note on 1294 a 17. 22. ἄρχαιος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρέτη Π² Bekk. (except that Π⁴ omits καὶ): ἀρέτη καὶ πλοῦτος ἄρχαιος Π¹ Sus. There is this to be said for the order of Π¹ that in 1301 b 3 we have εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκούων οἷς ἐπάρχει προγόνων ἀρέτη καὶ πλοῦτος, where ἀρέτη precedes πλοῦτος: on the other hand, προγόνων, which answers to ἄρχαιος, is placed first, and ἄρχαιος is probably rightly placed by Π² before the substantives which it accompanies, for it thus acquires emphasis (see explanatory note on 1275 a 32). 36. ά Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. quae): ἀν Π² Bekk. 37. έκάτερα Π² Bekk.: έκάτεροι Π¹ Sus. In 34 we have ἄφι έκατέρας, though it is true that in 1294 b 2 all MSS. have έκάτεροι, not έκάτερα.

1294 b 2. ἐτεροί] Vet. Int. alterum (ἐτερον Γ?). 5. τιμήματος Μ⁸ Π² Bekk. Sus.: τίμημα Γ Π¹ Q¹b. 8. Π¹ Bekk.¹ add το before κληρωτάς, and we cannot be certain that it did not do so too, but in the absence of evidence as to Γ it would be rash to follow Π¹. 26. διαδόχος Π¹ (Vet. Int. distinctus): διάδοχος Π², though this is corrected in Π²³⁴ (in Π² in the ink of the MS.). 29. το Γ Π¹, τῷ Π² Bekk. Sus.: τῶν М⁸ Π³. 37. ἔξωθεν is rightly bracketed by Thurot and Sus.: it may have found its way into this line by repetition from the preceding one. ζ has ab extrinsecus for ἔξωθεν possibly rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. extrinsecus. In 1312 a 40 all MSS. have ab extrinsec for ἔξωθεν. In 1294 b 36 ἔξωθεν is rendered ab extra. 38. το Π¹, τῷ Π² Bekk. Sus.: το Π². 39. πόλεως Π² Bekk. Sus.: πολιτείας Π¹. See critical note on 1318 a 9. 40. διὰ καθοστάναι πολιτείαν] Vet. Int. videtur consistere politia. Π no doubt had δοκεί with Μ⁸ in place of δι, but whether it had καθοστάναι πολιτεία in place of καθοστάναι πολιτεία, which is the reading of all the extant MSS., may well be doubted. Vet. Int. may have emended his Greek text to suit the false reading δοκεί (see vol. ii. p. lxiv). It is not, indeed, quite certain that consistere represents
καθεστάναι here, for it represents καταστήσαι in 1287 b 11 and καθις-
tάναι in 1321 a 21. See critical note on 1291 b 12.

1295 a 6. ἀνάψυχηρος Ms P1 2,3 Sus.: ἀνάψυχηρον Π2 Bekk.: Vet. Int. inexplēdiōs leaves the reading of γ uncertain. Compare the various readings in 1301 b 28. 12. μοναρχῶν Π2 Bekk. and also γ, for all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have monarches, though in the next line Vet. Int. has monarchae. 13. μοναρχων Ms P1 4 Ald. Bekk. and pr. P2 3: μονάρχαι προτερ. P2 3 Sus. 15. διὰ μὲν τὸ κ.τ.λ. Sus. 1 queries whether propterēa quidem quod in Vet. Int. should not be propter quidem quod, but see critical note on 1328 b 4. 20. ἀρχὴ P2 4 Qb Ald. Bekk. Sus. and rec. P3, ἀρχὴ Vb and pr. P3, ἀρχῆ γ Ms, ἀρχῆ P1. 27. τῆν] Vet. Int. esse (eiκας γ?). 28. ἕ] δ γ Π, except Ls and a MS. mentioned by Camerarius (Interp. p. 163), which have ἦ. Bekker and Sus. are probably right in reading ἦ, for the antecedent appears to be πανδείαν, not ἀρέτην and πανδείαν. 38. Chandler and Richards would add τῶν after βληστῶν. Π1 add δε, and marg. P4 δ', after τῆς, possibly repeating it from μεσότητα δε in the preceding line.

1295 b 7. ὑπέρπτωσον] Spengel would insert ὑπέρρασχον ἦ before ὑπέρπτωσον to make the correspondence exact, but not rightly: see explanatory note on 1323 b 35. 8. καὶ Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. aut, but he has aut or vel in 1262 a 8, 1298 b 29, and 1317 b 26, where Π have καὶ. 12. ἐτι ... 13. πόλεων] See explanatory note. φιλαρχοῦσιν P1 Ald. Bekk. and corrections in P2 3,4 in the ink of the MSS., φιλαρχοῦσι πρ. P2 3,4 Sus. 17. οὔδ' ἐν P2 4 Ls Ald. Bekk. and a correction in P3 in the ink of the MSS., οὔδέν Qb Vb pr. P3: οὔδε Π1 Sus. τοῖς διδασκάλιως P2 4 Ald. Bekk., τοῖς διδασκάλιως Π2 and the margin of Ls, τοῖς διδασκάλιως pr. Ls: τοῖς διδασκάλιως Π1 Sus. See critical note on 1259 a 13. 20. οὐδεμιὰ ἀρχῆ] οὐδέμιαν ἀρχῆν Spengel, Sus. 21. καὶ before δύναθα om. Π1: I follow Sus. in bracketing it, though not without hesitation. See critical note on 1282 a 17. 31. τῆς τούτων] Vet. Int. substantiam horum, but we must not suppose that he found ovis added in γ, for in 1317 b 23 he translates τὸ μη δὲς τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχεῖν μηδεμίαν non bis eundem principari nullo principi, where he adds principatu. 34. δῆλον γ P1 Bekk. Sus.: δῆλων Ms P2 4 Vb Ald. pr. P3. 39. εὐτυχία μεγίστη] Vet. Int. eufortunium maximum. Had γ εὐτυχία μέγιστον? Eufortunium stands for εὐτυχία in 1333 b 18 and 1295 b 14, whereas εὐτυχία is always, I think, in the Politics rendered by bona fortuna. 40. τοῖς om. Ms P1 and possiblyγ.
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1296 a 8. στάσεις] See explanatory note.

9. τῶν πολιτῶν Ar. Bekk. 2 Sus.: τῶν πολιτείων Γ Π Bekk. 1

28. τῶς is added before μίξας in Ms P1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. μιγνας whether it was added in Γ.

32. ἐπὶ Π Bekk. Sus.: ἐπὶ Π3 Π8 and pr. P4, where it is corrected in the ink of the MS.

34. δημοκρατίας, and 35. ὀλιγαρχίας] Vet. Int. democraitiam and oligarchium, but he sometimes renders the plural by the singular: thus in 1338 b 11 he has speciem for τὰ εἰδη, in 1303 a 14 vereeundiam for τὰς ἐρωτείας, and in 1310 b 34 beneficium for εὐφρενίας. 35. καθιστασαν Γ P2 Ald. rec. P3 Bekk. Sus., καθιστάσαι P1, καθιστάζη P4, καθιστασαν P4 Qb Vb L8 and pr. P5, καθιστώσει Μ6.

1296 b 4. φαμέν P2 3 etc. Bekk.: ἔφαμεν Π1 P4 Sus. 7. δεὶ Spengel Bekk. 2 Sus., δεὶ Γ Π Bekk. 1

10. τὸ om. P1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. dico autem ad hypothesim), but cp. 1300 b 17, τὸ δὲ πῶς (sc. λέγω), which Vet. Int. translates quomodo autem. 11. καλύπτει] καλύπτει Π3 Bekk.

26. εὑρίσκει om. Ms P6 Λ8 and pr. P4 (it is supplied in the margin of P4).

29. μισθορούντων] z has mercedem agentium, the other MSS. of Vet. Int. mercede agentium: z may be right, for in 1303 b 1 tovs μισθοφόρων is translated merces portantes.

31. μᾶλλον P4 6 Λ8 Ub Ar. Bekk.: om. Π1 P2 3 Qb Vb Ald. Sus. inserts it in angular brackets.

32. δεὶ om. Π1 Ar. 34–38. See explanatory note.

36. τῶς om. Ms P1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. leges whether he found it in Γ or not. 38. πλήθος Π Ar. Bekk.: Vet. Int. multitudine, whence Sus. reads πλήθει, but does not Vet. Int. take πλήθος wrongly with ἑπταετεῖς as in the acc., and translate it as if it were τὸ πλήθος?

40. μόνημον Π2 Bekk. Sus., except that P4 has μόνημον: νόμημον Γ Ms and probably pr. P1 (corrected into μόνημον in text and margin).

1297 a 1. τούτων] τούτῳ P1, τοῦ with τ superscribed over υ Ms: Vet. Int. super hoc, which stands for ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ in 1307 b 13.

2. βουλήσωντα] z has volunt rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have volunt. τοῖς εὐρίματοι om. Π1. 6–b 28. See explanatory note on 1296 b 34. 9. The second ev is omitted in Ms P1 and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. in praeteraudiendo populum may stand for τῷ παρακρίσθαι (παρακούσθαι Γ Ms) τῶν δήμων, just as in 1309 a 15 in non faciendo possessiones aequae partiles stands for τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μη τοιῶν ἀναδότως. See also critical note on 1253a 36.

11. ψευδοὶ] ψευδῶν Vict. Bekk. and possibly Ar. 14. τε is added after ὅρα in Ms P and may have been added in Γ, for Vet. Int. seldom translates τε.

17. γυμνασίαν Π2 Ar. Bekk.: γυμνάσια Π1
Sus., τὰ γυμνᾶσθα Μ8 and possibly Ρ (Vet. Int. exercitia).

24. δὲ ἐξεστὺν is added after ἀπογραφειμένοις in Π1 and δὲ in Ρ1: δὲ ἐξεστὺν is evidently repeated in Π1 from δὲ ἐξεστὶ just before, an error into which these MSS. occasionally fall, as we have already seen. 28. Vet. Int. has neque for μὴ before δικάζωσιν. 35. τὰ om. Π2 Bekk., but see critical note on 1291 a 1. 40. μὴ is added before ἔγιναν in Π1, but expunged in Ρ1 by a corrector. 41. ἀν om. Π1.

1297 b 1. μόνον Ρ1 Π2 Bekk. Sus.: μόνον Γ Μ8. 2. μόνον Π2 Bekk.: μόνον Π1 Sus. 3. ὁρισμένους Ρ1Π2 Bekk. Sus. (see explanatory note on 1297 b 1): ὁρισμένον Μ8: Vet. Int. determinata (in agreement with honorabilitate), which perhaps represents ὁρισμένον. 4. ποιον Γ Π Bekk.: πόσον Lindau, Sus. 7. εἰν Π2 Bekk., but there is an erasure in Ρ3 between ἐ and α, and the accents and breathings are corrected (see Sus.1): ἀν Μ8 Ρ1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. ἵστα what he reading he found in Γ. 6. τί Π1 Sus.: μὴ Π4 Bekk. (corrected to μὴ τε in Ρ4), which may be right (see critical notes on 1257 b 12, 1330 b 16, and 1293 a 9). 11. οὐκένιν Π2 Bekk. Sus.: καίερ Π5 Ρ1 Sus.: in: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. ex: Sus.1 'in?' 19. ὁ πόλεμος] Vet. Int. proelium, as in 1330 a 22. 25. καὶ is added after δὲ in Π1, but Ρ1 omits α, so that καὶ in Γ Μ8 may be a repetition of α. 27 sq. See explanatory note. 35. Vet. Int. adds cum dixerimus after his equivalent for Πᾶν δὲ, but whether these words represent anything in his Greek text is very doubtful. He may possibly have found a gloss λέγαντες or εἰπόντες in the margin of his MS. λέγαμεν Γ Ald. Ar. Bekk. Sus. and pr. Ρ2: λέγομεν Μ8 Ρ1 Ρ4 Ρ8 Qb Vb and a correction in P3 in the ink of the MS. 41. μὲν τί Congreve, Sus. (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 12, ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐν μὲν τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ.): μὲν τί Π1 Ald. Bekk. and a correction in Ρ3 in the ink of the MS., μὲν τοι Ρ4 Qb Vb and pr. Ρ4.

1298 a 2. γένεσθαι Π2 Bekk.1, γίνεσθαι Bekk.2 Sus.: γενείσθαι Μ8, and perhaps Ρ1 (for γίνε in Ρ1 is over an erasure) and Γ (for Vet. Int. fieri often stands for γενείσθαι). 3. τί Μ8 Ρ1 Bekk. Sus., τι Ρ4, τι Γ Ρ3. 6. καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεως om. Π2 Bekk. (the words are added in Ρ4 by a corrector). 7. ἀποδεδόσθαι Π3 Ρ1 Bekk. Sus.: ἀποδίδοσθα Μ8 and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has dare, though this might also stand for ἀποδεδόσθαι, for he has determinare for διωρίσθαι in 1290 b 7. 8. οἶνος Π3 Ρ4 Bekk. Sus.: η Ρ6 Qb Vb L8 and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 167). 17. διελθῃ Π2,

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diēlθη Bekk. (in P3 however λ is written in darker ink over an erasure) and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. pertranscat may well represent diēlθη, as in 1300a 26: ἐξελθη M4, διεξελθη P1, διεξελθη Sus. (apparently an amalgamation of the two other readings). 21. αἰγη-σομίνας is bracketed by Sus. probably rightly. 31. προανακρίνειν Π2 Bekk. Sus. (cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 32): ανακρίνειν M8, ἀνακρίνειν πρ. Π1 (προανακρίνειν marg. Π1): Vet. Int. referre (ἀναφέρειν ἢ; for referuntur stands for ἀναφέρονται in 1321 b 32: it stands, however, for ἐπανάγειν in 1298 b 37).

1298 b 4. ἀλγαρχικὴν Γ Π: ἀλγαρχικάτην οὐ ἀλγαρχί(αν δι-ναστευτικῶν Coray, Sus.: ἀλγαρχικάτην Welldon. 5. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a ζ, which have quidem wrongly for quidam, fail to give an equivalent for τινές. 6. καὶ ύπερ Π13 Π2, ύπερ Ρ2, καὶ ύποστερ M8, ύποστερ καὶ Π (Vet. Int. sicēt et), καὶ Vict. Bekk. 7. [ἡ κληρωταί] I follow Brandis Sus. and Welldon in bracketing: see explanatory note on 1298 b 5. Possibly, however, μη should be read in place of ή. 8. ή Π2 Sus. probably rightly: ή Π2: μὲν ή Bekk. following two MSS. of little authority. See explanatory note on 1298 b 5. 12. διώκειται possibly Π (Vet. Int. disponitur), but Vet. Int. occasionally renders an active by a passive verb (see vol. ii. p. lxiii, note 6): διώκει Π Bekk. Sus. Διώκειται is probably right, cp. 1298 a 31, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27. l. 11, προηρέτει τήν πολιτείαν διώκειν αὐτός. 13. διορισμοί] τρόπων Γ M8 and after δημαρχία pr. Π1 (corrected in the margin in paler ink). Τρόπων has evidently crept in from the preceding line and displaced διορισμοί: blunders of this kind occasionally occur in Π1, as has been already pointed out. 14. τε] See explanatory note on 1298 b 13. Π1 add ή before νῶν: see explanatory note on 1298 b 13. 15. καὶ τῶν νόμων] ζ Π has ei.iam legim: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. et legim. 16. τε αὐτὸ Γ Π (Vet. Int. meliusque ἵππουm facciére): Ar. Schn. Bekk. read τὸ αὐτὸ. Sus. brackets τε and adds τὸ before αὐτὸ. 19. τοῖτο δὲ] Richards would read τοῖτο δή. See explanatory note. 20. βουλεύονται Π2 Bekk. Sus.: βουλεύονται Π1. 23. ἵσος Π2 Bekk.: ἵσος Γ M8 pr. Π1 Sus. καὶ] Vet. Int. si, but see critical notes on 1282 b 8 and 1309 b 9. 27. προσαρμοθείαν] See explanatory note. 28. εῦ ων Π2: see critical note on 1275 b 7. 29. καὶ νομοφύλακας] Vet. Int. vel legis servatores, but see critical note on 1295 b 8. [καὶ] πεπο τούτων] I follow Coray and Sus. in bracketing this καὶ. 32. ή before ταύτα is omitted in Π1: these MSS. omit ή before ταύτα in 1268 a 6, and they are apt to omit
the first η where one η follows another (see critical note on 1282 a 17). 33. τής συμβουλῆς[ τοῖς συμβούλως Γ (Vet. Int. consiliarii), τοῖς συμβουλῆς Λ& Ald. 35. τὸ πλῆθος is added after δεῖ ποιεῖν in P², evidently because δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος occurs in the next line (see critical notes on 1290 b 29 and 1309 a 29). ἀποψηφιζόμενον . . . 36. ποιεῖν is omitted in P²b etc. and pr. P³ Qb: P² has ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, and Π¹ Bekk. ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος. Sus. follows Π¹, and brackets εἶναι, placing it between κύριον and δεῖ. In P² two alternative readings, εἶναι and ποιεῖν, seem to have found their way into the text together. 38. ἀνεστραμμένως] See explanatory note.

1299 a 1. πλείον τῆς MS Sus.: πλείωτος Π¹ Π² Bekk. 2. δῆ τῆς P² L¹ Bekk. Sus. and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 169): δεῖ Μ⁵ P¹ ² ³ ⁶ etc. διωρίσθω Γ Π³ Ar. Bekk. Sus., διωρίσθαι Π¹ ² ³ ⁶ etc. Μ⁵ omits τῶν, 2 . . . πολιτείας, 4. 8. καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεῖ τάς ἀρχός ομ. Γ Μ⁸ pr. P¹ (the words are supplied in P¹ by a corrector in the margin). 9. πλεονάκες] Vet. Int. saepe (πολλάκις Γ?). 14. πολιτείας Γ Π Bekk., except a correction in P¹ probably in the ink of the MS.: πολιτείαι corr. Π¹ Ar. Sus. probably rightly. 16. οὐ is added before πάντας by Rassow and Sus., but see Bonitz, Ind. 539 a 59, who remarks on the passage before us, 'negatio simplex, quae ad universum enunciation pertineat, omissa est propter negationes singulorum membrorum,' and compares Hist. An. 2. 12. 503 b 34, χείρας δ' οὐδὲ πόδας προ- σβίους ἔχει. Cp. also Pol. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20, τοῖς δὲ νεώτεροι οὖν ἱάμβων οὕτω καμψοφίας θεατάς νομοθετήσεων κ.τ.λ. The following sentence occurs in a letter addressed by the United States Venezuelan Boundary Commission to Mr. Olney, the Secretary of State—'The present Commission neither by the mode of its appointment nor by the nature of its duties may be said to belong to tribunals of this character' (Times, Jan. 22, 1896). 19. δὲ χορηγοὶ Π² Bekk.: δὲ καὶ χορηγοὶ Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus.: καὶ χορηγοὶ Γ? (Vet. Int. adhuc et distributores). πρεσβευταί Γ Π: πρεσβευτάς Congreve probably rightly, if αἱροῦνται in a passive sense is not to be supplied with ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες. Four lines lower we have αἱροῦνται στο- μέτροι. In Lex. Rhet. Cant. p. 672. 20 (quoted by Sandys on 'Ath. Pol. c. 54. § 2) we read 'Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὕτως λέγει: λογοταί δὲ αἱροῦνται δέκα, but Sandys suggests that κλη- ροῦνται should be read in place of αἱροῦνται. However, in Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. lii (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 250) we have τῶν
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It is possible therefore that πρεσβευταί may be right. See Liddell and Scott s.v. αἱρέω C. ii. 24. καὶ Γ Π Sus., om. Vict. Bekk.: but cp. 2. 7. 1266 a 32, τῶν καθεστηκαίνων καὶ καθ’ ἀσ πολιτείωνται νῦν. 26. ἀποδεδοθαί Π: Vet. Int. attribuitur. See critical note on 1275 b 16. 27. ἀρχικότερον ἐστίν Γ Π Bekk.: ἀρχικότερον ἐστίν Bekk.; ἀρχικότερον ἐστιν Sus. A similar doubt arises in 1256 b 3, where all the MSS. and Γ have ἐνδεικταὶ, but Bernays and Susemihl read ἐνδεικτερον: see also critical notes on 1293 b 32 and 1315 b 11. 29. οὗ γὰρ τῶν] Vet. Int. non enim unquam, which stands for οὗ γὰρ τω, for nulli enim unquam stands for οὗ δέν γὰρ πώποτε in 1336 b 29, and nihil unquam late for οὗ δέν τω τοιοῦτον in 1269 a 40. 31. ai is added after δ in P²: om. M S P¹ P² Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 33. Vet. Int. does not translate τε δή. 37. τάς μὲν, and 38. τάς δ’ Π Bekk.: τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δ’ Vict. Bekk.² Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain.

1299 b 6. τῶν αὐτῶν Γ Π Bekk.: αὐτῶν F. Thurot, Sus. 12. δεὶ is questioned by Susemihl (see Sus.² a and Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. 1894, p. 273, where he commends Norden’s suggestion of ἐνδεικτεται in place of it), and others. I am not satisfied with any of the substitutes which have been suggested. συνὼγοι] συνίδωι Bojesen, Sus., probably rightly. 14. ἀρμόττει ... δεὶ Γ Π. Sus., following Aretinus’ translation, interchanges the position of these two words, but in 18 we have ἰδεὶ διαφεῖν, not ἀρμόττει διαφεῖν. Camerarius (Interp. p. 171) would read in 13 εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν, ἥ μὴ ἀρμόττει. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Ἀρμόττει may be repeated from the preceding line, and may have taken the place of some other word, such as δεὶ or χρῆ. ποίων, and 15, πολλὰ Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 74), Sus., probably rightly: ποῖα, and 15, πολλάν Γ Π Bekk. 22. I bracket καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ in 1308 b 11, and it might be asked whether καὶ μοναρχία should not be bracketed here. There is no reference to μοναρχία in 24 sqq., but only to aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy; still I think that it would be hypercritical to bracket καὶ μοναρχία. 24. δ’ om. Γ M S L φ. ωδ’ Γ M S P¹ L² Ar. Bekk., αἰδεὶ P¹, ouk P² Q V Ald. ἐτέρων pr. P S Sus.: ἐτέρωι the other MSS. and Γ Bekk. 27. καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν Γ M S pr. P¹, καὶ κατ’ αὐτάς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν Π² Bekk.¹, καὶ κατ’ αὐτάς διαφορά τῶν ἀρχῶν Vict. Bekk.², whom I now incline to follow, though in vol. ii. p. 362 I favoured the reading καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς διαφοράι τῶν ἀρχῶν. Thurot (Études sur Aristote,
1299 a 24—1300 a 30. 101

p. 75) would read καὶ αὐτὰς τῶς πολιτείαις διαφοραὶ τῶν ἄρχων, and this reading also is a possible one. 29. διαφέρονσιν is queried by Bonitz (Ind. 191 a 60). After διαφέρονσι MSS P1 add διὰ ταύτας and Γ διὰ ταύτα or διὰ τοῦτο, for some MSS. of Vet. Int. have propter hoc and others propter hoc. Is not διὰ ταύτας an alternative reading for κατὰ ταύτας, 27, which has crept from the margin into the text of these MSS.? 33. ἀσχολον P2 etc. Bekk. Sus., ἀσχόλων P4: ἀσχολον M8, ἀσχολον P1: Vet. Int. non vacans, which probably stands for ἀσχολον here as elsewhere. 34. δὲ εἶν P23 Qb VB Bekk. and corr. P4: δὲ ἢν P1 Ald. and perhaps pr. P4 (for δὲ εἶν is over an erasure in P4): δὲ, ἢν Sus.: δὲ ἢν τῶν Γ M8 (Vet. Int. autem cum).


1300 a 2. μυσθοῦ Spengel, Bekk.2: ἡ μυσθὸς Γ Π Ar. Bekk.3: [ἡ] μυσθοῦ Sus. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 31, ὅπου μὴ μυσθοῦ εἰσπορὰ πάντων, and 33, δὲ δήμος εἰσπορῶν μυσθοῦ. 23. τέτταραι M8 Π Sus.: τέταραι P2 Bekk.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain, but the form τέταρες is the form which is usually found in Aristotle's writings. M8 P1 have τέτσαρα and P2 τέτταρα in 1315 b 26. 23. ἡ γὰρ πάντες . . . 1300 b 5, ἀρματοκρατικοῖς] As to the text of this passage, see Sus.4 23: Spengel, Aristotelische Studien, 3. 53 sqq.: Thurot, Εὐτυχὲς οἱ Αριστοτέλεις, p. 75 sqq.: H. Rabe in Jahrbücher für class. Philol. 1894, pp. 450-453. 24. Either we must bracket ἡ before ἢ εἰς ἀπάντων (with Schn., Thurot, Spengel, and Sus.) or we must read εἰ in place of it with a corrector in pale ink in the margin of P1 and with Coray. The former course is probably the better (see Thurot, Εὐτυχὲς οἱ Αριστοτέλεις, p. 75). Vet. Int. does not translate ὅσοι in ὃς ἢν μέρος: he has simply διείστη. 26. πολεῖων Ar. Lamb. Bekk. Sus.: πολείκων Γ Π (Vet. Int. civiles). I follow Conring and Spengel in bracketing καὶ after ἀπάντων and inserting ἡ πίνακες ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει ἡ πίνακες ἐκ τινῶν κλῆρον. 27. ἡ before τὰ μὲν om. Π2 wrongly. Γ Π Bekk. have τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ here and in 29 and 30: Spengel, followed by Sus., substitutes τῶς for τὰ in all the six places, but perhaps Rabe is right in thinking this change unnecessary; he considers τὰ . . . τὰ to be used adverbially as in c. 16. 1300 b 40, 1301 a 4, 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 7 sqq., 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 22 sqq., and 8 (6). 1321 a 38, and adds, 'the fact that in 1300 a 33 we have τῶς . . . τῶς does not make in favour of the change, since τῶν ἄρχων is added in that passage.' 30. After κλῆρον Ι insert καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει τὰ δὲ κλῆρον, following Sus., who however has τῶς μὲν
and τάς δὲ in place of τά μὲν and τά δὲ. 31. See explanatory note. 32. πάντως Ν° Bekk. Sus.: πάντα ι M° pr. P¹ (corrected in pale ink). 33. I bracket γίνεσθαι with Thurot, Spengel, and Sus. It may be an alternative reading for γίνωσται, 31, which has found its way into the text in a wrong place. 35. δ' om. ι M° pr. P¹ (corrected in pale ink). I bracket ἢ ἐκ τινῶν with Spengel. 36. I add ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ αἵρεσιν ἢ after τινῶν with Spengel. 37. πολιτικῶν . . . 40, ἀλεγραφίκων om. pr. P¹, but in the margin is added in pale ink ἀλός πολιτικῶν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν ἀλεγραφίκων (where τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἵρεσις is omitted before ἀλεγραφίκων), and also ἢς καλομενής ἐστι πολιτείας: τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων καθιστάναι τοὺς μὲν αἵρεσιν τοὺς δὲ κλήρῳ ἀλεγραφίκων (where ἢς καλομενής ἐστι πολιτείας takes the place of πολιτικῶν and, among other variations, the words ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἵρεσιν are omitted). This latter reading is the one translated by Ar. 38. καὶ τὸ . . . 1300 b 3, ἀμφοῖν] Spengel reconstructs this passage as follows—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ τὸ δὲ τινὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶς (ἡ κλήρῳ ἢ αἵρεσις) ἢ τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν τῶν δὲ κλήρῳ: τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἵρεσιν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν ἀλεγραφίκων, ἀλεγρα- χικῶτερον δὲ τὸ αἵρεσιν ἢ τὸ ἀμφοῖν. Thurot reconstructs it thus—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ πολιτικῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶς· καὶ τὸ ἢ ἀμφοῖν τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἵρεσιν, πολιτικῶν, ἀλεγραφίκωτερον δέ. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀλεγραφίκων, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἵρεσιν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν: and Susemihl thus—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ πολιτικῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, καὶ τὸ (τινὰς) ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, ἀλεγραφίκωτερον (ἡ κλήρῳ) ἢ τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (ἀἵρεσις) ἀλεγρα- χικῶν καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, μὴ γενόμενον δ' ὀραίως, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. I incline to suggest the following text—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ, ἀλεγραφίκωτερον δέ, καὶ τὸ ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικῶν ἀριστοκρατι- κῶς ἢ αἵρεσιν ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ τὰς μὲν αἵρεσιν τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (αἵρεσις) ἀλεγραφίκων, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. ἢ ἢ ἀμφοῖν, 40, means 'from a combination of some and all': cp. c. 16. 1301 a 8 sq. With τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν I supply τινὰς καθιστάναι from what precedes. I omit ἢ αἵρεσις, τὰς μὲν κλήρῳ τὰς δ' αἵρεσιν (39), because I regard these words as
1300 a 31—1300 b 13.

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a various reading for τὸς μὴν αἱρέσει καθιστάναι τῶς δὲ κλήρῳ which has been noted in the margin and has crept into the text. I omit ὀλιγαρχικοῖς, 40, because it may well be an alternative reading for ὀλιγαρχικῶτερον: ι Ἔσ om it. In 1300 b 3 I omit μὴ γενόμενον δὲ ὄριος (P²) or μὴ γενόμενον δὲ ὄριος (M⁸ P¹ and possibly ι: Vet. Int. non factum autem similiter) for a different reason. I think that this clause is out of place where it stands, and venture to suggest the possibility that μὴ γενόμενον δὲ ὄριος should be read, and that these words should be transposed to after κυνήσεις in c. 16. 1300 b 38. They may have been omitted in 1300 b 38 in the archetype and wrongly inserted in the margin opposite to 1300 b 3 instead of 1300 b 38. Compare the error by which εἴδος is inserted in the margin of P¹ in 1305 b 41 instead of 1306 a 6 (see critical note on the latter passage). For μὴ γενόμενον cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 6 sqq. 39. τὸς δὲ κλήρῳ τε ἢ κλήρῳ M⁸ and probably ι, for Vet. Int. has aut sorte. 40. Vet. Int. does not translate δὲ after ὀλιγαρχικῶτερον. 41. τὸ δὲ om. ι Ἔσ pr. P¹ (the words are added in P¹ in pale ink).

1300 b 1. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν] Lamb. translates, ‘at quosdam ex quibusdam electione fieri oligarchiae convenit’: thus he adds αἱρέσει before ὀλιγαρχικοῖς. In this he is followed by Conring, Spengel, and Sus., probably rightly. ‘Fieri’ in Lambinus’ rendering should have been ‘facere’ or some such word. 4. Vet. Int. has quosdam autem ex simul omnibus non oligarchicum. He probably found οὐκ ὀλιγαρχικοῖς added as a gloss in the margin of ι and translated these words as part of the text, for they appear as a red-ink gloss in P². τὸ τε Αἰ.: τὸ τε [δὲ] Sus., τὸ τε δὲ a pale-ink correction in P¹, τὸ τε δὲ a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 172): τὸ δὲ ι Ἔσ Ald. Bekk. and pr. P¹: τὸτε δὲ P² 3 4 Qb Vb L⁸. In several MSS., it will be seen, the two alternative readings τε and δὲ have found their way into the text together. Thurot and Spengel would read καὶ τὸ. πάντας αἱρέσει Spengel, Sus., probably rightly: αἱρέσει πάντας Π. 8. καὶ om. ι Ἔσ pr. P¹ (it is added in P¹ in pale ink). Sus. omits it also: I bracket it, though not without doubt, for the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions and especially in omissions of small words. 13. Π² have λοιπῶν δὲ τῶν τριῶν τὸ δικαστικὸν εἶπε· Π¹ λοιπῶν δὲ τῶν τριῶν εἶπεν τὸ δικαστικὸν περὶ δικαστηρίων, except that P¹ has δικαστηρίας. In Π¹ two alternative readings have evidently together found their way into the text. Τουτῶν, 14, suggests that περὶ δικαστηρίων
has preceded and should be substituted for το δικαστικών, which is itself an unusual expression in the sense in which it is used here. In the recapitulation contained in 8 (6), 1. 1316 b 33 we have καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων. Welldon reads περὶ δικαστηρίων and brackets το δικαστικών: Sus.\(^3\) takes the reverse course. 17. \(M^s\) pr. \(P^1\) have περὶ δὲ ὄν δὲ: \(P^2\) Bekk. Sus. περὶ ὄν δὲ. Vet. Int. has ὑπὸ quibus autem, which might stand for either περὶ ὄν δὲ or περὶ δὲ ὄν. See critical note on 1277 b 29. 27. ἀμφιβολείτων] Vet. Int. altercans: the translator’s eye has probably wandered to ἀμφιβολείτων, 22. 28. ἐπιφέρεται \(P^2\) Bekk. Sus.: φέρεται \(P^1\). οἷον ... δικαστήριον is bracketed by Chandler perhaps rightly (cp. 1322 a 20). 29. ἐν φραστοί \(P^1\) \(P^2\) Bekk. Sus.: ἐν φραστοὶ \(M^s\): we cannot tell from Vet. Int. quod in puteum compulit index what reading he found in \(\Gamma\). The reading of \(M^s\) may be correct: see Sandys’ critical note on ‘Ad. Pol. c. 57, 1. 22, ἐν φραστοῖν. 30. παρόντι \(P^2\) Bekk.: παρόντι \(P^1\) Sus. See explanatory note on 1300 b 29. 32. ἀντοίς \(P^2\) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτοῖς \(\Gamma\) \(M^s\) pr. \(P^1\), for στ is over an erasure in \(P^1\). 38. After κινήσεις should possibly be inserted μῆ γινομένων δ’ ὁμοίως from 1300 b 3 (see critical note on 1300 a 38-b 3). Translate, ‘and similarly if they are not instituted at all.’ For ὁμοίως cp. c. 13. 1297 b 31, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. For the contrast of γενέσθαι and καλὸς γενέσθαι cp. c. 4. 1291 a 41. δ')] δὴ \(\Gamma\) (Vet. Int. ɪlɪaquɪ). 41. κλήρῳ \(\Gamma\) \(P\) Bekk.\(^1\): κλήρῳ \(P^1\) Lamb. Bekk.\(^2\) Sus. 1301 a 3. See explanatory note. 6. See explanatory note on 1301 a 5. 8. αὐτοῦ om. \(P^1\). 12. Sus. appears to be right in thinking that ἦ, the reading of \(\Gamma\) \(P\), must either be bracketed or replaced by καὶ.

**BOOK VII (V).**

1301 a 22. εἰς τοίας \(P^2\) Bekk. Sus.: ἐφ’ ἀντοίς \(M^s\) \(P^1\) and possibly \(\Gamma\), for Vet. Int. has ad quales, and he often renders ἐπὶ by ad (e. g. in 1280 b 27, 1287 a 41, and 1304 a 2), while qualis is his ordinary equivalent for ὁποίας. 23. ἐπὶ δὲ ... 24. ἐκαίνυτο] See explanatory note on 1301 a 22. 27. τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ τοῦ καυ’ ἀναλογίαν ἰσον] See explanatory note on 1301 a 26. τοῦτον δ’ ἀμαρτανόντων] Most MSS. of Vet. Int. have ad hoc autem peccantium, but a z have ab in place of ad and are probably right: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25, where διαμαρτήκασι τῆς ὁρθότητος πολεμίας is rendered sunt vitiatae a rectis-
simia politia. 30. ὅτι . . . εἶναι om. P² Vb Ald., ὅτι . . . νομίζουσιν om. P² L² Ar., εἶναι . . . εἶναι om. pr. Qb. 31. ἐν τι Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἔτι M⁸, ἐ followed by a space sufficient for one letter and then τι pr. P⁰ (corrected into ἐν τι in pale ink): Vet. Int. in quocunque, which is his equivalent for ὅτιον in 29; perhaps his eye wandered from ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσου ἐν τι ὁρτας, 31, to the similar phrase ἐκ τοῦ ἰσοῦ ὁτιον ὁρτας, 29, unless indeed Busse (De praevidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 15) is right in regarding ὅτιον, 31, as a conjecture of Vet. Int. 36. Π M⁸ add αἱ πολιτείαι before πάσα and M⁸ omits τι, but αἱ πολιτείαι is a gloss which has crept into the text; αἱ πολιτείαι δηλονότι appears as a red-ink gloss in P². 38. ἦν om. P³ P⁰ and pr. P² (where it is supplied in darker ink than that of the MS.): it is placed after ἐκάηροι in M⁸ P⁰, but Vet. Int. has quam forte habent utrique, so that it probably stood before ἐκάηροι in Π. τυγχάνωνι Π¹ Bekk. Sus., τυγχάνων π³ P³ pr. P² (corrected in darker ink than that of the MS.). 39. στασιῶνων] After this word I propose to insert c. 3. 1303 b 3, στασιῶνοι ἔτε . . . 7, ὁντες, as to which see explanatory note on 1303 b 3.

1301 b 3. Π P¹ and perhaps P⁰ (Sus.¹) have the correct reading αἴτως, while M⁸ P² Ald. have αἴτον. See critical note on 1293 a 28. 6. διχῶς Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: δικαίος Π². 8. μεταστήσων] καταστήσωσιν is the reading of two MSS. of little weight (R⁹ V⁹) and, Sus.² thinks, perhaps of Π. Vet. Int. has ex institutis aliam constituant, and constituer: undoubtedly often represents καθιστάναι, whereas μεθιστάναι is usually rendered by transferre: still constituit stands for periéρησε in 1304 a 33, and it is possible that constituant may stand for μεταστήσωσιν here. 10. οὗ Π² Bekk. Sus.: οὐδὲ Π M⁸. 17. ἡ [Θ] Ια] Vet. Int. ut aut (Θ = ἡ γ)?). 26. ἦν om. Π¹, but see explanatory note on 1301 b 25. πανταχόν Π² P² Bekk. Sus.: πάντων Π⁸ V⁴ Vb Ald. and pr. Q⁹ according to Sus.¹.²: Sus.³ probably errs in ascribing the reading πάντων to Π², for St. Hilaire (Politique d’Aristote, ed. 1837, vol. ii. p. 344) finds πανταχόν in Π². 27. οὗ μὴν M⁸ Π² Bekk., οὗ μὴν δὲ Π¹: Vet. Int. non solum, which probably stands for οὗ μὴν, for, though he usually renders οὗ μὴν non tamen, a frequent equivalent for οὗ μὴν, nisi is non solum sed. I add οὐ after οὗ μὴν: see as to the whole passage explanatory note on 1301 b 26. 28. ἄνισον Π² Bekk.¹ (corrected into ἄνισον in Π³): ἄνισον Π¹ Bekk.² Sus. Compare the various readings in 1295 a 6. 32. ἵσω Π M⁸ pr. Π¹, ἵσω Sus.: ἵσω Π² Bekk. 33. λόγῳ ἔτε τὰ M⁸ corr. Π¹ Bekk.² Sus. and possibly Π (Vet. Int. ratione autem quattor): λόγῳ δὲ Π² Bekk.¹
and corr. P\(^3\): λέγω δὲ Ρ\(^b\) Ar. Ald. pr. Ρ\(^3\), λέγω δὲ τὰ perhaps pr. Ρ\(^1\): κατ’ ἀδίκων δὲ λέγω ἵνα τοπερέχειν τὰ Ρ\(^4\) \(^6\) L\(^s\) and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 177). τὸν δυνῶν Μ\(^s\) Ρ\(^1\) \(^3\) cbr. Ρ\(^2\) Bekk. Sus.: τὸν διὸ Ρ\(^6\) \(^6\) L\(^s\) pr. Ρ\(^2\) (corrected in the ink of the MS.): the reading of Γ is uncertain. 35. τὸν δυνῶν pr. Ρ\(^1\) (corrected into τὸν δυνῶν by Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., perhaps rightly), τὸν διὸ Ρ\(^6\) \(^6\) L\(^s\) pr. Ρ\(^2\) (corrected in the ink of the MS.): the reading of Γ is uncertain. In c. 3. 1302 b 37 Μ\(^s\) P\(^1\) Sus. have δυνῶν σπιθαμῶν (the reading of Γ is of course uncertain). In c. 10. 1310 b 5 all MSS. have δυνῶν (οὐ δυνῶν) κακῶν. In Hippocr. ap. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17 sub fin., we have δυνῶν πόνων. ημίση Π, though Vet. Int. has dimidium (ημίση Γ;). The earlier Attic form is ημίση, and this is the form which is used in Attic inscriptions of the fourth century B.C., though ημίση appears in an inscription of B.C. 180 or thereabouts (Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 118). However, ημίση occurs in several passages of Demosthenes Cod. Σ and in Hyperid. c. Demosth. col. 10. 28 (Kühner, Ausführli. Gramm. der gr. Sprache, ed. Blass, 1. 443). The only instance of ημίσηa in Aristotle’s writings given in the Index Aristotelicus is Phys. 8. 8. 263 b 8, to which 263 a 30 should be added. Immediately above in 263 a 23, 26, 28 we have ημίση. τὸ ἀπλῶς] Vet. Int. does not translate τὸ.

1302 a 2. έποροι Μ\(^s\) Ρ\(^1\) \(^2\) \(^4\) etc. Sus. and pr. Ρ\(^3\): άποροι Γ Bekk. έποροι is probably right, though Aristotle speaks otherwise in 3. 8. 1280 a 4 sq. πολλοί is added before πολλαχοῦ in Ρ\(^4\) \(^6\) L\(^s\) Ald. Bekk., but πολλοῖ and πολλαχοῦ are probably two alternative readings which in these MSS. have together found their way into the text. 10. εγγύνονται Ρ\(^2\) Harl.: εγγύνονται Μ\(^s\) Ρ\(^1\) Bekk. Sus. 14. εγγυτέρω] Vet. Int. propinquior (εγγυτέρα Γ;). For the confusion of a and ω compare 1305 b 10. The second η is omitted by Ρ\(^4\) \(^6\) L\(^s\) V\(^b\) Bojesen Sus. probably rightly. 15. τοιούτων om. Ρ\(^1\) \(^4\) L\(^s\). 18. εἰσὶ Γ Ρ\(^2\) Bekk.: εστι Μ\(^s\) Ρ\(^1\). δὲ Ρ\(^2\) \(^3\) \(^4\) V\(^b\) Ald. Bekk.: δὲ Π\(^1\) Ρ\(^b\) Ar.: γὰρ Sus. 31. περὶ δὲν δὲ Ρ\(^2\) Bekk.: περὶ δὲ δὲν Μ\(^s\) Ρ\(^1\) Sus.: Vet. Int. de quibus autem leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. See critical notes on 1277 b 29 and 1300 b 17. 33. αὐτῶν Γ Ρ\(^1\) Bekk. Sus.: the rest αὐτῶν. See critical note on 1293 a 28.

1302 b 4. διὰ μικρότητα Ρ\(^1\) Bekk. Sus.: διὰ σμικρότητα Μ\(^s\) Ρ\(^1\): the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. The forms μικρός, μικρότης are far more common in Aristotle’s writings than σμικρός, σμικρότης. Still in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 1 all MSS. but Μ\(^s\) have διὰ σμικρότητα. 6. πῶς
π Βεκκ. Sus.: πόσ' Π (πόσα Ρβ).

28. τῆς ἀρχίας καὶ ἀναρχίας] Vet. Int. εος qui sine ordine et sine principatu (τῶν ἀράκτων καὶ ἀνάρχων ἑ). But see critical note on 1326 b 19. 29. οἴων καὶ ἐν Θήβαις] z has velut et in thebis, the other MSS. velut in thebis.

30. πολιτευμονίων Π Βεκκ. and a correction in pale ink in Π: πολιτευμόνων ΜΣ Π Sus. and probably ἑ (though Vet. Int. politizantibus may represent either of the two readings). 36. ἡ om. Π B Βεκκ. before συμμετρία: whether ἑ added, is of course uncertain. It dropped out easily after μὲν, just as in 1305 b 24 ἡ drops out after διτῆ in Π 3 Ρβ Ββ.

37. ἡ om. Π. ὑποψισμαίνων Π 3 4 etc. Βεκκ.: ὑποψισμαίνων ΜΣ Π Sus. The reading of ἑ is uncertain (Vet. Int. duorum palmarum). See critical note on 1301 b 35. 38. μεταβάλλων Π Βεκκ. Sus.: μεταβάλλει with οἱ written above the last letter Π: μεταβάλλον Π 3. 39. τὸ is added before ποιῶν by only one MS. and that of little importance. Its absence is amply justified by the passages collected by Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 1.

1303 a 2. τὰς om. ΜΣ Π: the reading of ἑ is of course uncertain. 5. μικρὰν] Vet. Int. paulo, which usually represents μικρὰ. He has paulo posterus a Medicis for μικρὸν ύπερτον τῶν Μηδίκων: a is perhaps repeated from a before Ἰάπγης.

11. γὰρ Π Βεκκ.: γὰρ δὴ ΜΣ Π Sus. and possibly ἑ, for Vet. Int. has enim, and this represents γὰρ δὴ in 1284 b 29 and 1328 a 5. 13. See explanatory note. 14. τὰς ὑπεθέσιας] Vet. Int. verecundiam, but see critical note on 1296 a 34–35. 22. γενομένη Π Β Βεκκ. Sus.: γενομένη ΜΣ: Vet. Int. facia leaves the reading of ἑ uncertain. 24. (ἀπ') οἴδενος ἄρχον, ὡς ἐγγός ὅν ἀπ' om. ἡ II (Vet. Int. nullius): it is added by Schn., Βεκκ.5, Sus., and probably they are right. In place of ἐγγός ὅν all MSS. have ἐγγόν, except possibly ἑ, which may have had ἐγγός ὅν, for Vet. Int. has tāquam prōpinquum sit, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 13 Vet. Int. has tāquam hoc ad fortitudinem maxime sit conferens for ὃς τοῦτο πρὸς ἄρχον μάλιστα συμφέρον. However in 2. 2. 1261 a 15 he renders ὃς ἀρστῶν ὅν tāquam optimum ens: therefore it is not certain that he found ὃς ἐγγός ὅν in ἑ. Propinquum might stand for ἐγγόν (see critical note on 1271 b 6 and compare the renderings of Vet. Int. in 1283 a 35 and 1287 b 9, to mention no others), and the auxiliary verb is often added without support from MSS. (vol. ii. p. lxii, note 2). 28. ἔνστασισαν Π 3 Βεκκ., ἔνστασισαν Ρβ: ἐνστάσισαν Ρ Λ3 Ald. Βεκκ., ἐνστάσισαν Ρ. 35. Σαχλαίου Σαχλαίου Π, Σαχλαίου Ρ. 36. καὶ is added before αὑτοῦ in Ρ Ββ Λ3 Ald. Βεκκ.
CRITICAL NOTES.


1303 b 3. ἀποίκους Γ Ρ Bekk. (Vet. Int. ex pulsos): ἐποίκους Spengel, Sus., possibly rightly (cp. 1306 a 3, where all MSS. have ἐποίκους: Coray, however, would read ἀποίκους there as well as here). In 1319 a 36, where Π have ἀποίκιας (Vet. Int. habitacula), Coray, followed by Sus., would read ἐποίκιας. στασιάζουσι δὲ . . . 7, ὄντες] See critical note on 1301 a 39. 9. Χύτρων] See explanatory note. 11. τῶν Πειραιῶν] Vet. Int. suburbium. 12. αἱ διαβάσεις τῶν ὄχετων] Vet. Int. penetrationes aperturarum (is ὄχετων connected by Vet. Int. with οἰκεῖον?). 31. τὰ Ῥβ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. ea quae in aliis partibus): τὰς Μ* Ρ1 2 3 4 5 etc. 32. μηδεικά Μ* Ρ1 4 5 etc.: δημοτικά Ρ2 3 etc.: μήδεικα probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has midica (z nvidia). 34. τῶν πατρῴων] Π2 πατρῶν (τῶν add. Vet. Bekk.): Π1 πατρῶς (Vet. Int. de paterna hereditate), Sus. πατρῶς. 35. θαύρος is added after ἀποφαίνοντος in Ρ4 6 Ub Λ* Ald. Bekk. See critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1304 a 15, 1309 b 2, and 1313 b 32.

1304 a 3. θείοισι] θείοισι Ρ1: Vet. Int. sacrificatores, which may perhaps represent θείντα. See critical note on 1289 b 1.

4. Μυτιλήνη] μυτιλήνη πρ. Ρ2. See critical note on 1285 a 35. ζξ εἰπιλήρων] Vet. Int. ex hereditatibus. See critical note on 1274 b 25. 8. ο ζευσωθείς Ρ1 2 3 Bekk. Sus.: ο ζευσωθείς Ρb: ο ζευσωθείς Μ* Ρ4 etc. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. coariatus). 9. δεξανθρος Π1 Ρ2 Sus.: δόξανθρος Ρ3 Ρ* Bekk. 11. μναικάν Π2 Bekk.: μναιξάν Π* Sus. The Phocian whom Aristotle mentions here is probably the same man as the Mnaseas of Diod. 16. 38. For the forms Mnaseas, Mnasias, and Mnesias see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen. Both Mnaseas and Mnasias seem to have been forms used in Phocis. Μνάσωνος] μνάσωνος Ρ1 Ρ2 Bekk.: μνάσωρος Γ Μ*: the translation of Vet. Int., however, in the form in which it appears in the works of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus has Mnasonis (Sus.), and Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 445-3), whom Susemihl follows, adopts the reading Μνάσωνος. 15. δευσατέρα is added after τις in Ρ4 6 Ub Λ* Ald. Bekk. See critical note on 1303 b 35. 17. πολιτείας] πολιτείας followed by a lacuna pr. Μ*, πολιτός Ρ3, which shows that the archetype of these two MSS. contained ambiguous contractions. 18. καὶ is added before εκ in Π* Sus.: om. Ρ2 Bekk. 29. μετέβαλεν] Vet. Int. transmutatio facta est, but he will have found μετέβαλεν in Γ: cp. 1305 a 8, where
metēβαλλον is rendered fiebal transmutatio, 1316 a 18, where metā-
βαλλει is rendered fit transmutatio, and 1309 a 5, where τὸ μηδὲν
κερδαίεν is rendered eo quod nullum sit lucrum. 33.  eius locōn
περιευθυς] Vet. Int. in se ipso constituit. δοι Γ Π (Vet. Int. eliam,
which stands for δοι in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1292 b 10).

1304 b 1.  δ] δ Π Bekk. Sus.: δ Π2. μηδὲν δ μηκρὸν Π1 Sus.:
mikrōn δ μηκρῶν Π2 Bekk. For μηκρῶν πάρσαν cp. 1270 a 17, 1294 b 4.
6. αἰήαι Π Bekk. Sus.: αι Π2. Π1 should probably have had αι
αιεία in place of αἰήαία, the reading of Π1, but omitted αἰήαία after αι.
It is doubtful whether the right reading is αἰήαία or α αἰήαία, for
while in 1302 a 18 we have τὰς ἄρχας καὶ τὰς αἰήαίας αὐτῶν, in 1302 a 34
we have αὶ δ’ αἰήαία καὶ ἄρχαι τῶν κωνήσεως.
12. οἰον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρα-
κοσίων τῶν δημον ἐχθράμματων] Vet. Int. velut in trecentis qui populum
decerpunt, whence it would seem that οἰον was added in Г before тῶν
δημον. τετρακοσίων Π2 Bekk. Sus.: τριακοσίων Π1. In 1305 b 27 Π1
have τριακοσίων in place of τετρακοσίων wrongly. The two words
are often confused in the MSS. See critical note on 1286 a 13.
separatissimos. 25. οὕτω Π2, οὕτως Bekk.: ομ. Π1.
27. μισθοφορᾶν] μισθοφορῶν Μ8 and probably Г, for Vet. Int. has tractare
stipendia. 28. τε γὰρ om. Π1 Π46 Λ8, γὰρ om. pr. Π2 (it is supplied
by a correction in pale ink, and in the margin is added in the same
pale ink ἐν ἄλλῳ μισθοφορῶν οἶ δημαγογοὶ καὶ ἐξῆς). Sus. brackets τε
34. κατελθόντες] Vet. Int. supervenientes (ἐπελθόντες Γ?, for ἐπέρχεται
is rendered supervenire in 1289 b 24 and 1310 a 39). 35. ἦ ἐν
Μεγάρως] Vet. Int. does not render ἦ, but neither does he render ἦ
in 1313 a 24, ἦ περί Μαλοστῶν. See critical note on 1306 a 30.
36. ἐξῆσαλων Μ8 Π2 (except Ald.) Bekk. Sus.: ἐξῆβαλον Π1 23 Ald.:
Vet. Int. eiccerunt, which probably represents εξῆβαλον.

1305 a 3. ὅτε Γ Π2 Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. quandoque): τότε Π1,
στασιάσας] Vet. Int. seditionem movit, but see critical note on 1286 b
10. 32. καὶ τῶν νόμων] z has eliam legum; the other MSS. of
Vet. Int. wrongly legum. τοῦ ἦ] η om. Π1: see critical note on
1282 a 17.

1305 b 4. ἐν Μασσαλία] Μ8 has the form Μασσαλία here and
Μ8 Π1 in 1321 a 30 (where see critical note), but Head (Hist. Num.
p. 7) does not mention the occurrence of this form on the coins,
some of which have the inscription ΜΑΣΣΑ. In both passages
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z has massalia, though most MSS. of Vet. Int. have masalia in the passage before us and some of them in 1321 a 30. 6. metelaBou π² Bekk. Sus.: metéβαλων pr. P¹ (corrected in pale ink), metéβαλλον Ms Vb, metéβαλλον or metéβαλλον Π (Vet. Int. donec transmutarent). 8. οὐ νέωτερον] z has inuniores, the usual equivalent; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. less well minores, though it is possible that, as οὐ νέωτερον occurs in the next line and is rendered iunior, Vet. Int. may have preferred, as he sometimes does, to render it otherwise in 8. 10. ἐνθα] Vet. Int. in cho (b g h k l m) or in tho (a c s: z has intho). He probably misread ἐνθα as ἐν θα: see critical note on 1302 a 14. ή is omitted in P⁴ L⁸ V⁵ Ald. Bekk., but as to the omission of the article in these MSS. see critical notes on 1291 a 1, b 3, and 1292 a 22. 11. ἀπετελεύσεσθε] Vet. Int. remissa fiuil. 16. ἐπιλαθόμενος] Vet. Int. insurgens. His translation of ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν in Rhet. 3. 16. 1417 b 6 (deprehenduntur in oculis) is equally wide of the mark, but insurgere is a frequent equivalent for εὐτιεσθα in Vet. Int., and it is possible that Π had ἐπιθεμένοις in 16 as well as in 17. 17. ἐπιθεμένοις] Vet. Int. invalescens should probably be invadens (for invadere represents εὐτιεσθα in 1272 b 16, 1327 a 23, 1330 b 27, and 1331 a 17). 20. ἐπιμελομένων Π, except Ms Ald., which have ἐπιμελομένων. The form used elsewhere in the Politics is ἐπιμελείσθα, and in 1339 a 38 Π have ἐπιμελομένων. The word does not occur again in the present Book. The form ἐπιμελεῖσθαι is always used in the 'Ath. Pol., except in one passage (c. 50. I. 10), where the papyrus has ἐπιμελεῖνται. In Attic inscriptions between b.c. 380 and 30 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι is found far more often than ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 139). 24. ή om. P²⁵ R⁵ V⁵b. See critical note on 1302 b 36. ἐγγύνεται P²³⁴; ἐγγύνεται Ms P¹ etc. 25. πάν] Vet. Int. omina, which represents a variety of words, among them πάμμα, but may possibly stand for πάνω here, though πάνω is rendered valde in 1318 b 2. 26. ἐγχύοσαν] Vet. Int. habuerunt should probably be valuerunt, as Sus.¹ suggests. In 1292 a 22 ἐγχύοσαν is rendered valent. 27. τετρακοσίως Π² Bekk. Sus.: τρακοσίους Π¹. See critical notes on 1304 b 12 and 1286 a 13. 34. οὕτοι Π², οὕτοι Ald., οὕτω Bekk., οὕτω Bakk.: οὕτω Μˢ, οὕτω Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. sunt or sint after praetoria leaves the reading in Π uncertain).

1306 a 3. ἐποίους Γ Π: see critical note on 1303 b 3. τὸν Π² Bekk.: τὸν Ms P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. advenas Chalcideorum leaves the
reading of Γ uncertain. 6. Π¹ add εἰδὼς after μὲν οὖν, probably rightly, for Π² sometimes omit single words, e.g. in 1288 b 16, 27, 1259 a 37, and 1276 a 33. In the margin of Π¹ εἰδὼς is added not here, but after καὶ in 1305 b 41, probably, as Sus. suggests, by an oversight. See critical note on 1300 a 38. ‘ἐπιχειροῦσι’ Ζ has conantur; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. conantur wrongly. 8. ελιπτοτυρίων] Vet. Int. fures, but see critical note on 1289 b 1. 13. ἐμποίον] Vet. Int. inducunt, which might represent εἰσάγων. ‘Εμποίον is rendered efficere or facere elsewhere in the Politics and mostly in the Rhetoric, but it is rendered insinuare in Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 2, and inducunt may possibly stand for ἐμποίον here. 21. ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ] See explanatory note. 22. ἐγχειρίσωσιν] Vet. Int. manus iniecerint probably stands for ἐγχειρίσωσιν and not ἐγχειρίσωσιν, the reading of Μ¹, for ἐγχειρίσων is always rendered conari or invadere. In 27 ἐγχειρίσωσι is rendered muniant or minimant (so Z): should muniant be read, or mandant? In 1314 a 24 ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις is rendered manum militi ad impossibilitia. 24. αὐτοῖς] Ζ has ipsis (αὐτοῖς Γ); the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have amplius wrongly. 30. Ἀλευναῖον] ἀλωνίαν Α M¹ pr. Π¹ (corrected in Π¹ in the ink of the MS.). τῶν περὶ Σιμων] Vet. Int. circa Samum: thus he does not translate τῶν, but whether (as Sus.³ a thinks) τῶν was omitted in Γ is doubtful (see critical notes on 1304 b 35 and 1313 a 24). Σιμων Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 188, note 84): σάμων Γ. Π. ‘Corruptelam primus suspicatus est Camerarius’ (Sus.³): see Camerarius, Interp. p. 201. 31. ἐταμεῖαν Π¹ Ald. Bekk. Sus.: ἐταμεῖαν the rest. In 1272 b 34 all MSS. have ἐταμεῖαν, but in 1305 b 32 pr. Μ¹ Π²¹ have ἐταμείων, and in 1313 a 41 pr. Π³ has ἐταμεῖαν. In Αθ. Πολ. the form ἐταμεῖα is always used. 36. δὲ is added after διαγράφα in Π² except in Π⁴, which omits it in a lacuna: it is bracketed in Bekk.¹². 37. καὶ ἐν] Should ἦ be added between καὶ and ἐν (cp. 1306 b 5)? 38. στασιστικῶς Ρ² Bekk.: στασιστικὸς Μ¹: Vet. Int. seditionaliter leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. 39. Ἐυρυτίων Ρ⁵ R¹ and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 202), Vict. Bekk.: Ἐυρυτίων Π² R¹ and probably pr. Π³ (for Π³ has ἐνετίων with εἰσά over an erasure), ἐνεκτιῶν Γ, ἐνετίων Μ¹: Π¹. Perhaps the name of Euryton is the more likely to be right. Euryton was one of the Argonauts (Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography s. v. : Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen, s. vv. Εὐρυτίων and Εὐρυτός), and, it was claimed that the Argonauts on their way to Colchis landed on the coast where
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Heracleia was afterwards founded (Preller, Gr. Mythol. 2. 332). The tomb of the prophet Idmon, an Argonaut, was to be seen in the marketplace of Heracleia (Preller, p. 333, note).

1306 b 2. aîvov] See explanatory note on 1306 b 1. 4. tînov is left untranslated by Vet. Int. 8. δλος Π² Ar. Bekk.: om. Π¹. Sus. brackets it. 9 sqq. See explanatory note. 18. ai is added before ὀλγαρχία in Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk.: the reading of Π is of course uncertain. 20. ἐννόμων νῦν Π Μ⁸ (Vet. Int. ex legibus democraticis et oligarchicis in eas quae dominare). τὸς Π² Rb Ald. pr. Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: τοὺς Μ⁸ Π⁴ etc. and probably Γ, τοὺς a correction in Π¹ in pale ink. 28. Congreve’s conjecture of τι for τὸ deserves to be mentioned, though I do not adopt it. See explanatory note. 35. ’Αγγελίλιων Schn. Cor. Bekk.² Sus.: ἀγγελίλω Π Bekk.,¹ for Vet. Int. sub Agesilao stands for εἰς’Αγγελίλα (see critical note on 1289 b 39 and cp. 1271 a 39). 38. καὶ τοῦτο Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. hoc et (τοῦτο καὶ Π?). μεσονικῶν Π³ etc. Bekk.: μεσονικῶν Π¹ Π⁴ VB Sus.³ Π Sus.³ have μεσονικῶι in 1269 b 4 and Μ⁸ Π¹² Π⁴ Sus.³ μεσονικοῦς in 1270 a 3. Thus in the Politics the MSS. are divided. But in Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 a 11 and 3. 17. 1418 b 11 the best MSS. have μεσονικῶι and μεσονικῇ, and in Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 18 all the MSS. have μεσονικᾶι. On coins we find the form Μεσονικῶι, and the form with one sigma is of rare occurrence in inscriptions (see for an instance of it Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 181, where both forms occur). 39. δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο] κ.τ.λ.] I bracket καὶ τοῦτο, suspecting (as I see since writing this note that Mr. A. W. Verrall in Class. Rev. 10. 273, note, also does) that it has found its way into the text by repetition from the preceding line. This error is of frequent occurrence in Π¹, but it probably now and then affects all the MSS.

1307 a 5. Ἀννων Π Bekk. The MSS. of Vet. Int. have various corruptions of the word all beginning with h, whence Sus. reads ”Ἀννων. But Herodotus (7. 165), Polybius, Plutarch (Timol. c. 19), Diodorus, and Justin all give the name without the aspirate. 22. αὐξιωντων] z has augmentantibus, which is perhaps the reading of a: the other MSS. have augentibus. In 1303 a 12 αὐξιωντων is rendered augmentatis. 31. δῶνων Π² Bekk.: δῶνων Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus. (Γ uncertain). See critical note on 1253 b 33. Schneider, followed by Sus., believes, probably rightly, that a lacuna exists before ὁ δὲ δήμος. It is difficult to say what has dropped out: possibly ἐσταθείσων or some such word or words. 32. τῶν φρουρῶν om. Π¹. 33. τῆς
χώρας] τὴν χώραν Μσ Ρ2 Vb. 38. θελουσαν Μσ Ρ1 Sus. and possibly Γ: θελων Ρ2, θελων Bekk.

1307 b 1. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. add quod after arisocratiae. This is probably repeated by anticipation from eo quod solvantur or quod quidem dictum est in the following line. In much the same way in 1308 a 38 Vet. Int. has honorabilitatis for νομίσματος, repeating it from honorabilitatis communis immediately after. 12. χειροτονήσατα π2 Bekk. Sus.: χειροτονήσατα Ρ1, χειροτονήσαν with τι superscribed over a Μσ (=probably χειροτονήσαντα): Vet. Int. ordinantem (z ordinantes), which may stand either for χειροτονήσαντα or for χειροτονήσαντα, for Βλέψα is rendered aspiciens in 1289 b 6 and ἀκονσομένους audientes in 1298 a 19. 18. μετέβαλεν Γ Ρ1 corr. Μσ etc. Bekk. Sus. (for Vet. Int. transmutatus est stands for μετέβαλεν, as transmutata fuil does in 1301 b 21, 1303 b 21, 1304 b 26, and 1305 b 12): μετέβαλεν Ρ1 Π5 pr. Μσ: μετέβαλεν Ρ23 etc. 30. εν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εἰς κεκραμένας πολιτείας] z has in bene temperatis quidem igitur politis; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. wrongly add autem after bene. 31. παρανομοῦσιν] z has praevaricentur rightly; a praevaricetur, and the other MSS. privarentur. 32. παραδομοῦν ... 34, δὲ om. Π5 Ar. pr. Ρ8 (no doubt owing to the recurrence of λαυβάνει in 34), so that we are dependent for these words on Γ Μσ Ρ1. Μσ Ρ1, followed by Göttling, have λαυβάνει γὰρ παραδομοῦν ἡ παρανομία, ὡσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναφερόντος πολλάκις γυνήμενον (i of γυνήμενον in Ρ1 over an erasure). λαυβάνει δὲ (γὰρ Ρ1 Göttl. in place of δὲ), and this reading I have adopted. Vet. Int. has latet enim subintrans praevaricatio, sicut substantias parvae expensae consumunt saepe factae. latet autem, so that he may have found in his Greek text αὐτὶ μικρὸς δαπάνημα ἀναφεροῦσα πολλάκις γυνήμενη, but I do not think this very likely, for he renders δαπάνη (sing.) by expensae (plur.) in 1330 a 13 and 1321 a 40. Praevaricatio stands for παρανομία, for praevaricentur represents παρανομὸς in 31. That Victorius’ conjecture of ἐπεισδόσανα for παραδομοῦν (in which Bekker follows him) and of παράβασις or παράκβασις for παρανομία is wrong (he probably obtained his version of the passage by retranslation from Vet. Int.) is evident from Plato, Rep. 424 D (quoted in explanatory note on 1307 b 30), from which passage the sentence is repeated, a fact which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.5 a has called attention to this and adopted the reading of Μσ Ρ1. ] 34. ἡ δαπάνη Ρ1 Π2 (bracketed by Sus.): ἡ ἀπάν ἰ Μσ and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has seductio and vol. IV. I
seductis stands for ἔξοπαραγόντων in Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 23: ἢ μετά-
βασις Vict. Bekk. 36. ὡ om. Ms P1 (it is supplied in P1 in the
ink of the MS.) and probably r (Vet. Int. sic aut sophistica oratio).
1308 a 3. τι Π Bekk. Sus.: τιτι Π. 10. αὐτῶς Γ and, as it
would seem, P1 (see critical note on 1293 a 28): αὐτῶς Ms Π2.
17. ἐγγίσονται] Vet. Int. sinti, as in 1288 a 13, 1302 a 10, 13, and
1304 b 26. 33. παρειληφέναι] Vet. Int. comprehendantur, but he
often renders the active by the passive. 35. διὰ τὰ τιμῆματα] διὰ
τιμῆματος Γ Ms Vb (Vet. Int. per honorabilitatem).
39. κοινοῦ Π Bekk.: κοινοῦ Coray, Sus. 40. κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
χρόνον is placed in Π2 before ἐν ὀσκαί, 39, and Bekker places these
words there between brackets: Π1 Sus. rightly place them after
ἐναντίων. Bekk.1 had already remarked in his note on 1308 a 39
that the Vet. Int. did so.
1308 b 6. See explanatory note. 10. ἔβ is added before ὁλ-
γαρχία in Π1 Sus. 11. καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ is added in Π1, but crossed
through with red ink in P1: om. Π2 Bekk.2: καὶ μοναρχίᾳ Vict.
Casaubon Bekk.1, but Casaubon and Bekk.1 bracket the words, and
καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ is bracketed by Sus. I bracket καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ,
though not without hesitation, for in 1301 b 13 we have a refer-
ce to μοναρχία. See also critical note on 1299 b 22. 13.
ταχὺ μεγάλος Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. breviter magnos (so Z with
all MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, which has breviter et magnos): did
he find βραχύ in place of ταχὺ in Γ? 14. παντὸς] Z has ομνῖς
rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. (except a, which has breviter et magnos) did
he find βραχύ in place of ταχύ in Γ?
15. μὴ τοι γ´ Bekk. Sus.: μὴν τοι γ´ P1 Ald., μη τοι
γ´ P1 L8: μὴ τοι γ´ P2 3 etc.: μὴρ Γ Ms, μὴ τοι P1. In c. II. 1315 a 10
all MSS. have μὴ τοι το γε ἠδοθ θρανῶν. In 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 16 P1 L8
Ald. have μὴ τοι γε, and all the other MSS. μὴ τοι γε. In Metaph.
Z. 10. 1035 a 29 we have ἡ ὀλος ἢ οὔτω οὔτω γε. See Eucken, De
Π2 (it is supplied in P4 by a corrector). 17. οὔτως ἄγεων Π2 Bekk.,
but in Π2 is added in the ink of the MS., ἐν ὀλογῷ οὔτω καθιέρων and
in the margin in pale ink οὔτω καθιέρων: οὔτω θυμίζειν Ms P1: Vet.
Int. has sic ordinaire, which may stand here for οὔτω θυμίζειν, but
ordinare in Vet. Int. commonly stands for τάτεων. 22. Ms P1
omits the second τῶν: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. But
these MSS. have little authority in questions as to the omission of
Ms P1: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. firmare might
stand either for ἐγχειρίζειν or for τὸ ἐγχειρίζειν (cp. 1314 a 10, where ἔπι stands for τὸ χρήσθαι, and 1315 a 8, where nullum unum facere magnum stands for τὸ μηδένα ποιεῖν ἕνα μέγαν). 28. Π¹ may possibly be right in omitting the first καὶ (see critical notes on 1254 b 14 and 1260 a 26), but no great weight attaches to the omission of καὶ by these MSS. Vet. Int. adds autem after his equivalent for τοὺς ἀπόρους, but see critical note on 1318 a 35. 34. ἀλεγαρχικᾶς Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. in oligarchis. 37. Vet. Int. does not translate δ'.

1309 a 5. Βουλήσοντα] z has volent; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. volunt or valent. 10. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι] Vet. Int. et ut non surentur. Had ἐὰν καὶ τοῦ μὴ κλέπτεσθαι? Μ⁸ omits οὖν. 12. λόγους Ῥ Π¹ Ald. Ar. and a correction in pale ink in Π¹ (Vet. Int. contubernia): λόγους Μ⁸ Π³ etc. and pr. Π¹: τιθέσωσαν] Vet. Int. reponeantur, which stands for τιθέσωσαν here as repudio does for τιθέντος in 1259 a 23. 15. τὸ Ῥ Μ⁸ Lamb. Cor. Sus., τοῦ Π¹: om. Π² Bekk. In 1319 b 7 Π¹ omit τὸ. 29. Π¹ add ταῦτας after τῆς πολιτείας, probably owing to the occurrence of τῆς πολιτείας ταῦτας (or ταῦτα) a line below. Sus.⁸ a brackets ταῦτας. See critical notes on 1290 b 29 and 1298 b 35. 31. ταῦτας Π² (except Π², which omits ταῦτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας) Bekk. Sus.: ταῦτα Π¹. 35. δύναμις μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς] Vet. Int. potentiam maximorum operum principatus, but maximorum is probably a clerical error for maximam. 40. άφρεσων corr. P⁴ Sus. and other editors: διάφερον all other MSS. and Bekker. άφρεσω is probably right: cp. 1309 b 2 sq.

1309 b 2. μὴ στρατηγικὸς δὲ is added in Π⁴ L⁸ after φιλακ, but see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. 7. τάνωτι Π¹ Π² Bekk.: τονωτίοιν Ῥ Μ⁸ Sus. 9. κἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλακ Stahr, Sus., while Eucken would place τῆς πολιτείας after φιλακ. All the MSS. and Vet. Int. place τῆς πολιτείας before καὶ. They are probably wrong, as Π¹ are probably wrong in 1312 a 27, where Π¹ read δὲ ἢν ἀνομαστοί γίνονται τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ γνώριμοι in place of δὲ ἢν ἀνομαστοί γίνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, which is the reading of Π². Vet. Int. has si for κἂν, but he probably found κἂν in Ῥ (see critical notes on 1282 b 8 and 1298 b 23). 10. καὶ τὰ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: κατὰ Π³ etc. and pr. Π¹: τὰ corr. Π⁴. For a similar error see 1319 b 24. 14. ενίους Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: εὐῖος Π². 19. νῦν Π¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: δὴ Ῥ Μ⁸. 25. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα] Vet. Int. non lamen, which stands for οὐ
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1310 a 18. εἴπερ Π2 Bekk. Sus.: ἐπερ Π1. 19. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πεπα- δεόσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τούτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χάρωνσι] Vet. Int. est autem erudiri ad faciendum non hoc quibus gaudent (so ζ with the other MSS., except that the symbol in ζ may stand for either hoc or haec). The words should probably run—est autem erudiri ad politicam non hoc, facere quibus gaudent. 21. η Μ3 Π2 Bekk.: καὶ Ρ1 Sus. 22. Vet. Int. democratizare stands for δημοκρατεῖσθαι as in 1290 a 36 (cp. 1292 a 8). 33. εἰς δ χρήζων] εἰς δ χρῆσιν Π16 Λ4. Vet. Int. ad quod abundat. Perhaps he misread χρήζων as χορηγῶν (cp. 1325 b 38, where abundantia stands for χορηγίας). 39. καὶ om. Π1.

1310 b 5. δυνατ] δυνέω Π2 pr. Π3. z (with b alone) has δυνάσ rightly; the other ΜΞ. of Vet. Int. δυνάσ. 9. τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν δημον] See explanatory note. 10. εἰκ om. Π1. 15. δημαγωγών] δημα- γωγῶν Π2 8. 17. τῶν τυραννίδων Π2 4 etc. Bekk. Sus.: οἱ τυραννίδες Π1. 21. τὸς δημοσρήσεις καὶ τὰς δεορίας] Vet. Int. conditores populi et prospectores. See critical notes on 1326 b 19 and 1302 b 28. 24. τοῦτος Π2 Bekk. Sus. and corr. Ρ1: τοῦτο εἰς Ρ Μ8 pr. Ρ1: Bekk. 2 omits τοῦτος. 29. Κύψελος] κύψελλος Ρ1 4. So in 1315 b 24 Μ8 and perhaps Γ have κύψελλον and in 1315 b 27 Ρ1 Vb and perhaps Γ, and in 1315 b 23 Ρ4 has κυψελλίδων. In 1313 b 22 all MSS. have κυψελλίδων or κυψελίδων, and we find κυψελίδων in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 17. l. 14. In Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 13 the form Κύψελος occurs. In Hist. An. 9. 30. 618 a 31 there is a various reading κυψελλος for κυψελός ('swifts'), and in 34 a various reading κυψελλίσιμος for κυψε- λίσιν. 33. γένους Π2 Bekk. Sus.: γένος Π1. 37. Κόδρας] κόδρας Π2 3 Vb and perhaps Γ. 40. Μολοστόων] ζ has molottorum; all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have some corruption or other. δὲ] Vet. Int. enim, but whether Γ had γὰρ is doubtful.
1311 a 6. χρηματα Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. pecuniarium (χρημάτων γ?). 


13. κακοῦν τῶν ὑχλῶν] Vet. Int. suspectam habere turbam; suspectam is probably corrupt, for κάκωσις is rendered anxielas in Rhet. 2. 7. 1385 a 24 and afflictio in Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 8 (κακοῦν does not occur again in the Politics or at all, it would seem, in the Rhetoric). Should subjectam be read in place of suspectam? 15. καὶ is added after δὲ in Γ M⁴; two MSS. of Vet. Int., however (a z), omit et. 

21. ἐστιν] Vet. Int. fuit. See critical note on 1316 b 10. 22. καθάπερ αὖν σχέδων ἐλέξθη, τὰς αὐτὰς κ.τ.λ.] Σχέδων is often used with εἰρήται and similar words to soften the statement that such and such a topic has been dealt with (Bon. Ind. s.v. σχέδων), but there seems to be less reason for its use here in the simple repetition of an assertion, and in 1310 a 40 (the passage referred to) we have σχέδων δὲ παραπλήσαμε τῶν εἰρήμενοι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας, so that Spengel may well be right in reading καθάπερ ἀὖν ἐλέξθη, σχέδων τὰς αὐτὰς κ.τ.λ. 


37. Vet. Int. renders δὲ by et, as in 1291 b 40 and 1312 a 18. 'Ἀρμόδιον] ἀρμόδιοι Μ⁴ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. iliusisse Harmodio). 38. z has aristogiton; of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. a has aristogitaton and the rest aristogitaton. 

1311 b 5. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν νῦν αὐτοῦ] Vet. Int. quia enim mulier recusavit filium ipsius, where παρελεύσθαι has probably been misread or misunderstood by the translator. 7. αἰσχύναSus.: αἰσχύναi M⁴ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. verecundiam fecerunt: αἰσχύνεσθαι is rendered verecundari in 1324 b 34 and 1313 a 31): αἰσχύνεσθαι Π² Bekk., accepting which reading Vict., followed by Bonitz (Ind. 22 a 30), would insert υπὸ before τῶν μονάρχων. 8. μονάρχων Π Bekk.: μονάρχων Γ Sus. (Vet. Int. monarcharum). κραταίου Π² Bekk. Sus.: κραταίου M⁴ Π⁴: Vet. Int. Crataei, which leaves the reading of Γ uncertain: krateivou Scaliger,
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10. ἤ Πθ Σus.: ἦ Μθ P1 and probably ι, for Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for it, and he often gives no equivalent for the article: om. Vict. Giph. Bekk.  
12. Should τοῦ be added before πρᾶς?  
13. ἐλμείας Πθ Bekk. Sus.: ἐλμείας Πθ Ar., but a mark resembling a colon (\(\lambda\)) is placed in Πς over λ (see Sus.1). The letters ι and θ are interchanged in some words, e.g. in ἕρμουληψ, which appears also in Attic inscriptions as Υερμουληψ (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, pp. 59–60). But ἐλμείας is probably merely the mistake of a copyist for ἐλμείας, the letters ι and θ having been for a considerable period very similar in form in minuscule writing.  
14. τοῦ Πθ Bekk.: τον Μθ P1 Sus.: the reading of Π is of course uncertain. In 1304 a 8 and 1313 a 32 all MSS. have τοῖς, in 1277 a 18 όι τοῖς, in 1293 a 29 τοῖς τοῖς, but on the other hand all have τοῖς in 1261 b 39 and τοῖς in 1270 b 4. The Index Aristotelicus records no instance of the occurrence of the forms τοῖς and τοῖς in Aristotle’s writings: τοῖς occurs in Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b 11. In the 'Ἀθ. Πολ. the forms τοῖς (nom. and acc.), τοῖς are exclusively found. As to the use of these various forms see Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 113, who remarks that after b.c. 350 the forms of the word used in Attic inscriptions are generally those of the second declension, and Kühner, Ausf. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, i. 506 sqq. ηκιστα] Vet. Int. nihil.  
20. πάρρων Πθ Bekk. and a correction in P1 in the ink of the MS.: πάρρων Μθ pr. P1 (Vet. Int. πιρρόν or πιέρρων: z has πιέρρων): πίθον Fabius Benevolentius ap. Vict. ad locum, followed by Sus. The murderer of Cotys is usually called Πίθων: thus the best MS. of Diogenes Laertius, the Burbonicus, has Πίθων (so Prof. Bywater informs me) in 3. 46, and Demosthenes has Πίθων in c. Aristocr. cc. 119, 127, 163, and so has Plutarch in Adv. Colot. c. 32, De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, c. 11, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 20, and elsewhere. In Diog. Laert. 9. 65, indeed, it is implied that Diocles called the murderer of Cotys Πύρρων, but the passage is thought by Casaubon and Menage to be a gloss on ἐν τῷ Πίθων a dozen lines above which has crept from the margin into the text and has been severed in the process from the words on which it was a comment. There is much, therefore, to be said for the reading Πίθων in the passage before us. I hesitate, however, to depart from the reading of the MSS., as Aristotle may have written Πάρρων or Πύρρων, though he may have been in error in doing so. Zeller (Plato, Eng. Tr., p. 30, note 64) apparently
accepts the reading Πάρρων, for he distinguishes between Parrhon and Pytho. 25. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς] Vet. Int. et ea quae circa principatus. He takes τῶν to be neuter and appears to make τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς κτλ. dependent on διεφθειραν and ἐνεχείρησον. 27. πενθαλύθας Π Π Bekk., except that pr. M8 has πενθαλύθας and Rb πενθαλύθας. Penθαλύθας Schn. Sus. Almost all MSS. have πένθιλον or πενθιλον in 29. We find the form Πενθαλύθας in Strabo, p. 582, and Paus. 3. 2. i. περιώστας P14 Rb Ar. Bekk. Sus.: περιώστας M8 P23 Vb Ald. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. circumstantes: he renders περιουσία in 1329 b 28 by circumstantia). 29. Σύμβδια Camotius (editor of the Aldina minor in 1552), Sylburg, Bekk. Sus. etc.: συμέρθης Π Π Ar. See explanatory note. 30. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάον δ᾽ ἐπιθέσεως] Vet. Int. does not translate δὲ, but this he fails to do in some other passages in which καὶ ... δὲ occurs (1525 a 13, 1313 b 32 sq.). 35. τουαύτης Π Bekk. Sus.: τουαύτης Π2. 37. καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας om. Γ M8 pr. P1 (the words are added in the margin of P1 in pale ink). 40. συγγνώσεσθαι Π2 Bekk. Sus.: συγγνώσθαι M8 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. indulgeri), συγγνώσθαι pr. P1 (corrected in pale ink).

1312 a 1. Σαρδανάπαλλον Bekk.2 Sus.: σαρδανάπαλλον Γ Π Bekk.1. ξαῖνοντα] Vet. Int. percutiéntem se. 2. ἀληθῆ] Vet. Int. vere (ἀληθῶς Γ?). 4. τοῦτο Π Sus., τοῦτο with τ superscribed over the second τ M8 (two alternative readings being thus offered, 1. τοῦτο, 2. τοῦτο or τοῦτο τό, it is uncertain which): τό P23 Rb Vb: om. P4 Ald. Bekk. 6. μεθίοντα] After this word I propose to insert 17, μάλωτα δὲ ... 20, ἐπιθέωσιν. See explanatory notes on 1312 a 6, 17. 7. διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὡς λήσοντες] Vet. Int. propter confidere enim contemnuunt tanguam obilituri. Pιστεύεσθαι is elsewhere in the Politics rendered credi or credibilis fieri. Confidere stands for παρησιάζεσθαι in 1313 b 15, 16, and the translator may have misread πιστεύεσθαι as παρησιάζεσθαι. Perhaps latituri should be read in place of obilituri. 10. καὶ om. Π4 (z omits et with most of the MSS. of Vet. Int., unlike a). 11. μονάρχως Π Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. The first family of MSS. usually has the form μονάρχης (vol. ii. p. liii). 12. Ἀστυνάγει] Ἀστυνάγη Λb Ald. (Ἀστυνάγη Bekk.): ἀστυνάγει P4. See Kühner, Ausführli. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, i. 513, Anm. 2, and Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch d. gr. Eigennamen, s. v. Ἀστυνάγη. 14. θράξ Π2 (Θράξ Bekk.2 Sus.3): θράξ M8 P1 (Θράξ Bekk.1 Sus.3a). 16. z has ariobar sa e (perhaps = ariobarsanem); most of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have ariob-
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barsane or ariobar sane. 18. παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις] Vet. Int. a monarchis. μονάρχοι π Bekk. Sus.: the reading of γ is uncertain.

19. θράσος π Bekk. (θ in P1 over an erasure): θάρσος Giph. (p. 678) Sus. probably rightly: Vet. Int. audacia, which may represent either θράσος or θάρσος, for it represents θρασύς in 1269 b 35 and θάρσος in 1258a 11. 26. δοσερ καν] Vet. Int. ac si utique: so in 1278a 37 δοτε is rendered ac si. 28. γιγνώσται] Vet. Int. fierent is probably a clerical error caused by fieret in the preceding line. See however critical note on 1313a 14.


31. οἰ om. Ms P1 and perhaps also γ. 32. μὴ om. γ Ms Pr. P1 (it is added in P1 in paler ink) possibly rightly, but these MSS. are prone to omit, and especially to omit small words. 34. ἐγγενεσθαι πολλοῖς π² Bekk. Sus.: γενεσθαι πολλοῖς Ms P1: Vet. Int. adesse multíis, which probably stands for ἐγγενεσθαί πολλοῖς, though adesse is not the usual equivalent for ἐγγενεσθαί. 36. ὅπων] ὅπω Θompson Sus., but Xenophon sometimes wrote ὅπω where he should have written ὅπω (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 115: see Liddell and Scott on ὅπων and ὅπω), and it is possible that Aristotle wrote ὅπων here.

37. αὐτῷ Γ (Vet. Int. sibi): αὐτῷ π Bekk. 38. τὸν βίον is added after τελευτήσα in P1 and marg. P1: for similar explanatory additions in MSS. of the first family see critical note on 1255 b 12.

1312 b 4. αἱ om. Ms P1 Sus. and perhaps γ. 5. κεραμεῖς κεραμεὶ π1 Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1311 a 17 and Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 25): κεραμεὶ κεραμεὺς π2 Bekk. 9. ἐνα] z has aliqualdo with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, which has αλί, probably a miswriting of the contraction for aliqualdo. Did Vet. Int. find ἐνωτε in γ? More probably he substitutes aliqualdo for ἐνο for the sake of clearness. ὅπων οἱ μετέχουσες στασιάζωσιν] Vet. Int. quando qui participant seditiones fierent. Fecerunt should probably be fecerint. 10. δοσερ ἢ τῶν περὶ Γελώνα] Vet. Int. sicut qui circa Gelonem. Sus. rightly suggests that quae eorum has dropped out before qui. 13. ἄρχον] z has participaretur wrongly with all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. in place of principetur or principaretur. συνταύτων P1 34 Rb Vb Ald. Sus.: συντάυτων γ Ms P2 Bekk. (Vet. Int. has congregatis and renders συντάκτες in 15 by congregati). 14. Should ἢ be added before τυραννός? 15. αὐτῶν] Sus. (μετ') αὐτῶν, si omnino correctione opus est.' 20. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατα-
1312 a 18—1313 b 13.

φρονείσθαι] Vet. Int. ex contemptu autem. 23. ἀπολλύσαι Π² Bekk. pr. P² (corrected in the ink of the MS.) and corrections in P¹ in pale ink and in the margin of P³: ἀπολλύσαι Ms pr. P¹. Sus. See explanatory note on 1324 b 20.

1313 a 9. ἐν Π² Bekk.: ἐν Μ⁸ P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 11. πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημένας] z has cum his quae dictae sunt; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have cum his quae dictae sunt. 14. εἰγένετο] Vet. Int. fieret. See critical note on 1312 a 28. 18. δῆλον Γ Π: it is bracketed by Schneider, Coray, and Bekk.² (see also Bon. Ind. 173 b 38 sqq.), but Vahlen, whom Sus. follows, is probably right in suggesting that δῆλον ὅτι should be read (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 4. 432 sqq.). 20. ἐν om. Π¹. 24. ἥ περι Μολοστοῦς] Vet. Int. does not translate ἥ, but see critical notes on 1304 b 35 and 1306 a 30. 32. παρέλαβεν] z has acceperat, a acciperat; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. acceptit. 33. "ὁ δὲ ἐξαιτήσας φάναι] Vet. Int. non optaret hae dicere, but it is more likely that he misread his Greek text than that he found οὐ δει ταῦτα φάναι in it. 38. τῶν is added after τῆς in P¹. Vb Ald. Bekk.: om. M³ P³ Sus. (the reading of Γ is of course uncertain): in pr. P³ τῶν takes the place of τῆς, but is altered into τῆς by a corrector in the ink of the MS. 39. τὰ τὲ Γ Π² Bekk. Sus.: τὰ Μ⁸ P¹. Bekk.¹ conjectures ὀιονται for οἶνον τε, and is followed by Sus., but Bekk.² has οἶνον τε. ὀιονται seems to me to give a wrong sense; it implies that the advocates of this mode of preserving tyrannies are mistaken in thinking that it is preservative of them, whereas Aristotle admits that it is so (1314 a 12 sqq., 29 sqq.), but says that it is wicked (1314 a 13 sqq.). 41. οὐσία] Vet. Int. communicationes: elsewhere in the Politics οὐσία is always rendered convivia. Should concateniones (or convivaciones) be read? Convivare stands for οὐσία in 1317 b 38. Communicationes usually stands for κοινωνίας.

1313 b 2. φρόνημα τὲ P¹. Rb Ar. Bekk. Sus. and a MS. used by Victorius, and also the edition of the Vetus Interpres' translation contained in Albertus Magnus' Works: φρόνημα τὲ Γ Μ⁸ P². Qb Vb Ald. (see Sus.¹). 7. καὶ om. Γ Μ⁸ pr. P¹ (it is supplied in P¹ in the ink of the MS.). 8. φρονεῖν] Vet. Int. deprehendere. Sus.¹ suggests that he may have found φοράν in Γ, but perhaps he misread φρονεῖν as φωράν. Φωράν, however, is rendered by depraedare in 1303 a 34 and 1306 b 30. 13. συρρακοῦσας Π² P² Bekk. Sus.: συφρακοῦσαν Μ⁸ (Syracusanos Vet. Int.). τοὺς ὅταν ουσίας ἐξεπιμεν
CRITICAL NOTES.

Π² Bekk.: τοῦς ὀτακουστὰς, ἄβις εἴσεπμεν Π¹ Sus.: ὀσὶς ὀτακουστὰς εἴσεπμεν Coray. But if with Π² we omit ὀβὶς, the structure of the sentence introduced by ὀβὶς, 12, will resemble that of not a few other passages (see explanatory note). 14. δ is added before ἵερων in Ms P¹ Sus.: whether ι added it is uncertain. 15. Vet. Int. has confident for παρφησαίονταί, which is the reading of Π Bekk. Sus., and latebantium for λαβαθὸνταί (Π Bekk. Sus.), but he sometimes renders the present by the future: thus in 1281 a 19 he has corrumpet for φθείρει and in 1287 a 31 interimet for διαφθείρει. 19. μὴτε] See explanatory note on 1313 b 18. 20. πρὸς τὸ καθ᾿ ἡμέραν δοτες] Vet. Int. occupati circa cotidiana. Did he find not τὸ, but τοῦ in Π? 23. ὢλυμπίου Π: ὢλυμπίου Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note). 24. τῶν περὶ Σάμου ἔργα Πολυκράτεως] Vet. Int. corum quae de ὦμο opera multi imperi. Sus.¹ suggests that Π had παρὰ in place of περὶ, but see 1258 b 40 and 1317 b 26 sqq., where de represents περὶ. See explanatory note. 28. δὴ om. Π² Bekk. probably wrongly: Π² are probably wrong in omitting δὴ in 1330 a 37. 32. τοῦτον is omitted in Γ Μ³. αὐτὸν καθελεῖν is added after τοῦτων in P⁴ L⁸ Ald. Ar., but see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. 33. δὲ Π² Bekk.: δ’ ἐτὶ Μ⁸ P¹ Sus. and possibly Γ, for though Vet. Int. has adiue (=ἐτὶ) only and does not translate δὲ, he sometimes fails to give an equivalent for δὲ in rendering καὶ ... δὲ (see critical note on 1311 b 30). 39. ἀμφοτέρων Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἀμφοτέρας Π¹ (Vet. Int. utrasque).

1314 b 1. ἀπανῶτα] Vet. Int. expendat (the whole sentence running, primo guidem, ut videatur curare communia neque expendat gratuita taliæ), and so in 5 ἄποδιδότα reeddatt. Schn. Bekk.² and Sus., but not Coray, add eis before δωρεάς, probably rightly. 3. δῶδαι Π² Bekk. Sus.: διδάσκι Μ⁸ Π¹. 7. δόξειν Π¹ Bekk.² Sus.: δόξει Π² Bekk.¹ 9. γ' om. Μ⁸ Π¹: the reading of γ' is uncertain, as Vet. Int. usually fails to render γε. 11. ἐπιτιθεῖτο Π² R⁴ V⁴ Bekk. and corr. Π³, ἐπιτιθεῖν τὸ Ald.: ἐπιτιθεῖτο Π¹ Sus., ἐπιτιθεῖτο pr. Π³, ἐπιτιθεῖτο Μ⁸: the reading of γ' is of course uncertain (Vet. Int. insilient: z insiliet). See Kühner, Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, § 282, Anm. 5, where Plato, Laws 922 B, is referred to for τίθειτο, and Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10 for τίθειτο. Τίθειτο occurs in Plato, Laws 674 A etc. In 2. 11. 1273 b 6 all MSS. except Μ⁸ have προείθει. 16. τε] Vet. Int. autem, as in 1336 a 5, where see critical note. 17. κωμῶν Π¹ Π⁴ Bekk. Sus. and over an erasure Π²: κωμὸν Π³ R⁴ V⁴ Bekk. 22. πολεμικὸς Madvig (Adv. Critica, i. 468)—who compares c. 12. 1315 b 16, διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενέσθαι Κλεοθέντας οὐκ ἦν ἐκκαταφρώπησος, and 1315 b 28 sq.—and also Sus.: πολιτικὴς γ' Π Bekk. 26. ἄλλας Π² Bekk.: τῶν ἄλλων Π¹ Sus. So in 1260 a 26 Μ⁸ Π¹ have τι τοιῶντων, the rest τι τῶν τοιῶτων, and in 1331 a 34 Μ⁸ Π² corr. Π¹ have μηδένα τοιῶντων and pr. Π¹ (perhaps γ' also) μηδένα τῶν τοιῶτων. See critical notes on 1331 a 34 and 1336 b 8. 32. δαιμονίων Π, except corr. Π³ which is of no authority: δαιμονίων corr. Π³ Cor. Bekk.² Sus. The reading of γ' is of course uncertain. See explanatory note. 38. το γε] Vet. Int. ἴσω (τὸ γ'). See critical note on 1318 a 1. 1315 a 3. ἄβελτρείας] ἄβελτρείας Bekk.¹ (see Liddell and Scott): ἄβελτρείας Π⁴, the rest ἄβελτρείας. 7. ἄρχοντων καὶ δικαιοτηρίων] See explanatory note. 11. περὶ Π² Bekk.: παρὰ Π¹ Sus. 15. δνείν Μ⁸ Π¹ R³ Sus.: δνοῦν Π² Bekk. See critical note on 1310 b 5. τὰ ὁμάτα Π² Bekk.: τὰ ὁμάτα Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus. and probably γ', for though a has corpus, several MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have corpus. κολάσων is bracketed by Schneider Bekk.² and Sus. probably rightly. 20. ἢ μὴ is omitted in γ in a lacuna; no blank, however, is left in z. 31. ψυχῆς γὰρ ὁμοθείαι] Vet. Int. animae enim prelimum fieri. 38. παραίρεσιν Π² etc. Bekk. and probably pr. Π (for ἄφ is over an erasure), παραίρεσιν pr. Π⁴: ἄφαρεσιν Μ⁸ Sus. corr. Π¹: the reading of γ' is uncertain (Vet. Int. ablationem, which is his equivalent for παραίρεσιν in 1311 a 12). Παραίρεσιν is probably right, for all the MSS. have παραίρεσιν or παραίσειν in 1311 a 12, and in the
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'Αθ. Πολ. (see Sandys' Index) παραρέσθαι is exclusively used with ὀπλα, though in Plato, Rep. 569 B we have ἀφελόμενος τὰ ὀπλα.

40. τῶν before ἐπιτεθεμένων om. M* pr. P1 (it is supplied in P1 in the ink of the MS.): the reading of Π is of course uncertain.

1315 b 6. τῶ P2 etc., τφ Bekk. Sus.: τῶν M* P1 1 L8. Vet. Int. has quam quod meliores principentur et non humiles (τῶ βαλτίων ἀρχεων καὶ μὴ τεσσαπεμιμένους Π?). 11. As to the brackets within which I have placed 1315 b 11–39 see explanatory note on 1315 b 11. ὀλιγοχρονίωται ὁμοιοιος rather ὀλιγοχρονίωται and ἕστι in place of ἐστὶ, the words ὀλιγορία καὶ being omitted, Spengel (Aristot. Studien, 3. 63). ὀλιγοχρονίωται should probably be read. See critical notes on 1293 b 32 and 1299 a 27. 14. ἔτη δ' αὐτή διέμενεν ἐκαθότευμ Π Π Bekk. Sus.: οὖν Π. See critical note on 1320 a 29. 24. ἐτυράννησεν P2 Bekk.: ἐτυράννησεν M* Sus., ἐτυράννησεν P1: the reading of Π is of course uncertain. In 32 all MSS. have ἐτυράννησεν (P1 ἐτυράννησεν), except P2, which has ἐτυράννησεν, and in 36 all have τυράννησαν. It seems likely, therefore, that the form τυραννίω should be preferred in all these three passages, though in 31 all MSS. have τυραννίω. The form τυραννίω, however, occurs nowhere else in the Politics, and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of it from Aristotle's writings; its occurrence here, therefore, throws additional doubt on the genuineness of 1315 b 11–39. The rare fem. ὀλιγοχρόναι also occurs in 39 (ὁλιγοχρόναι P1 pr. P8 only). The Index Aristotelicus gives no reference for it to Aristotle's writings. In 1317 b 24 we have the fem. ὀλιγοχρόνιοι. 26. τέτταρα P2 Bekk.: τέσσαρα M* P1: Vet. Int. quattuor leaves the reading of Π uncertain. See critical note on 1300 a 23. Susemihl is probably right in adopting T. Hirsch's emendation ἡμισ. The symbol occasionally used in Greek MSS. to represent ημισ is one which it would be easy to confound with that for τέτταρα: see Gardthausen, Gr. Palaeographie, p. 268. Ψαμμίτιχος] Ψαμμίτιχος Π P2 3 Sus.: 'ψαμμίτιχος Rb Vb Ald. Bekk. (recte, ut videtur), ψαμμίτιχος P1 (Sus.). See Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch d. gr. Eigennamen for the two forms of the name and their use by various authors. The famous Greek inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 4) has the forms ψαμμίτιχος and ψαμμίτιχος. Γορδιόν] So Γ Π Bekk.: Sus. Γόργον, which is the correct name (it appears on two coins of Ambracia: see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 642. 6), but
it is possible that the writer of the passage made a slip: Γοργίων Ῥόπερ and a MS. of the Vet. Int. (m), which has gorgie, not gordie, like the rest, and Plut. Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 17 sqq. 27. ταυτά τι P* Bekt. Sus., ταυτά L*: ταυτά the rest (M* has ταυ with r over the ν). 28. ἀδορνυφόρτων] z has sine armatorum custodia perhaps rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. sine armorum custodia. 31. ἐφυμε] z has fugit rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. fuit. 34. Bojesen and Sus. insert τῶν before περὶ τέρμανα, but without necessity: see explanatory note. περὶ συρακούσας P* Sus., περὶ συρακούσας M*: Vet. Int. circa siracusam or syracusam (περὶ συρακούσαν Ῥ?): περὶ συρακούσας P** A* Vb Ald. Bekt.3 (παρὰ Συρακούσιοι Schn. Bekt.3). 35. ἔτη 8' οὐδ' αὐτή πολλὰ διέμειν Ῥ] Vet. Int. non autem permansit ipsa multis annis (ἔτη 8' οὐκ αὐτή πολλὰ διέμειν Ῥ?). M* P* have οὐδ' αὐτῆ. 36. δυοι P* P* Bekt. Sus.: δυοι M* P*.

1316 a 1. τοῦ πλάτωνος is added after τη in P* L* Ald. Ar., but see critical note on 1313 b 32. 9. μὲν οὖν is left untranslated by Vet. Int., οὖν om. M*. 14. γε corr. P* Cor. Bekt.2 Sus.: τε M* P* P* Bekt.: Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. 28' ὡν] propter quod b c g h k l m n rightly, for διὰ with the accusative is commonly rendered propter by Vet. Int.: per quod a z. 17. ἀρα om. G* P* (οὖν, 16 ... μεταβάλλει, 17, is omitted in M*): ἀρα ἀμα μεταβάλλει Thompson, Sus.3 a. 26. Casaubon, followed by Sus., is probably right in adding οὖν εἰ ἔσται after ἔσται. 28. καὶ is added after διὰ in P*.

29. συνεχεῖς P* Bekt. Sus.: συνεχεῖς P*.
32. τῶν ... 33. δόσπερ ἦ om. G M*, so that for these words P* is the only representative of the first family of MSS., and P* has τῶν in place of τῶν in 32. 34. Χαρίλαο] See critical note on 1271 b 25. καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι om. pr. P*.

35. Kluge (Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, p. 86) is perhaps right in thinking that something has dropped out after καὶ. He says, ‘nomen quidem huius Poenorum regis, sub quo haec mutatio imperii facta fuerit, aut textu excidit aut philosophus ignorasse videtur.’ ‘H followed by the name of the tyrant in the genitive has perhaps dropped out. 36. αἱ om. M* P* and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. plurimae). 38. ἀναξιλάον P* Bekt. Sus.: ἀνεξιλάον G M* P* R* Vb Ald.

1316 b 1. πολὺ Γ P* Vict. (who however translates οἱ πολλοί) Schn. Cor. Göttl. Bekt.2 Sus.: πολλοὶ M* P* Bekt.1 2. εἶναι P* P* Bekt.: om. G M*: it is bracketed by Sus. See critical note on 1252 a 8. οὐν] z has equaliter with a; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. equale or equalam. τῆς πολέως] z has per civitates with a; the
other MSS. of Vet. Int. have per civitatem. See critical note on 1253 a 10. 5. δημοκρατουμένην] See explanatory note on 1316 b 3. χρηματιζομενά] z has pecuniosi sunt, not pecuniosi fuerint, as most of the other MSS., and probably rightly, for χρηματιζομενά is rendered pecuniosum fieri in 1316 b 4. 6. διέ] z has autem with a; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have enim. 8. αυτὴ Π1 Sus.: αυτὴ Π2 Bekk. 10. εἰσιν] ήσαν Π Μs (Vet. Int. eranti). See critical note on 1311 a 21. 16. Lamb. Bekk.2 Sus. add καί before κατατοκιζομενοι, but see critical note on 1260 a 26. 20. οὐδὲ τότε Camotius in the later Aldine (or Camotian) edition of Aristotle’s writings published at Venice in 1552, followed by Bekk.2 and Sus.: οὐδὲτοτε Π Βekk.1 23. See explanatory notes on 1316 b 23, 24. 24. Π1 adds οἱ after εξείναι, Μs οἱ, οἱ (Vet. Int. sibi): [οἱ] Sus. The word is probably repeated from δ τι, which follows. 25. φησιν Π1 Bekk. Sus.: φασι Π2 Π3 Αr., φάσι Π3. 27. As to the existence of a lacuna here see explanatory note.

BOOK VIII (VI).

1316 b 33. ποια Μs Π4 etc. Sus.: ποια Π Αr. Bekk. and pr. Π3: ποια Π2.

1317 a 2. τοι is placed after ἀλγαρχικάς in Μs Π1, but not by Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain, as Vet. Int. seldom renders τοι. 5. Spengel Bekk.2 Sus. add περὶ τοῖς before βουλευόμενον. ἀλγαρχικῶς . . . 8. ἀρχαιοεισίς om. Μs. 6. τὰ δὲ . . . 7. μὲν om. Π4 s Ρb L s Ald. Ar. and pr. Π3, so that for these words we are dependent on Γ Π12 (a recent correction in the margin of Π3 has been erased). Spengel and Bekk.2 read τὰ δὲ in place of τὰ δὲ. 11. ἀλγαρχικῶν Γ Π5 Ar. Vict. Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. oligarchiarum, though one MS., g, has oligarchicarum): all the MSS. except Γ Π5 have ἀλγαρχικῶν. 12. τίς Ρb Αr. Bekk. Sus.: τὶ Π1, τὶ Γ Μs Π234 etc. 13. Schneider, following the translations of Lamb. and Ramus, and followed by Bekk.2, is probably right in adding ἐτῶς before δεὶ. 23. ἀπερχεῖ Π2 Bekk. Sus.: ἀρ Μs Π1: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. often fails to render περ. 28. ἀλλὰ καὶ] z has sed et rightly; a has sed and the other MSS. of Vet. Int. sed ex. 36. συναγαγεῖν Π2 Bekk.: συνάγειν Μs Π1: Vet. Int. congre- gare leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. For similar differences of
reading see critical note on 1284 a 5. 39. λέγωμεν Π¹ Rb Ar. Bekk. Sus.: λέγομεν P² 3 4 etc.

1317 b 3. δημοκρατίων Π² Bekk.: δημοκρατίων Ms P¹ Sus. Vet. Int. has democraticum, which probably represents δημοκρατίων, though δημοκρατία is rendered democraticus in 1292 b 13, 16 and 1299 b 32. In 1318 a 18 all MSS. have το δημοκρατία, though in 1318 a 4 all have το δικαίον το δόμολογυμένον είναι δημοκρατίκων and in 3. 9. 1280 a 8 all have το δίκαιον το δπ ἀληγραφία και δημοκρατίαν. 6. τούτον είναι [και] τέλος] και om. Π¹ and Ar. does not translate it. Π¹ may be right, and I have bracketed και, though the authority of these MSS. is small in cases of omission. Sus. follows Thurot in reading και τούτον είναι τέλος, but τούτο is probably the antecedent of τι. Compare for the form of the sentence 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 33, καί ὅπερ αὐτοῦ ἔκαστον οὐ φασιν είναι δίκαιον οὔτε σιμφέρον, τούτον οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκόντες, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 30 sq. 12. τὸ is added before τίς in Ms P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 13. διαλέγοντος Π¹ Bekk.² Sus.: διαλόγισαν οὖν Π² Bekk.¹ Πρώτου διάλογον takes the place of πρωτοείσοντος in some MSS. in Xen. Cyrop. 2. 7. 16. I see no such reason for διάλογον here as exists in Plato, Laws 728 B, τὸ ὅμοιονθαν τοὺς οὖν κακοὶ ἀνδράς: Aristot. De Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 12; Demosth. in Lept. c. 7. 17. τούτων Π² Bekk.: τοιούτων Π¹ Sus. 24. Π¹ Sus. may be right in adding εἰσαγ αν διάλογον ἀν: it is omitted by all MSS. in the somewhat similar passage 2. 12. 1273 b 40, but there it can be more easily supplied from what precedes. 27. περὶ is added after εὐθείων και in Ms P¹ Sus. and possibly also in Γ, but this is uncertain because 'praepositionem cum plurium nomencl copulatam ante unumquodque eorum repertere solet Guillelmus' (Sus.¹ p. xxxiii: see vol. ii. p. 65), and here he repeats de not only before his equivalent for παλιτείαν, but also before his equivalent for τῶν ἱδίων συναλλαγμάτων. 29. πάντων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων] In Γ Π Bekk. the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων follow διάλογον, 30, but (with Schn. Cor. and Sus.) I follow the third Basle edition of Aristotle in placing them after πάντων. It is possible that owing to the similar ending of μεγίστων and διάλογον the words ἄρξην δὲ μεδείμαν μεδεῦσιν ἢ ὅτι διάλογον were omitted by the writer of the archetype and subsequently added by him in the margin without a sufficiently clear indication of the place at which he intended them to be inserted. The only thing which throws doubt on this transposition is the presence in the text of the second κυρίον, which seems needless if
we adopt the transposition, but I do not think that this is sufficient to turn the scale. 30. διεγέρσων] διεγέρσων Μ 
1320 a 12 P has διεγέρσω with ε superscribed over the second ο. 
31. In Metaph. I. i. 1053 a 9, and in Phys. 5. 3. 226 b 28 pr. E. 
32. have διεγερσων (see also the various readings in De An. 3. 3. 428 b 
34. to by Liddell and Scott). 37. καί βουλήν] καὶ βουλᾶς Μ 
35. Schneider and Bekker add τὴν before βουλήν, but as to 
36. the omission of the article in enumerations see critical notes on 
37. 1291 a 4 and 1274 a 21, and cp. 8 (6) 8. 1322 b 31 sqq. and Plato, 
38. Rep. 545 A. 39. Sus. brackets καί βουλήν, and no doubt it has just 
39. been implied that the Boulè is one of the magistracies, from which it is 
40. here distinguished, but Aristotle is sometimes inconsistent. 
41. Αρχαί and βουλαί are mentioned separately in a similar way in Plut. 
42. Solon, c. 16. πάντα δ' ὡμάλως ἐπιστρέφειται, ἀρχάς ἐκκλησίας δικαστήρια 
43. βουλᾶς. That the payment of the Boulè was of importance in a 
44. democracy we see from Demosth. c. Timoc. c. 99, πῶς οὖ δεινῶν, 
45. εἰ διὰ τῶν νόμων, δὲν σὺ τέθεικας μισθὸν λαβών, ἀμισθὸς δ' ἰδίως καὶ 
46. τὰ δικαστήρια ἔσται; 38. την . . . 41. βαναναία] See explanatory 
47. note. 41. την Ar. Lamb. Sus.: τὴν Γ Π Bekk.
1318 a 1. καταλειψθῇ] Vet. Int. deficiat (we expect relicta sit or 
48. derelicta sit: defiscere usually represents ἐλλείπειν). τὸ γε Cor. Sus.: 
49. τὸν Γ Π. See critical note on 1314 b 33. 3. ταῖς δημοκρατίαις Π 
50. Bekk. Sus.: τῆς δημοκρατίας Π. 7. P6 Ar. Bekk.2 Sus. have τῶν 
51. εὐπόρων ἡ τῶν ἀπόρων: P8 has τοὺς εὐπόρους (corrected into ἀπόρους) 
52. ἡ τῶν εὐπόρων: all other MSS., including Π, have τοὺς ἀπόρους ἡ τοὺς 
53. εὐπόρους. The authority of P8 is very small. As to ἀρχαι see 
54. explanatory note on 1291 b 32. 9. πολιτεία Π2 Ar. Bekk.: πόλει 
55. Π1 Sus. Πολιτεία seems to prefer to πόλει: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 
56. sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq. 12. χλιδεῖς] τοῖς χλιδεῖς Τ 
59. Bonitz (Ind. 180 b 59): διαφέρετων Γ Π Bekk.1 See critical note on 
60. 1332 b 36. Δ1 easily drops out and is easily added before Δ1. 
61. 24. δίκαιος μόνος] Vet. Int. solutum iustum (δίκαιον μόνον Γ)? 
62. 27. ὁμολογήσαντοι P8 R6 Ald. Bekk. Sus.: ὁμολογοῦσιν Π1 Π24 L6 Ar. 
63. 32. τὸ is added after τοῦτο in Γ Μ8. 34. εἰ om. Π2 Bekk. These 
64. MSS. omit εἰ in 1287 b 6 also. 35. προσγεγένηται] Vet. Int. 
65. adiungantur autem. Compare his addition of autem in 1308 b 28.
37. ὑποτέρων Π² Bekk. Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. quorum-cunque): ποτέρων Μ⁸ pr. Π¹ (corrected in the ink of the MS.).

40. διχα D² R⁴ Ald. Bekk. and a recent correction in Π⁴, δι followed by a lacuna pr. Π⁸: διχή Π¹, δίχθη Μ⁸ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. divisa in duo): διχή Σus. Διχα is probably right: cp. Hdt. 6. 109, τοις δε Ἀθηναίων στρατηγούσι εὔνοντο δίχα αἱ γυναι.

1318 b 3. συμπιέσα] Vet. int. permutiere should probably be persuadere. 4. το ἵσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον Π² Bekk.: τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἵσον Π¹ Sus. In 2 all the MSS. have τὸν ἵσον καὶ τὸν δίκαιον, and this is the usual order. It is possible that Π¹ are right (compare the change from τὸ ἱσος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 14 to τῇ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν in 1292 b 16), but it is more likely that Π² are. For similar diversities of order in the two families of MSS., see critical notes on 1331 b 41 and 1333 b 36. 9. διαλε[ι] διέη Π¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. sic ut si quis distinguat populum). 14. αὐτοίς Π¹ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk. 17. ἡ Π⁴ L⁸ Ald. and Π⁸ in the margin, followed by Bekk. and Sus.: Γ also may have had ἡ (Vet. Int. magis appetunt lucrum quam honorem): om. Μ⁸ Π¹β Q⁶ R⁶.

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1320 a 4. ἦ Π² Bekk. Sus.: μηδὲ Γ Μς, μὴ δ᾿ pr. Π¹ (corrected in the ink of the MS.). This μηδὲ is probably an intruder from two lines above. 8. φερόμενον Bernays (Ges. Abhandlungen, 1. 173. 1), Sus.³ a, φερομένων Γ Π¹, φερόνων the rest followed by Bekk. 10. καταψηφιεῖται corrections in P²³ in the ink of those MSS. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. corrigité sententias), followed by Bekk. Sus.: καταψηφίζεται Μς Π¹ and pr. P²³. 13. ἐπιτίμιως Π² Bekk.: ἐπιτί-
μιος Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. damnis, which probably stands for ἐπιτίμιος, for ἐπιτίμια is rendered increpationes in 1309 a 23 and ἐπιτίμων damnosum in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 b 35). Π² are likely to be right, for ἐπιτίμια does not occur in this sense in the Politics, and the only instance of its use in this sense in Aristotle’s writings given in the Index Aristotelicus is from Probl. 29. 14. 952 b 12. 15. τοι Π⁴ Λς Ald., τοῖ Bekk. Sus.: τοῖ the rest. See critical note on 1308 b 15. 21. δικαστήριας φασίνων] Vet. Int. præteria malorum, but whether he found δικαστήρια φασίνων in Γ is very doubtful. 23. διήγας δ᾿ ἦμέρα Π² Bekk. pr. Π¹ and a correction in P³ in the ink of the MS.:
6. περιοικίδια Με P² Bkk. Sus. (Vet. Int. negotia domus, which perhaps stands for περιοικία, the reading of Ald., for in 1269 b 3 praedia circa domos represents περιοικίας): περιοικίδια P³ ⁶
9. τὰ ταρατίνων Π² Bekk.: τὴν ταρατίνων Με P¹, but Με has a lacuna after ταρατίνων: τὴν ταρατίνων ἀρχήν Γ? (Vet. Int. Tarentinorum principatum). If Γ had τὴν ταρατίνων ἀρχήν, and principatum was not merely supplied e conj. by Vet. Int., ἀρχὴ may have been repeated from ἀρχῆς, i. E. For if τὴν ταρατίνων is right, one would be inclined to add πόλιν rather than ἀρχὴν. 15. τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς Γ Schn. Cor. Bekk.² Sus. (Vet. Int. de eodem principatu): τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῆς Π Bekk.¹ 25. τὸ τε κτωμένῳ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: τῶν τε κτωμένων Π² 26. εἰσαγομένους Π¹ Sus. (see explanatory note): εἰσαγομένων Π² Bekk. 29. τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι] Vet. Int. communicantes. See critical note on 1289 b 1. 30. μικρόν] z has parum; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. probably rightly parvum. 35. Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 91) would add καί before τοῖς πλατηρίαις, while Rassow, followed by Sus., would add τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καί in the same place. Something seems to be missing, and either Thurot or Rassow may be right. 38. δύναται Π Sus. and probably Γ: δύναται Ald. Bekk.
1321 a 3. δήλων ἐνι Γ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. patam quod'): δήλωντι M s P 1π2. 5. μάλιστα Π Bekk. Sus.: κάλλιστα π2. 6. βασινηκῶν Π Sus., except that R b and a recent marginal correction in M s have βασινη ον (so Bekk.): κανονικὸν pr. M s (Vet. Int. nautica). The Index Aristotelicus does not include the word βασινηκῶν. 12. ὁπλιτὴν Camerarius (Interp. p. 258), Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. armatiān): ὁπλιτὴν M s P 1π2 Bekk.1, ὁπλιτῶν Lamb. Schn. Cor. Göttl. Bekk.2 14. δημοτικῆς δημοκρατικῆς L s Ald. Bekk. 16. χείρω Π Bekk.1: χείρων M s P 1 Bekk.2 Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. dēterius). 19. δήμοι Π Bekk. Sus.: δημοτικοὶ Γ (Vet. Int. populares). 20. The MSS. of Vet. Int. add et before the equivalent for πρὸς ἵππικην, but z omits this et. ἵππικην καὶ ὁπλιτήκην Γ P 2 3 Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. equestrem et armatiān): ἵππικον καὶ ὁπλιτικὸν M s P 1: καὶ ὁπλιτικῶν is omitted in P 4 6 L s. 22. ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ P 2 3 R b Ald. Bekk.: ἐφ' αὐτοῦ P 1, ἐκ' αὐτοῦ M s, ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ P 1: αὐτοῦ Γ (Vet. Int. sibī ipsis): ἐφ' αὐτοῦ Sus. Cp. ἐπὶ τοῦ πολίτας in 3. 14. 1285 a 28. 26. τῶν μετάδοσων] Vet. Int. appositionem (πρόσθεσιν Ι?). He does not elsewhere render μετάδοσιν thus. In Rhet. 3. 2. 1405 b 3 William of Moerbeke renders πρόσθεσις by apposition. 30. Μασσαλία] μασσαλία M s P 1 and perhaps Γ (massalia b g m n, masilla k). See critical note on 1305 b 4. For the various emendations of the words τῶν ἐν τῷ πολεμώματι which have been proposed see Sus.3 a. I have myself been sometimes tempted to substitute τιμῆματι for πολεμώματι (for τῶν ἐν τῷ τιμῆματι cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19), but I do not believe that any change in the text is called for. 31. τῆς πόλεως is added after ἐξωθεὶν in Γ M s. 33. προσκείοθα] Vet. Int. ἀφρονερε, but he probably found προσκείοθα in Γ, for he often renders the passive by the active voice, and in 1297 a 17, 26 ἐπικείοθα is rendered ἐπικείοθα. 35. εἰσώντας] Vet. Int. immittentes (εἰσώντας Γ or εἰσώντας misread as εἰσώντας?). 37. κοσμομομένη] z has ornatam rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. armalam. 40. τῆς δαπάνης] Vet. Int. expensarum, but see critical notes on 1287 a 27 and 1307 b 32–34. 1321 b 16. ἄλληλων] z has invicem probably rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have ad invicem. The equivalent for ἄλληλων in Vet. Int. is usually invicem or ad invicem, not ad invicem. ὑπογνωτὸν R b Bekk.: ὑπογνωτὸν M s P 1 Sus.: ὑπογνωτὸν P 2 3 4 Q b Ald.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. The form ὑπόγυνος occurs in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric (see Bon. Ind. s.v.): the Index Aristotelicus gives one reference for ὑπόγυνος to the
g may have had ἄλλος, for Vet. Int. has propter quod melius non utin esse hunc principatum, sed alios ex aliis praetoriiis, where alios may agree with principatus understood.  

12. See explanatory note on 1322 a 16.  

20. οἶνον Ἀθηναίων (ἡ) τῶν ἐνδεκα καλομένων is bracketed by Sus., and he may well be right (see explanatory note and cp. 1300 b 28). Coray, followed by Bekk. and Sus., is probably right in adding ἡ.  

25. Π adds ἄλλος before μᾶλλον (Vet. Int. custodia aliorum magis) and M 8 has ἄλλος in place of μᾶλλον.  

26. πρὸς αὐτῶν] Vet. Int. apud ipson, but Sus. is mistaken in inferring from this that he found παρ ἀυτῶν in Γ, for in 1331 b 10 apud forum represents πρὸς ἁγορᾶ (see critical note on 1329 b 18).  

27. τὴν αὐτὴν Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. eodem (if we follow a b z: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have eodem), with which however it is possible that principatus should be supplied; in that case eodem would represent τὰς αὐτῶς.  

33. ἀν Π Sus.: om. Π 2 Bekk.: Bekk. adds ἀν before εἰν.  

1322 b 2. ἐκάστων P 1 Π Bekk.: ἐκάστων Π Μ 8 Sus.  

9. προσευθυνοῦσαν Bekk. and many editors before him: προσευθυνοῦσαν Π Sus. (except that M 8 has προσευθυνοῦσαν). Vet. Int. has sumentem rationem et emendantem for τὴν
CRITICAL NOTES.

ληψομένην λογισμόν καὶ προσευθυνόσαν (or προσευθυνοῦσαν). 14. εἰσφορὰν Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἐφορεῖαν Π¹. ἦ Μσ Bekk.² Sus., ἦ Π¹ 1234 etc. Bekk.¹, ἦ Γ (Vet. Int. qua). 16. καλεῖται καλοῦται Π¹ and perhaps Γ (for a z have vocantur). 18. σχεδὸν om. Γ Μσ pr. Π¹ (supplied in Π¹ in the ink of the MS.). 32. The second περὶ is omitted in Π¹ and bracketed by Sus. See critical note on 1331 b 24. 34. τὰ before περὶ is bracketed by Schneider and Sus. and expunged by Bekk.³, but cp. 1317 a 6. συναλλαγμάτων Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: συναλλάγματα Π². 35. ἐπιλογισμοῖς] Vet. Int. circa ratio-cinationes (περὶ λογισμοὺς Γ?). 36. πρὸς εἰδώνας Μσ Π¹ Π² Bekk.: προσευθύνας Sylburg, Götting, Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. et correctiones). 37. ἰδία Π¹ Sus.: ἰδία Π² Ar.: ἰδίᾳ Bekk. 1323 a 2. συμβαίνει Π² Bekk. Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. accidit): συμβαίνη Μσ Π¹. 3. γίνεσθαι Μσ Π¹ 2 3 Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι Π²: Vet. Int. fieri may stand for either. 7. καθ is bracketed by Schn. Göttl. Bekk.², following Heinsius, whose paraphrase is, 'cum tres in civitatibus plerisque eligantur magistratus, qui sunt omnium supremi' (Politica, p. 758). It is omitted by Coray. 10. I follow Conring and Sus. in placing the mark of a lacuna after πασῶν.
NOTES.

BOOK VI (IV).

10. Ἐν ἀπάσας ταῖς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. As to the absence of any connecting particle see note on 1274 b 26. I am not aware of any other passage in which Aristotle sets forth with equal fulness the manifold problems to which any art or science that lays claim to completeness must address itself, but we are more or less prepared for his teaching on this subject by Rhet. i. i. 1355 b 10 sqq., Top. i. 3. 101 b 5 sqq., and Eth. Nic. i. iil. iioia 3 sqq. See vol. ii. p. 397 sqq. In ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις Aristotle must be speaking of ποιητικά and πρακτικά ἐπιστήμαι, not of θεωρητικά ἐπιστήμαι, for the latter are not concerned with τὸ ἀρμόττων. For ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 34–36, 3. 12. 1282 b 14, and 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 37. Ἐπιστήμη is interchanged with τέχνη in 1288 b 21, 22: cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 34–38, where ἡ πολιτική ἐπιστήμη is said to be one of the τέχναι καὶ δυνάμεις. As to the various problems to which Political Science is here required to address itself, see vol. i. p. 488. They are as follows—it must seek to ascertain

1. τὸ περὶ ἐκαστον γένος ἀρμόττων in its two forms,
   A. the constitution which suits those who possess the best natural gifts and the best equipment, i.e. ἡ ἀριστή πολιτεία,
   B. that which suits those who are less well circumstanced (ἡ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη ορ ἡ ἐνδεχομένη ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων),
2. how any given constitution (ἡ δοθείσα ορ ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολιτεία) is to be brought into being and kept in existence as long as possible,
3. ἡ μᾶλλον πάσας ταῖς πόλεωιν ἀρμόττουσα πολιτεία, ορ ἡ ρᾶς καὶ κοινοτέρα ἀπάσας,
4. what are οἱ ἀριστοὶ νόμοι and οἱ ἐκάστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρμόττουτες. See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 717. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripa-
Aristotle's enumeration of the various problems with which Political Science has to deal prepares the way for a descent in the last three Books of the Politics to less exalted questions than those with which he has so far been dealing. It was something new to say that the inquiry how democracy or oligarchy or tyranny should be constituted so as to last holds as legitimate a place among the inquiries of Political Science as the inquiry respecting the best or the best attainable constitution.

taîs μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, 'which do not come into being in a fragmentary shape': cp. 7 (5). I. 1301 b 21, καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμων ἐς μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον (Sus. 'theilweise'), and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 28, μὴτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' εἰκόνι γινομένην. That Political Science was often studied in a fragmentary way we know from Plato, Laws 630 E, quoted in vol. i. p. 375, note 1. For the contrast of κατὰ μόριον and τέλειος, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 24 sqq.

11. γένος ἐν τι, 'one whole class of subject-matter': cp. Plato, Laws 916 D, καθολείαν ἐς χρή πάντα ἀνδρα διανοηθήναι καὶ ψεύδος καὶ ἀπάτην ὡς ἐν τι γένος ὡν.

12. μιᾶς (sc. τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης), 'one and the same art and science': cp. 22, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης.

ἐκαστὸν γένος, 'each description of thing,' whether it be κάλλιστα περικός καὶ κεχορηγημένον or otherwise.

17. ἰκνομένης = προσηκούσης (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

18. According to Bon. Ind. 8 a 16, where Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a 8 and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16 are compared, ἄγωνία is here 'idem quod ἄγων.'

18. τῷ μηδὲν . . . 19. δύναμιν+ This sentence appears to be corrupt or mutilated. See critical note.


19. καὶ τάστιν τὴν δύναμιν, 'this inferior degree of capability also' (i.e. this inferior grade of bodily constitution and science).'

20. There is a roughness about ἐσθήτα (i.e. ἐσθήτος ποίησιν, Bon. Ind. 289 a 15) which is not without occasional parallels in the style of the Politics (see note on 1258 b 19). We expect ἐφαιντικὴν (cp. 4
(7).  4. 1325 b 41, ὑφάντη καὶ ναυπηγή, but ἐσθήτα is more definite, because other things are woven besides clothes, and then again the difference between one quality of clothes and another may not be in the weaving but in the dyeing or something else. The word ἱματοπηγή is used by Plato in Polit. 280 A and would have suited Aristotle's purpose here, but this word seems either to have been invented by Plato on this occasion or at any rate to have been rarely used. No general word for 'clothes-making' is given by Pollux in 7. 33 sqq., 159. The non-repetition of περί before ἐσθήτα links the making of ships and garments together as to a certain extent cognate: cp. c. 14. 1298 a 4 sqq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 7–10.

23. τίς ἐστι, καὶ ποία τις ἀν οὖσα κ.τ.λ. The answer to τίς comes in a definition of the best constitution, the answer to ποία τις in a full description of it (see note on 1274 b 32).


25. τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην. For the combination of κρατίστην and ἀρίστην here Bonitz (Ind. 408 b 21 sqq.) compares Eth. Eud. 1. 3. 1215 a 4 sq.

26. τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην, 'the best that the assumed circumstances allow' (cp. 32, τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων). The phrase ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων does not seem to occur elsewhere in the Politics.


28. ἐτὶ δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, sc. πολιτείαν θεώρησα τῆς αὕτης ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, 'and still further it is the business of the same science to study as a third constitution that which is based on something given and presupposed'—for instance, it may be given and presupposed that the constitution to be studied is not to be either the best or the best attainable, but inferior to both (30 sqq.). So when the gymnastic trainer is asked to produce an ἔξω falling short of ἡ ἴκνουμένῃ ἔξω, he is asked to produce an ἔξω ὑποθέσεως ἔξω (16 sqq.). In c. 11. 1296 b 9 sqq., as Sus.² (Note 1306) points out, πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν is used in a different sense. Contrast the tone of [Plato,] Epist. 7. 330 Ε, τούτο δ' ἔξω το παράτων βαίνοντι τῆς
NOTES.

Πρός πολιτείας καὶ μηδαμή ἐθέλουσιν αὐτής εἰς ἐνος λένα, προαγορεύοντι δὲ τῷ ἔμμοδοφῷ τῷ μὲν πολιτείαν ἔαν καὶ μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποδανούμενον έὰν κινή, ταῖς δὲ βουλήσεσι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν ὑπηρετοῦντα ἔμμοδοφέων κελεύοντι, τίνα τρόπον γίνοιτ’ ἂν σνάστα τε καὶ τάγματα εἰς τῶν ἀεὶ χρόνων, τῶν μὲν ὑπομένουτα ἔμμοδοφός τοιαύτα τῇ γούμῃν ἄν ἀναθρόνη, τῶν δ’ οὖχ ὑπομένουται ἀνθρώποι· cp. Plato, Laws 684 B sq.

29. ἐξ ἀρχής τε πῶς ἄν γένοιτο. This question has been raised as to the best constitution in 3. 18. 1288 b 2 sqq., and we are told in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq. how the polity comes into being, and in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 7 sqq. how kingship and tyranny come into being, but the question most often raised by Aristotle as to constitutions is rather πῶς δεὶ καθιστάται οἱ κατασκευάζειν (see for instance 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 40, 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 14 sqq., 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 38 sqq., and 8 (6). 7. 1321 b 1 sqq.). The reason why this latter question is raised more often than the former probably is that the really important and difficult thing is not to bring a constitution into being, but to frame it so as to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.).

30. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. The structure of this sentence deserves study. Mήτε, 31, is clearly answered by μήτε, 32, but what is the place of ἄρχορηγητών τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων in the sentence? Does τε answer to μήτε, 31, in the way in which τε often answers to μήτε (i.e. in the sense of ‘not only not—but’: cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 35 sqq.)? It is possible, but I have not noticed a parallel in Aristotle’s writings or elsewhere to this sequence of μήτε—τε—μήτε, and it seems better to regard ἄρχορηγητών τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων as a parenthetical addition to μήτε τῶν ἄριστων πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν, and not as taking up μήτε, 31. Richards, regarding it thus, would read δὲ in place of τε.

31. τῶν ἄριστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν. Cp. 2. 5. 1262 b 38 sq. and Plut. Phocion, c. 27, πολιτευομένους δὲ τὴν πάτριον ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτείαν.

32. ἄρχορηγητῶν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ‘and indeed to be unprovided even with the things that are necessary to it,’ much more with those that are merely desirable and expedient with a view to it. For ἄρχορηγητων καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 33, τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαραθαγόνους, and see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 421. 4. Anm. 5, 6 (ed. Gerth, § 421. Anm. 5–7).

35. ὡς οἱ πλείστοι κ.τ.λ. That Political Science should make τὸ χρήσιμον its aim as well as τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔγον, we have already been told (see notes on 1253 b 14 and 1260 b 32). For ὡς, ‘since,’ cp.
The Index Aristotelicus does not appear to notice this use of ὥς with the indicative.

36. καὶ εἰ by no means implies that the fact is so.

38. τὴν διατήρησιν, i.e. τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, 32, and τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην, 26.

τὴν βίω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἀπάσαις, 'that which is easier and more attainable by all States.' Supply τοῖς πόλεσιν. For other instances of the omission of the word πόλις see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1293 b 12.


41. τὰς ὑπαρχόντας ἀναρρωτεῖς πολιτείας, 'abolishing the existing constitutions.' Aristotle no doubt refers to Plato among others: cp. Rep. 501 A, where Plato commends the lawgiver who makes the tablet a clean surface before he writes his laws upon it, and Rep. 540 E sq., and compare what Plutarch says of Lycurgus in Lycurg. c. 5.

1. τινα ἄλλην, such as the State sketched by Plato in the Laws: 1289 a. cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 2 sqq., where it is implied that this State is allowed by Plato to approach that of the Republic too nearly to be practicable.

χρῆ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but a lawgiver should introduce a constitution of such a kind that those for whom he legislates will easily, starting from their existing constitutions, be induced and be able to live under it.' Aristotle apparently regards the constitution which he has described in 1288 b 38 as τὴν βίω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἀπάσαις τοῖς πόλεσιν as answering to this description, and looks upon its discovery as one way among others of amending (ἐπανορθώσαι, 3) a constitution. See note on 6. He probably has before him a saying of Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 15), ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀρίστον ἤν, οὐκ ἐπήγαγεν ἰατρείαν οὐδὲ καινοτομίαν, φοβηθεὶς μὴ συγχαίς παντάπασι καὶ ταράξας τὴν πόλιν ἀθεοειστερος γένηται τοῦ καταστῆσαι πᾶλιν καὶ συναρμόσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον' & δὲ καὶ λέγων ἠπιτίζε πειθομένους καὶ προσάγων ἀνάγκην ὑπομένους χρήσασθαι, ταῦτ᾽ ἐπραττεν, ὡς φησιν αὐτός, ὄμωδ βιῆν τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσασα.
where Plato disagrees with the common view that lawgivers ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive. Ἀν (sc. τάξιν) κοινωνεῖν I take to be a construction with a cogn. acc., τάξιν standing for κοινωνίαν: for κοινωνεῖν κοινωνίαν cp. Plato, Laws 881 E. I prefer this interpretation of the passage to taking ἄν (τάξιν) as equivalent to καθ' ἄν τάξιν and comparing 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13, νενεμήσαν δὲ χρῆ τὴν εἰρήμενην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν.

2. καὶ πειθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται. We expect rather καὶ δυνήσονται καὶ πειθήσονται (cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 2, ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρόμενος), but see note on 1264 b 18.

3. ὡς ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Solon had been appointed διορθωτής καὶ νομοθέτης τῆς πολιτείας (Plut, Solon, c. 16 sub fin.), and the greatness of his task was well known. Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (Works, ed. Bohn, 2. 439) speaks to much the same effect as Aristotle does here. ‘At once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing’ (i.e. calls for much ability). ‘When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is super-added is to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady, persevering attention, various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an understanding fruitful in expedients, are to be exercised.’

τὸ ἐπανορθώσαι πολιτείαν ἡ κατασκευάζειν ἡ ἀρχής. For the contrast cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 33 sqq., and for the omission of τὸ before κατασκευάζειν cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 19, and see note on 1263 a 15. The difference of tense in ἐπανορθώσαι and κατασκευάζειν should be noticed (see note on 1331 b 21). For ἐπανορθώσαι πολιτείαν cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 35, l. 12 sqq., Isocr. Areop. § 15, ἡ (πολιτείας) ἡμεῖς διεφθαρμένης οὐδὲν φροντίζομεν, οὐδὲ σκοπούμεν ὧπως ἐπανορθώσομεν αὐτήν, and Strabo, p. 398, where we read of Demetrius Phalerus that he ὁ δὲ μόνον οὐ κατέλυσε τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπηρώθωσε.

5. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημεύοις, i.e. in addition to studying the best constitution and a constitution like the Lacedaemonian, more attainable than the best, but still involving for its realization the abolition of the existing constitution.

6. τοῖς ὑπαρχοῦσιν πολιτείαις βοηθεῖν probably includes not only the discovery of a constitution the realization of which will not involve the sacrifice of the existing constitution, and in particular the discovery of τὴν ῥάω καὶ κοινωτέραν ἀπάσας ταῖς πόλεσι, but also τὸ ἐπανορθώσαι πολιτείαν in general, and perhaps in addition the
study of the question how any given constitution may be so instituted as to last as long as possible. The inquiry in 8 (6).

4-7 as to the way in which the different kinds of democracy and oligarchy should be framed so as to last illustrates the meaning of the expression. There was a proverb τὸ παρὼν εὖ ποιεῖν: see Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 499 C, and Meineke on Cratin. Πυλαία, Fragm. 3 (Fr. Com. Gr. 2. ii 13),

ἀνδράς συφοῦσι χρή τὸ παρὼν πράγμα καλώς εἰς δύναμιν τίθεσθαι.

Cp. also Eth. Nic. i. ii. 1100 b 35 sqq. and io. io. 1180 b 25 sqq.

7. πρότερον, in 1288 b 28-39.

ταύτο δὲ αδύνατον κ.τ.λ., ‘and this it is impossible to do, if one is ignorant how many kinds there are of a constitution’ (for the sing.

πολιτείας cp. 4. 1290 b 25, ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ χρών προφοροῦμεθα λαβεῖν εἶδον). If we supply ποιεῖν, the case of ἀγνοοῦστα is explained. Compare (with Büchsenschütz, Studien zu Aristoteles’ Politik, p. 5. note) Rhét. 1. 4. 1360 a 17 sqq. In amending democracies and oligarchies it is necessary to distinguish between the different kinds of these constitutions and to deal with each kind in a different way, so that those who recognize only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy cannot amend these constitutions aright.

9. τινὲς here, as sometimes elsewhere (e.g. in 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 39), refers to Plato: cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 25 sqq.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τούτ' ἀληθεῖς. For the use in reference to Plato of this blunt expression cp. i. 1. 1252 a 16, where see note.

10. τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς τῶν πολιτείων I take to mean ‘the varieties of each constitution,’ cp. 20 sqq. and c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq. Sus., however, appears to understand the words otherwise, translating ‘die sämmtlichen Unterschiede unter den Verfassungen,’ and Welldon also translates ‘all the shades of difference between the various polities.’

11. συντίθενται ποσαχῶς, sc. αἱ τῶν πολιτείων διαφοραί, ‘in how many ways the varieties of each constitution are compounded.’ This is explained by 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 29, τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦσα καὶ δοκοῦσα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεία τάτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἑλάττω, τῇ δ' ἀκολουθόθει πλείως, τῇ δ' ἀπαντά ταῦτα: cp. 1317 a 20 sqq.

μετὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης κ.τ.λ., ‘and with the help of this same kind of scientific insight the man of political science should discover the best laws,’ etc. In 1288 b 22 we have τῆς
aúthē ēpistēmēs. For φρόνησις used as here in much the same sense as γνώσις or ēpistēmē, cp. Metaph. M. 4. 1078 b 15, ἐπερ ēpistēmē τῶν ἐστι καὶ φρόνησις, Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 24, ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἡρῴατο ἄρσεναθαι, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 831 b 4 sqq. I have followed the text of the MSS., but there is some strangeness about μετὰ τῆς αυτῆς φρονήσεως. Has ταύτα fallen out after ἐ (cp. c. 2. 1289 b 20, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα)? Since the above was written, I see that my suggestion has been anticipated by an annotator on the margin of the copy of Morel's edition of the Politics used by Stahr (see Stahr and Sus.').

13. πρὸς γάρ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 11. 1282 b 10, and see explanatory note on 1282 b 8. For τίθεσθαι (not τιθέναι), see note on 1283 b 38. We should have been glad if Aristotle had illustrated this remark and shown us by instances how laws vary to suit constitutions. Of course the laws in which the constitution is embodied will vary, and such laws as that prohibiting a repeated tenure of offices would be especially found in democracies, but other laws also would vary—for instance, laws to an inheritance (see note on 1309 a 23) and as to the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage (note on 1270 a 21). Oligarchies tended to allow full freedom in these matters (cp. Plato, Rep. 552 A sqq., 555 C: 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 35, l. 14 sqq.) and to ignore the claims of relatives (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.).

15. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. This gives the reason why the laws must be adjusted to the constitution and not the constitution to the laws. The constitution embodies the end, the laws the rules to be followed by the magistrates and others with a view to that end. The sharp distinction here drawn between the constitution and the laws (cp. c. 14. 1298 a 17, συνώναι δὲ μόνον περὶ τε νόμων θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας) is not, however, always maintained; thus in c. 5.1292 b 15, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολιτείαν, it seems to be implied that the constitution is embodied in laws: on the other hand in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq. we have τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ... καὶ ἄλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, as if τὸ περὶ νομοθεσίας was a part of τὸ περὶ πολιτείας, and not the latter a part of the former. So in Laws 735 A Plato had brought under the common head of πολιτεία the two things distinguished by Aristotle in the passage before us, for he there says, ἐστὸν γάρ δὴ δύο πολιτείας εἶδο, τὸ μὲν ἄρχων καταστάσεις ἐκάστους, τὸ δὲ νόμοι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδοθέντες. Yet he seems to distinguish between πολιτεία and νομοθεσία in Laws 678 A. The distinction
between πολιτεία and νόμοι passed to Cicero, who marks off the ‘optimus rei publicae status’ from ‘leges’ (De Leg. 1. 5. 15), and has been inherited by ourselves. With the account here given of the nature of a constitution cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., where τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας is identified with τὸ πολιτευμα, and see vol. i. p. 243, note 1. That each form of constitution assigns a different end to the State, we see from such passages as 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 9 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1 (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 10 sq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37—b 2). See also Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 2—b 6. Then again the normal constitutions aim at the common good and the deviation-forms do not.

16. νενέμηται. For the perfect see notes on 1280 a 16 and 1282 b 24.

19. φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτοὺς, ‘watch and check those who transgress them’, for φυλάττειν probably here means something more than ‘to watch’: see Bon. Ind. s.v. and cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 40.

20. τὰς διαφοράς, ‘the varieties’: see above on 10.

21. τὸν ἄριθμὸν, sc. τῶν διαφορῶν. Cp. c. 4. 1290 b 32.

24. ἐπέρ δὴ according to Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 48, does not occur elsewhere in Aristotle’s writings. As P² C² P² and pr. P have πλειῶ in place of πλεῖον, Stahr, followed by Eucken, proposes to read ἔδη in place of δὴ (cp., with Eucken, c. 2. 1289 b 13). Ἐπέρ δὴ occurs, however, as Eucken points out, in Theophr. Hist. Plant. 6. 6. 3, and πλεῖον is supported by c. 11. 1296 b 4, ἐπεὶδὴ πλεῖον δημοκρατίας καὶ πλεῖον ὀλιγαρχίας φαίμεν εἶναι.

26. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. After the statements of c. 1 we expect to be C. 2. told in c. 2 that, the best constitution having already been dealt with, it remains to deal with the other questions marked out for consideration in c. 1, but in place of this we are unexpectedly carried back to the list of constitutions given in 3. 7 and are informed that two of these constitutions have now been dealt with, and that it remains to deal with the rest. An attempt is, in fact, made in c. 2 to represent the Sixth (old Fourth) Book of the Politics as taking up the programme set forth in 3. 7 init. in addition to that of the first chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book. See vol. i. p. 489.

ἐν τῇ πρῶτῃ μεθὸδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτείων. This term does not include the First Book (cp. i. 13. 1260 b 12), but it probably includes the Second, and certainly the Third, possibly also the Fourth (old Seventh) and Fifth (old Eighth). See vol. ii. p. xx sqq. Aristotle evidently regards the investigation on which he is entering
as a δευτέρα μέθοδος περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, probably because he is about to deal with an inferior group of constitutions to that with which he has hitherto been dealing, for though polity is a normal constitution, it is inferior to kingship and aristocracy.

30. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας κ.τ.λ. That the study of the best constitution is in fact equivalent to the study of kingship and aristocracy is implied in the closing chapter of the Third Book, where we are told that, if we wish to bring a kingship or an aristocracy into existence, we must ask what education and habits will produce citizens of the best State, or in other words good men. As it is implied here that the best constitution has been already dealt with, some inquiry on the subject must have intervened, or, if it was still unwritten, must have been intended to intervene, between the end of the Third Book and the beginning of the Sixth (old Fourth), but that this inquiry is that contained in our Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books we are not in a position to prove. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 295) that while in the last chapter of the Third Book kingship and aristocracy are classed together as the best of constitutions, true kingship is dismissed as no longer practicable in our Fourth Book (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq.). It seems strange that Aristotle should treat an inquiry respecting the best constitution as equivalent to a discussion of kingship and aristocracy, when he has in that inquiry dismissed kingship as impracticable. This inconsistency may be accounted for either by supposing that after writing the Third Book Aristotle passed on at once to the composition of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book, and that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books had not yet been written when the passage before us was penned, or by supposing that the Fourth and Fifth Books are a second edition of the original inquiry on the subject of the best constitution, and that the reference in the passage before us escaped revision after the substitution of the second edition for the original inquiry. See on this subject vol. ii. p. xxv sq. and p. xxxi, note 2. I do not feel sure that Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen, i. 356) and Sus.4 (1. 660, 662) are right in holding that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books were written before the Sixth (old Fourth). The remark in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14, ἀφεντως δ’ ἐπὶ ταξις καὶ κρίσει ἔργον, may be a reminiscence of 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., and that in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2–5 a reminiscence of 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.
Compare also 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. with 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq.,
9. 1328 b 37 sqq. with 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., though it is
impossible to say whether the passages in the one Book were
written earlier than those in the other. It is true, however, that we
are reminded of 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 40 sqq. when we are told in the
passage before us that the best constitution is based on fully
equipped virtue. That aristocracy and kingship are based on
virtue is implied in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 8.
1294 a 9 sqq.

§ 270, peri di sophias kai philosophias tois men peri alleiv
rweiv agonizeomeiv oik an arwomeive legein peri twn ophmaitwn
tou twv, i.e. about the things called by these names.

33. kat' aretian evneostanai kekhorhngmenv, 'to be constituted on
the basis of virtue furnished with external means' (Welldon), just
as the best constitution is. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 9, etan y kat' iosthipa
twn poltwn evneostikia kai kath' omyostta, and 4 (7). 8. 1328 b
19 sq. We do not hear of politeiai evneostikia kata plouton or
kat' elotheia, though oligarchy and democracy might conceivably
be thus described. Not all forms of aristocracy can be said to be
'constituted on the basis of virtue furnished with external means'—
this can hardly be said, for instance, of those aristocracies which
combine only democracy and oligarchy and differ from polities
solely in inclining to oligarchy more than polities do: see c. 7.
1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.—but aristocracy at its
best aims at being thus constituted.

eti di diapheroiswv allhovn aristonkratia kai basileia. This
has been explained in 3. 7. 1279 a 33 sqq., 3. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq.,
and 3. 16. 1287 b 35-17. 1288 a 15.

34. kai pote dei basileian nomizein. This has been explained in
3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq. For nomizein, 'to adopt,' cp. 3. 1. 1275 b 7,
ou' ekklhipswv nomizeswn.

38. fanerov men ouv k.t.l. Mien oiv appears to be answered by
alla in 1289 b II. Aristotle's remark is suggested by his
identification of aristocracy and kingship with the best constitution,
which implies that they are the best of the normal constitutions
(cp. 3. 18. 1288 a 32 sqq.); hence the kai in kai tou twv
pareklademos ('of these deviation-forms also'). Another reason for
the remark is that the better a constitution is, the better is its claim
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to priority of consideration (c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.), and the fewer precautions are needed for its preservation (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq.). Thus the question which is the worst of the deviation-forms, and which is the worst but one and so forth, has a bearing on the task which lies before Aristotle. Besides, Plato had already considered it (Rep. 544 C: Polit. 302 B sqq.). Aristotle's solution of it seems to be that the worst deviation-form is that which deviates most from the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form, and the least bad one that which deviates least. This is the case with democracy, as we are told in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19, ἥειστα δε μοιχηρῶν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία ἐπὶ μικρῶν γὰρ παρεκθαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας ἀνίδος.


'For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds,
Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.'

Τυραννίς is said in 28 and in 3. 7. 1279 b 4 sq. to be the παρεκθασίς of kingship, but here we learn that it is the παρεκθασίς of the absolute form of kingship (cp. c. 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.). It is said in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 5 sqq. to be 'the most injurious of constitutions to the ruled', and, if Aristotle sometimes groups the worst forms of democracy and oligarchy with it and calls them 'divided tyrannies' (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 34 sqq.: 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq.), he does not probably intend to say that they are as bad as tyranny (see note on 1292 a 17). Καὶ θεωράτης is added after τῆς πρώτης to explain in what sense kingship is said to be the first of constitutions; it is the first in the sense in which what is divine is first (cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 11 sqq.). Kingship is most divine, because the rule of Zeus is the rule of a king (1. 12. 1259 b 12 sqq.: 1. 2. 1252 b 24 sqq.): cp. also Plut. Amat. c. 16. 759 D, καθότι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν δύο ταῦτα, βασιλείαν καὶ άρετήν, θεωράτης καὶ νομίζομεν καὶ νομοδίκοις. A note on the passage before us written by Macaulay in his copy of the Politics runs, 'I think narrow oligarchy on the whole the worst form of government in the world' (Macmillan's Magazine, July, 1875, p. 221).

41. τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κ.τ.λ., i.e. but kingship must necessarily be the first and most divine of constitutions.
toûνομα μένον ἐχειν οὐκ οὐσαν, like the kingship of a κληρωτὸς βασιλεὺς (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 6).
1. η διὰ πολλὴν ὑπέροχην εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλείουτος. Cp. 3. 13. 1289 b 4.
2. εὐριστὴν οὐσαν πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας. As Thurot points out (Études sur Aristote, p. 56), we expect rather εὐριστὴν εἶναι πλείστον ἀπέχουσαν πολιτείας, but see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 960 B. πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, 'to be furthest removed from a constitution': cp. c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.
4. μετριωτάτην δὲ, sc. εὐνα. See notes on 1279 b 7 and 1334 b 25.
5. ηδὴ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by οὐ μὴν, 6, as in 2. 7. 1267 a 37 sqq., except that οὐ μὴν here introduces a participial clause. For ηδὴ with the aorist see note on 1303 a 27.
6. οὐ μὴν εἰς ταύτη βλέψας ήμῖν, 'not however keeping in view the same thing as ourselves' (Vic. 'non tamen ad idem respiciens quod nos'). Plato took as his guide the principle that there is a good and a bad sort of oligarchy and democracy, Aristotle the principle that both oligarchy and democracy are perversions, and that there is no good sort of either. For βλέπειν εἰς or πρὸς, see Plato, Rep. 477 C–D, Laws 965 D, Cratyl. 389 A: Andoc. 3. 35: Isocr. De Pace § 142.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for he [recognized a good and a bad form of each of these polities and] held,' etc. (Welldon). Cp. Plato, Polit. 303 A, διὰ γέγονοι (sc. η τοῦ πλῆθους ἀρχῆ) πασῶν μὲν νομίμων τῶν πολιτείων οὐσῶν ταύτων χειρίστη, παρακόμων δ' οὐσῶν ἐξιμπασῶν βελτίστῃ, καὶ ἀκόλουθων μὲν πασῶν οὐσῶν ἐν δημοκρατία νυκά ζήν, κοσμίων δ' οὐσῶν ἠκειτα ἐν ταύτῃ βιωτείᾳ. Plato had not, however, called the good sort of oligarchy 'good oligarchy' but 'aristocracy' (Polit. 301 A).
9. ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 19 sq. and 7 (5). i. 1301 a 35 sq.
11. ηττον δὲ φαίλῃ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19 sqq. As Susemihl has already pointed out (Sus. 8, Note 1140), Aristotle does not always observe this rule; thus we find the epithets βελτίων and βελτίστῃ applied to varieties of democracy in c. II. 1296 b 6 and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6.

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NOTES.

ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. 'The judgement of which we have spoken' is the judgement in what order of demerit the deviation-forms stand. The subject does not seem to be farther considered in what we possess of the Politics, for in c. ii. 1296 b 3 sqq. the question raised relates to the order of merit in which the varieties of democracy and oligarchy stand.

12. ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. As to this programme of the remaining inquiries of the Politics, see vol. i. p. 492 sqq., where we have seen that it does not fully harmonize with the contents of c. i. The recapitulations in c. i3. 1297 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). i. 1317 a io sqq. should be compared with it. The first question suggested for examination—the question how many varieties of constitution there are—is one suggested for examination in c. i. 1289 a 7–11, a passage which appears to be taken up in πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτείων here, though the words εἴπερ ἐστιν εἰδὴ πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας seem to imply that the inquiry will be confined to varieties of democracy and oligarchy, a limitation for which we are not distinctly prepared in c. i. 1289 a 7–11. Some sort of answer to the question how many varieties of constitution there are is obtainable from cc. 3 and 4 (see c. 3. 1290 a 11 sqq. and c. 4. 1290 b 34 sqq.), though in the recapitulation in c. 4. 1291 b 14 sq. the question which has been under consideration is said to have been the question whether there are more constitutions than one and why, not how many varieties of constitution there are (cp. c. i3. 1297 b 28 sqq.). It should be noticed that in εἴπερ ἐστιν εἰδὴ πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας a fact is assumed the truth of which forms the subject of a separate inquiry in c. 4. 1291 b 15–30.

13. πλείονα (neut. plur.), not πλείον: cp. c. 4. 1290 b 8.

14. ἔπειτα κ.τ.λ. That ἡ κωνστάτη πολιτεία and ἡ αἰρετοτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν are not necessarily the same, we have learnt in 2. 6. 1265 b 29 sqq. Aristotle's language here leads us to expect to find in c. i1, where the topic now referred to is dealt with, a discussion both of the question what is the most generally attainable constitution and of the question what constitution is the most desirable after the best, but in fact he there asks what constitution is the best for most States and most men, and decides that it is ἡ διὰ τῶν μέτων. Nothing is said in c. i1 of any constitution other than this which is at once 'aristocratic and well organized and suitable to most States.' The recapitulation in c. i3. 1297 b 32 sq. corresponds better with the actual contents of c. i1 than
does the preliminary announcement before us. Aristotle probably adds καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλη κ.τ.λ., because he does not wish to exclude in advance the consideration of forms to which the superlatives κοινοτάτη καὶ αἰρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν do not apply, but which are at once ‘aristocratic’ in the broader sense of the word and suitable to most States. Many aristocratic constitutions are not ‘suitable to most States’ (c. 11. 1295 a 31 sqq.).

17. ἐπειτὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἰρετή, ‘next which among the other constitutions also’ [i.e. other than those just referred to] ‘is desirable for whom.’ This question is dealt with in c. 12. 1296 b 13 sqq. As Sus.² points out (Note 1142), the addition of καὶ before τῶν ἄλλων prepares us to find the question τίς τίσιν αἰρετή considered with reference to other constitutions than democracy and oligarchy, and we do in fact find that it is considered with reference to the polity (c. 12. 1296 b 38 sqq.), though not with reference to the so-called aristocracy.

20. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. This question is dealt with to some extent in 6 (4). 14–16, though not, as we should expect from the passage before us, exclusively with reference to the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy (see 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq.). The question is more fully dealt with, so far at least as the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy are concerned, in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book, cc. 1–7, and we are led in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 36 sqq. and 1317 a 14 sq. to expect to learn in the Eighth Book how to construct the other constitutions also, but our expectation is disappointed. Thus promise and performance are at variance both in the Sixth (old Fourth) and in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book. There is, indeed, a further discrepancy between the intimation given in the passage before us and the sequel of the Sixth Book, for we find in c. 9. 1294 a 31 sq. (cp. 1294 b 40 sq.) an inquiry how the polity and the so-called aristocracies should be constructed, which is more than the passage before us leads us to expect.

22. τέλος δὲ κ.τ.λ. This question is dealt with in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book, which is often implied to be περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σοτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν (8 (6). 1. 1317 a 37 sq.: 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37 sq.). The passage before us certainly leads us to expect that the old Fifth Book will be the last Book of the Politics, whereas the MSS. unanimously place the old Sixth Book after it. The insertion of the old Seventh and Eighth Books after the Third is justified by (among other things) indications in the MSS. at the close of the
Third that the old Seventh at one time followed immediately after it, but there are no similar indications in the MSS. to justify the insertion of the old Sixth Book between the old Fourth and the old Fifth. Aristotle may have come to see, as he progressed with his work, that his study of the way in which each form of democracy and oligarchy should be constructed in order to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.) should follow, and not precede, his study of the causes which prevent constitutions from lasting. That he did so seems likely from 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37-1320 a 4. See vol. i. p. 493 sq. Vet. Int. takes τέλος δὲ πάντων τούτων together, translating ‘tandem autem post omnia haec,’ but the words can hardly be taken together, and a genitive is also needed after ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἐνδεικμένην μείαν. Πάντων τούτων is emphasized by being placed before ἄτον: cp. Aristoph. Τελωνεία, Fragm. 1, 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1159).

24. τίνες φθοράι κ.τ.λ., ‘what forms are assumed by the destruction and preservation of constitutions, both of constitutions in general and of each constitution separately, and by reason of what causes these destructions and preservations tend most to come about.’ ‘Φθοράς et σωτηρίας rerum publicarum vocat interitus et incolumitates’ (Camerarius, Interp. p. 144). Sepulveda translates τίνες φθοραί κ.τ.λ., ‘quaes res interitum afferat et quae vicissim rebus publicis sint salutares,’ and many translate in a similar way (so Sus. ‘welches die Mittel zur Zerstörung und zur Erhaltung der Verfassungen sind’), but I prefer the above rendering. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34, ἄτι δὲ περὶ φθοράς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ ποιῶν τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνω σιείας, εὑρήται πρότερον. We are not prepared in the passage before us for the separate treatment of the way in which monarchies are destroyed and preserved which we find in 7 (5). 10-12.

25. For ταύτα referring to fem. substantives, see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 7, and see notes on 1263 a 1 and 1291 a 16.

27. As to the Third and Fourth Chapters see vol. i. Appendix A. We look to these chapters for an answer to the inquiry suggested in c. 2. 1289 b 12-14 and in c. 1. 1289 a 7-11 and 20 sqq., the inquiry how many varieties of each constitution, and especially of democracy and oligarchy, there are, and, as has been said above on
1289 b 12, we find in them some sort of answer to this question, but the answer which we find in them is by no means distinct, and the main aim of the two chapters seems rather to be to explain why there are many constitutions (an inquiry for which we have not been prepared in the opening chapters of the Book, though it is referred to in c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq. as having been dealt with), and at once to account for and to disprove the view that there are only two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, a heresy of which we hear nothing in cc. i and 2. A further defect of the Third and Fourth Chapters is that (as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 495, note 1, and Appendix A: see also below on 1290 b 21–24) they give mutually inconsistent accounts of the parts of the State without distinctly substituting the one for the other. The first discussion traces the variety of constitutions to a variation in the way in which office is distributed to the different kinds of δημος and γραφειοί, the second to a variation in the combinations made of the various forms assumed by the cultivators, artisans, deliberators, judges, and other necessary parts of the State. According to the first discussion, again, the reason why democracy and oligarchy are thought to be the only two constitutions is that the one represents the rule of the many and the other the rule of the few, and that the remaining constitutions are deviation-forms of these, while according to the second the reason is that a constitution implies the rule of a distinct class and the only necessarily distinct classes in a State are the rich and the poor, the former ruling in oligarchy and the latter in democracy. It is more easy to see that these chapters are unsatisfactory as they stand than to say how it happens that they are not more satisfactory than they are. There seems to be little doubt that both of them are from Aristotle's pen—it is, indeed, possible that, as has been pointed out above on 1289 a 30, a reminiscence of a passage in the Fourth Chapter (1291 a 24 sqq.) is contained in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2–5—but it is difficult to think that he intended the two disquisitions, c. 3. 1289 b 27–c. 4. 1290 b 20 and c. 4. 1290 b 21–1291 b 13, to stand together in the text of the Politics. He may have written the second of these disquisitions in the margin of his manuscript of the Politics with the intention of substituting it for the first, or with the intention of using the two disquisitions as materials for a third, which would take their place on a final revision of the work, and an editor, finding the manuscript in this state and misinterpreting Aristotle's purpose, may have
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added whatever was necessary to make a connected whole of them. Throughout the Sixth (old Fourth) Book there is much to suggest the suspicion that an editor's hand has been at work, piecing together materials which Aristotle had left in an unconnected state, or which at any rate were unconnected, whatever the cause. Susenihl brackets as interpolated the entire passage 1289 b 27-1291 b 13, but then the succeeding sentence 1291 b 14, ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τῶν αἰτίων, εἰρημένων, ceases to have anything to refer to, unless we take it to refer to 3. 6. 1278 b 6 sqq. Besides, 1291 b 16, φανερῶν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, appears to refer to 1289 b 32 sqq.

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Other explanations why there are more constitutions than one are to be found in 3. 6-7, in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37 sqq., and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. In these passages Aristotle shows that there are more constitutions than one, and why this is so, but he does not show how large the number of possible constitutions is. He shows in 3. 6-7 that six constitutions exist, for rule may be in the hands of one man, or a few, or many, and the one, the few, or the many may rule for the common advantage or for their own, and elsewhere he shows that rule may be awarded for virtue, as in kingship and aristocracy, or for military virtue, as in polity, or for wealth, as in oligarchy, or for free birth, as in democracy, or it may be won by force and deceit, as in tyranny. But now he shows that the number of possible constitutions is not limited to six, but is very large. Constitutions, he now tells us, vary in relation to the parts of the State; these parts vary and rule is distributed among the varying parts in a varying way (c. 3), or the varying parts are combined in a varying way (c. 4). It may be noted that the explanations given in the chapter before us and in the succeeding chapter do not seem to account for the existence of kingship and tyranny.

29. ἔπειτα πάλιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 11. 1295 b 1 sqq., and contrast 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq.

31. καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed of the well-to-do and the poor the one part, [the well-to-do,] heavy-armed, and the other part, [the poor,] without heavy arms.' Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33, where οἱ ὀπλίται are distinguished from ὁ δήμος, and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12, τὸ γὰρ ὀπλιτικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων. Yet see note on 1294 a 41. Aristotle cannot mean to say that a part both of the
well-to-do and of the poor was heavy-armed and a part not, for surely none of the well-to-do would be ἄνωπλοι.

32. καὶ τῶν μὲν γεωργικῶν δῆμον ὁρᾶμεν οὕτα, τῶν δὲ ἀγοραίον, τῶν δὲ βάραυσον. Aristotle usually divides the demos into four classes, not three—cultivators, artisans, traders, and day-labourers (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 5 sq.)—or into five, if we add herdsmen and shepherds (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19–28). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. he adds τὸ περὶ τὴν βαλατταν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον. Thus he omits in the passage before us day-labourers and herdsmen and shepherds, to say nothing of the two last-named classes. See note on 1319 a 24, and as to the ἀγοραίοι note on 1291 a 4.

33. καὶ τῶν γυνώμιων κ.τ.λ. Here, as often elsewhere, the antithesis to ὁ δῆμος is οἱ γυνώμοι, a wide term including not only οἱ πλουσίοι, but also those whose claims were based on birth or virtue (cp. c. 4. 1291 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.). See note on 1304 b 1.

34. καὶ κατὰ τῶν πλουτῶν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας. Bonitz (Ind. 357 b 34) remarks as to the first καὶ, 'Ad καὶ praeparativum post aliquod intervallem ἔτι refer videtur in Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 34, 40.' Τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας is probably added to make it clear in what sense ὁ πλουτὸς is here used, for the word was sometimes used in the sense of ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κτίσεως (1. 13. 1259 b 20). For the absence of κατὰ before τὰ μεγέθη see critical note on 1330 b 31.

35. οἴον ἵπποτροφίας, sc. ἀναφορά ἔστι. For the genitive of Epegeesis, see note on 1322 b 5 and Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 124, who quotes Apol. 29 B, ἀμαθία ... αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονεῖσθαι, ἢ τοῦ ὀλυσίου εἰνάντι αὐτῷ οἴον οἴον, and other passages. For the fact mentioned cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11, αἰ δ᾽ ἵπποτροφία τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένον εἶναι: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.: Xen. Ages. 1. 23. Why were rich men alone able to rear horses? We never find the same thing said of the rearing of horned cattle or sheep (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 14), or even of mules. The reason must be that horses were used in ancient Greece mainly for war, racing, or similar purposes, and that it did not pay to keep them.

36. διότερ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—and hence it was that in ancient times States whose strength lay in their cavalry were ruled by the wealthy, for the wealthy alone could rear horses, and that oligarchies existed in them. Aristotle's language implies that this was not as much the rule in later days, though it would seem that even in later days the more pronounced type of oligarchy found a congenial
home in States whose territory was suited to cavalry (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.).

38. ἐξρώτο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and they were in the habit of using horses for their wars with their neighbours.' It would be difficult in early times to transport horses by sea for use in distant campaigns. The fact stated shows how important horses were to the State, and explains why supremacy in the State fell to those who were able to keep them. Wars with neighbours were more trying and more full of peril than any others (Demosth. Olynth. 2. 21: De Cor. c. 241). For one thing it was easy during such wars for slaves to desert en masse (C. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Blümner, 4. p. 89). For χρήσθαι πρὸς τῶν πολέμους, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22, τοιοῦτοι χρήσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλους, and Aristot. Fragm. 499. 1559 a 31, 'Ἀριστοτέλης δέ φησιν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ πολιτείᾳ χρήσθαι Λακεδαιμονίων φοινικῶν πρὸς τῶν πολέμους. The sentence would be improved if the second πρὸς were omitted (for πόλεμος ἀστυνείτων cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 17 sq.), but see note on 1328 a 19. We have in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 35, if the text is correct, ἐκ προκρίτων ἐκ τῶν χωλίων.

39. As to the oligarchy of the Hippobotaes at Chalcis see Strabo, p. 447 (Aristot. Fragm. 560. 1570 a 40 sqq.), and as to the oligarchy of the Knights at Eretria see 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 35 sq. The Thessaliens were ἰπποτρόφοι (Heraclid. Pont. ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 c-e). As to Magnesia on the Maeander we read in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 22, ἰπποτρόφοι ὅ εἰσιν, ὅν τρόπον καὶ Κολοσσωνικ, πεδιάδα χωρῶν ἐξουσί. In τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν there is no doubt a reference to Colophon (cp. Strabo, p. 643): Cyme also is probably among the cities referred to ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 11. 6). See notes on 1297 b 16 and 1321 a 8. Caria is said to be unsuitable for cavalry in Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 12 (cp. Julian, Or. 7. 205 D), and though this cannot have been true of the lower part of the valley of the Maeander, Aristotle is probably not speaking in the passage before us of most of the Greek cities of Caria. No doubt also he is not speaking of the islands off the coast of Asia Minor.


1290 a. 1. καὶ εἰ τι δὴ κ.τ.λ. To what is this a reference? According to Susemihl (Sus.26, Appendix, p. 366), to 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 17-9. 1329 a 39, and it is true that τοιοῦτων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. (1290 a 3 sqq.) may

3. τούτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν κ.τ.λ., ‘[for these parts are the cause of the existence of a plurality of constitutions] for sometimes all of them share in the constitution, and sometimes a smaller number of them and sometimes a larger.’ In democracy, for instance, all kinds of γνώριμοι and all kinds of demos share in the constitution (4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32 sq.), while in the more extreme forms of oligarchy only ἵππορφοι share in it.

7. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain and justify what has just been said, that the existence of parts of the State differing in kind involves the existence of constitutions differing in kind. A constitution is an ordering of the parts of the State in relation to their participation in magistracies. One constitution gives the magistracies to the rich, another to the poor, another to rich and poor together, and constitutions differ according as they give the magistracies to one part of the State or to another. I repeat here for the sake of convenience the translation of the passage already given in vol. i. p. 566—‘for a constitution is the ordering of the magistracies of the State, and this ordering all men distribute among themselves either according to the power of those who are admitted to political rights or according to some common equality subsisting among them—I mean, for example, the power of the poor or the rich—or some power common to both. Thus there will necessarily be as many constitutions as there are ways of ordering the magistracies of a State according to the relative superiorities and differences exhibited by the parts.’ For κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινῆς, cp. Plato, Laws 695 C, νόμως ἡξίου δέμενος οἰκεῖν ἰσότητα τινα κοινήν ἐλεφέρων, and Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq., in addition to 3. 6. 1279 a 9, ὅταν ἡ κατ’ ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκώ ἑαυτῷ καὶ καθ’ ὀμοιότητα, and other passages referred to in vol. i. p. 566, note 1. With τῶν ἀπόρων ἡ τῶν εὐπορῶν I supply τὴν δύναμιν, and with ἡ κοινῆς τιν’ ἀμφότερον I supply δύναμιν. In 12, κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μορίων, it is implied that constitutions vary both according to the superiorities (in wealth, birth, or virtue, or in numbers) possessed by this or that part of the State and according to the differences between the parts (for instance, the γνώριμοι may be γνώριμοι κατὰ πλούσιον or κατὰ γένος or κατ’ ἁρμονίαν, and the demos may
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be agricultural or trading or artisan). Τὸν μορίων is emphatic. Each constitution reflects a difference in the parts of the State and the way in which office is assigned to them. For κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς, cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 22 sq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 11, ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τοὺ ἄνθρωπον καθιστᾶσι, καὶ δύο πολιτείαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 1: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26 sqq.

18. μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο . . . 18. ὀλιγαρχία. For the structure of the sentence see note on 1253 b 35–37. Demosthenes took this view (vol. i. p. 494, note 1). Nothing is said about monarchy, but perhaps the inquirers here referred to regarded it as a form of oligarchy. Those who viewed ἦ κατ’ ἀρετὴν διαφορά as a διαφορά τῶν γνωρίμων (1289 b 40 sqq.) would naturally be led to class ἀριστοκρατία as a kind of oligarchy; Aristotle himself, in fact, admits in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 24 that it is ὀλιγαρχία πως. Politics, again, were accounted democracies in early times (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24). Not many, however, can have held the view that there were only two constitutions, for we are told in c. 7. 1293 a 35 sqq. that the existence of four constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and the so-called aristocracy—was recognized by all, though polity was generally ignored. There is a reference to the opinion that there are only two winds in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. and in Strabo, p. 29, where Posidonius is quoted as saying that it was not accepted by Aristotle or by Timosthenes (a Rhodian writer of the first half of the third century B.C.) or by the astronomer Bion. Some held that there were only two elements and not four (De Gen. et Corr. 2. 3. 330 b 13, όδ εἰδῆς δύο ποιωντες, ὡσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆ, τὰ μεταξύ μήγατα ποιοῦσι τοὺς, οἳν ἀέρα καὶ ἕδωρ), and some recognized only two Greek dialects, identifying the ancient Attic dialect with the Ionic and the Doric with the Aeolic (Strabo, p. 333). In the same way some studied dichotomy in their divisions of animals (De Part. An. 1. 2. 642 b 5 sqq.). This tendency would be favoured by the influence of Heraclitus’ teaching (see Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 15). But the view that there were only two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, may well have been suggested by the fact that most constitutions in ancient Greece were democratic or oligarchical (c. 11. 1296 a 22 sqq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 39 sqq.), just as the view that there were only two winds, the North and the South, may well have been suggested by the fact that the wind blew oftenerst from these
quarters (Meteor. 2. 4. 361 a 6: cp. Theophrast. Fragm. 5. 2 Wimmer).

15. ὅτως καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, σκ. εἰδὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι: cp. 20, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεί τίθενται εἰδὴ δύο.

18. ὁσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19, ὅλος δὲ τὰ μὲν βόρεια τοῦτον καλεῖται, τὰ δὲ νότια. προστίθεται δὲ τὰ μὲν ξεφυρικὰ τῷ βορέᾳ (ψυχρότερα γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ δυσμᾶν πνεῖν), νότῳ δὲ τὰ ἀπηλωτικὰ (θερμότερα γὰρ τῷ ἀπ’ ἀνατολῆς πνεῦν). For the reversal in the order of the names, τῶν μὲν ξέφυρων τοῦ βορέιον, τοῦ δὲ νότου τῶν ἑφρων, cp. 27-29 and see note on 1277 a 31.

19. τοῦ βορέου, σκ. εἰδος.

24. ἀληθεστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν κ.τ.λ. The inquirers criticized by Aristotle regarded democracy and oligarchy as the forms of constitution of which the rest are deviations, but Aristotle is always inclined to point to a mean form as the best and to regard the extremes between which it lies as deviations from it. Each of the moral virtues, for instance, is a μεσότης between two extreme states which are deviations from it (Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 27 sqq.: 2. 9. 1109 b 18, δ μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων), and the Dorian mode is a midway mode between two deviation-forms (Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.). That the correct form of constitution assumes only one or two shapes, while the deviation-forms are many, is quite what we should expect: cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 28, ἢτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πολιάρχαι ἐίκαζον, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθῶν μοναχῶς, where Aristotle follows Plato, Rep. 445 C, εἰ μὲν εἶναι εἰδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀπειρὰ δὲ τῆς κακίας. Cp. also 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 26 sqq., where the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions is traced to the fact that men err (ἀμαρτανόντων) in their attempts to realize τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἦσον. 'Ἀληθεστερον καὶ βέλτιον, because it is better so to classify constitutions as to give prominence to the best. 'Ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, i.e. in c. 2, where ἄρσικτοκρατία and βασιλεία are said to be the best constitution, and oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny to be deviation-forms (1289 a 38, b 9). Aristotle, however, speaks in the passage before us as if the polity was also a deviation-form, but this is probably by inadvertence; he speaks more exactly in c. 8. 1293 b 23 sqq. Plato had already said in Rep. 445 D, 449 A, that the best constitution may take the form either of a kingship or of an aristocracy, and that all other constitutions are deviation-forms of it. Aristotle’s teaching in 3. 7.
1279 b 4 sqq. (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26–30) is different (see vol. i. p. 218).

27. ολιγαρχίας μέν κ.τ.λ. Oligarchy is here compared with tense modes like the mixo-Lyidian (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.) and democracy with relaxed modes like the softer variety of the Ionian. The metaphor recurs in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq. and in Plut. Pericl. c. 15, Coriolan. c. 5 sub fin., and Lycurg. c. 29 sub fin. Cp. also Αθ. Πολ. c. 26. 1. 2, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα συνέβαλεν ἀνίσοται μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμους δημαγωγούντας, and Demosth. c. Androt. c. 51, πάντα πραύτερα ἐστίν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ.

C. 4. 30. Οὗ δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ. In times Aristotle probably refers among others to Plato, who had said in Polit. 291 D, ΣΕ. καὶ μετὰ μοναρχίαν ἐστιν τις ἄν, οἷς, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ολίγων δυναστείαν. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δὲ ὅ; ΣΕ. τρὶτον δὲ σχῆμα πολιτείας οὐχ ἴ τοῦ πλῆθους ἀρχή, δημοκρατία τοῦνομα κληθεῖσα; The reason why Aristotle takes so much pains here to correct this definition of democracy and oligarchy appears to be that he holds that it tends to facilitate the error of reducing all constitutions to these two forms. He seeks, therefore, to show that democracy and oligarchy cannot be defined as forms in which supremacy falls to the majority or to the few, or even (though we thus approach nearer to the truth) as forms in which supremacy falls to ἀλευθερία or to wealth; they are rather forms in which the ἀλευθερία being a majority, and the rich being a few, rule. Two things (ἀλευθερία and superior numbers), or even three, if we add poverty, must be conjoined in those who are supreme in a democracy, and two things (wealth and paucity), or three, if we add high birth, in those who are supreme in an oligarchy. If we thus define democracy and oligarchy, it becomes impossible to group all constitutions under these two heads and to treat polity as a kind of democracy and aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, for in the polity the hoplites rule, who do not belong to the poorer class, and in the aristocracy rule falls not to wealth or to high birth, but to virtue. It is evident, then, that this inquiry as to the true definition of democracy and oligarchy is not altogether out of place here, looking to what precedes it, but we are surprised that no notice is taken in it of the similar inquiry in 3. 8, especially as a different definition of democracy and oligarchy is there arrived at, and one which takes fuller account of the difficulties of the question. For if in a democracy the free-born and poor being a majority rule, and in an oligarchy the rich and noble being few
in number rule, what are we to call the constitutions in which the free-born and poor not being a majority rule, and those in which the rich and noble not being few rule? They cannot be called democracies, nor can they be called oligarchies. This difficulty is considered and solved in 3. 8, but it is neither considered nor solved in the chapter before us. It should be noted that, notwithstanding what he says here and in c. 8. 1294 a 11 sqq., Aristotle takes τὸ κύριον εἰναι τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν as a mark of democracy in 1291 b 37 sqq., in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 4 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 18 sqq., 24 sqq.).


καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀληγραφίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλέον μέρος κύριον, i.e. τὸ πλέον μέρος τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας (cp. c. 8. 1294 a 11 sqq.).

35. τοὺς τριακοσίους καὶ πέντεσιν κ.τ.λ., 'to those who are but three hundred in number and poor, though free-born' (or perhaps 'of citizen-birth') 'and alike in all other respects.' For τοὺς τριακοσίους καὶ πέντεσιν, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 25, τὰ τῶν πλούσιων καὶ ἐλαστῶν, and 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος, and Poly. Strateg. 5. 47, τοὺς πέντεσι καὶ πεξόν κοῖς ἐγνώριοι καὶ ἵππευσι συνεκρουσαν.

37. τούτους, i.e. the members of the πόλις in which this is the case.

ἐι πέντεσι μὲν ὀλίγοι εἶχον, κρεῖττους δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'if there were a few men poor but stronger,' etc.

39. τὴν τοιαύτην, sc. πολιτείαν. For similar omissions see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1279 a 9.

3. ἐλευθεροὶ μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δ' ὀλίγοι, 'for there are 1290 b. many free-born, but few rich.'

4. καὶ γὰρ ἐν κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise,' etc. (i.e. if we define) oligarchy as the rule of a few).

5. τίνες. Herodotus says (3. 20: see above on 1282 b 27) that the Ethiopians chose their kings in this way (Schneider, Eaton). The case, however, which Aristotle is imagining is the choice not of kings, but of magistrates for their stature. In Hist. An. 2. 1. 499 a 20, ὀσπερ λέγονσι τίνες, Herodotus (3. 103) is similarly referred to.

η κατὰ κάλλος. For the choice of kings on this principle, see
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(with Schneider, Eaton, and Sus. 3) Athen. Deipn. 566 c, Strabo, pp. 699 and 822, and Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), but these passages refer to kings, not magistrates.

7. οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον, i.e. πλούτῳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ.

8. ἄλλ᾿ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., ‘but since there are more elements than one both in a democracy and in an oligarchy, we must add this further distinction that,’ etc. It is implied that democracy does not exist unless all its elements (the free-born, the many, and the poor) are present in the ruling class, nor oligarchy, unless all its elements (the rich, the few, and the noble) are present in the ruling class. Δήμος here = δημοκρατία, as in 1290 b 1 and c. 3. 1290 a 16. For the expression μόρια τοῦ Δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα πλῆθυ πάντα σχεδόν, ήδὲ ἂν λοιπα δημοκρατίαν εὐπρεπῆ, πολλῷ φανυότερα τούτων. The elements of a democracy or an oligarchy seem here to be the elements of which the dominant class in each is composed. The term μόρια τῆς πολιτείας is otherwise used in c. 14. 1297 b 37, c. 15. 1299 a 4, and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 22. For πλείων neut. plur. (not πλείω), cp. c. 2. 1289 b 13. The neuter plural substantive μόρα is followed, as often elsewhere, by a verb in the plural.

9. οί ἐλευθεροὶ must here mean ‘those of full citizen-birth.’ In Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf (for κάλποι is to be supplied, see note on 1329 b 29) and in Thera no one seems at one time to have been accounted of full citizen-birth who was not a descendant of the earliest settlers. Ησίων, 12, implies that this was no longer the case in Aristotle’s day. Compare 3. 2. 1275 b 23 sqq., where we read that there were those who denied the name of citizen to any one who could not trace back his origin to two or three or more citizen grandparents. Apollonia and Thera in a similar spirit required of those who held office a pedigree reaching back to the very foundation of the colony. Oligarchy in these two cities was evidently of an old-world type, based on nobility of birth rather than on wealth. Apollonia was in many respects a kind of foil to its neighbour Epidamnus; it was an εὐνομωτάτη πόλις (Strabo, p. 316), whereas Epidamnus was famous for its civil broils (Thuc. 1. 24. 3). It was situated nearly seven miles from the sea, and more than one mile from the river Aous (Strabo, ibid.), whereas Epidamnus was a seaport; unlike Epidamnus, it kept strangers at a distance, just as Sparta did (Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 15, ὅτι Ἀπολλωνίᾳ ξενόπλαστον ἔστων κατὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμόνων νόμων ἔπιθεμεῖν παρείχον τῷ βουλευμένῳ).
12. οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρώτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας. Καὶ seems here to be explanatory; nobility in these two States was based on descent from the earliest settlers, for πρώτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας no doubt includes the descendants of the original settlers, as well as the original settlers themselves. οἱ πρώτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας were the founders not only of the State but of its worships (Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 36, καὶ δὲ τῶν πρῶτων οἰκίζοντων τὰς πόλεις καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἱδρυσαμένων τὰ ἱερὰ μάλιστα δεὶ διαμένειν τὰς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπιμελείας). Compare the monopoly of the more important offices at Thurii by the Sybarite element in its citizen-body (Diod. 12. 11. 1: Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 31 sqq.), and similar distinctions within the citizen-bodies of some Phoenician settlements (Freeman, Sicily, 1. 294). The same thing happened at Venice according to Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, 1. 6 iniit. 'As a great number of people were forced to retire into those isles where Venice now stands, and the multitude at last increased to such a degree that it became necessary to make some laws, in order to live peaceably and securely together, they established a form of government, and assembling frequently in council to deliberate on the affairs of the city, when they thought they were numerous enough to form a State, they ordained that nobody that should come thereafter to live amongst them should have any share in the government; and in course of time, when a sufficient number of inhabitants outside the government had settled in the place to give distinction to those who governed, they called themselves Gentlemen, and the others men of the People' (Farneworth’s Translation with some modifications). Compare the way in which in the South African Republic the Boers have excluded the Uitlanders from full participation in the suffrage.

14. ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν. For this use of the partitive genitive, cp. Plato, Tim. 39 C, τῶν θ' ἄλλων τὰς περιόδους οὐκ ἐννεοηκότες ἀνθρωποί, πλὴν ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.

οὕτε ἄν οἱ πλοῦστοι κ.τ.λ., 'nor if the rich rule [not because of their wealth, but] simply because they are more numerous than the poor, does an oligarchy exist.' Cp. 3. 8. 1280 a 1, ἀναγκαίων μὲν, ὅπως ἄν ἄρχασι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἔλαττοις ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, where διὰ πλοῦτον is emphatic. As to the reading ὀλιγαρχία see critical note on 1290 b 15.

15. οἱον ἐν Κολοφώνι τὸ παλαιόν. For the fact cp. Athen. Deipn. VOL. IV.
526 a sqq. The war with the Lydians referred to occurred during the reign of Gyges, who captured Colophon (Hdt. i. 14), and therefore during the first half of the seventh century before Christ (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 458). Colophon was not only strong in cavalry at the time of which Aristotle speaks, but also had a fleet (Strabo, p. 643).


18. κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς δοῦν, 'have rule in their hands': cp. 1290 a 33, κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας, and 35, μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἀρχῆς. The phrase is not a common one. For τῆς ἀρχῆς cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 8, πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχὴν.

21. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . 24. πόλιν. The first of these sentences is repeated in 1291 b 14 sq., and it is likely enough that the disquisition which finds a place between these two identical remarks is a subsequent addition, whether it was inserted here by Aristotle or by some later hand. The sentences from 21, Ὅτι μὲν οὖν, to 24, πόλιν, look as if they had been added by some editor, who has sought to link together two inconsistent disquisitions on the plurality of constitutions found by him in Aristotle's manuscript or among his papers. See note on 1289 b 27. The inquiry just concluded is said to have shown that there are more constitutions than one and why—an inadequate account of its drift—and the inquiry now announced is said to be designed to show that there are more constitutions than 'those which have been mentioned' and what they are and why this is so, but in reality the two inquiries deal with the same subject, though they are not at all in agreement (see note on 1289 b 27). Congreve, Sus., and others take 'the constitutions which have been mentioned' (τῶν εἰρημένων, 22) to be democracy and oligarchy, and certainly it is not easy to see what else the words can mean. But then it seems difficult not to attach the same meaning to τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτείαν in 37; yet, if we do so, we must conclude that the inquiry which commences in 22 is intended to prove, not that there are more kinds of constitution than democracy and oligarchy, but that there are many varieties of democracy and oligarchy. This, however, can hardly be what it is intended to prove, for it is a point to the proof of which a separate inquiry (1291 b 15–30) is devoted. We seem, therefore, to be compelled to fall back on the only alternative open to us, which is to explain τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτείαν in 37 differently from τῶν εἰρημένων in 22, and to take the former expression to refer to the six constitutions enumerated in c. 2.
23. τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, in c. 3. 1289 b 27.

25. ὁπεροῦν εἰ ᾧνον προφητεύμεθα λαβεῖν εἰδη κ.τ.λ. Eucken (Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 54) distinguishes this deductive mode of arriving at a classification of animals from this the inductive method by which the classification of animals is arrived at which we find in Aristotle's zoological works (for this see Dr. Ogle, Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, p. xxxiii). The two methods are mentioned side by side, as Eucken points out, in Top. i. 8. 103 b 3 sqq. in reference to the inquiry contained in that passage how many kinds of ταύτων there are. The teaching, however, of the text as to the nature of a zoological species agrees in the main with that of the zoological works. Both there and here Aristotle bases identity of species on identity of parts: see Ogle, p. 148, who says, 'When the individuals in a group are precisely alike in all their parts, the group is a species,' and p. 141, and cp. Hist. An. i. 6. 491 a 14 sqq. and De Part. An. i. 4. 644 b 7 sqq.

We note, indeed, one difference between the passage before us and the teaching of the zoological works, for while in them we are told that a difference in any one part suffices to produce a difference of species, we are told here that only a difference in a necessary part does so. The question then arises, what parts are necessary to an animal. The list of necessary parts here given is a good deal longer than that which we find in De Part. An. 2. 10. 655 b 29, πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς ᾧνοις καὶ τελείοις δὲ τὰ ἀναγκαίατα μόραι ἐστίν, ἃ τε ἔχουσιν τὴν τροφὴν καὶ ἃ τὸ περίττωμα αφήσουσιν, or in Hist. An. i. 2. 488 b 29, πάντων δὲ ἐστὶ τῶν ᾧνοις κοινὰ μόρια, ἃ δέχεται τὴν τροφὴν καὶ ἐὰν δὲ δέχεται . . . μετὰ δὲ ταύτα ἄλλα κοινὰ μόρια ἔχει τὰ πλείστα τῶν ᾧνοι πρὸς τούτοις, ἃ αἵρεσι τὸ περίττωμα τῆς τροφῆς [καὶ ἃ λαμβανεῖ] οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν ἐστὶ τούτο. καλεῖται δὲ ἃ μὲν λαμβάνει, στόμα, εἰς δὲ δέχεται, κοιλία (where Aubert and Wimmer omit καὶ ἃ λαμβάνει), or in Peri νεότητος καὶ γήρως 2. 468 a 13, τριῶν δὲ μερῶν ἄνων εἰς δὲ διαφέρεται πάντα τὰ τέλεια τῶν ᾧνοι, ἐνώς μὲν ἃ δέχεται τὴν τροφήν, ἐνώς δὲ ἃ τὸ περίττωμα προίτεται, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ μέσου τούτων, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς μεγάλοις τῶν ᾧνοι καλεῖται στῆθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνώλογον . . . ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττικά, πρόκειται καὶ μόρια τὰ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν, οἷς τὸ πῶς οὕτων κύτως, σκέλη τε καὶ πόδες καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτὴν ὀψιμόν. In the passage before us Aristotle appears rightly to mark off the parts which serve for locomotion from those which it is necessary that every animal should
possess. He can hardly mean that any and every difference in a necessary part suffices to constitute a difference of species, for in that case blue-eyed men would belong to a different species from black-eyed men. Bonitz (Ind. 151 b 54 sqq.) points out that eιδη is used here and in 36 interchangeably with γένη, 33. See above on 1258 b 32.

πρώτον has nothing to answer to it, for it does not seem to be taken up by πρός δε τούτοις, 28; the second step, however, apparently is to point out the possible varieties of each part. A similar question arises as to the use of πρώτον in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 (see note).

26. ενιά τε τῶν αἰσθητήρων. Organs of touch and taste are regarded by Aristotle as the most indispensable (De An. 3. 12. 434 b 11 sqq.): next come organs of smell. Aristotle doubts whether some animals possess organs of sight and hearing (Hist. An. 4. 8. 535 a 13 sqq.).

27. τὸ τῆς προφής ἐργαστικὸν, i.e. the mouth: cp. Hist. An. 2. 5. 501 b 29, ὅ δε ἐλέφας οὐδότας μὲν ἔχει τέταρτα ἐφ' ἑκάτερα, οἷς καταγέζεται τῷ προφή, and Περι νεόστης 3. 469 a 2, φαινον τοίνυν δι' μίαν μὲν των ἐργασιῶν ἢ τοῦ στόματος λειτουργεῖ δύναμις, ἔτέραν δ' ἡ τῆς κοιλίας περί τὴν προφήν.

28. οἷς κυνεῖται μορίος, like c. 5. 1292 b 8, ὅσπερ ἡ τυραννίς εἰν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἵν τελευταίας εἴσομεν δημοκρατίας εἰν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις.

29. εἰ δὴ τοσαῦτα [εἰδὴ] μόνον. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 b 12, where εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' εὖτιν ἄλλη δι' εὐθείας similarly refers back to what has preceded. I cannot follow Thurot and Sus. in reading εἰ δὲ in place of εἰ δὴ. As to εἰ δὴ see note on 1331 a 10, and as to [εἰδὴ] see critical note. Supply μόρα with τοσαῦτα from μορίος, 28.

30. στόματος τινα πλείω γένη. So birds have a peculiar kind of mouth (Hist. An. 2. 12. 504 a 19, στόμα δ' οἱ ἄρνικες ἔχουσι μὲν ἰδον δὲ οὕτε γὰρ χρέων οὕτ' ὀδούσας ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ ῥύγχοι). As to differences in the κοιλία, see De Part. An. 3. 14. 674 a 21 sqq. 'In homine pars motus est pes, in ave ala, in pisce pinna, et rursus in homine bini pedes, in beluis fere quaterni, et rursus in quaternis aliis fissi, aliis solidi' (Giph. p. 431). As to τινα πλείω γένη see note on 1319 b 34.

32. τούτων, sc. τῶν διαφορῶν (cp. 34, διαφορικ').

33. πλείω γένη ζῷων. In 25 we have ζῷον (not ζῶον) εἰδη. In just the same way we have in Plato, Rep. 445 D, πέντε (τρόποι εἰσι) πολετείων, and in Laws 735 A, δύο πολετείας εἰδη.

ταύτων ζῴων, 'the same kind of animal.'

35. τούτων, sc. τῶν διαφορῶν.
36. τού Ἴφου. See note on 1286 b 17.

37. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν, 'and it is the same with the constitutions that have been mentioned': i.e. there are as many kinds of them as there are possible combinations of the various forms of necessary parts of the State. For the gen. see above on 1253 b 27. As to 'the constitutions that have been mentioned' see above on 21–24. It is easy to see how differences in some of the parts of the State enumerated here (e.g. in the fighting, the judicial, the well-to-do, the deliberative, and the official classes) would cause a difference in the constitution, but how would differences in the cultivating or day-labouring class or in the class of artisans or shopkeepers do so? And to what differences in these classes does Aristotle refer? Probably he refers partly to differences in the relative numbers of these classes (for the effect of such differences on the constitution see c. 12. 1296 b 26 sqq.) and partly to differences in their composition. For instance, if the βίωνων or the ἄγοραίων or the δῆτες consisted to a large extent of persons open to exception on the score of their extraction (half-servile, it may be, or half-alien or illegitimate), and persons of this kind had access to the deliberative, the dicasteries, and the magistracies, the result would be that an advanced form of democracy would exist.


ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For the differences between this list of the necessary parts of a State and that given in 4 (7). 8, see vol. i. p. 97.

40. οἱ καλοῦμενοι γεωργοὶ. Here, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sqq., Aristotle omits from his enumeration herdsmen, shepherds, fishermen, and hunters, though these also are providers of food; perhaps he is concerned both here and there only with those whose services cannot be dispensed with. Plato had spoken in the same way in Rep. 369 D. As to the expression οἱ καλοῦμενοι γεωργοὶ see note on 1331 b 9.

2. ὡν ἀνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον ὀικεῖσθαι. We see from 3. 12. 1283 a 1291 a. 20 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.) that this phrase includes both the things without which a State cannot exist and the things without which it cannot exist nobly.

3. τὰς δὲ εἰς τροφῆν ἢ τὸ καλὸς ζῆν. These are the two opposites to that which is necessary, for τὰ ἀναγκαῖα are contrasted both with
NOTES.

tâ eis eînaxhamoûnâ kai peruswiaîn (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27 sqq.) and with
tâ kalâ (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 32 sqq.).

4. tâto ëv âgoraioû k.t.l. For the omission of the article before
âgoraioû see critical note. For tâs prâseis kai tâs ônâs cp. 1291 b 19,
tô âgoraioû tû perî oûnî kai prâsîn diatirîson: Eth. Eud. I. 4. 1215 a 31,
chiymatiastîkâs ðè (tçvâs) tûs prôs âgorâs mèn (âgorâseis Syburg, Sus.)
ku prâseis kqilqâs: Plato, Rep. 525 C, oûk oûnî ouîdi prâseos xârîn
ôs ejmpórous ò kqilqâs melatântas: and Xen. De Vect. 3. 12. Neither
tô âgoraioû not to ïthikôn is included among the necessary parts
of a pôlos in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 4 sqq., though it is afterwards implied
that tô ïthikôn is among them (see vol. 1. p. 97), but in 8 (6). 8.
1321 b 14 sqq. buying and selling are treated as necessary incidents
of life in a pôlos, and in the passage before us Aristotle goes farther
and treats émporoi kai kqilqâs as necessary classes. The term
 tô âgoraioû is used here apparently in a sense inclusive both of
émporoi and of kqilqâs, but in Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sq. (cp. Xen.
Mem. 3. 7. 6 and Plato, Rep. 371 D) émporoi are distinguished from
âgoraioû. The âgoraioû were so called because most selling was done
in or near the agora (see Bûchenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 469
sq.). The bâwmiôs teçvûtsai and the ïthte, however, were frequenters
of the agora as well as ol âgoraioû (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 28 sqq.). In tô
perî tûs prâseis kai tûs ônâs kai tûs ejmporîas kai kqilqâs one perî serves
for all the substantives because the things they represent are nearly
akin. Compare the use of perî in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 16 sqq. and

6. tô ïthikôn. The existence in ancient Greece of a numerous
class of this kind deserves notice, for, according to Mommsen, Rôm.
Staatsrecht, 2. 474. 4, ‘the working of free persons for hire was
confined in Italy within narrow limits.’

7. ô toîtov ouîdêi ëttôv ësttv anegkaioûn épárxeiû. For the con-
struction see note on 1329 a 35.

8. múi yàr k.t.l., ‘for is it not impossible that it should be meet
to give the name of State to a State which is by nature the slave
of others? ’ For ìxîv eînai cp. 3. I4. 1283 b 17 sq. For the use of
múi here see note on 1263 a 41. As to the importance of valour
to a State compare a Delphic response to Lycurgus quoted in Diod.
7. 14. 2 and the comment of Ephorus in the next section, and also

9. tôv fûstei duolhî, not tôxy: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 3, ô ápôles dia
fûstiv kai ou diâ tôxyn.
10. αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐτάρκες. For the reversal in the order of the words see note on 1277 a 31. τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐτάρκες. Cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 26—34, and i. 5. 1254 b 20 sqq.

11. For ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ see note on 1342 a 32. The reference is to Rep. 369 B—371 E. For κομψός, οὐχ ἰκανός δὲ ἐξήρθαι Bonitz (Ind. s.v. κομψός) compares De Caelo, 2. 9. 290 b 14 sq. and 2. 13. 295 b 16. ἕνοι γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Contrast Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 31, οὗτε γὰρ ἐκ δεκά αὐθρώπων γένοιτ' ἀν πόλις.


16. ἐπὶ δὲ ἐμπορὸν τε καὶ κάτηλον. Cp. Rep. 371 A—D. The word κάτηλος is often used by Plato, but seldom by Aristotle, who here repeats it from Plato. It is omitted by mistake in the Index Aristotelicus.

ταῦτα πάντα, neuter, though referring to men: see notes on 1263 a 1, 1289 b 25, and 1307 a 39, and Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 6. 13, τάλλα τὰ ταύτα, who compares Demosth. Phil. 1. 8, κατέπτυχε πάντα ταῦτα, and refers to Jebb's note on Soph. O. T. 1195. As to the order ταῦτα πάντα, not πάντα ταῦτα, see critical note on 1282 a 40.

γίνεται, 'comes to be': cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 5, 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39, and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24.

17. τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7 sqq.

ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκώσαν, ἄλλ' οὔ τοι καλῶν μᾶλλον, ἵσον τε δεμερήνη σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. All that Plato says is that the πόλις comes into being for the supply of the physical needs of those who form it, and Aristotle himself describes the πόλις in 1. 2. 1252 b 29 as γινομένη τοῦ ζῆν ἐνέκεν. Still a real difference exists between them, for it is evident from the passage before us that in Aristotle's view soldiers and judges and deliberators must find a place even in the πρώτη πόλις, whereas Plato thinks that soldiers need not, and says nothing about judges and deliberators. Plato's language is open, in Aristotle's opinion, to another objection also. It implies that shoemakers are as necessary to a πόλις as cultivators, which is far from being the case.

19. τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 373 D, οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίου χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτεμήτων . . . πολεμήσομεν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, Ὀ Γλαύκων; According to 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 7 sqq. a military force is necessary not only for defence against external foes, but also to control insubordinate members of the State.
NOTES.

20. πρὶν ἡ... καταστῶσιν. See note on 1336 b 21.

22. ἀλλὰ μὴν... πόλεως. Cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 19–13. 1283 a 26 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 16–25. For the necessity of a judicial authority within the State, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 sqq.: 1. 2. 1253 a 37 sqq.: 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5 sqq. For καὶ ἐν τοῖς τίτταροι καὶ τοῖς ὑποστοιχοι κοινωνίαι, where ἐν is not repeated, see note on 1289 b 34.

25. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'parts of the aforesaid kind,' i.e. χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον, not πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν. For the contrast cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 28 sqq.

27. δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς. Compare the account of ἡ τῆς τῶν δικαστῶν δυνάμεως ἱδία ἀρετή given in Plato, Polit. 305 B. The reference to the δικαιοσύνη δικαστικῆ possessed by judges and to the σύνεσις πολιτικῆ possessed by deliberators serves to sharpen the contrast between judges and deliberators on the one hand and τὰ εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν συντείνοντα on the other, and to suggest a resemblance between the former classes and the soul.

τὸ βουλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνεσέως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 5. 1140 a 25, δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύναται καλῶς βουλεύομεν σαθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἁγαθά καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, αὐτὸν ποιὰ πρὸς ἑγείειν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποιὰ πρὸς τὸ εἰς ἔργ. I incline, looking to this passage, to translate σύνεσις πολιτικῆ here as 'political prudence,' and not as 'the political art,' as Sus.3 Ind. s. v.

28. καὶ ταύτῃ εἶτε κ.τ.λ., 'and whether these three kinds of work fall to separate classes or to the same persons makes no difference to the argument, for it often happens to the same persons to be hoplites and cultivators [and yet hoplites and cultivators are distinct parts of the State].' For the construction οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἶτε... εἰτε, cp. Rhet. 3. 15. 1416 a 5.

31. καὶ ταύτα καὶ ἐκεῖνα, i.e. both parts contributing to political life and parts contributing to merely necessary uses, or in other words both parts which constitute the soul of the State and parts which constitute its body.

32. τὸ γε ὀπλιτικὸν, 'the hoplite force at any rate,' whatever we may think of other branches of the fighting class, such as trireme-oarsmen: cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 8, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν ναυτικῶν ῥχλαυ) μέρος εἶναι δεί τῆς πόλεως.

33. ἐξδομον. The sixth part has not been named, and some think that a mention of it has been lost in a lacuna before ἐξδομον, but probably the judicial authority (22 sqq.) is the sixth, notwith-
standing the renewed reference to it in 39 sq. That the rich are a necessary part of the State, we see from Dio Chrys. Or. 38 (2. 130 R), ἐὰν δὲ πάσαις μὲν ταῖς πόλεσι, μᾶλλον δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις, δεῖ μὲν καὶ τῶν πλουσίων, ἵνα καὶ χορηγοῦσι καὶ φιλοσωμόνται ταντὶ τὰ νενομισμένα διαπάνιμα.

34. ὁγδοος δὲ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ is explanatory, as often elsewhere. Hesych. (s. v. δημιουργός), παρὰ ταῖς Δωρεάνις οἱ ἄρχοντες, τὰ δημόσια πράττοντες: Etym. Magn. (s. v. δημιουργός), δημιουργοί δὲ ἐκαλοῦντο παρά τε Ἀργείοις καὶ Θεσσαλοῖς οἱ περὶ τὰ τέλη (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 327. 3).

35. λειτουργοῦν. See above on 1279 a 11.

36. τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν, ‘those who are fit to serve as magistrates’: cp. 1291 b 6 and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32.

40. τούτα, i.e. τὸ βολεύοντα καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητούσιν. Sus. (Note 1189) misses a reference to the work of το περὶ τὰς ἄρχεις λειτουργοῦν, but we often note an absence in the Politics of absolute completeness and precision.

1. ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχειται εἰναὶ τινας ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν. 1291 b. These words have been interpreted in different ways. Some have taken τῶν πολιτικῶν as in the genitive after τιμα: so Vet. Int. (‘necessarium et aliquos politicorum esse participantes virtute’), Vict., Congreve, and Welldon. Sepulveda, however, following Aretinus and followed by Giph. and Schn., translates ‘utique necesse est ut aliqui sint virtutis res civiles attingentis compotes,’ while Sus. (and perhaps Lamb.) takes τῶν πολιτικῶν as in the genitive after ἀρετῆς, but makes the words masc. and not neuter. Sepulveda is probably right: cp. Plato, Laws 643 D, τελειον εἰναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς (Stallbaum, ‘virtutis quam negotium ipsius postulat’).

2. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. The cultivator in ancient Greece seems to have been sometimes also a handicraftsman—an interesting fact. This is confirmed by Diod. 1. 74. 7, παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις (i.e. other races than the Egyptian) ἦδεν ἐστὶ τούς τεχνίτας περὶ πολλά τῇ διανοίᾳ περιπολομένους καὶ διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν μὴ μένουσα ποτέ παράπαν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐργασίας: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφάπανται γεωργίας, οἱ δὲ ἐμπορίας κοινωνίᾳ κ.τ.λ.: cp. also Plato, Rep. 397 E, 551 E sq. That cultivators and handicraftsmen were often also soldiers is well known. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἄλλα, 7. Δυνάμεις, ‘powers’ or ‘capacities,’ such as the capacity to fight or to till the soil.

5. ἀντιποιοῦται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες, so that they would not admit that a separate class of men possessed of virtue is a necessary
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part of the State. 'Virtue also,' as well as serving in war, tilling the soil, judging, etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 10, προς ουσίαν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπικείμενῳ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λαοῖς, δ' τουσκότην ὑπολαμβάνοντας εἶναι, and 1166 b 3 sq., and also the sarcastic line of Cratinus (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 141: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 221), ἀνδρῶν αἵρεσιν πάσα γαργαίμει πόλις.

6. καὶ τὰς πλείονες ἄρχας ἄρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι, so that they would not admit that a separate official class is a necessary part of the State. That the demos did not claim a share in all offices, we see from [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3 (cp. Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.). According to King George the Third (quoted by Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 484) 'every man is good enough for any place he can get.'

7. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. Ταῦτα, i.e. οἱ πεντεμένοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι, όροι, in Aristotle's own words, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. Ταῦτα (= οὐτοί), like ταῦτα in 10, is attracted into the gender of μέρη (cp. αὐτῷ in 5 (8), 3. 1337 b 32). Aristotle on the contrary holds that a fighting class, judges, and deliberators are parts of the State in the fullest sense, and not the rich and the poor (1291 a 24 sqq.).

9. έτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to ταῦτα see preceding note. The rich and the poor are again referred to. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38, κυριόται θ᾽ οἱ πολιτείαι καὶ όταν τάναντια εἶναι δοκοῦσα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἵσαγι ἄλληλοις, οἱν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ δήμοι, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq., where the ἄποροι and the εὐποροὶ are spoken of as ἀντικείμενα μόρια. 'Εναντία is emphatic—not only parts of the State, as the rich and the poor have been said to be in 7 sq., but also opposite parts of the State, and it is into opposite parts embodying attributes which cannot be combined that a whole should be divided (cp. De Part. An. 1. 3. 643 a 31, έτι τοῖς ἀντικείμενοι διαμερίσθη δύσφορα γάρ ἄλληλοι ταύτικείμενα, οἱν λευκότης καὶ μελανία καὶ εὐθύτης καὶ καταπλάτης). These inquirers, therefore, had something to urge in defence of their view, but they erred in supposing that all men have virtue and capacity for office. Besides, the rich and the poor are not as much opposites to each other as the good and the bad (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 15 sq.). For μέρη . . . μορίων see note on 1339 b 38.

11. οὐτοὶ καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ., 'so that they [not only treat the rich and the poor as opposite parts of the State, but also], etc.

κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθίστασι. Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 20–24 and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27–32.
14-30. That the first sentence of this passage repeats 1290 b 21 has been remarked already (see above on 1290 b 21-24). The doctrine of c. 3 that the parts of the State are the various kinds of δῆμος and γνώριμοι reappears here intact, notwithstanding the totally different account of the parts of the State given in c. 4. 1290 b 21-1291 b 13 (see vol. i. Appendix A). Much of what is said in 1291 b 14-30 has already been said with less detail in c. 3. 1289 b 27-1290 a 2, and we hardly expect to find the ground gone over again. In severing the artisan class from τὸ χειριστικὸν (19, 25) the passage before us differs from 3. 4. 1277 a 38 sqq.; it may also be not quite in accord with 1291 a 4 sqq. (see note on 21). We are surprised to observe that little or no account is taken of its teaching when the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy come to be distinguished in 1291 b 30-c. 6. 1293 a 34.

16. δῆμος ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Plato in the Politicus (302 D sqq.) had already distinguished democracy according to law from the opposite kind, and Isocrates (Areop. §§ 60, 70) had distinguished well constituted democracies from others. The Theban orator in Thuc. 3. 62. 4 had implied that a distinction exists between an ὁλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος and a δυναστεία ὀλιγῶν ἀνδρῶν, and Plato in the Politicus (301 A) had marked off oligarchy according to law, which he calls aristocracy, from oligarchy not according to law. Isocrates implies that there are two kinds of oligarchy in Panath. § 132. Aristotle advances further in the same track.

16. καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, 'even from what has been already said' (in c. 3. 1289 b 28 sqq.): cp. c. 6. 1292 b 23, ἐξ ἀστῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φαινόντων ἐστιν. Aristotle says nothing here as to the other cause for the distinction of different kinds of democracy which he points out in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 22 sqq., a passage which may probably have been written later than that before us.

18. οἱὸν δήμου μὲν εἰδὴς κ.τ.λ. In the terminology of the passage before us whatever does not fall under the head of οἱ γνώριμοι falls under that of ὁ δῆμος. 'Ο δῆμος thus becomes a term of wide extension; it includes not a few who were by no means poor; many τεχνίται, for instance, were well-to-do (3. 5. 1278 a 24) and many ἐπιτομοί. The μέσοι or moderately well-to-do, again, of whom we read in c. 3. 1289 b 31, must here be reckoned among the demos. But the term ὁ δῆμος is not always thus used. We sometimes find it used in contrast not to οἱ γνώριμοι, but to οἱ ἐπιτομοί (c. 11. 1296 a 28: c. 12. 1297 a 9 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 5 sqq.).
The demos then becomes the part of the citizen-body which is not επιστορον, not the part which does not consist of γρώμοι, and is consequently a less extensive class. In 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 1 sq. and 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 sq., again, δήμος is opposed to οἱ πλούσιοι, and in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25 to οἱ τάς οἰκονίας ἔχοντες. The poorest classes within the demos would be the fishermen (Theocr. Idyll. 21. 16) and the day-labourers (here called το χερνητικών). The trireme-oarsmen at Athens must also have been poor. A demos of trireme-oarsmen would be a demos of a very special type; it would have much more national feeling than a demos of επιστορον bent on gain and wandering from one seaport to another (see Herodas, 2. 55 sqq.), but it would be somewhat inclined to war: cp. Diod. 18. 10. 1, where we read of the Athenian assembly at the outbreak of the Lamian War, πολυ τοις πλήθεσιν ἐπερείχον οἱ τὸν πόλεμον αἱρούμενοι καὶ τὰς προβάς εἰσέθετε ἐκ τοῦ μεταθερομένων ois ποτ’ ἔφησεν οἱ Φίλιππος τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἐιρήμην ὑπάρχειν, τὴν δὲ εἰρήμην πόλεμον (this, however, was said by Philip of the orators of the Athenian assembly: see his Letter to the Athenians, c. 19). There must have been a large contingent of trireme-oarsmen in the demos of Carthage, if Meltzer (Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 136) is right in thinking that the oarsmen and sailors of the Carthaginian fleet were taken as a rule and in the main from the demos. Aristotle includes the γεωργαί in his enumeration here, but not οἱ νομείς, as to whom see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sqq.

20. καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ. For the distinction between τὸ πορθμεντικὸν and τὸ ἀλιευτικὸν, cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 23, πολλὰ καὶ ἀλιευτικὰ (sc. πλοῖα) ἔλαβε καὶ πορθμεία ἀνθρώπων μετὰ καταπληθοῦντα ἀπὸ νῆσον, and as to the class of vessels designated by the word πορθμεία see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 483. 8. Many Tenedians seem to have been employed as sailors in vessels carrying passengers from Tenedos or other islands to the mainland, or from one side of the neighbouring Hellespont to the other. Another city in which many of the inhabitants were similarly engaged was the Boeotian city of Anthèdon on the Euripus (Psuedo-Dicearch. De Graeciae Urbibus, c. 24, προσπεπουθέται πορθμοῖς οἱ πλείοντι καὶ ναυπηγοῖ: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 259). As to οἱ πορθμεύοντες εἰς Ἑρωδᾶς in Chios see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 592. Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 348) says, 'as to the crews of trading vessels we have no information (fehlt es uns an Nachrichten), still it is probable that they consisted to a large extent of slaves,' and he refers to Demosth.
in Apatur. c. 8, but it would seem from the passage before us that their crews often formed part of the demos and therefore must often have consisted of freemen and citizens. The Athenian orator Demades had been a ναύτης and a πορθμεύς (see Schäfer, Demo-
sthenes, 3. 1. 19. 4), and the lowness of his birth was a stock reproach to him. There was a proverb ἀπὸ κόπης ἐπὶ βῆμα, indicating the length of the step from the one to the other. As to the fishermen of Tarentum, see Mr. A. J. Evans in the Journal of Hellenic Studies, 7. 35, and as to Byzantium, Dio Chrys. Or. 35, 2. 73 R, φέρε δὴ, τίνας ἀλλοὺς τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ἄκοιμων; Βυζαντίων, χώραν τε ἀρίστην νεμομένου καὶ βαλλατταν εὐκαρποτάτην· τῆς δὲ γῆς ἡμελήκασι διὰ τῆς ἁρετῆς τῆς βαλλάττης· ἢ μὲν γὰρ διὰ μακρὸν φέρει τῶν καρπῶν αὐτοῖς καὶ δεὶ λαβεῖν ἐργασιμένους, ὥθε αὐτόθεν μηδὲν πονήσασιν. Byzantium, as is well known, was a great centre for the tunny-
fishery (Strabo, p. 320). The soil of Chios was rocky, and though its wine was good, its inhabitants must have been forced to live to a large extent by commerce, like those of Aegina (see note on 1258 a 34) and other States in a more or less similar position (see note on 1326 b 26). The passage before us shows that, whatever may have been the case in earlier times (see Isocr. De Pace, § 48, Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 326 sq., and above on 1327 b 11), in Aristotle's time many Athenian citizens served as oarsmen in the fleet. τὸ ἐμπορικὸν, however, must also have been a numerous class at the Peiraeus.

21. χρηματιστικῶν, explained by ἐμπορικῶν in 24. Aristotle appears to be speaking of seafaring men on board merchant-ships; it is not quite clear whether he includes ἐμποροὶ among them. If he does, he brings ἐμποροὶ here under the head of τὸ περὶ τὴν βαλλατταν, not under that of τὸ ἄγαραῖον, as in 1291 a 4 sqq. For the contrast of πολεμικῶν and χρηματιστικῶν, cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sqq.

25. τὸ χερνητικὸν, here apparently = τὸ ὄχθικον, though in 3. 4. 1277 a 38 sqq. οἱ χερνητὲς include ὁ βάλαυας τεχνίτης.

τὸ μικρὸν ἔχουσα ὀσίαν, less than the γεωργοῦ, who are grouped in c. 6. 1292 b 25 sq. with persons possessing μετρίαν ὀσίαν.

26. τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφότερων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, 'that which is not citizen by both parents': see vol. i. p. 248, note 1, and cp. c. 6. 1292 b 39, where ἐλεύθερον seems to answer to πολίτης in c. 4. 1292 a 3. Cp. also Diog. Laert. 6. 4, ἐνεκτιμημένος ποτὲ (Ἀντικῦρης) ὥσοιν εἰς ἐκ δύο ἐλεύθερον, "οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ δύο," ἐφη, "πολιστικῶν, ἀλλὰ πολιστικόν εἰμι." At Athens, democratic though it was, the class of
'half-breeds' was looked down upon, all the more so probably because the Athenians claimed to be autókhônes: cp. Eurip. Ion, 529 Bothe (589 Dindorf),

> eînai fæsi tás autókhônas

κλεινάς 'Λόημας οὐκ ἐπείσακτον γένος,

ἐν ἐσπεσοῦμαι δύο νόσω κεκτημένοις,

πατρός τ' ἐπακτοῦ καύτως ὄν νοθαγενής.

They were regarded as ἐξοι (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq.) and were often of partly servile origin (1278 a 33). Not every kind of democracy admitted them to citizenship (ibid. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6-11), and even the democracies which made them citizens did so mostly when they were short of genuine citizens, and withdrew the boon when they ceased to be so (1278 a 29 sqq.). According to Isocrates they were the bane of the States to which they belonged (Panath. § 165, τοῖς τε μὴ δυναμένοις εν ταῖς αὐτῶν ζην καὶ τοῖς χειρων γεγονόν δὸν οἱ νόμοι προστάταις, ὀπερ ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ λυμαίνονται τὰς πολεῖς: cp. Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 1532, μαχαίρωσαν οὖν, φησί, Κλεοφὼν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τοῦτο ὄμοι εἰσί ἐξοι εν ταῖς πατρίσιν αὐτῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐν τῇ 'Αττικῇ κυνεῖτω- σαν πολέμους· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν πατρίς ἀυτῆ). We learn from 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 13 that the class of citizens whose extraction was not pure was one of the classes which supported Peisistratus before he made himself tyrant. Many demagogues belonged to this class (Gilbert, Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens, p. 75 sqq.). It was to a corresponding class at Rome that Scipio Africanus the younger referred in the stern words which he addressed to the Roman mob, ‘Taceant quibus Italia noverca est’ (Val. Max. 6. 2. 3).

28. With τῶν γυνωρίμων some such words as ἐθη πουοῦσιν must apparently be supplied (Vict. 'notorum autem species constituunt divitiae,' etc.). For the fact cp. c. 3. 1289 b 33 sqq. and c. 8. 1293 b 37 sq., and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39, ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλουτώ καὶ παθεία ὀρίζεται.

29. καὶ τὰ τοῦτος λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν διαφοράν. Τοῦτος is neuter, though it refers to masc. and fem. substantives: see note on 1291 a 16. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν διαφοράν is 'fere idem quod κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν συστοίχιαν' (Bon. Ind. 192 b 34), and συστοίχια = 'series notionum quae codem genere continentur' (Bon. Ind. s. v.). Cp. Metaph. Δ. 10. 1018 a 35, ἑπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τάλλα ὡσα κατὰ ταύτα λέγεται, ὡστε καὶ τὸ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον.

30. δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now goes on to fulfil the
promise he makes in 15 sq. (cp. c. 1. 1289 a 10 sq. and c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq.) to show that there are more kinds than one of democracy and oligarchy. As to the various kinds of democracy see Essay on Constitutions. Aristotle deals with democracy before oligarchy because it is less bad than oligarchy, and the better constitutions deserve to be noticed first (c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq.). *Mēn oūn* is taken up by *mēn oūn*, 38, but to *mēn* after πρώτη there is nothing to answer. For the absence of the article with δημοκρατία cp. 3. 8. 1279 b 20, where see note. For ἥ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἱσον, ‘that which is so called most in accordance with equality,’ cp. Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 9, ἥ μὲν oūn κατὰ τὴν ἐφησιν λεγομένη πέψις τούτ’ ἔστιν. Aristotle regards this kind of democracy as placing rich and poor on a level more than any other, but his view is open to question. It placed rich and poor nominally on a level, but, as it did not provide pay, the holders of office would be unrecompensed, and members of the assembly and dicitas would be so too. Hence it would be difficult for poor men to play an active part in the State, and Greek democrats would deny that this form of democracy really placed rich and poor on a level. The constitution of Rhodes as described by Cicero in De Rep. 3. 35. 48, in which pay was provided, seems to make a nearer approach to this ideal. It may, indeed, be questioned whether the kind of democracy described in the passage before us falls within the definition of democracy given in 3. 8. 1279 b 18, where democracy is said to exist when the poor are supreme, not when neither rich nor poor are supreme. It should be noticed that in the kind of democracy which ranks as first in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book—a kind which appears to answer to the first two of the chapter before us—property-qualifications for office may or may not exist; they may be entirely absent (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 31 sq.), as indeed they may be in the πάτριω δημοκρατία (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.), but they may also exist, and indeed may reach a high amount in the case of the most important offices (1318 b 30 sq.), and in that case these would be quite beyond the reach of the poor.

32. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἥ τοὺς εὐπόρους. Ὑπάρχειν is the reading of Γ Μύθος Ρ 3 6 etc. Vat. Pal. Bekk., while Ρ 1 4 Ar. Sus. have ὑπερέχειν, but in 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 6 sqq., a passage apparently based on that before us, we have ἵσον γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἁρχεῖν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἧ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀν ἵσον καὶ ἀριθμόν. Hence Vict., followed by Schn.,
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Coray, Stahr, Bonitz (Ind. 789 b 2 sqq.), and Welldon, would read ἀρχεῖα in place of ὑπάρχεια. It is not easy to account for the addition in the MSS. of the prefix ὑπ-, but I am inclined on the whole to think that Vict. is right, unless indeed ἀρχοντας or some such word should be added before ὑπάρχεια.

34. εἶπερ γάρ κ.τ.λ., ' [and the law is right,] for if,' etc. Γάρ introduces a justification of the interpretation of political equality adopted by the law of this democracy. Freedom will be enjoyed by the citizens under a democracy of this kind, because office will be open alike to all (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sqq.), and equality, because they will all share alike. That freedom and equality were commonly thought to go with democracy, we see from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq.: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 19, Isocr. Areop. § 60, Plato, Rep. 562, and Plut. Themist. c. 27, where Artabanus says to Themistocles, ὑμᾶς μὲν ὅπως ἐλευθεριάν μᾶλλονθανμιζέων καὶ ὁσόπηρα λόγος. But in 3. 6. 1279 a 21 Aristotle says that all the παρεκβάσεις are διεξευκοι.

37. ἐτέει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here the test of the existence of a democracy is found in τὸ κύριον εἶναι τὸ δόξαν τῶν πλείονων, notwithstanding what has been said in c. 4. 1290 a 30 sqq. See note on that passage.

39. ἄλλο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another, the characteristic of which is that the offices are held on a property-qualification, this property-qualification being, however, small.' Δέι δὲ κ.τ.λ. is added to make it clear that admissibility to office is not confined in this kind of democracy to those who at the moment of its institution happen to possess the small prescribed property-qualification, but falls of right to any one who may acquire the property-qualification from time to time, and is not retained by any one who loses it. Cp. c. 5. 1292 a 41. 

Mετέχεια, sc. τῶν ἀρχῶν. In τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, 39, we have the plural ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, and this occurs more frequently in such phrases than the singular ἀπὸ τιμήματος, but the latter occurs in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 28, and elsewhere.

1292 a. 1. For the absence of δὲ after ἐπερ in cp. 4. c. 16. 1300 b 20, 31, Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 a 20, ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων, and 3. 15. 1416 a 6, 13, 20, 21, 24.

2. δοσὶ δινεύθηναι, i. e. κατὰ τὸ γένος: cp. c. 6. 1292 b 35 sqq., where see note. Compare also Diog. Laert. i. 55, καὶ ὁ ἀργὸς ὑπεύθυνος ἐστώ παντὶ τῷ βουλαμένῳ γράφεσθαι. To the mind of a Greek there would be a great difference between a democracy which excluded from office persons of illegitimate birth or wholly or in part of alien or slave
extraction, and a democracy which did not. Aristotle distinguishes in 3. 5. 1278 a 17 sq., 26 sqq., between democracies which admitted artisans and day-labourers to citizenship and democracies which went further and made half-aliens and vódoi citizens. So Aeschines traces disastrous results to a contamination of the Athenian citizen-body (De Fals. Leg. c. 173, παρεμπεσόντων δ' εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐλευθέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους οὐ μετρίων κ.τ.λ.). Compare the cry sometimes heard in France, 'À bas les Juifs! Vive la France Française!' Some States of the American Union are easier than others in admitting aliens to citizenship (Bryce, American Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62: vol. ii. p. 440 sq.), and this no doubt affects the working of the State-constitution.

3. εὰν μόνον ἣ πολίτης. This answers to δοσι ἢ ἐλευθεροὶ δοσι in c. 6. 1292 b 39. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 27, ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτεων ἐν τισὶ δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν.

4. ἔτερον εἰδος δημοκρατίας κ.τ.λ. Ταύτα seems to mean 'the same as in the last-mentioned kind of democracy.' For κύριον δ' εἴναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τοῦ νόμου (where τὸ πλῆθος = ὁ δήμος, cp. 11 and 26–28), compare c. 14. 1298 b 13, συμβείη δὲ δημοκρατία τῇ μάλιστ' εἴναι δοκούσθη δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν (λέγω δὲ τουαίτην ἐν ἣ κύριος ὁ δήμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) κ.τ.λ. An Attic law quoted in Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 87 and Andoc. De Myst. c. 87 contains a provision, ψήφισμα μηδὲν μήτε βουλής μήτε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι. In the kind of democracy to which Aristotle here refers the assembly sets itself above the law, and passes decrees which are not in accordance with it. The majority of the Athenian assembly claims a right to do this in Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 12, τὸν δὲ Καλλίζεον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φιάσκοσι εὐγράφαναι ἐνρυττάλεμος τὸ ὅ Πεισίανκατος καὶ ἄλλου τινες. τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἐνοί ταύτα ἐπίρουν, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐξω δευνὸν εἶναι εἰ μὴ τὰς ἐὰς τῶν δήμου πράττειν ὅ ἀν βούλητα: cp. [Demosth.] c. Neae. c. 88, ὁ γὰρ δήμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖον κυριώτατος ἀν τῶν ἐν τῷ πολεῖ ἀπαίτων καὶ ἐξον αὐτῶ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἀν βούλητα, οὕτω καλὸν καὶ σεμὲν ἡγήσατ' εἶναι δόρων τῷ Ἀθηναίων γενέσθαι, ὡστε νόμους ἑκατον αὐτῶ καθ' οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ, εἰάν τινα βούλωνται, πολίτης, and see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 310, on these two passages. Aeschines appears to imply in c. Timarch. c. 177 sqq. that decrees were often passed by the Athenian assembly which were in controversy of law. This may well have been the case, notwithstanding what Demosthenes says of Midias in c. Mid. c. 150, πατρίδος τετευχώς ἡ νόμοι τῶν ἀπαζόν πολέων μάλιστα οἰκεῖοθα δοκεῖ.
That Aristotle objects to rule uncontrolled by law, except in the case of the absolute king, we have seen already (see note on 1272 b 7 and cp. also 3. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq.). His statement that when the decrees of the assembly come to be supreme and not the law, this is due to the demagogues, appears to be inconsistent with the statement which he makes immediately after, that demagogues do not arise except in the kind of democracy in which the law is already not supreme. Elsewhere he does not seem to hold that demagogues do not exist in democracies according to law, for he implies in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 29 sqq. that Peisistratus was a demagogue, yet he cannot think that in those early times a democracy existed at Athens in which decrees, not laws, were supreme: see also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq., where it is implied that demagogy is practised even in the πατρία δημοκρατία. In c. 6. 1292 b 41 sqq. the rise of the ultimate kind of democracy is traced to a different cause; it is ascribed not to the flattery of the assembly by demagogues, but to profounder causes—to an increase of the States in populousness and in revenue and to the provision of pay. It is implied in 36 sq. that the difference between a law and a decree of the assembly is that a law is universal in its terms, whereas a decree is drawn to meet the shifting circumstances of the moment (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137 b 27 sqq.) and is not universal. Yet we find an instance of a decree of an universal character in Plut. Aristid. c. 22, γράφει (δ’ Ἀριστείδης) ψήφισμα κοινὸν εἰναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρείσθαι. We might infer from what Aristotle says here that it was the assembly only that shook off the restraints of law in the ultimate democracy, but it would seem from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25–36 that the individual citizens also did so. Did the dicasteries in an ultimate democracy observe the laws? Aristotle appears to be silent as to this in the Politics.

7. τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς. The word δημαγωγός, which appears to be modelled on παιδαγωγός, is occasionally used in a neutral sense of influential ῥήτορες in general (e.g. in Thuc. 4. 21. 3, Isocr. De Antid. § 234, and [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 4), and in 2. 12. 1274 a 14 we hear of δημαγωγοὶ φαύλοι and in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 26 of δημαγωγοὶ πονηροί, so that we conclude that Aristotle regarded some demagogues as good, but he commonly uses the word in an unfavourable sense of those among them who habitually flattered the demos. Here the δημαγωγός is tacitly contrasted with οἱ βέλτιστοι
tōn πολιτῶν, 'the upper class of citizens.' The word is for obvious reasons seldom used by the Attic Orators (with the exception of Isocrates), and, if one may judge by the silence of Ast’s Lexicon Platonicum, never by Plato.


9. οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν, 'the upper class of citizens': cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318b 34 (where οἱ βέλτιστοι = οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ γνώριμοι): Isocr. Hec. § 33 (τοὺς βέλτιστους τῶν πολιτῶν): Diod. 11. 86. 5 (οἱ χαρίστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν): Plut. Phocion, c. 34 (οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν): Thuc. 8. 47 (τοὺς βέλτιστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων): Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 6 (οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαντινέων), and Grote’s remarks on this passage in Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76 (vol. 10. 50, note). It was no doubt a name which this class of the citizens had given themselves (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 22). But the phrase is sometimes used in a more purely ethical sense, e.g. in Isocr. De Pace, § 119, and perhaps in Panath. § 148. In c. 8. 1293 b 41 we have τοὺς ἀριστότοι τῶν πολιτῶν, and in Xen. Hell. 1. 4. 13 κράτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν, used in this ethical sense.

cίοιν ἐν προεδρίᾳ = κίοιν οἱ μέγιστοι (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22).

11. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δήμος γίνεται κ.τ.λ., 'for there' (i.e. where the laws are not supreme) 'the demos becomes a monarch.' The picture of a tyrant Demos surrounded by flatterers comes to Aristotle from the Equites of Aristophaenes: cp. Eq. 1111 Didot,

Δῆμε, καλὴν γ’ ἔχεις ἄρχειν, ὅτε πάντες ἄν-θρωποι δειαί σ’ ὀσ-περ ἀνδρα τύραννον,

'Αλλ’ εὐπαράγωγος εἰ, θωπονύμονός τε καί-ρεις κ.τ.λ.

and 1330,

dεξιωτέ τῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡμῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς μόναρχος.

Compare 7 (5). 111. 1313 b 38 sqq., 2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq., and 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31 sqq. It is when a democracy or an oligarchy (c. 6. 1293 a 17 sqq.) comes to be like a monarchy that law ceases to be supreme and men become supreme in place of it.

N 2
NOTES.

13. Ὀμηρος, in II. 2. 203 sqq., where Odysseus addressing men of the people says,

οὐ μὲν τωι πάντες βασίλευσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοι.
οὐκ ἀγαθῶν πολυκοιρανή' εἰς κόιρανος ἕστω,
εἰς βασιλείας, ὁ ἐδώκε Κρόνου παῖς ἄγκυλομήτεως.

Aristotle sees that there may be two kinds of πολυκοιρανή, one in which the ruler is one, though made up of many individuals, and another in which there are more rulers than one. As to the evils of the latter kind, see Thuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18, and Isocr. Nicocl. § 24 sq.

15. δ ς' οὖν τοιούτος δήμος κ.τ.λ., 'be that as it may, the kind of demos we have mentioned,' etc., as in 23, though in 17 the same words must mean (as in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11) 'a democracy of the kind we have mentioned.' By δ τοιούτος δήμος is meant a demos which is not ruled by law. For the thought cp. Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 426 Nauck (506, ed. 2),

πάντων τύραννος ἢ τύχη ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν,
τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὅνωμα ταύτα πρόσκειται μάτην-
μόνη διοικείν οὖν ἄπαντα βούλεται,
or, if we adopt Nauck's reading in his second edition,

μόνη διοικεί γοῦν ἄπανθ' ἢ βούλεται.


καὶ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1292 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 5 sq., 37 sq., and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq. Had this been said of the ultimate democracy by any one before? Aristotle, however, does not probably mean to say that this kind of democracy is as bad as tyranny, for tyranny combines in itself the evils of the extreme forms of oligarchy and democracy (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3 sqq., 1311 a 8 sqq.: see also above on 1289 a 39).

19. δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιώνων. Cp. c. 10. 1295 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. In the first, or most moderate, form of democracy the ἑπικείσαι καὶ γνώριμοι are not ruled by men worse than themselves (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 35 sqq.).

20. τὰ ἑπιτάγματα, the technical term for the 'ukases' of tyrants: cp. Plato, Laws 722 E, τυραννικὸν ἑπίταγμα, and 859 A: Stob. Floril. 99. 34, ὁ φιλοσοφία, τυραννικά σοι τὰ ἑπιτάγματα, and Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 185, where, however, it is implied that oligarchies
issue ἐπιτάγματα as well as tyrants: also (with Vict.) Demosth. Ol. 2. 30, εἰ δέ τοῖς μὲν δοστερ ἐκ τυραννίδος ὑμῶν ἐπιτάγματα ἀποδώσετε. Προστάγματα δεσποτῶν occurs in Plut. Pelop. c. 34.

καὶ ὁ δημαγογός καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ὦτα αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. Cp. 7 (5). Π. 1313 b 40 and Aristot. Fragm. 421. 1548 a 24, τῶν δημαγωγῶν τὰ πλήθη κολακεύοντων, ὡς φησιν 'Ἀριστοτέλης εὖ πολιτείας (referred to in Bon. Ind. 174 a 38). Καὶ before ἀνάλογον means 'or,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8, δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. See also note on 1294 a 35.

23. τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. For the omission of παρά, see notes on 1274 b 12 and 1295 a 29.

25. πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δήμον, everything, even matters regulated by law. For ἀνάγοντες cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 32 sqq. and 2. 8. 1267 b 40. For the fact cp. c. 15. 1300 a 3 sq. and 7 (5). 1305 a 29 sqq.

28. ἐπὶ δὲ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες κ.τ.λ., 'and further those who bring charges against the magistrates [also add to the supremacy of the people, for they] say,' etc. Not a few held that the many were the fittest judges of disputed questions when the arguments of the contending parties had been placed before them (3. ii: 3. 16. 1287 b 23 sqq.: so Athenagoras in Thuc. 6. 39. 1).

29. δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν, 'receives the invitation' to decide the question at issue. Δέχεσθαι τὴν πρόκλησιν is a phrase of frequent occurrence (Thuc. 3. 64. 5: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 39 init.: Plut. Pyrrh. c. 12 init., Sulla, c. 22 sub fin.), and in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 41 we have τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν δήμων πρόκλησιν. Thus there is little doubt that πρόκλησις is the true reading here, and not πρόσκλησις, though the latter reading has the support of Vat. Pal. as well as Π. 

ὡστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, as well as the law. Even the Boulè (c. 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.).


οὐ πολιτείαιν. For the position of the negative see Waitz on Categ. 6. 4 b 22 and Bon. Ind. 539 a 5 sqq.

32. ὅπως γάρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχοῦσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. Cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 9 sqq. If it is objected that the absolute kingship, in which laws do not rule, is nevertheless a form of constitution,
Aristotle’s reply would probably be that the absolute king is himself a law.

"δεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the law ought to rule over everything, and the magistrates and the citizen-body to decide [only] in reference to particulars.' For the suppression of 'only' see note on 1282 a 36. Aristotle probably remembers the saying of Pindar quoted in Hdt. 3. 38 (ep. Plut. Demetr. c. 42), ὃρθος μοι δοκεῖ, Πύνδαρος παίγνις, νόμον πάντων βασιλεία φήσας εἶναι. The magistrates and the citizen-body should decide about particulars, because the magistrates will deal with some things best and the citizen-body with others (3. 11. 1281 b 21–38: 3. 15. 1286 a 26 sqq.: 3. 16. 1287 b 15 sqq.). For the gen. τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστα, see Kühner, Ausführ. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 417. 4. Anm. 10 c (p. 363), where Plato, Rep. 576 D, ἀλλ’ εἰδαμονίας τε αὐτός καὶ ἀδιάλυτος ὡσάντως ἢ ἄλλος κρίνεις; is referred to (see Stallbaum’s note), and cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, αἰ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον εἰσὶ τῶν κοινῶν (see note on 1322 b 37). For πολιτεία in the sense of 'universitas civium' see Bon. Ind. s. v. and Liddell and Scott.


36. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου, and in constitutions the universal rules, because law rules in them and law is an embodiment of the universal.

C. 5. 39. As to the various kinds of oligarchy see Essay on Constitutions.

40. μὴ μετέχειν, sc. τῶν ἀρχῶν, or, which is the same thing, τῆς πολιτείας.

πλείους δοταγ. But suppose the poor are not more numerous but fewer than the privileged class, does not an oligarchy exist even then? The answer given in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 19 sq. is 'No,' but in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq. 'Yes.' In the polity the class which shares in the advantages of the constitution is more numerous than that which does not (c. 13. 1297 b 4 sqq.). Even in an oligarchy the privileged class ought to be stronger than those excluded (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 26 sqq.).
41. ἔζειναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας. That this was the rule in the first form of oligarchy is confirmed by 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26–28). The words before us are added because even where the property-qualification was not high, admission to the privileged class might be made subject to additional conditions, such as the abandonment of trade or selection by the authorities (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26 sqq.).

1. διὰν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὄσων αἱ ἀρχαί. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 1292 b. 21 sqq.

καὶ αἰρώνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας. Αὐτοὶ is usually explained to mean 'the office-holders,' but in c. 6. 1293 a 23, where the kind of oligarchy referred to in the passage before us is further described, αὐτοὶ means οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, or in other words 'the class which has access to office, the members of the πολίτευμα,' and that is probably what it means here. Τοὺς ἐλλείποντας is explained in c. 6. 1293 a 24 by τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας. I can hardly think, therefore, that the explanation of Bonitz (Ind. 238 b 10), 'eos magistratus qui desunt,' is correct.

2. αὖ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. ΄Εκ πάντων τούτων, 'from all those who possess this property-qualification.' For τούτων thus used cp. ταύτα, 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 24, and see note on 1252 a 33. Aristotle regards this mode of electing as comparatively aristocratic, and the mode in which the choice is made from a designated section of those who possess the property-qualification as oligarchical, because, when some elect out of all, the arrangement is aristocratic (c. 15. 1300 b 4 sq.), and when some elect out of some, oligarchical (1300 b 1 sq.).

5. εἰσίν, sc. εἰς τὰς ἀρχαίς (so Stahr and Welldon), or possibly εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα, not, I think, εἰς τὴν βουλὴν (as Bonitz suggests, Ind. 224 b 15, where c. 14. 1298 b 2 sqq. is compared).

6. τέ is displaced; it should follow ὑπάρχῃ, not τῷ.

7. καὶ ἔστων κ.τ.λ. This echoes the corresponding remark about the extreme democracy in c. 4. 1292 a 17.

For ἀυτόστροφος ὑσπερ, cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 3, ὅτι ἀνάλογων ὡς τοὺς ἄρρεσιν ἡ γονὴ ὡστὸ τὰς ἰδίες ἡ καταμίμη, φανέρων. Aristotle probably has before him here Thuc. 3. 62. 4, where the Thebans say, ἦμων μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν ὡστὸ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνίσονον πολιτεύουσα ὡστὸ κατὰ δημοκρατίαν. ὑσπερ δὲ ἔστι νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντίωτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυφάνου, δυναστία ἀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶξε τὰ πράγματα. See also c. 6. 1293 a 31 and 2. 10. 1272 b 7–11.
NOTES.

9. καὶ καλουσι δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'and further they call,' etc. For καὶ . . .
δὴ see note on 1253 a 18. Vict. 'quare addit, vocare consuerunt
hunc dominatum paucorum dynastiam, quia par similisque est
huiusce modi principatu: dynastas vero appellare mos erat regulos.'
Zeus is called a δύναστης in Soph. Antig. 609. For the term
δυναστεία see (with C. F. Hermann) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 (quoted above)
Hell. 5. 4. 46: Isocr. Paneg. § 105.

11. οὐ δὲὶ δὲ λαυθάνειν κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to convey
a caution: compare the similar caution introduced by δὲὶ δὲ μὴ
λαυθάνειν in 3. 1. 1275 a 34 sqq. We must not suppose that the
list of democracies and oligarchies just given exhausts the subject.
It is not the case that the only democratically ruled States are
those in which the constitution as embodied in the laws is-demo-
cratic, and the only oligarchically ruled States those in which it is
oligarchical. There are virtual as well as actual democracies and
oligarchies. A State may be democratically ruled, though its con-
stitution is oligarchical, if its customs and training are democratic,
and a State may be oligarchically ruled, though its constitution is
democratic, if its customs and training are oligarchical. When the
constitution is not in harmony with the prevailing customs and
training, the reason usually is that a revolution has occurred which
has affected the customs and training of the State, but has not yet
affected its constitution. Under circumstances of this kind the
law is often the last thing to be changed. Plato had already
spoken to much the same effect (Rep. 424 D: see vol. i. p. 78,
note r). It is interesting to observe that revolutions of a demo-
cratic or oligarchical nature were attended with changes of customs
and training. A democratic revolution would bring with it an
alteration in the bearing of the poor to the rich and of the rich to
the poor, and an oligarchical revolution an alteration of an opposite
kind. Mr. Bryce (American Commonwealth, end of c. 76) refers
to England as a country 'where, though the constitution has
become democratic, the habits of the nation are still aristocratic':
this is the reverse change to that described by Aristotle. For συμ-
βάνειν followed by ὡστε see note on 1261 a 34. For the distinction
between οἱ νόμοι and τὸ έθος καὶ ἡ ἀγωγή, cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 103, έὰν
μὴ θυτῶν τῶν νόμων κατὰ ἐθη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα χρηστῶς πολιτεύωμαι, for
ἐπιτηδεύματα = ἀγωγή, as we see from Diod. 11. 87. 5, καὶ καθόλου
πολλοί τὰ φαύλα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀντὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ σπουδαίας ἀγωγῆς

6. ἀλάττοντο. Some light is thrown on the meaning of ἀγωγή by Diod. 9. 1. 4, ὅτι δέ αοὺς Σίλων τὴν ἀλήν ἀγωγὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐχοῦσιν Ἰωάκην, καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν μαστώνην ἐκτεθηλμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μετέθηκε τῇ συνθείᾳ πρὸς ἀρετήν καὶ ζηλον τῶν ἀρεσκόντων πραξέων.

14. The subject of πολιτεύεσθαι is probably τὴν πολιτείαν, 12, as the subject of ἀλγαρχεύσθαι, 16, is τὴν πολιτείαν, 15 (cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 1): compare Plato, Laws 701 E, τούτων ἐνεκα δὴ πολιτείας τὴν τε δεσποτικότατην προελόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερικότατην ἐπισκοποῦμεν νυν, ποτέρα τούτων ὑπὸ τοῖς πολιτεύεσται, and see note on 1293 b 8.

18. οὐ γὰρ ἑυθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν, sc. ἐξ ἀλγαρχιᾶς ἐς δημοκρατίαν, or vice versa, ‘for they’ (i.e. the citizens of the State which undergoes a change of constitution) do not [in this case] change at once from the one constitution to the other’ (cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D). Bonitz (Ind. s. v. μεταβαίνειν) supplies αἱ πολιτείαι, but it seems better to supply the same subject with μεταβαίνουσιν and with ἀγωγῶι.

19. παρ’ ἀλλήλων, i.e. the oligarchical party from the democratic or vice versa.

23. ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων, i.e. probably from the account which C. 6. has been given in c. 4. 1291 b 17 sqq. of the different ἐδήν or μέρη τοῦ δήμου. The reference may, however, possibly be to c. 3. 1289 b 32 sq. and 1290 a 3–5. For in one form of democracy (the ultimate form) all these kinds of demos both share (μετέχουσι) in the constitution and take an active part in its working (κοινωνοῦσι), whereas in two at any rate of the three other forms not all of them even share in it, access to a share in it being accorded in the one to those only who acquire a certain property-qualification, and in the other to those whose extraction is unimpeachable, while in all three those who share in the constitution (owing to the absence of revenues and consequently of pay) have not the leisure to take an active part in its working.

25. τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν. The γεωργικοί are a part only of τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν, for the νομεῖς also belong to this category (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 9 sqq.) and probably other classes. The γεωργικοί of Aristotle are evidently peasant-proprietors, and the νομεῖς also may have been owners of land as well as of the herds and flocks they tended (see notes on 1318 b 9 and 1319 a 19, and for cases of the existence of democracies of this kind see note on 1318 b 10). We read of μετρία οὐσία here and in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sq., and the class which is here said to have μετρία οὐσία appears to be the same as that which is said in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sq. to
have μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν: we read, again, of οὕσια μέση καὶ ἱκανή, a larger amount apparently, in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 40, of μικρὰ οὕσια in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 and οὕσια βραχεία in 2. 7. 1267 a 9 sq., and of μακρὰ οὕσια and μακρὰ οὐσίαι in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16 and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11.

28. τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες, ‘setting the law over men’s doings as a ruler’: cp. Plut. Solon, c. 21, ἐπέστησε δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐξίδους τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐορταῖς νόμου ἀπείρογα τὸ ἅτακτον καὶ ἀκύλατον, and c. 6. 1293 a 20, ἀνάγκη τῶν νόμων ἀξίων αἰτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦς. 

έκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11, διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχεων ἀσχολοῦ (ἄ γεωργικός δῆμος), ὅστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιαζέων. It was when meetings of the assembly came to be frequent that it was led to draw all authority to itself (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.) and to set itself above the law.

29. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν κ.τ.λ. So that not only does the class in possession of power rule in accordance with law, but the admission of those outside it to its ranks is also regulated by law, and indeed by a law which does not leave it free to admit or exclude whomsoever it pleases: contrast the law referred to in 1293 a 23 sqq. Μετέχειν, sc. τῆς πολιτείας (cp. 39), or in other words τῶν ἀρχῶν, though the γεωργικὸν and οἱ κεκτημένοι μετρίαν οὐσίαν would enjoy only a nominal access to office, as they would not be rich enough to hold office without pay (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 13 sqq.), and pay is not forthcoming in this kind of democracy. It is not clear whether in democracies of this type purity of extraction is made a condition of sharing in the constitution, as well as the possession of a certain property-qualification, but this may be Aristotle’s meaning.

30. ἄλος μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for that it should not be open on any terms to all to share in the constitution is characteristic of an oligarchy [and inappropriate to a democracy], but that it should be open to all to do so is characteristic of a democracy; hence it is open [in this form of democracy] to all who have acquired the property-qualification to share in the constitution, but it is impossible [for the ruling class in it] to take leisure in the absence of revenues, [and consequently to hold office].’ As to the text of this passage see critical note on 1292 b 30–33. Ὁ λος qualifies μὴ ἔχειναι: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8, ἦ τὸ ἄλος μὴ ἔχειναι κεκτήσθαι πλείω γὰρ μέτρου τινὸς ἦ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. For the repetition of μὲν
33. theo tov μὲν οὖν εἴδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας, 'this then is one kind of democracy by reason of these causes': i.e. it is marked off from other kinds by the fact that, while it opens office to all who can acquire a moderate property-qualification, and therefore is a democracy, office in it falls to those who are enabled by adequate means to take leisure. For διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας cp. 1293 a 10 sqq. and c. 10. 1295 a 23, τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταύτα καὶ τοσάυτα διὰ τὰς εἰρήμενας αἰτίας.

35. διὰ τὴν ἔχομενην διαίρεσιν. I follow Spengel, Sus., and Bonitz (Ind. 18 b 52) in reading διαίρεσιν in place of αίρεσιν, which is the reading of Π Bekk. Sus. translates διὰ τὴν ἔχομενην διαίρεσιν, 'durch die zunächst angrenzende Unterscheidung' ('by reason of the distinction which stands next in order'). Διὰ τὴν ἔχομενην αίρεσιν is rendered by Sepulveda 'per proximam rationem mandandi magistratus,' and so Vict., Lamb., and others. I should prefer the rendering 'by reason of the choice [of a ruling class] which stands next in order,' if αίρεσιν were retained, but it seems better to read διαίρεσιν.

καὶ πᾶσιν . . . τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, 'to all those also who are not open to objection on the score of extraction,' as well as to those who possess a certain property-qualification. For τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, see above on 1292 a 2, and cp. Libanius' Life of Demosthenes (prefixed to Bekker's Demosthenes, p. 5), Δημοσθένης τοῖνε τῷ μῆτροι πατήρ ἢν Δημοσθένης, ἀνεπελήπτος τῷ γένει δοκῶν: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 169, ὅμως ὁινότα τοῖς δὲν ὑμᾶς ὀμολογήσαι τάδε δειν ὑπάρξαι τῷ δημοτικῷ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθερον αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ πρὸς μητρός, ἢν μὴ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸ γένος ἀνυχιάν δυσμενής ἢ.
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de democracy furnished only when it is populous, one citizen parent would be accounted δελεύθερον.

Because, as there is no revenue to furnish the ruling class with pay, they cannot meet in the popular assembly often enough to usurp the place of the law (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 3 sq.).

1. ἡ τελευταία τοὺς χρόνους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. Cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 29, τὴν νεωτάτην δημοκρατίαν. Aristotle's language in 3. 4. 1277 b 11, διὰ παρ' ἑνίων οὓς μετείχον οἱ δημοσύνοι τὸ πολιάν ἀρχών, πρὶν δὴμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἑαυτόν, suggests that he regarded the ultimate democracy as not having been introduced very recently.

dia γάρ κ.τ.λ. Does τὰς πόλεις here mean 'cities' or 'States'? 'Ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι in the preceding sentence means 'in the States'; it is probably, therefore, better to take τὰς πόλεις to mean 'States,' but when States are said to have grown larger, or in other words more populous (for, notwithstanding 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 24 sq., μείζων seems here to mean 'more populous'), the increase referred to in their population is no doubt an increase in the population, and especially the citizen-population, of the central city and its seaport, if it has one, not an increase in the rural population. Hence the meaning of the passage is much the same, whether we translate τὰς πόλεις 'cities' or 'States.' That an increase in the size and populousness of a State was favourable to democracy, and in particular to extreme democracy, we see from 3. 15. 1286 b 20 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sq.: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 62, τῶν τοῖνυν ἄλλων πόλεων ταῖς ἑπιφανεστάταις καὶ μεγίσταις . . . εὑρήσομεν τὰς δημοκρατίας μᾶλλον ἤ τὰς ὀλεγαρχίας συμφερούσας. Athens is described by Critias in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 24 as 'the most populous of Greek States.' This increase in population would lead to an increase of revenue, because a large part of the revenue of Greek States was derived from imposts which would become more productive as the population of the State increased, such as customs, market-dues (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 29 sq.), fees and fines in the lawcourts, and the like, to say nothing of the probability that the State, as it became more populous, would acquire dependent allies and would receive tribute from them. Compare Xen. Anab. 7. 1. 27 and Demosth. Phil. 3.
An ultimate democracy might, however, exist where there were no πρόσοδοι (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sqq.). For προσόδοις εὐπορίας cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 2. 1422 a 13, προσόδοις εὐπορία (with Bonitz), and for the plural εὐπορίας Demosth. De Pace, c. 8, τοῖς ἐκείθεν ἐνδήσε τὰς εὐπορίας ἄγουσιν, and Diod. 12. 30. 1, διά τὰς προειρημένας εὐμερίας.

3. μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλῆθους, 'all share in the constitution on account of the superiority' (in number, not in quality) 'of the multitude': cp. c. 12. 1296 b 24, ὅπως μὲν οὖν ὑπερίχει τὸ τῶν ὁπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατία, καὶ ἑκαστὸν εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἐκάστον, and 1296 b 34.

4. κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ πολιτεύονται. Cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὅ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύονται καὶ κοινωνοῦν πάλινος (βίος). For κοινωνοῦσι cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 2. Πολιτεύονται is a wider term than ἄρχειν: it includes sharing in any kind of political activity, for instance habitual attendance at the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. Pay enabled the poor to attend frequent meetings of the assembly (Plato, Rep. 565 A: Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 1 sqq.).

6. τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆθος, 'the kind of multitude we have described,' i.e. one composed of poor men receiving pay.

8. τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq. Aristotle does not say that the rich often did not belong to the Bouλε, but this seems to be a natural inference from these passages. It is hardly likely that at Athens, if the lot fell on them and they declined to serve, they were forced to do so. They do not appear to have been liable to any fine for refusing to serve on the dicasteries (c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.), and they were probably not liable to a fine if they declined to serve on the Bouλε. As to the absence of the rich from the dicasteries at Athens see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 289.

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τὴν ἀνάγκην βουλεῖ τὸ μετὰ τούτο διελθαμεν, the word ἀνάγκη is explained as = 'causa' by Ast, Lex. Platon. s. v.

12. τὰ δὲ τῆς ὀλγαρχίας, sc. τοσαύτα καὶ τοιαύτα ἐστιν.

15. καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι κ.τ.λ. For τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος cp. c. 13. 1297 b 9. We see from what follows that the mere numerousness of the dominant class does not by itself suffice to secure the supremacy of the law, if the dominant class possesses leisure, being either so rich as to be able to live without paying close attention to its property or so poor as to be supported by State-pay. The class which is supreme in an ultimate democracy is very numerous, and yet it becomes collectively a monarch, because it possesses leisure, being supported by State-pay.

17. We expect ὅσο γὰρ ἐν πλείον κ.τ.λ. to be answered by τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον ἀνάγκη τῶν νόμον ἀξίοιν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, but the clause is in fact answered by ἀνάγκη τῶν νόμον ἀξίοιν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν without τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον. This is probably due to the interposition of καὶ μήτε... πόλεως between ὅσο γὰρ ἐν πλείον ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας and ἀνάγκη τῶν νόμον ἀξίοιν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν. It rarely happens that τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον is omitted after ὅσο with a comparative. Kühner (Ausführung. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 582. ii. 2. Anm. 1), however, gives an instance of this from Xen. Cyrop. i. 3. 14, καὶ χάριν σοι εἴσομαι ὅσο ἐν πλεονάκης εἰσίς ὅσ ἐμί, and another will be found in Demosth. Prooem. 51. p. 1457, ὅσο γὰρ ἐν πλεονάκης ἐξετάζῃ τις αὐτά, ἀνάγκη τοῖς τούτων αἰτίων εὐδοκιμεῖν.

20. Vict., Eaton, and Sus. take αὐτοῖς to be in the dative after ἄρχειν (Vict. 'statuere ut lex ipsis imperet'), but the Index Aristotelicus gives no instance of ἄρχειν governing the dative, and perhaps we should rather translate 'for them' (Welldon, 'in their case'). The position of the word makes it unlikely that it is to be taken with ἀνάγκη.

22. πλεῖω δὲ, sc. οὐσίαν ἔχωσι.


26. τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιούτων, 'they enact the law in terms of that kind,' i.e. to the effect that the members of the πολίτευμα shall have the power to elect those who are to be admitted into it from the outside. In the third form of oligarchy the law provides that when a member of the πολίτευμα dies, his son shall succeed him, so that in this form no one is admitted from outside (28 sqq.). For
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cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 680 b 27, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δ’ αὑτίνι καὶ ἡ κοιλία τούτη ἐσχισταί.

ἐπιτείνωσι, ‘strain matters further in the direction of excess.’ For ἐπιτείνωσι, ‘non addito obiecto,’ Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) refers to 7 (5).

28. For ἰ’ αὐτῶν ἢσειν cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 12, and Aristid. Leuctr. i. p. 421, λέγειν γὰρ ἡθη πρὸς αὐτοὺς Θέαμειώνδαν ἂς οὐδὲν ὀφελεῖ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πλεονεκτήματος, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν βάλατταν δ’ αὐτῶν ἔσοισιν.

29. τῶν τελευτώντων, ‘those who from time to time die’: cp. 2. 8. 1268 a 8, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 20, τῶν πιστῶτων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὀδὸν σωτηρία καὶ διάφθορας, and 1322 b 21: also Plut. Lycurg. c. 26.

31. ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν repeats Thuc. 3. 62. 4, quoted above on 1292 b 7. ‘Ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία, i.e. a δυναστεία τῶν πολίων ὑπερενιότον ταῖς οὔσιν καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις.


35. Ἐτι δ’ εἰσι κ.τ.λ., ‘and further there are,’ etc. Besides that C. 7. there are more kinds of democracy and oligarchy than one, there are other constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. Aristotle has now dealt with the question which stands first in the programme contained in c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq., the question how many varieties of democracy and oligarchy there are, and we expect that he will pass on to the next, τίς πολιτεία κοινωτάτη καὶ τίς ἀρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, but this he does not do; he does not deal with this question till c. 11, and cc. 7-10 are occupied with investigations respecting constitutions which have not hitherto been sufficiently studied. Aristocracy has been studied, so far as it is coincident with the best constitution, but the ‘so-called aristocracy’ (which, it would seem from 1293 a 38 sq., was the only form of aristocracy commonly included in enumerations of constitutions) has not been studied, nor have polity and tyranny. These forms are therefore dealt with in cc. 7-10, before Aristotle passes on to the question τίς πολιτεία κοινωτάτη καὶ τίς ἀρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν. Aristotle has, in fact, already promised in c. 2. 1289 a 35 sqq. to treat of polity and tyranny as well as of democracy and oligarchy, so that we are prepared for the investigations contained in cc. 7-10 with the exception of those relating to the so-called aristocracy. In 35 his words are παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε καὶ ὀλεγαρχίαν, but in strictness he should have said παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλεγαρχίαν καὶ μοναρχίαν.
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(cp. c. 8. 1294 a 26). When he says that all included aristocracy in their list of constitutions, his statement is not literally correct (see vol. i. p. 211, note 1). The view, however, that there were four constitutions, monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, was no doubt a common one; we trace it in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 22 sq., in Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 29 sq., and in the title of the Πολιτείαι ascribed to Aristotle, Πολιτείαι πολέων δυοίς δεούσαιν ρξ... δημοκρατικαί, ὀλιγαρχικαί, ἀριστοκρατικαί, τυραννικαί (where however τυραννικαί takes the place of monarchy, and kingship is omitted), Aristot. Fragm. 1465 b (143).

36. ὅν τὴν μὲν ἐτέραν λέγουσι τε πάντες καὶ εἰρηται κ.τ.λ. For the structure of the sentence cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 27, ὅσα μὴ τοῖς ἱερεύσιν ἀποδίωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμὴν.

38. τέταρτον δὲ τὴν καλομένην ἀριστοκρατίαν, 'and in the fourth place the so-called aristocracy.' Aristotle appears to imply that no one had yet included in their list the true aristocracy, that in which the good citizen is also a good man. Even the aristocracy sketched in Plato's Republic would count among its citizens many who could not be called good men in the sense which Aristotle attaches to the term.

39. πέμπτη δ' ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. The existence of the 'polity' specially so called was generally recognized (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν, cp. c. 8. 1293 b 34 sqq.), but those who sought to enumerate the different kinds of constitutions had omitted it from their lists. As to Plato, indeed, all that Aristotle says is that he had not included the polity in the list of constitutions given in the Republic, so that Aristotle's words do not absolutely exclude the supposition that he regarded it as included in the list given in the Politicus (302 C sqq.). In Laws 712 C Plato enumerates only three constitutions, democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, in addition to tyranny and kingship (=monarchy). The expression ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις refers either to the Republic of Plato as a whole (for other instances of the use of it in this sense see Henkel, Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat, p. 10, who refers to Themist. Or. 2. 32 c, Πολιτείαι τε αἱ κλειναὶ καὶ οἱ βεσσέσιαι Νόμοι, etc.) or (as Bonitz, Ind. 598 a 42, and Sus., Note 1231, think) to the Eighth and Ninth Books of it only (see note on 1342 a 32). Though Aristotle says here that the Polity 'did not occur frequently,' we gather from c. 13. 1297 b 24 sq. that what were called democracies in early times were really polities, and of early democracies there can have been no lack; besides, as Prof. Francotte points out (Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement
d'après Aristote, p. 17, note 1), the polity appears to have existed at one time or another at Malis (c. 13. 1297 b 14 sqq.), at Tarentum (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 3 sqq.), at Syracuse (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.), and at Oreus (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 18 sqq.).

1. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'true, it is right to call by the 1293 b. name of aristocracy,' etc. Aristotle feels it necessary to justify his use of the name in 38 sq. in reference to the 'so-called aristocracy.' As to the reference in περὶ ἦτε διάλογου εἰς τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις see vol. ii. p. xxiv. Susa. (p. 367) takes the reference to be to the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, and it is very possible that 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.) is referred to, but this is not certain, and as a similar account of the best constitution is already in substance given in the Third Book (cc. 4–5, c. 7. 1279 a 34 sqq., c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq., and c. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq.), the reference may be to the Third Book. It is not certain that the Fourth and Fifth Books were in existence when the words before us were written (see note on 1289 a 30 and vol. ii. p. xxv sqq.).

3. τὴν γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for to only one constitution is it right to apply the name of aristocracy, to the constitution the citizens of which are men best in respect of virtue absolutely and not merely good with reference to certain given conditions, for in this constitution alone the same man is an absolutely good man and good citizen, whereas in all others good citizens are good men only relatively to their own constitution' (i.e. with reference to certain given conditions, not absolutely). 'Ἀριστοκρατίαν κατ' ἀρετήν, 'best in respect of virtue,' and not merely in respect of other things such as practical ability or serviceableness to the constitution under which they live (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10, κρείττων κατ' ἀρετήν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων). For the account here given of aristocracy cp. 4. (7). 9. 1328 b 37, ἐν τῇ κάλλιστᾳ πολιτευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δυκαίως ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἄλλα μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and 3. 5. 1278 b 1 sqq., and as to the variation of virtue and justice with the constitution, 3. 4. 1276 b 30 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq. For πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν, cp. Prob. 10. 52. 896 b 22, where τὸ πρὸς χρείαν τινὰ καλὸν is contrasted with τὸ καθ' αὐτὰ καλὸν.

8. τὰς διλιγαιρούμενα, sc. πολιτείας (see note on 1292 b 14).

The words καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι, which follow διαφοράς in ΠΠ, are placed by Thurot and Sus. after πολιτείαν, probably rightly. Jackson and Welldon would omit them.

10. ὅπως γε κ.τ.λ., 'seeing that in them,' etc.: cp. Plato, Rep. VOL. IV.
343 A. ὅτι τοῖς σε, ἔφη, κορυφώντα περιορᾷ καὶ ὁποὶ ἀπομίτει δεόμενον, ὅτε γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγαντιάκες. Ἡκὼν γε often==’quando-quidem,’ and Liddell and Scott, s.v. ὅπου, give the words that meaning here, but in ὅπου γε as used here ὅπου seems to retain its ordinary meaning of ‘where.’ Magistrates are elected πλουτιδῆν in oligarchies (2. 11. 1273 a 21 sqq.), and Aristotle appears to imply here that they are not elected even partially ἀριστιδῆν in polities (see vol. i. p. 219, note 2). How far does this agree with what we are told in 3. 17. 1288 a 14 sq., that elections to office in polities take place κατὰ νόμον τὸν καρ’ ἄξιαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχὰς? Perhaps to distribute office among the well-to-do in accordance with ἄξια is not to elect ἀριστιδῆν. It should be noticed that in 2. 11. 1273 a 23 sqq. a constitution in which magistracies are filled ἀριστιδῆν καὶ πλουτιδῆν is distinguished from an aristocracy on the ground that in an aristocracy election to office is καρ’ ἀρετῆν. Aristotle’s conception of aristocracy in the Sixth Book appears to be less strict than in the Second.

11. αὐτῇ ἡ πολιτεία. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

12. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain and justify ἀριστιδῆν and ἀριστοκρατικῆ. When, in the absence of a public care for virtue on the part of the State, men reputed to be good (ἐπιεικεῖ) are elected to office, the community may fairly be said to elect ἀριστιδῆν and its constitution may be called aristocratic. Cp. Rhet. 1. 8, 1365 b 35, οἱ γὰρ ἑμμεμενύκτες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἁρχουσιν ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτον φαινεσθαι ἀριστοτεύς ὧδε καὶ τοῦτον εἰληφθε τοῦτο, and Plato, Laws 854 B, ἦδι ἐπὶ τάς τῶν λεγομένων ἄνδρων ὑμῖν ἁγαθῶν ἔφωναίς. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 554 C, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξουσιοβαλαισ... ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι: also Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 25, (Ἐφιάλτης) δοκῶν ἀδωροδόκητος εἶναι καὶ δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, and the line of Cratinus quoted on 1291 b 5. Πόλεις must be supplied with ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιομέναις κοινῆ ἐπιμέλειαι ἀρετῆς: this is a word which is frequently omitted by Aristotle (see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1288 b 38). For the use of ἔμως here cp. De Part. An. i. 5. 645 a 5 sqq. (quoted in note on 1258 b 10).

14. ὅπου οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not explain why a constitution which recognizes virtue and wealth only is not an aristocracy. Looking to 10, we expect him to regard a constitution of this kind as an aristocracy. Such a constitution would seem at any rate to be superior to constitutions which do not recognize virtue at all, yet these are allowed the name of aristocracies in 20 sq.
19. τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν.  Ὁμ. c. 8. 1294 a 24, τὴν ἀληθεύου καὶ πρῶτην, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 3, τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης σωτῆς, and 28, τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην.

20. καὶ τρίτον κ.τ.λ., ‘and in the third place whatever [mixed] constitutions incline towards oligarchy more than the polity does,’ for πολιτεία should probably be supplied with ὅσα, and not ἀριστοκρατία (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15, where πολιτείας, not ἀριστοκρατίας, must be supplied). Aristotle here departs from the account which he frequently gives of aristocracy as a constitution in which virtue is recognized in the award of office either alone or in combination with other things, and concedes the name to constitutions in which this is not the case. Hence Sus. brackets as interpolated καὶ τρίτον ἁμαρτιαποθετέρα, but the same view reappears in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10–16, and Sus. is compelled to bracket this passage together with its context, a course in which it is difficult to follow him. It seems more probable that both passages are genuine, and that Aristotle is guilty of an inconsistency, into which he is led, partly by his reluctance to depart too far from the ordinary classification (cp. De Part. An. i. 3. 643 b 10 sqq.) and from the ordinary use of language, partly by the difficulty of bringing these constitutions under any other of the six forms of constitution recognized by him, and partly by the kinship which (following Plato in Polit. 301 A and other inquirers) he always conceives to exist between aristocracy and oligarchy (3. 7. 1279 b 5: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). See Prof. H. Sidgwick in the Classical Review, 6. 144.

23. ἐπάνω τῶν δ' οὕτως, sc. τὴν ὄνομαζομένην πολιτείαν. Οὔτως, i.e. C. 8. among the παρεκβασιες, and not before them, where we expect to find polity dealt with looking to the announcements in c. 2. 1289 a 35 sqq. and 3. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq.

24. ταῦτην, i.e. the polity. See note on 1306 b 26.

25. In τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς we have an instance of μὲν solitarium (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34).

πάσα, i.e. both polity and the aristocracies just described.

26. ἐπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, ‘and consequently are counted with the deviation-forms’: cp. c. 3. 1290 a 16 sqq., where aristocracy is said to be often held to be a form of oligarchy and polity of democracy.

εἰσὶ τ' αὐτῶν αὕτως παρεκβασιες, ‘and these deviation-forms are deviation-forms of them’ (i.e. of the aristocracies just described and of polity). This implies that oligarchy is a deviation-form of
the so-called aristocracy and not of the true aristocracy, but we are not told this elsewhere. Tyranny at any rate is a deviation-form of the true kingship (c. 2. 1289 a 40).

27. ἐν τοῖς κατ’ ἀρχήν, i.e. in 3. 7, where however oligarchy is not said to be a deviation-form of the so-called aristocracy, but of aristocracy generally.

tελευταίον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Contrast Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου (i.e. ἀνθρώπου) τελευταίον λεκτέω διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἐχεῖν πραγματείαν (comparing with this passage c. 10. 1295 a 1 sqq.). That tyranny is the worst of the deviation-forms we have been told in c. 2. 1289 a 39 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3 sqq.).

30. τέτακται, sc. ταῦτα. Cp. ἐτάξαμεν, 23.

31. νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἢμιν περὶ πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. For the use of δεικνύει without an object, Bonitz (Ind. 167 b 26 sqq.) compares Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 25 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 b 7. For ἥ δύναμις αὐτῆς cp. 10. 1295 a 9 and 1. 4. 1254 a 13, τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δήλον, and Isocr. Panath. § 134, αἱ μὲν οὖν φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις τῶν πολιτείων οὕτως ξονοῦν. Aristotle describes how polity differs from the so-called aristocracy in the remainder of c. 8, and how it comes into being and how it should be constituted in c. 9.

34. εἰώθαι δὲ καλεῖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said that the polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, and now he goes on—'but people are wont to give the name of polity to those mixtures of oligarchy and democracy only which incline to democracy and to call those which incline to oligarchy aristocracies.' Twice before in this Book (c. 3. 1290 a 22 sqq. and c. 4. 1290 a 30 sqq.) Aristotle has corrected customary views, and now he corrects this one. He grudging the name of aristocracy to a mere mixture of oligarchy and democracy inclining to oligarchy, and gradually feels his way in 1293 b 34—1294 a 25 to the conclusion that, next to the true aristocracy, the constitution which has most right to the name of aristocracy is that in which there is a mixture of all the three things which claim to be recognized in constitutions—free birth, wealth, and virtue. This conclusion is quite in harmony with the tendency of what is said in 3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq. and 2. 6. 1266 a 4 sq. (It would seem from Aristotle’s use of the word ‘most’ that while he ranks the claims of the form in which all the three attributes are recognized above those of the form in which only two—virtue and free birth—are recognized,
and also above those of the mixed constitutions which incline to oligarchy rather than to democracy, he does not deny the name of aristocracy to either of these forms.) Thus he is led to draw a different distinction between the so-called aristocracy and the polity from that which was commonly drawn. He first describes in 1293 b 34-42 the way in which mixtures of oligarchy and democracy inclining to oligarchy had come to be thought specially to deserve the name of aristocracies, and then in 1293 b 42 sqq. he appeals in correction of this view to the commonly received opinion that aristocracy and εὐνομία go together, and argues that if this is the case and εὐνομία involves obedience to well-constituted laws, and well-constituted laws are either the best attainable or the best absolutely, then aristocracy implies obedience either to the best attainable laws or to the laws which are absolutely the best, neither of which tests is satisfied by laws inclining towards oligarchy. A further proof of the same conclusion is derived from another commonly held opinion that aristocracy especially implies the award of office for virtue, whereas in oligarchy office is awarded for wealth.

37. παίδειαν καὶ εὐγένειαν. It is taken for granted that these attributes are closely connected with aristocracy. That παίδεία is so, we see from c. 15. 1299 b 24, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαθεμένων (ἀι ἀρχαὶ εἰσιν), and that εὐγένεια is so may be inferred from the fact that virtue is an element in it (1294 a 20 sqq.). For the connexion of παιδεία and εὐγένεια with wealth cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.

38. ἐτὸς δὲ δοκοῦσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 5, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς βελτιστοῖς ἐκ ἀκολουθία τε ὀλεγίατε καὶ ἀδικία, ἀκριβεία δὲ πλείστη εἰς τὰ χρηστά· ἐν δὲ τῷ δήμῳ ἀμαθία τε πλείστη καὶ ἀταξία καὶ πονηρία· ἦ τε γὰρ πενία αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἀγεί ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχρά καὶ ἡ ἀπαθεσια καὶ ἡ ἁμαθία δι᾽ ἐνδικαν χρημάτων ἐνοικ τῶν ἄνθρωπων. That this view is not regarded by Aristotle as correct we see from 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq. A wealthy man is not saved by his wealth from temptations to commit injustice.

39. οἴδει καὶ καλοὶς κάγαθοι καὶ γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. Cp. Plato, Rep. 569 A, τῶν πλούσιων τε καὶ καλῶν κάγαθων λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει, and Cic. De Rep. i. 34. 51: perhaps also Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 313, πλούσιος δ’ ἄρετή καὶ κύδως ὀψηθεί. Aristotle appears to hold that the belief in the virtue of the rich won them the name not only of καλοί κάγαθοι, but also of γνώριμοι, so that
he must understand γράμματα-to mean ‘widely known for their virtue’: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 27 sq.

41. τὴν ὑπεροχήν. Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.

καὶ τὰς ἁλιγαρχίας εἶναι φασίν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον. Bonitz (Ind. 503 b 7 sq.), followed by Sus.3, Ind. s.v., takes ἁλιγαρχία here in the sense of τὸ ἐν ἁλιγαρχίᾳ πολέμεια, κέφων, and groups this passage with 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἁλιγαρχίας, but I do not feel sure that they are right: cp. c. 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα πλῆθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ δὲ αὐτὸν λοιπά δημοκρατίας συνεστάση κ.τ.λ., and 2. 6. 1265 b 26–29.

42. δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Μὴ is placed by Γ Π before εὐνομείσθαι, but I follow Thurot and Sus. in transferring it after τὴν and before ἁριστοκρατοῦμεν. Εἰ ΕΠ were right in placing μὴ before εὐνομείσθαι, we should expect the second clause to run ὁμιῶς δὴ καὶ μὴ ἁριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν εὐνομοῦμεν, but Γ Π have ὁμιῶς δὲ καὶ ἁριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομοῦμεν, which seems to show that the first clause should run τὸ εὐνομείσθαι τὴν μὴ ἁριστοκρατοῦμεν πόλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατοῦμεν. The change in the position of μὴ has this further advantage, that the words ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατοῦμεν, which are not easily explained if we retain the reading of Γ Π, no longer present any difficulty. The view that εὐνομία is found where the best men rule, is implied in Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 154, δὴ εὐνομεῖτο μᾶλλον ἡ πόλις καὶ βελτίως προστάταις ἐχρῆτο, and in Isocr. Panath. § 132 sq., and indeed in Theogn. 43–52 and Pindar, Pyth. 10. 71 sq. Bergk: cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 5 sq. and Plato, Rep. 605 B.

3. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία κ.τ.λ. This had been already in substance said by Xenophon in Oeon. 9. 14 and by Ephorus in Fragm. 47 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 246), εὐνομείσθαι γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἀπαντα φιλαττομένους τὰ τῶν συκοφαντῶν, ἄλλα τοὺς ἐμέμνησας τοῖς ἀπλῶς κειμένοις: cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 6 and Demosth. c. Mid. c. 57. But the remarks of Aeschines on Athenian ways in c. Timarch. cc. 177–179 are especially present to Aristotle’s memory.

4. διὸ μὲν εὐνομίαν κ.τ.λ. In Diog. Laert. 3. 103 Plato is said to have distinguished three senses of εὐνομία—εὐνομία διαφερεῖται εἰς τρία: ἐν μὲν εἰς τοὺς νόμους σπονδαίους, εὐνομίαν φαμὲν εἶναι: ἐπεραν δὲ ἐὰν τοὺς κειμένους νόμους ἐμέμνησαν οἱ πολίται, καὶ τοῦτο φαμὲν εὐνομίαν εἶναι: τρίτον δὲ ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων κατὰ ἐθί καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμαta χρηστὸς πολιτεύωνται, καὶ τοῦτο εὐνομίαν προσαγορεύομεν. Compare with this
the definition of ἐνομία which we find in the Definitions ascribed to Plato, 413 E, ἐνομία πειθαρχία νόμων σπουδαίων. How far either of these accounts of ἐνομία is correctly attributed to Plato is extremely doubtful. Aristotle appears to find true ἐνομία in obedience to good laws.

7. τούτο δὲ ἑνδέχεται διχῶς κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. obedience to well-constituted law) 'is possible [only] in two ways, for [it is possible to obey] either the best laws attainable in the given case or those which are absolutely the best.' For the omission of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36.

9. δεικῇ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'aristocracy again is thought especially to consist in the distribution of the offices according to virtue,' and not according to wealth, which would be the rule of distribution if it bordered on oligarchy. See note on 1309 a 2.

11. τὸ δ' ὅ τι ἄν δέξῃ τοῖς πλείστοις, sc. κύριον εἶναι, 'but the principle that whatever the majority decide is supreme [is not characteristic of any particular constitution, for it] is recognized in all.' Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31 sq., 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 4 sqq., where it appears that the supremacy of the decisions of the majority was commonly conceived to be a mark of democracy.

12. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the repetition of ἐν see notes on 1325 b 10 and 1305 b 4.

15. For τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἰδὸς καλεῖται, 'the form which is called polity exists,' cp. Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, ἐνθα δὴ ὁ σύλλογος καλεῖται, which Holden translates, 'where the so-called muster of forces is,' and see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Phaedo 107 C, τοῦ χρόνον τούτου ἐν δὲ καλούμεν τὸ τέχν.

17. For the absence of καὶ before πλοῦτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας see explanatory note on 1277 b 10 and critical note on 1260 a 26.

σχεδόν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See above on 1293 b 39. For the absence of τὴν before τῶν καλῶν καγαθῶν (which Coray, Bekk., and Sus. add without necessity), cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 470 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 325 and 5. ccxc),

μὴ ποθ' (μὴθ' MSS.) ὁ πονηρός κατεχέτω χρηστοῦ τόπον.

19. ἐπει νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but since there are three things which lay claim to an equal participation in the constitution, free birth, wealth, and virtue—I say three, for the fourth, that which is called nobility, [is not a distinct thing, for it] is a concomitant of the two latter.' For ἀμφίσβητοντα cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 16 sqq., where, as
Bonitz points out (Ind. 40 a 28 sqq.), ἀντιποιοσθαται is used as synonymous with ἀμφισβητεῖν (1283 a 11, 38), and for τῆς ἱσώτητος τῆς πολιτείας, c. ii. 1296 a 30, τὴν ἰπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας, and 3. 9. 1280 a 18, τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἱσώτητα.

21. ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. In 3. 13. 1283 a 37, εὐγένεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄρετὴ γένους, we hear nothing of wealth (cp. Plato, Rep. 618 B, τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ γένεις καὶ προγόνων ἄρεταις, and Aristot. Fragm. 83. 1490 a 18 sqq.), but in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 3 those persons οῖς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἄρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος are said to be thought εὐγενεῖς. The common Greek view probably was that εὐγενεῖα implied nothing more than descent from several generations of wealthy ancestors: cp. Plato, Theaet. 174 E, τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνοῦσαν, ἣς γενναῖος τὶς ἐστὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφήματι, and a fragment from the Aeolus of Euripides (Fragm. 22), in which one of the characters, no doubt wishing to depreciate noble birth, says of it, ἐν χρήμασιν τῶν ἔστι, and adds, ὁ δ’ ἐν ἐν δόμαις

χρόνον συνοικῆ πλείστον (sc. τὰ χρήματα), οὗτος εὐγενής.

Cp. also Julian, Or. 2. p. 81 B, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων εὐγενεῖς. The Greeks would, it would seem, refuse the epithet εὐγενῆς to a newly-made Peer of the Realm, unless the family to which he belonged had been distinguished for wealth for generations past.

30. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 22 sqq. and see notes on 1288 b 29 and 1293 b 31 and vol. i. p. 294, note 1.

34. τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν, i.e. τὴν τούτων διαφορὰν (Bon. Ind. 180 b 40, where Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 3 is referred to, ἀλλ’ ἀρα οὐ μᾶλα δὲ τὰ συμβαλλήτα μὴ ὑμὸνυμα εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ ἐγείν διαφοράν, μήτε ὁ μήτ’ ἐν φ’; λέγω δὲ οὖν χρόνομα ἐγείν διαίρεσιν). Sus. (Ind. s. v. διαίρεσιν), however, explains διαίρεσιν here as synonymous with διορισμόν. Τούτων, i.e. τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς διλεγάρχιας.

ἐκ τούτων is rendered by Vict. in his translation ‘post haec’ (so Stahr, ‘alsdann,’ and apparently Sus. and Welldon), but in his commentary ‘ex ipsis,’ and Lamb. and Giph. render the words ‘ex his’ (i.e. of democracy and oligarchy). I incline to render ἐκ τούτων in the latter way, taking it with συνθετέσθοι: cp. Plato, Soph. 252 B, ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, and Cratyl. 427 C, ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ ἢδη αὐτοῖς τούτοις συντιθέναι ἀπομακρύνεσθαι. The words ἀφ’ ἑκάτερα διαμεριστὶς σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας will then be added to explain the exact method by which the polity is to be compounded of democracy and oligarchy.
35. σύμβολον, 'pars' (Bon. Ind. s. v.), where we find a reference among other passages to De Gen. An. i. 18. 722 b 10, φησι γὰρ ('Εμπεδοκλῆς) ἐν τῷ ἄρρητι καὶ τῷ θῆλει οἷον σύμβολον ἑνείκα, διὸν δ’ ἀπ’ οὐδετέρῳ ἀπίεναι, ἀλλὰ διείσπασται μελέων φύσει, ἤ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός’ (cp. De Gen. An. 4. 1. 764 b 3 sqq.).

εἰς δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως, ‘and there are three determining principles of this combination or mixture.’ For καὶ = ‘or,’ see note on 1292 a 20 and cp. De An. i. 4. 407 b 30, καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναρτίων εἶναι. Μίξεως is probably added because the polity had been described as a μίξις in 1293 b 34 and 1294 a 16, 23. "Ορος is explained by Bonitz (Ind. 529 b 53) in the passage before us and in 1294 b 15 as ‘id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur.’ Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33, δῆλον ὅτι τούτοις ὅρους τρεῖς ποιήσεων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τὸ τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον.

37. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις . . . 40. Ἰμιαίαν. This is repeated in c. 13. 1297 a 21-24 and 35-38, and in c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. It appears from the passage before us that there were oligarchies in which dicasteries existed composed of both rich and poor, though the poor would not be likely often to act on them, no pay being provided, and the rich would be sure to act, as they would incur a penalty if they did not. The oligarchies in which this system existed would not be oligarchies of an extreme type, for in extreme oligarchies the poor would be excluded from the dicasteries altogether. So again paid dicasteries would not exist in all forms of democracy, but only in those which approached the ultimate form.

41. κοινὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 13. 1297 a 38 sqq. We gather from the passage before us that in a polity there may be poor dicasts receiving pay, yet in c. 13. 1297 b 1 sqq. we read of the polity, δεὶ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὀπλα ἔχουσι μόνον, and in what follows οἱ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχοντες are tacitly distinguished from οἱ ποιήσεως (see note on 1289 b 31). We must suppose that there might be a proportion of poor men even in the hoplite class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12). See vol. i. p. 503, note 1. This is confirmed by 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12, καὶ τὸ τὸ πλῆθος μηδὲν πιστεύειν, διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦσαν τῶν ὀπλῶν, which implies that the πλῆθος has heavy arms to be taken away.

1. πολιτικῶν, ‘characteristic of a polity.’

εἰς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the first of the three modes of mixing democracy and oligarchy here described the entire arrangement
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characteristic of democracy is adopted in conjunction with the entire arrangement characteristic of oligarchy, in the second an institution (a property-qualification for the assembly) is borrowed from both, not however in the form in which it exists in democracies and oligarchies, but in a midway form, and in the third a part of the arrangement characteristic of democracy is adopted in conjunction with a part of the arrangement characteristic of oligarchy. Thus in framing a polity the lawgiver might balance a democratic institution with an oligarchical one, or he might steer a midway course between democracy and oligarchy, or he might ally a part of a democratic institution with a part of an oligarchical one. A polity would evidently differ much according as one or other of these methods was predominantly employed in its construction.

3. οὐ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστέων κ.τ.λ. Supply τάττουσιν. It would seem from this passage that even in democracies a small property-qualification for membership of the assembly might exist (see vol. i. p. 508, note 3). We also gather that an assembly often existed in oligarchies, though membership of it would be confined to those possessed of a high property-qualification (cp. Plato, Polit. 298 C, ἔνθεσα δὲ ἐκκλησίαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐξυπαντά τὸν δήμον ἢ τοῖς πλουσίοις μόνον). This would not be the case in the first, or most moderate, form of oligarchy, for in that form a high property-qualification would hardly be required for membership of the assembly, and in not a few oligarchies there would be no assembly whatever (3. i. 1275 b 7).

4. καὶ οὖν δὲ γε κ.τ.λ. Thus in a polity there would be a moderate property-qualification for membership of the assembly, but none for office (1294 b 12 sq.).

5. τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρω τιμήματος τούτων. For ἐκατέρω τιμήματος τούτων see note on 1283 b 4.

6. τρίτον, 'in the third place.' Τρίτος would have been more regular, but for a similarly imperfect correspondence cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 23, where τρίτον δ᾽ ἀδύναμι τῶν πραγμάτων should have been τρίτον δ᾽ ἀδύναμία τῶν πραγμάτων.

ταγμάτων takes up τάττουσιν, 3. The Index Aristotelicus translates τάγμα here by 'lex, institutum,' and gives no other instance of the occurrence of the word in the genuine writings of Aristotle. Τάγμα occurs in a different sense in Oecon. 2. 1349 a 24.

τὰ μέν, sc. λαμβάνεις, obtained from 2 (cp. λαβέω, 11).
7. λέγω δ' οὗν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is here only stating the popular impression (δοκεῖ). As a matter of fact, even extreme democracies did not always, or perhaps generally, claim that all magistracies should be filled by lot (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.), and magistracies would seem to have been sometimes filled by lot in oligarchies, though of course not ἐκ πάντων but ἐκ τινῶν (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 1 sqq.: cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 8 sq.). So again the filling of magistracies by election, and not by lot, is not peculiar to oligarchy; the magistracies are filled by election on the ground of virtue in an aristocracy (2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq.); what is characteristic of oligarchy is rather to elect to magistracies on the ground of wealth (ibid.). But indeed they seem to have been filled in some oligarchies not by election, but by hereditary succession (c. 5. 1292 b 4 sqq.). In 3. 5. 1278 a 23 it is implied to be characteristic of oligarchy not simply to require a property-qualification for office, but to require a high property-qualification. Indeed, in the more moderate forms of democracy a property-qualification for office often existed (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 39: see note on 1305 a 28), sometimes varying with the importance of the office (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30 sq.); still it is true that the tendency of democracy was to do away with property-qualifications for office (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 22 sq.). Cp. Diod. 18. 18. 4, τὴν δὲ πολιτείαν μετέστησεν ἐκ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ προσέταξεν ἀπὸ τιμήσεως εἶναι τὸ πολίτευμα.

10. ἀριστοκρατικῶν τοίνυν καὶ πολιτικῶν κ.τ.λ. For the association here of aristocracy and polity cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 4, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. The reference to aristocracy here shows that the mode of combining democratic and oligarchical elements in the case of a so-called aristocracy is similar to that which obtains in the case of a polity. Aristotle, in fact, considers himself to have been dealing in c. 9 with so-called aristocracies as well as with polities (1294 b 40 sq.). Though according to the passage before us it is appropriate to a so-called aristocracy that no property-qualification for office should exist, we learn from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq. that it is appropriate to the same constitution (ἀριστοκρατικῶν) that the γνώμονες should hold the offices. This would be all the more likely to be the case because it is ἀριστοκρατικῶν that offices should be unpaid (2. 11. 1273 a 17). It may be noted that the conception of ἀριστοκρατία in a fragment of the ‘Constitutions’ ascribed to Aristotle (Aristot. Fragn. 560. 1570 b 4), προέστησαν γὰρ αὐτῆς (i.e. τῆς τῶν ἀποθετῶν
politeias) από τιμημάτων ἄνδρες ἀριστοκρατικῶς ἀρχοντες, and in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 25. 4, πολιτείαν δὲ καταστήσαντο ἀριστοκρατικῷν χίλιοι γὰρ πάντα διοικοῦσιν ἀιρέτοι απὸ τιμημάτων, which may also be derived from the ‘Constitutions,’ stands in marked contrast to that in the passage before us, for in these passages we read of aristocracies in which office was elective, subject to a property-qualification. For another instance of a discrepancy between the Politics and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. see note on 1306 b 29.

12. ἐκ μὲν τῆς διλιγαρχίας τὸ ἀἱρεταὶ ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς. As to the way in which offices were filled in a polity see note on 1288 a 12.

15. ὁρὸς, ‘the determining mark,’ or ‘criterion’: see note on 1294 a 35.

ἐνδεχῆται, ‘it is possible.’

18. ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 7. 1234 b 5, ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἡτὶ ποιό τὰ ἄκρα, and De An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικῶν γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν βάτερον τῶν ἄκρων.

οὐκ ἑξαίτιες περὶ τὴν Λακεδαίμονιον πολιτείαν. Ὅπερ seems to refer to 15, ὅταν ἐνδεχῆται λέγειν τὴν αὐτήν πολιτείαν δημοκρατιαν καὶ διλιγαρχίαν. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 712 D sqq., and also Isocr. Areop. § 61, οὐδα γὰρ . . . Λακεδαίμονιον διὰ τοῦτο κάλλιστα πολιτευμένους, ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατούμενοι τηγχάνονσιν ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰρέσει καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἵθομεν ἣν παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸς ἰσότητας καὶ τὸς ὁμοφόρας μᾶλλον ἣ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσχυνος, while another mood of Isocrates’ mind is represented in Nicocl. § 24, ἐτί δὲ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Λακεδαίμονιους, τοῖς ἀμχατα τῶν Ἑλληνῶν πολιτευμένους, ἅπαντες ἵσμεν ὅικοι μὲν διλιγαρχομένους, παρὰ δὲ τῶν πόλεμον βασιλευμένους.

21. τὴν τάξιν = τὴν πολιτείαν, as in c. 1. 1289 a 1, c. 3. 1290 a 12, and c. 11. 1296 a 40 (Sus. 3 Ind. s. v.).

πρῶτον is taken up by ὁμοίως δὲ, 24.

τροφή, ‘bringing-up,’ whereas in 26 sq. τροφή means ‘food.’ In an oligarchy the bringing-up of the sons of the rich, or at any rate those of them who were in office, was luxurious (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22 sqq.) and very unlike that of the sons of the poor.

23. For τὸν πρῶτον τούτον see note on 1281 a 21.

24. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and [things are ordered] similarly.’ We are not probably intended to carry on τρέφονται and παπείνονται.

οὖτω τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν ταυτά πᾶσιν ἐν τοῖσι συσσιτίωσι, "and [just as no difference is made between the rich and the poor in other ways,] so also is the food in the syssitia the same for all." Οὖτω carries on the comparison just as if καθάπερ had preceded. Sus. translates 'so sehr ist die Kost für Alle dieselbe in den gemeinsamen Mahlzeiten'—"so much is the food the same for all in the common meals"—but I doubt whether this is the meaning of οὖτω, and Welldon translates the word 'so too.' For the fact cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 10. Τροφή and ἐσθήσ are mentioned together in 3. 16. 1287 a 14 sq.

27. καὶ τὴν ἐσθήτα κ.τ.λ. Spengel would insert ἔχουσιν, but we are by this time familiar with Aristotle's tendency in the Politics to omit words. See vol. ii. p. 11, note 4. For τις καὶ τῶν πενήτων ὀπτισοῦν cp. Plato, Rep. 350 A, εἰ τίς σου δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὀπτισοῦν πλείον ἀν ἐμέλειν αἱρεῖσαί ἡ δοσι κ.τ.λ. The dress of the rich in ancient Greece would ordinarily differ from that of the poor in fineness of material and in dye, to say nothing of ornamental accessories. It is interesting to gather from the passage before us that a too great contrast between the rearing and education, and also the food and dress, of rich and poor was regarded as undemocratic (cp. Demosth. Ol. 3. c. 25 sq.: yet that a difference did exist between the dress of the rich and the demos at Athens is implied in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10). Was the change from an ornate costume to μετρία ἐσθήσ which Thucydides (i. 6. 3) describes at Athens connected with the rise of democracy there? At Venice the Nobili and the Cittadini wore the same plain black clothes, partly because the poorer Nobili were thus saved expense, and partly because in concourses the small number of the ruling class became less conspicuous (Roscher, Politik, p. 159).

29. ἐπὶ τῷ δύο κ.τ.λ. Supply δημοκρασίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν. τὰς μεγίστας ἄρχὰς seems to imply that the senatorship and the ephorship were greater offices than the kingship in the Lacedaemonian State. Yet the kings are said to be μεγάλων κύριοι in 2. 11. 1272 b 41 (cp. 4 (?). 14. 1333 b 35). As to the way in which the ephors were appointed see note on 1270 b 28.

31. οἱ δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, sc. εἶναι λέγουσιν.

32. πάσας, sc. τὰς ἄρχας, which must be supplied from 29. As to the non-employment of the lot in appointments to offices in oligarchies see note on 7.

33. ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς. The reference is to
the Lacedaemonian senate (Xen. Rep. Lac. 10. 2: Plut. Lycurg. c. 26). In democracies the infliction of these penalties fell to the popular assembly (c. 14. 1298 a 5–10) or to popular dicasteries. But did it not fall to a few in aristocracies as well as in oligarchies?

34. δεὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ., ‘and in the polity that is mixed well both of the mixed elements’ (democracy and oligarchy) ‘should seem to be present and neither of the two.’ The mixture must be so subtle and complete that the mixed elements are felt to be both present in it and not present, just as one might say of a glass of wine and water both that wine and water are each present in it and that neither is present but only a mixture of wine and water.

36. καὶ σώζεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν, sc. τῆν πολιτείαν. Cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 21 sq.

37. As to [ἔξωθεν] see critical note.

40. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζομένας ἀριστοκρατίας. Hardly any reference has been made in c. 9 to the so-called aristocracies, but the use of the word ἀριστοκρατίκων in 1294 b 10 probably indicates that Aristotle has had them in view in this chapter as well as polities (see note on 10).

C. 10. 1. Περὶ δὲ τυραννιδος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle sometimes treats of a subject last when it requires especially full treatment (Hist. An. 5. 1. 533 a 7, καὶ δὲ περὶ τούτου τελευταίου λεκτέων διὰ τὸ πλεῖότητι ἔχειν πραγματείαν), so now he explains that he does not treat of tyranny last for this reason.

2. ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος. Bonitz (Ind. 455 b 2) compares Meteor. 1. 1. 338 a 25, λοιπὸν δὲ ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἐτι θεωρητέον, δ κ.τ.λ. Tyranny was often contrasted with πολιτεία, as in Demosth. Olynth. 1. 5, and indeed by Aristotle himself in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the Politics.

4. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις κ.τ.λ., i.e. in 3. 14–17.

7. πάθεν, ‘from what source’: cp. Plato, Rep. 375 C, πάθεν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ μεγαλοδύναμον ὄνομα εὑρήκομεν; and Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10, καθισταται βασιλείως ἐκ τῶν ἐπισκείων. The answer given has been, from men of surpassing virtue, not from men of surpassing stature, as was the practice in Ethiopia (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sq.).
In these two kinds of tyranny rule is exercised over willing subjects (16), and yet they are here classed as tyrannies. This does not agree with 3. 14. 1285 a 27, οἱ δὲ (τύραννα) ἀκάντων ἄρχοντων. Aristotle, in fact, here includes among tyrannies any forms of monarchy in which the monarch rules despoticōs kατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην (16 sq.). In 3. 14. 1285 a 16 sq. he classes these two kinds of tyranny among kingships; still even there he seems to feel that they are rather μοναρχίαι than βασιλείαι (see note on 1285 a 16).

8. μὲν is taken up by δὲ in τρίτων δὲ εἴδος τυραννίδος, 17.

ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, in 3. 14. 1285 a 16—b 3. The two kinds of tyranny there described are the form of hereditary kingship with despotic authority which existed among some barbarian races and the asymmetry of the early Greeks. As to the electiveness of these barbarian kingships see note on 1285 b 2. They seem to have been hereditary as well as elective, though we hear nothing of their hereditariness here (see note on 1313a 10). How they combined the two characteristics we are not told.

9. διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασι-λείαν, ‘because their nature in a way overlaps in relation to king-
ship also [as well as mutually].’ As to ἐπαλλάττειν, which is here followed by πρὸς, see note on 1255 a 13. For τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν cp. c. 8. 1293 b 32, ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς.

11. ἐν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισίν κ.τ.λ. The fact that these monarchs were elective is dwelt on because it shows that their monarchy was in accordance with law: cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 92, οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες ὑπὸ τῶν πολετῶν ἐπὶν αἱρεθήσατο, κατὰ νόμον ἄρχοντιν. Αὐτοκράτορας is explained by κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην, 17. Niebuhr (quoted by Eaton) thinks that Aristotle here refers to the Roman Dictatorship, and certainly we are reminded of the passage before us in Appian, Bell. Civ. 1. 99, Ἦμεραίων δὲ . . . χειροτονοῦσι τῶν Σύλλαβαν ἐς δοὺν θέλου τύραννον αὐτοκράτορα· τύραννος μὲν γὰρ ἢ τῶν δικτα-
tόρων ἄρχῃ καὶ πάλαι, ὅλην χρόνων ὀρμομενή, τότε δὲ πρῶτον ἢ αὖριστον ἐδούσα τυράννις ἐγίγνετο ἐντελῆς, but Aristotle may have in his mind among other barbarian kings those of the Ethiopians, who are spoken of as elected in Diod. 3. 9. 4. See note on 1313a 10.

13. τοῦ τρόπου τοῦτον, i. e. by election.

15. ἠσαν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 2 sq. Διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον, sc. ἐλνα.

18. ἦπερ μάλιστα ἐστὶν δοκεῖ τυραννίς. So we hear of a μάλιστα λεγομένη βασιλεία in 5, and of a μάλιστα ἐλοι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία in
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19. τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἡτίς κ.τ.λ. Possibly a reminiscence of Hdt. 3. 80, κῶς 8' ἄν εἰς χρῆμα κατηρητήμενον μοναρχίαν τῇ ἐξεταί ἀνευθύνω παιδευ̂ν τὰ βούλεται; For the definition here given of ἡ μᾶλιστα τυραννίς, cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 41 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37, μοναρχία 8' ἔστι κατὰ τούτον ἐν ἐς ἀπάνων κύριός ἐστιν' τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινά βασιλεία, ἡ 8' ἀδριστός τυραννίς.

C. 11. 25. Τίς 8' ἀρίστη πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Welldon places a note of interrogation after μετασχέων, 31, and he may be right, but perhaps it is more likely that the sentence is incomplete and that σκεπτόν or some such word would have been added but for the interposition of the clause καὶ γὰρ . . . λεκτέων (31-34), which distracts the writer's attention. I do not think (with Conring and Sus.) that any word or words have fallen out of the text after μετασχέων, 31, for the same thing occurs elsewhere in the Politics, e. g. in i. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.

26. μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ. For the dative συγκρίνωσι compare the dative in Rhet. i. 1. 4. 1360 a 31, ἐκ τῶν παρελθυστῶν θεωροῦτι. For ἄρετὴν τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἰδίωτα see note on 1330 b 38.

27. μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears here to speak not of παιδεία in general, but of a specially exalted kind of it; in Lucian, Somn. c. 1, however, we read of παιδεία in general, τοῖς πλείστοις αὐτὸ ἔδοξε παιδεία μὲν καὶ πόνον πολλοῦ καὶ χρόνου μακροῦ καὶ δαπάνης αὐτὶ μικρὰς καὶ τοῖχος δεῖχθαι λαμερὰς.

28. τυχηρῶς qualifies χρηματίζει, but not, I think, φόρος, as Sus. apparently holds that it does (Sus. 8 Ind. s. v. φόρος). Τύχη is something apart from φόρος (cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27 sqq. and 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 41). For the contrast of φόρος and χρηματίζει cp. Polyb. 6. 2. 13.

29. βίον τε τῶν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνίσαι δυνατόν. Supply πρὸς. See note on 1274 b 12, and cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 23. For βίον τῶν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνίσαι δυνατόν cp. Xen. Anab. 4. 1. 24, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐφί ἡγήσεται δυνατῆν καὶ ὑποξύγιοις παρεύσεται ὡδῶν.

31. καὶ γὰρ ᾧς κ.τ.λ. The sense is—for the so-called aristocracies described by us just now, which might seem to be in a special degree the constitution of which we are in quest, are partly beyond the reach of most States, so that they do not really concern us now, and partly border on the polity, so that they are not more the constitution of which we are in quest than the polity is, and we must speak of them and of it as one constitution.
Aristotle adds this remark to show that the question which he has just asked has not as yet been answered, and that it still needs to be dealt with.

32. τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρω πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων. This is implied as to the Lacedaemonian constitution in c. i. 1288 b 40 sqq. For ἐξωτέρω πίπτειν see Bon. Ind. 594 b 59 sqq.

34. ἀμφοί, these aristocracies and the polity.

ἡ δε ἡ κρίσις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle shows in 34–1295 b 1 that the μέσος βίος and the μέση πολιτεία are the best. He thus prepares the way for the conclusion which he is occupied in establishing in 1295 b 1–35, that ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία is the best, a distinct conclusion, be it observed, from that which he had previously arrived at, that the μέση πολιτεία is the best, for we can conceive a μέση πολιτεία which is not διὰ τῶν μέσων. However, Aristotle identifies ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία with ἡ μέση πολιτεία in 1296 a 7. He proves that ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία is the best in the following way:—A mean state in respect of the gifts of fortune is best. For those who are thus circumstanced (1) obey reason most readily, and therefore are less likely to commit unjust acts, (2) they are most capable, as citizens should be, of both ruling and being ruled, and also most alike and equal, and for both these reasons are best suited for membership of a πόλις, for a πόλις thrives best when it consists of men alike and equal, among whom the friendship and community of feeling essential to a πόλις are most likely to be found; besides, those who are moderately well-to-do are most secure, for they are least given to plot against others and are least plotted against themselves. Hence the constitution which places supreme power in the hands of the moderately well-to-do class is the best (1295 b 34 sqq.). It is also the best because it is least subject to civil discord (1296 a 7 sqq.). A further indication that it is the best may be found in the fact that the best lawgivers have belonged to this class (1296 a 18 sqq.). It is only because in many States the moderately well-to-do class is small, and for other reasons which Aristotle gives in 1296 a 22–b 2, that ἡ μέση πολιτεία, or in other words ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία, has so seldom existed.

περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων, i.e. which is the best constitution and the best life for most States and most men (25 sqq.).

35. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων, ‘based on the same elementary principles’: cp. Top. 6. 5. 143 a 13, σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τά γένη στοιχείων, and Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16, τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον

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στοιχείον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κ.τ.λ.: also Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, ταύτα γὰρ στοιχεία τρώτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἑστίν.

38. ἐν τοῖς ἣδικοῖς. Probably a reference to Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 9–21, as well as to Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 14 sqq. and similar passages.

τὸν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, 'that which is unimpededly lived in accordance with virtue.' Ἀνεμπόδιστον agrees with βίον understood, not with ἀρετὴν, as Vet. Int. supposes that it does, translating 'eam quae secundum virtutem non impeditam.'

37. μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108 b 11, τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἐλλειψιν, μᾶς δ’ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος. As Sus.² points out (Note 1288), Aristotle would have spoken more exactly if he had said that moral virtue is a mean state. Τὴν is added before ἀρετὴν because κατ’ ἀρετὴν has preceded: see note on 1286 b 17.


38. τῆς ἐκάστους ἐνδεχομένης τυχείν μεσότητος, 'ea mediocritate quae potest singulis contingere' (Sepulv.). This is added because the same mean state is not within the reach of every one (see Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 32 sqq.). The mean state of a great wrestler like Milo in respect of food is not attainable by a novice. For the explanatory genitive τῆς ἐκάστους ἐνδεχουμένης τυχείν μεσότητος, added in interpretation of τὸν μέσον βίον, compare the somewhat similar genitive in Plato, Laws 776 C, ἢ Ἱππαλκεοτῶν δουλεία τῆς τῶν Μαριαμνίκων καταδουλώσεως (‘servitium, sive servi, Heracleotarum, qui extirrunt ex subiectione Mariandynorum,’ Stallbaum), and see Stallbaum’s note on Phaedo 97 A, ἢ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίου ἀλλήλων τεθναυ.

39. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὅρους κ.τ.λ., 'and these same criteria must necessarily be the criteria of the goodness or badness of a State also and a constitution,' i.e. States and constitutions will be good or bad according as they are or are not in a mean condition, just as the life of an individual will be good or bad according as it is or is not in a mean condition. Καὶ before πόλεως probably means 'also,' not 'both,' though it is followed by another καὶ: see note on 1342 a 4.

40. ἢ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τῖς ἔστι πόλεως, i.e. for what holds of a State is likely to hold of a constitution, for a constitution is a form of the life of a State. See vol. i. p. 210, note i.
1. ev adpasais k.t.l. Cp. c. 3. 1289 b 29 sqqu., where the μέσοι are 1295 b.

the midway class between the εὐποροι and the ἄποροι, just as they are in 1296 a 10—13 and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 28 sqqu., whereas in the passage before us they are the midway class between the εὐποροι σφόδρα and the ἄποροι σφόδρα. In 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 1 sq, they are the midway class between oi πλούσιοι and ὁ δήμος (cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 40 sqqu., where oi πλούσιοι and oi πέντεσε are the extremes between which they stand), and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 12 sqqu. the midway class between oi γνώριμοι and ὁ δήμος. In Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 18 sqqu. they are opposed to ei ev dèvoun kai euvuxias. We hear nothing of the μέσοι in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq. It would seem from 1296 a 10 sqqu. that, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the μέσοι hardly existed in small Greek States. Aristotle no doubt has before him Eurip. Suppl. 225 Bothe (238 Dindorf),

τρεῖς γὰρ πολεῖν περίδες οἱ μὲν ἀλλοι   
ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλείων τῇ ἐρώτι ἀνεί:

οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανιότατοι βίου, 
δεινοὶ, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλείων μέρος, 
eis τοὺς ἐχοντας κέντρ' ἀφάσιν κακά,

γλωσσαίς ποιήσαν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι

τριῶν δὲ μοιράς ἣν μέσον σάξει πόλεις, 
κόσμον φυλάσσου' ἀντιν' ἰ ν ἀκοὸ πόλις.

3. ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν ὅμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ᾑριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14 sq. As Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 163), the saying Μέτριον ἀριστον was ascribed to Cleobulus of Lindus (Diog. Laert. i. 93), and Theognis had said (335),

μηδὲν ἄγων σπείδεων' πάντων μεδ' ἄριστα.


4. φανερὸν ὄτι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqqu. Under εὐτυχίματα Aristotle evidently includes both bodily and external goods; both are the gifts of fortune (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27 sqq.). He has before him here and in what follows Plato, Laws 679 B sq. and 728 D, μνείων δὴ μοι φαίνεται ... 729 A, ὡς τὸ πολύ. Compare also Eurip. Fragm. 80 Nauck (79, ed. 2),

βρατοῖς τὸ μείζον τῶν μέσων τίκτει νόσους:

θεῶν δὲ θυτοὺς κόσμου οὐ πρέπει φέρειν,

and the fragment of Rhianus referred to in vol. ii. p. 419 (Stob. Floril. 4. 34).
5. ῥάστη γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν, 'for it is most ready to obey reason': cp. [Plato,] Menex. 249 C, τοῖς τε γὰρ τελευτήσασι καὶ τοῖς ζώσιν οὕτως ἀν προσφυλεστατοί εἴπτε καὶ ῥάστοι θεραπεῦειν τε καὶ θερα-
πενείσθαι, and Plut. Anton. c. 6, οὗ γὰρ οὕτως εὐχερῆς ἤν οὐδὲ ῥάσιον ὑπ’ ὀργῆς ἐκπεσεῖν τῶν λογισμῶν Πλάτων Καῦσαρ, ὡστε κ.τ.λ. We hardly expect to find Aristotle asserting so close a connexion between a moderate amount of property and a readiness to be swayed by reason after what he has said in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sqq. and 1267 a 41 sqq.


12. ἐτι δ’ Ἦκισθ’ οὕτω φιλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσιν ταῦτα δ’ ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν. οὕτω evidently refers to the μέσω, who have not, however, been mentioned since 3. It may be doubted, therefore, whether the words ἐτι δὲ ... πόλεσιν stand in their right place; they would be more in place after πόλεσις, 28, or εἴναι, 34. As to their probable meaning see vol. i. p. 499, note 1, and compare Xen. Oecon. 2. 5 sqq. (already referred to in vol. i. p. 580). Cp. also Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 17 sqq. If the words are in their right place, they adduce a further proof that the μέσω are more under the guidance of reason than the very rich, derived from their abstinence from extravagant expenditure on liturgies. Giph. (p. 467) would expunge ἐτι δὲ ... βουλαρχοῦσιν as an interpolation and retain in the text only ταῦτα ... πόλεσιν, and Sus. adopts a similar course, bracketing ἐτι δὲ . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν and reading ταῦτα δὴ in place of ταῦτα δ’. It is of course possible that the words ἐτι δὲ . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν, and indeed the whole clause ἐτι δὲ . . . πόλεσιν, are nothing more than a remark added by Aristotle or some one else in the margin which has crept into the text, but I incline on the whole to a more favourable view of them, though, as has been said, I doubt whether they are in their right place.

13. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now turns to the political, as distinguished from the moral, defects of those who have too much or too little of the goods of fortune. He has before him Plato, Laws 728 D-729 A: cp. also Laws 791 D, λέγω δὴ τὸ γε παρ’ ἦμν
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δόμαι, ὃς ἡ μέν τρυφὴ δύνακα λαὶ ἀκράξολα καὶ σφόδρα ἀπὸ σμικρῶν κι-
νούμενα τὰ τῶν νεῶν ἦθη ἀπεργάζεται, τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐναντίον ἦ τε σφόδρα καὶ
ἀγρίᾳ δούλωσις ταπεινοῖς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους ποιούσα ἀνεπιτρεπέουσα ἐννοίκους ἀποστελεῖ. We are told, however, in Eth.
Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sq. that an abundance of the goods of fortune is
thought to engender greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία). In Pol.
7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19 sq. much the same unfavourable account is
given of οἱ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις generally, not merely of those who are
extremely rich.

16. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εὕθες κ.τ.λ. Εὕθες οἴκοβεν, ‘from their parents’ house
at the outset’: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 3. 7, Κύριῳ πως ἐτι οἴκοβεν συνήθης καὶ
ἀρεστὸς ἀνήρ. For the fact here mentioned, cp. Carneades ap. Plut.
De Adul. et Amic. c. 16, Καρνεάδης δὲ ἔλεγε, ὃτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλέων
παῖδες ἱππεῖν μῶν, ἀλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εἰ καὶ καλῶς μανθάνουσιν: κολακεύει
γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαίς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἐπισώπων, καὶ ὁ προσπαθαῖος ὑπο-
κατακλινόμενος. Plato had said much the same thing in Laws 695 B,
pαραλαβόντες δὲ οὖν οἱ παῖδες τελευτήσατος Κύριον τρυφὴς μετοκι καὶ
ἀνεπιπληξίας, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν ἄνδρων ἄτεροι ἄπεκτεινε τῷ ἠδρο ἀγανακτῶν
κ.τ.λ., and 695 E, τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον οὗ τύχης, ὅτι ἐγὼ λόγος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ κακὸς
βίας, διὶ οἰ τῶν διαφερόμενων πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες τὰ πολλὰ ἱδον.
Cp. also Laws 791 D, quoted above on 13. ‘A boy has the best
chance of being well brought up in a household where there is
solid comfort combined with thrift and simplicity’ (Trevelyans, Life
of Lord Macaulay, i. 37).

21. γίνεται οὖν κ.τ.λ. That a πόλις in which one section of the
citizens consists of masters and the other of slaves is no true πόλις
is a view inherited by Aristotle from the Menexenus (238 E sq.),
and from Plato, Laws 756 E sq. (quoted in vol. i. p. 499, note 2) and
712 E, and Rep. 417 A—B. He probably also remembers Laws 679 B,
ὡς ἐὰν ποτε ἐξωνακία μήτη πλουτὸς ἐξωνακῆ μήτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν τούτῃ
γενναίότατα ἦθη γίγνον; ἂν οὖτε γὰρ ὑβρίσι οὐραί ἀδικία, δήλοι τε ἀδ καὶ
φάνταν οὐκ ἐγγέγνωσαι. That the πόλις is an association of ἐλευθερο
two are told in 3. 6. 1279 a 21.

23. κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς. Πολιτικῆς goes only with κοινωνίας, not
with φιλίας. For κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς without the article cp. i. 2.
1253 a 38.

24. ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικῶν, ‘for association is a thing connected
with [and springing from] friendliness’: cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 38, τὸ δὲ
τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἐγροῦν ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προοίμες φιλία, and Plato,
Gorg. 507 E, ὡς δὲ μὴ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, φιλία οὐκ ἄν εἰρ. In Laws 697 C
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tò φίλον is conjoined with tò κοινών, and in 695 D φιλία with κοινωνία: cp. also Laws 837 B.

οἴδε γάρ ὧνοι βούλεται κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἔχθροισ. Is Aristotle thinking of Aeschines and Demosthenes on their second embassy to Pella? Cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 97, οἴδεις αὐτῷ (i.e. ἰμποθεῖνει) συναστεῖν, δὲ ἐξήμευν ἔπι τὴν ὑστέραν προσβείαν, ἤθελεν, οἴδε ἐν ταῖς ὧνοις, ὅπως δυνάτων ἦν, εἰς ταύτων πανδοκείων καταλέυειν. More probably he has in view the general inclination of foes to give each other a wide berth (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 225: Aristoph. We read of the old families and their antagonists at Lausanne in 1817 in Mr. S. Lane-Poole’s Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (1. 274), ‘The spirit of democracy showed itself even on the high-road, and whenever cart met carriage, the latter in most instances had to knock under.’

25. βούλεται δὲ γε ἢ πόλις ἢ Ἑσσον ἢιναι καὶ ὰμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα. Βούλεται, i.e. ‘aims at being,’ not ‘tends to be,’ for Aristotle does not mean to assert that the πόλις tends, as time goes on, to become an union of men alike and equal. Aristotle is here speaking of the citizens of the πόλις, not, as in 3. 4. 1277 a 5, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἁρμονία ἡ πόλις, of all its components. Compare Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 30, κατ’ ἁρμονίαν δὴ βούλεται εἶναι ἢ πολιτικὴ φιλία, and Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35, ἢ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὰμοίων. Political rule itself is a rule over men free and equal (1. 7. 1255 b 20). It is not of course enough that the citizens should be alike; poor men are alike and slaves are alike, yet a πόλις composed of poor men or of slaves would not be a πόλις (3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq.). Machiavelli (Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 1. c. 55) goes so far as to say that ‘whosoever shall attempt to found a Republic where there are many gentlemen will never effect his purpose except he can first root them all out.’ He explains that he means by ‘gentlemen’ ‘such as live in idleness and abundance on the income of their estates without needing to trouble themselves to till the soil or to undertake any other kind of labour, in order to live.’ He holds that if three Republics, Florence, Siena, and Lucca, had subsisted a long time in the not large country of Tuscany, it was because there were but very few gentlemen there and no Lords with castles and subjects of their own, whereas Lombardy and the Kingdom of Naples abounded with these two sorts of men, and were consequently marked out for monarchy.

27. ὡστ’ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ., ‘so that this State’ (i.e. a State com-
posed of moderately well-to-do citizens) 'will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the State is by nature composed.' The elements referred to are the very rich, the very poor, and the moderately well-to-do (1295 b 1 sqq.). A saying is attributed to Thales in [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. c. ii that the best democracy is that in which the citizens are neither very rich nor very poor. For ταύτην τὴν πόλιν = τὴν ἐκ τῶν μέσων συνεστῶσαν πόλιν, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 6, ταύτης τὰς πολιτείας (= τὰς τῶν ἀρίστων πολιτείας τῶν Ἑλλήνων). For the ellipse in ἐξ ὧν see note on 1253 b 3.

28. καὶ σῶζονται δὲ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν κ.τ.λ., i.e. not only save the State, but also save their own lives and fortunes. Euripides had said, τρίαν δὲ μοιρὰν ἦν μέσφ σώζει πόλεις (see note on 1295 b 1): cp. also Plato, Rep. 417 A, καὶ οὕτω μὲν σώζουστο ἵ ἄν καὶ σώζουν τὴν πόλιν. For the fact cp. Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 462 Nauck (547, ed. 2), esp.

ἡ δὲ μεσότης ἐν πᾶσιν ἀσφαλεστέρα, and Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 35.

31. τῆς τοῦτον. Aristotle expects us to supply οὐσίας: compare the omission of πολιτείαν in 1296 a 5. For similar omissions see vol. ii. p. li, note 4.

καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. Compare the passage from the Supplices of Euripides quoted above on 1295 b 1, Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 28–31, and Corn. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 3, neque animo aequo pauperes alienam opulentium intueantur fortunam.

33. διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.


34. δῆλον ἄρα κ.τ.λ., 'it is clear then that the constitution also in which the moderately well-to-do are supreme is best,' as well as ἡ μέση κτίσει τῶν ἐντυχεῖσαν (1295 b 4 sq.), or perhaps as well as the πολλα of 34. 'Ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική here means 'the constitution,' as in 2. 1. 1260 b 27 (cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 29). In 1. 1. 1252 a 7 it seems to mean 'the πόλις.' For ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων, cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 6 sq.

36. καὶ τᾶς τοιούτας κ.τ.λ. 'The condition of economical and political well-being in any highly civilized nation is a harmony of large, moderate, and small incomes. Things are best when the moderate incomes predominate—when, as Rousseau says, "no citizen is so rich that he can buy up the rest and none so poor
that he must needs sell himself’’ (Roscher, Politik, p. 473). Mr. A. J. Balfour remarked of Ireland in the House of Commons (Times, March 11, 1890), that one reason why its land-system was imperfect was that ‘there was an absence of a class intermediate between the occupying farmer and the landlord which might hold the balance between the two.’ Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38 sqq.

ἐν αἰς δή. ‘Δή vim relativi urguet, “welcher eben,” “welcher gerade”’ (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 43).

39. τὰς ἑναντίας ὑπερβολὰς, i.e. extreme democracy and unmixed oligarchy.

40. τῶν πολιτευμένων, ‘cives optimo iure’ (Bon. Ind. 613 b 27), ‘the active citizens’ (Welldon). See note on 1328 a 17.


2. ἡ τυραννίς δι’ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, ‘or, as a result of both these extremes’ (extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy), ‘a tyranny.’

3. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Τῆς υεινικοτάτης probably qualifies both δημοκρατίας and ὀλιγαρχίας: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3, ἢ δὲ τυραννίς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς υστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας. The reason why extreme democracies and extreme oligarchies were apt to change into tyrannies may be gathered from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.; both these constitutions placed great power in the hands of individuals, the one of them in the hands of demagogues and the other in those of the leading oligarchs. Tyranny often arose out of oligarchy (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and according to a saying of Dionysius the younger (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Iun. 4. 176 D), the elder Dionysius became tyrant μεσομένης δημοκρατίας. The narrow oligarchy of the Bacchiadæ at Corinth ended in a tyranny, but the less narrow oligarchy which was set up on the fall of the tyranny had not been replaced by a tyranny, though it is true that Timo-phanes had attempted to overthrow it (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 23 sqq.).

5. τῶν μέσων, sc. πολιτείων, which is suppressed because easily supplied. The term ἡ μέση πολιτεία is used of a constitution midway between oligarchy and democracy in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13. 1. 18.

τῶν σύνεγγυς, i.e. the moderate forms of oligarchy (cp. 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21, τῶν μὲν ἑκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχίων καὶ πρώτην, αὐτή δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυ τῇ καλομενή πολιτείᾳ) and also of democracy. Thus
the cities of Achaia, being under moderate democracies, were mostly free from tyranny (Paus. 7. 7. 1: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 105).

7. & µέση, sc. πολιτεία. It is implied that in the μέση πολιτεία the midway class will be large: cp. 23 sqq., where εν ταύταις apparently means εν ταις πλείσταις πολιτείαις, and c. 13. 1297 b 26, δι’ ἀλγανθροπίαις γὰρ ὅκει εἶχον (αἱ ἀρχαία πολιτείαι) πολύ τό µέσον.

8. δι’ου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30, τὸ µέσον αὗτων τούτω γὰρ διαλείται διὰ τὴν ἀνυσόφητα στάσεις. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 744 D, διε γὰρ εν πόλει που, φαμέν, τῇ τοῦ µεγίστου νοσηµατικοῦ της διάστασιν ὁ στάτων ὁρθότερον ἐν εἴη κεκλῆσθαι, μήτε πειναί τὴν χαλεπὴν ἐνείαν παρὰ τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν µήτ’ αὐτοῦ πλούτου, ὃς ἀµφοτέρων τυχόντων ταῦτα ἀµφότερα. This passage lends support to the reading of the MSS. here, στάσεις καὶ διάστασεις, and makes it unlikely that Schneider and Sus. are right in reading συντάσεις in place of στάσεις, a change suggested by the rendering of Vet. Int., ‘conturbationes et dissensiones politiarum,’ where however ‘conturbationes’ may stand for στάσεις, for στάσις is not always rendered ‘seditio’ by Vet. Int. Compare also Menecles of Barca, Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 4. 449), αἱ πολιτείαι εν θῆρᾳ ἑσταυσάσαι καὶ διέστησαν ἀλλήλων, and Gellius’ version of Solon’s law as to neutrality in a sedition (Gell. 2. 12, si ob discordiam dissensionemque seditio atque discessio populi in duas partes (στάσις καὶ διάστασις) fiat, etc.); also Plato, Rep. 560 A, στάσεις καὶ διάστασεις, and Plut. Solon, c. 12, τῆς στάσεως ἀκήρυ βλαβούσις μάλητα καὶ τοῦ δήμου διαστάσεως. In a διάστασις the citizens were divided into two camps, and a division into two camps was probably often the precursor of actual fighting (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 19).

9. αἱ µεγάλαι πόλεις, ‘large States’ probably, not ‘large cities,’ as in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sq. The tendency of small States to στάσεις may be illustrated by the examples of Cynætha (Polyb. 4. 17), Epidamnus (Thuc. 1. 24), and Delphi (Pol. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle’s remark that τὸ µέσον was a numerous class in large Greek States throws an interesting light on the distribution of property in them. If we could trust the statement of the tribune Marcus Philippus in b.c. 104 that there were not two thousand men in Rome who possessed property (Cic. De Offic. 2. 21. 73), which is in all probability an exaggerated one, the state of things at Rome must have been at that time very different.
10. ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς κ.τ.λ. If οἱ μέσοι were so few in number in small Greek States, the polity can hardly have been suitable to them. Yet were not most Greek States small? If so, can the polity have been suitable to most Greek States? Aristotle says himself in 1296a 23 sqq. that the midway class was often a small one in Greek States. The difficulty just pointed out does not seem, however, to have occurred to him.

11. μηδὲν μέσον, ‘nothing midway between the very rich and the very poor.’

13. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὁλιγαρχῶν κ.τ.λ. A different reason is given for this in 7 (5). i. 1302 a 8 sqq.: cp. also 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sqq.

16. ἔπειδ᾽ introduces a proof that the greater durability of democracy as compared with oligarchy is due to the μέσοι, the proof being furnished by the fact that when the supremacy of the poor in a democracy is not due to the aid of the μέσοι but to their own superiority in number, democracies do not last long. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 12-19. The fact mentioned by Aristotle is interesting. The Athenian democracy, which lasted long, must have had the support of the μέσοι. Mommsen (History of Rome, Book 4, c. 6: Eng. Trans., ed. i, vol. iii. p. 212) says of the demagogues Saturninus and Glauca, ‘While Gaius Gracchus, clearly perceiving that no government could be overthrown by means of the proletariat alone, had especially sought to gain over to his side the propertied classes, these continuators of his work began by producing a reconciliation between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.’ For κακο-πραγματέα γίνεται cp. Plato, Laws 701 E, ἐγένετο εὐπραγία.

18. σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. An indication of what? Probably of the fact that the constitution which gives supreme power to the midway class is the best.

19. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων (δηλοὶ δὲ εκ τῆς ποιήσεως). For δηλοὶ = δηλοῦ ἐστι, see Liddell and Scott and Bon. Ind. 174 a 14 sqq. That Solon belonged to the moderately well-to-do class is testified also by 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 5 and Plut. Solon, cc. 1 and 14. No evidence of the fact is to be found in Solon, Fragm. 15, which seems only to show that he was not wealthy, nor do the quotations from his poems in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 5 prove the point, as the writer seems to think that they do. Aristotle probably did not regard Cleisthenes as one of the best lawgivers. He must have been a wealthy man.

20. οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεύς. This is added in correction of those who
had said that Lycurgus was king. Ephorus had done so (Fragm. 64, ap. Strab. p. 482, τέως μὲν οὖν ἐβασιλεύειν ὁ Δυκαύργος αὐτὶ τοῦ ἄδειλφος, γενομένου δὲ παῦδος ἐπετρόπευεν ἐκεῖνον: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 3). Other authorities went further; according to them Lycurgus was for many years king at Lacedaemon (Plut. Solon, c. 16). Wide domains were attached to the Lacedaemonian kingship (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 44. 2), and if Lycurgus had been king, he would have been a rich man and not one of the μέσοι. Cp. Hom. Odyssey. i. 392,

οὐ μὲν γὰρ τι κακὸν βασιλεύειν αἴψα τε οὐ δῶ
ἀφινεῖν πελεσταί, καὶ τιμηστέροις αὐτῶς.

The view that Lycurgus was not a king recurs in the speech of Cleomenes III in Plut. Cleom. c. 10, τὸν Δικούργον, δὲ οὕτω βασιλεύσ ἐν οὕτω ἀρχών, ἰδιώτης δὲ βασιλεύειν ἐπιχειρών ἐν τοῖς ὁπλαις προήλθεν εἰς ἀγοράν κ.τ.λ.

21. Χαρώνδας. Charondas, though praised here, is apparently referred to in c. 13. 1297 a 23 sqq. as the author of an ἁριστοκρατία embodying one at any rate of the σοφίσματα to which Aristotle objects (see note on 1274 a 22).

22. φανερὸν δ' ἐπ τούτων κ.τ.λ. Three reasons for the comparative rarity of ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία are given in what follows:—(1) the class of μέσοι is often small, (2) the constitution is the outcome of a victory of the rich or the poor, (3) those who have had the hegemony in Greece have seldom favoured this constitution. In 7 (5), 1. 1301 b 39 sqq. a different reason is given for the tendency of constitutions to assume the form of oligarchy or democracy.

23. ἐν ταύταις, i.e. ἐν ταῖς πλείονται πολιτείαις (cp. 14 sqq.).

27. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ. Compare Plato, Laws 715 A, and as to Argos Thuc. 5. 82. 2, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20. 2. As to Tegea see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6–10.

30. τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας, 'the superior share in the advantages of the constitution': cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 28, τοῖς ἠπτομ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας, and 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19, τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας.

32. ἐτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.' The cause now mentioned for the general prevalence in Greece of democracy and oligarchy does not account for the prevalence of these two constitutions throughout the Greek world, for though the constitutional development of the States of Greece Proper, Western Asia Minor, the Northern Aegean, and
the Propontis, etc. was considerably influenced by the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, this can hardly be said of the constitutional development of the Greek States of Italy and Sicily, in which Athens did not interfere till a comparatively late date, or of Cyrene and Massalia, where neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians appear to have interfered at all.


38. ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγοις. Aristotle often uses expressions like this: cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23, ὀλίγακις ἐδικίας, and see Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1454 a 1, who refers to Poet. 24. 1460 a 9, De Gen. An. i. 19. 727 b 28 sq. and 3. 5. 756 a 16 sq., Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1151 b 30, and other passages. See also Bon. Ind. s. v. ὀλιγάκις, and Plato, Rep. 491 B.

ἐἶς γάρ ἀνήρ κ.τ.λ., 'for one man only of those formerly in a position of supreme authority was persuaded to allot this constitution [to those with whom he had to do].' For the use of ἐπὶ in τῶν πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονία γενομένων, cp. ἐπ' ἐπιτραπέτια in Soph. O. C. 1554,

ἐιδαίμονες γένοισθε, καὶ ἐπιτραπέτα
μέμησθει μου βασιλέως ἐπιτραπέτει.

It is doubtful whether we should supply τῆς Ἐλλάδος with ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ, though we have had τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἐλλάδος in 32; Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἡγεμονία) and Sus.² (i. 597) do not appear to supply τῆς Ἐλλάδος, but to take statesmen at the head of their respective States to be referred to. Statesmen at the head of the greater Greek States would, however, be in a position to exercise an influence over the affairs of Greece. It is to be noticed that while the reference is to peoples in 32, statesmen are now referred to. I take the allusion to be to Theramenes: see vol. i. p. 470. A constitution which Thucydides describes both as ὀλιγαρχία and as ἄριστοκρατία was introduced at Thasos and in other States dependent on Athens in the time of the Four Hundred (Thuc. 8. 64). Aristotle
may well have thought that Epaminondas and Pelopidas missed a splendid opportunity of introducing the polity when the victory of Leuctra made Thebes the leading power in Greece, and that Arcadia, for instance, might have prospered better if Epaminondas had advised those who reorganized it to give it a less democratic constitution than they actually did. Why 

\textit{συνεπεισόθη} and not \textit{επεισόθη}? \textit{Συμπείδιειν} seems hardly to differ in meaning from \textit{πείδειν} in De Caelo, 2. i. 284 a 2, \textit{διόπερ καλῶς ἔχει συμπείδειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ ἀρχαίου καὶ μᾶλλον πατρίου ἡμῶν ἀληθείς εἰναι λόγους,} and the word is said by Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 254. 3 to be often used in the same sense as \textit{πείδειν} by Theopompus. \textit{Συνεπεισόθη} may mean no more here, or it may mean, as Richards suggests, ‘was persuaded to agree in doing so and so.’ For \textit{ταύτῃ ἀποδόωνα} τὴν τάξιν, where I can hardly think (with Welldon) that \textit{ἀποδόωνα} means ‘to restore’ (Sus. translates the word ‘ins Leben zu rufen,’ ‘to call into being’), cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, \textit{οὐ πρότερον ἀπέδωκε τῷ πλήθει τοὺς νόμους (ὁ Λυκούργος).} In ’Aθ. Pol. c. 11, \textit{τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδόωνα}, the word perhaps means ‘to restore.’

\textbf{40. Ἡδη δὲ κ.τ.λ.} Καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, ‘among those in the individual cities also,’ as well as among rulers of the leading States of Greece: cp. Xen. Anat. 6. 6. 12, \textit{εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνων προεστήκασιν: Ικανοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς ἐκαστὸς Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὃ τι βουλοῦνται διαπράττεσθαι.} Aristotle evidently holds that the bad spirit to which he refers had had its origin in the policy of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian statesmen and had spread from it to the dependent States ruled by them. Macaulay perhaps remembers the passage before us when he writes of the Englishry and Irishry of Ireland in 1688–9 (History of England, c. 12), ‘It was now impossible to establish in Ireland a just and beneficent government. . . . The opportunity had passed away; compromise had become impossible; the two infuriated castes were alike convinced that it was necessary to oppress or to be oppressed, and that there could be no safety but in victory, vengeance, and dominion.’ \textit{Μηδὲ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἵσον, ‘not even to wish for that which is equal and fair,’} much less to endeavour to realize it. \textit{For τὸ ἵσον} cp. 29, \textit{οὐ καθιστάσα} καὶ ἐν ἀποστείαις αὐτὸ ἵσον.

\textbf{2. ἀρίστη, sc. ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεις (c. 11. 1295 a 25: c. 13. 1296 b. 1297 b 33).}

\textbf{5. καὶ τούτων δὲ τῶν τρόπων ἔχομένῃ.} Cpr. 2. 8. 1268 b 15, καὶ τούτων δὲ τῶν τρόπων δήλον ὅτι μεριώσει: Metaph. z. 2. 1028 b 24,
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καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τῶν τρόπων ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὕσιας, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 173 a 16 sqq. In 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 16 we have καὶ οὕτω δὴ, which is less common.

7. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. So in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 sq. we are told that the first form of oligarchy is that which makes a near approach to the polity.

9. πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, 'in relation to a presupposition' (in contradiction to ἀπλῶς), i.e. in relation to the presupposition of a given case in which what is in the abstract most choiceworthy is not most advantageous. For πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν see Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.

λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. It does not follow that what is in the abstract most choiceworthy will be advantageous in a given case. Punishment, which is in the abstract by no means choiceworthy, will be advantageous in the case of a criminal (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.). Cp. also Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 37, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. Thus, though the first form of oligarchy, which makes a near approach to the polity, is in the abstract the most choiceworthy form, in a given case an extreme form of oligarchy may be advantageous (cp. c. 12. 1296 b 33 sqq.).

C. 12. 18. Τίς δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 1. 1288 b 24 sqq. and c. 2. 1289 b 17 sqq. Compare also Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 30, χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μάνων ἑπαίειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρελθόντων ἐπαφροίνη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἀλλοις εἶδεν, αἱ ποιῶν τοῖς ποιῶν ἀρμόττουσιν.

14. ληπτέων, i.e. ὑποθετόντων: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης, and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 18. 'In a logical sense λαμβάνειν is used synonymously with αἰτεῖσθαι, ὑποθέτονται, and in contrast to διεκνίεται' (Bon. Ind. 422 b 11). That the principle here insisted on was inherited by Aristotle from Theramenes we have seen in vol. i. p. 491. Aristotle draws attention to it here because it has a bearing on the question what constitution is advantageous in a given case. To answer this question we must begin by ascertaining what is the strongest element in the given State, and what constitution will enlist its support.

17. ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποιοῦ. For the omission of the article before ποιοῦ cp. 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 1, πρῶς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς. 'New England abolished caste; in Virginia they still talk of "quality folk"' (Lowell, Among my Books, p. 239).

18 ἐλευθερία, which is said in c. 8. 1294 a 11 to be the ὀρος of
democracy, is here distinguished from ἡ τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπεροχή. The πλῆθος, in fact, may include others than αἱ ἐλείθυροι (3. 15. 1286 a 36). For the grouping together of πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν cp. c. 4. 1291 b 28 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39.

20. For ἐτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ἀν συνεστίκη μερῶν ἡ πόλις, see note on 1339 b 38. For the reversal of the order of the words in τὸ μὲν ποιῶν ύπάρχειν ἐτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως ... ἀλλὰ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσῶν see note on 1277 a 31, and cp. 26, ἐκαστὸν εἴδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν τοῦ δήμου ἐκάστου.

23. ὑπερέχειν, sc. τοῦτο τὸ μέρος.

25. τὴν εἰρήμενην ἀναλογίαν, i. e. so as to overbalance its defect in quality.

26. Though Aristotle uses the word πέφυκεν here, he does not probably intend to imply that democracy or oligarchy exist by nature under any circumstances (cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 39 sq.).

29. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ μισθαρόντων, τὴν τελευταίαν.

This hardly agrees with c. 6. 1293 a 1 sqq. No doubt the ultimate democracy will exist only in States in which artisans and day-labourers are very numerous, but it will not exist even in them unless the revenue is large enough to make an ample provision of pay possible.

31. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γυνωρίμων κ.τ.λ. We see from 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq. that other things have to be taken into account in deciding what kind of oligarchy is suitable to a given State besides that mentioned here—for instance, the character of the territory. In 2. 12. 1274 a 18 we have ἐκ τῶν γυνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, but in the passage before us the article is omitted after καὶ because the two classes are treated as nearly akin. Compare with 31 sq. Peri μακροβιότητος 5. 466 a 33, μακροβιότερα γὰρ τὰ λειπόμενα τῷ πλῆθει τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἐὰν πλείον λόγῳ ὑπερέχη κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν ἢ λειπέται κατὰ τὸ ποσῶν.

34. κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλῆθους, 'according to the degree of superiority' (i. e. in quality) 'possessed by the oligarchical population.' Πλῆθος must here be used of the class referred to without much reference to its numbers: cp. 31, τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γυνωρίμων (sc. πλῆθος). The phrase recurs in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 11, ὁπότε δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν ποίῳ πλῆθει.

34. δεῖ δὲ δέλ. ... 38. τούτους, and 1297 a 6. ὅσῳ ... b 1. μόνον Sus., following Buecheler, would transfer to before 1294 b 14, τοῖς, and 1297 b 1. δεῖ ... 28. ἀρχεσθαι, to after ἀλως, 1294 b 40. But
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Welldon retains the traditional order of these passages, and, I think, rightly. I do not see any reason why Aristotle should not in 1296 b 34–38 advise the framers of oligarchies and democracies to frame their constitutions so as to satisfy the μέσον, and though the counsel as to the construction of durable polities and aristocracies which is given in 1297 a 6–b 28 might have been given in c. 9, where Buecheler and Sus. would place it, it should not escape attention that μονομορία, 1297 a 7, evidently takes up μόνον, 1296 b 40, and that it can hardly be right to tear asunder the two sentences in which these words occur, as Buecheler and Sus. would do. It should also be noticed that the closing remark in 1297 b 26–28 as to τὸ μέσον comes better after, than before, what we have been told in c. 11 as to the importance of οἱ μέσοι. Aristotle’s object in 1297 a 6–b 28 is to add two cautions to what he has already said in c. 9 as to the proper way of constructing polities and aristocracies, the one against falling into the error into which framers of these constitutions frequently fell, and trying to deceive the demos in addition to giving an unfair share of power to the well-to-do, and the other against fixing the property-qualification without reference to the circumstances of the particular case, and omitting to take care that those admitted to political rights shall be more numerous than those excluded from them. The latter caution is in complete harmony with, and was probably suggested by, what is said at the outset of the discussion in c. 12. 1296 b 14 sqq.

35. εὖ τῇ πολιτείᾳ goes with προσλαμβάνειν, and we should translate ‘should make the moderately well-to-do sharers in the advantages of the constitution in addition to the class specially favoured by him.’ Bonitz (Ind. s.v. προσλαμβάνειν) compares with the passage before us 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, τῷ προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστου καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον τοὺς γυναικὸς ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς νόθους κ.τ.λ.

36. στοχάζεσθαι τῶν μέσων. Κρ. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22, στοχαζῶμεν τοῦ πλῆθους, and Polyb. 6. 15. 9.

37. εἶν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ κ.τ.λ. Κρ. c. 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.

38. δὲν ἐὰς κ.τ.λ., ‘but where the mass of the moderately well-to-do outweighs either both the extreme classes taken together or even one of them only, there it is possible for a durable polity to exist.’ See vol. i. p. 501, note. ‘Υπερτείνει probably means ‘outweighs’ (cp. 32, ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποιότητι), not ‘exceeds in number,’ though in small Greek States the very rich may often have been
more numerous than the moderately well-to-do (c. 11. 1296 a 10 sqq.).

40. For οὐδὲν φοβερὸν μὴ cp. (with Bon. Ind. 828 a 30) Metaph. θ. 8. 1050 b 23, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτὲ στῆ : cp. also Xen. Hiero, 1. 12, φοβερὸν γὰρ μὴ ἁμα στερηθῶσι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀδύνατοι γενόνται τιμωρήσασθαι τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας.

2. οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλήσουνται δούλευείν τοῖς έτέροις κ.τ.λ. 1297 a. The sense is—for, if the rich are to combine with the poor against the μέσοι, either the one class must submit to be ruled by the other, and neither of the two classes will agree to that, or they must fall back on a κοινή πολιτεία which will give both classes a share of power, and if they seek to find a πολιτεία more κοινή than this, they will seek in vain.

3. οὐδεμιᾶν εὐρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης. Vict. and Lamb. supply κοινοτέραν before ταύτης, while Sus.2 (‘so werden sie keine andere als diese finden’) and Welldon (‘they will not discover any other than this’) make ταύτης in the gen. after ἄλλην. For ἄλλος with the gen. cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 15 sq. and see Bon. Ind. s. v. I incline myself, however, to supply κοινοτέραν.

4. ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἀρχεῖν κ.τ.λ. Τὸ ἐν μέρει ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι is a sign of freedom (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sq.), and a constitution in which it found a place would be especially κοινή.

6. διατητῆς δ' ὃ μέσος. Cp. De An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικὸν γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἕκατερον αὐτῶν διάτερον τῶν ἄκρων. Aristotle’s conception of the μέσον ruling as arbitrators between rich and poor was perhaps suggested to him by the fact that Greek States occasionally had recourse to an ἄρχων μέσοις when the ἁπατία πρὸς ἄλληλους mentioned in 4 sq. existed (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 26 sqq., where the phrase recurs).

ἀδω 8' ἐν ἄμεινον ἢ πολιτεία μικρά, τοσοῦτος μονιμωτέρα. Cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 5 sqq.

7. καὶ τῶν τῶν ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας, ‘even of those who wish to construct aristocratic constitutions,’ not merely of those who wish to construct oligarchies. I incline to think that τῶν ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας means here ‘aristocratic constitutions,’ not ‘aristocratic polities,’ though in c. 14. 1298 b 10 we have πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς used in the sense of an ‘aristocratic polity.’ That many aristocracies were not unlike oligarchies we know from c. 7. 1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sqq.

9. ἐν τῷ παρακροώμεθα τῶν δήμων. How odious laws were VOL. IV.
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which deceived the demos, we see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 79.

10. ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. By ψευδῶς ἀγαθά Aristotle means apparent privileges which come to nothing and disappoint those to whom they are given. He perhaps remembers Theogn. 607, ἀρχῇ ἐπὶ ψευδοὺς μικρὴ χάρις ἐς δὲ τελευτήν αἰσχρῶν δὴ κέρδος καὶ κακῶν, ἀμφότερον, γάνεται: oüδὲ τι καλὸν, ὅτι ψευδος προσομαρτῆ ἄνδρὶ καὶ εἴδηθι πρῶτον ἀπὸ στόματος

(a saying which is apparently referred to in Soph. Fragm. 749, 750 Nauck; cf. also Plato, Rep. 490 C, ἡγομένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἐν ποτε, οἷοι, φαίμεν αὐτῇ χαρῶν κακῶν ἀκολουθήσαι). Eurip. Fragm. 1022 Nauck (1035, ed. 2) should also be compared, διστηροὶ ὅστις τὰ καλὰ καὶ ψευδὴ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο χρῆται τοῖς καλοῖς ἀληθείας, and Fragm. 266 Nauck (264, ed. 2), τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ὄρθως πρασσόμεν ὄρθως τοῖς πρῶτον κακῶν ἡθεῖν, and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. ccxiv (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 292),

κριτῶν δ’ ἐλίσθαι ψευδὸς ἡ ἀληθεῖς κακῶν.

Some familiar proverb or verse probably lies at the root of all these passages.

11. αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλούσοι μᾶλλον τῆν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου, ‘for the undue gains of the rich’ (i.e. the superiority of political advantage which the ingenious constitutional contrivances referred to secure to the rich) ‘are more fatal to the constitution than those of the demos.’ Πλεονεξία here = τὸ πλεῖον ἔχειν, not τὸ βούλεσθαι πλέων ἔχειν (Bon. Ind. s.v.). The reason why the undue gains of the rich are more fatal to the constitution than those of the poor probably is that these gains fall to a minority, and to a minority specially keen for political predominance (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 17, κριτῶν τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι ἵσον ἔχοντες) and specially ready to abuse it (1307 a 19 sq.).

C. 13. 14. ἔστι δ’ ἰσα κ.τ.λ. ‘ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαισι probably means ‘in politics,’ i.e. in politics strictly so called: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 40 sqq., where a warning is addressed to ‘well-mixed constitutions’ not to trust to the artifices described in the chapter before us; hence it is likely that framers of aristocracies and politics often committed the error of trusting to them. We know that Plato did so
in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 502, note 2), and the constitution sketched in the Laws is said by Aristotle to be meant for a polity (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.). Plato may have been misled by the example of Charondas (1207 a 23). The plan followed in the aristocracies and polities which Aristotle here criticizes was to give the demos an apparent, but illusory, share in the popular assembly, in office, in the dicasteries, and in the possession of arms and the practice of gymnastic exercises. Similar devices are occasionally practiced in modern times. Thus in the South African Republic the Uitlander or alien after a period of two years' residence and naturalization acquires only a vote in the election of the second Raad, a worthless franchise, for the Acts of this body must be presented to the President of the Republic for consideration, and can only become law if he decides to submit them for the approval of the first Raad, and its approval is obtained (Times, Jan. 1, 1896). It should be noticed that the advice which Aristotle himself gives to oligarchies to associate the demos with the privileged class in the deliberative, but to give it only a nugatory or consultative voice (c. 14. 1298 b 32 sqq.) comes perilously near that which he censures here. It would seem from what Aristotle says in the passage before us that even in polities the rich had to be forced by penalties to attend in the assembly and dicasteries, and to possess heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises, so that it is not surprising that in extreme democracies they commonly absented themselves from the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries (c. 6. 1293 a 8 sqq.).

17. περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 9 sqq. Aristotle does not object to the imposition of a fine on all, whether rich or poor, for non-attendance at the assembly, but to the imposition of a fine exclusively on the well-to-do, or of a much larger fine on them than was imposed on the poor, unless indeed the imposition of a fine on the rich is balanced by the provision of pay for the poor (1297 a 38 sqq.: cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.). A fine was imposed at Athens on those who did not attend the assembly (Pollux, 8. 104, where habitual absentees are perhaps meant by τῶν μὴ ἐκκλησίαζοντως), but no doubt on rich and poor alike, though of course a fine would not be easily leviable from the very poor. If the fine thus levied was of equal amount for both rich and poor, it would obviously fall more lightly on the rich than on the poor, and therefore would be more effective in securing the attendance of the poor.
than of the rich, whether this was intended by those who instituted it or not. The comitia centuriata at Rome were so organized that the centuries of the rich outnumbered those of the poor (Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 350).

19. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἄρχας κ.τ.λ. A device of a somewhat similar kind finds a place in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedia, for under this constitution office was confined to the 'complete citizens,' and no one could become a complete citizen without having in youth attended the public schools, which only those could do whose fathers could afford to maintain them in idleness. Thus while Xenophon can say that none of the 120,000 Persians were excluded from office by law, it was practically possible only for the sons of well-to-do parents to hold office (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 15).

20. τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τιμήμα, 'those who possess rateable property,' cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 17, τιμήμα φέροντας, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 39, l. 24, ἐν τοῖς τὰ τιμίματα παρτχομένοις.

μὴ ἔξειναι ἐξόμυσθαι. It is implied that in the constitutions to which Aristotle refers men were glad to avoid holding office; hence no pay can have been attached to the offices, or at any rate no pay large enough to be tempting. The tenure of office without pay is described in 2. 11. 1273 a 17 as characteristic of aristocracy, and some of the constitutions to which Aristotle here refers were aristocracies (cp. 8); whether offices were unremunerated in politics also, we do not learn.

21. καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1298 b 16 sqq. In the constitutions referred to here there seem to have been dicasteries of which the poor were nominally at any rate members, but in the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian aristocracies the magistrates constituted the judicial authority of the State (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.).

23. ἐν τοῖς Χαρώνδου νόμοις. Charondas legislated for Catania and the other Chalcidian cities of Italy and Sicily (2. 12. 1274 a 23 sqq.), but his laws seem to have been in use also at Thurii, if we may trust Diod. 12. 11 sqq., at Mazaca in Cappadocia (Strabo, p. 539), and apparently at Cos (Herondas, 2. 48: see Crusius, Untersuchungen, p. 34 sqq.), and very possibly in other cities of which we do not hear.

24. ἀπογραφαμένους, 'after having their names entered in a register.' There was a list of members of the assembly at Athens (πίναξ ἐκκλησιαστικῶς), in which men entered their names on attain-
ing the proper age (Demosth. Or. 44. in Leoch. c. 35: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 199, 289: Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 112 sq.), and such lists must have existed in most Greek States which had assemblies, for otherwise it would be impossible to exclude persons not entitled to serve, especially where pay was forthcoming for attendance, but the peculiarity of the arrangement described in the text is that registration was optional, and that poor men were discouraged from registering by the imposition of heavy penalties on those who after registering failed to attend (τοὺς, 27). This device differs from the rest in not affecting the poor exclusively. Not a few rich persons might be glad to avoid all risk of incurring these heavy penalties, and might consequently abstain from entering their names on the register. As to the use of the word ἀπογράφεσθαι see Mr. W. Wyse in Class. Rev. 12. 392.

29. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Some oligarchies deprived the many of their heavy arms (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12 sq.), and the constitutions referred to here did in a stealthy way much the same thing as those oligarchies did openly. We are told in 2. 5. 1264 a 20 sqq. that the Cretan States forbade their slaves to practise gymnastic exercises and to possess heavy arms, and the two things go together in the passage before us also.


36. ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ. This was the case at Athens, where pay was provided for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries, but no special fine was imposed on the rich for non-attendance. Pay would be provided in democracies for holders of office also, but Aristotle does not dwell on that, because in many democracies the real authority rested to a large extent with the assembly and the dicasteries. We do not hear, so far as I am aware, that poor men were ever in democracies enabled by pay to possess heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises.

40. τοῖς μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν. Πορίζειν does not suit with ζημίαν, and we expect τοῖς δὲ τάττειν ζημίαν (cp. 38), but see notes on 1257 a 21 and 1287 b 26, and cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq., where τάττειν is used both with μισθὸν and with ζημίαν. Aristotle evidently sees that simply extending the fine to the poor would not suffice, inasmuch as many of them would be too poor to pay it, and indeed could not afford to attend without remuneration.
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41. κοινωνοίεν, sc. τού ἐκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικαζειν.

1297 b. 1. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but the constitution [of the polity] should indeed be composed of’ (or in other words ‘should give political rights to’) ‘the possessors of heavy arms and none others, [so that it will be necessary to name a property-qualification for membership of it:]’ still it is not possible to define the amount of this property-qualification absolutely’ (in contradistinction to ‘relatively to the particular State’) ‘and to say that it should be this or that, but we must consider what is the highest amount falling within the reach of the particular State that will allow those who share in the constitution to outnumber those who do not, and we must fix this amount.’ Sus. and Welldon translate τὴν πολιτείαν here ‘the polity,’ but if we translate it thus, we can hardly avoid translating ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. and 14 sq. in the same way. In 14 sq., however, at any rate ἡ πολιτεία cannot be thus translated, and neither Sus. nor Welldon thus translate it there. I incline, therefore, to translate τὴν πολιτείαν here ‘the constitution [of the polity],’ and to translate ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. and 14 sq. ‘the constitution.’ Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 12 sq.) translates τὴν πολιτείαν in the passage before us and ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. ‘universitas civium,’ but I prefer the rendering ‘the constitution’ (see note on 1293 b 41). That the polity will confine political rights to the possessors of heavy arms is taken for granted; this has been already said in 2. 6. 1265 b 28 sq. and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq. If the property-qualification were fixed so high as to make those excluded from political rights more numerous than those admitted to them, the constitution would not be a polity but an oligarchy (c. 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.). The property-qualification which entitles to political rights in the polity will vary in different States; it will be high where a high qualification will bring an adequate number within the constitution, it will be lower where that will not be so. When it is said that the constitution must be ‘composed of’ the possessors of heavy arms (for ἐκ here designates the material of which the constitution is made, cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 28 sq. and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq., and see notes on 1290 b 8 and 1319 a 24), the meaning probably is that membership of the assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing magistrates should be confined to this class. For though καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν, 6, might seem to indicate that the phrase implies access to office strictly so called, a distinction is drawn in 14 sqq. between membership of the πολιτεία and eligibility to office. It is evident, in fact, from 2. 8.
1268 a 27 sqq. and 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sqq. that, though the expression μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας often means μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν (e.g. in c. 5. 1292 a 41 and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 26)—in one passage, indeed (2. 8. 1268 a 21 sqq.), it means μετέχειν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν—it does not always do so, and sometimes implies nothing more than membership of the assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing magistrates. Under οἱ τὰ ὀσπα ἔχοντες Aristotle probably includes only οἱ ὁπλετεύοντες, not οἱ ὁπλετευκότες (cp. 12 sqq. and 2. 8. 1267 b 32 sq., where τὸ τὰ ὀσπα ἔχον is coupled with τὸ προσαλέμον). οἱ τὰ ὀσπα ἔχοντες are tacitly distinguished in what follows from οἱ πένητες: see as to this above on 1289 b 31 and 1294 a 41. For ὀρισμένως Busse (De Praesidii Aristotelis Politica Emendandi, p. 22) compares Poet. c. 7. 1451 a 9, ὃ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὤρος, ἅπα σὲ ὁ μεῖζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνθηκος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς δὲ ὀσπα διαμεθάντας εἰσέπραξεν, ἐν ὀσφ κατ' αὐτῇ τ.λ. Δεῖν must be supplied with ὑπάρχειν (Schneider) and δεῖ with τάττειν. As to the suppression of δεῖ see notes on 1335 b 5 and 1328 a 8.

6. ἑκάστου γὰρ οἱ πένητες κ.τ.λ., ‘for [this course will not cause any difficulty with the poor, for] they are willing,’ etc. We learn, however, from 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 14 sqq. that something besides abstinence from outrage or spoliation on the part of the rulers is necessary if the poor are to remain quiet; office must not be a source of large gains. Who are meant by οἱ πένητες, we see from Aristoph. Plut. 552 Didot,

πτωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος, δοῦν λέγεις, ζην ἔστω τιδὲν ἔχοντα·
toi b peýntos oen fxeidhexon kal tois èrgois proosékhonta,
perigýgenvsa b αὐτῷ μηδὲν, μὴ μεντοι μηδ' épideipsete.

The passage before us shows that they possessed some property: in 1. 2. 1252 b 12 it is implied that the πένης owned an ox for ploughing, but of course this would be true only of small cultivating landowners, not of urban πένητες. In Plato, Rep. 552 A the terms πένης and ἀπορος are conjoined. As to the ἀπορος see note on 1279 b 19.

9. χαρίειντας. See note on 1267 a 1.

10. καὶ εἰδότας δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just noticed a difficulty in connexion with his proposal which may be removed by wise conduct on the part of the ruling class, and now he notices another of which the same thing may be said. He perhaps remembers how the Council of the Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens of
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Athens to take their place in the triremes and to fight at Salamis by giving each man eight drachmae ('Αθήνα, Πολ. c. 23). Compare the experience of the oligarchical leaders at Mytilene (Thuc. 3. 27. 2). To be willing to fight on condition of receiving food and without any pay was evidence of an easily contented disposition: cp. Plato, Rep. 420 Λ, ναί, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταύτα γε ἐπισίτως καὶ οὔδε μεσθόν πρὸς τοὺς σιτίους λαμβάνοντες, ὀσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι (ἐπίκουροι), and Eubul. Δαιδάλος, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 216), ἐβίλει δ' ἄνευ μισθοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς καταμένειν ἐπισίτως.

Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 10, ὀργίζεσθαι δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥστε τὴν πενήν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν τών παροῦσαι Ἀθηναίοις μόνον ὁρῶσι, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς φιλοτυμίας ἀμημονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σιτίους ύπὲρ τῆς Ἕλλασ ἀγωνίζεσθαι παρακαλοῦντες. It would seem from the passage before us that the poor were commonly expected to help in fighting for the State even in a polity—whether as hoplites or as light-armed troops (6. 7. 1321 a 13 sq.), we are not told.

12. ἦστι δ' ἡ πολιτεία παρ' ἐνίοις οὔ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἄλλα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευκότων. 'Ἡ πολιτεία, 'the constitution.' Aristotle would approve this arrangement because it adds to the number of those admitted to political rights (and so to the strength of the polity) without altering the class to which they belong. Plato (Laws 753 B: vol. i. p. 446) had given the right of nominating the three hundred citizens from whom the thirty-seven Nomophylakes are afterwards chosen by the whole city to those citizens, ὅπουοι περ ἰν ὅπλα ἑπτάκια ἡ πεζικά τιθῶνται καὶ πολέμων κεκουμηνίκωσαν ἐν ταῖς σφετέραις αὐτῶν τῆς ἴλλιας δυνάμει, a constituency not very unlike that described in the text.

15. ἐκ τούτων, i.e. ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων καὶ τῶν ὀπλιτευκότων. Membership of the assembly and the dicasteries was conferred on both these classes. So in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia office was confined to those citizens who, being between the ages of twenty-six and fifty-one, bore heavy arms and served on foreign expeditions, while the citizens above fifty-one years of age elected the holders of the magistracies and acted as judges (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 13 sq.).

16. καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. This is added in justification of the recommendation in 1297 b 1 that the polity should confine political rights to the possessors of heavy arms. The earliest constitution gave political rights to those who fought for the State,
and Aristotle is probably inclined to presume that the earliest constitution will have been framed on a correct principle; thus he holds that the oldest kind of democracy is the best (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6 sqq.). We do not hear what was the nature of the military force under the kings, but the knights were supreme in the oligarchies which arose after the fall of kingship. It is clear from c. 3. 1289 b 36 sqq. that the strength of every State did not lie in cavalry, and therefore that these oligarchies of knights did not exist everywhere, but they are said in that passage to have existed, among other places, at Chalcis and Eretria, at Magnesia ad Maeandrum, and at many cities in Asia. They probably existed wherever there was a spacious open (Hdt. 5. 63) plain near the city, in which cavalry could act with effect (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). See notes on 1289 b 39 and 1321 a 8.


ἀνὴρ ὑπόλητης δούλοις ἐστὶ τῶν ὄπλων, καὶ τοῖς συνταχθείσιν οὕτω μὴ 'γαθοῖς αὐτὸς τέθηκε δειλία τῇ τῶν πέλας, and Plut. T. Flamin. c. 8, ἦς γὰρ ἵνα φάλαγξ ἔσκειν ὁμάχω τὴν ἵσχυν, ἐως ἐν ἑστὶ σῶμα καὶ τημεῖ τῶν συνασπισμῶν ἐν τάξει μιὰ, διαλυθείσης δὲ καί τὴν καθ’ ἑαυτῶν ἀπόλυσε τῶν μαχημάτων ἐκαστος διὰ τε τῶν τρόπον τῆς ὑπόλειτος καὶ ὅτι παντὸς τῶν ταῦτα παρ’ ἄλληλοις μέρεσι μᾶλλον ἤ δὲ αὐτῶν ἰσχύει.

20. αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ὄνων ὑπήρξον, 'and the crafts and tactical rules connected with the above-mentioned matters' (i.e. the ordering of hoplites) 'did not exist among the ancients.' Aristotle speaks of ἐμπειρίαι, not τέχναι, because the crafts based on mere practice to which he refers hardly deserved the name of arts; arts have to do with τὰ καθόλου, not so ἐμπειρία (Metaph. A. 1. 981 a 15 sq.). Cp. Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 1, τὰς ὀλίσθεν ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας, and Plato, Phaedr. 260 E, οὗ ταύτη τέχνη, ἀλλ’ ἄλλοι πείρασι προθη, Gorg. 462 B sq., 465 A, and Laws 938 A, εἰτ’ οὕτω τεχνή εἶτε ἀλλ’ ἄλλοις ἔστι τες ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβη. Γιὰ τὰς τάξεις ('taktischen Regeln,' Stahr), cp. Plato, Laws 688 A, τὰς τάξεις τῶν
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22. αὐξανομένων τῶν πόλεων, 'the States increasing in size': see notes on 1293 a 1, where it has been explained that this increase would especially consist in an increase of the central city, and on 1310 b 17.

24. διὸπερ, 'hence,' i.e. the constitutions which then arose were called democracies (though they would now be called polities), because the possessors of political rights under them were more numerous than before and might well seem to be a demos when compared with the handful of men who ruled in the oligarchies which preceded them. It was perhaps in part because Aristotle saw that the earliest democracies were polities that he came to regard democracy as a perverted development of polity.

25. αἱ ἀρχαίαι πολιτεῖαι. Bonitz (Ind. 613 b 12), Susemihl, and others take these words to mean 'the ancient polities,' but I incline rather to render them, with other interpreters, 'the ancient constitutions.' The words αἱ ἀρχαίαι πολιτεῖαι seem to take up ἡ πρώτη πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς "Ελλησιν, where πολιτεία means 'constitution,' not 'polity.' Prof. Francotte (Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement d'après Aristote, p. 41, note 2) is not altogether satisfied with Susemihl's rendering, though he follows it.

26. δι' ὀλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ ὦκ εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον (sc. αἱ πόλεις). Cp. c. 11. 1296 a 9 sqq.

27. ὅλγου τε ὑπότε τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν. 'Ολγου must be supplied with κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν in the sense of 'insignificant,' which of course is not its natural sense, but Aristotle often makes one word do, where the use of a second would have improved the sentence (see notes on 1257 a 21 and 1297 a 40). I do not think that any adjective, such as φαῖλοι, has dropped out before or after κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν. What is the suppressed nominative to ύπειμένων? I incline to think αἱ δημοτικοί, or in other words the class which rose to supreme power in the democracies, better called polities, which succeeded the kingships and oligarchies, i.e. αἱ τὰ δῆλα ἔχοντες. For the displacement of τε, which should follow το, see note on 1325 a 19.

28. διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτείαι πλείους. This question has been dealt with in c. 3. 1289 b 27—c. 4. 1291 b 13.

29. καὶ διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἔτεραι. Τὰς λεγομένας appears to include monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, one kind only of
democracy and oligarchy being recognized: cp. c. 8. 1294 a 25, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄτερα πολιτείαι εἶδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. This question has been dealt with in c. 4. 1291 b 15—c. 8. 1294 a 25.

31. τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίωσ. For the genitive see note on 1253 b 27. Monarchy has two forms, kingship and tyranny; oligarchy has four (c. 5), aristocracy several (cc. 7-8); we are not distinctly told that there are more forms than one of polity, though we hear incidentally of aristocratical polities (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10: cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 41 sq.).

ἐτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, 'and further what the differences between them are, and owing to what cause it happens [that they are what they are].’ Cp. c. 6. 1293 a 10 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 8.

32. πρὸς δὲ τούτους τίς ἀρίστη κ.τ.λ. Dealt with in c. 11.
33. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποία κ.τ.λ., ‘and of the other constitutions which constitution’ (literally, ‘which of the constitutions’) ‘is suitable to whom.’ Dealt with in c. 12. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10 sqq.

35. Πάλιν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This inquiry is referred to as past in 8 (6). C. 14. 1. 1316 b 31 sqq., but we are not prepared for it in the programme given in c. 2. 1289 b 12-26, except so far as it relates to democracy and oligarchy (see vol. i. p. 493). Its aim is to show how the deliberative magisterial and judicial elements should be organized under each constitution and each variety of constitution so as to harmonize with the constitution of which they form a part (cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 12 sqq.). Aristotle seeks to enable the statesman to avoid in framing each constitution adopting an organization of any one of these elements inappropriate to the tendency and spirit of the constitution, his special aim being, it would seem from c. 16. 1300 b 36 sqq., to prevent civil troubles and constitutional innovation. It should be noticed that Aristotle here proceeds to study constitutions in their parts, the most searching way of studying them (see note on 1252 a 17, τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον), and also that τὸ προτευομένων, notwithstanding what is said as to its importance in c. 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., is not one of the μῦρα τῶν πολιτειῶν mentioned here. Aristotle appears to regard it as a μέρος τῆς πόλεως, and an important one, but not a μέρος τῆς πολιτείας. It is, in fact, concerned, not with ruling or judging, but with fighting.

36. αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν ὑφηγ.,
37. μόρια τῶν πολιτείων πασῶν. Cr. c. 15. 1299 a 4, τούτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας, and see vol. i. p. 514, note. Compare also Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 79. τρία γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰς ὅν ἡ πολιτεία συνεστήκειν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ διώκτης. The expression αἱ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι seems to be used here in a sense exclusive of kingship and tyranny, of which we hear hardly anything in cc. 14-16.

38. ἐκάστη τὸ συμφέρον, cp. 8 (6). i. 1316 b 38, καὶ τὸν οἰκείον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην.

ὡν ἐχόντων καλῶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 48, ὅσ παρ’ ἐκαστον τῶν μερῶν ἣ καλῶς ἢ κακῶς τὸ σύμπαν ἐξον, οὔτω οποιαδήποτε περὶ αὐτῶν. That the parts, on the other hand, cannot be in a good state if the whole is not so, is a remark ascribed to the Thracian Zamolxis in Plato, Charm. 156 E, where he is made to say of the Greek physicians, that they knew not how to cure most diseases, ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἀγροικεῖν, ὁ δὲ ἢ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὐ μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντος ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ μέρος εὗ ἐχεῖν.

39. καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἐκαστον τούτων. We have been told in 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq. that constitutions differ because they give supreme power to different supreme authorities, but now we are told that they also differ because they organize the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial elements in a different way.

41. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 749): Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 283) that the three 'elements of all constitutions' named by Aristotle—the deliberative, the magistracies, and the judiciary—do not coincide with the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities of modern theorists. Aristotle’s deliberative is indeed charged with legislative functions, but it is also charged with executive functions (for questions of peace, war, and alliance come before it) and with judicial functions (for it has power to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation). For the union of legislative and judicial authority in the hands of the deliberative no defence can be offered; it was not well that the deliberative authority should have power to punish with death, exile, or confiscation. But when the Greek State gave the authority which had to do with legislation a voice in questions of war, peace, and alliance, it anticipated the practice of modern States. Prof. H. Sidgwick (Elements of Politics, ed. i, p. 439) recommends that ‘the consent of the legislature should be required, as a general rule, for making war,
or ceding or annexing territory, or making treaties that pledge the State to any such measures or that otherwise affect materially the financial liabilities or resources of the State.' The three elements named by Aristotle were probably marked off from each other in most Greek constitutions, but they were not in all. In many forms of oligarchy, for instance, and in some of aristocracy (3. i. 1275 b 8 sqq.) judicial authority rested with the magistrates, and in some extreme forms of oligarchy one or more magistracies—often perhaps a gerusia—constituted the deliberative (1298 a 8 sq.). The deliberative in Greek States was not so called because it had a monopoly of deliberation, for the magistrates also deliberated (c. 15. 1299 a 25 sqq.), but because certain specially important subjects of deliberation were made over to it, just as in a modern joint-stock company the consideration of some specially important matters is often reserved for meetings of the shareholders. (Compare Tac. Germ. c. 11, de minoribus rebus principes consultant, de maioribus omnes, ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est apud principes pertractentur.) What these subjects were, we learn from 1298 a 3 sqq. It should be noticed that the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation and that of reviewing the conduct of magistrates in office (c. 16. 1300 b 19) were often possessed also by dicasteries, so that the deliberative had not exclusive competence on these subjects. We see from the chapter before us that some of the powers enumerated in 1298 a 3 sqq. were given to the magistrates even in some forms of democracy, for there were democracies in which the functions of the assembly were confined to the enactment of laws and of provisions connected with the constitution, while in others they did not include the review of the magistrates' conduct in office and the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation. In the 'ultimate' form of democracy, on the other hand, not only did the competence of the assembly include the whole range of the subjects mentioned in 1298 a 3 sqq., but the functions of the magistracies (with the exception no doubt of those of the stratēgē when employed on expeditions) extended only to making preliminary inquiries, the right of effectual decision on all important matters being reserved for the assembly, which thus tended to become the supreme administrative authority of the State (cp. 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 27, ὁ δήμος . . . τὰ μὲν ἐκὼν τὰ δὲ ἀκὼν προσκεῖτο τὴν πολιτείαν διουκεῖν αὐτῶς). That the demos at Rome possessed most of the powers ascribed to the
deliberative by Aristotle, we see from Polyb. 6. 14, τιμής εὔστι καὶ τιμωρίας εἶν τῇ πολιτείᾳ μόνοις οὐ χήμοι κύριοι ... κρίνει μὲν οὖν οὗτος καὶ διαφόρους ποιλάκει, ὅταν ἄξιόχρεος ἢ τὸ τίμημα τῆς αὐδικίας, καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν τάς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐσχήκοτας ἀρχικές, θαυμᾷ δὲ κρίνει μόνοις ... καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀρχικές ὁ δήμος δίδωσι τοῖς ἄξιοις ... ἔχει δὲ τὴν κυρίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν νόμων δοκιμάσιαν, καὶ τὸ μέγαστον, ὅπερ εἰρήνης οὗτος βουλεύεται καὶ πολέμου. καὶ μὴν περὶ συμμαχίας καὶ διαλύσεως καὶ συνθηκῶν, οὐτός ἐστιν ο βεβαιῶν ἐκαστα τούτων καὶ κύρια πιθῶν ἢ τούναντιον. Aristotle omits to mention some of the powers possessed by the deliberative—for instance, its power of conferring citizenship and its powers in reference to taxation, such as the power to impose an eisphora or a new tax. Nor does he say anything of the power sometimes possessed by it of suspending or displacing any magistrate whom it held to discharge his duties ill (as to the exercise of this power by the deliberative at Athens, see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 223 sqq.).

1298 a. 2. ἃς δὲι. sc. εἶναι. For ἃς, not τίνας, though τίνων follows, see Kühner, Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 562. 4, who refers to Isocr. Ad Demon. § 5, διόπερ ἡμεῖς ... μελλομεν σοι συμβουλεύωμεν δων χρὴ τοὺς νεωτέρους ἀρέγχησαι καὶ τίνων ἔργων ἀπέχονται καὶ ποῖας τισιν ἀνθρώπων ὀμιλεῖν καὶ πῶς τῶν ἐαυτῶν βίου ὑκονομεῖν. Cp. also Plato, Laws 728 D, τὰς δ' αὖ τιμᾶς δεὶ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅπερ κίβδηλοι. 
ποῖαν τυλί δεὶ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν. Cp. c. 15. 1299 a 10 sqq.
3. τὴν αἵρεσιν must here include appointment by lot as well as by election.
5. καὶ περὶ νόμων. That it often fell to the whole body of citizens to enact, or at any rate to confirm, laws, we see from Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42, πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἴσιν, οὐς τὸ πλήθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἐγραψε, φεράξαν ὁ τε δεὶ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀ μὴ. A common course was for the assembly to appoint νομογράφου to draft laws and submit them to it for confirmation: see as to Teos Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 126. 45 sqq. (referred to by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 313. 2), where the assembly of Teos is advised by Antigonus to appoint νομογράφου for this purpose, and compare Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 29 sqq., where the Athenian assembly appoints συγγραφείς to draw up a new constitution, which is afterwards submitted to it for confirmation (cc. 30 init., 32 init.). Laws, however, were occasionally enacted by the deliberative without recourse being had to νομογράφου or συγγραφείς:
see Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 470 (quoted by Gilbert ibid.), [όγ]άδη τύχης, [οίκ]ονομάσσας Δημητρίου, μηνός Θαρρηλίων ἰμετέρας, 'Ἀλέξων Δύσωσε εἴπεν' νόμων εἶναι Γαμβρείωταις κ.τ.λ. As to the mode in which laws were enacted at Athens, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 300 sqq., and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 290 sqq., and on the broad subject of direct legislation by the people Bryce, American Commonwealth, c. 39. There is this to be said in favour of direct legislation by the people in a Greek City-State, that the people were not precluded by their numbers from meeting together for discussion, as the people of a modern State are.

καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ δηµεύσεως. That questions of this kind came not only before the dicasteries in Greek States, but also before the deliberative is proved by the inscriptions collected by Gilbert in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 314. 1—Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 551 (about B.C. 357), ἔδοξεν τῷ δήµῳ Φίλωνα καὶ Ἑταρκέλεα φέγγεων Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τὴν γὴν τὴν Ἀμφιπολίτεων ἀειφυγὴν καὶ αὐτῷ[v]ς καὶ τῷ[v]ς παῖδας, καὶ ἔµ πο[τ] ἄληκκωνται, πάσχεων αὐτῷ[v]ς ὁσ πολεμίο[v]ς καὶ νηπιαίει τεθνάναι, τὰ δὲ χρήµατα αὐτῶν δηµόσια εἶναι: Dittenberger, Syll. No. 77 (from Iasus), ἔδοξεν τῷ θεάθε καὶ τῷ δήµῳ, μηνὸς Ἀποστροφίων, ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Παταίκου τοῦ Σκύλου[ετ]ῶν ἄν[δρ]ῶν τῶν ἐπιβουλευόντων Μαυσώλλων καὶ τῷ Ἰασών πόλη τὰ κτήματα δηµέουσα . . . καὶ φέγγεων αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκγόνους [ἐς] τῶν ἀδιδῶν χρῶν. Gilbert also quotes Cic. De Rep. 3. 35. 48, where we read of the Rhodians, et in theatro et in curia res capitalis et reliquas omnis iudicabant idem. As to Athens see Hdt. 6. 136, Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 9 sqq., and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 306.

8. καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἴρεσεως καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. Cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 26 sqq.

8. οἶν άρχὴ τινὶ μᾶ ἡ πλείοσιν, ἡ ἐτέραις ἐτέρας, 'as for instance all may be assigned to some one magistracy or to more magistracies than one, or some may be assigned to certain magistracies and others to others.' Aristotle here has oligarchies mainly in view, and it appears from what he says that in an oligarchy a single magistracy—possibly even a single magistrate—might be invested with all these great powers, the right, that is to say, to punish with death, exile, or confiscation, the right to appoint the magistrates and to review their conduct in office, the right to make laws, and the supreme control over the foreign policy of the State. When a single magistrate possessed all these powers, it must have been easy for him to convert
his position into a tyranny (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sqq.). There were well-governed oligarchies where a single magistracy possessed these high prerogatives; the oligarchy of Massalia would seem to have been a case in point, for the great council of the Six Hundred 
 τιμονάρχων must probably have possessed them (cp. Cic. De Rep. 1. 27. 43, ac modo si Massilicienses, nostri clientes, per selectos et 
 principes cives summa iustitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea condicione 
 populi similitudo quaedam servitiutis). Oligarchy would assume a 
 still more extreme form, where the magistracy which was invested 
 with these prerogatives was less numerous than at Massalia. On 
 the other hand, it would be less extreme where they were given to 
 more magistracies than one, acting, we must suppose, together, and 
 less extreme still, when some of these powers were given to some 
 magistracies and others to others, for then the one group of 
 magistracies would be a check on the other. 

9. ἡ τιμᾶς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τιμᾶς δὲ τισίν. This would be the case 
 in an aristocracy or a polity. 

τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἀπάντων δημοτικῶν. Supply 
 populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantium, liberius, beatius, 
 quiuppe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum, 
 capitis uniuscuiusque, pecuniae. 

10. τὴν τοιαύτην ἱσότητα, i.e. the equality implied in all deliber-
 ating about everything. This is arithmetical, in contradistinction 
 to proportional, equality, τὸ πλῆθος ἡ μεγέθει ταῦτα καὶ ἰσοῦν (7 (5). 1. 
 1301 b 29 sqq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 757 Α, δυὸν γὰρ ἱσότηταν οὕσαν 
 κ.τ.λ. 

11. έισεὶ δὲ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντας πλείους. All may be said to 
 share in deliberative authority, (1) if all do so successively (i.e. by 
 relays) on almost all subjects, and the subjects on which all 
 deliberate collectively are very few, so that the powers of the 
 collective gathering of all the citizens are small, and deliberative 
 work falls for the most part either to relays of citizens, the magi-
 strates taking no part in it, or to a council of magistrates to which 
 all the citizens are admitted by relays; (2) if all deliberate col-
 lectively on a considerable number of subjects, and magistrates 
 elected or taken by lot from all deliberate on the rest; (3) if all 
 deliberate collectively on a considerable number of subjects, and 
 magistrates deliberate on the rest taken by lot (from all?) in all 
 cases in which the nature of the office does not make it essential
that its holders shall be skilled persons, and consequently that it shall be filled by election (from all?); (4) if all deliberate collectively about all subjects and the magistrates merely make preliminary inquiries. But if τὸ πάντας βουλεύεσθαι καὶ περὶ ὀπάνως is democratic (1298 a 9 sq.), are the second and third modes really democratic?

12. εἰς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντος ἀδέρφους, sc. βουλεύεσθαι.

It was possible to give deliberative authority to sections of the whole citizen-body in rotation, or to a council composed of boards of magistrates on which every citizen served by turns, and by thus admitting all the citizens in relays to a share in deliberation, to reduce to a minimum the work of the collective assembly of all the citizens. Of the Telecles mentioned in the text nothing is known but what we learn here. Sus.3 (Note 1321) regards him as a constitutional theorist, and groups him with Hippodamus and Phaleas. Certainly the phrase ὧσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τελεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου reminds us of ὧσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος in 2. 1. 1261 a 5. A parallel to his constitution is offered to some extent by the arrangements in connexion with the Five Thousand at Athens, at any rate as represented by the envoys of the Four Hundred to the armament at Samos (Thuc. 8. 86. 3, τῶν τε πεντακισχίλιων ὧτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν). So again, in the democracy of Mantinea and others the right to elect the magistrates belonged not to the assembly, but to τῶν αἴρετοι κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.). We must not mix up Telecles’ organization of the deliberative with the first kind of democracy described in c. 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and c. 6. 1292 b 22 sqq., for in this kind of democracy the deliberative seems to have consisted of all the citizens, not of a part of them only (c. 6. 1292 b 27 sqq.). We are not told of what nature the sections were to which deliberative authority was successively entrusted under the constitution of Telecles. Were they tribes or subdivisions of the tribe, or were they independent of the tribe? It is evident that if some sections lived nearer to the city than others, it would be easier for them to act when their turn of deliberative authority came than for those further off. Nor are we told for what length of time each section was to continue to act as a deliberative. The successive sections appear to have been given the power of appointing the magistrates (by election or by lot or in both ways?) and that of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and the concession to them of these great powers would be attended with many dangers.

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We do not learn whether popular dicasteries were to exist in the State of Telecles or not. Obviously he had no choice but to withhold from the sections the right of legislation, or at any rate of legislation in relation to the constitution, and to reserve it for a collective gathering of the citizens, for otherwise each section would have been able during its term of power freely to modify, and even to abolish, the constitution; the sections, in fact, would have been, especially if no popular dicasteries existed, the absolute masters of the State. The scheme of Telecles, however, possessed this merit, that the deliberative would not be as large as if it consisted of the whole citizen-body, and that it would not be likely to claim or to acquire that supremacy over the law which the popular assembly tended to acquire in the ultimate form of democracy (cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32 sqq.). Demagogues would not have the same power in a deliberative of this kind as they had in gatherings of the whole citizen-body. True, even under this constitution the whole citizen-body would occasionally meet in a collective assembly, but as it would meet only for the enactment of laws and to deal with questions as to the constitution and to receive the directions of the magistrates, it would meet but seldom, and consequently the assembly would acquire but little cohesion or power.

13. καὶ ἐν ἀλλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. These constitutions (we are not told whether they were ideal or actual) were more democratic than that of Telecles, for while his gave every citizen by turns a place in the deliberative assembly, they gave every citizen by turns a share of office (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 23 sqq.); this was exactly what Solon, who distrusted the fitness of the many for office, had sought to avoid (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.). In the opinion of the Greeks democracy was most fully realized when a rotation of office was established, so that every citizen held office in turn: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., and Eurip. Suppl. 392 Bothe (406 Dindorf),

δήμος δ’ ἀνάσσει διαδοχαίσιν ἐν μέρει
ἐναντίασιν, οὐχὶ τῷ πλοίῳ διδοὺς
τὸ πλείστον, ἀλλὰ χῶ τένης ἔχων ἰσον.

'The effect of the rule forbidding more than one reappointment to the Boulê at Athens was to give every Athenian citizen at some period of his life a seat in that body' (Sandys on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 62). So we read in Cic. De Rep. 3. 35. 48 as to Rhodes, omnes erant idem tum de plebe tum senatores, vicissitudinesque habebant, quibus mensibus populari munere fungentur, quibus senatorio:
utrobique autem conventicium accipiebant. Democracy, in fact, meant to the Greeks equality, and the arrangement most consonant with equality was a rotation of office; even appointment to office by lot fell short in this respect of rotation. The system described in the passage before us had this merit, that under it the participation of all the citizens in the government was effected at a far smaller cost than in those democracies in which a paid and frequently meeting assembly existed. It was open, however, to the objection that there was no security that the decisions of the portion of the citizen-body which happened to be in office at any given time would be satisfactory to the citizens generally.

14. αἱ συναρχίαι συνιοδοσίαι. This is an early instance of the occurrence of the word συναρχίαι. For another see Aen. Poliorc. c. 4. 11. The word is often met with in inscriptions after the death of Alexander and also in Polybius (4. 4. 2: 38. II. 4 sq.). συναρχίαι here means ‘the boards of magistrates,’ as in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., Nos. 132, 234. The principal boards of magistrates were frequently formed into a combined board—a great administrative improvement, for the magistracies were thus grouped together in a kind of Cabinet and were better able to consult and to act in concert—and we sometimes find this combined board discharging the functions of a pre-considering body in relation to the Boulê and Assembly (see Gilbert on συναρχίαι in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 322. 1, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, pp. 249, 323). In the constitutions referred to in the passage before us, however, the συναρχίαι appear to have been invested with far more considerable powers; they were not a mere pre-considering body entitled to draw up resolutions to be sanctioned or the reverse by the Boulê and Assembly, but were the deliberative authority of the State, competent to deal finally with questions of war and peace and alliance, to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and to review the conduct of the magistrates on the expiration of their term of office, the only matters withdrawn from their jurisdiction being the making of laws and of enactments relating to the constitution. We are, in fact, surprised to find any form of Greek democracy trusting these great powers to a board composed of magistrates; we must remember, however, that all citizens in turn became members of this board. It should be noted that συναρχίαι appear to have existed at Miletus, the city of Telecles, in later days at any rate than his: see Meineke,
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Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 625, where Μικασίου καὶ ταῖς συναρχίαις καὶ τοῖς γεράντοις is quoted from a grammarian.

16. τῶν μορίων τῶν ἔλαχιστων. Households are probably referred to.

17. διέλθη, sc. τὸ ἀρχεῖο. See note on 1300 a 26.

συνιέναι δὲ μοίων κ.τ.λ., sc. πάντοις, i.e. the whole body of citizens, for Hildenbrand (Gesch. und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, Ι. 468) seems to me to be right in translating ‘während Generalversammlungen der Bürgerschaft nur dann zusammen-treten, wenn es gilt Gesetze zu geben,’ etc. (so too Welldon). In a democracy like that of Telecles it was necessary to reserve legislative authority for a collective gathering of the citizens for the reason mentioned above on 12; besides it was well to have the consent of all the citizens to laws and constitutional enactments, and also to have means of acquainting them with directions given by the magistrates.

18. τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 1298 b 31, τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν, and 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 4, τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. Here the distinction between νόμοι and πολιτεία is maintained, which is not always the case (see above on 1289 α 15).

19. ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ. In this form the magistracies are not filled in turn by all the citizens, but those who hold them are selected by election or lot out of all the citizens, so that a turn of office does not necessarily come to every citizen, and consequently the powers of the collective assembly of all the citizens are more extensive. The magistracies being less accessible to all, the collective assembly naturally acquires greater importance. As to this form and the next see note on 1298 a 11. In it the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation apparently falls to the magistrates, though we might have expected it to be given to popular dicasteries.


24. ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ. In this form only those offices are filled by election which an advanced democracy will allow to be so filled—the offices referred to are explained to be those which demand experience and skill in the holder (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21: [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3)—and all the rest are filled by lot (a system specially dear to democracy, 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.), and here
again the powers of the collective assembly are extensive. They do not, however, include the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, which seems to fall, as in the last form, to magistrates, nor is the making of laws expressly mentioned among them, though the omission of any reference to this latter subject is probably accidental. In the explanation given above of οἶς ἐνδέχεται I follow Sepulveda and Victorius. The former (p. 136 b) explains these words thus—‘ratio reipublicae popularis poscit ut magistratus non suffragio mandentur sed sortibus, permittit tamen ut suffragio mandentur qui debent a doctis aut peritis administrari necessitatis causa.’ Welldon’s translation is similar—‘who are appointed by suffrage so far as is possible [in this advanced form of democracy].’ Εξ ἀπώτατων is not added with alperēs oðera, as in 23 sq., but this is probably what is intended, for otherwise the τρόπος under consideration would not be democratic.

30. τὰς δ’ ἀρχὰς περὶ μηδενὸς κρίνειν ἀλλὰ μόνον προανκρίνειν. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 28 sqq., and for ανακρίνειν Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 56. l. 29 sq. That this had come to be true of the Boule at Athens, we see from Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 45 (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38-1300 a 4) and c. 55. l. 10 sqq.; that it had also come to be true of the archons, we see from Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 31. l. 31 sqq. (where see Sandys’ note) and c. 48. l. 26 sqq. As to the euthyni, see c. 48. l. 23 sqq. That the powers of the stratēgi when employed on expeditions cannot have been narrowed in this way, we have seen above on 1297 b 41.

32. ἡν ἀναλογοῦν φαμερ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 17 sqq. and c. 6. 1293 a 32 sqq.

35. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for when eligibility to the deliberative body is conferred by a comparatively moderate property-qualification, and a comparatively large number of persons is eligible because of its moderateness, and the members of the deliberative do not make changes in things which the law forbids to be changed but conform to the law, and it is open to any one acquiring the property-qualification to be elected to the deliberative, the constitution is indeed an oligarchy, but it is an oligarchy bordering on polity by reason of its moderateness of spirit.’ Sepulveda, who translates μετέχειν, 39, ‘aditus ad rempublicam,’ supplies τῆς πολιτείας with μετέχειν and is followed by Vict. and Lamb.: Sus. also translates ‘der Zutritt zu allen Aemtern offen steht.’ But it seems more natural to supply τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι (cp. 40, δόταν δὲ μὴ
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πάντες τοῦ βουλεύοντα μετέχωσιν. It would appear from the passage before us that in the most moderate form of oligarchy the deliberative was not composed of the whole number of those who were privileged under the constitution, but was an elective body chosen from them (and by them?). Yet we gather from c. 9. 1294 b 3 sqq. that there were oligarchies in which an assembly existed, and we know that this was so at Corinth (Plut. Dion, c. 53). Aristotle’s list of the forms assumed by the deliberative in oligarchies is silent as to those oligarchies in which deliberative authority was confined to the magistrates, but the demos had a consultative voice (1298 b 33 sqq.). Nor does it quite tally with his list of oligarchies.

38. ἀκολουθῶσι, sc. τῷ νόμῳ: see note on 1339 a 19.


ἡ τοιαύτη, sc. πολιτεία.

40. οὐταν δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but when not all [those who acquire the property-qualification] have access to the deliberative, but only selected persons, but they rule in accordance with law, as before also, this is oligarchical.’ Ἀλρετοὶ seems to be used here in much the same sense as ἀφορμημένοι in c. 15. 1300 a 16 sqq. We are not told who the electors were in this form. Under the rule of the Thirty at Athens the magistracies (including the Boulê) were confined, if the text is correct, to πρόκριτοι ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, i.e. out of the knights (’Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 35. 1. 3 sqq.). Office was sometimes confined in oligarchies to the members of certain clubs (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 31 sqq.).

1293 b. 5. τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36.

οὐταν δὲ τινῶν τινές κ.τ.λ. Supply κύριοι διαν from what precedes. Πάντες περὶ πάντων is the democratic arrangement, τινὲς περὶ πάντων the oligarchical, τινὲς περὶ τινῶν the arrangement appropriate to an aristocracy or polity, being intermediate between the other two. In the aristocracy which Aristotle imagines questions of peace and war and the review of the conduct of magistrates in office and probably their election would fall within the competence of ‘all’ acting collectively, while legislation and the conclusion and dissolution of alliances and the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation would be reserved for the cognizance of ‘some.’ It is not surprising to find legislation reserved for ‘some’ in an aristocracy, for in 2. 8. 1269 a 24 sqq. Aristotle in effect suggests that not any one and every one should have to do with the alteration of laws, but only select persons. There would also
be an obvious advantage in reserving for the consideration of a few questions relating to alliance and the infliction of the grave punishments referred to, though the reservation to a few of the power to inflict these punishments was in the case of the Lacedaemonian State commonly criticized as oligarchical (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 33 sq.). When, on the other hand, we are told in 7 that the magistrates of an aristocracy may be appointed either by election or by lot (i.e. apparently by lot pure and simple, not by lot ἐκ προκρίτων, as to which see note on 8), the statement conflicts with 2. 11. 1273 a 17, τὸ δὲ ἀμῖσθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτάς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θείον (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 4 sq.), and Brandis, followed by Sus., is probably, therefore, right in bracketing ἡ κληρωτοί. Another reason for bracketing ἡ κληρωτοί is that, if we do not, it becomes difficult to distinguish the organization of the deliberative in aristocracy from its organization in those forms of democracy in which some of the subjects dealt with by the deliberative are reserved for the cognizance of magistrates elected or taken by lot out of all (1298 a 19 sqq.), unless indeed we add ἐκ τινῶν in 7 before αἱρετοὶ ἡ κληρωτοί. Vict., followed by Giph. (p. 497), reads ἡ πολιτεία in 8 in place of ἡ πολιτεία, and Giph. (ibid.) explains, 'et aristocratiae quidem (proprium), ubi magistratus non sortito verum suffragiis mandentur, reipublicae vero, ubi sortito sint facti,' but Camerarius, Bekk., and Sus. are probably right in reading ἡ πολιτεία. It should be noted that even where the magistrates are appointed by election, if they are not elected for virtue, the constitution does not really deserve the name of an aristocracy (c. 7. 1293 b 7 sqq.: c. 8. 1294 a 9 sqq., 19 sqq.).

6. For ὑπέρ in the sense of περί, see Bon. Ind. s.v. and Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 47, who remarks that it is used in this sense oftener in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Rhetoric, and the Topics than elsewhere in Aristotle's writings.

8. ἐὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Two questions arise as to the organization of the deliberative which is here said to be suitable to an aristocratic polity or a polity—i. Are we to carry on from 5 sq. ὁν πολέμοι μὲν καὶ ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες, so that the modes of organization described in 8 sqq. apply only to those subjects which are not reserved for the cognizance of all? This question should probably be answered in the affirmative. 2. Are the αἱρετοὶ and κληρωτοί, or the mixed body of αἱρετοὶ and κληρωτοί referred to in 8 sqq., magistrates, or are they simply a deliberative council? The answer is doubtful, but as Aristotle does not repeat the
word ἀρχοντες, perhaps the chances are in favour of the latter hypothesis. The plans appropriate to polity proper are probably that by which some subjects are assigned to persons appointed by election and others to persons appointed by lot, and that by which some members of a deliberative council are appointed by election and others by lot (compare the advice which Aristotle gives to extreme democracies in 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11–16), while the appointment of deliberators by lot ἐκ προκρίτων savours rather of an aristocratic polity. Thus, when Athens was under a democracy mingled with aristocracy (Isocr. Panath. §§ 130–1), it appointed its magistrates in this way (Panath. § 145, καθίστανται ἐπὶ τὰς ἄρχας τοὺς προκριθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν φυλετῶν καὶ δημοτῶν: cp. Ae. scop. § 22, οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων τὰς ἄρχας κληρονύμες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἰκανωτάτους ἐφ’ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες, and Λθ. Πολ. c. 8. l. i sqq.: c. 22. l. 20 sqq.: c. 30. l. 11 sqq.: c. 31. l. 2 sqq.). Appointments to priesthoods were sometimes made in this way (Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 46). When it is implied in 2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq. that the appointment of magistrates by lot is inconsistent with aristocracy, Aristotle probably refers to their appointment by lot ἐκ πάντων, not ἐκ προκρίτων. In 2. 6. 1266 a 8 we are told that the appointment of magistrates by lot out of elected persons is common to oligarchy and democracy; it would seem, therefore, that both oligarchy and democracy used this mode of appointing magistrates.

9. In ἧ κοινῇ αἱρετοῖ καὶ κληρωτοῖ the reference seems to be to a mixed body or bodies composed of elective members and members appointed by lot, acting as the deliberative in relation to all the subjects which are not reserved for the cognizance of all.

11. ἀρρηται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For πρὸς cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 37, δὲ ό εἰς ἡλικία πρὸς ἀναγκαῖον διηρήσθαι τὴν παιδείαν. In 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 5 sqq. we have οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἄρχας... διηρήθηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ὡστός, cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 27, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἀρρηταί κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας.

13. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Further advice as to the assembly in the ultimate democracy is given in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sqq., but here Aristotle places in the forefront of his recommendations the adoption of measures to induce the γνώριμοι to attend its meetings. As to these recommendations see vol. i. p. 513. They are quite in harmony with the views expressed in 3. 11. 1281 b 34 sqq. (see note on 1281 b 35) and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq., but they can have had but little chance of being adopted in an ultimate democracy.
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συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατία τε τῇ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούση δημοκρατία
νῦν κ.τ.λ. Bekk.² omits τε, and Schneider, though he leaves it in
his text, calls it superfluous (2. 265), but Sus.² may be right in
regarding it as corresponding, though in an anacoluthic way, to δὲ
in ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, 26. Aristotle would probably have con-
tinued καὶ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, if the intervening recommendations to
the ultimate democracy had not run to a considerable length. For
τῇ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούση δημοκρατία νῦν, cp. c. 10. 1295 a 5, 18, and
7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25, ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαι
δημοκρατίαις, which suggests whether we should not read δημοκρατία
in place of the second δημοκρατία (or δημοκρατία ἡ II') in the passage
before us. The expression ἡ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούσα δημοκρατία is
applied in 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 5, not to an ultimate democracy, as in
the passage before us and in 1310 a 25 sqq., but to one in which
rich and poor stand on a level, neither being alone supreme.
1294 a 37 sqq.
18. οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μισθῶν τοῖς ἀπόροις. Cp. c. 13. 1297 a
36 sqq.
19. τούτο δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τοιείν. For τούτο δὲ see Ast,
Lex. Platon. 1. 422, who says of τούτο δὲ in Plato, Tim. 59 D,
'redintegrat orationis structuram post parentheses quae dicitur.'
Richards, however, would read δὴ in place of δὲ in the passage
before us.
20. βουλευόσονται γὰρ βελτιῶν κ.τ.λ. See note on 1281 b 35. So
lawsuits will be tried all the better if rich and poor sit together on
dicasteries (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq.). Cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 b
25 sqq. Contrast the provision in Plato's Laws 764 A by which
attendance at the assembly is made compulsory only on members
of the first and second property-classes, not on members of the
third and fourth, though the composition of the Boulé in the Laws
(756 B sqq.) suggests that Plato no less than Aristotle sought to
bring rich and poor to deliberate together, for while the Athenian
Boulé was composed of representatives not of the property-classes
but of the tribes, Plato in the Laws by a remarkable innovation
makes his Boulé consist of representatives of the property-classes,
and thus secures that both rich and poor shall find a place upon it.
Aristotle's desire that the assembly and dicasteries in an ultimate
democracy should be composed of both rich and poor deserves
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notice, because this is not the way in which our own deliberative assemblies and juries are constituted, but we must not lose sight of the fact that he recommends this only in the case of an ultimate democracy. He would undoubtedly prefer assemblies and dicasteries in which the moderately well-to-do predominate.

21. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Compare with this suggestion 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 13 sqq. Ἐκ τῶν μορίων, which I have taken in vol. i. p. 513 to refer to tribes and other sections of the State, probably rather refers to the sections just named, the γνώριμοι and δήμος (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq.). We gather from what follows that Aristotle regards this suggestion as suitable only to the case in which there is no great disparity between the numbers of the γνώριμοι and δήμος. He comes here near to suggesting a representative assembly, though one of a doubtfully workable kind, for would a representative chamber prove workable in which half the members were returned by the γνώριμοι and half by the δήμος? It is true that Zurich was ruled for many years by a Council of twenty-six, half of the members of which were taken from the upper class (Konstafel) and half from the trades or arts (Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, i. 456–8: Short History of Switzerland, Eng. Trans., p. 70).

23. συμφέρει δὲ κάν κ.τ.λ. Κάν, 'if also': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 1, ἕτε κάν δειν ἰππίδες κ.τ.λ. When the numbers of the δήμος greatly exceed those of the γνώριμοι, evil results follow; the constitution becomes disorderly and the γνώριμοι insubordinate (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq.: 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31 sq.).


τῶν πολιτικῶν here seems = τῶν γνωρίμων, 25. For the contrast drawn between οἱ δημοτικοὶ and οἱ πολιτικοὶ compare that between οἱ ἐργαστικοὶ and οἱ πολιτικοὶ in Polyb. 10. 16. 1, and that between τὸ βάσανον and τὸ ἔστειον in Plut. Camill. c. 38.

26. τοὺς πλείους, 'those who are in excess of this number.' Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 63, καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πλείον λέγειν;

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ. Just as the ultimate democracy is advised to induce the γνωρίμοι to take part in the work of the deliberative, so oligarchies are advised to allow the voice of the δήμος to be heard in the deliberative, not however without taking certain precautions. As to these precautions see vol. i. p. 513 sq.

27. ἢ προσαρείσθαι τινὰς ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθους. Supply συμφέρει.
Sus. is probably right in suggesting that προσαμείσθαι should be read in place of προσαμείσθαι: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 5. 5-6. So we are told in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 17 that Theramenes said ὅτι εἰ μὴ τις κοινωνίας ἱκανός λύσοι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀδύνατον ἐσοιτο τὴν ὀλγαρχίαν διαμείνειν. At Solothurn in Switzerland in the fourteenth century the Council of Twelve chosen from the nobles added to itself two representatives of the eleven arts (Zünfte) selected by itself (Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, 2. 367).

ἡ κατασκευάσατας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 15. 1299 b 30 sqq., where probuli are said to be an oligarchical magistracy, 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 16 sq., and 1323 a 6 sqq., the last-named passage so far disagreeing with that before us that it connects νομοφύλακες with aristocracy, not with oligarchy. Compare (with Arnold) Thuc. 8. 1. 3, where the Athenians after the disaster at Syracuse decide to appoint ἄρχὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἀδριὼν, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ὡς ἀν καιρὸς ἥ, προβουλεύσουσι. It is possible that in the long-lived oligarchy of Corinth, in which probuli found a place side by side with a Boule (see note on 1299 b 36), and, it would seem from Plut. Dion, c. 53, a popular assembly, the powers of the popular assembly were restricted in the manner described in the text. Even where probuli were not elderly men, they would be few in number in comparison with a Boule, and therefore the institution would be oligarchical (c. 15. 1299 b 34 sqq.). A sole πρόβουλος occurs in an inscription which probably belongs to Leucas (Oberhummer, Akarnanien, pp. 272, 274). As to probuli see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 315, and as to nomophylakes, ibid. 2. 337 sq., though no instances are there given of nomophylakes acting in a probouleutic capacity. We read in Pollux, 8. 94 of nomophylakes at Athens, who τοῖς προεδροῖς ἐν ἐκκλησίαις συγκαθίζουσιν, ἑννα διακαλύννετε ἐπίχειροτευνίν, ὡς μὴ συμφέρειν. The existence of probuli in a State appears to imply the existence in it of a larger deliberative body, for the function of the probuli was to consider beforehand matters to be brought before such a body. Thus probuli will hardly have existed in the more extreme forms of oligarchy, for in them larger body will not have found a place.


32. εἰς ἡ ταυτὰ ψυφίζεσθαι τῶν δήμων ἥ μὴ δέν ἐναντίον τοῖς εἰσφερο-μένοις. A stronger measure than the restriction of the deliberations of the popular assembly to proposals introduced by probuli or nomophylakes, for the latter measure would leave the assembly free to deal with these proposals as it pleased, whereas the former would
tie its hands. For this measure cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 10 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 9 sqq. In some States only the χρηστοὶ were allowed to speak in the assembly ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 6).

33. ἦ τῆς συμβουλῆς κ.τ.λ. A stronger measure still. For the implied contrast between a consultative and an effective voice in deliberation, cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 65, εὖ δὲ φαίνεται γεγραφῶς τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ τῶν ἐκκλησίων συμβουλεύειν τῶν βουλόμενον, τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ τοὺς προθύρους ἐπιψηφίζειν τὰς γνώμας, λόγου δὲ μὴ προσιθέναι.

34. καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This recommendation of course applies only to cases in which the assembly has something more than the mere right to give advice. It would seem that in polities the few (by which is probably meant the magistrates) often possessed a final and decisive voice in rejecting a measure, while affirmative resolutions arrived at by them were not valid until confirmed by the assembly. Aristotle advices oligarchies to adopt the opposite plan—to give the assembly a final voice only in rejecting, and to require that affirmative decisions should be referred back for confirmation by the magistrates. (So I understand the passage: compare Vict., who explains, 'iusbet igitur ipsos contrarium facere eius quod servatur in statibus liberis et qui reguntur a multitudine, id est, permettere multituidini ut improbet repudietque quae sibi non placent, nec tamen valeat sententiam ullam confirmare ac ratam facere, quia necesse est quod illi probatum sit referri ad principes.' Stahr and Welldon, on the other hand, take ἐπαναγέσθω πᾶλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας to refer not to affirmative decisions of the assembly, but to bills rejected by it. Whichever view we adopt, however, as to the meaning of these words, there is no difference of opinion as to the invalidity attaching to affirmative decisions of the assembly.) The restriction suggested by Aristotle would place a check on rash affirmative resolutions of the assembly—resolutions, for instance, in favour of a declaration of war—by making them invalid if the magistrates withheld their approval. Compare the rule at Rome as stated by Cicero, De Rep. 2. 32. 56, quodque erat ad obtinendam potentiam nobilium vel maximum, vehementer id retinebatur, populi comitia ne essent rata, nisi ea patrum adprobavisset auctories, and by Livy, 1. 17. 9, decreverunt enim ut cum populus regem iussisset, id sic ratum esset, si patres auctores fienter, and 6. 42. 10. Compare also the addition to the Rhetrae of Lycurgus made by the kings Polydorus and Theopompus, οἱ δὲ σκολιῶν ὁ δάμος ἔλοιπο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενίας καὶ ἄρχαγετας ἀποστατήρας ἥμεν, τούτ' ἦστι μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ'
6 (4). 14. 1298 b 33—15. 1299 a 3. 253

δλως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλύειν τὸν δῆμον (Plut. Lycurg. c. 6), and see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 49. 3. 'I am so far anti-democratic,' says H. Crabb Robinson in a letter dated Sept. 13, 1831 (Diary and Reminiscences, 2. 509), 'that I would allow the people to do very little; but I would enable them to hinder a great deal.' Yet it would hardly have been to the advantage of Rome if the Roman comitia had persisted in their refusal to declare war against Philip V of Macedon in b.c. 200 (see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Book 3, c. 8: Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 233).

35. ἀποψειφύζομεν. For the use of ἀποψειφύζεσθαι in the sense of 'reject,' cp. Plato, Laws 800 D, τούτον δὴ τὸν νόμον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀποψειφύζομεν; Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 174, and Deinarch. c. Aristog. c. 9.

36. For the use of καταψειφύζομεν in the sense of 'voting affirmatively,' or perhaps simply in that of 'decernere,' see Bon. Ind. s.v., where Poet. 25. 1461 b 2 is referred to, and Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik, 4. 423.

38. ἀνεστραμμένοις. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1424 b 7, where however Fritzsche reads ἀνεστραμμένως, as indeed Bekker (with one or two inferior MSS.) does here.

1. καὶ τοῦ κυρίου δὴ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. c. i. 1289 a 17, 8 (6). 1. 1299 a 1316 b 31 sq., and 3. 11. 1282 a 25 sqq. In 2. 6. 1264 b 33 sq. τὸ βουλευόμενον is said to be κύριον τῆς πόλεως, not τῆς πολιτείας.

3. Ἐχωμένη δὲ τοῦτων κ.τ.λ. The list of questions as to magistracies given in c. 14. 1298 a 1 sqq. omits, as Sus. 2 points out (Note 1343), the third question mentioned here, the question as to the period for which they are held and the permissibility of a repeated tenure, and this question is not dealt with either in the chapter before us or in 8 (6). 8, though something may be learnt on the subject from 34 sqq. and more from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq. If we look back to c. 14. 1297 b 37 sqq., we shall see that the main object which Aristotle has in view is to discover what organization of the magistracies is appropriate to each constitution, and it is to this problem that he chiefly addresses himself in the chapter before us, but he finds it requisite to inquire first, what are and what are not magistracies (1299 a 14—30), and what magistracies are absolutely necessary to a State and what are desirable if the constitution is to be a good one (a question as to which we learn but little from 1299 a 31—b 13, and more from 8 (6). 8), and to deal with one or two other preliminary inquiries (1299 b 14—20),...
before he strikes into his destined path and asks how far the same magistracies will exist in different constitutions (1299 b 20–1300 a 8), and how the mode of appointing to them will differ in each (1300 a 9 sqq.). See as to the contents of the chapter before us and its relation to 8 (6). 8, vol. i. p. 514 sqq.

4. ἔχει γάρ κ.τ.λ. Πόσαι τε ἄρχαι κ.τ.λ. is added to explain in reference to what points the many differences spoken of arise. Compare the very similar sentence in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5, ἐστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτων τοῦ τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποιῶν τῶν ὑπάρχειν δεί φύσει, as to which see note. For τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας cp. c. 14. 1297 b 37. In the Lacedaemonian State the magistracies would seem to have been much fewer and less specialized than at Athens. Judging from 8 (6). 8, one would say that Aristotle desires to steer a midway course between the two States in this matter. It would be easy to add to the list of questions as to magistracies and their tenure which Aristotle gives here. Questions might be raised as to whether magistracies should be salaried, whether they should be subject to review and by whom, whether more than one should be allowed to be held by the same person at the same time, whether the chief magistrates of a State should be combined to form a single great board, and whether boards are better than single magistrates, and if so, of how many members they should be composed, etc.

6. οἱ μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. Democracies liked to make magistracies, or as many of them as possible, tenable for only a short time (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq.), six months (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.) or less. In early democracies, however, we hear of magistracies tenable for long periods (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sq.). The prytaneis at Athens held office for thirty-five or thirty-six days (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 43), and their epistatês for one day and night only (c. 44). Still there were magistrates at Athens (for instance, the ταμίαι στρατιωτικῶν, and οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν, and ὅ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητῆς : see Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 43) who held office for four years; Aristotle, indeed, can hardly mean to say that some States made all their magistracies of brief tenure. Democracies were especially opposed to offices tenable for life (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). In oligarchies, on the other hand, offices were often held for life (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 16 sqq.), or at any rate for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.). In the Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία the kings and senators held their offices for life.

9. πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτοὺς, sc. ἄρχειν. For πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτοὺς
Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Top. 5. 2. 130 a 29 and 6. 3. 141 a 21. Democracies tended to set limits to a repeated tenure of all offices except those relating to war and a few others (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23 sq., where see note: see also Sandys’ note on 'Ath. Pol. c. 62. 1. 18). At Thurii a course was adopted unusual even in democracies, and restrictions of this kind were extended to offices relating to war, the office of strategus not being tenable a second time by the same person, except after an interval of five years (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 7).

10. τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, cp. 1300 a 9 sq., 32, b 7 sq., and Plato, Laws 768 D, al peri tās ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις.

11. δει γίνεσθαι, sc. τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν: cp. 1300 b 7, πῶσ δει γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις.

12. πῶς, i. e. by election, or by lot, or by a combination of the two.

14. ποίαι, sc. ἀρχαί.

ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1275 a 26, and compare Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 13—19, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle’s mind here, λέξουσι δὲ ... καὶ ἐτερῶν τινα λόγον ... ὡς ἀρα ὡς τις αἱρετὸς ὄν πράττει κατὰ ψφύσιμα, όυκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀρχὴ ἄλλη ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ διακοινία (cp. τῶν ἐπιμελείων, 20) ἀρχῶν δὲ φήσωσιν ἐκείνας εἶναι ἃς οἱ θεσμοθέται ἀποκληροῦσιν ἐν τῷ ᾿Οθησίῳ, κάκεινας ἃς ὁ δῆμος εἰσεθεὶ χειροστοῖς ἐν ἀρχαιοτοις, στρατηγοὺς καὶ ἵππαρχους καὶ τὰς μετὰ τούτων ἀρχὰς, ὧς ἄλλα πάντα πραγματεία προστεταγμένας κατὰ ψφύσιμα. To this plea Aeschines opposes the language of the law, which declares ἀρχὰς ἀπάσας εἶναι ἃς ὁ δῆμος χειροστοῖς, “καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστάτας” φησι “τῶν δημοσίων ἐργῶν” (ἔστι δὲ ὁ Δημοσθένης τειχοστός, ἐπιστάτης τοῦ μεγίστου τῶν ἐργῶν) κ.τ.λ., where we are reminded of 15, πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἤ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται. (If cc. 13—19 of Aeschin. c. Ctes. are here present to Aristotle’s mind, the passage before us cannot have been written before b. c. 330, for Aeschines’ speech was delivered in that year.) Aristotle seems here by implication to deny the name of magistracy to any post which is not filled either by election or by lot, and consequently to the position of member of the assembly, if not to that of dicast. He speaks more decidedly here than in 3. 1. 1275 a 26 sqq. He adds that not all posts which were filled by election or lot were to be accounted magistracies; priests were not magistrates (cp. Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461), though some of them were elected (Paus. 7. 20. 1) and others appointed by lot (Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 46), nor were chorēgōi, though some of them were elected ('Ath. Pol. c. 56. 1. 7 sqq.), nor heralds (of the mode of whose appointment in
most States little seems to be definitely known, though they were a hereditary profession at Sparta, Hdt. 6. 60), nor ambassadors, who were elected (19). Aristotle may have been led to mark off πολιτικαί ἄρχαι from such posts as those of priests and heralds by a recollection of what Plato had said of priests and heralds in Polit. 290.

18. διόπερ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἰρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἄρχοντας θετέων. The inference appears to be—as so many functionaries are required for the purposes of the political association, it is not likely that they will all be magistrates, and therefore we must not treat as magistrates all those functionaries who are appointed by election or by lot. For the absence of οὗ before πάντας, which some would add, see critical note.

18. τούτο, the office of priest. Aristotle does not explain why he denies the name of ἄρχοντες to priests, chorēgi, heralds, and envoys.

19. έτι δὲ χοηγοί καὶ κήρυκες. We should probably supply 'are not magistrates.' It would, however, also be possible to supply 'are elected.' Αἰρεώνται δὲ καὶ προσβευταί. See critical note. Compare [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 31, νόμος δὲ ἢν Χαλκιδεῶι μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ προσβεύσαι νεώτερον ἑτῶν πεντήκοντα, and Harpocr. εὐθυναί (Aristot. Fragm. 405. 1545 b 43), οἱ προσβευόντες ἢ ἄρξαντες ἢ διοικήσαντες τι τῶν δημοσίων, passages which imply that the post of envoy was not an office. 'In Attic inscriptions the plural of προσβευτῆς is till b.c. 250 πρεσβεῖες, afterwards προσβευταί' (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. Att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 112). The plural προσβευταί, however, occurs in our text of Thucydides (8. 77 and 86), and προσβευτᾶς in Andoc. 3. 41 and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 12.

20. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελείων. Τῶν ἐπιμελείων takes up πολλῶν ἐπιστάτων, 15. Aristotle appears to regard only πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμελείαι as ἄρχαι in the truest sense. Πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμελείαι are explained to be offices in which an ἐπιμελεία is exercised over the whole or a part of the citizens (πολίται, hence πολιτικαὶ) with a view to a given action. It is implied apparently that no such ἐπιμελεία is exercised in the case of οἰκονομικαὶ or υπηρετικαὶ ἐπιμελείαι. Aristotle does not explain how treasurers or auditors or registrars of contracts, whom he no doubt regards as entrusted with πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμελείαι, can be said to exercise an ἐπιμελεία of the kind to which he refers.

πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν. Supply ἐπιμελείαι.

21. For πρός τινα πράξεων cp. 1299 b 18, πότερον κατὰ τὸ πράγμα δεῖ διαμεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, and Polyb. 10. 16. 2.
οστρατηγὸς οστρατευομένων, sc. ἐπιμελοῦμενος. We expect ὀστρατηγῶν, but cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3, μέγισται δὲ καὶ πρῶτοι τῶν ἀρχῶν ἦσαν βασι[λεύς καὶ πολ]είμαρχος καὶ ἀρ[χῶν], c. 7. l. 9 sqq., and c. 31. l. 16: also Pol. 3. 1. 1275 a 23–26, and the passage quoted above on 14 from Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 13–19, κάκεινας κ.τ.λ.

22. ἡ κατὰ μέρος, 'or sectionally.' It is implied that women and children are citizens, which is of course not strictly the case.

23. οἰκονομικά, 'economic': i.e. these magistracies have to deal with matters similar to those with which the head of a household has to deal, for instance the distribution of food (cp. i. 10. 1258 a 21 sqq.).

πολλάκις γὰρ αἱροῦνται στομέτρας. 'Corn-measurers' would be elected when corn was distributed among the citizens, and this would have occurred in times of scarcity or when a present of corn was made to the State: thus we read in Diod. 13. 58. 4 οἱ γὰρ Ἀκραγαντινοὶ στομετρόποντες αὐτοῖς δημοσίᾳ διδώκαν κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας: see also an inscription from Iasus in the Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8. 100, and Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8 init. In Pollux 7. 18 στομέτραι αἱροῦνται under the head of αἱ ἑπὶ ταῖς τροφαῖς τέχναι. They must not be confounded with the Prometrētae, as to whom see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, Eng. Trans. pp. 48, 239. Public 'measurings-out' of wheat no doubt took place at Athens during the four years of scarcity b.c. 330–326 (see vol. i. p. 135, note 2, and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 268 sq.), and it is possible that the passage before us was written during or after the scarcity which these distributions of food were intended to alleviate. Cp. Demosth. Or. 34. in Phorm. c. 37, ἐν τοιούτῳ καιρῷ ἐν ὡς υμῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἄστει οἰκούντες διεμετροῦντο τὰ ἀλφατα ἐν τῷ φθείρῳ, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Πειραιᾷ ἐν τῷ νεωρῷ ελάμβανον κατ' ὀξολούν τους ἄρτους καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μακρᾶς στοίχειας, τὰ ἀλφάτα καθ' ἡμέραν μετροῦμενοι καὶ καταποιοῦμενοι. Sus.8 (Note 1348) identifies the στομέτραι with the σιτοφυλάκες, but not, I think, rightly, nor do I agree with Liddell and Scott that 'inspectors of corn-measures' are referred to in the passage before us.

24. αἱ 8' ὑπηρετικαὶ κ.τ.λ. Plato had already marked off magistrates from ὑπηρέταια in Polit. 290 B, ὅσπερ εἰτές νῦν, ὑπηρέτας, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας. As to the employment of public slaves as clerks and the like, see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 341, note 3. ὑπηρέταια were a despised race (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 249: Diod. 14. 66. 6).

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25. μάλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14, where see note. Aristotle has before him Plato, Polit. 260 C sqq., where τὸ ἐπιστάτειον, or rather ὁ αὐτεπιστατικός, is ascribed to ὁ ἀρχων, and probably also Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 11, ὡς τὰ γὰρ τις ὀμολογήσει τοῦ μὲν ἀρχωντος εἶναι τὸ προστάτειον ὧ τι χρὴ τοις κ.τ.λ. (cp. Poet. 19. 1456 b 17, τὸ γὰρ κελεύσαι, φησὶ (sc. Πρωταγόρας), ποιεῖν τι ἡ μὴ ἐπίτοξις ἔστω). In ὅσοις ἀποδέδοται βοιλεύσασθαι τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι Aristote adds περὶ τινῶν because a magistracy has a definite, not an indefinite, sphere of competence. He does not confine the name of ἀρχή to posts of which ὅσοις κ.τ.λ. can be said, but he thinks that these deserve it best. He would hardly include among the posts which best deserve the name of ἀρχαῖ the ἐπιμελείαι which he describes as ὀικονομικαὶ and ὑπηρετικαὶ, or indeed the magistracies of ultimate democracies, for they possessed only the power to make preliminary inquiries (c. 14. 1298 a 30 sqq.). But he does not distinctly say to what posts he would give the name of ἀρχή and to what he would not. The question was made all the more perplexing by the fact that in the ordinary use of the Greek language a distinction was drawn between ἀρχαὶ and such posts as that of envoy. Giphanius remarks (p. 504), 'Bodinus in methodo historica, pagina 195, ita definit: Magistratus, inquit, est is qui imperii publici partem habet—publici inquam, ut ab imperio herill, patrio, aut alio domestico distinguatur: ubi multis quoque verbis hunc locum et definitionem Aristotelis reprehendit.' The criticism referred to by Giph. will be found in Bodinus, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, p. 154, ed. 1595. Vict. quotes Cic. De Leg. 3. 1. 2, videtis igitur magistratus hanc esse vim, ut praeit præscribatur recta et utilia et coniuncta cum legibus. But is a magistrate not a magistrate if the things which he orders to be done are not recta et utilia,' etc.?

28. ἀλλὰ ταύτα κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to break off the discussion (for similar breakings-off see note on 1274 a 30 and see 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 18 sqq.); what Aristotle says in 30 explains why he has given a certain amount of consideration to the question. 'Hoc dicit, quoniam (ut alio in loco adnotavimus et saepe ipse admonet) in doctrina civilis, licet pleraque omnium ad actionem pertinent, ut in ceteris doctrinis practicis sive activis, tamen quaedam cognitionis duntaxat gratia traduntur' (Sepulveda, p. 140 b): cp. 3. 8. 1279 b 11 sqq.

ταύτα, the determination of the question who is a magistrate and who is not.
πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις, 'in relation to practice' (in contrast to πρὸς τὰς διανοήσεις).

29. οὐ γὰρ πω κ.τ.λ., 'for no decision has yet been given, the discussion having been merely about the name.' The fact is mentioned to show that the question is not one of practical importance. It would have already been decided one way or the other, if it had been. For κρίσεις γέγονεν cp. c. 16. 1300 b 34, δεὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τοῦτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν.

30. ἔχει δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν, 'but it offers an opportunity to a certain extent for speculative inquiry': cp. Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦτον τελευταίον λεκτόν διὰ τὸ πλείοτην ἐχεῖν πραγματείαν, and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 12, δόσα μὲν οὖν ἐχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν. "Ἀλλος is pleonastic, as often elsewhere (see note on 1309 b 30).

31. ποία δ' ἄρχαί κ.τ.λ. For the answer to this question see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. (cp. 1300 a 4 sqq.).

33. πρὸς ἀπασάν τε δὴ πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ., 'with a view to every constitution, and especially with a view to small States.' For δὴ following ἀπασά, cp. Soph. Aj. 992. For καὶ δὴ καί, cp. Poet. 24. 1460 a 5: Meteor. 2. 3. 357 b 26: Ἀθ. Ποι. c. 2. 1. 2 sqq.: and Plato, Laws 758 E. Aristotle occasionally studies the circumstances of small States, e.g. in c. 11. 1296 a 10 sqq., 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq., and 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq. Most Greek States were small, and it is probable that many of his pupils, like himself, came from small States, for the attractions of philosophy were greater where those of a political career were less (Plato, Rep. 496 B).

34. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις κ.τ.λ., 'for in the large States [there will be as many offices as there are duties to be discharged, for in them] it is possible and right for one office to be set apart for the discharge of one duty.' Aristotle has already said of Carthage what he says here (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.). The course which he here recommends had not always been followed at Athens, though it was a large State: thus we read of the Commissioners of the Theoric Fund (ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κεχειροτονήμων) in the days of the ascendency of Eubulus, ἦρξαν μὲν πρὶν ἢ τὸν 'Ἡγήμανον νόμον γενέσθαι τὴν τοῦ αὐτογραφίας ἀρχήν, ἦρξαν δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν καὶ ρωσίων ἀρχήν, καὶ σκευοθηκήν φωτόνμου, ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ὅσποιοι καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν θλην διωκήσαν εἶχον τὸς πάλας (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 25).

37. ὅστε τὰς μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'so that in the case of some offices men intermit the tenure of them for a long time, while others they hold
only once.' Cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 24 sqq. So in the constitution adopted at Erythrae after its reduction by Athens towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. no one was to be a member of the Boule a second time till four years had elapsed (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 23). At Athens the position of epistates of the prytaneis could only be held once by the same individual ('Ath. Pol. c. 44). So in the days of the Four Hundred at Athens, according to 'Ath. Pol. c. 31. l. 16 sqq., it was ordained that except in the case of the Boule and the office of stratēgus, no one should hold the same magistracy twice. Aristotle does not notice, or at any rate point out, that the frequent tenure of important posts by novices which regulations of this kind involve would not be favourable to efficiency.

38. καὶ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., 'and every task is better attended to, when the attention of the person discharging it is directed to doing one thing and not many.' Compare 1. 2. 1252 b 3 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 b 14 sq. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Rep. 370 C, ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἐξαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ραβόν, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ, and 374 A sqq., and (as Vict. points out) Laws 846 D sqq. He probably also has before him Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 21, ἐκεῖνο δοκῶν καταμεμαθηκέναι ὅτι οὗτοι κράτιστοι ἐκαστα γίγνονται οἱ ἀν ἀφέμενοι τοῦ πόλλως προσέχειν τῶν νοῶν ἐπὶ ἐν ἔργον πράσσωσιν, and 8. 2. 5–6, where the increased specialization of labour in large States as compared with small is dwelt upon, and the increased excellence of work resulting from this is described. 'Formae monopraematiæ et polypraematiæ unicum ex hoc loco exemplum posuit Stephanus' (Schm.).

1299 b. 1. συνάγειν εἰς ὀλίγους. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 6. 14, πᾶσαι δὲ συγκεφαλαιοῦνται πολιτικαὶ πράξεις εἰς ὀλίγους ἐπιστάτας, and Pol. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 37, ὅταν ἑνοὶ εἰς ἐλάττους ἑλκοσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. 2. ὀλιγανθρώπιναν, 'paucity of citizens,' as is clear from 1299 a 37, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς ἐνοῦ τοὺς πολίτας. 5. καὶ νόμων, i.e. laws regulating the tenure and administration of magistracies.

πλὴν αἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but large States often require the same magistracies, whereas it is only at long intervals that small States do so.' In large States, for example, magistrates for the repair of the walls will often need to be appointed, not so in small States. Cp. c. 16. 1300 b 29, συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν. It appears from the Gortyna Code that the ὀρτανοδικασταί of Gortyna 'n'avaient qu' une existence inter-
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and Aptiov. We see the Areopagus and is authority infer ovofMVd by {rviov tlv)Tai*A\(is irotbs because their holders but little to do.

9. \προς τὴν διληγανθρωπίαν, 'to suit the paucity of citizens.' Cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 1, πρός δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην.

10. διβελισκολύχια. See notes on 1252 b 1 and 2. We read of similar contrivances in Athen. Deipn. 700 d, "Ερμιττςος δ' ὁ κοιμόθη-

ποιός ἐν τοῖς ἱάμβοις τὸ στρατιωτικὸν λυχνεῖον σύνθετον ὄντως (i. e. λυχνείων) ὁμοίες (Hermipp. Fragm. 8 Bergk), and 700 e, ἐξολοθρεύον ἐπὶ ἡμεῖς' καὶ τάχα τούτων ὄμοιων ἐντοι το παρὰ Θεσπόμπρο διβελισκο-

λύχινων (see Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 517).

τόδας, sc. ἄρχας, which does not come to the surface, as it were, till 13. See notes on 1281 a 26 and 1336 a 21.

14. ἀρμόττει δὲ κ.π.λ. This question needs to be considered because it has a bearing on the question raised in 1299 a 31 sqq., what offices are necessary. A similar question would be whether it is better to give the strategi, as at Athens, command both by land and by sea, or, as in the Lacedaemonian State, to give the command by land to one magistracy and the command by sea to another.

16. εἰκοσμίας. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 14, 20, and Plato, Laws 764 B. At one time in the history of Athens the Council of the Areopagus was charged with the maintenance of εἰκοσμία throughout the State: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 37, τὴν ἀρείου πάγου βουλήν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμελείσθαι τῆς εἰκοσμίας, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3, ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεισταγών βουλή τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἰς τοῦ διατηρῆν τῶν νόμων, διαφερεὶ δὲ τὰ πλείστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ ξημ[α]υς πάντας τοὺς ἀκο-

σιστὰς κυρίος. This width of jurisdiction had its drawbacks, especially as the Council not only tried and sentenced culprits, but also carried the sentence into effect ('Αθ. Πολ. ibid. and c. 8. l. 19 sqq.: cp. Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 16 sqq.), and we may probably infer from 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12 sqq. that Aristotle prefers, at any rate in the case of large States, the arrangement by which the task of caring for εἰκοσμία is entrusted to more magistracies than one. There is obviously something to be said on the other side. In modern States we are accustomed to look to one supreme police-authority in each city. We note that Aristotle entrusts the receipt
and paying out of the revenue to one magistracy with jurisdiction everywhere (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq.).

17. ἀλλων δὲ κατ’ ἀλλων τόπον, i. e. astynomi in the city and agro-
nomi in the country (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq., 27 sqq.). The proedri ἐπιμελητή τῆς ἐκκοσμίας in the assembly (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 44. l. 10).

18. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πράγμα δεὶ διαφεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. The latter method seems to have been followed in some cases in Persia according to Xen. Oecon. 4. 9, καὶ εἰδὶ δ’ αὐτῷ οἱ ἄρχοντες διαταγμένοι ἔφ’ ἐκάτερον οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἄρχουσι τῶν κατοικοῦντων τε καὶ τῶν ἐργατῶν . . . οἱ δ’ ἄρχουσι τῶν ὁπλισμένων φρουρῶν. We are ourselves familiar with Guardians charged with the care of the poor and Commissioners charged with the care of lunatics.

19. λέγει δ’ οἶνον ἕνα τῆς ἐκκοσμίας. Supply πότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεὶ. 21. καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄρχων γένος, ‘the magistracies also,’ as well as the constitution. Τὸ τῶν ἄρχων γένος probably means no more than αἱ ἄρχαι. See as to expressions of this kind Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 382, and cp. Plato, Laws 797 A, τὸ τῶν παιδίων γένος, and Tim. 76 C, τὸ τῶν τριχών γένος.


27. καὶ κατ’ αὐτάς, i. e. κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας (cp. 21, καθ’ ἐκάστην), as well as κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, κατὰ τὰ πράγματα, and κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

29. ἐπεί μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Great magistracies were seldom found in democracies (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq., 29 sq., 41 sqq.), except in early times (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.).

30. οὖ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ίδιαὶ τινές εἶσον. To the magistracies mentioned here as peculiar to special constitutions a gerusia may be added, for a gerusia can hardly have existed in democracies.

31. ἢ τῶν προβούλων. See note on 1298 b 27.

αὕτη γὰρ οὖ δημοκρατική. Nor was the office of probulus suitable to an aristocracy either: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 8 sq.

βουλή δὲ δημοτικών. The name Boulé seems, however, sometimes to be applied to Councils not of a democratic character: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 131. 1: 2. 190: 2. 315. 3. The γερουσία in the Cretan States, which was composed of persons who had held the office of cosmos, an office tenable only by the members of certain gentes, was called a Boulé (2. 10. 1272 a 7 sq., 33 sqq.), though there was nothing democratic about it. It is implied in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6–9, where the word βουλεύοντι is used, that a Boulé might exist in an oligarchy.
33. ὃπως ἀσχολῶν ἦσται, 'in order that it may be able to attend to its business.'


36. ἀλλ' ἐποῦ κ.τ.λ., 'but where both these magistracies exist, [the arrangement is still oligarchical, for] the probuli are established as a check upon the bouleutae.' We can trace the existence of probuli in addition to a Boulê at Corinth (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90, who refers to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 60 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394), at Corcyra (Gilbert, 2. 234 sq.), at Eretria (Gilbert, 2. 67), and indeed at Athens after the Syracusan disaster (Thuc. 8. 1. 3). Since the foregoing note was written, I have noticed that my remark as to the coexistence of probuli and a Boulê at Corinth has been anticipated by Professor Wilisch (Beiträge zur inneren Geschichte des alten Korinth, p. 17) and by Mr. Lutz (Class. Rev. 10. 419).

38. καταλύεται δὲ . . . 1300 a 4. κρίνουσιν. The connexion with what precedes is, 'but though the Boulê is a democratic institution, even its authority is destroyed in extreme democracies.' The substance of this passage is repeated in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30–35. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29, ὅστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαι, and Cic. pro L. Flacco, c. 7. 16, Graecorum autem totae respublicae sedentis continentis temenitate administratur. As to Athens, cp. Ἁθ. Πολ. c. 41. 1. 24 sqq., c. 45, c. 49. II. 20–24, and see Sandys' note on c. 43. 1. 30, where ways are pointed out in which a departure occurred from 'the principle laid down by Solon, μηδὲν ἐὰν ἀπροβοῦλετον εἰς ἐκκλησίαιν εἰσφιρισθαί (Plut. Solon, c. 19).’ It should be noticed that Aristotle here connects the decline of the power of the Boulê with the introduction of liberal pay for the assembly (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 31, ὅπως μὴ μισθοῦ εἰσπορία πᾶσιν). This throws light on the date at which he would place the decline of the Boulê at Athens.

4. παίδονόμος δὲ κ.τ.λ. This remark is partly repeated in 8 (6). 1300 a. 8. 1323 a 3 sqq.

5. καὶ εἰ τὸς ἀλλὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers to the γυμνασίαρχος among others, as appears from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37 sqq.: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 337. 3, where Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 246. 30 sqq. is quoted, γυμνασίαρχος τε αἴρεθει τῆς τε εὐταξίας τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν νέων προευνοθῆ, τῆς τε ἄλλης εὐσχημοσύνης τῆς κατὰ τὸ γυμνίσιον ἀντιλάβετο καλῶς καὶ φιλοσύμως.
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8. περὶ μὲν τοῦτων. In the next line we have περὶ with the acc. See for other instances of this Bon. Ind. 579 b 20 sqq., where 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 30 sq. is among the passages referred to. Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 28 sq.

10. For ἐξ ἀρχῆς see Bon. Ind. 111 a 56 sqq.

14. ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν τριῶν τοῦτων διαφοράι τρεῖς εἰσὶν. I take the nine διαφοράι to be as follows:—All appoint, or some, or all to some offices and some to others; the appointment is made out of all, or out of some, or to some offices out of all and to others out of some; the appointment is made by election or by lot, or to some offices by election and to others by lot.

17. γένει, as the Cosmi in Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 33 sq.).

ἀρετὴ, as in the election to the Lacedaemonian Gerusia (2. 9. 1270 b 23 sqq.).

ὤσπερ ἐν Μεγάροις κ.τ.λ. Plato appears to have cases of this kind before him in Laws 715 A, ἀρχῶν περιμαχήτων γενομένων, οἱ νυκτισταντες τὰ τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα, ὥστε ἀρχῆς μοῦ ὠρίουν μεταδίδονα τοῖς ἅττηθίζον, μήτε ὠνόην μήτε ἐκγόνων, παραφυλακτοντες δὲ ἀλλάζους ξωσίν, ὅπως μὴ ποτὲ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπανατηχειηκένοις τῶν ἐμπροσθὲν γεγονότων κακῶν. It is not certain when the change from democracy to oligarchy at Megara referred to in the text took place. A change of this nature probably took place there in the time of the poet Theognis, whose date however is a contested point (see Christ, Gesch. d. gr. Litt. p. 113 sq., and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 394. 2). Plutarch may have the democracy of those days in view when he describes in Quaest. Gr. c. 18 the oppressive way in which the rich were at one time treated at Megara, and in c. 59 the disorderly spirit which prevailed there and the sacrilegious outrage of which some Megarians were guilty; he does not, however, mention that it was overthrown and that an oligarchy took its place. It is to the overthrow of this
democracy that Welcker (Theogn. p. xii), Sus.2 (Notes 1365, 1513, and 1556), and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 70. 1) take Aristotle to refer to the passage before us and in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 30 sq. and 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 34 sqq. Busolt, on the other hand (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 395. 6), takes Aristotle to refer to this revolution in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 34 sqq., but thinks that the reference in the passage before us and in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 30 sq. is to the events of B.C. 424, described in Thuc. 4. 66–74, when a democracy was succeeded at Megara by an extreme oligarchy (Thuc. 4. 74). He does not give the reasons which lead him to take this view. Others, among whom are Schlosser (Aristoteles' Politik, 2. 169, note) and E. Meyer (Gesch. d. Alterth. 2. 633), take all the three passages to refer to the revolution of B.C. 424. Sus.2 (Note 1365) objects that the account of Aristotle does not suit the description of the events given by Thucydides, and it is true that while Aristotle evidently refers to an overthrow of democracy which was the result of a victory over the demos won by oligarchs returning from exile, Thucydides says nothing of any such victory and represents the fall of the democracy to have been due to the intervention of Brasidas and his army aided by a Boeotian force. Still the oligarchical exiles at Pegas, who, as Thucydides tells us (4. 74), were enabled by the fall of the democracy to return to Megara, may have won a victory over the demos which Thucydides omits to record, and certainly his description of the oligarchy set up in B.C. 424 as 'extremely oligarchical' (4. 74) quite agrees with what Aristotle says in the passage before us. A third view is that of Congreve, who in his notes on 1302 b 30 and 1304 b 34 connects the overthrow of democracy at Megara mentioned in the three passages of the Politics with the withdrawal of Megara from the Athenian alliance after the battle of Coroneia in B.C. 447 (Thuc. 1. 113 sq.). An oligarchy in which power was confined to returned exiles would probably be especially oppressive, for exiles could hardly fail to return embittered by exile. Philip of Macedon set up an oligarchy of this type at Thebes after Chaeroneia (Justin, 9. 4, pulsos deinde per iniuriam in patriam restituit: ex horum numero trecentos exules iudices rectoresque civitati dedit).

19. πάλιν ταύτα συνθυαζόμενα, 'again there is the case of these things being combined.' For the asyndeton in πάλιν cp. i. 5. 1254 b 10.

22. τούτων δ' ἐκάστης ἐσοναι τῆς διαφορᾶς τρόποι τέτταρες, 'and
of each variety of these there will be four modes. Τούτων, i.e. τῶν τριῶν ὀρίων (10 sqq.). Take, for instance, the first ὀριο—‘who is it that appoint?’ One variety under this head is that all appoint. There will be four modes of this variety.

All may appoint from all by election,

'' '' '' '' lot,

All may appoint from some by election,

'' '' '' '' lot.

The same holds good of the second variety under this head, that in which some appoint.

Some may appoint from all by election,

'' '' '' '' lot,

Some may appoint from some by election,

'' '' '' '' lot.

So again as to the third variety, in which partly all, partly some, appoint.

Partly all, partly some may appoint from all by election,

'' '' '' '' '' '' lot,

Partly all, partly some may appoint from some by election,

'' '' '' '' '' '' lot.

Thus there will be twelve modes of each ὀριο, if we confine our attention to one only of the three possible συνδυασμοί, i.e. the συνδυασμός ‘partly all, partly some,’ and neglect the two others, which are ‘partly from all, partly from some’ and ‘partly by election, partly by lot.’ This is explained in 30 sq. If we took account of all three συνδυασμοί, there would be more than twelve modes. See Spengel, Aristotelische Studien, 3. 53, whose explanation I follow. But what is exactly meant by all or some appointing by lot? If an appointment is made by lot, how can it be said that all appoint or some appoint?

23. Ἡ γὰρ πάντες . . . 1300 b 5. ἀριστοκρατικόν. As to the text of this passage see critical notes.

24–26. The first of these two modes of appointing from all is open to the objection that, as the magistrates would be taken by election or lot or both from each of the tribes, demes, and phratries composing the State in succession, all the magistrates of the State might at a given moment belong to one and the same tribe.

25. φρατρίας. The way in which phratries are referred to here
suggests that they were a subdivision of the deme. As to the relation of the phratry to the deme at Athens see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 428 sq.

26. διελέθη. Sus. apparently takes the nom. to διελέθη to be 'die Ernennung aus Allen' ('the nomination out of all'), and probably this is so. In c. 14. 1298 a 17, on the other hand (cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 4. l. 16), τὸ ἀρξεῖν has to be supplied with διελέθη.

ἀντι ἀπάντων, i.e. on each occasion out of all; not merely out of all, if we take several occasions together.

31. χωρίς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. See above on 22.

τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικάκι ν.τ.λ. It has been objected to the text as it stands that not two, but only one mode of appointing is mentioned in what follows (τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων), or else three (τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει ἡ κλήρῳ ἡ ἁμήκον): hence Sus. would read τρεῖς instead of δύο, and H. Rabe would insert καὶ τὸ πάντας ἐκ τινῶν after πάντων, 32. I incline to think that no change should be made in the text. It has been explained in 24–26 that the one democratic mode of appointing (τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων) assumes two forms, τὸ πάντας ἐς ἀπάντων ἅνα μέρος and τὸ πάντας ἀν ἀπάντων. Μέν is answered by δὲ, 34. I take Aristotle's meaning to be that if all appoint out of all taken in successive sections, so that the appointment is made out of all, though not out of all simultaneously, the arrangement is democratic, but that if all appoint by successive sections, one section appointing first and then the next and so on till all have had their turn of appointing, and the appointment is made out of all—the MS. text adds (probably erroneously), 'or out of some'—by lot or election or both, or to some offices out of all and to others out of some by lot or election or both, the arrangement is suitable to a polity. In other words, it is essential to democracy that the appointment should be made by all simultaneously, but not that the selection should be made from all simultaneously. It should, however, be pointed out that in one or two passages of the Politics Aristotle seems to take a different view. Thus in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23–27 a scheme under which persons elected from all the citizens by alternation (τινὲς ἀρχαὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων) elect the magistrates is treated as democratic. Perhaps, however, in this scheme the electors were elected by all simultaneously, and this is regarded by Aristotle as equivalent to the election of the magistrates being made by all simultaneously. Another passage which deserves attention is that in which the
constitution of Telecles is described (6 (4). 1298 a II sqq.). This constitution is regarded by Aristotle as a democratic constit-ution. Were not, however, successive sections of the citizens invested under it with the right of appointing the magistrates? We are not explicitly told that they were, but, if this was the case, it is not easy to reconcile the teaching of 1298 a II sqq. with that of the passage before us.

1300 b. 1. τὸ δὲ τυπᾶς ἐκ τυπῶν κ.τ.λ. See note on 1292 b 2.
2. As το μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὄμοιος see note on 1300 b 37.
3. τὸ δὲ τυπᾶς ἐξ ἀπάντων κ.τ.λ. See note on 1292 b 2.
4. τὴν κυρίαν τῶν προσόδων, sc. ἀρχήν, the magistracy of the apodectae or tamiae (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq.).
5. τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς, the magistracy of the stratēgì (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.).
6. τὴς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἠγορᾶν συμβολαίων κυρίας, the magistracy of the agoranomi (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 425 C sqq.). We see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 112 how humble the position of an ἠγορανόμος or ἀστυνομός or δικαστὴς κατὰ δήμον αὐτοῦ was at Athens compared with that of an envoy. Cp. also Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 31, where it is implied that ἀστυνομικά and ἠγορανομικὰ νόμιμα are of little importance.


ἐστι δὲ διαφορὰ κ.τ.λ., ‘now there is a difference between dicasteries, dependent on three determining factors’: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 3, διαφορὰ δὲ τες φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν. In c. 15. 1300 a 10 we have εἶτι δ’ αἱ διαφοραὶ εἰ τοῦ ὑπὸς ὑπὸς, where the article is added before διαφοραί. See note on 1300 a 10. There were other differences between dicasteries besides those noticed here. For instance, the members of some were paid, of others
not; the richer members of some were fined for non-attendance, of others not; the members of some were numerous, of others not, and so forth. Aristotle takes no notice of these differences, and confines his attention to the three points mentioned by him, which he probably regards as more closely connected with the κατάστασις τῶν δικαστηρίων than the others.

18. πρῶτον οὖν διαφεύγω πόσα εἶδη δικαστηρίων. Aristotle takes it for granted that a separate kind of dicastery will exist for each of the more important departments of judicial jurisdiction. Hippodamus had classified lawsuits (2. 8. 1267 b 37 sqq.) as concerned with three subjects only, ἔβρις, βλάβη, δάνας: he would seem, therefore, to omit offences against the State and against religion unless they can be brought under one or other of these three heads (see note on 1267 b 37). Aristotle, on the other hand, gives much prominence to offences against the State (no doubt for the reason mentioned in 36 sqq.), but omits from his classification many suits which Hippodamus includes in his; we hear nothing from him about suits connected with ἔβρις or βλάβη, except where there is a contract (συνάλλαγμα), nor indeed of any criminal trials except those for homicide or offences against the State; none connected with offences against the gods. Which of his dicasteries, again, would try questions of inheritance? Plato had already distinguished, as Aristotle does here, between the way in which dicasteries dealing with offences against the State and dicasteries dealing with offences against private persons should be constituted (Laws 767 sq.: 957 A). We see which were the most important dicasteries of those enumerated here from 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, τὸ δικάδικον πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἡ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, αἷον περὶ εὐθύνων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἵδιων συνάλλαγ-μάτων. The most important dicasteries were probably also those on which the largest number of dicasts sat (see 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 53. l. 15 sqq. and Sandys' note, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 31. 12 sqq.). We hear at Athens of dicasteries of 200, 400, 500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, and 2,500 members (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 393).

19. ἐν μὲν εὐθυντικοῖς. As to this kind of dicastery see 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 48 sub fin. It has this peculiarity, that the persons brought before it were exclusively magistrates. Dicasteries of this kind seem to have found a place both in democracies and in oligarchies (Plato, Polit. 298 E sq.). Aristotle might have added as another
kind of dicastery those which dealt with the δοκιμασία of magistrates ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 55. l. 6 sqq.).

20. ἀλλο δὲ εἰ τίς τῶν κοινῶν ἄδικεί, 'and another dealing with any one who commits an offence against any public interest': cp. Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b 20, διὸ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ δικαίωματα διχῶς ἐστὶν ἄδικείν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν' ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ὁρμαζόν ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ὃ γὰρ μαχεύον καὶ τῶν ἄδικων τινὰ τῶν ὀρισμένων, δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινὸν (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 9 a 58), Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 35, τοὺς ἄδικουτάς τι τῶν κοινῶν, and Plato, Laws 767 B. τὸ δ' ὁπόταν τὸ δημόσιον ὑπὸ τινὸς τῶν πολιτῶν ἠγήται τις ἄδικείσθαι καὶ βουληθῆ τῷ κοινῷ βοηθεῖν. Under the head of ἄδικηματα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν would fall not only the avoidance of military service, but theft of public property (Laws 941 C–D: Xen. De Vect. 4. 20 sq.), the non-payment of debts to the State, and a host of other offences. See Demosth. in Lept. cc. 100, 135, and c. Timocr. c. 172 sq.

ἐτέρον δόσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει. For the ellipse of περὶ ταύτα before δόσα see note on 1253 b 3. Cp. also Demosth. Or. 41. in Spud. c. 7, τὸν νόμον, ὅσα εἰς ἀθυρήθην, δόσα τις ἀπεισόμεθα, εἰναὶ δίκαι, οὐτ' αὐτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς κληρονόμοις. For εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει cp. Plato, Rep. 449 D. Acts alleged to be unconstitutional and attempts to change the constitution by force would fall within the province of this kind of dicastery.

21. τέταρτον κ.τ.λ., 'a fourth both for magistrates and for private persons dealing with contentions arising about impositions of penalties.' How important it was that a court of this kind should exist, we see from 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq. This court, unlike the one which will next be mentioned as dealing only with differences between private persons, had to do with questions affecting both private persons and magistrates. Plato perhaps refers to this kind of dicastery among others in Laws 957 A, τὰ δὲ δημόσια καὶ κοινὰ (sc. δικαστήρια) καὶ δόσος ἄρχας δεὶ χρωμένας τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν διοικεῖν. Ζημίωσις appears to be a rare word. Greek officials, unlike officials in general among ourselves, had the power of imposing money-fines (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq.: as to Athens see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 3). Plato, indeed (Laws 847 A), empowers the ἀστυνόμοι of his State in a particular case to punish the offender, if a citizen, ὀνείδεσι τε καὶ ἀτυμίαι, i.e. with penalties other than money-fines.

22. πέμπτον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Polyb. 6. 17. 7, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἀποδίδονται κρατᾶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τῶν ιδιωτικῶν συναλ-
lambda mantos, oista megathos xheis ton egklhmatoiv. In idioi kai ekhoston megathos a limitation of idioi seems to be introduced by kai: see as to this use of kai Bon. Ind. 357 b 8 sqq., and cp. Plato, Laws 766 C, ois prosoikontes kai epitihmunites proros patroos kai muatro mekri anpsiwv paidow.

24. phoniko evn os evi k.t.l. This is based on Athenian custom. For similar enumerations of courts dealing with homicide see 'Ath. Pol. c. 57. l. 14 sqq., Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 65-77, and Helladius, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 279 (p. 535 a 22 sqq. Bekker). In the passage before us and in Helladius only four kinds of court are enumerated, whereas Demosthenes and the 'Ath. Pol. mention five, the additional court being that which tries cases of homicide in which death is caused by the impact of stone, wood, iron, or the like, the thrower being unknown.

27. amfiothetaitei de peri tou diekaiou. Cp. i. 6. 1255 a 16, alla peri tou diekaiou mouon einai tyn amfiothetaian, Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 b 27 sq., and Rhet. 3. 17. 1417 b 25 sq.

tetartov de k.t.l., 'and a fourth kind of court concerned with acts of homicide charged against persons who have left the country for homicide upon their return.' The first act of homicide would be accidental, the second willful: cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 77, eiv tonon pempoton diekasthron allo theasasone oion uperbeibhe, to eiv theaitoi eintatha yap... kelevi diekas uphechon o nimos, ean tis 'ep akousoi phoio pefeugios, mepw twn ekbalwntow auton 'hdeismwv, aitian ehi etepo phono ekousion.

29. kai, 'for instance.' See note on 1255 a 36.

sumbainei de k.t.l. 'For the first time during the last twenty years the Isle of Man has been the scene of a trial for murder' (Times, Nov. 15, 1892). 'Evn to partr chrwv, cp. Plato, Tim. 36 E, proros tov etnapanta chrwv, and Phaedo, 107 c, oux uper tov chrwv toutou mouon, ev o kaloudem to zyn, all' uper tov pantos: Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 117. 15, summaqho tois Ierapuntwv ton paina chrwv: Pindar, Pyth. i. 46, o pais chrwv. P1 have ev to parwnti chrwv, which seems less suitable.

31. tov de xeikov evn men zeinovs pror zeinovs, allo zeinovs pror astous, 'and of the dicastery for alien suits one kind for aliens in litigation with aliens, and another for aliens in litigation with citizens.' Zeinovs pror astous might refer only to suits brought by aliens against citizens, and not to litigation between aliens and citizens generally. But Susemihl, Welldon, and other interpreters are probably right in giving the words the wider meaning. At
NOTES.

Athens according to Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 254, 'the πολιμάρχος had jurisdiction in most private suits in which the defendant was a foreigner.' The kind of dicastery which dealt with litigation between aliens and citizens would obviously be regarded as more important than that which dealt with litigation between aliens; it would also be that in which infractions of justice were most likely to occur (Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 22), and infractions of justice which might possibly result in war. We read of ξενοδίκαι at Oeantheia and Chaleion in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 31.

32. ἐτὶ δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Supply δικαστήριων ἐστὶ. The Forty had jurisdiction at Athens in suits where the matter in dispute did not exceed the value of ten drachmae (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 53. 1. 5).

33. μικρῷ πλείονος. Here the amount of money which is involved in the contract is expressed in the genitive: see Kühner, Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 418. 6 c (ed. Gerth, § 418. 7).

34. οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλῆθος. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἐμπίπτειν) compares such expressions as ἐμπίπτουσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ εἰς ἄλλους λίσεις (Soph. El. 30. 181 b 19). Cp. also Plut. Solon, c. 18, τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν διαφόρων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς.

35. περὶ μὲν τούτων, sc. τῶν δικαστηρίων. Δικαστηρίων must also be supplied with τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν and with τῶν πολιτικῶν. The term τὰ πολιτικὰ δικαστήρια seems to include the first five kinds of dicastery. We read of οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἁγώνες in Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 18 (Bon. Ind. 614 a 57): cp. also Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 8. That injustice in the review of magistrates' conduct in office had a special tendency to produce στάσεις we see from Plato, Laws 945 D sq.

37. περὶ δὲ γυνομένων καλὸς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτείων αἱ κινήσεις. At the end of this sentence should possibly be added μὴ γυνομένων δ' ὁμοίως from 1300 b 3. See critical note on 1300 b 38. For the thought cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20 sqq.

38. ἀνάγκη δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not consider the possible alternative of all the citizens sitting as a dicastery. He would probably regard a dicastery of this kind as too numerous. He takes it for granted that a dicastery will comprise only a part of the citizens, whether selected by election or by lot or by both.

39. περὶ πάντων τῶν διηγημένων, 'respecting all the subjects which have been distinguished' (cp. 1300 b 18, διαρείσθαι). Looking to 35-38, we expect Aristotle to confine his attention to the matters with which political dicasteries have to do, but περὶ πάντων τῶν διηγη-
μένων seems to imply, as Prof. Jowett remarks, that he does not do so.

41. peri ēνων τῶν αὐτῶν. This has been interpreted in different ways. Vict. 'de quibusdam certissque': Sepulv. 'de quibusdam eiusdem generis controversiis': Welldon, 'or some of them must invariably come before certain judges appointed partly by lot and partly by suffrage.' Of these interpretations I prefer those of Vict. and Welldon, but another is possible, and I incline to adopt it, 'about some things, the same [for both classes of dicasts].' If my view is correct, Aristotle adds τῶν αὐτῶν wishing to make it clear that the two classes of dicasts, those elected and those appointed by lot, have similar competence and deal with the same, and not with different, causes. Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 35, καὶ ἄδων ἐν ὧν ἀν ταύτη ὑπερίχη πολὺ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἰρτόρυκος ἀδυνάτου εἰσεῖν κ.τ.λ., where ταύτῃ, which has been doubted (Λε has ταύτα), receives some support from the passage before us.

2. οἱ κατὰ μέρος, 'the sectional modes,' i.e. the modes in which 1301 a.

3. Is καὶ οἱ δικάσωντες 'the dicasts also' as well as those appointed to magistracies, who have been dealt with in c. 15. 1300 a 27 sqq.? Spengel brackets καὶ and Sus. is inclined to transfer it to before ἐκ τινῶν, 2, but perhaps without absolute necessity.

4. τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δὲ ἀἱρέσει, 'partly by lot and partly by election.' The dicasteries dealing with the more important matters would probably be elective.

ἡ ἑνία δικαστήρια peri τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν, 'or some dicasteries composed of persons appointed by lot and by election, the subjects dealt with being the same for both classes of dicasts.'

5. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. It seems likely that one or more words have dropped out in this sentence. Vict. and Sus. insert οἱ αὐτοῖ εἰσι after οἱ τρόποι, while Schneider and Coray add ἦν, which Coray places after τῶς εἰρημένοις. Possibly ἀντίστροφοι may be the missing word, and should be added after οἱ τρόποι. 'Αντίστροφοι would easily drop out after τρόποι from the similarity of the ending. The translation will then be, 'these modes then, as they were previously said to do, correspond to those already mentioned.'

7. τὰ αὐτά. Δικαστήρια should probably be supplied, as with τὰ μὲν and τὰ δὲ.

10. ἄμφοτ. I take Aristotle's meaning to be that dicasts might VOL. IV. T
be appointed from all or from some or from both all and some, either by election or by lot or by both methods.

11. τοιτων δε κ.τ.λ. Τα μεν πρώτα, sc. δικαστήρια. It seems from this that there was nothing undemocratic in an elected dicastery or in a dicastery appointed partly by election and partly by lot, if only the dicasts were elected out of all. This is remarkable, as even in the Solonian democracy, a very moderate form, the dicasts were appointed by lot (2. 12. 1274 a 5). Aristotle probably preferred in a democracy dicasteries appointed from all wholly or in part by election to dicasteries wholly appointed from all by lot, but would Greek democrats agree with him in regarding such dicasteries as democratic? And would they be content even with dicasteries appointed by lot from all, if these dicasteries were not both numerous and paid? Dicasteries appointed wholly or in part by election would hardly be suitable to any but moderate democracies. And what does Aristotle mean by dicasts appointed by election? Does he mean dicasts thus appointed for a given term—say a year or some longer or shorter term—or for a given trial? There would be obvious objections to appointing dicasts by election for a given trial, though the three hundred dicasts who tried the ἐναγήσις for the murder of the followers of Cylon were appointed for the trial and by some sort of selection, not by lot (Plut. Solon, c. 12). Imagine if the English judge and jury who tried the leaders in the Transvaal raid had been appointed for the given trial by election!

12. τα δε δεύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, δοσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων. So that if the dicasts were selected ἐκ τινῶν by lot or partly by election and partly by lot, the plan would be oligarchical. Aristotle does not tell us whether the plan would be oligarchical, if they were elected ἐκ τινῶν by all, but probably it would not. It is to be presumed that by ἐκ τινῶν Aristotle means 'from the rich' or 'from the well-born,' for there would be nothing oligarchical in a selection from 'the good.'

13. τα δε τρίτα κ.τ.λ., 'and the third sort of dicasteries is suitable to an aristocracy or a polity, all those which are partly taken from all and partly from a limited class.' So Sus. probably rightly: Stahr, however, translates τα μεν—τα δε 'for some matters' and 'for others' ('für einige Sachen' and 'für andere'). Dicasteries composed both of members appointed out of all and of members appointed out of a limited class (ἐκ ἄμφων, 8) are not distinctly named, though Aristotle probably intends to class these also as suitable to
aristocracies and polities. He may well, indeed, have preferred dicasteries of this kind to any others, if we may judge by what he says in c. 14. 1298 b 20 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq., where he holds that in an extreme democracy rich and poor should deliberate and judge together. But of the three other plans—that by which some suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from a limited class and others by dicasts taken from all, that by which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from all, and that by which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from a limited class—he will have preferred the first. Here again it is remarkable that Aristotle does not explain what sort of limited class he means by τῶς. Would he regard it as an aristocratic arrangement if some suits were tried by dicasts taken from all and others by dicasts taken from the rich?

BOOK VII (V).
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

A few remarks may here be added to what has already been said in vol. i. p. 521 sqq. as to the teaching of this Book.

If we study the eleven causes of στάσις and constitutional change enumerated in c. 2. 1302 a 34 sqq. (see vol. i. p. 523 sqq.), we shall see that they may be grouped under three main heads. Στάσις and constitutional change may arise either from a certain emotional state of the minds of the citizens or some of them, or from social causes, such as the increase of a class in size out of proportion to the rest or the unlikeness of one part of the citizen-body to the other, or from negligence on the part of the authorities of the State and similar causes. It is obvious that a great difference exists between the second group of causes and the two others. Negligence in government can be avoided, and it is possible also to avoid arousing feelings of envy, or contempt, or indignation at oppression or fears of future oppression, but it is far less easy to prevent a class increasing in size or credit, or an individual or individuals acquiring a pre-eminence in power, or to secure the existence of a midway class capable of holding the balance between rich and poor, or to soften distinctions of race or geographical contrasts. If the increase of a class in relative magnitude is often due to accidental causes, as we are told that it is in c. 3. 1303 a 3 sqq., how is it possible to prevent it in these cases? When the numbers of the upper class at Tarentum were greatly reduced in consequence
of the defeat of the Tarentines by the Iapygians, what amount of
good conduct or vigilance on the part of the magistrates would have
saved the polity from becoming a democracy?

Aristotle's analysis of the causes of ἀράτιος and constitutional
change reveals, in fact, the existence of causes with which it is
extremely difficult for the statesman to deal, however great his
skill and watchfulness. Aristotle himself seems, indeed, to be
hardly conscious of this. He hardly realizes how difficult it is to
prevent ἀράτιος and constitutional change when they are brought
about by changes in the size or credit of classes, or other social
changes not easily guided or controlled. He may possibly have
underrated the difficulty of doing this, for we find him in 7 (5). 8.
1308 b 30 advising statesmen under certain circumstances to 'try to
increase the midway class' without betraying much consciousness
of the difficulty of the task.

Another consequence of his recognition of the share of social
causes in bringing about ἀράτιος and constitutional change seems
also to be imperfectly realized by him. Does not the fact suggest
a resort to means of preserving constitutions of which he would
hardly approve? If the increase of the rich in numbers or wealth
is often fatal to democracies (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 10 sqq.: 7 (5). 12.
1316 b 12 sqq.), will not democracies be wise if they thin the
numbers of the rich and impoverish them? This view was com-
monly held by Greek democrats (see vol. i. p. 538 sqq. and Pol. 7
(5). 9. 1310 a 8 sqq.), but Aristotle advises democracies to adopt
an opposite policy and to spare the resources of the rich (7 (5). 8.
1309 a 14 sqq.). Is he not rather inconsequent in this? He
would probably reply that, however dangerous to democracies an
overgreat increase in the numbers or wealth of the rich may be, the
danger of driving the rich to combine against the democracy by
oppressive measures is still greater (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 20 sqq.).

When at the close of c. 4 Aristotle passes on from studying the
causes of constitutional change in constitutions taken as a whole to
study in cc. 5-7 its causes in each constitution taken separately,
some causes are pointed out of which we hear nothing in the first
four chapters. We now learn that changes of constitution may result
in democracies from oppression practised on the rich not by magis-
trates, but by demagogues (c. 5. 1304 b 20 sqq.), or from the
ambition of demagogues who are also generals, in oligarchies from
the rivalry of great officials in courting the favour of those who
elect to offices, from an overgreat narrowness of the constitution, from feuds within the ruling class, or from the ruin of individual oligarchs by spendthrift and dissolute habits of life, and in aristocracies from strong contrasts of wealth and poverty within the citizen-body. These are causes of constitutional change of which we have not heard before.

It has already been pointed out in vol. i. p. 527 that the theory of constitutional change set forth in this Book is not quite the theory which we expect from Aristotle. We do not hear as much in it as we expect of the effect of ethical changes in the citizens in bringing about changes of constitution. We know that the constitution represents the mode of life preferred by the State (vol. i. p. 209 sqq.) and reflects its conception of justice, and its view as to the things which produce happiness (vol. i. p. 220 sq.), or in other words is an indication of the moral level of the community, and we are, in fact, told in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. that each constitution is preserved by the ἴδιοι appropriate to it, so that we infer that a change in the ἴδιοι of the citizens will often produce a change in the constitution, but this cause of change remains unnoticed in this Book till we are told in c. 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. how important it is that the citizens should receive an education conducive to the preservation of the constitution. We infer, again, from such passages as 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 28 sqq. that the rise or increase of new classes in a State, such as those of artisans, day-labourers, or seafaring men, will result in constitutional change, but this source of constitutional change is nowhere dwelt on in this Book. Other causes of constitutional change which we expect to find noticed in it, but do not, are pernicious and erroneous teaching, or teaching likely to overthrow or undermine the existing constitution, disasters to the State (see note on 1304 a 33), disease and famine (Plato, Laws 709 A), great differences of opinion among the citizens, the mistakes of statesmen, the presence of ἀτυχεσ within the city ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq.), or of exiles in neighbouring cities. Something is said in c. 11. 1314 b 1 sqq. of the dangers attaching to heavy taxation in tyrannies, but we hear little or nothing of it as a source of στάσις and constitutional change in constitutions generally, except incidentally in c. 5. 1305 a 5, c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq., and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20 sqq. Aristotle does not notice how often the foreign relations of a State helped to determine its constitution.

One reason why Corinth, for instance, was oligarchically governed
no doubt was that its dreaded neighbour, Argos, was democratically governed, and one reason why a democracy existed at Argos was that its enemy, the Lacedaemonian State, was in the opposite camp. States were apt to give supreme power to the class which was least likely to betray them to the foe they feared. Instances of this might easily be multiplied. Some occasions of στάσεις and constitutional change which Aristotle notices elsewhere escape mention in this Book. We gather, for instance, from 6 (4), 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that changes in the relative importance of different arms of the military force of the State bring with them changes of constitution, but we hear nothing of this in the Book before us. So again we gather from the Second Book that στάσεις is caused by the continued rule of the same men (2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq.), and by the coexistence of two similar and rival great magistracies (2. 9. 1271 a 39 sqq.). In Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 9–16 bad men are said to be in a state of στάσεις among themselves because of their moral badness. Of these sources of στάσεις we hear nothing in this Book.

As to the causes to which the fall of monarchies is traced in it, we note that while we hear of their being overthrown owing to misgovernment, and especially owing to ἐθελος in its various forms (c. 10. 1311 a 27 sqq.), owing to fear, and owing to contempt (1311 a 25 sqq.), and we gather that they sometimes fell in consequence of disunion within the ruling family (1312 b 9 sqq., 40 sq.) or of making a single individual overgreat (c. 11. 1315 a 8 sqq.), or not taking sufficient care to have the strongest class in the State on their side (1315 a 31 sqq.), we do not hear that they were affected, as constitutions strictly so called were, by what we have termed the social causes of constitutional change, such causes, for instance, as the disproportionate increase of a class in size or the like.

From the counsels given in cc. 8 and 9 we learn that constitutions are especially preserved (1) by vigilance. The constitution must be carefully guarded; in well-balanced constitutions small infractions of law must not be tolerated, and in oligarchies resting on a property-qualification and polities the property-qualification must be altered, if any changes should occur from time to time in its value; the first beginnings of rivalries and feuds among the notables must be detected and checked; both in oligarchy and in democracy the private life of the citizens must be watched and spendthrift habits controlled. Under no constitution should a single individual be made overgreat or be suddenly dispossessed of his greatness.
(2) Both the class favoured by the constitution and the class not so favoured should be fairly treated. In aristocracies and oligarchies the members of the former class should be placed as far as possible on a level, and their access to office facilitated by making official terms short. In all constitutions special care should be taken of the class not favoured by the constitution. It must not be wronged or oppressed. Its more ambitious members must not suffer in their honour nor the many in their pecuniary interests, and those who are fit for rule must be brought within the constitution. If this class is excluded from office, as was often the case in oligarchies, it should be reconciled to its exclusion by laws and regulations securing that office shall not be a source of gain, but oligarchies are advised in 1309 a 20 sqq. to reserve minor but lucrative offices for it, and both oligarchies and democracies are advised (1309 a 27 sqq.) to award it honorary distinctions to make up for its non-admission to the more important offices. Too often, it would seem, the class favoured by the constitution claimed a monopoly both of power and of honour and profit: Aristotle advises, on the contrary, that it should be content with a monopoly, or something like it, of the more important offices, and allow a full share of honour and profit to the less fortunate class. But he evidently holds that neither vigilance nor fair and kindly treatment both of the class favoured by the constitution and of the class not so favoured would suffice without attention to a third point (3). The constitution, if a deviation-form, must be moderate and must have the strongest element in the State on its side, and the ruling class must be prepared by an appropriate education to rule in such a way as to secure that the constitution will last. Vigilance, fair treatment of all within the State, a moderate and strongly supported constitution, and a ruling class fitted by education to rule—these are the things which make constitutions durable.

Aristotle's counsels are wise, but yet we feel that he has pointed out causes of ὀτάσις and constitutional change with which they do not enable us to deal. How is it possible to counteract the social causes of ὀτάσις and constitutional change, such causes, for instance, as the disproportionate increase of a class, especially in those cases in which it is due to defeat in war or other circumstances of an accidental kind?

The question of the causes of ὀτάσις and constitutional change had been studied to some extent by others before Plato and Aristotle
took it up. Some light is thrown on it now and then by Herodotus (e.g. in 3. 80–82), by Thucydides (e.g. in 3. 82 sqq. and 8. 89. 3), and by Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480: see note on 1302 a 34). The date of Phaleas is not known, but he had evidently considered it. No one, however, appears to have dealt with it at all fully till Plato dealt with it in the Republic and Laws and Aristotle in the Politics.

Throughout the Politics Aristotle often illustrates and confirms general statements made by him by adducing historical examples in support of them, but in none of its Books does he make a larger use of this method than in that before us. U. Köhler (Rhein. Mus. 53. 491) has anticipated me in raising the interesting question what class of Greek writers first made use of this method, and in pointing out that it is already used by Aeneas in his Commentarius Poliorceticus thirty years or more before the Politics was written. He may well be right in thinking that Aeneas will not have been the first to use it. I am sometimes inclined to suspect that the references in medical writers to cases occurring in their practice (see e.g. Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6) suggested the employment of a similar method in other fields of inquiry.

The historical examples adduced in this Book are drawn pretty evenly from most parts of the Hellenic world, most freely perhaps from the less remote parts of the coast of Asia Minor and the islands lying off it. In Greece Proper they are largely furnished by the history of the chief cities, Athens, Megara, Corinth, Argos, Lacedaemon, Heraea, Elis, Thebes, Larissa, Pharsalus; no reference is made to the cities of Achaia, to Messene after its restoration, or to Megalopolis, to the Acarnanians or Aetolians, to Corcyra (which is surprising, considering how full an account Thucydides had given of its troubles), or to Crete. Not many illustrations are drawn from the history of the Sicilian cities, with the exception of Syracuse, nor from that of the Aegean islands other than those lying near the mainland of Asia or Europe; none from the history of the cities of the more distant part of the Euxine. We might have expected that Aristotle would make more use than he appears to do of the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. Whether he made a larger use of the history of Ephorus, we cannot say. It is not easy to trace the source from which he obtained his illustrations. Some of the facts he mentions may have become known to him personally (see notes on 1304 a 4 and 1311 a 36), and he may have learnt others from his numerous pupils.

20. ἐκ τῶν δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτείαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποιῶν. This question, stated in a slightly different form in c. 2. 1302 a 16, ἐτεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τῶν αἱ τε στάσεις γίγνονται καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τῶν πολιτείας (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sqq., and c. 7. 1307 b 24 sq.), is dealt with in cc. 2–4. It has been already noticed in vol. i. p. 521 that this summary does not prepare us for the distinction between πολιτείαι and μοναρχία which is a conspicuous feature of the Book. See also note on 1289 b 24.

21. τίνες ἑκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί. This question is dealt with in cc. 5–7.

22. ἐκ ποιῶν εἰς ποιᾶς μάλιστα μεθίστανται. This is a question on which light is occasionally thrown in cc. 5–7 and elsewhere in the Book. We gather, for instance, from c. 5 that democracies are apt to change into oligarchies and tyrannies: see also c. 7. 1307 a 20–27.

ἐτι δὲ σωτηρία τίνες καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρίς ἑκάστης εἰσίν, ἐτι δὲ διὰ τίνων δὲ μάλιστα σῶξοιτο τῶν πολιτεῶν ἑκάστη. Giphanius (p. 525) brackets ἐτι δὲ διὰ τίνων—ἕκαστη, and Spengel and Sus. regard these words as an alternative recension of ἐτι δὲ σωτηρία—εἰσίν. It is possible that they are so; it is also possible that they are a gloss which has crept from the margin into the text; I incline to think, however, that they are neither, but, on the contrary, are in place where they stand: cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 23, πειρατέων ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραί καὶ τίνες σωτηρία τῶν πολιτεῶν καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρίς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφικεν, and 8 (6). i. 1316 b 34, ἐτι δὲ περὶ φθοράς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτεῶν, ἐκ ποιῶν τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρὸτερον. Both these passages distinguish between the σωτηρία, or modes of preserving constitutions, and the αἰτία σωτηρίας, the means by which they are preserved. Thus in 7 (5). ii. 1313 a 34 sqq. and 1314 a 29 sqq. two broad modes of preserving tyrannies are described, distinct from the means which each mode employs for the purpose. So again in 8 (6). 5. 1319 b
37 sqq. the σωτηρία are mentioned side by side with τὰ σώγωνα. We often trace in the Politics a distinction between the τρόπος and the δείον, e.g. in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δε' ἄλλων ἐκαστος τούτο θηρεύων κ.τ.λ.: 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑσταί: 3. 18. 1288 a 39, τῶν αὐτῶν τρόποι καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν.

25—1302 a 15. The contents of this part of c. 1 may be thus summarized. The origin of στάσις is to be found in the fact that men seek what is equal and that many constitutions do not give what is equal, inasmuch as they treat as equals men who are not really equal, or as unequals men who are not really unequal. Hence στάσις arises, which sometimes seeks to substitute one constitution for another, and sometimes does not. What it always seeks to do is to obtain that which is equal. But the equal is of two kinds—the arithmetically equal and the equal according to desert. Hence two main constitutions come into existence, democracy and oligarchy, the one based on the one sort of equality and the other on the other. Democracy is safer than oligarchy, but they both rest on one sort of equality only, and both are consequently unsafe. Constitutions should combine both sorts of equality. Here Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 757 A—E.

Aristotle has promised in 1301 a 20 sq. to inquire into the causes of changes of constitution (ικ τίνων μεταβαλλομενι αἱ πολιτείαι καὶ πάσων καὶ πόλεων), but we find him inquiring in the passage before us how στάσις originates, and hence he is led in c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq. to enlarge the subject of his inquiry, and to ask what are the causes of στάσις as well as of changes of constitution. Now στάσις does not always aim at a change of constitution (1301 b 6—26), nor are changes of constitution always preceded or accompanied by στάσις (c. 3. 1303 a 13 sqq.), so that Aristotle’s addition of an inquiry into the cause of στάσις to an inquiry into the causes of constitutional change somewhat complicates his investigation. Still it enables him to insist that the constitution should realize that which is equal and should realize it in both its forms, and this he is no doubt glad to have an opportunity of doing. It should be noticed, however, that constitutional change may occur not only without being preceded or accompanied by στάσις, but also without the existence in anybody’s mind of a sense of injustice. In oligarchies based on a property-qualification and polities, for instance, it may occur through accident, if owing to any cause there should be a rise or a fall in the value of property (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.).
25. δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., 'and we must first assume the starting-point that the reason why many different constitutions have come into being is that,' etc. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 14, ἀρχῇ δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ τῆς σκέψεως καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων πρῶτον λαβεῖν περὶ σπέρματος τί ἐστιν. For ὑπολαβεῖν ('sumere ac statuere aliquid pro vero,' Bon. Ind. 799 b 26), cp. Anal. Post. 1. 16. 79 b 26 sqq., where ἀπλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν is opposed to διὰ συλλογισμοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ὑπάληψιν. The first step taken is the assumption of the starting-point that the existence of numerous constitutions is due to an error as to what is just and proportionally equal, but what is the next? Perhaps to point out (1301 a 37 sqq.) that στάσις arises when constitutions are found by certain classes (the rich and the freeborn) not to give them the position which they think their due.

26. πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον. Spengel, Bekk., and Sus. read εἶναι in place of καὶ (cp. 1301 b 35 sq.), but Bonitz (Ind. 512 a 33) brackets καὶ, coupling the passage before us with 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3, ἐπεὶ τοῖς ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτρων ἀρµατον. I doubt whether any change is called for in the text: καὶ is probably here, as often elsewhere, explanatory ('the just in the sense of that which is proportionally equal': see note on 1318 a 33). For ὁμολογεῖν with an acc. (meaning 'to agree about') cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 18, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἴσοτητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀρμιστητοὺς, and Plato, Rep. 597 E, τὸν μὲν δὴ μυμηθὲν ὁμολογήκαμεν. For τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 32, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ’ ἁρμισμόν τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἰδὴ ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ., 7. 3. 1238 b 19 sqq., and 7. 10. 1242 b 12 sqq. In a just award of advantages to persons proportionally, not arithmetically, equal the advantages which fall to each are proportionally, not arithmetically, equal, i.e. they are proportioned to the comparative ἄξια of the persons (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 16 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 24 sqq.). Hence in 1301 b 29 sqq. and c. 7. 1307 a 26 we have τὸ κατ’ ἄξιαν ἴσον in the same sense as τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον here. But τὸ κατ’ ἄξιαν ἴσον is τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον (1301 b 35 sqq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 9. 1158 b 30, ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρῶτος τὸ κατ’ ἄξιαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποιον δευτέρως): therefore τὸ δίκαιον is identified in the passage before us with τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.

NOTES.


34. πάντων τῶν ἰσων ἀξιούσι μετέχειν, and so demand a democracy.

πάντων τῶν ἰσων. Cp. Diod. i. 5. 29. 6, προσελάβοντο δ' καὶ τοὺς Θεσαύρους ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν συνεδρίῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσους πᾶσιν: Plut. Alex. c. 13, tois katafugouais eti thn olain apainov meteiddosas ton filanerhoptai: Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 321, καὶ γὰς καὶ οἰκίας ἐγκτησιν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τίμια καὶ φιλανθρώπα πάντα ἃ ήταν κ.τ.λ. Various changes in the text have been proposed (see Sus, 9), but, as it seems to me, without necessity.

35. πλεονεκτεῖν ἦτοους, and so demand an oligarchy.

τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἀνίσον, 'for [they seek the unequal and] the more is unequal.'

36. πάσαι, i.e. both democracy and oligarchy. See note on 1280 a 9.

ημαρτημέναι δ' ἀπλῶς εἰσίν, 'but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous.' They are κατὰ τι ὀρθαί, but ημαρτημέναι ἀπλῶς. Compare (with Lutoslawski, Erhaltung und Untergang der Staatsverfassungen, p. 91) Plato, Rep. 543 B, ἀλλ' οὔν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημέναι ἐλέγες, εἰ αὐτὴ ὁρθὴ. Cp. also 3. 6. 1279 a 19 sqq. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 9.

37. διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν. Does this mean 'because democracy and oligarchy are ημαρτημέναι ἀπλῶς, based on erroneous views of what is just,' or 'because the supporters of democracy and oligarchy take erroneous views of what is just'? I incline to the former interpretation. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 A, διὰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ταύτα (the giving of too much power to the few and of an equal share to the good and the bad) στάσεων αἱ πολιτείαι πληροίναι.

39. στασιάζουσιν. What is the exact meaning of στάσις and στασιάζουσιν? Τὸ στασιάζειν occurs when a number of the citizens of a State form themselves into a faction for the attainment of some political end by legal and illegal means. A party is assumed to pursue its end by legal means only, whereas a στάσις is prepared to carry its point by illegal means, if necessary. Στάσις may have as its aim either an entire change of constitution or something short of that (1301 b 6—26). The existence of στάσις implies the absence of ὁμόωνa (Plato, Rep. 352 A); it implies hostility between those who ought to be friendly to each other (Rep. 470 B), but τὸ στασιάζειν is distinguished from τὸ ἐπιτίθεσθαι in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 25, and στάσις from μάχαι in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27 sqq. (cp. 7 (5)).
1303 b 1 sq.) and Plato, Rep. 560 A, and from πόλεμος in Polit. 271 E etc., though in Laws 629 D στάσις is said to be πάνων πολέμων χαλεπώτερος.

After στασιάζουσιν I propose to insert c. 3. 1303 b 3, στασιάζουσιν δὲ—7, διότι: see critical note on 1301 a 39 and explanatory notes on 1303 b 3–5.

πάνων δὲ δικαιώτατα κ.τ.λ. Cρ. 3. 13. 1283 a 24 sqq.

2. οὐκ ἄξιοσαί τῶν ἰσων αὐτούς. Cρ. 3. 13. 1284 a 9, ἄξιομενοι 1301 b. τῶν ἰσων, and Plut. Pelop. c. 25, τῶν ἰσων οὐκ ἠξιώτα, and for the fact Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 34 sqq.

3. εὐγένεις γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle uses the word δοκοῦσιν here, but in 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21 sq. (where see note) he adopts this view as his own. In the passage before us he hints that true εὐγένεια is something different (cp. i. 6. 1255 a 39 sqq. and the fragment of Menander quoted in the note on 1255 a 34, where true nobility is identified with virtue). Whatever claim to rule wealth and virtue may confer on their possessors, mere descent from the wealthy and virtuous confers none.

4. ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἶπείν αὐταί καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεων εἰσιν, ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν, 'these then are the sources, speaking broadly, and the springs of civil discord, from which civil discord takes its rise.' Μὲν οὖν may possibly be taken up by ἐπεὶ δὲ σχοπούμεν, c. 2. 1302 a 16, but it is not certain whether (owing to the length of the disposition which follows) it is taken up by anything. Αὐταί, i.e. a sense on the part of a person or persons that they have not the position under the constitution which they regard as their due. Thurot would place ὡς εἶπείν before πηγαὶ and Sus. after it, because, while ἀρχαί 'est une expression ordinaire, qui n'a pas besoin d'être doucic et excusée,' πηγαὶ 'est une expression figurée,' but ὡς εἶπείν is often used where no 'expression figurée' has gone before, to restrict and qualify an absolute statement (c. e. g. in 3. 11. 1282 a 5, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 28 sq., and 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 4 sq.): see Bon. Ind. 872 a 34 sqq. and Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 631, who says 'ὡς εἶπείν proprie est modestes loquentis et rem infinita ratione vel universe signahtis.' So here Aristote uses it to express the fact that it is only in a broad way that inequality under the constitution can be said to be the source of στάσις, for a more detailed investigation (c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq.) reveals to him that a sense of unequal treatment under the constitution is not the only source of στάσις and constitutional change. The phrase πηγαὶ τῶν
στάσεως comes to Aristotle from Plato, Laws 690 D, νῦν γὰρ δὴ
στάσεως πυγὴν τινα ἀνευρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς.

6. διὸ καὶ αἰ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται διχώς, 'hence the changes also
[as well as the στάσεις that lead to them] come into being in two
ways' (i.e. they arise either from στάσεις which seeks a complete
change of constitution or from στάσεις which does not). As the aim
in στάσεις is broadly the removal of inequality, and inequality may
be removed with or without a change of constitution, the changes
which result may be either changes in the constitution or changes
stopping short of that. The long parenthetical passage, 1301 b
6–26, breaks the continuity of the argument and looks at first sight
like a marginal note which has found its way into the text, but this
it can hardly be, for it is with reference to the case of Lysander
mentioned in 19 sqq. that the inequality of a perpetual kingship,
where all are equal, is dwelt upon in 27 sq.

οτὲ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, sc. στατικοῦσιν.

10. ταύτας ἐξ ἑκέινων, i.e. oligarchy and democracy in place of
polity and aristocracy.

οτὲ δ’ οὖ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυίαν πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ. Of this kind of
change (i.e. change which does not seek the substitution of one
constitution for another), three kinds are mentioned; its promoters
may seek either (1) to leave the constitution as it is, but to take
the place of the existing holders of supreme power, or (2) to make
the constitution more moderate or more pronounced, or (3) to alter
a part of it. Those whose aims fall under the second or third
head, no less than those who do not desire any change in the
constitution, are marked off from those who seek to replace the
existing constitution by another, for they seek only to modify it.
I cannot follow Susenohl, therefore, in transposing 10, ὁτὲ δὲ . . .
13, μοναρχίαν, to after πολιτεία ταύτη, 26. Aristotle makes no men-
tion here of a fourth type of revolution, of which we read in 6 (4).
5. 1292 b 17 sqq. The leaders in this sought the total overthrow
of the existing constitution and its replacement by another, but
they did not, when successful, proceed at once to overthrow it,
resting content for a time with acquiring supreme power for them-
styles and modifying the customs and training of the State.

13. ἥ τὴν μοναρχίαν. Cp. c. 12. 1316 a 29, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ
ἐἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἥ Σικεύνως ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος εἰς τὴν Κλε-
σθένους.

ἐτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον, sc. στατικοῦσιν.
14. οίον ἡ ὁλιγαρχίαν οὔσαν κ.τ.λ. Μεταβάλλουσιν should probably be supplied.

15. ἡ δημοκρατίαν οὔσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι, like Cleisthenes at Athens (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 21 sq.).

16. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτείων, sc. στασιάζουσιν.

17. ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. Here again we must supply στασιάζουσιν.

18. μέρος τι τῆς πολιτείας. See note on 1297 b 37 and vol. i. p. 514, note.

ἀρχήν τινα καταστήσαι, as for instance at Epidamnus a Βούλε. Kingship is here treated as an ἀρχή, as in c. io. 1313 a 5, 8.

19. ἡ ἀνέλειψ. So, in addition to Lysander and Pausanias, Empedocles at Agrigentum τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα κατέλυσε συνεστάτως ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τρία (Diog. Laert. 8. 66). See also Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 10 (quoted on 1306 a 12) as to Ephialtes at Athens and Phormion at Elis. As to Lysander see note on 1271 a 21. In strictness his plan seems to have been to open the kingship to the best of the Spartans irrespectively of descent, but this change was equivalent to putting an end to the kingship of the Heracleidae (cp. Diod. 14. 13, διότι ἐπὶ τούτων πεφρονυμασιμένως διενεκέρ καταλύσαι τὴν τῶν Ἰρακλειδῶν βασιλείαν καὶ κοινὴν ἐκ πάντων Σπαρτατῶν ποιῆσαι τὴν αὐτῶν τῶν βασιλείων), and perhaps Aristotle here means no more than this by his phrase καταλύσαι τὴν βασιλείαν, as to which cp. Xen. Ages. 1. 4. As to the question to what Pausanias Aristotle here refers, see notes on 1333 b 34 and 1307 a 3. Pausanias ὁ βασιλεύς is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 32 sqq. to have tried to make himself master of his own State, and we know that Pausanias the victor of Plataea did so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq.). Is it likely that two men of the name of Pausanias plotted at Sparta at different times with the same end in view?

21. καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμμων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Changes of a part of a constitution would mostly occur where the partisans of the existing constitution were strong and offered a vigorous resistance to proposals of change. In a State torn by faction like Epidamnus this would be likely to be the case.

22. ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλαρχῶν Βούλην ἐποίησαν. For ἐποίησαν cp. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 8, τῶν τάς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων πολείν πολιτείας, and see note on 1274 b 7. This was of course a change in a democratic direction, for a Βούλε was a democratic institution (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 32). The context implies that the φυλαρχοι were an element of inequality in the State, and that their exalted position
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gave rise to a feeling in the minds of the citizens generally that they were unjustly dealt with. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 236) conceives them to have been the heads of the three Dorian tribes and to have acted as a council to the single magistrate who managed the affairs of the State (1301 b 25). This is possible, but we know too little about Epidamnus to be sure of it. That the three Dorian tribes existed at Epidamnus is likely enough, for we find traces of one of them at all events in the mother-State, Corcyra (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 236. 2). But it is not certain that they existed there, nor that, if they did, they were the only tribes, for at Calympna we find the three Dorian tribes co-existing with others (Gilbert, 2. 213). As we know neither how many tribes there were at Epidamnus nor whether each tribe had one or more φίλαρχοι at its head, we cannot tell how many in number the φίλαρχοι were, but they were no doubt less numerous than the Boulê which took their place. As to Epidamnus see notes on 1290 b 9 and 1304 a 13.

23. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν κ.τ.λ., 'but it is still obligatory on the magistrates [alone] among the members of the privileged class to proceed to the Heliaeae when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote, [which is an oligarchical arrangement].' Götling was apparently the first to interpret this passage aright. He says (p. 391), 'sic intelligendus est locus aristotelicus: ex omnibus iis qui ad rempublicam accedere possunt non nisi magistratibus imperatur interesse comitiis cum creatur aliquis magistratus; ceteris civibus interesse licet quidem, at non imperatum est.' Susemilh and Welldon take the passage substantially in the same way. Stahr, on the other hand, in his translation of 1860, takes τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι not as a partitive genitive after τῶς ἀρχάς, but as in the genitive after τὴν ἡλιαίαν ('the Heliaeae of the members of the privileged class'), and this is a possible view, though I prefer the other. To enforce the attendance of the magistrates exclusively at elections by the Heliaeae was an oligarchical measure, because when one set of men were forced to be present and the rest were not, the probability was that those only would be present whose attendance was enforced, and that they would thus acquire a decisive voice in the election. The magistrates would, in fact, be almost placed in a position to name their successors in office. Plato in a similar spirit arranges in Laws 755 C and 756 A that the nomophylakes shall propose the generals and hipparchs to the assembly, though he allows any one to propose alternative names.
Some Greek States enforced the attendance of the rich exclusively at meetings of the assembly (6 4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq.; Epidamnus enforced the attendance of the magistrates exclusively at elections by the Heliaea. Compare Baunack, Die delphischen Inschriften, No. 2561. D 25 (in Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften), a[i 8' a]xian ποιόντων ἅρχων α]τ[η, ἀποτεισάτω οδελάν, where the assembly of the members of the Delphic phratry of the Labydae is referred to. Aristotle mentions the continued existence of this oligarchical feature of the constitution of Epidamnus, and of the other to which he refers in 25 sq., in order to show that democratic innovation there was confined to one point and that the constitution μετέβαλε κατὰ μόρον. The ἡλιαία (i.e. the assembly) at Epidamnus was probably called there ἄλια or ἄλια (see Liddell and Scott on these words), but Aristotle uses the Attic form. For εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν βαδίζειν cp. Plut. Dion, c. 53, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς συνεδριον παρακαλούμενος οὐκ ἐξουλέτο βαδίζειν.

25. Διλεψικὲς δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ εἰς ηυ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ.
That the single supreme magistrate was an oligarchical feature, we see from 3. 10. 1281 a 32 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sqq., though it is implied in 3. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. that making one man κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως, as at Epidamnus and Opus, was not an arrangement peculiar to oligarchies. The use of the word διοικήσις suggests that this great officer did not add military functions to his civil ones (see note on 1287 a 6). In c. 4. 1304 a 16 it is implied that a plurality of magistrates existed at Epidamnus, at any rate at one time. A difficulty arises in connexion with ηυ, 26, for this magistracy is referred to in 3. 16. 1287 a 7 as actually existent, but too much need not be made of this discrepancy, for the office may have ceased to exist when the passage before us was written. ηυ omit, but little weight attaches to these MSS. when they omit small words.

26. πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνίσον ἡ στάσις' οὗ μὴν (εἰ) τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀδίκος γὰρ βασιλεία ἀνίσος, ἐὰν ηὲ ἐν ἰσοίς). I add εἰ before τοῖς ἀνίσοις, and translate, 'for everywhere' (i.e. both where those who stir civil discord seek to overthrow the constitution and where they stop short of this) 'civil discord arises on account of inequality, not however if unequals receive in proportion to the inequality subsisting between them (for a perpetual kingship [such as that which Lysander sought to abolish] is unequal [only] if it exists among equals). In other words, inequality of advantage
does not give rise to civil discord if those to whom it falls deserve the superiority of advantage which they enjoy. Compare 3. 9. 1280a 12, καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γάρ ἐστιν, ἄλλ' ὀν πᾶσιν ἄλλα τοῖς ἀνίσοις, 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3, οὐ γάρ νῦν ἐπειδή πλέον τοῦ ἁπλοῦ ἁγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναλογῶν ἐστιν. Aristotle has in his memory in the passage before us, Plato, Laws 757 A, τοῖς γάρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἱσα ἀνίσα γένοιτ' ἀν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου διὰ γάρ ἀριθμότερα ταῦτα στάσεως αἱ πολιτείαι πληροῦνται. Schneider (following Sepulveda, who has 'cum non' in his translation for οὐ μὴν, and Ramus, who has ' nisi ') reads οὐ μὴ in place of οὐ μὴν, and is followed by Coray and Sus., but οὐ μὴν can be retained if we add εἰ before τοῖς ἀνίσοις. Welldon retains the reading of the MSS. and takes ἀναλογῶν with τοῖς ἀνίσοις, translating 'not that inequality [in this sense] exists among people who are only proportionately unequal,' but I cannot follow him in this. The thought that inequality is the source of στάσεως is derived from Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 14, φωνή τις αὐτοῦ περιφερεμένη πρότερον εἰπόντος ὃς τὸ ἱσον πέλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ: compare the proverb ἴσοτης φιλότης in Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 8 and elsewhere, and Plato, Rep. 547 A, Laws 757 A).


31. κατ' ἄξιαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ. That which is equal according to desert is the proportionally equal, because in any just distribution between A and B the share of A will be to the share of B as the desert of A is to the desert of B. See note on 1301 a 26.

32. οὖν ὑπερέχει κ.τ.λ. This is added not to prove that the equal according to desert is the proportionally equal, for that it does not do, but to illustrate by an example the difference between the proportionally equal and the arithmetically equal. The excess of four over two is proportionally equal to the excess of two over one, but not arithmetically equal to it, for what is arithmetically equal to the excess of two over one is the excess of three over two, not that of four over two. The proportion in which two stands to four is the same as that in which one stands to two, for two is the half of four and one is the half of two.
35. ὀμολογούντες δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and though men agree that the absolutely just is that which is in accordance with desert, they differ' etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25, τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς διανομαῖς ὀμολογούντες πάντες κατ’ ἄξιαν τινά δὲιν ἐστίν, τὴν μὲντοι ἄξιαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ελέεθεριαν, οἱ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ’ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ’ ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. Yet in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 we read καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἱσον ἐκεῖν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἄμφος ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ’ ἄξιαν (cp. 1318 a 3 sqq.). See note on 1288 a 22. For the contrast of ὀμολογεῖν and διαφέρειν cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sq.

36. καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, in 1301 a 26 sqq.

39. διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ., 'hence two constitutions especially come into being, democracy and oligarchy, for [only constitutions championed by a large number of supporters are likely to come into being, and] while high birth and virtue are found in few, the attributes on which democracy and oligarchy are based are found in a larger number.' These attributes are wealth and poverty. Contrast the reasons given for the prevalence of democracy and oligarchy in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 22 sqq. For καὶ μᾶλλον cp. Plato, Phaedo 61 D and Laws 773 C, quoted by Riddell in his Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 133 (Plato, Apol. p. 169 sq.).


2. εὔποροι δὲ πολλαχοῦ. We expect εὔποροι δὲ καὶ ἐποροὶ πολλαχοῦ, 1302 a, but Aristotle does not add καὶ ἐποροῖ, because the fact is obvious.

τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 E, οὗτος δὴ χρυστέων ἀναγκαῖος μὲν τῶν ἰσοτήτων ἄμφοτέρον, ὡσ′ ὁ τι μᾶλλον ἐπ’ ὀλιγόστοι τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, τῇ τῆς τύχης δεομένη. We need not perhaps supply τὴν ἐπιτελεῖν with τετάρτω: cp. c. 8. 1306 b 31 sqq. It follows that, if στατίς is to be avoided, the constitution must not only secure the citizens 'that which is equal,' but must combine the two kinds of equality. It has hitherto been implied that democracy no less than oligarchy rests on a misconception of τὸ κατ’ ἄξιαν ἱσον (cp. 1301 a 25 sqq., b 35 sqq.), but now Aristotle implies that it rests on arithmetical equality, not on equality according to desert. Perhaps he regards its contention that those who are equal in one thing are wholly equal as tantamount to a demand for arithmetical equality.

3. οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν, 'for of constitutions of the sort we have mentioned' (i.e. constitutions based on one of the two kinds of equality) 'none is durable.' For the use
of ἐκ here, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 414. 5 b, Anm. 4 (ed. Gerth, § 414. 5 b, Anm. 5). Compare also its use in 3. 1276 a 16, τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος ἀτικρίζεις, where, as in the passage before us, the simple genitive would have sufficed.


8. ὁμος δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but nevertheless,' i. e. though both democracy and oligarchy are unsafe, as resting on one kind of equality only. It appears from c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq. that oligarchy is exposed to a third sort of στάσις besides the two mentioned here, when the privileged class does not include all the rich—to στάσις arising between the privileged and the excluded rich. The fact mentioned in 12 sqq. that στάσις did not arise to any considerable extent within the demos is remarkable, for the interests of the peasants must often in ancient Greece, as in modern times, have been by no means the same as those of the artisans and labourers of the city (cp. Aristoph. Eccl. 431 sqq.). At Athens the trireme-oarsmen gained by war (see note on 1291 b 18) and the peasant-proprietors by peace. Did not στάσις arise within the demos when one part of it was of pure extraction and the other alien or semi-alien, or when the demos was composed of persons differing in race? Στάσις will also have arisen in democracies between rival demagogues and their followers. The fact that democracy is safer than oligarchy is differently accounted for in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.
11. καὶ ἔτι, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 21 (Bon. Ind. s. v. ἔτι).

12. τὴν διλιγαρχίαν, ‘the oligarchs,’ as in c. 6. 1305 a 39 sq.

13. έτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Yet we are told in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq. that the most moderate form of oligarchy is σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένη πολιτείᾳ. Are we to infer from the passage before us that the constitution in which the midway class is supreme is based on both kinds of equality?


15. τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν, ‘of the constitutions of the kind we have mentioned.’ What constitutions are referred to? Sepulveda (p. 145 b) takes Aristotle to refer to the ‘depravatae republiae, seu quae ab optimo statu republiae deflexerunt,’ Sus. (Note 1508 b) interprets the phrase in the same way, and it is not easy to see what else it can mean, though we might have expected it to bear the same meaning as in 5. Cp. Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 23 sqq.

17. περὶ τὰς πολιτείας may go either with ἂν μεταβολαί (cp. c. 7. C. 2. 1307 b 24 sq.) or with γίγνοσται (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 17 sq.). Sus. and Welldon perhaps rightly take the words with ἂν μεταβολαί.

καθόλου πρῶτον, ‘first generally’ in constitutions as a whole (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sq., and c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq.), afterwards in each constitution taken separately.

18. τὰς ἀρχαί καὶ τὰς αἰτιὰς αὐτῶν. Cp. 34 sq., and see for the phrase Bon. Ind. 112 a 49 sqq.

εἰσὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We gather from what follows that it is not enough to cause στάσεις and constitutional change that there should be a sense of injustice in men’s minds and advantages to be won; there must also be occasions calling that sense of injustice into activity (1302 a 34 sqq.). Special stress is laid on these occasions in Aristotle’s theory of constitutional change, as we have it in the Book before us, and if we study cc. 8 and 9, the chapters in which the means of preserving constitutions are described, we shall see that Aristotle’s counsels are mainly directed to preventing the rise of these occasions of evil. He perhaps rates rather too highly the share of these ‘occasions’ in causing constitutional change.

19. ἃς διοριστέον καθ’ αὐτὰς τούς πρῶτον, ‘which we must mark out each by itself first of all in outline.’

20. δεί γὰρ λαβείν κ.τ.λ. See vol. I. p. 523, note i, where it has been already shown that a similar classification is employed in
the Rhetoric (1. 10. 1368 b 27): compare also Eth. Nic. 7. 4. 1146 b 15 sqq.

21. τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν καί τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλους στάσεων. Τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν, because there are such things as ταραχαί between members of the same family or between States (Thuc. 5. 25, καί εἴθες ἄλλη ταραχή καθίστατο τῶν ἔμμαχων πρὸς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα). The ταραχαί here referred to are between citizens of the same State. For the conjunction of ταραχαί and στάσεις, cp. Isocr. Philip. § 107, οὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν πόλεις στάσεις καί ταραχαῖς καί σφαγᾶς ἐμποιοῦντες ἑκτόντο τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην, and Diod. 15. 40. 1, μετὰ γὰρ τὴν συγχωρηθεῖσαν τοῖς δήμοις αὐτονομίαν αἱ πόλεις ἐνέπιπτον εἰς ταραχάς μεγάλας καί στάσεις. Ταραχή implies strife, but not necessarily actual fighting; it is coupled with ἔρις in Demosth. De Cor. c. 18, ἀλλὰ τίς ἦν ἄριστος καί ταρά τούτοις καί παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπανεῖν ἔρις καί ταραχή. It is a more general word than στάσις: thus in Hdt. 4. 162 the recourse of Arcesilaus of Cyrene to στάσις is an incident of the πολλῇ ταραχῇ περὶ τῶν τιμῶν.

24. περὶ ἡς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες, in c. 1. 1301 a 33 sqq. and 1301 b 35 sqq.

28. τοῦτων, i.e. equality and inequality.

29. ἐλάσσον, ‘smaller,’ opposed to μεῖζον: cp. Alex. Κυθερίτης, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 434), ὅσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βίων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἡ τύχη ἡμῶν μεγίλης προσένεμε τοὺς δὲ ἐλάσσον.

31. περὶ ὧν δὲ στασιαζόσοιν κ.τ.λ., in other words τὰ τέλη (c. 10. 1311 a 28). Thucydides had said much the same thing (3. 82. 16, πάσην δ' αὐτῶν αἵτων ἄρχη ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καί φιλοτιμίαν, which is perhaps present to Aristotle's memory in Pol. 2. 9. 1271 a 16 sqq.: cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 2, οὕτως οὖν ἡμεῖς θαυμαστῶν οὐδὲν πεποίηκαμεν οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἄρχην τε διδομένην ἐθεξάμεθα, καί ταύτην μη ἀνείμην ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων νυκτῆσεις, τιμής καί δέος καί ὄφελείας). Plato also implies in Rep. 464 D sqq. that one of the causes of στάσις is χρημάτων κτῆσις. Phaleas had held (2. 7. 1266 a 38 sqq.) that στάσις arises exclusively in connexion with property, and especially, it would seem, landed property, for he meddled with nothing else (2. 7. 1267 b 9 sqq.), and hence had gain or the avoidance of loss as its object and had nothing to do with honour (2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq.).

32. καὶ γὰρ ἄτιμαν φεύγοντες κ.τ.λ. So at Epidamnus (c. 4. 1304 a 13 sqq.) and at Heracleia and Thebes (c. 6. 1306 a
36 sqq.). 'C. etiam Caesar dicebat se civile bellum movisse ut ignominiam a se depelleret, quod quasi concedit M. Cicero, cum Q. Ligarium defenderet' (c. 6. 18), 'refellit autem ac falsum esse docet in epistola quadam ad Atticum' (7. 11. 1) 'his verbis, Atque omnia se facere ait dignitatis causa, qui ne umbram quidem των καλῶν vidit unquam' (Vic., who slightly alters the passage).

33. η ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν η τῶν φίλων. Cp. c. 11. 1315 a 27 sq. The preposition is not repeated before τῶν φίλων: cp. c. 10. 1311 a 29, b 25 sq., and 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 31.

34. αἱ δὲ αἱτία καὶ ἀρχαι τῶν κινήσεων κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 392 b 11 sqq.) appears to supply τῆς πολιτείας with τῶν κινήσεων, and he may well be right, for though Stahr and Sus. translate 'Bewegungen' ('movements'), and Polybius uses κίνησις in this sense (3. 4. 12: 3. 5. 1), I do not notice that Aristotle does so elsewhere. Vict. explains τῶν κινήσεων 'motuum animi,' but this can hardly be the meaning of the word here. It is implied in 22 sqq. that a sense of injustice is broadly the cause of the mental state which prompts to revolution, but now we study the causes of revolution more in detail, and the detailed study of them discloses that a sense of injustice is not always present in the minds of those who aim at constitutional change. For men may be stirred to aim at constitutional change by witnessing the deserved enjoyment by others of a superior degree of profit or honour, or, in other words, under circumstances which leave no room for a sense of injustice in their minds. Nor do the circumstances under which constitutional change is said to occur in c. 3. 1303 a 13–25 seem to be connected with a sense of injustice. With the account here given of the causes of στάσις and constitutional change compare the view of Ephoros (ap. Strab. p. 480, Fragm. 64 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 249: cp. Cic. Pro Rosc. Amerin. 27. 75), who holds that δικαιοσύνεια arises διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ τρφήν, which cause φθόνος ὑβρίς and μύσος, so that the best means the lawgiver has of preventing δικαιοσύνεια is to compel the citizens to lead a temperate and frugal life. The Cynic Crates seems to have taken a similar view (Plut. De tuenda sanitate praecepta, c. 7: see Wytenbach's note on 125 E), but Aristotle agrees with Ephoros only in part; he holds, indeed, that φθόνος and ὑβρίς are potent causes of στάσις, but he does not think that the prevention of luxurious living will do much to prevent it, nor would he say that φθόνος ὑβρίς and μύσος are its only causes: it may arise, for instance, when none of these things are present, but only
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υπερωχή or αδέρσις παρά τὸ ἀνάλογον. It should be noticed that of the seven causes enumerated by Aristotle the first four affect those who are depressed in the political scale and the three others those who are exalted. Revolution as often proceeds from those who 'wax fat' as from those who are in the opposite case. The order in which the causes are enumerated here (ὑβρίς, φόβος, υπερωχή, καταφρόνησις κ.τ.λ.) agrees with the order in which the causes of attacks on monarchies are enumerated in c. 10. 1311 a 31-1312 a 39 (ὑβρίς, φόβος, καταφρόνησις, φιλοτιμία). The list of causes of στάσις and constitutional change here given seems incomplete. Other causes besides the seven or eleven here mentioned appear to disclose themselves when Aristotle proceeds in cc. 5-7 to deal with each constitution separately. The overthrow of oligarchies, for instance, by the demagogy of some of the oligarchs (c. 6. 1305 b 22 sqq.) or by spendthrift and ruined oligarchs (c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq.) cannot easily be brought under any of the eleven heads.

37. ἔστι δ' ὅς πλείους, i.e. if we count in the four additional causes mentioned in 1302 b 3 sqq. 'Nam septem sunt quae magis per se iram et seditionem movent, alia vero, ut negligentia . . . magis ex accidenti' (Sepulveda).

ὅν δὲο μὲν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν is here displaced, as occasionally elsewhere (see notes on 1259 b 15 and 1268 b 12); it qualifies ταύτα. Supply ταύτα with ὑσταύτως: see note on 1257 b 35.

38. διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq. and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30 sq.

40. πρότερον, in 31 sqq.

1302 b.

2. ἐτί διὰ οὐθίν, sc. παροξύνονται πρὸς ἄλληλους.

3. ἐτί δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Here again we must supply παροξύνονται πρὸς ἄλληλους. Hence it would seem that the four causes now named by Aristotle may produce στάσις, though we learn in 1303 a 13 sqq. that they do not always do so. I do not agree with Vict., therefore, when he explains ἄλλον τρόπον 'alia pacto, id est sine dissensionibus et armis' (he is followed in this by Giph., p. 539): Aristotle's meaning seems rather to be that we have now to do with causes of a more remote kind and acting less directly, due to the action or default of the authorities of the State (see Sepulveda, quoted above on 1302 a 37).

5. δι' ἀνομοίοτητα. This cause is dealt with in 1303 a 25 sqq. Compare Oecon. i. 4. 1344 a 18, αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοίοτητες τῶν οἶκων ἡκατὰ φιλικῶν. Democritus had long before said that his atoms were in
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a state of stasis because of their unlikeness (Aristot. Fragm. 202. 1514 b 18, stasiaothen di καὶ φέρεσθαι εν τῷ κενῷ διὰ τὴν ανωμοίωτητα καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς τὰς εἰρημένας διαφοράς), and Plato (Rep. 547 A), speaking of ανωμοίωτητα καὶ ανωμαλία ανάρμοστος, says, ἄ γενόμενα, οὐν ἄ γγεινηται, ἀει τίστει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν.

6. τῶς αὐτία, sc. στάσεως, cp. 11.

ὑβριζόντων τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq. The subject of stasiazoosi is 'the citizens.' Aristotle probably has before him Theogn. 43–52. 'Υβρίς and πλεονεξία are often mentioned in conjunction (c. 7. 1307 a 20: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 94: Polyb. 1. 81. 10).

Αδικία is said to be the offspring of ὑβρίς in Plato, Laws 691 C (cp. 713 C, ὑβρεώς τε καὶ αδίκιας, and 775 D). It was by the ὑβρίς and πλεονεξία of the leading men of Agrigentum that Empedocles was roused to action (Plut. Adv. Colot. c. 32, 'Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τούτοις τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρίζοντας καὶ διαφοροῦντας τὰ κοινά εξελέγχας κ.τ.λ.: Diog. Laert. 8. 64). Cp. also Solon, Fragm. 4. 37, εἰδοῦν δὲ δίκαι σκολιὰς ὑπερήφανα τ᾽ ἔργα πρατνεί,

and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 5 sub fin., καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγέως δεδοκέτων φησιν (ὁ Σιλων).

τὴν τε φ[λαργύρ]ίαν τὴν θ᾽ ὑπερήφανῶν, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἔχθρας ἐνεστῶ[σ]ῆς. As to τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, see note on 1303 b 22.

3. ἦ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ιδίων, ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. Depredations by magistrates on public property were probably more frequent than on private—we hear of them at Apollonia on the Euxine in c. 6. 1306 a 7, and Aristotle makes special provision against them in c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq.—but depredations by magistrates in oligarchies on the property of the many seem to be referred to in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 19 sq.

11. καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὀρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζοσιν. Aristotle remembers the case of Lysander (see c. 7. 1306 b 31 sqq.). Compare also the conspiracy of wealthy Athenians just before the battle of Plataea (Plut. Aristid. c. 13, ἄνδρες ἐξ οἰκῶν ἐπιφανῶν καὶ χρηματῶν μεγάλων πένθες ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου γεγονότες καὶ πᾶσαι ἁμα τῷ πλοῦτῳ τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει δύναμιν αὐτῶν καὶ δόξαν οἰκομενή ὀρῶντες, ἐτέρων τιμωμένων καὶ ἀρχαντῶν, . . . συνομόστιμοι καταλύσει τῶν ὁμοίων).

12. ταύτα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ταύτα, 'this honouring and dishonouring.' There is perhaps here a reminiscence of Hippias of Elis, Fragm. 13
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(Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 62), 'Iστιας λέγει δυο εἶναι φθόνους, τῶν μὲν δίκαιων, ὡτι τις τοῖς κακοῖς φθονῷ τιμωρέοντο, τῶν δὲ ἄδικων, ὡτι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. For κατά τὴν ἁξίαν, not κατ’ ἁξίαν, cp. 8 (6). 1321 a 2 sq.

15. δι’ ὑπεροχὴν δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. στασιμίζουσιν. We read of the ὑπεροχή of Themistocles at Athens in Dio. 11. 54. 5 (cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 205, ἐκείνω Θεομάστοκλέα λαβάτε μείζον αὐτῶν ἄξιοτά φρονεῖν ἐξηλάσαν ἀκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ μεθοιμῶν κατέγρωσαν); we read also of Theron before he became tyrant of Agrigentum in Dio. 10. 27. 3, ὅτι Ὑήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνως γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος φιλανθρωπίᾳ πολὺ προείχεν οὐ μόνον τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλά καὶ πάνω τῶν Σικελιώτων. Compare Eurip. Phoeniss. 650 Bothe (703 Dindorf), ἠκούσα μείζον αὐτῶν ἢ Ὑήρως φρονεῖν, κηδεὶς τ’ ἀδράστοι καὶ στρατηγὸς πτεραιότα,

Justin, 21. 4. 1, opes suas, quibus vires reipublicae superabat, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 235, οὐ μέγεθος ὅτι οὐδεὶς πόλει ἐπέθετο πρότερον δήμου καταλύσει, πριν ἄν μείζον τῶν δικαστηρίων ἱσχύσῃ; Μείζον ἡ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν πολιτεύματος, 'great out of proportion to the State and to the power of its supreme authority.' It appears, however, from c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq. that not only over-powerful men but also men of ruined fortunes sought to make themselves tyrants.

17. μοναρχία ἡ δυναστεία. The former, if this superiority of power is possessed by one man; the latter, if by more than one. Cp. c. 6. 1306 a 22 sqq. and Plato, Gorg. 492 B, ἀρχὴν τινα ἡ τυραννίδα ἡ δυναστεία. For μοναρχία, which is here apparently = τυραννίς, cp. c. 10. 1313 a 4.

18. διὸ ἐναχοῦ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1284 a 17. The ostracism seems to have been not unknown to the laws even of the oligarchy of Berne. 'If the influence of a citizen had increased so much, owing to benefits conferred by him on the people, that in the opinion of the Council or a majority of the Council it threatened to be injurious to the State, he was to absent himself from the city for five years and to pay a fine of ten pounds. An ostracism, in fact, in optima forma' (Geiser, Gesch. der bernischen Verfassung von 1191-1471, p. 31).


21. οἱ τε ἡδικηκότες, δεδιότες μὴ δώσι δίκην. Cp. Cic. pro Sest. 46. 99, etenim in tanto civium numero magna multitudo est eorum qui
aut propter metum poenae peccatorum suorum conscii novos motus conversionesque republicae quaerant, aut etc. To this category belong the five wealthy men brought to trial at Corycra (Thuc. 3. 70. 5 sqq.), Hanno at Carthage in his alleged second attempt to make himself tyrant (Justin, 21. 4. 6), and the friends of Catiline at Rome (Sallust, De Coniur. Catil. c. 14, referred to by Giph.). Hence too the support given to the designs of Peisistratus by persons who claimed to be citizens of Athens without being of pure Athenian extraction (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 13. 1. 22 sqq.), and, if we could trust ’Αθ. Πολ. c. 25. 1. 11 sqq., the intrigue of Themistocles against the Council of the Areopagus.

22. καὶ οἱ μελλοντες δίκεισθαι κ.τ.λ. For an instance of this at Argos see Diod. 15. 58. 1. We see from c. 5. 1305 a 5 sqq. that a period during which the rich were pillaged with calumnious accusations often preceded that in which actual wrong was done to them, and no doubt they frequently took up arms during the period in which there was only a menace of future wrong. ‘Eadem causa et Caesarem concitavit et impulit, metuentem ne dimiso exercitu privatus, Romam et domum reversus, a potentissimis inimicis opprimeretur’ (Giph.). But Caesar had more genuine reasons than this for the course which he took.

23. ἐν Ὀρθώ. Cp. 32 sq. and c. 5. 1304 b 27 sqq. The three passages probably refer to the same combination of the notables against the demos, though it would seem from 1304 b 27 sqq. that the notables were driven to combine not by the dread of wrong, but by actual experience of wrong, the action of the demagogues being such as to expose them to the lawsuits briefly referred to in the passage before us, and it would also seem from 1302 b 32 sq. that they were encouraged to combine by a feeling of contempt for the disorderliness of the democracy. Susemihl is probably right in taking the revolution of b.c. 390 to be referred to, though Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 427), followed by Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 175), believes Aristotle to refer to the substitution of an oligarchy for a democracy in b.c. 357 (Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. cc. 14, 19), when Rhodes revolted from Athens at the commencement of the Social War. We find, in fact, that Diodorus in describing the revolution of b.c. 390 uses the same expression as Aristotle does in 33, where he speaks of ἡ ἐπανάστασις (Diod. 14. 97, οἱ λακωνιζόμενοι τῶν Ῥωμῶν ἐπανασταύνετς τῷ δῆμῳ τοῦ τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων φρονοῦντας εξεβαλον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως). It is true that, as Susemihl points out (Sus. 2,
Note 1511), Xenophon (Hell. 4. 8. 20–24) represents this revolution as effected not by the Laconizing party at Rhodes, as does Diodorus, but by an intervention of the Spartan Teleutias at the head of a fleet after the failure and exile of the Rhodians who were opposed to the democracy; this, however, only shows that Aristotle’s version of the transaction agrees with that of the authority followed by Diodorus, and not with that of Xenophon.

25. καὶ οταναίξουσι καὶ ἐπιτίδενται. The two words are conjoined in 2. 7. 1267 a 41 also. Τὸ οταναίξεν does not necessarily involve τὸ ἐπιτίδενθαι (see note on 1301 a 39).

26. ἐν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ὀσίν οἱ μὴ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας. We might infer from 6 (4), 5. 1292 a 39 sqq., where we are told that even in the first and most moderate form of oligarchy the poor, though more numerous than the rich, do not share in the offices, that in all forms of oligarchy those who do not share in the constitution are more numerous than those who do, but it is implied in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq. that there were oligarchies in which this was not the case.

28. καταφρονοῦσαντες, as in c. 7. 1307 b 9 (cp. c. 11. 1314 b 32, θαιμάσωσιν). We have καταφρονοῦσαν in c. 10. 1312 a 10, 15 sq., and καταφρονῶν in 1312 a 12.

τῆς ἀταξίας. Some light is thrown on what is meant by this word by Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59, οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαρεὶς δὴ ἀταξίαν τῆς πολιτείας ἠμέλησαν τοῦ άδικίματος.

29. οὖν καὶ ἐν Θῆβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οινοφότοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. The wording of this passage is ambiguous, and we cannot be sure that we are right in inferring from it that the democracy the existence of which at Thebes after the battle of Oenophyta it clearly implies dated from that battle, and did not exist before it, for Aristotle may only mean that the maladministration of the democracy began then, but it is likely enough that this was the case. Nor do we learn from the passage when the democracy was overthrown, but its fall probably did not occur till after the Athenian defeat at Coroneia (Thuc. i. 113). The course of events in Boeotia after the battle of Oenophyta is disputed and obscure. Busolt’s view on the subject, whether it is correct or not, may be gathered from Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 320. 3. He places the battle of Oenophyta in B.C. 457 (ed. 2, 3. 1. 258. 1) and that of Coroneia in B.C. 447 (ibid. p. 422. 1).

30. καὶ Ἡ Μεγαρέων δι’ ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἠττηθέντων. Supply
31. καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν 'Ρόδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. It is not certain what should be supplied after ἐν Συρακούσαις and after ὁ δῆμος, but I incline to think that we should supply in the former place 'the democracy aroused contempt by disorderliness' and in the latter 'aroused contempt in a similar way.' I take ὁ δῆμος here to mean 'the commons,' not 'the democracy'; it was against the commons that the insurrection of the notables was directed (see Diod. 14. 97, quoted above on 23). Some supply ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη after ἐν Συρακούσαις and διεφθάρη after ὁ δῆμος, but I cannot think that this is right, for the democracy was overthrown at Syracuse by, and not before, the advent of Gelon as tyrant, and at Rhodes by, and not before, the insurrection against it. As to Syracuse, see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 126, and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 785. The demos of Syracuse had recently put an end to the oligarchy of the Gamori and expelled them from the city with the help of the serfs who tilled the soil of the State. Both demos and serfs were probably to a large extent of Sicel origin, and it is likely enough that a demos of this kind, intoxicated by its triumph, would be disorderly and undisciplined. As to Rhodes see above on 23.

34. ὤσπερ γὰρ σώμα κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 122 b 17) compares De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27, τῇ μὲν γὰρ κρατοῦν (sc. τὸ πεπτόμενον) τῇ δὲ οὐ κρατοῦν ποιεῖ πολυμορφον τὸ συνιστόμενον, οὗν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν συμβαινει διὰ τὴν πολυφαγίαν διὰ πλήθος γὰρ τροφῆς οὐ δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως κρατεῖν, διὸ άνάλογον αὕξεων καὶ διαμείκνυσι ὁμοίων τῆς μορφῆς, ἁλλὰ γίνεται τὰ μέρη, καὶ σχεδὸν ἐνωθή ὁπως ὅστε μηδὲν εὐκείμην τῷ πρότερον. παραπλῆθαιν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ νόσημα τὸ καλομέιον σατυρῶν καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διὰ μέγατον ὁ πνεύματος ἀπέπτω οὖσαν, εἰς μόρια τοῦ προσώπου παρεμπεσόντος, [τοῦ ἴδου] καὶ σατύρου φαίνεται τὸ πρόσωπον,
and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 5. 321 b 28 sqq. Compare also Dio Chrys. Or. 17. 470 R. In the passage before us we must supply τὸ σῶμα before αὐξάνεται (35), with φθείρεται (36), and with μεταβάλλει (38) and αὐξάνει (39). We gather from what Aristotle says that a whole consisting of parts, for instance a body or a State, must grow in such a way as to preserve a certain proportion or symmetry between its parts, otherwise it will be destroyed and may even change into a wholly different entity. I am not aware that Aristotle anywhere formulates this doctrine as clearly as he does here, but we trace some approach to it in Phys. 1. 5. 188 b 12 sqq., where he tells us that τὸ ἡμοσμένον φθείρεται εἰς ἀναρμοστίαν, and in Fragm. 41. 1482 a 6 (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 744 a 45), τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ τοῦ σῶματος ἐναντίων ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τοῦ σῶματος, ἀναρμοστία δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σῶματος πόσος καὶ ἀνθέναι καὶ αἰχμῶς. An overgreat increase of a part, indeed, is fatal to the identity not only of the whole of which it is a part, but also of the part itself (c. 9. 1309 b 27 sqq.).

38. ἐνίοτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. This would happen if, for instance, the human foot not only grew to be out of proportion to the body in size, but also underwent a disproportionate qualitative increase, e.g. in hardness, so that flesh and muscle stiffened into horn, and the foot became a hoof. Changes not unlike this were thought to occur in certain diseases, such as satyriasis (see above on 34), leontiasis, and elephantiasis, which were held to cause the human form to approach that of the satyr, the lion, or the elephant. See a paper by F. E. Hoggan, M.D., on the Leper Terra-Cotta of Athens in the Journal of Hellenic Studies, 13. 101, where ‘theleonine aspect characteristic of leprosy’ is mentioned.

40. οὔτω καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not directly tell us anywhere how he proposes to prevent the disproportionate increase of a part of the State, but we can see from passages like c. 8. 1309 a 20-26 and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20-b 16 how he would combat an increase of the poor. The measures suggested in c. 8. 1309 a 20-26 would also serve to some extent to prevent a disproportionate increase in the numbers of the rich.
oligarchies the poor are not a part of the State (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.), and that in them an increase of the poor would not be an increase of a part of the State. As to the use in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the term ‘parts of the State’ see vol. i. p. 567. The change to which Aristotle refers may have occurred in recent times among ourselves, for I read in the Times, April 7, 1899, that ‘what is certain is that the wage-earning class [in Great Britain] has greatly added to its numbers—probably out of all proportion to the increase in other classes of the community—during the past thirty years.’

3. συμβαίνει δ' ενίοτε τούτο καὶ διὰ τόχασ, ‘and this’ (i.e. a change of constitution arising from the disproportionate increase of a part of the State) ‘happens occasionally by reason of accidents also,’ as well as in consequence of insensible or unnoticed growth. The τόχα referred to would not escape notice: cp. c. 6. 1306 b 14 sqq. The Athenian Stranger in Laws 708 E is tempted to say ὡς ὀυδεὶς ποτε ἰνδρότων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τόχαὶ δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖα πίπτουσαι παντοῖος νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἣμῖν.

οἷον ἐν Ἡραμα, κ.τ.λ. Ἡπτηβέντων, sc. τῶν Ταρατίνων (cp. 8, ἀνυχοίων πεζί, sc. τῶν Ἀθηναίων). As to the meaning of τῶν Μηδικῶν see note on 1341 a 28. This great defeat is placed by Diod. 11. 52 in B.C. 473: see also Hdt. 7. 170 and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 805 sq. ‘Ut contigit post Sembachiam cladem, qua Helvetiorum qui montes accolunt nobilitas paene tota occubuit; ceteri ferre liberum exilium quam plebis direptionibus et contumeliis patere maluerunt’ (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 235).

6. καὶ ἐν Ἁργεί, κ.τ.λ., ‘and at Argos, those [who perished] on the seventh day of the month having been put to death by Cleomenes the Laconian, they were compelled to receive into the citizen-body some of the serfs.’ That ὅλ ἐν τῇ ἱβδόμῃ most probably means ‘those who perished on the seventh day of the month’ appears from Plut. De Mulierum Virtutibus, c. 4, where we read as to the victory of Cleomenes, τὴν δὲ μάχην οἱ μὲν ἱβδόμῃ λέγουσιν ἑσταμένοι μνῆσις, οἱ δὲ νομηκαὶ γενίσθαι κ.τ.λ. The first and seventh days of the month were sacred at Athens to Apollo (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 44. 5), and probably at other places also, and there was evidently a tradition at Argos that the battle occurred on a day sacred to Apollo, though some thought that it occurred on the first and others (with whom Aristotle agrees) on the seventh. For ἐν τῇ ἱβδόμῃ cp. Lucian, Pseudolog. c. 16, ὅ δὲ ἱβδόμῃ (sc. τινὰ εἶπεν), δότι, ὡσπερ οἱ
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παίδες ἐν ταῖς ἔθνοις, κακίνους ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπαιζέ καὶ διαγιάλα καὶ παρὰ ἄν ἐποιήσε τὴν στοιχὴν τοῦ δήμου. The first and seventh days of the month were days on which Apollo was specially honoured at Sparta (Hdt. 6. 57), and the victory was no doubt attributed to aid rendered by Apollo, which would evoke all the more gratitude in the minds of the Spartans because Apollo was also one of the chief gods of Argos (Paus. 2. 19. 3: 2. 24. 1). Apollo was believed to have been born on the seventh of the month (Preller, Gr. Mythologie, I. 187) and was therefore called ἐβδομαγενῆς (Plut. Sympos. 8. 1. 2), and it was remembered of Plato and Carneades that they were born, like Apollo, on the seventh (Plut. ibid.). See as to the seventh day of the month Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 410 (59 h). Vict. remarks, ‘est autem obscum quid hic valeat illud auctoris τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐβδομῇ: a diversis sane interpretibus longe alteri acceptum est, cum quidam ipsorum putarint tempus ostendere, et ipsum infaustum, alii vero locum. Ego facile crederem ordinem quendam certum in ea republica significare.’ Welldon accordingly translates ‘the members of the seventh order.’ It is conceivable that φυλή or some such word should be supplied, and not ἡμέρα, for we read ἐν τῶν ἔβδομοι in an inscription of Tenos, a city divided into τῶν (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 207. 2), but on the whole I prefer to supply ἡμέρα, at any rate till we are in possession of some fresh data on the subject. Cleomenes is distinguished as ὁ Λάκων because there were other well known persons of the name, for instance the nomarch of the Arabian nome of Egypt under Alexander. Τῶν περιοίκων τιμίω, ‘some of the serfs,’ for this is the sense in which the word περιοίκων seems always to be used by Aristotle. Herodotus speaks of them as δοῦλοι (6. 83, Αργος δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐχθρώδη οὕτω, διότι οἱ δοῦλοι αὐτῶν ἐν Ἵχον πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ἀρχοντες τε καὶ διεστρες ἐσ ἐπήξησαν το τῶν ἀπολομένων παῖδες). It would seem that the serfs admitted to citizenship became the masters of the State. Plutarch, indeed (De Mul. Virt. c. 4), claims that the persons admitted to citizenship were not slaves, but Perioeci, using the word apparently in the sense in which we use it of the Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and it is of Perioeci of this kind that Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 75. 2) and Sus.² (Note 1518) understand Aristotle to speak, but the word does not appear to be used in this sense by Aristotle.

8. καὶ ἐν ’Ἀθήναις κ.τ.λ., ‘and at Athens owing to reverses by land the upper class came to be less numerous than before, because
during the Laconian War service in the army fell on citizens taken from the service-list [and not on mercenaries]. In Aristotle’s day the citizens were apt to leave service in the hoplite force to mercenaries (Demosth. Olynth. 3. 30). _Kataλογοὶ_ were kept at Athens of citizens who served in the cavalry (‘ΑΘ. Πολ. c. 49. l. 8 sqq. with Sandys’ note), of citizens liable to serve as hoplites (including only the three higher property-classes, and not the Thetes, Thuc. 6. 43), and apparently also of trireme-oarsmen (Demosth. Or. 50. in Polycl. cc. 6, 16). It is to the two former lists, and especially to the second of them, that Aristotle here refers. This list included all Athenian citizens from eighteen to sixty years of age belonging to the three higher property-classes, except presumably those who rendered cavalry service (see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 315). A similar catalogue of _οἱ ἐν ἡλίκιᾳ_ seems to have been kept at Syracuse (Plut. Nic. c. 14): as to the cities of Boeotia see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 58 sqq. The phrase _ἐκ καταλόγοι ὁμοσπονδαὶ_ occurs in Xen. Mem. 3. 4. 1, and we read in ‘ΑΘ. Πολ. c. 26, τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γεγο-μένης ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις ἐκ καταλόγου. In the last-named passage a diminution in the number of _οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὔπορων_ is said to have occurred in the time of Cimon owing to _τὸ στρατεύ-εσθαι_ ἐκ καταλόγου, whereas in the passage before us Aristotle speaks of the _γνώριμοι_ becoming fewer from the same cause during the Peloponnesian War. Isocrates in De Pace, § 86 sqq. traces losses extending over the whole period of the first Athenian Empire ending in the disappearance of many ancient families at Athens (§ 88: cp. Diod. 13. 97. 1). That the rich became fewer at Athens towards the close of the Peloponnesian War is evident from the fact that the task of equipping a trireme was then for the first time allowed to be divided between two trierarchs (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 370). The Chorègia for tragedy and comedy was also then allowed to be divided between two citizens (Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 404: Gilbert, ibid. p. 359). Aristotle does not say that a change of constitution resulted at Athens, but he may have thought that the constitution became more democratic in consequence of these losses.

10. ὑπὸ τῶν Λακωνικῶν πόλεμον. For ὑπὸ Eucken (Praepositionen, p. 74) compares c. 7. 1306 b 38. For τῶν Λακωνικῶν πόλεμον in the sense of the Peloponnesian War, cp. c. 4. 1304 b 14, τῶν πόλεμον τῶν πρὸς Λακεδαμονίων. Cp. also Diod. 15. 25. 1, ἐπὶ δὲ VOL. IV. X
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tóútoi ó κληθείς Βαυστικός πόλεμος ἐνέστη Δακεδαμονίας πρὸς Βαυστικὸς διὰ τοιούτας αἰτίας. In Paus. 8. 48. 4 ó Λακωνικός πόλεμος is used of an early war between Tegea and the Lacedaemonians in the days of King Charillus or Charilaus.

11. τούτο, i.e. a change of constitution arising from the disproportionate increase of a part of the State, as in 3.

πλείόνων γὰρ κ.π.λ. This explains why not a few democrats thought that the best means of preserving a democracy was to oppress and plunder the rich ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 4, 14). That when the rich increased in wealth without increasing in numbers a δυναστεία often resulted is what we should expect from 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.

13. δυναστείαι. After this word Sus. would insert 1304 a 17, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ ... b 5, πρὸς πολλοῖς, but this change of order involves the insertion of a passage dealing with the εἰ δὲν αἱ μεταβολαί, which is the subject treated in 1303 b 17–1304 b 5, in the midst of a passage dealing with the δὲ αἱ μεταβολαί, the subject treated in 1302 a 37–1303 b 17, for ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκήσας, 1304 a 18, takes up the ἐκ of 1303 b 18, 21, 37, 1304 a 4, 10, 14. Besides, the passage 1304 a 17–b 5 must not be severed from what immediately precedes it in 1303 b 17–1304 a 17, for it stands in contrast to this, a transition being made from revolutions occasioned by insult to revolutions occasioned by a rise in reputation and greatness (see note on 1304 a 17).

μεταβάλλουσι δὲ αἱ πολιτείαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως κ.π.λ., ‘and constitutions change even without civil discord,’ etc. See note on 1302 b 3. Another way in which constitutions changed without civil discord was through a change in the value of the property-qualification (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.). This is not mentioned here.

14. τὰς ἐρυθείας. Ἐρυθεία (‘canvassing for office’) occurs in the sing. in c. 2. 1302 b 4, but both it and ἐρυθείσθαι (16) are very rare words.

ὅσπερ ἐν Ἥραιᾳ. Heraea appears to have been under an oligarchy when this change was introduced (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 130). The lot is spoken of as an antidote to στάσις in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 12 sqq. Compare the reason for which the lot was introduced in 1268 at Venice in the election of the Doge (De La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 15: Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, pp. 340 sqq., 345), and also that for which the
practice of 'imborsazione' was introduced at Florence. The names of all who were to hold any of the magistracies for a long time to come were put into a bag or purse and drawn out from time to time when an office had to be filled. 'It was thought that these "imborsations" would prevent much trouble to the city and remove the cause of those tumults which took place on the creation of magistrates from the number of candidates for office' (Machiavelli, History of Florence, Book ii, c. 6: Eng. Trans., p. 81). 'The lot was introduced at Basle in 1718 to prevent election intrigues. The only exception made was in the case of the Burgomaster and of envoys' (Roscher, Politik, p. 369, note 13). See note on 1305 a 28 as to the risks attending the filling of offices by popular election.

15. ἐποίησαν, sc. τὰς ἀρχὰς, which is suppressed because it will readily be supplied (see note on 1296 a 5). It is hardly likely, however, that all the offices, the military ones not excepted, came to be filled by lot. Still Aristotle seems to imply that the change amounted to a modification of the constitution in a democratic direction.

16. καὶ δὴ διηγωρίαν κ.τ.λ. Hence the advice given in c. 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. That a magistrate had special opportunities of overthrowing a constitution we see from Plato, Laws 715 A, para-


18. ὡσπερ ἐν Ἡσείας κ.τ.λ. Hestiaea in Euboea (mentioned under that name in c. 4. 1303 b 32 sqq.) came to be often called by the name of Oreus, one of its demes, when after its revolt from Athens in B.C. 446 its citizens were expelled from Euboea and their place was taken by 2,000 Athenian cleruchs. Sus.2 (Note X 2
1529) and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2, refer the change introduced by Heracleodorus to b.c. 377; when the State revolted from the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 56 sq.) and joined the new Athenian Confederacy, in which it appears under the title ["Εὐθρᾳοὶ (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 81). This was, in fact, still the official name of the colony, though the name Oreus was more commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 430. 2). According to Pausanias (7. 26. 4) some people even in his day called Oreus by its old name Hestiaea. Oreus lay on the coast a little to the west of Hestiaea (Baedeker's Greece, p. 208). Compare with the case of Heracleodorus at Oreus that of Leontiades at Thebes, who, holding the office of polemarch, introduced the Spartan Phoebidas and his troops into the Cadmeia and revolutionized the State (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 76: vol. 10, p. 80 sqq.).

20. καί, ' or rather': see Shilleto on Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 90 (102), ἀπόλωλε καὶ γέγονεν ἀσθενῆ, where Phil. 3. c. 39, ἀπόλωλε καὶ νενόηκεν ἡ Ἑλλάς, is compared, and cp. Thuc. 6. 60. 1, πάντα αὐτῶς ἔδοκεν ἐπὶ ἕξυμωσια ὀλιγαρχικῆ καὶ τυραννικῆ πέπραξθαι. See also notes on 1262 a 6 and 1335 b 40.

ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν, 'further on account of the slightness of the difference between one thing and another.' This source of constitutional change is marked off from ὀλιγορία because, while in cases of ὀλιγορία the peril is not overlooked but is made light of, here it is overlooked and escapes attention altogether. For τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν see Bon. Ind. 562 a 28 sqq., where Anal. Pr. i. 33. 47 b 38 is referred to among other passages, ἀνή μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ὅς γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρον εἰπεῖν τὸδε τῶδε ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸδε τῶδε παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, συγχωροῦμεν (a passage evidently based on Plato, Phaedrus, 261 E sq., which Eaton quotes). In c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq. and c. 8. 1307 b 32 τὸ μικρόν takes the place of τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν. As to Ambracia see note on 1304 a 31.

22. τῶν νομίμων. The expression τὰ νόμιμα is used in much the same sense as οἱ νόμοι in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5, 7 (see note), but in Plato, Crito, 53 C and Laws 793 A sqq. τὰ νόμιμα and οἱ νόμοι are distinguished, the latter passage explaining τὰ νόμιμα to be the unwritten customs which are the best support of written laws. In the passage before us τὰ νόμιμα probably includes both written and unwritten law, so that Susemilh's rendering 'der gesetzlichen Zustände' ('of the legal order of things') is perhaps not far from the truth.

25. στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μῆ ὀμόφυλον, ἦς ἅν συμπνεύσῃ.
Here we enter on the class of στάσεις caused by ἄνωμοιότης (c. 2, 1302 b 5). There may be ἄνωμοιότης of race (i.e. τῶν ἀνθρώπων) or ἄνωμοιότης of site (τῶν τόπων). The former is dealt with in 1303 a 25—b 3, and the latter in 1303 b 7—17. Aristotle does not say that unlikelihood in either respect causes constitutional change, but only that it causes στάσεως. For στασιαστικῶς (the adjective στασιαστικὸς is not given in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear to be used by Aristotle, though all MSS. have στασιαστικῶς in 3. 13. 1284 b 22), cp. c. 6. 1306 a 38, where Π² have στασιαστικῶς and Μ² Π¹ and possibly ἀ στασιαστικῶς. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 708 D (where Plato may remember the experience of Thurii), τὸ δ’ αὖ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταῦτα ἐννεφρενίως γένος ὑπακούσα μὲν τῶν νόμων καὶνόμων τάχα ἀν ἐδεχθήσεις μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ συμπεντεῦσα καὶ καθίστη ἵππων κεύως καθ’ ἑνα εἰς ταῦταν, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐμφυσώσαι χρόνον πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλησον. Cp. also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4 sub fin., πόλεως οὕτω συμπεπενεκκια, and Sympos. 4. 1. 2, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3. 10 sub fin., ἡ δ’ ύμετέρα πόλει ἀδικάστητος ἑστιν ἔτι καὶ ἀδικάστητος, ἀτε νεκτιστος οὕτα καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν συμφόρτη ἐβόνων, ἢ μακρῶν δὲi χρόνων καὶ παθημάτων παντοδαπῶν, ἔνα καταρτισθῇ καὶ πάνυτιμα παρατατομένη καὶ στασιάζοσα ὀσπερτ νῦν. See also Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 25 sqq. and 9. 5. 1167 a 11 sqq. As to τὸ μὴ ὀμφυλον see note on 1330 a 26. It would seem from the examples adduced in what follows that Aristotle denies the name of ὀμφυλον not only to Achaeans and Troezenians or to Lesbians and Chians, but also to Zanclaes and Samians and to Amphipolitans and Chalcidians, though all four peoples were of Ionic extraction. Aristotle’s remark is illustrated by our own experience in South Africa. ‘There is a native population in South Africa in varying stages of civilization, and there is a white population of diverse nationalities. There are descendants of Dutch settlers and of French refugees, a considerable German population, and a large number, but not a majority, of English people. It is not an easy matter to carry on the administration of affairs in such a country, but it has been the aim of the Colonial Governments to weld together as one people those various nationalities’ (Speech of Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, Times, August 5, 1886). It will be noticed that in most of the instances given by Aristotle either the one stock or the other was expelled from the State. Conflicts of race were as bitter within the Greek City-State as conflicts of class. We notice also that after a time distinct races came to pull better together. The children born in the colony
would feel less removed from each other in race, and would agree better together, than the immigrants themselves had done, and the lapse of time would do something to improve the relations even of the latter to each other. Plutarch (Num. c. 17) gives an interesting account of the way in which he conceives that Numa at Rome sought to make the distinction between the Sabines and Romans less sharp (see note on 1319 b 19).

26. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλει γίνεται. Sus.² (Note 1531 b) refers to 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18 and to 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16, ἣ γὰρ πόλει πλῆθός ἐστιν οὗ τὸ τυχόν, ἄλλα πρὸς ζωῆς αὐταρκεῖς, which explains the passage before us. Not any and every body of men will serve to form a πόλει: they must not be too many or too few (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq.), nor all slaves nor all poor men (3. 9. 1280 a 32: 3. 12. 1283 a 18), nor all βάπται (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18 sqq.); some of them must be fighting men (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.), some fit to be judges and members of the deliberative (1291 a 22 sqq.). They must be unlike (2. 2. 1261 a 22 sqq.), yet not too unlike (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sqq.). For ὥσπερ οὐδ' followed by οὐτές οὐδέ, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 18, λέγεις σὺ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ ὡς ἑμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδέ γεωργοῦ ἀργοῦ οὐδὲν ὀφελοῦ, οὐτές οὐδέ στρατηγοῦ ἀργοῦτος οὐδὲν ὀφελοῦ εἶναι.

27. διὰ ὅσον ἢδη συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλείστοι διεστασάσαι. See in Rhein. Mus. 42. p. 424 O. Crusius' remarks on the Greek proverbs, ποιήσαν μὲ ἐνοίκου, ἵνα σε πούσ ἐξοικεῖ, and ἐπηλοῦ τὸν ἐνοίκον' λειπέτε τὸ ἐξῆβαλλεν. Διὸ, 'hence,' because τὸ μὴ ὀμφύλου is productive of στάσεις. It is implied that σύνοικα and ἐποίκοι will not be ὀμφύλου. The word σύνοικοι is here used of those who join in founding a city, but it is not always used in this strict sense; it is not, for instance, in Thuc. 2. 68. 5 and Diod. 14. 9. 9, where the σύνοικοι spoken of might have been called ἐποίκοι. Aristotle's first two examples are of σύνοικοι, the rest of ἐποίκοι. All his illustrations of ἐποίκοι are taken from colonies. States in Greece Proper, however, must sometimes have recruited their population with ἐποίκοι. The introduction of ἐποίκοι from the mother-city will hardly have been attended with the risks here described, though even ἐποίκοι from the mother-city would perhaps not be accounted ὀμφύλου. It was when, as at Antissa and Zancle, the ἐποίκοι came not from a variety of alien sources, but from a single State which was not the mother-State of the colony, or when they belonged to an alien stock powerful in the vicinity, as
at Amphipolis and Argos Amphilochicum (Thuc. 2. 68. 5), or when, as at Syracuse, they formed a body of men accustomed to act together, that the operation of introducing ἔτοικοι was attended with most risk. The metoeci and other aliens to whom Cleisthenes gave citizenship at Athens probably came from a variety of sources, not from a single city or stock, and their successful fusion with the older citizens was no doubt due partly to this, and partly to the pains which Cleisthenes took to mingle the two elements of the citizen-body (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.: 'ΑΘ. Πολ. c. 21). 'Ἡδη, 'ere now,' cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 5 sq., Xen. Mem. 4. 8. 5, ὅππο ὅρᾶσ ... ὅτε οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι δικασταὶ πολλοὶ μὲν ἡδη μυθήν ἀδικοῦται λόγῳ παρα- 
χέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὶ δὲ ἀδικοῦται ἀπέλυσαν; and Eth. Nic. i. i. 1094 b 18 sq. ‘"Ηδη with the perfect, as in Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 7 sq., is much less common than ἡδη with the aorist’ (Richards). 
Διοστασίασαν is here intrans. as in Polyb. i. 82. 4: it is used in a transitive sense in c. 4. 1303 b 26 and c. 6. 1306 a 3.

28. οὖν Τροιζηνίων Ἀχαίων συνόκησαν Σύμαριν. 'Cp. Solin. 2. 1’ (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 398. 5)—Solin. 2. 10 Mommsen.
Some identify the expulsion of the Trozenians here mentioned with the expulsion by the demagogue Telys of the five hundred wealthiest citizens mentioned by Diodorus (12. 9. 2), but with doubtful correctness. The expulsion of the Trozenians probably occurred at a far earlier date.

30. δὴν τὸ ἄγος συνεβή τοῖς Συμαρίταισι. The ἄγος at Athens is well known. We hear of an ἄγος also at Megara (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59) and at Delphi (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 825 A sqq.), to say nothing of that which arose from the murder of Aesop there (Plut. De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 12). In the last-named chapter we read of a μήμα τῆς Λευκαδίας Ἡρας with which Sybaris was afflicted—Συμαρίταισι δὲ φραζῶν (ὁ Ἄπολλων) ἀπόλυσιν τῶν κακῶν, ὅταν τρισὶν ὀλίβροις θίλασα, τὸ μήμα τῆς Λευκα-
δίας Ἡρας—but whether this was identical with the ἄγος mentioned in the text does not appear. See as to the passage before us Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 769. 1, where other crimes are noticed which were supposed to have led to the destruction of Sybaris.

31. καὶ ἐν Θουριώταις Συμαρίται τοῖς συνοικήσαν, sc. διοστασίασαν οἱ 
στασίσαν. Cp. Diod. 12. 11. 1, ὁλγὸν δὲ χρόνον ὄμοιον ἀπεικόνισαν οἱ 
Θεόροι ὡς μεγάλη περίμετρον ὅπως ἄλγος· τοῖς χάριν προνάρχοντες 
Συμαρίται τὰς μὲν ἄξιολογητὰς ἁρξαὶ οὐ συνείμενον, τάς δὲ εὐτελεῖς 
τοῖς ὑστερον προσγεγραμμείνοις πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς γυναικᾶς ἐπιθένει τοῖς θεοῖς
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Φοντο δειν πρότας μεν τας πολιτίδες, ύστερας δε τας μεταγενεστέρας', πρός δε τούτους την μεν σύνεγγυς την πολιτι χώραν κυτελληραίους ισαταις, την δε πόρρω κεμένην τοις επίπλωσι γενομένης δε διαφοράς δια τας εἰρημένας αἰτίας, οἱ προσγραφέντες ύστερον πολιτι πλείους και κρείττους ύπερ απέκτειναν σχεδόν ἀπαντας τοὺς προϋπάρχοντας Συβαρίτας (Aristotle says that the Sybarites were driven out) και την πολιν αὐτοι κατάφησαν, and Strabo, p. 263, οὗτοι δ' οἱ περγενέμενοι (Συβαρίται) συνελθόντες ἐπάκουν ὑλίγοι χρόνο δε και οὕτω διεφθάρησαν ὑπὸ 'Αθηναίων και ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, οἱ συνακήσαντες μὲν ἑκείνους αφίκοντο, καταφτάνοντες δε αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν διεχερίσαντο . . . την δε πολιν εἰς έτερων τόπων μετέβηκαν πλείσιον και Θεορίους προσηγόρευσαν ἀπὸ κρήνης ὅμωνυμων. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 523. 3) bases partly on this passage of Strabo, partly on other considerations, his conclusion that the colonization of Thurii from Athens and other parts of Hellas was preceded by a similar colonization of Sybaris, and that it was from Sybaris, and not from the subsequently founded colony of Thurii, that the Sybarite section of the colonists was expelled in consequence of the position of superior privilege assumed by it. Aristotle's language in the passage before us, however, leaves no doubt that, in his view at any rate, the expulsion took place at Thurii.

32. ὃς σφέτερας τῆς χώρας, 'in the view that the country belonged to them.' Τῆς χώρας means, I think, 'the country,' not 'the soil.' Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 177, ὃς αὐτοῦ τῆς χώρας ὀσύης. The extent to which the Sybarite members of the colony of Thurii carried their claims may be inferred from the fact that the name πολιτίδες is given in Diod. 12. 11. 1 (quoted above on 31) to their wives and daughters exclusively. So in Thera and in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf the descendants of the first settlers were alone accounted ἐλείθεροι and were alone admissible to office (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.). In our own day, as has been noticed already, the 'burghers' of the South African Republic, representing the original colonists, claim in a similar way to exclude the 'Uitlanders,' or alien new-comers to the colony, from all real participation in political power.

33. καὶ Βυζαντίων κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known of this event, or of the events at Antissa mentioned in the next line. The success of the people of Antissa in ridding themselves of the Chians is evidently contrasted with the failure of the Zanclaeans to rid themselves of the Samians. It was a bold step on the part of a small Aeolian State like Antissa to receive a body of exiles belonging to
a powerful Ionian State like Chios. It was through receiving exiles from Colophon that the Aeolic city of Smyrna was detached from the neighbouring group of Aeolic States (Hdt. 1. 150). These Chian exiles probably hoped to repeat at Antissa the coup which had succeeded so well at Smyrna.

35. Ζαγκλαίοι δὲ Σαμίων ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοὶ. According to Hdt. 6. 22 sqq. the Zancleans did not invite the Samians who fled their country after the suppression of the Ionic Revolt to join them at Zanclē; they invited the Ionians of Asia Minor in general to found a new Ionic colony at Calē Actē on the north coast of Sicily, no doubt with the object of strengthening the Ionic element in Sicily against the Doric and of strengthening Zanclē against the Sicels; it was a foe of Zanclē, Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, who suggested to the Samians to give up colonizing Calē Actē and to seize Zanclē during the temporary absence of its citizens, who were occupied in besieging a Sicel city. The whole story is told by Herodotus (6. 22 sqq.): see also Freeman, Sicily, 2. 109 sqq. Ἐξέπεσον αὐτοὶ contrasts the case of Zanclē with those of Byzantium and Antissa, in which the new settlers were expelled.

36. καὶ Ἀπολλωνιάται οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ κ.τ.λ. The last five words are added to distinguish this Apollonia, which was a colony of Miletus, from other cities of the same name, and especially from Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, which was a colony of Corinth and Coreys. The busy seaport of the Euxine coast of Thrace with its two large harbours, situated, partly on an island, close to the southern horn of the deep bay of Bourgas, was, however, a very different sort of place from the quiet and 'well-ordered' city of Illyria nearly seven miles from the sea, as to which see note on 1290 b 9. The Thracian city owed its name to its famous temple of Apollo (Strabo, p. 319: Head, Hist. Num. p. 236), and perhaps also to its Milesian origin, for one of the chief worships of the Milesian State was that of Apollo at Branchidae. It is said in the poem which passes under the name of Scymnus Chius (730 sqq.) to have been founded 'fifty years before the kingship of Cyrus,' i.e. in b.c. 610, but if it was founded by the philosopher Anaximander (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 17), who was apparently born in b.c. 611 and died soon after b.c. 547 (Diog. Laert. 2. 2), it must have been founded at least twenty or thirty years later. It deserves notice that the Megarian colony of Heracleia, which was founded on the south coast of the Euxine by Megarians and Boeotians
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(Ephor. Fragm. 83: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 259) about the middle of the sixth century B.C. (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 487), and which was situated at about the same distance from Byzantium as Apollonia, was named after Heracles just as Apollonia was named after Apollo, probably because Heracles was born at Thebes and his mother Alcmenê and son Hyllus had tombs at Megara (Paus. i. 41: cp. Justin, 16. 3. 4). Apollonia was in all likelihood founded a good deal earlier than Heracleia, but the resemblance of the names of the two colonies suggests that the latter may have been founded in rivalry with the former. The Euxine (Eŭξeînos, not Eŭξenos, probably because it received its name from the Milesian settlers on its shores) is here called by its full title: more usually Aristotle speaks of it as ὁ Πόντος (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 21: 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, 1306 a 9). We read in c. 6. 1306 a 7 sqq. of an oligarchy at the Pontic Apollonia which was overthrown by citizens attacking dishonest office-holders, but whether the incident mentioned in the passage before us was connected with the fall of this oligarchy it is impossible to say.

38. καὶ Συρακοῦσιοι κ.τ.λ. As to this passage see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 5. 318, note. The ‘aliens and mercenaries’ referred to were already citizens before the fall of the tyranny of Thrasybulus—they had been made citizens by the tyrants (Diod. 11. 72. 3)—but now the Syracusans made them citizens, rendering them however—and this important fact Aristotle does not mention—inadmissible to office (Diod. ibid.). It was the infliction of this disability on men who, as Grote says, had been the first citizens of the State under the tyrants, that led them to rebel. They rebelled, in fact, not because they were citizens of a different stock from the rest, which is the cause assigned by Aristotle for their rebellion, but because the citizenship conferred on them was of an inferior kind. ‘This is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens’ (Grote). Sus.2 (Note 1538) seeks to reconcile Aristotle’s account with that of Diodorus by taking μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά exclusively with ἐστασίασαν and not also with ποιησάμενοι, but it seems hardly possible to get over the difficulty in this way.

μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά. See note on 1270 b 11.

toûς ξένους καὶ τοûς μισθοφόρους. Καὶ is here explanatory (see note on 1257 b 7). The addition of καὶ τοûς μισθοφόρους, however, also serves to place the step in its full significance before the
reader. To make ξένω citizens was a strong measure, but to make μισθοφόροι citizens was a still stronger one. Μισθοφόροι were both disliked and despised in Greece (Plato, Laws 630 B: Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 123). Wytenbach (Index to Plutarch, s. v. μισθοφόροι) remarks, 'In vita Dionis μισθοφόροι dicuntur Dionysii milites, ξένω Dionis milites. Attamen aliquoties Dionis milites dicuntur μισθο-
φόροι, sed ex persona Syracusanorum, qui iam Dionis ξένωs odisse incipiebant.' See note on 1310 b 12, ἐκ τοῦ δῆμου καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους.

2. καὶ Ἀμφιπόλεις κ.τ.λ. The people of Amphipolis were rash. 1303 b. The city lay in the immediate neighbourhood of the powerful Chalcidian Confederacy, the cities composing which had from the first viewed with jealousy its colonization by Athens (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. I. 560), and to admit a body of Chalcidians to citizenship was to incur a great risk. This soon became evident. The newly-made Chalcidian citizens, strong in the support of the neighbouring Confederacy, expelled most of the older citizens of Amphipolis (cp. c. 6. 1306 a 2 sqq.). It is possible that Amphipolis was already on friendly terms with the Chalcidian Confederacy when it decided to admit these new citizens; it is, however, also possible that the step prepared the way for the close relation in which we find Amphipolis standing to Olynthus, the head of the Chalcidian Confederacy, in B.C. 365-4. Schäfer (Demosthenes, 2. 9) takes the latter view. In any case the victory of the Chalcidian settlers at Amphipolis strengthened the hold of Olynthus on the city and secured to the Chalcidian Confederacy the important bridge over the Strymon at Amphipolis which was a main means of communication between Macedon and Thrace, much no doubt to the dissatisfaction of Macedon. Amphipolis was, in fact, in B.C. 365-4, not long in all probability after the event here mentioned by Aristotle, 'a free Greek city inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, to. 344, who refers to Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 150). Hence Timotheus, seeking in that year to recover Amphipolis for Athens, attacked and took many Chalcidic towns allied with Olynthus (Diod. 15. 81: Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 14, c. Philocl. c. 17). Olynthus was thus weakened, and 'the most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement' broken down (Grote, 10. 525). The coins both of Amphipolis and of the Chalcidian Confederacy have a head of Apollo on the obverse, in the former however facing, in the latter in profile (Head, Hist.
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Num. pp. 185, 190). It is probable that some of the Amphipolitans who were exiled by the Chalcidian intruders on the occasion referred to in the text lived to see with vengeful exultation the destruction of Olynythus by Philip of Macedon in B.C. 348. For the qualifying addition of oi πλείστοι αυτῶν cp. Strabo, Book 7, Fragm. 11, εξ ἐν (sc. πόλεων) ὦστερον ἐκβάλλομενοι (οἱ Χαλκίδες) ἀναβήσαν εἰς μίαν οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν.

3. [στασιάζουσι δὲ—7. οὕτε]. I agree with Sus. and others that this paragraph is not in place here. Sus.3 thinks that there is no other place to which it can fitly be transferred, but it has been already suggested in the critical and explanatory notes on 1301 α 39, στασιάζουσιν, that it should be inserted after that word.

4. ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὀλιγαρχίας. In aristocracies also, it would seem (c. 7. 1307 a 23 sqq).

5. πρόστερον, in c. 1. 1301 a 33 sqq. It is no objection to the proposed transposition that, if we place 1303 b 3–7 after 1301 a 39, στασιάζουσιν, the reference in καθάπερ εἰρητι πρόστερον will be to what has been said eight lines above. Reference is made in a similar way to passages equally near or nearer in 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 11, where ὅπερ εἰρητι πρόστερον refers to 1328 a 1 sqq., in 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29, where καθάπερ ἔσομεν refers to 1328 b 24–28, and in De Caelo, i. i. 268 a 19, where ὅπερ εἰρητι refers to 268 a 13 sqq.

7. στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ τοῦς τόπους κ.τ.λ. Καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους stands in tacit contrast to διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, or in other words διὰ τὸ μὴ όμοφυλον, which is the origin of στάσις dealt with in what precedes, if we remove 1303 b 3–7 to another place. See note on 1303 a 25. Cp. Plut. Solon, c. 13, οἱ ἀθραύσιοί . . . τὴν παλαιὰν αὕτην στάσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας ἑστασίαζον, ὅσα ἡ χώρα διαφοράς εἶχεν, εἰς τοσαυτὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως δυστάσις. Cities, both Greek and other, were often built partly on an island close to the coast and partly on the mainland itself: so Cnidus, which Strabo calls δίπολας on this account (p. 656), Apollonia on the Euxine (note on 1303 a 36), and Aradus and Tyre. ‘Comme Arad, Tyr avait une partie insulaire où s’élevaient ses temples et ses arsenaux, une partie continentale qu’on appelait la vieille Tyr, Palae-Tyros’ (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l’Orient, p. 192). We read of the Aradians in Polyb. 5. 68. 7, τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν προσέχοντον αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἄλληκμαν κατέταυσεν (Ἀντίοχας), διαλύεσα τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πρὸς τοὺς τὴν ἡπειρον κατακούσας τῶν Ἀραβῶν. Part of Clazomenae, again, was on an island, part on the mainland
opposite to it, and the two parts did not pull well together. The interest of those who dwelt in the island would be to favour the masters of the sea, for instance Athens; the interest of those who dwelt on the mainland would be to favour Persia. So in Thuc. 3. 34 Persia finds it easier to win Colophon than Notium, the seaport of Colophon. We are reminded of the feud between Plymouth and Plymouth Dock in Boswell’s Life of Johnson. ‘Johnson affecting to entertain the passions of the place was violent in opposition . . . No, no! I am against the Dockers; I am a Plymouth man. Rogues! Let them die of thirst. They shall not have a drop!’ The relations between England and Ireland might have been better if the two countries were not severed by the sea.

9. οἱ ἑπὶ Χύτρῳ, sc. στασιάζοντες. Sus.⁸ and Mr. E. L. Hicks (Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 76) follow Sylburg in reading Χύτρῳ in place of Χύτρῳ, referring to Corpus Inscr. Att. 2. pp. 397, 423, with which Sus. compares Ephor. Fragm. 136 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 271), and it is much in favour of their view that the phrase οἱ ἑπὶ Χύτρῳ occurs in the inscription, and that τ and τρ are easily confused (see critical note on 1338 b 23), but Strabo (p. 645) has Χύτρῳν, and this fact lends some support to the reading Χύτρῳ here. There was a town called Χύτρῳ in Cyprus, and another called Χυτρόπολις in Thrace (Theopomp. Fragm. 150: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 304). Why ἑπὶ Χύτρῳ, not ἐν Χύτρῳ? Is ἑπὶ here = ἐν, or does it mean ‘near’ (cp. Soph. Philoct. 353, τάπι Τροίας πέραγαμ;)

10. καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι κ.τ.λ. Ἀθήναις, ‘in the Athenian State,’ as in 2. 7. 1267 b 18, 3. 2. 1275 b 35, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 24 etc., not specially ‘at Athens,’ for evidently Ἀθηναῖοι includes the Peiraeus. Compare the use of ἐν Δακεδαλίῳ in 2. 5. 1263 a 35, where see note. Aristotle does not say of the Athenian citizens resident at the Peiraeus and of those resident at Athens what he says of the two sections of Clazomenians, that they στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἄλληλους, though that did come about in the days of the Thirty (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 24 sqq., 35–37), but only that there is a difference of political sentiment between them. Perhaps, however, this was more due to a difference of class and occupation, the Peiraeus being full of ναύται καὶ κέλευσται καὶ κυβερνήται (Plut. Themist. c. 19 sub fin.), than to residence on a distinct site. The site of Eleusis was distinct from that of Athens, but no great difference of political sentiment seems to have resulted.
12. ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις. Aristotle implies that the thing did not happen much in marches in time of peace.

15. μεγίστη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the greatest severance is perhaps that of virtue and vice.' This is so because it involves a difference of soul and of character (Poet. 2. 1448 a 2 sqq.), a difference in respect of goods of the soul, not external goods (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 6 sqq.). It is only on a severance of this kind that Aristotle consents to base the distinction of slave and free, well-born and low-born (1. 6. 1255 a 39 sqq.). Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it, but it is perhaps virtually taken up by ὅν μία καὶ ἡ ἐπιμένῃ ἐστὶν, i.e. 'but the severance we have mentioned is a severance, though a minor one.'

διάστασις. We expect rather διαφορά, but Plato (Rep. 360 E) had spoken of the διάστασις of the ἄδικος and the δίκαιος.

16. καὶ οὖτω δή. See note on 1296 b 5.

μάλλον, sc. διάστασις ἐστιν.

C. 4. 17. γίγνονται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's reference to the effect of small differences of locality in producing στάσεις leads him to notice other minute causes of στάσεις. Μὲν οὖν introduces a summing-up of what has just been said, in order that a further statement may be added to make the exact extent of Aristotle's assertion clear. Some might infer from his remarks that στάσεις is in his view concerned with things of trivial moment, and Aristotle hastens to correct this impression by adding that through the occasions of στάσεις are often small (I do not understand him to mean that they always are), the things with a view to which recourse is had to στάσεις are great, and indeed that small discords are most fruitful of result when they arise within the circle of those who are supreme in the State (ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις, 19). In 1303 b 17—1304 b 5 we have to do with the ἐξ ὧν of constitutional change, its immediate occasions, not its profound causes. We see this from the recurrence of ἐκ in 1303 b 18, 21, 37, 1304 a 4, 10, 14, 18 (see note on 1303 a 13). That disagreements often arise ἐκ μικρῶν we have been told in 2. 5. 1263 a 17 sqq. We read in De Gen. An. 5. 6. 785 b 36 εὐφαντὸν καὶ εὐκίνητον τὸ μικρῶν. Solon had said of the beginnings of Ἀτέ (Fragm. 13. 14),

ἀρχὴ δ' ἔξ ὀλίγου γέγενται ὡστε πυρὸς,
φλαυρῇ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνιψθ' δὲ τελευτᾶ,

and a similar thought may be traced in Soph. Aj. 1077 sq.: Eurip. Fragm. 415 Nauck (411, ed. 2),
micropo yap eK lampestros 'Idaiou lepas
prisieven an vis,
and 424 Nauck (420, ed. 2): Demosth. in Lept. c. 162 (already referred to in vol. i. p. 525, note 2): Polyb. 3. 7. 7, epeidh fytai
mel eK tov tuXhontov pollaikes ta mgia ta tov pragmatov: Tac. Ann. 4.
32 sub fin. Compare also De Caelo, 4. 3. 310 b 26, kaitov eniste kai taitsa eK atovn metabalkleei, kai mikras genvomeneis eK tois eKo kynheous to mev eis evgeian ferchetai to 6' eis aivex. Aristotle does not consider
whether constitutional change is not sometimes prevented, as well as brought about, by small things. It should be noticed that the instances which Aristotle gives in what follows of stpaeis arising from small causes seem all to be taken from oligarchies (cp. c. 6. 1306 a 31 sqq.). Quarrles would be especially frequent and mischievous in oligarchies.

19. elaista de k.t.l. K.ai ai mikrai, sc. stpaeis, 'even small discords' (much more great ones): cp. 30, kai to ev auti mikron amartima. Plato had said in Rep. 545 D, paisa politia metabalklee eK autov tov 'exousios tov arxias, othan ev auti toitov stpasia egxengetai, onouanotose de, kai paino avygon 7, adynata kynhein. Compare also for the thought De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 a 11, tv mev oiv mikrav parakbainontai tvn finous (sc. tvn tikitomivnoy) eK eiowen, tv de plieiv ou eK, othan ev tois kryiais tov eK yveneita tv parai finos, and Hist. An. 8. 2. 590 a 2, ouste deilov oti kai ev tv eK arxhfs syntasai akryaioi tvos metabalklontos tv megelbei, eiv 7 arxveidiv, ginetai to mev thlun to 6' arren.

20. oiiv synvebai kai ev Syparouosai ev tois arxaios chrnovos. Kai ev Syparouosi, 'for example in Syracuse' (see note on 1255 a 36). If Busolt is right (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2. 2. 785. 2), this feud arose under the oligarchy of the Gamori at Syracuse shortly before it was overthrown by the demos and the serfs (see note on 1302 b 31), an event followed by Gelon's seizure of Syracuse in b.c. 485. For ev tois arxaios chrnovos cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 13, eti tov arxaios chrnov, and 7 (5). 1305 a 7, eti tov arxaiou, and see note on 1285 a 30. This story and that told about Delphi in 37 sqq. are told with added details in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32, where we read, ev de Syparouosai dutov neanivkow synvebwn, o mev ton erowmenon ton etaiou
lavon fylassevne dievfeirven apodhmoiountai' o 6' ekkeivn pawm aspeter antapodidous 7bEevn eroixeuse tv gnivaika' tvon de presioiteron tvs eis
boivnh parakbwn ekleusen arfotirous elaiwn prw apoleta kai ano-
plerebnoi ton pawm 6' auton tv 6' exheres' oiv mhn erxeisen, allala kai ek
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τούτων στασιάζαντες ἐπὶ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀνέ-
τρεψαν. Plutarch not only, like Aristotle here, tells the two stories
together, but also, as U. Köhler points out (Rhein. Mus. 53: 491),
prefixes to them a remark very similar to that made by Aristotle in
1303b 26 sqq., οὐδενός ἦτον τῷ πολιτικῷ προσήκει ταῦτα (i.e. τὰς ἐκ
πραγμάτων καὶ προσκρουσμάτων ἰδίων διαφοράς) ἰᾶσθαι καὶ προκατα-
λαμβάνειν, ὃπως τὰ μὲν οὐδὲ ὅλως ἐσται, τὰ δὲ παύεται ταχέως, τὰ δὲ
οὐ λύβεται μέγεθος οὐδὲ ἂνεται τῶν δημοσίων, ἄλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μεινὶ τοῖς
diaφερομένοις, αὐτῶν τέ προσέχοντα καὶ φράζοντα τοῖς ἀλλοις ὡς ἰδια
κοινῶν καὶ μικρὰ μεγάλων αὐτὰ καθίσταται, παροφράνετα καὶ μὴ τυχόντα
θεραπεῖας ἐν ἄρχῇ μηδὲ παρηγορίας. Köhler thinks that Aristotle
and Plutarch derive the stories from some common source in
which they were narrated together and the moral was drawn as
to the duty of the statesman which both of them draw. It should
be noticed, however, that the two stories are told by Plutarch in
a different order, the Delphian story coming first and the Syracusan
second, and the intervening story about Hestiaea being omitted;
that no mention is made by Plutarch of the point on which
Aristotle especially insists, the fact that the two young Syracusans
belonged to the ruling class; and that the moral drawn by Plutarch
is not the same as that drawn by Aristotle, for while Plutarch advises
that private feuds should be prevented from spreading to public
affairs, Aristotle's advice is that feuds about small matters arising
between members of leading families should be prevented from
ending in a conflagration involving the whole State. If Aristotle
and Plutarch, therefore, used a common source, one or other of
them must have failed to follow it closely. Other hypotheses are
possible. It will be observed that the two stories told by Plutarch
are love-stories, and that he does not tell the story of the two
brothers who quarrelled over an inheritance at Hestiaea. This
fact suggests that the source from which the two stories came
to him may have been a collection of ἔρωτικά, possibly that of the
Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, from whom he gets the story that the
hostility between Aristides and Themistocles at Athens began in
a love-quarrel (Aristid. c. 2, and Themist. c. 3, where the account
ends, ἐκ δὲ τούτων διετέλειν καὶ περί τὰ δημόσια στασιάζοντες, words
which remind us of the passage quoted above from Reip. Gerend.
Præc. c. 32). Whether the more detailed form in which Plutarch
gives the two stories came ultimately from the 'Constitutions'
ascribed to Aristotle, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xix, it
is impossible to say, but Ariston of Ceos would no doubt be acquainted with the 'Constitutions.'

22. ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαίς ὀντὼν. Köhler remarks (Rhein. Mus. 53. 490, note) that 'these words should not be taken to refer to the holding of definite offices, a view which has often been taken of their meaning, but to indicate that the two Syracusans belonged to the ruling class.' His interpretation of them suits the passage before us well, for it is a little surprising to hear of two _neaiσκοι_ holding office, and also of one of them being absent from the State, though in office, unless indeed his office was a military office. The word _neaiσκοι_, however, must not be pressed too much, for one of the _neaiσκοι_ was old enough to have a wife, and the use of ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαίς εἶναι in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 2 sq., where it seems clearly to mean 'to be in office,' makes against Köhler's view. Looking to this passage we shall probably be right in interpreting the phrase in the same way in c. 3. 1302 b 6 sqq., c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq., c. 8. 1309 a 3, and the passage before us: cp. c. 8. 1308 a 5 sq., 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 12, and Thuc. 8. 89. 2.

23. ἔταῖρος ὄν τις, 'a person, though being his comrade': cp. c. 10. 1312 b 16, κηδεστής ὄν. We expect ἔτερος in place of τις (so Coray, placing it before ἔταῖρος), but cp. Philipp. 'Αργυρίων Ἀραυσμός, Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 469),

ἀν γὰρ ἀναθῇ τις, εἰδὼς ἔτερος ἤρπαισεν,

and Epicrat. Inc. Fab. Fragm. (Meineke, 3. 371),

λάχανον τις ἐφη στρογγύλον εἶναι,

ποιάν δὲ ἀλλος, δένδρον δ’ ἔτερος.

25. ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν. Cp. Rhet. 2. 23. 1308 a 24 sq. (Bon. Ind. 872 b 2). If adultery was a criminal offence at Syracuse, as it was at Heraclea and Thebes and elsewhere (see note on 1306 a 36), the aggrieved husband might have prosecuted the adulterer, though the fact that he was the original offender would probably have told against him in the lawcourt. But we hear nothing of any resulting lawsuit, only of a στάσις and διάστασις.

26. διεστασάσαι, here transitive (see note on 1303 a 27).

διόπερ ἀρχομένων κ.τ.λ. Τῶν τοιοτῶν, 'the feuds which we have described,' cp. c. 8. 1308 a 31, τὰς τῶν γυνώμων φιλοσκίαις καὶ στάσεις. Aristotle's precept is based on an early medical precept, which may be traced in Theogn. 1133,

Κύριε, παρούσι φίλοισι κακῶν καταπαύσωμεν ἀρχήν,

ζητῶμεν δ’ ἔλκει φάρμακα φυσικόν,

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quoted by Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 308, in their note on the proverb ἀρχήν ἱάσθαι πολὺ λῶν ἢ τελευτῆ, where they also refer to Ovid, Rem. Amor. 91 sq. and Pers. Sat. 3. 64. Compare too Xen. De Re Equestri, 4. 2, and Hippocr. Aphor. vol. iii. p. 716 Kühn.


ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἀμάρτημα, 'for the error arises in a starting-point' (or 'source'). The error referred to is the initial feud. Aristotle is led to speak of the ruling class as a starting-point, because the Greek word for 'rule' means also 'beginning.' Compare the similar play on the word in the De Pace of Isocrates, §§ 101, 105. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Laws 792 C, έστι γὰρ οὖν ἡμῖν ἁ τοιαύτη πράξεις διαφορὰ μεγίστῃ πασῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται ἕκκαστος προφήτης. Cp. c. i. 1302 a 6, and De Anim. Motione, 7. 701 b 24, ὅτι δὲ μικρὰ μεταβολῆ γνωμῆν ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφοράς ἀποθεῖ, οὐδὲ ἄφρον. οὗ τοῦ οίκου ἄκαρπον τι μεθισμαμένον πολλῇ ἡ τῆς πρόφας γίνεται μετάστασις: De Gen. An. i. 2. 716 b 3 sqq., 4. i. 766 a 28 sqq., and 5. 7. 788 a 11, μικρὰ μεταστάσεις μεγάλων αἰτίας γίνονται, οὐ δὲ αἰτίας, ἄλλ' ἄτινα συμβεβήκι ἀρχὴν συμμεταβάλλειν: ἐὰν γὰρ ἀρχὴν μεγέθει οὔσα μικρὰ τῇ δυναμεῖ μεγαλεῖ εἰσίν, τότε γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἀρχῆς εἶναι, τοῦ αὐτὴν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἄλλο ἀνώθεν μηδέν, together with Fragm. Aristot. 85. 1491 a 2 sqq.

29. ἢ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡμῖν εἶναι παντός. As to this familiar proverb see Eaton's note and that of Leutsch and Schneidewin in Paroem. Gr. 2. 13.

30. ἀνάλογον ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν, 'bears a similar proportion to the errors in all the other parts,' i.e. is half of the whole, and therefore is equal to them, as they can be no more. Cp. De Caelo, i. 5. 271 b 6 sqq., and especially 11, τούτω δ' αἰτίων ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει, διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ γίνεται παρμιγεῖδες.

31. ὅλως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly' (i.e. whether they arise περὶ ἐρωτικῆν αἰτίων, like the one at Syracuse just referred to, which involved the whole State in its consequences, or not).

32. οἷον ἐν Ἕστιατα κ.τ.λ. As to Hestiaea see note on 1303 a 18. As to τὰ Μηδικά see note on 1341 a 28. This quarrel appears to have happened between the battle of Plataea and the reduction of Hestiaea by Athens in B.C. 446. It is likely that the dissatisfied brother brought his case before a court of law, but without success.
Hestiaea was probably under an oligarchy at the time (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2), and the law or the lawcourts of an oligarchy may have favoured the richer suitor. Ἀποφαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν is a technical expression: cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 4. 1. 8, and [Demosth.] Or. 42. in Phaeinp. cc. i, 11, 14. It will be noticed that in 35 the treasure discovered by the father is distinguished from ἡ οὐσία, perhaps because it was less unequivocally the property of the deceased man. This treasure may have been a treasure buried by the Persians like that discovered by Amineocles the Magnesian, as to which compare (with Eaton) Hdt. 7. 190. See Schneider's note. But it may also have been a treasure 'laid up' by some Greek 'for himself and his family': cp. Plato, Laws 913, where we learn what was thought of those who took up such treasures.

37. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς κ.τ.λ. The story is thus told by Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32, οἰον ἐν Δελφοῖς ὁ μέγας Λέοντας γενέσθαι μεσοτηριμοῦ ἢπο Κράτησος, ὁ μέλλων θυγατέρα γαμεῖν Ὀργίλαος ὁ Φάλλιδος, ἐται τοῦ κράτησος αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς σπούδαις μέσου ὄνειροσμένου καὶ καταληκτῶν τὴν νύμφην ἀπῆλθε μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς· ὁ δὲ Κράτης ὅλοις ὑστερον ἐθύνατα αὐτοῖς ὑποβαλόν χρυσὶν τε τῶν ἱερῶν, κατεκρήμνυσε τὸν Ὀργίλαον καὶ τὸν ἄδελφον ἄκριτον, καὶ πάλιν τῶν φίλων τινῶς καὶ οἰκείων ἑκτεύοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τῆς Προναίας ἀνέλει: πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γενόμενων, ἀποκτείνωσε οἱ Δελφοί τοῦ Κράτητα καὶ τοὺς στασιάσαντας ἐκ τῶν χρημάτων ἐναγκαλίων προσαγορευομένων τοὺς κατω ναοι ἀνυποδέχμενοι. See also Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 5. The name of the defaulting bridegroom should perhaps be Orsilas, not Orgilaus. At the marriage-feast in the house of the bride's father, at the close of which the bride would be conducted in procession to her new home, and in the presence of many of her relations and friends the crater, or vessel for mixing wine and water, burst asunder just when the libations were being made, the worst moment at which the mischance could happen. U. Köhler (Rhein. Mus. 53. 487) takes the κάτω ναοῖ of Plutarch to be three temples in a line with a fourth, identified by him as that of Athene Pronaia, the foundations of which have been traced below the road leading from Arachova to Delphi, a little before it crosses the brook which flows from the fountain of Castalia (see Frazer, Pausanias, 5. 251), but the point is uncertain. Aesop seems to have met a similar fate at Delphi to that which befel Orgilaus and his brother (Plut. De sera numinis vindicta, c. 12: Aristoph. Vesp. 1446 sqq. Didot). Vict. and many after him have compared the story of the jilting of a girl of the Amidei family at Florence by
young Buondelmonte (Machiavelli, Hist. of Florence, Book ii : Eng. Trans. Bohn, p. 50). The Emperor Frederick the Second, Machiavelli adds, took the side of the Amidei and Uberti, who drove out the Buondelmonti, 'and so our city came to be divided into Guelfs and Ghibellines, as the whole of Italy was for a long time.' However, Orgilaus had a better case than Buondelmonte, for the latter had no ill omen to plead. It is not surprising that Delphi was much troubled with στάσις, for, to begin with, it was a small State, and small States were more troubled with στάσις than large (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 9 sqq.), and then again we can easily imagine how many opportunities of lawful and unlawful gain the authorities of the Delphic temple must have possessed (see for instance Diod. 14. 13), and how keen in consequence must have been the struggle for political power and control over the temple. Inscriptions recently discovered at Delphi have shown also how much profit of a lawful kind the Delphians and their phratries derived from the influx of strangers desirous of consulting the oracle (see Buchheim, Beiträge zur Geschichte des delphischen Staatswesens, i. 21 sqq.).

38. διαφορᾶς. See note on 1334 b 37.

ἐγένετο, sc. ἡ διαφορά. For the construction compare 1304 a 4 sqq. and 10 sqq., and see Vahlen’s note on Poet. 4. 1449 a 9.

1304 a. 1. οἰωνισάμενος τι σύμπτωμα. Not, as Vict., ‘cum enim sponsus ominatus esset quendam gravem casum,’ but, as Welldon, ‘interpreting as an omen of evil some accidental occurrence’: compare Plutarch’s narrative (quoted on 1303 b 37) and also Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 1, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔξω τῆς οἰκίας ἐγένετο, λέγονται ἄστρατα καὶ βρονταὶ αὐτῷ αἰσθανεῖται τούτων ἢ ἀλλὰ προφητεύουσιν ἤλιον ἤπειρον ἐπορεύετο.

2. οἱ 5' ὡς ὧβρισθέντες κ.τ.λ. The bride’s relations thought that they were treated with ὧβρις, but in reality Orgilaus’ act was not one of ὧβρις, but of superstitious dread. We learn from Plutarch that Orgilaus and his brother were put to death without trial: cp. Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 5, λαβάντες οὖν αὐτοὺς ὡς θεοῦλας, ἀπήγαγον ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν, καὶ κατεκρήμνωσαν κατὰ τὸν Δελφικὸν νόμον. Precipitation from a cliff was the recognized punishment at Delphi for persons guilty of sacrilege (Paus. 10. 2. 4), and it may have been lawful, especially for men of high position like Crates, to inflict this punishment without a previous trial on offenders caught in the act. As to summary punishments of this kind see Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la République Athénienne, p. 92. Crates’ subsequent
muder of friends and relatives of the victims, when suppliants in a temple, cannot, however, have been even technically legal.

4. καὶ περὶ Μυτιλήνης δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Prof. Jowett's note. I agree with him that there is no inconsistency between the passage before us and the account given by Thucydides of the revolt of Mytilene, except that the deeper causes of the revolt are better set forth by the latter. Thucydides explains how the proxenus of Athens 'spurred on' the Athenians in 3. 2. 3. Τενέδοιο γὰρ ὄστες αὐτοὶ διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναιοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἄδει ἄνδρες καθὰ στάσιν, πράξεων Ἀθηναίων, μηνυταί γίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ἤνσει κιγώνει τῇ τὴν Λέσβων ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βία καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἀπασάν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἔνεφερόν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγοντα. It is evident from the speech of the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. that the real cause of the revolt was the fear which the Mytileneans not unnaturally entertained of the ultimate loss of their independence, and nothing would do more to intensify this fear than the consciousness that they had been denounced to the Athenians. Aristotle was for some time a resident at Mytilene (vol. i. p. 466), and he may have heard this story there, possibly from a descendant of Timophanes, or he may have heard it from his friend and pupil Theophrastus, who belonged to Eresus in Lesbos.

5. ἐγένετο, sc. ἡ στάσις (see note on 1303 b 38).

7. Τιμοφάνους γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We are more familiar with the Corinthian Timophanes, the brother of Timoleon, of whom we read in c. 6. 1306 a 23 sq. We do not learn whether Timophanes had made a will and bequeathed his two orphan heiresses to others than the two sons of Dexander, or why, if he had not, they did not pass in marriage to the nearest male relative (see note on 1270 a 21). Perhaps the question who the nearest male relative was may have been a disputed one and may have been decided by the magistrates or lawcourts of the Mytilenean oligarchy against Dexander, or perhaps the strict rules which prevailed at Athens with respect to succession to the hand of an orphan heiress did not prevail at Mytilene, and much was left to the discretion of the magistrate or the heir of the deceased father (as at Sparta: see note on 1270 a 21). It is evident that a precise rule as to the succession to the hand of an orphan heiress and an honest application of it by the magistrate or the lawcourt were things very conducive to the internal peace of Greek States. Aristotle's narrative does not make it clear why Dexander avenged his disappointment, not on his successful
rival, but on the State of Mytilene; probably, however, the authorities of the State had in some way or other lent support to the claims of his opponent.

8. ὀ περιωσθεῖς, cp. c. 6. 1306 a 32. τοῖς ὑλῶσιν αὐτοῦ, 'for his own sons,' a dative of gain.

9. The difference of tense in ἡρξε and παρῴξυνε (a continued action) should be noticed.

10. καὶ ἐν Φωκεύσῳ κ.τ.λ. Περὶ Μνασίας, 'in connexion with Mnaseas': cp. Hdt. 3. 76, τὰ περὶ Πηνᾶσπεα γεγονότα. 'the circumstances that had happened in connexion with Prexaspe.' Τὸν 'Ονομάρχου, sc. πατέρα. The passage before us is our only source of information with respect to this στάσις. Mason was a friend of Aristotle (Timaeus ap. Athen. Deipn. 264 d) and was probably his informant, as Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 445) has pointed out. He seems to have given evidence favourable to the conduct of Aeschines in Phocian matters at the trial of the latter in B.C. 343 for misconduct on his second embassy to Philip, which ended in his acquittal (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 142 sq.), and later to have become the tyrant of Elateia (Schäfer, Demosthenes. 3. 36). His house and that of Onomarchus were among the leading houses of Phocis (Schäfer, 1. 444 sq.). As to his patronage of artists see Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 99, 107. Aristotle does not tell us in what way the quarrel between the two houses resulted in the Sacred War. The immediate causes of the war were 1. the imposition of a heavy fine by the Amphictyonic Council under the influence of Thebes on some Phocians (Onomarchus perhaps being one of them) who had cultivated land belonging to the Delphic temple, and 2. a threat that, if the fine remained unpaid, Phocis should be declared to have escheated to the Delphic god (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 11. 342: Curtius, Hist. of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 62 sqq.: Schäfer, 1. 443 sqq.). Aristotle probably means that the existence of this στάσις in Phocis encouraged Thebes and the Amphictyons to do what they did, or else that Mnaseas invoked the aid of Thebes. Justin (8. 1) lays the blame of the war entirely on Thebes; Aristotle, on the other hand, as a friend of Macedon, which had overthrown and ruined Phocis in the war, was perhaps not sorry to be able to point out that some leading families of Phocis itself were partly to blame (see note on 1306 a 10).

18. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἑπιδάμνῳ ἦ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμίκων κ.τ.λ. The change of constitution at Epidamnus here referred to may
probably be the same as that described in c. 1. 1301 b 21 sqq., but we cannot be certain of this. Does καὶ ἐν ἑπιτιθέμενοι imply that the troubles arising ἐκ γραμμάκων at Delphi and Mytilene and in Phocis had also led to a change of constitution?

14. ἰπομνημοσύνων, ‘having betrothed his daughter to a man.’ Ἀτερος is added in 16 with fatal results to the sentence: see note on 1306 b 9.

17. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1303 a 13. So far we have had to do with cases in which στάσις has arisen from contumely or wrong: now we learn that constitutional change may arise from the growth in reputation or power of a magistracy (such as the Council of the Areopagus) or a part of the State (such as the demos or the ναυτικὸς ὀχλος or the γυνώρμοι). A similar transition from ὅ τι ἀτιμάζεσθαι to ἱπεροχή is made in c. 3. 1302 b 15.

20. οἶον ἢ ἐν ὁ Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῇ κ.τ.λ. The Council of the Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens to man the triremes and to fight at Salamis by distributing eight drachmae to each man (‘Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 23: Plut. Themist. c. 10: see note on 1297 b 10). Cicero goes further in De Offic. i. 22. 75, where he says of the war against the Persians, est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone erat constitutus.


καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὀχλος κ.τ.λ., ‘and on the other hand the naval multitude, having been the cause of the victory at Salamis and by means of it of the hegemony by reason of the power [of the State] by sea, made the democracy of a more decided type.’ Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 12 sqq. and Plut. Aristid. c. 22, and for ἵσχυροτέραν 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 9. With Sus. and Welldon I take διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν ὄναμον with what precedes, and not (as Lamb. and Stahr) with τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἵσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν. Πάλιν here, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 4 and other passages, ‘contrarium motum vel actum significat’ (Bon. Ind. 559 a 60 sqq.). Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὀχλος refers to the trireme-oarsmen who formed a large element in the Athenian demos (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sqq.). Διὰ ταῦτα, sc. τῆς νίκης.

26. καὶ ἐν Ἀργείᾳ κ.τ.λ. The γυνώρμοι referred to are the thousand picked warriors of the richest class (Diod. 12. 75. 7, 86. 3), who after the battle of Mantinea in B.C. 418 ‘took it in hand’ to overthrow the democracy at Argos, and indeed ruled the State for some months
(eight according to Diod. 12. 80. 4, but see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 7. 136. 2), and might have ruled it longer but for the brutal conduct of their leader Bryas (Paus. 2. 20. 2). See as to the thousand Thuc. 5. 67, Diod. 12. 75, 80, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20, with Gilbert's note in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 78. As to their success against the Lacedaemonians see Thuc. 5. 72. 3 and Diod. 12. 79. 4 sqq. That they won credit in a war with the Lacedaemonians is mentioned because this added to the credit acquired, and it is for the same reason that we are told in what follows that the war in which the Syracusan demos triumphed and won political supremacy was a war with Athens. Καταλύειν τὸν δήμον recurs in c. 5. 1304 b 30, 31, 34, and c. 7. 1307 b 24. In c. 5. 1304 b 35 we have κατελύθη ἡ δημοκρατία. Καταλύειν τῶν δήμων, κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου were the phrases used in the νόμος εἰσαγγελίας, as to which see 'Δθ. Πολ. c. 8. l. 25 sq. and Sandys' note.

27. καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις κ.τ.λ. Φοι τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου cp. Plato, Laws 641 A, νίκη πολέμου τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἄν γίγνοντο, and 638 A, νίκην τε καὶ ἡτταν λέγοντες μάχης: Thuc. 1. 121. 5, μὴ τε νίκη ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς διάκονται. Aristotle sometimes distinguishes ὁ δῆμος from οἱ ὀπληται (c. 6. 1305 b 33: cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12-14). Does he mean here that the failure of the Athenians in the siege of Syracuse was brought about rather by the fleet and light troops of the Syracusans than by their hoplites and cavalry? The turning-point of the siege came when the victory of Gyippus (Thuc. 7. 6) made it possible for him to complete the building of his wall (Freeman, Sicily, 3. 254 sqq.). This victory was won by the Syracusan hoplites assisted by their cavalry and light troops (ἀκοντισταῖ), but, to judge by Thucydides' account, the cavalry did more to win it than the hoplites and light troops. Aristotle may have been otherwise informed, or he may have regarded the first victory won by the Syracusan fleet in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7. 41: Freeman, 3. 298 sqq.) as the real turning-point of the siege. There is at any rate no doubt that the Syracusan fleet and light-armed did much to make the disaster complete and irreparable (Thuc. 7. 71: 7. 81. 4: 7. 84. 4). 'The Syracusan heavy-armed infantry seems to have been of a very inferior description and never to have encountered the Athenians with effect except when supported by the Syracusan cavalry' (Arnold on Thuc. 7. 84). But the cavalry, a force not recruited from the demos, appears to have often done good service. At the same time nothing reflected more lustre on Syracuse or did
more to depress the spirits of the Athenians than the unexpected victory of her fleet (Thuc. 7. 55). Aristotle appears to consider that a polity or aristocracy (c. 10. 1312 b 6–9) existed at Syracuse from b.c. 466–5, when the tyranny was overthrown, to b.c. 413, the date of the failure of the Athenian expedition. Yet in c. 12. 1316 a 32 sq. we are told that the tyranny was succeeded by a democracy. As to the part of the Twelfth Chapter in which this statement occurs, however, see vol. i. p. 519, note 1. Thucydides (7. 55) says that the Syracusans were under a democracy at the time of the Athenian invasion. The main change in the institutions of Syracuse which was made after the Athenian repulse seems to have been that the lot came into use in appointments to magistracies (Diod. 13. 34. 6). It is perhaps this change that Aristotle has in view when he says that a polity was succeeded by a democracy. Τὴν πολιτείαν must apparently be supplied with μετέβαλεν.

29. καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known about the tyrant Phoxus at Chalcis, or about the tyrant Antileon, who is mentioned in c. 12. 1316 a 31 sq. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 66) surmises that these two tyrannies occurred as temporary breaks in the continuity of the oligarchy of the Hippobotae at Chalcis, which seems to have lasted from very early times till the reduction of Chalcis by Athens in b.c. 506. Unlike the tyranny of Antileon, which was followed by an oligarchy (1316 a 31), the tyranny of Phoxus was followed by a democracy. Hence it is not likely that Phoxus was the last tyrant of a dynasty founded by Antileon. Φοξός (the accent being altered, as usual, in proper names) means 'peaked in the head,' an indication of impudence ([Aristot.] Physiognom. 6. 812 a 8); Thersites is φοξός in Hom. II. 2. 219. But φοξί was believed often to possess great physical strength (Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6: vol. iii. p. 583 Kühn). Compare such names as Simus and Pyrrhus. The name Phoxus occurs at Phocaea (Polyaen. Strateg. 8. 37).

31. εἴχετο τῆς πολιτείας, 'took firm hold of the constitution.'
καὶ ἐν Ἀμφρακία κ.τ.λ. We might have expected the order of the words to be Περιανδρον τῶν τύραννον τοῖς ἐπιθεμένων ὁ δήμος συνεκβαλὼν, but then it would have resembled too nearly the order of the words in the preceding sentence, and therefore a different order is preferred. Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, sent his illegitimate son Gorgus to found a colony at Ambracia, and Gorgus had two sons, Psammetichus and Periander. The former in b.c. 585 succeeded Cypselus' son Periander in the tyranny of Corinth and was slain,
and the tyranny overthrown, three years later. The latter became tyrant of Ambracia and was expelled (Plutarch, Amat. c. 23, says slain), probably not long after the fall of Psammetichus at Corinth, under the circumstances narrated in c. 10. 1311 a 39 sqq. A democracy was then established at Ambracia, but as this revolution occurred early in the sixth century B.C., it is perhaps hardly likely that in the democracy then set up the low property-qualification for office existed of which we read in c. 3. 1303 a 23 sqq. It may have been introduced later. The neighbouring Corinthian colony Leucas seems to have undergone a somewhat similar change in a democratic direction (2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq.), but we are not told at what time this happened. At Corinth, on the other hand, the tyranny was succeeded by an oligarchy, which held its own for a very long time (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90).

33. καὶ δὲ ὑπὲρ δῆ κ.τ.λ., ‘and further broadly this must not escape notice’ etc. For καὶ . . . δῆ, see note on 1253 a 18, and cp. i. 13. 1259 b 32, καὶ καθόλου δῆ. Aristotle has said that when a magistracy or a part of the State, such as the demos or the γνώριμοι, grows in reputation or influence, constitutional change is apt to follow, and now he adds the broad statement that all winners of power for the State, even if the winner is not a magistracy or an important part of the State like the demos or γνώριμοι, but only a private individual or a body of individuals, become the source of στάσεις. Of men who won power for their State as magistrates and who afterwards were not willing μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵσων we have a conspicuous instance in Lysander (see Diod. 14. 13. 1 sqq.). Themistocles may have been another (see note on 1302 b 15). Hermocrates of Syracuse made his State great by his policy of resistance to Athens and was eventually banished by his fellow-citizens (Xen. Hell. 1. i. 27: Freeman, Sicily, 3. 429 sqq.). The Council of the Areopagus helped to make Athens great by its action before the battle of Salamis (1304 a 20 sqq.: 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 23), and the honours paid it in consequence may well have aroused jealousy and caused στάσεις, and ultimately led to a limitation of its powers. Aristotle may possibly have before him among other things in his reference to private individuals, and also in ὅπουνον πλῆθος, the services rendered by Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans to Croton. It was during the period of their ascendency that Croton conquered and destroyed Sybaris in B.C. 510, and the honours they then earned may probably have led to the attack which was subsequently made on them and to their expul-
sion from Croton. I do not know to what tribes Aristotle refers. The Aeantid tribe at Athens covered itself with glory at Marathon and Plataea and received special honours in consequence (Plut. Sympos. 1. 10. 3, Aristid. c. 19), but whether these honours aroused the jealousy of other tribes, we are not told. The Aeschrionian tribe at Samos must have done much for the greatness of the State, for some members of it were resident in Herodotus' day in the Great Oasis, seven days' journey west of Thebes (Hdt. 3. 26), but we know of no resulting στάσις. It is possible that Aristotle has in view the case of Sicyon, where the tribe Aegialeis, to which the tyrant Cleisthenes belonged and on which he heaped honours (Hdt. 5. 68), may well have helped him to achieve greatness for the State with the result that στάσις followed and the tyranny was overthrown. That στάσις sometimes arose in connexion with gentes we see from the story of the Myletiidae in Thuc. 6. 5. The case of the Aegideai at Sparta (Hdt. 4. 149) may have been similar. Οπουκονοῦν πλῆθος, e.g. whether composed of rich men like the 'thousand picked warriors' at Argos or of poor men like the ναυτικὸς δῖκλος at Athens or of philosophers like the Pythagoreans. Aristotle does not notice that those to whose mismanagement a diminution in the power of the State is due are still more often the cause of στάσις than those who have added to its power. The troubles, for instance, of the reigns of Richard the Second and Henry the Sixth in England were to some extent due to the loss of the possessions of the Crown in France. National ill-success had something to do with the French Revolution of 1789 and the following years. 'Throughout ancient as well as modern history defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 598).
his death, inter ipsos vero aequalitas discordiam augebat, nemine tantum ceteros excedente ut ei aliquis se submitteret, and 16. 3. 1, adsiduum inter pares discordiae malum. Eīnai dōkṓnta, because the really contrary parts of the State are the good and the bad (c. 3. 1303 b 15). That the rich and the poor are thought to be contrary we have seen in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2–11; they are treated as actually so in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 27 sq.

1304 b. 1. oί πλοῖσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος. ‘O δῆμος is contrasted with oί πλοῖσιοι here and in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 11 sqq., with oί εὐποροι in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 28, 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 9 sq., and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 6 sq., with oί τάς οὐσίας ἔχουσες in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25; still oftener with oί γνώριμοι, especially in the present Book (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 25 sqq., 30: 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 16 sq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12 sq.: 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 18); elsewhere with oί ἐπιστέφεις (2. 12. 1274 a 12 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 34 sq.). In 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33 ὁ δῆμος is distinguished from oί ἀπλῖτοι, and in the passage before us by implication from τὸ μέσον. And yet we see from 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. that ὁ δῆμος includes classes members of which must have been rich, for instance the τεχνίται (3. 5. 1278 a 24, πλοῖσιοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοί τῶν τεχνιτῶν).

5. ὅλιγοι γὰρ γίγνονται πρὸς πολλοὺς, ‘for they come to be few against many.’ See notes on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14, and cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24.

καθόλου μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is virtually repeated in 17, ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., and it is very possible that the passage 7–17, which intervenes between these two sentences, is a later addition, though it may well have been placed where it stands by Aristotle.

7. κινούσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. This is mentioned in order that those who seek to preserve constitutions may be prepared for the various methods to which those who seek to destroy them may be expected to have recourse. Peisistratus won his tyranny on the first two occasions by deceit and on the third by force (’Αθ. Πολ. cc. 14, 15), and Dionysius the Elder imitated him in beginning by deceit (Diod. 13. 95. 5 sq.). Lysander had sought to change the Lacedaemonian constitution by attempting to suborn various oracles to give answers in support of his policy (Diod. 14. 13), and was no doubt prepared, if necessary, to follow up his intrigue by the use of force. Tyrants were commonly conceived to win their tyrannies either by deceit or by force (Diog. Laert. 3. 83; cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10 and
Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 9 sq.): it was Aristotle's merit to have pointed out that all persons who sought to change a constitution were apt to resort either to force or to deceit or to a combination of the two. To win by deceit was more odious than to win by force (Thuc. 4. 86. 4: Dio Cass. 52. 2. 6 sq.). We need not take Aristotle to mean that constitutional change is always effected either by force or by deceit or by a combination of the two.

10. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διετῇ, 'for deceit also is twofold [and therefore it is not surprising that force is so].' Καὶ γὰρ here retains its full meaning, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 8. There is deceit which is eked out by a subsequent use of force, force being called in to complete what deceit has begun, and there is deceit which is not supplemented subsequently by force, but suffices by itself and is employed throughout.

12. κατέχουσιν, sc. τήν πολιτείαν (cp. 15 : see Bon. Ind. 377 a 12), 'keep the constitution in their hands.' Cp. θεμοσθ. Ol. 2. 9, καὶ μὴν εἰ τις ύμῶν ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ἥγειται, οἴσται δὲ βλά καὶ μὲν αὐτὸν τὰ πράγματα τῷ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὰ τουαίτα προειληφέναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴσται.

οἶνον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων κ.τ.λ. 'Aristotle seems to imply that Peisander and his colleagues had overstated from the first their confidence in the promises of Alcibiades, and were not so sinned against as Thucydides describes' (Mr. E. L. Hicks in Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8. 403, note).

13. ἐξηπάτησαν, sc. οἱ μεταβαλλόντες τήν πολιτείαν.

τὸν βασιλέα. The article is usually omitted (as in 'Ath. Pol. c. 29. ll. 4, 8) when the Persian king is referred to (see Liddell and Scott s.v.).

14. ψευδάμενοι, 'after this false statement' (Welldon). Bonitz (Ind. s.v.), however, explains ψευδάμενοι as synonymous with ἐγατάρησατες, 10. Perhaps the latter of these two interpretations is to be preferred.

17. αὐτῶν, i.e. those living under the constitution.

19. Καὶ ἐκαστοὺς δὲ εἴδος πολιτείας κ.τ.λ., 'but [we must not rest with ascertaining the broad causes common to all constitutions:] we must take each kind of constitution, and making these broad principles our starting-point, we must study kind by kind what happens in each.' So in c. 12. 1316 a 3 sqq. Aristotle finds fault with the Platonic Socrates for not tracing the overthrow of the best constitution to causes special to it. Μερίζοντας, sc. τὰς
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politeias, ‘dividing constitutions as a whole into the different kinds composing the whole.’ For τὰ συμβαίνοντα cp. c. 10. 1310 b 1 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 713 a 19 sqq.

20. αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 1305 a 34, and then answered by δὲ in c. 6. 1305 a 37. In the chapter before us Aristotle dwells only on those modes of change special to democracy which are most apt to affect democracies (μάλιστα, 20: yet πᾶσας σχέσεως, 1305 a 35). Demagogues are especially fatal to them, causing them to change into oligarchies and formerly into tyrannies, and also causing them to change from the traditional kind of democracy into the ultimate democracy. We have been told in c. 3. 1302 b 6 sqq. that ἐβρίτος and πλεονεξία in magistrates are sources of constitutional change. but now we learn that the misconduct of demagogues, who are not necessarily magistrates, is a source of constitutional change in democracies. That there are other causes of change in democracies not special to them, we have learnt already. They are subject to changes arising from contempt engendered by disorder (c. 3. 1302 b 27 sqq.), from the disproportionate increase of a class (in their case the rich: cp. c. 3. 1303 a 10 sqq.), from the admission to important offices of men unfriendly to the constitution (c. 3. 1303 a 16 sqq.), and from the aggrandizement of single individuals or a few persons (c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), to mention no others. Plato had ascribed the fall of democracies rather to ἡ ἀγαν ἔλευθερία (Rep. 562 B, 564 A) than to the license of demagogues; he had also said (Rep. 564 A: cp. c. 12. 1316 a 22 sq.) that democracies tended to change into tyrannies, and Aristotle agrees that this is especially true of the extreme democracy (see note on 1316 a 24), but he thinks, as the chapter before us shows, that democracies were in his own day less apt to change into tyrannies than they had once been, and that their tendency then was rather to change into oligarchies (cp. c. 12. 1316 a 23 sq.). The view that the ‘impudent license’ of demagogues leads to the fall of democracies comes to Aristotle from Lysias (Or. 25. 27, quoted by Eaton) and from Isocrates (De Pace, §§ 108, 123). In the hope of counteracting this source of change in democracies Aristotle gives some wholesome advice in c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq. and c. 9. 1310 a 2 sqq., and also in 8 (6), 5, where he suggests means of checking the abuse of the lawcourts by demagogues. Possibly too the advice given in c. 8. 1308 b 10 sqq. not to make any single individual overgreat refers
to demagogues among others, though it seems rather to refer to the aggrandizement of magistrates. It will be noticed that in 8 (6). 5 what he dreads for the extreme democracy is not its conversion into a tyranny, but its tendency to alienate the rich. Democracies do not seem, to judge by the chapter before us, often to have changed into aristocracies or polities, nor do we often hear of the extreme democracy changing into ἥ πατρία δημοκρατία. Yet that this sometimes occurred seems clear from c. 6. 1306 b 21, ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας.

21. τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. The passage before us should be compared with 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq. In all these three passages some light is thrown on the ways in which the rich were oppressed in those democracies in which they suffered oppression. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. democracy is said not only to exile the notables, but also to destroy them secretly and openly. Of this we do not hear anything in the passage before us or in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq. The demagogues are said in the passage before us to oppress the rich in a variety of ways. Sometimes they made the rich as a class the object of their attacks, setting the many on them (cp. c. 9. 1310 a 3 sqq.); sometimes they singled out individual rich men for attack and brought calumnious accusations against them with a view to the confiscation of their property, or confiscated their property without these preliminary accusations, often exiling them to make the thing easier (we do not learn whether in these cases confiscation was effected by the assembly—cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6, διμεσέσεως—or by the dicasteries); sometimes, again, they robbed the rich of part of their income by imposing heavy liturgies upon them (cp. c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.). From the third passage, 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq., we gather that what the rich had to fear in a democracy was rather the confiscation of their property by dicasteries and as a result of ‘public actions’ than its confiscation by the assembly, and that they were especially exposed to oppression in those extreme democracies in which, the assembly being a very numerous body, a large sum of money was required to provide it with pay, and there were no special revenues to supply the pay. In such democracies the eisphora would be heavy, confiscations frequent, and the dicasteries bad. We sometimes find democracy credited with a leaning to a general redivision of the land and a cancelling of debts—e. g. by Plato (Rep. 565 E sq.) and Polybius (6. 9. 8 sq.: cp. Justin, 16. 4. 2)—but of this Aristotle says nothing.
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22. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Rep. 565 A–B. Compare the circumstances under which the famous σκυτάλασμος at Argos arose, which are thus narrated by Diodorus (15. 58. 1), τῆς πόλεως τῶν Ἀργείων δημοκρατουμένης καὶ τῶν δημάγων παραβουλοῦντων τὸ πλῆθος κατὰ τῶν ταύτων ἐξουσιάς καὶ δόξας ὑπερεχόντων, οἱ διαζωλόμενοι συντάσσεις ἐγνωσαν καταλῦσα τῶν δήμον κ.τ.λ., though it is not clear that in this instance the demagogues singled out individual rich men for calumnious attack.


tοῦτο, i. e. the overthrow of democracies owing to the misconduct of demagogues.

25. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῷ κ.τ.λ. Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 427) connects this change with the defection of Cos from the Athenian Confederacy in b.c. 357 (Diod. 16. 7. 3), but nothing is certainly known as to its date. We notice that the examples which follow are taken from Dorian States (Cos, Rhodes, the Pontic Heracleia, and Megara).

27. καὶ ἐν Ῥώδῃ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1302 b 23. The demagogues at Rhodes, in their anxiety to provide funds for the supply of pay to the poorer citizens (for attendance probably at the assembly and dicasteries, etc.), seem to have prevented, or at any rate delayed, the payment to the trierarchs (who would of course belong to the class of γνώρμοι) of sums due to them from the State for work done by ship-builders or ship-fitters by their direction, the result being that the ship-builders or ship-fitters brought actions against the trierarchs for the recovery of the money owing to them. In other words the demagogues obtained the means of providing pay for the poorer citizens by leaving expenses in connexion with ship-building or ship-fitting for which the State was properly responsible to be defrayed by the trierarchs. As to liturgies at Rhodes connected with the navy see Strabo, p. 653, where however a lacuna in
the text makes the exact nature of the liturgy obscure. At Rhodes there was a refusal under the influence of demagogues to pay money justly due to γνώριμοι from the State, or at any rate a delay to pay it; at Heracleia, Megara, and Cyme the demagogues went further and exiled many of the γνώριμοι.

28. ἑπόριζον . . . ἐκάλυν. The tense used shows that the demagogues kept doing this (cp. 33, ἐξειπττον, and 36, ἐξεῖβαλλον).


31. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἰππακλείᾳ κ.τ.λ. What Heracleia is here referred to? The Trachinian Heracleia according to C. O. Müller and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190. 2), the Pontic Heracleia according to Bonitz (Ind. 319 b 39), Sus.3 (Note 1555), and Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2. 2. 395). The latter view is probably correct, for though in c. 6. 1305 b 3 we have ἐν Ἰππακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Πῶλτῳ as the designation of this city, the words ἐν Ἰππακλείᾳ (without τῇ ἐν τῷ Πῶλτῳ) in c. 6. 1305 b 5 and 1306 a 37 appear to refer to the Pontic Heracleia, as do the words ἡ πόλεις τῶν Ἰππακλεωτῶν in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 14. So in Diog. Laert. 7. 166 πόλεως δὲ Ἰππακλείας refers to the Pontic Heracleia. This was a colony of Megara, founded in the middle of the sixth century b.c. (see note on 1303 a 36), and it would seem from the passage before us to have been at the outset democratically governed. It is not clear whether it is to this democracy that Aeneas refers in Poliorc. 11. 10, or to a democracy of a later date (see note on 1305 b 33). The chronology of the constitutional changes at Megara in the sixth century b.c. is too little known to us to allow of a certain answer to the question whether a democracy existed at Megara when it founded Heracleia, but this may possibly have been the case (Plut. Quaest. Gr. cc. 18, 59: see note on 1300 a 17). The transition to Megara in 34 sqq. makes in favour of the view that the Pontic Heracleia is referred to. The demagogues appear to have behaved in much the same way in the mother-city and in the colony, and with fatal results to the democracy in both places. We observe that the contrast of δῆμος and γνώριμοι existed in Heracleia immediately after the foundation of the colony; this seems to show that the original lots of land there cannot have been equal (see note on 1266 b 1). Newly founded cities were often in a disturbed state (Isocr. De Pace, § 49, χειρὸν καὶ ταραχωδέστερον τῇ ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν διοικοῦμεν τῶν ὄρτοι τὰς πόλεις οἰκείωτων).

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32. Some light is thrown on the meaning of ἀδικουμένοι by 1305 a 3-5.

34. παραπλησίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1300 a 17. It appears from c. 3. 1302 b 31 that the democracy at Megara referred to fell not only owing to the conduct of the demagogues, but also because much ἀραξία καὶ ἀπαρχία prevailed under it. The democracies introduced by Thebes in the cities of Achaia fell in a somewhat similar way to this Megarian democracy (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 43).

36. ίνα χρήματα ἐξωτι δημευεύν, ‘in order to be able to confiscate property’: cp. 1305 a 6 sq. The proceeds of the confiscated property, or whatever part of them was not plundered on the way by the demagogues, would be distributed among the poorer citizens or used to provide them with pay for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries. ‘Nullo loco Aristoteles optativo post particulas finales utitur, sed promisce et post tempus praesens et post præteritum coniunctivum adhibet’ (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 52). In 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35, τεκναστέων οὖν ὅπως ἀν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνος, according to Eucken, ‘videtur particula ὅπως vi plane relativa uti,’ and in Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 9–12 Eucken would read γίγνοιται with Mb in place of γίγνοντο. Weber, however (Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 25), retains γίγνοντο and explains it by attraction to ποιοῦτο. He produces (ibid.) another exception to the rule (overlooked apparently by Eücken), Hist. An. 9. 9. 614 b 14, καὶ τιθασενήμονες δὲ της ἢθη ἁμαρτόλων εἰς πορεμὴν ἐξουλο ἑυθεῖα, ὅπως ἑναρμόσεθεν ὑπομεῖνεν αὐτῷ τὴν πληγήν, ἐν τῇ τριτῇ πληγῇ διεκλεφε καὶ κατήσθει τὸ μαλακόν, but adds that this exception does not interfere with our acceptance of the rule.

39. τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, perhaps ‘the well-known oligarchy’: cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq.

συνεσθῃ δὲ ταύτων κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known about these events. Which Cyme is referred to, is uncertain both here and in 2. 8. 1269 a 1. ‘Forma generis neutrius ταύτων saepe legitur non solum ante vocales, verum etiam ante consonantes’ (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16).

1305 a. 2. τῶν ἄλλων, sc. πάλινων. See note on 1266 b 1.

3. ἵνα χαρίζωμαι, sc. τὸ δὴμο, the mark of a demagogue (see Plato, Gorg. 502 E, and note on 1274 a 5).

4. ἦ τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1309 a 15 sqq. ‘It is curious that in both places ἀναδιάστους is applied somewhat loosely to the second substantive. The annual proceeds are not re-divided’ (Richards). See notes on 1257 a 21, 1297 a 40, and 1297 b 27.
7 (5). 5. 1304 b 32—1305 a 7.
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7. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαῖων κ.τ.λ. For this expression see notes on 1303 b 20 and 1285 a 30. In Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 28. l. 28 sqq. Nicias, Thucydides son of Melesias, and Theramenes are marked off from οἱ ἀρχαῖοι. Μετέβαλλον, sc. οἱ δημοκρατικοί. We read in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22 ὅτι Πεισίστρατος δημοκρατικός καὶ στρατηγός ὁν τύραννον κατέστη. Plato (Rep. 565 C sqq.), following Herodotus (3. 82) and Euripides (Fragm. 628 Nauck: 626, ed. 2), had depicted the conversion of the δῆμον προστάτης into a tyrant, evidently holding that the change was as likely to occur in his own time as in earlier days, but Aristotle thinks otherwise for three reasons—1. the modern demagogue was not, like the demagogue of earlier times, a man of military skill and prowess, therefore he was not equally able to seize power by force; 2. great magistrates held by individuals were rarer than they had been; 3. the demos no longer lived a busy life in the country, so as to be unable to control the action of its champion in the city, but dwelt to a large extent in the city. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle speaks of the change of democracy into tyranny in c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq. without any intimation that it was of rarer occurrence than it had once been. Cypselus, the founder of the tyranny at Corinth, was a demagogue (c. 10. 1310 b 29: c. 12. 1315 b 27) and also polemarch (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58 : Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 392). Panætius of Leontini (Polyæn. Strateg. 5. 47), Peisistratus, and Dionysius the Elder were, like him, both demagogues and holders of high military offices. The same thing is true of Euphron, who made himself tyrant of Sicyon in b.c. 368 or soon after (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 44 sqq.). The tyrants of mediaeval Italy also were commonly men of military prowess, though this is not true of the founders of the Medicean dynasty (Roscher, Politik, p. 684). Military prowess alone, however, did not usually suffice in ancient Greece to enable a man to win a tyranny; he had also to gain the confidence of the demos by action hostile to the rich. Plato had said much the same in Rep. 565 D sqq., but he goes farther than Aristotle in that passage, for he speaks as if tyranny always arose ἐκ προστατικῆς βίης, whereas Aristotle only says that most of the ancient tyrants had been demagogues before they were tyrants. There were, in fact, kings (like Pheidon of Argos), and holders of great offices (like the tyrants of Ionia, and also Phalaris) who had made themselves tyrants without having been demagogues (c. 10. 1310 b 18-29). The same thing holds
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of δυνάσται in oligarchies (c. 8. 1308 a 22 sqq.), and of commanders of mercenary troops (c. 6. 1306 a 21 sqq.). Indeed we gather that any citizen who surpassed the rest in wealth and influence was often suspected of a design to make himself tyrant (3. 13. 1284 a 20 sqq.: 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.: 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22: Diod. 19. 1). That the orators at Athens were no longer also the generals of the State had already been remarked by Isocrates (De Pace, § 54 sqq.: cp. Philip. § 140). Phocion, indeed, made it his aim, according to Plut. Phocion, c. 7, to be both ῥήτωρ and στρατηγός, as Solon Aristides and Pericles had been (see this passage, which confirms what Aristotle says), but he probably stood almost alone in this ambition at Athens. At Thebes, however, Epaminondas and Pelopidas were surely both δημαγωγοί and στρατηγοί.

8. σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 14, σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν έκ δημαγωγών ὡς εἰπείν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ δια-
βάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους, where ἄρχαιον disappears, and Plato, Rep. 565 D sq. For τῶν ἄρχαιων τυράννων cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 18, τῶς ἄρ-
χαιος τυραννίδας. 'With ἄρχαιον the perfect γεγόνασιν is hardly logical.
I have noticed a few similar uses, e.g. Thuc. 1. 50. 2, γεγένηται: Plato,
Apol. Socr. 28 C, τετελευτήσασιν: Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 70, περιγεγόνασι.
In all these places the perfect seems = the aorist. ήγόνα is very
commonly thus used in late Greek, e.g. in giving a man's date,
γέγονε κατὰ τὴν ... 'Ολυμπιάδα' (Richards).

II. οὐ γάρ πω δεινόν ἣσαν λέγειν, 'nondum hominibus dicendis faculatatem adeptis' (Sepulveda). I prefer this interpretation to that of Sus., 'because there were as yet no trained speakers' ('weil es damals noch keine geschulten Redner gab'). It seems better to render ἣσαν 'men were' than 'there were.'

14. πλὴν εἰ ποι κ.τ.λ., 'except if anywhere one or two cases of the kind have occurred.' For βραχὺ τι cp. Plato, Rep. 496 B and
Laws 711 D. 'Βραχύ τι, per breve tempus?,' suggests Bonitz (Ind.
143 a 44), but I do not think that he can be right. To what cases
Aristotle refers is unknown.

1308 a 20 sqq., from which passages we learn that the tenure of
great offices for long terms was especially apt to result in tyranny,
and that great offices were often held for long terms even in
democracies in early days, though not many would be so in the
democracies of Aristotle's own day (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq).

16. ὁσπερ ἐν Μιλητω ἐκ τῆς πρωτανείας. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt.
2. 139. 2) thinks that the tyranny of Thrasybulus (Hdt. 1. 20) is here referred to as arising out of the office of prytanis. The same thing is said of tyranny throughout Ionia in c. 10. 1310b 28 sq. The prytanis at Miletus appears to have been a sole magistrate, like the annual prytanis who took the place of the king at Corinth under the Bacchiadai (Diod. 7. 9. 5: Paus. 2. 4. 4), and unlike the later prytaneis at Rhodes, who were six in number (Gilbert, Gr. Staats-alt. 2. 178). As to the title see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.

18. ἐτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τῶν πόλεων κ.τ.λ. Τὰς πόλεις here must mean 'the cities,' not, as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, 'the States.' As the demos lived a busy life in the country, it could not itself rule, and it was obliged to allow the leader whom it trusted to seize and exercise supreme power. The Eupatriae lived in the city, the demos lived in the country and were mostly tillers of the soil (Etymol. Magn. p. 395. 50: Thuc. 1. 126. 7, 2. 14). Thus the ἄγροικοι formed in early days a large section of the demos at Athens ('Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13: see Sandys' note). Compare Theogn. 55 sqq., and as to Epidaurus Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. i. Compare what we read of the Allobroges at a far later time (Strabo, p. 186, Ἀλλόβριγες δὲ . . . γεωργοῦσι τὰ πεδία καὶ τῶν αἰλάνων τῶν ἐν ταῖς Ἀλπεσί καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κομηδῶν ζῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἑπιφανέστατοι τὴν οὐίλλαν ἄχουσε . . . κατεσκενάκασι πᾶλιν). At Plataea in the fourth century B.C. the peasants lived in the city (Paus. 9. 1. 4–7), but this was owing to their distrust of the Thebans. Tanagra is a better instance of a 'peasant-town.' There the townsmen were largely tillers of the soil (Pseudo-Dicearch. De Graeciae Urbibus, c. 9: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 257). In c. 10. 1310 b 17 sqq. the acquisition of tyrannies by demagogues is said to have occurred ἡδι τῶν πόλεων ἡξημένων, where τῶν πόλεων probably means 'the States' (see note); the cities may well have been small, however, even if we take τῶν πόλεων to mean 'the cities.'

20. οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου here takes the place of οἱ δημαγωγοί, 11. In c. 6. 1305 a 39, 40 προστάτης is explained by ἥγεμόν. Οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου is probably a somewhat narrower term than οἱ δημαγωγοί, for not every demagogue would be one of the heads of the demos. For τυράννιδι ἐπετίθετο see note on 1305 b 41.

21. πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευόντες. Σφ. c. 10. 1310 b 14 sqq.

23. Πεισιστράτως, sc. ἥξισθη τῆς τυραννίδος.

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The more usual form is πεδεῖς (see Sandys’ note). Cp. Plato, Rep. 566 Λ, οὖν δὴ, ἐφφυ, ὡς σταυρίαν γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐχωντας τὰς οὐνίας; In Diog. Laert. i. 58 the Pedieis are distinguished from οἱ ἐξ ἀστεος as well as from οἱ παρικίαι.

καὶ Θεαγένης κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known from any other source of the exploit mentioned in the text.

25. λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπιεύμοντας, ‘having caught them grazing their herds and flocks in land not their own by the river.’ ‘Ἐπιεύμονον est in alieno agro pascere’ (Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 843 D): cp. Demosth. Or. 55. in Callicl. c. i i.

26. καὶ Διονύσιος κ.τ.λ. Daphnaeus was one of the Syracusan generals who failed to save Agrigentum from capture by the Carthaginians and who were consequently accused by Dionysius the Elder before the Syracusan assembly and dismissed from office, Dionysius himself being one of the generals appointed in their place (Diod. 13. 86-92). When Dionysius had made himself tyrant, Daphnaeus became one of his chief opponents till Dionysius convoked an assembly and had him put to death (Diod. 13. 96. 4). We can guess what allegations Dionysius would make against generals who were rich men from Diod. 13. 91. 5.

28. ὡς δημοτικὸς ὄν. It was Peisistratus’ reputation for being δημοτικὸς that more than anything else enabled him to become tyrant (‘Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 21: c. 14 init.: c. 16. l. 29 sq.).

μεταβάλλουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply αἱ δημοκρατίαι. Cp. c. 6. 1306 b 17 sqq., where however the contrast is between αἱ ἐννομοὶ δημοκρατίαι and αἱ κυρίοι. We have ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία here, but ἡ πάρτιος δημοκρατία in 2. 12. 1273 b 38. Πάρτιος is the more common form of the fem. in Aristotle’s writings (see critical note on 1285 b 5), but all the MSS. have πατρίας here except P*, which has πατρίδος wrongly: in 3. 14. 1285 b 5 only Π* and possibly Γ have πάτρια. Τῇ νεωτάτῃ, cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41, τέταρτον δὲ εἴδος δημοκρατίας ἡ τελευταία τοῖς κρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. Polybius (6. 57) gives a somewhat similar account of the change of democracy into ochlocracy. We gather from the passage before us that in the πατρία δημοκρατία there may be no property-qualification for office, and this agrees with 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27-32. The absence of a property-qualification for office is said to be characteristic of democracy in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 9 sq. (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 22 sq.); yet it would seem from 2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 21 sqq.) that the absence of a property-qualification for office makes a constitution
too democratic; hence a πατρία δημοκρατία in which there is none is defective. It is true that in a polity there may be no property-qualification for office (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.), but then in a well-organized polity it is not the demos that elects to office, but the hoplites (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sqs.). The teaching of Aristotle in the passage before us is in effect that if in a πατρία δημοκρατία there is no property-qualification for office and the demos elects, a keen competition for office results (see note on 1303 a 14), and the competitors make rival bids for the favour of the demos with the result that they eventually place the demos in a position of superiority to the laws. (Thurat has already pointed out in Études sur Aristote, p. 82, referring to c. 6. 1305 b 30 sqq., that even when there is a property-qualification for office, candidates for office will do the same thing; hence he proposes to place μη ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δὲ after ὁ δῆμος, translating ‘où l’élection est faite par le peuple entier, sans condition de cens,’ while Sus. proposes to omit these words, but the tendency to demagogy would at any rate be stronger where there was no property-qualification for office. For one thing the competitors would be more numerous.) Aristotle adds that this would happen less often if the magistrates were elected not by the demos as a whole, but by the tribes. We do not learn whether what he recommends is that the right of electing the magistrates should fall to each tribe in turn (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.), or that one tribe should elect to one magistracy and another to another, or that the magistracies should be organized as boards and that each tribe should elect a member of each of the boards. Perhaps he would prefer the last-mentioned alternative. Chorégι, τείχοποιοί, ταφροποιοί, and τριμυθοποιοί were elected by the tribes at Athens (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 202), and at one time the preliminary selection of the persons out of whom the magistrates appointed by lot were so chosen seems to have rested (with one or two exceptions) with the tribes (Gilbert, ibid., p. 217 : cp. Isocr. Panath. § 145). Election by the tribe would have the advantage that no competitor for office, however eager he might be, would be likely to make the tribe with which the election lay superior to the laws. At Rome even in its democratic days the assemblies voted not per capita as in Greece, but by divisions (curiae, centuriae, tribus)—see Roscher, Politik, p. 343 and Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 168—but Aristotle would hardly have been satisfied with this. He seems to have desired
that the magistrates should be elected, not in a collective assembly of the citizens, but by each tribe meeting separately from the rest. The evil of which he complains would be remedied by the adoption of the lot in appointments to office, but he probably does not think the lot a fit means of filling high offices in a παρπία δηµοκρατία (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.); some offices, indeed, could not well be filled by lot. Another remedy would be, as Thurot says, to introduce a property-qualification for office, but this it might be difficult to do under the circumstances described in the text. Aristotle forgets to mention in the passage before us that an abundance of pay must be forthcoming before an ultimate democracy can come into being even in a State in which there is no property-qualification for office (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq.). The experience of modern States has confirmed Aristotle's view that the filling of the highest offices by popular election has its dangers, but it has taught us that these dangers exist, whether the election is made in a collective assembly or not. The influential men who compete for high office are exposed to the temptation of making rival bids for popular support, and of promising, where the institutions of the State give them opportunities of fulfilling their promises, to promote an alteration of the constitution in a popular direction.

32. ἄκος δὲ τοὺ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1267 a 3. If ἄκος is here used in its usual sense of 'remedy,' τοὺ κ.τ.λ. will be in the genitive after it and will express the effect of the remedy.

C. 6. 37 sqq. In the sixth chapter we have in strictness to do only with those causes of the fall of oligarchies which are special to them: still some of the causes enumerated must have affected other constitutions also; we know, for instance, that the paucity of those admitted to office was perilous to aristocracies as well as to oligarchies (c. 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). Causes which affect oligarchies in common with other constitutions have been already dealt with in cc. 3 and 4 (for instance in c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and 1303 a 16 sqq. and in c. 4. 1304 a 17 sqq.). Some additional causes of the fall of oligarchies over and above those mentioned in cc. 3, 4, and 6 may be gleaned from c. 8. 1308 a 18 sqq. and c. 10. 1310 b 22 sqq., where the long tenure of a great office by one man or the union of several great offices in the hands of one man is said to be often fatal to them (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq. and 3. 15. 1286 b 16 sqq.), and from 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 14 sqq. and 26 sqq., whence we gather that oligarchies were often overthrown owing to their making no satis-
factory provision for the admission of deserving members of the demos into the privileged body, and owing to the defective numbers and quality of their light-armed troops. On two or three points Aristotle differs from Plato. The latter had said in Rep. 564 A, εἰκότως τοῖς, εἰπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἀληθεῖς πολιτείαις τυραννίς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας: Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that extreme oligarchy was specially apt to pass into tyranny (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq.: cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 16 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.). Plato, again, had spoken in a passage of the Republic (545 D: cp. Laws 683 E) as if changes of constitution were always due to quarrels among the holders of supreme power: Aristotle, on the contrary, points out in the chapter before us that oligarchies were often overthrown without discord among the oligarchs. Indeed, oligarchies based on a property-qualification (and polities also) might owe their fall to a mere accidental rise of the average level of the wealth of the individual members of the State. So again in Rep. 551 D sq. Plato had spoken of oligarchies as unable to make war without risk of overthrow, and hence Aristotle is careful to point out that they ran a similar risk in time of peace (1306 a 19 sqq.). The sixth chapter distinguishes between ἐννομοὶ and κύριοι ὀλιγαρχία (1306 b 20 sq.), but it takes no account of this distinction in dealing with the causes of the fall of oligarchies; it is evident, however, that most of the causes which it enumerates would affect κύριοι ὀλιγαρχίαι in a higher degree than ἐννομοὶ. Not a few of these causes were probably pointed out here for the first time; there is more that was new in this chapter than in the preceding one. Here and there we may suspect that Aristotle exalts the occasions of constitutional change into its causes.

Αἱ δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαι κ.τ.λ. The use of διὰ in διὰ δύο τρόπους ('owing to two modes') is remarkable. In c. 11. 1314 a 29 we have ὁ μὲν οὖν εἰς τρόπος δὴ οὖ γίγνεται σωτηρία τῶν τυραννίων τουτών ἐστιν. The two φανερώσατοι τρόποι are (1) ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι (sc. οἱ ὀλιγαρχοῦντες) τὰ πλῆθος, or if in some other way civil discord originates with others than the oligarchs (see note on 1305 b 1), and (2) if it originates with the oligarchs.

38. ἐνώ μὲν has nothing strictly answering to it, but is virtually taken up in 1305 b 22, κυνοῦσα δὲ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι εἶς αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

39. τὰς γὰρ ἰκανῶς γίνεται προστάτης, i.e. τὰς γὰρ προστάτης (καὶ ὁ τυχὼν) γίνεται ἰκανός (Coray, p. 329).

μάλιστα δὲ, sc. ἰκανὸς γίνεται, not, I think, μεταβάλλοντοι.
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ες αυτης της ολιγαρχιας = ες αυτων των ολιγαρχουντων: cp. c. 1.

1302 a 12.

40. καθαρει εν Ναξω Λυγδαμις κ.τ.λ. Supply εγενετο α ηγεμον.

As to Lygdamis see Hdt. 1. 61, 64, Aristot. Fragm. 517 (from the 'Constitution of the Naxians' ascribed to Aristotle, ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 348), Oecon. 2. 1346 b 7 sqq., and 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 15 with Sandys' notes. The fragment of the 'Constitution of the Naxians' traces the Naxian στασις to an outrage committed by some young Naxians of the wealthy class on a fellow-citizen named Telestagoras belonging to the same class and his two daughters, not on members of the demos, but it is likely enough that similar outrages were also committed on the demos. We find Lygdamis first heading the Naxian demos in its successful revolt against the oligarchs and establishing, it would seem, a democracy in place of the pre-existing oligarchy, then after an interval of uncertain length visiting Eretria to offer Peisistratus aid in men and money in acquiring for the third time the tyranny at Athens—whether as head of the Naxian democracy or after his own fall from power or the fall of the democracy, we do not know—and thus paving the way for his own accession to the tyranny of Naxos, which followed on Peisistratus' capture of the island. When the fragment of the 'Constitution of the Naxians' says that Lygdamis became tyrant of Naxos in consequence of his leadership of the people against the authors of the outrage referred to, the statement may be so far correct that, if he had not led the demos, he would not have been in a position to induce Peisistratus to make him tyrant. See Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2, 324. 3.

1305 b. 1. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἣ ἐς ἄλλων ἄρχη στάσεως διαφοράς. Compare 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τούτο διαφοράς πλείους. 'Ἀλλων has been interpreted in many different ways. Sepulveda, Giphanius, Heinsius, and Göttling take it to mean ἄλλων ἡ τοῦ πλῆθους, but if we so take it, it is difficult to explain the mention in 1305 b 18 sqq. of the revolution at Erythrae, which was caused by the demos, and also to explain καὶ, for we have not been clearly told that, when civil discord originates with the many, it originates in different ways. Stahr's interpretation, 'from other causes than that just mentioned' ('es gehen aber auch noch aus andern Ursachen die Anfänge zu Revolutionen hervor, die verschiedene Erscheinungen bieten'), escapes the first of these difficulties, but ἄλλων in ἐς ἄλλων is probably masculine. Vict. explains ἄλλων as 'others than those
who have governed oppressively’ (‘expertibus illius iniustae potestatis’), but not, I think, rightly. The natural meaning of ἀδων appears to me to be ἁλων ἢ τῶν ολιγαρχῶν: I translate, therefore, ‘but when civil discord originates also with others than the oligarchs [as well as when it originates with the oligarchs], it originates in different ways.’ That civil discord originating with the oligarchs originates in different ways, we see from 1305 b 22 sqq. Some would emend ἀδων, but the emendations hitherto proposed do not seem satisfactory. Αὐτῶν is suggested in place of it in the margin of the third Basle edition of Aristotle and is read by Schneider, Coray, and Welldon; αὐτῶν by Nickes and Congreve. Spengel, followed by Sus., would read ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀλλήλων ἄρχην στάσεως διαφορά. But if we read αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, or ἀλλήλων, we must take these words to mean τῶν ολιγαρχῶν: the examples which follow, however, are of changes of constitution brought about not by οἱ ολιγαρχῶν, but by εἴσαρμοι or γνώριμοι excluded from office, as Prof. Jowett has already pointed out, or else by the spontaneous action of the demos, as at Erythrae.

2. ὅτε μέν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There is nothing to answer to this μέν, but Aristotle intended to go on ‘and sometimes from the demos.’

οὐ τῶν δινῶν δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. For the phrase see note on 1303 b 22.

3. γίγνεται κατάλυσις. Cp. c. ii. 1314 a 30, γίγνεται σωτηρία. At Istrus there was a complete κατάλυσις of oligarchy, but at Massalia and Heraclea only a κατάλυσις of the extreme oligarchy in favour of a moderate form.

4. οἶνον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κ.τ.λ. As to the repetition of ἐν here see notes on 1294 a 12 and 1325 b 10, and cp. Plato, Rep. 563 E, ἐν ὀραίοις καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σῶμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα, and Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 3, ἐπείπερ ἐγρωσαν τὸ πείθεσθαι μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν στρατῷ καὶ ἐν ὀίκῳ. In the States here mentioned it was the rule that father and son or more brothers than one should not be in office at the same time. The object of the rule no doubt was to place on an equal footing the various households comprised within the privileged class and to prevent any one of them acquiring a disproportionate share of power, but this object might have been attained equally well if three or four members of each household, not one or two only, had been allowed to be in office at the same time, and then the number of those in office would not have been so small. At Venice three members of the same family
could be Senators at the same time (Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, p. 76), though two nobles from the same quarter of the city or the same family could not be Counsellors of the Doge at the same time (Yriarte, p. 349). The rule mentioned by Aristotle finds many parallels in mediaeval Italy. Thus at Siena there were five families two of whose members ‘could be in the government at the same time, while for all other families the number was limited to one’ (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 73). So again in the Republic of San Marino, ‘as of old at Venice, precautions are taken that family rings should not dominate the State, for ’ in elections to the Council ‘but one member from each family may be chosen, and if personal interests are discussed in Council, the Statutes provide that relations to the third degree shall leave the hall’ (E. Armstrong, ‘A Political Survival,’ Macmillan’s Magazine, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 199). Spinoza adopts a similar rule for the judges and councils of an aristocracy (Tractat. Polit. c. 8. 39, quamvis non opus sit ut unusquisque (īndex) ex diversa sit familia, necesse tamen est ne duo sanguine propinqui simul in subselliis locum occupent; quod in reliquis conciliis observandum est, præterquam in supremo, in quo sufficit, si modo in electionibus leges cautum sit ne cuiquam propinquum nominare, nec de eo, si ab alio nominatus sit, suffragium ferre liceat, et praeterea ne ad imperii ministrum quemcumque nominandum duo propinqui sortem ex urna tollant). If, as is probable, the Heracleia here mentioned is the Pontic Heracleia, the three States instanced by Aristotle were all of them situated in positions of peril on the outskirts of the Hellenic world, and precautions of this kind would be especially in place under those circumstances; the restriction, however, also existed at Cnidus (12 sqq.), which was in a different geographical position.


10. καὶ ἐνθα μὲν πολιτικοτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ διλιγαρχία, ἰ. ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ. For πολιτικοτέρα cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 39. It was at this time in all probability that the machinery was devised by which members of the demos were admitted to the privileged class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq., where Aristotle gives it his approval). In Β.Ε. 196 (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200) and in the time of Strabo (p. 179) the city was ruled by a Council of 600 timuchi, holding office for life, who were required to be fathers of children and to be
descended from three generations of citizens, but it is doubtful whether this supreme Council of 600 came into existence on this occasion, for in that case we might have expected Aristotle to say of Massalia what he says of Heracleia, εἰς ἑλπικάργοιν εἰς ἑλπικάργος Ἰλβεν ἡ ἡλιγαρχία.

11. ἀπετελεύτησεν, sc. ἡ ἡλιγαρχία.
12. εἰς ἑλπικάργος Ἰλβεν, sc. ἡ ἡλιγαρχία, cp. c. 7. 1307 a 36, εἰς ἡλίγιος αἰ oψίαι ἕρχονται. The chief place in the oligarchy overthrown by Agathocles at Syracuse was held by a Council of 600 (Diod. 19. 5. 6). See above on 1305 b 10 as to Massalia. It is not clear whether the arrangement as to the dicasteries at the Pontic Heracleia described in 1305 b 34 sqq. existed there under the oligarchy of 600 which is here referred to.

μετέβαλε δὲ κ.τ.λ. At Cnidus, unlike the States just mentioned, the oligarchy was not overthrown by the excluded γνώριμοι, but by the demos, as in Naxos (1305 a 38 sqq.), but this case is distinguished from that because at Cnidus (as also at Erythrae) the demos was not driven to revolt by oppression; its revolt was due rather to contempt (c. 3. 1302 b 25 sqq.). As this oligarchy was overthrown by the demos, it is probably to be distinguished from the oligarchy at Cnidus which is said in 1306 b 3 sqq. to have been overthrown by some members of the privileged class disgusted with the despotic character of its rule.

15. ἄλλα ἦ τὸν πρεσβύτατον. Bonitz (Ind. 33 a 61 sqq.) includes this among the passages in which 'ἄλλα ἦ ad significationem particulae πλῆρς vel ei ὑπ' prope accedit,' of which he gives a considerable number.

18. καὶ ἐν Ἕρωδαῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. We find a gens of Basilidae also at Ephesus (Baton ap. Suid. Πυθαγόρας, quoted by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141. 2: cp. Strabo, p. 633, διόπερ τὸ βασιλείον τῶν Ἰώνων ἱκεῖ (at Ephesus) συντήραι φασί, καὶ ἐτὶ νῦν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὑμοίζωσαι βασιλεῖς ἑχούσαι τινας τιμᾶς, προεδρίαν τε ἐν ἄγωσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπισήμον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σκίτωμα ἀντὶ σκήτρωμα, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἑλευσίνης Δήματρος), and perhaps also at Chios (Gilbert, 2. 153. 1). See Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 240. The gens of the Basilidae was probably composed of descendants of the kings: compare the Neleidae at Miletus (Aristot. Fragm. 515. 1562 a 29), the Penthilidae at Mytilene (7 (5). 10. 1311 b 25 sqq.: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 162), and the Eupatridae at Athens, who are described by one authority as οἱ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀστυ ὀικούντες καὶ
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metékontes basileikou génous (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 102. 3).

19. καίπερ καλός ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. Lamb. 'quamvis ea quae ad rempublicam pertinenter bene procurarent,' and Sus.⁹ a (Ind. p. 347) apparently takes τῶν to be neuter, but surely τῶν is masc., and the sentence should be rendered 'though those who possessed rights under the constitution managed [the affairs of the State] well.'

22. κυνοῦται δ' αἱ δηλιγραφίαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now passes to the second of the heads under which he groups the causes of the overthrow of oligarchies, causes originating with the oligarchs themselves. Cp. Thuc. 8. 89. 3, κατ' ἱδίας δὲ φιλοσιμίας οἱ πολλοί αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειτο, ἐν ὑπερ καὶ καλίστα δηλιγραφία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερίων ἀξιούσιν οἷς ὅπως ἦσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸς εἶναι (which is partly based on Hdt. 3. 82), and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 13, where ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικία is mentioned as a cause of στίσεις at Athens.

23. ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διπτή, ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις κ.τ.λ. This is repeated in c. 8. 1308 a 17. Ἡ μὲν is answered not without some roughness by ἡ ὅταν κ.τ.λ., 28 : cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23 sqq., where ἐνιαὶ μὲν is followed by ἡ (see note on 1275 a 24), and see note on 1338 b 1. Δημαγωγία is a humouring of the propensities of the δημαγωγοῦμενος with a view to the aggrandizement of ὁ δημαγωγός, and may be resorted to not only in relation to a few persons or many, but even in relation to one (c. 10. 1312 b 12 sq.).

25. οἷον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα κ.τ.λ. Οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα, i. e. Charicles (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 66). It would seem that in Aristotle's opinion the Thirty were led into the excesses which proved fatal to them by Charicles rather than by Critias. The name of Charicles also comes first in Lys. c. Eratosth. c. 55, ἐτέρῳ οἱ δακοῦντες εἶναι ἐναντιώτατοι Χαρικλεὶ καὶ Κριτία καὶ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐταιρείᾳ. We hear nothing of Charicles in the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία, which is remarkable if the work is from Aristotle's pen. According to Isocr. De Big. § 42, Charicles was a returned exile and eager both to enslave Athens to the Lacedaemonians and to rule over her himself. Δημαγωγοῦτες τοίς τριάκοντα, 'through courting the Thirty.' Kaibel (Stil und Text der 'Αθ. Πολ., p. 54) remarks, 'Everywhere in the 'Αθ. Πολ. the word δημαγωγεῖν is used absolutely: δημαγωγεῖν τὸν δίκλον etc. occurs in the Politics, but not in the 'Αθ. Πολ. '

26. καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle was friendly to
7 (5). 6. 1305 b 19—30.

Theramenes (‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 28: Plut. Nic. c. 2), and we find him here, unlike most people, laying the responsibility for the fall of the Four Hundred not on his shoulders, but on those of Phrynichus.

29. οἶν ἐν Λαρίση κτ.λ. As to the πολιτοφύλακες see note on 1268 a 22. They may probably have been annual magistrates, but it would seem that they were re-eligible. We see from 2. 8. 1268 a 21 sqq. that their office was a very important one—the custody of the city and of its walls and gates was probably in their hands (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.: compare the functions of the πολίταρχος in Aen. Poliorc. 26. 12 and of the πολιτάρχαι in Acts 17. 6 sqq.)—and we may perhaps infer from the passage before us that at Larissa it was tenable only by persons possessed of a high property-qualification, though the right of electing the πολιτοφύλακες belonged to the whole people. We are not told that the demos at Larissa elected the magistrates generally, as in some of the oligarchies mentioned in 30 sqq. All we are told is that it elected the πολιτοφύλακες. The rivalry of these great officials with each other in courting the body which elected them may have ended (cp. 1306 a 26 sqq.) in the transfer of their functions to an ἀρχων μεσίδιας at the head of a body of mercenaries, who used his position to make himself tyrant of the city. No wonder that a State so disunited as Larissa found it difficult to make head against the tyrants of Pherae and was obliged to call in Philip of Macedon against them (Schäfer, Demosthenes, i. 458).

30. καὶ ἐν δόσις ὀλιγαρχιάς οὐχ οὗτοι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὃν οἱ ἀρχοντές εἰσίν κτ.λ. It is not quite clear what should be supplied before ἐν δόσις ὀλιγαρχιάς. Should we supply δημαγωγοῦσιν, or κυνῶσιν αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι, or κυνῶσιν αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγοῦντων? I incline to think that we should supply the last-mentioned words. We may probably infer from the passage before us that in most oligarchies the magistrates were elected by the class which was eligible for the magistracies. Among the oligarchies referred to here the first form of oligarchy must, it would seem, find a place, for in that form the right of electing to the higher magistracies would commonly be possessed by a far more numerous body than that which had the right to hold them, inasmuch as the latter right was commonly confined to citizens possessing a high property-qualification (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 sqq.). The same weakness, however, was shared by other constitutions
also—for instance by aristocracies, for offices seem often to have been unpaid in aristocracies (2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.) and must therefore in practice have been tenable only by the rich, and indeed by democracies of the Solonian type, in which office was confined to the three higher property-classes and some offices were confined to the highest class, though the whole people had the right of electing to them. The cause of constitutional change here indicated by Aristotle—the rivalry of the holders of great offices in courting those who elect them with a view to their own aggrandizement—is indeed widely traceable in history both ancient and modern—for instance in the history of ancient Rome and in that of our own country—and is far from being confined in its operation to oligarchies (see note on 1305 a 28).

31. ἂλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄρχαι ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσίν ἢ ἔταιριῶν, αἱροῦνται δ' οἱ δῆμοι. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 24, ἀληθεων δ' εἰσίν δύο τρόποι ή γὰρ εἰς ἔταιρειας ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν τιμημάτων. Here, however, we have ἐκ (not ἄπο) τιμημάτων μεγάλων, and τίμημα must mean not 'property-qualification,' but 'the class possessing the property-qualification.' For ἐκ τιμημάτων αἱ ἄρχαι εἰσίν cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων (αἱ ἄρχαι καθοπτανταί), πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπον δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν, Plato, Rep. 553 A and Laws 698 B, and for ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων Pol. 2. 6. 1266 a 20, οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων τιμημάτων, and Plato, Laws 756 D, τετάρτη δὲ φέρευ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ συμφράστου τιμήματος ἀπανταῖ. Oligarchies in which only members of certain clubs are eligible for office are not distinctly named in the list of oligarchies in 6 (4). 5—6, though the class of oligarchies to which they belong is referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 15 sqq. (cp. also 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 40 sqq.). The oligarchies established by Lysander after Aegospotami were of this nature (Plut. Lysand. c. 13, καταλύουν δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολειτείας ἔνα μὲν ἀρμοστὴν ἐκάστης ἀκεδαμόνων κατέλαπτε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντες ἐκ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συγκεκριμένων κατὰ πολὺν ἕταιρεῖαν καὶ ταῦτα πράττον ὁμοίως ἐν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεις παρεῖπε σχολαῖς, τρόπον τῷ κατα- σκευαζόμενος ᾠρῳ τῇ τῇ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ἡγεμονίᾳ ὀντε ἐκτὸς ἄρσενίδον ὀντε πλουτιόδον ἀπεδείκνυε τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἄλλ' ἕταιρείας καὶ ἕξιν ἐχαριζόμενος τὰ πρᾶγματα καὶ κυρίους ποιῶν τιμῆς τε καὶ κολάσεως. The oligarchy of Abydos so far resembled those founded by Lysander that the magistracies were tenable only by persons belonging to certain clubs, but it differed from them in this, that the hoplites or the demos had the right of electing the magistrates, a peculiar arrange-
ment, as Prof. Jowett has already remarked; it appears, in fact, to have resulted in the tyranny of an ἄρχων μεσίδιος supported by mercenary soldiers (1306 a 26 sqq.). The competition of the oligarchs for the favour of the electors would be intensified by the circumstance that they belonged to rival clubs. How soon oligarchy at Abydos assumed the form described in the text, we have no means of knowing, but an oligarchy of some kind was probably set up there after the revolt of the city from Athens in B.C. 411 (Thuc. 8. 62), when it became for more than twenty years 'the great military station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 443), remaining faithful to the Lacedaemonians even after the defeat of their fleet at Cnidus in B.C. 394, notwithstanding the general defection of the Greek States of Asia Minor. This fidelity was ill repaid at the peace of Antalcidas, when with most of Asiatic Greece Abydos was abandoned by the Lacedaemonians to Persia. Still even down to the time of Demosthenes (c. Aristocr. c. 158) the dissolute (Athen. Deipn. 524 f sqq.) but gallant little city (see the story of its heroic defence against Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 200 in Polyb. 16. 29-33) remained 'persistently hostile to Athens' and in all probability an oligarchical State. Sestos on the opposite side of the Hellespont was also hostile to Athens (see the account of its fate at the hands of Chares in B.C. 353 in Diod. 16. 34); no cities, in fact, were more coveted by Athens than these two, which, lying as they did at the narrowest point of the Hellespont, were the natural stepping-stones between Europe and Asia, and hence of great importance. Another important advantage possessed by Abydos was the excellence of its harbour, which offered a secure anchorage to vessels, while outside it a strong current ran in the Hellespont (Polyb. 16. 29. 13 sq.). That the ἑταρία at Abydos, or at any rate their domination, had passed away at the time at which Aristotle wrote seems to be implied by his language in 1306 a 30 sq. Τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἑταρίας was bad; cp. Dio Chrysost. Or. 45 (2. 206 R), μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ ἡξίουν μηδὲ ἐτέρουν μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἔδος εἰσίγειν μηδὲ καθ' ἑταρίας πολιτεύεσθαι μηδ' εἰς μέρη διοικᾶν τὴν πόλιν.

33. καὶ ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἐστιν, 'and where the dicasteries are composed of others than those who are eligible for office.' As τὸ πολιτεύμα cp. 1306 a 14 sq., where this seems to be the meaning of the word. Aristotle probably does not

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A a.
mean that the members of the πολίτευμα were excluded from the dicasteries, but that membership of the dicasteries was not confined to them (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8, γίγνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ δῆμου πάντες). This arrangement existed at one time at Heracleia on the Euxine, and it seems to have led to a change of the oligarchy into a democracy. If so, this democracy cannot have been that which appears to have been instituted at Heracleia at the foundation of the colony (see note on 1304 b 31); it must have arisen at a later date. If the dicasteries referred to by Aristotle were popular dicasteries, and if they possessed the power of inflicting the penalties of death and exile, no arrangement was more alien to the spirit of an oligarchy (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 31–34). This important power was reserved for a few not only in most oligarchies but also in such aristocracies as the Lakedaemonian and the Carthaginian (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 31 sqq.: 3. 1. 1275 b 9 sqq.). The authority which Solon conceded to dicasteries open to persons who were not under his constitution admissible to office (2. 12. 1274 a 3, 18 sqq.) was thought by many to have proved fatal to the moderate democracy founded by him (1274 a 3 sqq.). When C. Gracchus gave judicial authority to the equestrian order (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., vol. iii. p. 116), he dealt a heavy blow at the oligarchy. Still Aristotle knew of constitutions in which the deliberative and the magistracies were oligarchically organized, but the dicasteries were organized as in an aristocracy (8 (6). 1. 1317 a 4 sqq.).

36. ἐπὶ δ' ἦταν ἐνώι κ.τ.λ. Supply μεταβάλλων τὴν πολιτείαν before ἦταν. This is mentioned in connexion with changes due to τὸ διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγεῖν because calling in the demos is akin to τὸ δημαγωγεῖν, though in strictness there is no φιλονεικία in the case, for the excluded members of the oligarchy are obliged to call in the demos. The narrowing of an oligarchy is conceived to lead to democracy in a slightly different way in 3. 15. 1286 b 18, οἷς γὰρ ἐστὶν ἑλάττους ἐγγόνες δι' αἰσχροκέρ- δειαν ἵσχυστερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιβέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας.


πολλοῖς πέντες, ὀλβίονς δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
dοκοῦνται εἶναι, συμμάχους ἀνα ἔχει,
io στάσιν ἒθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν.
éφ' ἀρπαγαίοι τῶν πέλας, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμωις

dapánwaios ἄρρωθα διαφυγώθ' ἐν' ἀργίας.

Aeneas (Poliorc. 14. 1) says of debtors in a besieged city, ὅπου γε
καὶ φοβορετάτα τῇ κύρους ἐκεῖν ὦ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀνθρώποι. The loss of wealth
would be especially likely to cause constitutional change in oligarchies, because it would often entail exclusion from the ruling class, but would it not tend to cause constitutional change in democracies also? This cause of change is guarded against in c. 8. 1308 b 20 sqq. In illustration of Aristotle's remark the instances of Catiline and Julius Caesar may be referred to (Appian, Bell. Civ. 2. 1 sq.).

40. ἀναλώσωι, sc. τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλεγαρχίᾳ τυνές. Cp. c. 12. 1316 b
18, ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἑγεμόνων τυνές ἀπολέσωι τὰς ὀυτίας, καινοτομώσωι.

καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, 'for men of the kind just described also.'

41. ἥ τυραννίδι ἐπιθετεῖται αὐτοί. 'Ἐπιθετεῖται τυραννίδα here, as
in c. 5. 1305 a 21 and c. 8. 1308 a 22 sq., means 'affectare
tyrannidem' (Bon. Ind. 281 a 51 sq.), but we have in c. 10. 1311 a
26 ἐπιθετεῖται ταῖς μοναρχίαις and in 1312 b 18 ἐπιθετεῖται ταῖς τυραννίσιν,
where the meaning is 'attack monarchies' or 'tyrannies.' Ruined
oligarchies, as well as men of wealth and influence, seem to have
been able to make themselves tyrants (see note on 1302 b 15).

1. ἄσπερ Ἰππαρίνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις. See Grote, Hist. 1306 a.
of Greece, 10. 599 and 11. 76 (Congreve). Hipparinus was a leading
citizen of Syracuse and was, like Dionysius the Elder, one of
the strategi who were chosen when the previous strategi were
deposed by vote of the people (Diod. 13. 92), and were themselves
displaced when Dionysius was elected στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ in
b.c. 406-5 (Diod. 13. 94: Plut. Dion, c. 3: Dict. of Greek and
Roman Biography, art. Hipparinus). His position as a colleague
of Dionysius would make it easy for him to aid the designs of
the latter. That his support of Dionysius, who married his
daughter Aristomache, enabled him completely to retrieve his
fortunes, is pointed out by Grote (11. 76), who refers to the fact
that his son Dion became one of the richest men in Syracuse.
Aristotle does not mean to imply that Syracuse was under an
oligarchy when Dionysius the Elder obtained the tyranny; it was,
in fact, democratically governed (c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.: Plut. Reg.
et Imp. Apophth. 176 D).

2. καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει κ.τ.λ. See note on 1303 b 2. 'A man
whose name was Cleotimus' introduced Chalcidian ἵπποικα, and after
A a 2
NOTES.

their arrival created a διάστασις between them and the rich of Amphipolis, whether with the view of making himself tyrant or some one else, Aristotle does not explain, nor does he tell us how the thing ended. We cannot even infer from the passage with any certainty that an oligarchy existed at Amphipolis before the events here narrated. All that is clear is that Cleotimus' conduct was caused by his dissipation of his own fortune, and that his object was tyranny, for himself or for another.

ονόμα ἦν Κλεοτίμως. Cp. Hdt. 3. 143, ταῦτα εἶπε ἐὼν ἐν τοῖς ἀκτοῖς δόκιμοι, τῷ οὖν οἴημα ἦν Τελέσαρχος: Diod. 15. 30. 3, Νεογέννης τις οἴημα: [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 8. 2, Ἀρχιλόχου τὸν ποιητὴν Κάραξ οἴημα ἔκτεινε: Aristot. Fragm. 508. 1561 a 39, Ἐξεινος δ' ὁ Ποκαίνος Νάνο τῷ βασιλεί, τούτο δ' ἦν αὐτῷ οἴημα, ἦν ξίνος: Ammian. Marc. 27. 8. 10, Civilem nomine. It is evident that in some of these passages the explanation that the word is a proper name is added because otherwise misapprehension might occur, but this does not seem to be the case in the passage before us.

3. εἶλθόντων. See notes on 1281 b 4, 13.

4. καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνη κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known of this 'transaction with Chares' from any other source, but it is easy to guess what happened. A wealthy Aeginetan who had wasted his fortune in riotous living made application to the Athenian general Chares, who usually had mercenaries at his disposal, for the assistance of his mercenaries in an attempt to make himself or some one else (we are not told which) tyrant in Aegina, offering Chares no doubt a great reward in the event of success. The attempt seems to have been made, but to have failed. The 'promises of Chares' were proverbially delusive (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 463). The date of the 'transaction' referred to may have been b.c. 367, when Chares was stationed at Corinth with Athenian mercenaries (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 372, 393). Athens was then siding with the Lacedaemonians against Thebes, and Aegina, her constant foe, may not improbably have been on the side of Thebes. Chares would therefore be glad to substitute for the existing government of Aegina a tyrant who would owe his position to Athens. For the unfavourable use of τὴν πράξιν πράττειν cp. Plato, Laws 831 D. The phrase itself occurs in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 18. l. 13 sq.

6. διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, i.e. because he had dissipated his fortune (cp. 1306 b 17 and 3. 13. 1284 a 23 sq.).
7. ὅθεν κ.τ.λ., 'whence civil trouble is stirred against the oligarchs either by the depredators or by those who resist them in their depredations.' The two cases are (1) where the government does not connive at these misappropriations of public moneys, in which case the thieves attempt to create a οὐσία to escape punishment (διὰ φόβου, c. 3. 1302 b 21 sqq., which should be compared); (2) where it does, in which case the section opposed to the peculations rises against the conniving government' (Postgate, Notes on the Politics of Aristotle, p. 22). It would seem that at Apollonia on the Euxine the revolt against the oligarchy was raised by the opponents of the depredators, so that here the oligarchs must have connived at the depredations. Cp. Hdt. 3. 82, where we are told that when some champion of the demos put a stop to the misdeeds of plunderers of public property, he often became a tyrant.

9. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ὁυκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς. Plato (Rep. 545 D) had said that no constitution can be overthrown if τὸ ξενόν τὰς ἀρχὰς is at one with itself; Aristotle will commit himself only to this, that an oligarchy of which this can be said is not easily overthrown from within; it may be overthrown by the demos or by excluded rich men. He remembers the case of Erythrae (1305 b 18 sqq.).

10. σημεῖον δὲ ἦ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ. The expression τὸ χρήσαταν σφήσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς suggests, if we compare c. 8. 1308 a 10 sqq., that Pharsalus put the members of the privileged class as far as possible on a level, both in respect of participation in office and in other ways. Pharsalus had not always been free from στάσεις. We read in Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2 sq. that, having been in a state of civil discord (στασύσαντες), the citizens of Pharsalus at some time previous to b.c. 375 entrusted Polydamas, one of their number, with the custody of the acropolis and with the receipt and employment of the revenue, and that Polydamas proved himself worthy of their confidence. Not long after b.c. 375, however, Pharsalus was forced to become dependent on Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 18), and Jason's successor, Polyphron, put 'Polydaimas and eight other Pharsalians to death (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 34). In b.c. 352, when Philip of Macedon reduced Pherae, Pharsalus exchanged its dependence on Pherae for a virtual dependence on Macedon. Philip showed much favour to the city (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 248, 324, 503), which derived considerable importance from its position at 'the entrance of the most direct and central of the passes which
lead from the plains of Thessaly to the vale of the Spercheius and Thermopylae' (Leake, Northern Greece, i. 449). For how long the Pharsalian oligarchy had deserved the praise which Aristotle gives it, we cannot say with any certainty; it did so at any rate at the time at which he wrote. His commendation of Pharsalus is just what we should expect from a friend of Macedon (see note on 1304 a 10). Not long after it was penned, Pharsalus took part in the rising of Thessaly against Macedon in the Lamian War (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. i. 352).

11. πολλών κύριοι εἴσι, 'are masters of many men': cp. Xen. Hell. 6. i. 8, where we read of 'the cities dependent on Pharsalus' in B.C. 375 (τῶν ἐξ ἑνῶν ἱστημένον πόλεων). Philip gave Halus to Pharsalus (Strabo, p. 433 : Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 248. 1).

12. καταλύονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is perhaps suggested by what immediately precedes, for to create an oligarchy within an oligarchy is the opposite to τὸ χρήσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 101. 1) identifies these senators with the δημουργοὶ of Thuc. 5. 47. 9, but this is doubtful. That this oligarchy at Elis was overthrown is clear from the passage before us, but we are not told whether it was overthrown by the members of the πολίτευμα who found themselves virtually excluded from the senate or by an union of these persons with the demos or by the demos acting by itself. It was probably overthrown by a man named Phormion: compare (with Schn.) Plut. Reip. Gerend. Pracc. c. 10, οὐκ ἀγροῦ δὲ ὧτι καὶ βουλη ὑν των ἑπαξη καὶ ἀληγαρχῆς κολούσατε, ὥσπερ 'Εφίμαλτης 'Αθηναῖς καὶ Φορμίων παρ' ἤλεοι, δύναμιν ἄμα καὶ δοξαν ἱσχον. It is quite uncertain, however, when Phormion lived (see Sus. 2, Note 1586, and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 102. 4).

18. ἑνεκήκοσι δοτας, 'being only ninety in number.'

19. γύνεται δὲ . . . 31. ἢφαίδου. We have still to do here with revolutions in oligarchies due to the oligarchs themselves, for in the cases now described the overthrow of the oligarchy is brought about by the oligarchs, who entrust the defence of the State in war to mercenary troops or to the demos, or its custody in peace to a neutral magistrate at the head of mercenaries. This passage corrects Plato, Rep. 551 D sq. (see note on 1305 a 37 sqq.). Kai
7 (5). 6. 1306 a 11—23. 359

Plutarch, cp. According to Plato, Plut. Hist. v. 24, 24. 155. In Plut. Timol. 5. 8, resemble Plut. Timol. 5. 8 is connected with the passage best in the light of Argos. The Corinthian oligarchs would be intensified by the circumstances connected with the return from Argos of the exiled democrats,
which Diodorus refers to B.C. 375 (15. 40. 3), and by the scheme of Athens in B.C. 366 to get possession of Corinth, in which she may probably have counted on aid from the Corinthian demos (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 4 sq.: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 79, vol. 10. 396 sq.). The appointment of Timophanes was subsequent to the failure of this Athenian project (Grote, Part 2, c. 85, vol. 11. 193).

24. άν δὲ πλείον α. к.τ.λ. Supply δόσων. "Εστια is omitted in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 17 (where see note), and άν εἰρήν probably in 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 35 sq., and εἰρήν apparently in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 38.

25. ὅτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 551 D sq. Machiavelli remarks (Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, 1. 6) that the circumstance that the Romans did not, like the Venetians, abstain from employing the plebs in war 'gave the plebs additional force and influence and infinite occasions of raising tumults.' We read in a quotation from the fremdenblatt of Vienna (Times, Oct. 12, 1893) that 'the introduction of conscription [in Austria] made it morally incumbent on the State to grant the right to vote to those who had borne heavy burdens for the commonweal.' 'Taine (Origines de la France Contemporaine: Le Régime Moderne, r. 284-296) justly describes conscription as the natural companion or brother of universal suffrage' (Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, ed. 1, 1. 261).

26. έν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ κ.τ.λ. See note on 21. "Ἀρχαίοι μεσιδίῳ, 'to a neutral magistrate' standing midway between the contending parties: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 22, καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦντι ἐναὶ μεσιδίους, ὅς εἰν τοῦ μέσου τίχως, τοῦ δικαίου τευχόμενοι, and Pol. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 4, ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν ὥς ἐν ὑπομονῆιαν (sc. οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ πένητες) διὰ τὴν ἄπισταν τὴν πρὸς ἄλλους' πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτήτης, διαιτήτης δ' ὁ μέσος, where διὰ τὴν ἄπισταν τὴν πρὸς ἄλλους again occurs. Were the services of a 'neutral magistrate' ever resorted to in conflicts between rich and poor as well as in conflicts between two oligarchical factions? The position of Polydamas of Pharsalus (see note on 1306 a 10) must be distinguished from that of a 'neutral magistrate,' for we are not told that he was at the head of a body of mercenaries, and besides he was charged with the receipt and employment of the revenue, which the 'neutral magistrate' does not seem to have been.

29. ὀπερ συνέβη κ.τ.λ. "Οπερ refers to δὲ ἐνότα γίνεται κύριος ἀμφιτέρων. Larissa and Abydos are here again named together, as in 1305 b 29-33. Perhaps in both the competition of high magis-
trates for the favour of the people produced in the minds of the two oligarchical factions a strong distrust of each other, and led to the custody of the acropolis, walls, and gates of the city being placed in the hands of a 'neutral magistrate,' who however ultimately made himself master of both factions. That there were two factions at Larissa in B.C. 431 we see from Thuc. 2. 22, ἦ γύναι τοῦ δε αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Δαρίσκης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἄριστονος, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἐκάτερος. I take εἰς τήν τῶν 'Ἀλευάδων ἀρχής τῶν περὶ Σίμων to mean 'in the time of the rule of Simus the Aleuada' (cp. c. 10 1312 b 10, ἦ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα τυραννίς), and Simus was in all probability the 'neutral magistrate' referred to, just as Iphiades was at Abydos. The name Simus (as to which see note on 1304 a 29 and cp. Plin. Nat. Hist. 11. 158, where the Roman name Silo, derived from silus, 'snub-nosed,' is compared with it) is one which occurs more than once in the family of the Aleuadae—for instance, the father of an early Aleus was named Simus (Euphorion in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 72)—but there can be little doubt that the Simus of the passage before us is the well-known Simus of Larissa, who is said by Demosthenes (De Cor. c. 48) to have, in conjunction with Eudicus, also of Larissa, brought Thessaly into subjection to Philip of Macedon, and to have lost his favour as soon as he had done so. We read of his dissolute youth in [Demosth.] c. Nearer. cc. 24 sq., 108. He is thought to have been tetrarch of one of the four divisions into which Thessaly was broken up by Philip in B.C. 342 (Demosth. Phil. 3. 26 : Curtius, History of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 368 : Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 402 : Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 13. 3), and his name may appear in this capacity on some coins of Larissa of the fourth century B.C. which bear the inscription ΣΙΜΟΣ (Gardner, Catalogue of Greek Coins, Thessaly, Introduction, p. xxvi, and p. 31 : Head, Hist. Num. pp. 253, 255). As to Iphiades, that he was a skilful soldier appears from the narrative in Aen. Poliorc. c. 28. 6 (referred to by Schneider). The Iphiades mentioned in Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 176–7, who had a son in Cersobleptes' custody as a hostage on behalf of Sestos, may probably be the same man. Another Iphiades of Abydos is mentioned in Polyb. 16. 30. 7. That clubs were often 'centred round a single individual' we see from the example of those at Athens, where we hear of the clubs of Phaeax, Euphiletus, Alciades, and others (Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. 153–204, quoted by L. Whibley, Political Parties in Athens, p. 83 sq.).
Aristotle has just been describing how oligarchies were often overthrown if power were placed in the hands of captains of mercenaries or a demos or a neutral magistrate, and now he goes on to show that στάσεις might arise within the circle of the oligarchs themselves without any external intervention. They might arise either when the oligarchs treated each other despitefully or when the oligarchy itself was intrinsically overspotic. In either case some of the oligarchs might step in and overthrow the oligarchy. Aristotle suggests precautions against the former source of trouble in c. 8. 1308 a 31 sqq. Cp. Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 824 F sqq.

32. τῶν ἐν τῇ διλιγαρχίᾳ. Cp. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 126 (an inscription from Chios), οἱ ἐν τῇ διλιγαρχίᾳ.

34. μὲν is answered by δὲ, 36.

αἱ εἰρήμεναι πρότερον, in c. 4. 1303 b 37-1304 a 17. Supply ἐγώντο from γώνωταi, 31.

35. καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δ' ὑλιγαρχίαν τῷ τῶν ἰππέων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 36-40. This Eretrian oligarchy helped Peisistratus in his final recovery of the tyranny at Athens (Ἑθ. Πολ. c. 15). Diagoras was evidently one of the oligarchs, and his disappointment (probably of the hand of an heiress) was due not to the decision of a dicastery, but to a factious intrigue against him (cp. 33, κατασταυρίζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους). The Diagoras mentioned in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 12 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 217), Διαγόρας εἰς Σπάρτην πορευμένον καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ τελευτήσας Ἐρετρεῖς εἰκόνα ἐστησαν, is probably the same man. Müller distinguishes him from the famous Διαγόρας ὁ ἄθεος of Melos. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 66) thinks that the overthrow of this oligarchy by Diagoras probably occurred before the Persian wars.

36. ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως κ.τ.λ. Μοιχεία was a criminal offence in Greek States (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 91: Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 59). The technical term μοιχεία included at Athens not only adultery, but also some kinds of illegal intercourse with unmarried women or widows, and the offender, if taken in the act, might be put to death by the husband, or, in the case of an unmarried woman or widow, by the father, brother, or grandfather, if her κύριος (Meier und Schömann, Der attische Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 402 sqq.). Aristotle makes some suggestions as to the punishment of adultery in 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 38 sqq.; he seems to regard the degrading punishment mentioned in the text as excessive. The κύριος was
a wooden yoke placed on the back of the neck, which kept the
head bowed down (see Suidas, s. vv. Κύφοις and Ἐπίκουρος, and
Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 476), and exposure in it in the most public
part of the city was a punishment rather for thieves than for
c. 11, where we read of Hyperbolus, ὁ τοὺς ἐν τῇ τότε χρόνῳ τοῦ μὲν
δαμανίου πύρω τίθεμεν εαυτόν, δὲ δὴ τῷ κυφων μᾶλλον προσήκον). It
may, however, have been an obsolete punishment revived for
the occasion, for a similar punishment was inflicted on adulteresses
at Cyme (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 2). The punishment inflicted on
Dercyllidas by Lysander (Xen. Hell. 3. 1. 9: Grote, Hist. of
Greece, Part 2, c. 72, vol. 9. 289) was far less degrading, yet he felt
it deeply. The στάσεις at Heraclea (probably the Pontic Heraclea)
and Thebes to which Aristotle refers were apparently well known.
We are not told whether they led to any change in the constitution.

1. ἐφιλονεικήσαν γάρ αὐτοὺς. Φιλονεικεῖν seems here to have an 1306 b.
accusative of the person after it because it contains much of the
meaning of φιλονεικως ἐδιώκαν or ἐκόλασαν. But verbs compounded
with φιλο- occasionally take an accusative of the person: so φιλο-
στοργεῖν in Plato, Laws 927 B and Polyb. 5. 74. 5, and φιλανθρωπεῖν
in Polyb. 3. 76. 2 and 11. 26. 5. Richards, however, would read
αὐτοῖς with Liddell and Scott (s. v. φιλονεικέω).

2. ἐν ἄγορᾷ, as in 6 (4), 15. 1299 b 16 and often in Plato (see
Ast, Lex. Platon. s. v. ἄγορά). In 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 20 we have τῶν
ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ ἄγορᾷ καθήμενων. As to κατὰ πόλιν and κατὰ τὴν
πόλιν see note on 1285 b 13.

3. πόλλαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. We read in Diod. 15. 40. 2 that the holders
of office in the Peloponnesian oligarchies in the days of Lace-
daemonian supremacy had dealt with the citizens imperiously
(ἐπιτακτικῶς), and that they suffered in consequence after the fall
of the oligarchies. This throws light on the meaning of ἄγαν

6. γίγνονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. Compare 2. 12. 1274 a 12 and the changes
διὰ τῶν as mentioned in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 3 sqq. The polity would
be exposed to changes of this kind because it imposed a property-
qualification on members of the assembly (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sqq.: 6
(4). 13. 1297 b 1 sqq.). Some oligarchies would not be affected
by the change in the value of property to which Aristotle refers—
for instance, those in which office was confined to members of
certain clubs (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 31 sq.), or to persons who in addition
to possessing a high property-qualification were elected by the πολίτευμα (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 sq.) or succeeded to office by right of birth (1292 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle omits to refer to the democracies in which a property-qualification for office existed (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 39 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.). If there were aristocracies in which there was a property-qualification for office, notwithstanding the counsel given in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.—and Thurii seems to have been a case in point (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 23–29)—Aristotle is silent also as to these. Nor does he take any notice here of the liability of the same constitutions to a change in the opposite direction—that of increased narrowness—if the general level of wealth in the State should fall instead of rising, though he deals with this also in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. A property-qualification for the assembly appears to have existed in some oligarchies in which an assembly existed (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.), but Aristotle refers here only to property-qualifications for office. For the effect of peace on the prosperity of Greek States see Diod. 11. 72. 1 and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 95 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 259). It is possible that the cessation of internal war in Greece enforced by the Congress of Corinth after the battle of Chaeroneia (see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 48) had done something by the time at which Aristotle wrote to raise the average level of wealth in Greek States (see as to Athens Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 272). According to Roscher, Politik, p. 412, 'the old centurial constitution of Rome had wellnigh lost its timocratic character by the time of Fabius Maximus, in b.c. 304, because the property required for the first class hardly implied even well-to-do circumstances.'

8. βουλεύοντα, i.e. βουλευταί εἰσι (Sus. 8 Ind. s.v.). Cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 29 sq. See note on 1299 b 32.

τὰς ἄλλας ἄρχας. In many of the oligarchies to which Aristotle refers judicial functions would be exercised by magistrates; indeed, some claimed that a member of a dicastery held a magistracy (see note on 1275 a 26).

9. πολλάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. s.v. Anacoluthia) compares this passage with De Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 b 2, τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφοροκοῦντα τρόπον τινὰ μετὰ τὸ σύντημα τὸ εἶ ἄρχας φοιεῖς γίνεται, De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq., and Top. 1. 15. 106 a 1 sqq., remarking that in all these passages 4 nominativus in principio enunciati ponitur quasi absolute et tituli instar.' Susenmihl, like Coray, Thurot, and others, believes that something has dropped out of the text after
7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8—7. 1306 b 22.

συμβαίνει, but Bonitz is probably right. See notes on 1304 a 14, 1315 b 40, and 1326 a 34.


14. ἐκ προσαγωγῆς. See note on 1336 a 18.

17. στασιάξεως refers to 1306 a 31 sqq. I have not found any other passage in which constitutions are said στασιάξειν: this is often said of States. Yet cp. Plato, Laws 757 A.

dλως δὲ κ.τ.λ. All constitutions are said in c. 12. 1316 a 18 sqq. to change more often into their opposites than into allied forms. Aristotle more than once traces, though less fully than we should wish, how democracies ruled by law pass into absolute democracies (e.g. in c. 5. 1305 a 28 sqq. and 2. 12. 1273 b 35—1274 a 21), and we learn something as to the way in which a similar change occurs in oligarchy from c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq., c. 6. 1306 a 24 sq., c. 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 6 sqq., and 1309 a 23 sqq., but of the change from absolute oligarchies and democracies into oligarchies and democracies ruled by law we hear hardly anything from him. He does not tell us how this happy change was to be brought about (for instances of it see note on 1305 b 3), but it is easy to see that anything which promoted a more equal distribution of property would tend in this direction in oligarchies, and that anything which diminished the omnipotence of the assembly and the demagogues would tend in a similar direction in democracies.

20. τάς κυρίους. For the fem. form κύριος cp. (with Sus. 3 Ind.) 3. 15. 1285 b 36 and 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 7. It is not meant that there are more κύριαι δημοκρατίαι καὶ δημοκρατίαι than one (cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17). In 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5 sqq. only one form of each in which the law is not supreme is recognized.

22. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ. Nothing answers to αἱ μὲν, C. 7. but these words seem to be virtually taken up in 1307 a 5 sqq. Some στάσεις in aristocracies arise from the frowness of those who share in office (cp. c. 8. 1309 a 2, τὸ τόις γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικάς), and others from too large a proportion of power being given to the rich. The latter sort seems to be thought by Aristotle to be the more destructive (λόγῳ δὲ μάλιστα, 1307 a 5). The former cause of στάσεις is said to be most operative when it is reinforced by other causes of discontent—(1) when virtue is thought not to meet with its due meed of honour, whether it is that the many claim to be equal in virtue to the ruling few, or that indi-
individuals of high merit and position are insulted by men of still higher position, or that an individual of manly character is excluded from office; or again (2) when there is a great inequality of wealth in the State, some of the citizens being very rich and others very poor; or again (3) when an individual already great is not satisfied with his greatness but seeks to be sole ruler. All Aristotle’s examples but one are taken from Lacedaemonian history, and he evidently regards the sharers in office in the Lacedaemonian aristocracy as few, notwithstanding that the ephorate was open to all the citizens. The Lacedaemonian aristocracy was also affected by the other cause of στάσις in aristocracies. It did not, indeed, like Thurii at one time (1307 a 27 sqq.), make a high property-qualification a condition of the tenure of office, but it allowed property to find its way into the hands of a few (1307 a 35 sq.). It is implied in c. 8. 1308 a 3 sqq. that aristocracies are not safe constitutions. It will be noticed that in none of the instances adduced in 1306 b 27–1307 a 5 was the στάσις successful.

23. εἶπεν, in c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq.

24. διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι πως. Cp. 1307 a 34 sq.

25. οἱ ἄρχοντες ὁτὲ τῶν ἄρχοντων μετέχοντες = οἱ τῶν ἄρχων μετέχοντες: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 34 sq., 37 sq.

οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτων ὀλίγοι. The rulers are few in an oligarchy because the rich are few, in an aristocracy because the good are few.

26. ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταύτα καὶ ἡ ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι. This is added in confirmation of what has just been said, that the rulers are few both in aristocracy and in oligarchy. It is because they are few in both that some take aristocracy to be a kind of oligarchy (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16 sq.). The inference drawn from the fact is a proof of the reality of the fact. Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 25 sqq., where a false inference drawn from the fact that happiness is concerned with the use of absolute goods is adduced in evidence of the fact. For the interposition of οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτων ὀλίγοι between ἐπεὶ—εἶναι and ἐν ἀριστοκρατίαις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες, cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 22 sq., where τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου is similarly interposed, 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27, where τὸ εἰρημένον refers not to what immediately precedes, but to 23, ἡ μέν ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον, and 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 24, where ταύτην refers not to τυραννίδος, which immediately precedes, but to τὴν ἀνδραζωμένης πολιτείας.

27. τοῦτο, i.e. the production of στάσεις by the fewness of the rulers.
28. ὅταν ἂ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς ὅμοιον κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, 'when the mass of the people is of the type which is elated with the belief that it is like the ruling few in virtue.' Τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων, sc. πληθῶν. ὅ τὸ πλῆθος (=? θῆμος in Diod. 15. 72. 2) here stands in opposition to the ruling few, just as it is opposed to οἱ ἄρχοντες in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 34 sqq. The true πλῆθος for an aristocracy is a πλῆθος ἄρχοντες δυνάμεις τῶν τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχῶν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀρετήν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικῆν ἀρχῆν (3. 17. 1288 a 10 sqq.): if the πλῆθος thinks itself just as ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικῆν ἀρχῆν as the rulers, trouble will result. When the ruled are of a high spirit, they are inclined to plot against their rulers (c. II. 1314 a 15 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 182 C, 190 B).

29. οἶον ἐν Ἀκεδαίμονι κ.τ.λ. Different accounts are given of the origin of the Parthenia: perhaps those who were friendly to Tarentum took a more favourable view of it than others. Aristotle often speaks well of Tarentum, and the account given of the origin of the Parthenia in the passage before us is more favourable than most. Antiochus, an historian belonging to the rival city of Syracuse and contemporary with Thucydides, says (ap. Strab. p. 278) that they were sons of ‘Lacedaemonians’ who had been degraded to the rank of Helots because they had failed to serve in the Messenian War (the First Messenian War), and that they were themselves ἄτιμοι. I do not think (with Sus.², Note 1592) that by ‘Lacedaemonians’ Antiochus means Perioeci, for the word is used of Spartans in the account given by Strabo (p. 279) of Ephorus’ views (cp. Diod. 15. 66 and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 26). The account given on the authority of Ephorus by Strabo (p. 279) is less unfavourable. According to Ephorus the Spartans serving in Messenia in the tenth year of the Messenian War, finding that owing to their ten years’ absence from home the citizen-population was dwindling, and being themselves precluded from returning by the oath which they had taken not to return till the Messenians were conquered, sent home the younger men, who had not taken the oath, to recruit the population by intercourse with Spartan virgins. This account treats the founders of Tarentum as the sons of Spartan fathers (whether of Homoei is not clear) and Spartan mothers, but by irregular, though specially authorized, unions. Aristotle, on the other hand, in the passage before us implies that in his opinion the Parthenia had Spartan Homoei for their fathers; of their mothers he says nothing. A fourth account
is to be found in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 26, ὂτε δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Μεσσηνίους ἐπολέμουν, αἱ γυναῖκες, ἀμφότεροι τούτων, παῤῥὰς τὡς ἐγέννησαν, οὐς ἐν ὑπηργίας εἶχον οἱ πατέρες ὡς οὐκ ὤστε αὐτῶν καὶ Παρθενίας ἐκέλουν. If this statement is found on the ‘Constitutions’ ascribed to Aristotle, like many others in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspublicis, the ‘Constitutions’ did not agree with the Politics. For while the Politics represent the Partheniae as the sons of Spartan Homoei, [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspublicis represents them as the sons of Spartan women by unknown fathers, possibly Helots. For another instance of a discrepancy between the Politics and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. see note on 1294 b 10. It should be noticed that a similar, but still keener, controversy raged as to the position and character of the original colonists of the Epizephyrian Locri, the unfavourable side being here taken by the ‘Constitution of the Locrians’ ascribed to Aristotle and the favourable by Timaeus (Polyb. 12. 5, 6, 10–12: Arist. Fragm. 504). The fact probably is that many unions were temporarily recognized as legitimate during the First Messenian War, when the numbers of the Spartans were being thinned by the war, which were no longer regarded as legitimate when the war came to an end and the drain ceased. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 28 sqq. 30. ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἤσαν, ‘for they were descended from the Homoei,’ is added to explain why they held themselves to be like the ruling few in virtue. Descent from the good, however, is not a sure evidence of goodness (1. 6. 1255 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle implies that the Partheniae were not Homoei, but does not tell us why they were not. His view may be that they were the sons of fathers who were Homoei by mothers of an inferior grade. As to the Homoei of the Lacedaemonian State, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 39. 31. ἡ ὥστεν τινές κ.τ.λ. Tinet stands in contrast to τὸ πλῆθος, 28. It appears to refer to single individuals, for Lysander is mentioned in illustration. See note on 1327 b 38. 33. οἴον ἀσανθρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων. First by king Pausanias when he intervened against Lysander at Athens in B.C. 403 after the fall of the Thirty (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 29), and afterwards by king Agesilaus in Ionia (Plut. Lysand. c. 23). 34. ἄνδρον, and therefore φιλότιμος (Rhet. 2. 17. 1391 a 22 sq.) and δυνάμενος ἀρχεῖν (Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 b 5 sq.). Thus ἄνδρον is not far removed in meaning from ἡγεμονικός (c. 8. 1308 a 8).
οίον Κινάδων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 5, where we read of Cinadon, ὁδός δ᾿ ἦν καὶ τὸ εἶδος νεανίσκος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὀμίοιων. See for the story of Cinadon Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 4–11, Polyaen. 2. 14, and Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 73, vol. 9. 343 sqq. His object was to be μηδὲν ὢτ᾽ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 11). His case illustrates the danger of excluding from office and placing in a position of inferiority a man of manly and vigorous character, where the ruling class is small and those excluded have weapons of any kind at their disposal (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 5, 7). It does not appear that Cinadon had been oppressed or ill-treated in any way. Aristotle probably remembers the affair of Cinadon when in c. 8. 1308 a 8 he recommends aristocracies to bring within the constitution any of those outside it who are fit to rule. The oligarchy of Massalia was in this matter wiser than the Lacedaemonian aristocracy, for it would have brought Cinadon within the privileged class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq.). Compare the conspiracy of Francesco Balduino at Venice in 1412 (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 271 sq.).

36. ἐν δὲ σταυροβ. Precautions are taken against this evil in c. 8. 1308 b 24 sqq. For the results of a great inequality of property see 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sq. and 1296 a 1 sqq. Cp. Sallust, De Coniur. Catil. c. 20. 11 sqq.

37. καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τούτο γίνεται. Aristotle's remark is confirmed by the experience of Rome in the Second Punic War (see Lange, Röm. Alterth. 2. 170 sq.). The English landowners grew richer in the long war with Napoleon and the poor poorer.

συνέβη δὲ καὶ τούτο κ.τ.λ. 'This also,' i.e. στάσις resulting from the production by war of strong contrasts of wealth and poverty, occurred at Lacedaemon, as well as στάσις resulting from the causes mentioned before. There is nothing to show whether the Messenian War here referred to is the same as that mentioned in 2. 9. 1270 a 3. It seems likely from 2. 9. 1269 b 3 sqq. that Aristotle looked back to more wars than one between the Lace-daemonians and Messenians. If we follow the traditional account and that of Pausanias, we shall say that the Messenian War referred to is the Second Messenian War. The raids of Aristomenes from his fastness at Eira during this war were so ruinous to the farms of the Spartans both in Messenia and in the neighbouring part of Laconia that the Messenians profited more by the cultivation of the land than the Spartans, and an ordinance was made that the land

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exposed to these raids should not be sown while the war lasted, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτον σιντοδεία ἔγνετο ἐν Σπάρτῃ καὶ ὁμοῦ τῇ σιντοδείᾳ στάσις: οὐ γὰρ ἥνεκόντων οἱ τὰῖς τὰ κτήματα ἔχοντες τὰ σφέτερα ἁργὰ εἶναι, καὶ τούτως μὲν τὰ διάφορα διδέων Τυρταίος (Paus. 4. 18. 1–3). The owners of land in Messenia and the border of Laconia, in fact, were impoverished, while the owners of land farther from the seat of war grew richer, because they alone had produce to sell.

30. δήλον δὲ [καὶ τούτο] ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας. As to [καὶ τούτο] see critical note. For ποίησις in the sense of ‘poem’ see Liddell and Scott. The poem was intended to compose dissensions at Sparta, and hence its title.

1307 a. 1. θλιβόμενοι γὰρ τινες κ. τ. λ. This is mentioned to show that war produces στάσις by producing extremes of wealth and poverty.

2. ἐπὶ δὲν τις μέγας ἡ κ. τ. λ. We pass here to a case in which the plotter is not, as in the instances previously given, driven to plot by humiliation or poverty, but plots purely from ambition. See note on 1304 α 17.

3. Before ἵνα μονάρχῃ supply στάσιν κινεῖ.

ὡσπέρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κ. τ. λ. See notes on 1333 b 34 and 1301 b 19. The aim ascribed to the Pausanias of the passage before us, that of becoming sole ruler, agrees well with that ascribed to ‘Pausanias the king’ in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 32 sqq., where he is said to have been accused of seeking to rule his own State. In 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 sq., on the other hand, ‘Pausanias the king’ is said to have sought according to some to abolish the ephorate, which might seem at first sight a more restricted aim; still, as the ephorate resembled a tyranny in the extent of its power (2. 9. 1270 b 13 sq.: 2. 6. 1265 b 40), there is nothing in this account of his aim to show that ‘Pausanias the king’ is not referred to in the passage before us. The ephorate was the main barrier in the way of any one who sought to set up a tyranny at Sparta. Aristotle does not commit himself to a positive statement that Pausanias was guilty. For κατὰ τῶν Μηδικῶν πόλεμον cp. c. 12. 1315 b 28, κατὰ τὴν ἄρχην, and Hdt. 7. 137, κατὰ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ ’Αδριαίων πόλεμον.

5. καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἀννων. As to Anno or Hanno see Justin, 20. 5 and 21. 4. He appears to have been one of the Carthaginian generals in a war in Sicily with Dionysius the Elder (Justin, 20. 5. 11 sqq.). Aristotle is careful not to affirm his guilt, and it seems to have been doubted (Justin, 22. 7. 10); at any rate he did not succeed any more than Pausanias did in making himself tyrant.

λέγοντα δὲ μάλιστα κ.τ.λ. Λέγονται is emphatic. If aristocracies are troubled with στάσις for the reasons which have been mentioned, both polities and aristocracies are mostly overthrown owing to some contravention of justice in the framing of the constitution itself, and especially to an undue leaning in favour of either the rich or the many. (Cp. 6 (4).) 12. 1297 a 6, διὸ δὲ ἂν ἀμείων ἡ πολιτεία μικρῆ, τοσοῦτον μονομοιρά. In the passage before us αὐτῇ ἡ πολιτεία seems to be tacitly contrasted with the administration of the State (cp. c. 8. 1308 b 32, καὶ τῶι νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ, and 2. 9. 1270 a 13 sqq.).

11. ταύτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is only these two things that polities endeavour to mingle and most of the so-called aristocracies also.' See note on 1293 b 20.
13. τούτῳ, 'only in this,' i.e. in the way in which they mix these two things.
14. διὰ τοῦτ', 'on account of this,' i.e. the way in which the two things are mixed. For the repetition of τούτῳ see notes on 1284 b 28, 1325 b 11, and 1317 b 5.
15. τὸς γὰρ ἀποκλινοῦσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, sc. πολιτείας. For the phrase cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 34–38.
16. τὸ πλῆθος. See note on 1322 b 16.
17. κρείττον ἐς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The many are stronger than the few and therefore have a securer hold of power, and besides they are more apt to be content with an equal share. Euripides had already said of the rich (Suppl. 225 Bothe, 238 Dindorf), οἱ μὲν ἄλβοι ἀναφελεῖσ τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρώτ' ὑπεί.
In μᾶλλον ἄγαπῶσιν ἵναν ἔχωσι Aristotele repeats the remark of Callicles in Plaio, Gorg. 483 C, ἄγαπῶσι γὰρ, οἷμαι, αὐτοὶ (i.e. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς δυσθραποὶ καὶ οἱ πολλοί), ἄν το ἴσον ἔχωσι φαύληστεροι ἄντες. Cp. also c. 8. 1308 a 11 sq. With ἄγαπῶσιν supply οἱ πλείους from τὸ πλεῖον (see note on 1319 b 14).
19. For οἱ ἐν ταῖσ ἐδοποιαῖς cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 19, τοὺς ἐν b b 2
NOTES.

\[\delta \varepsilon \iota \omega \mu \alpha \tau i ~ kai ~ \varepsilon \iota \upsilon \chi \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota s, ~ and ~ Rhet. ~ 2. ~ 5. ~ I.382 ~ b ~ 35, ~ oi ~ \epsilon \nu ~ \varepsilon \iota \upsilon \chi \iota \varsigma \iota \varsigma \iota s ~ \mu e\gamma \iota \lambda i a ~ \delta \omega t e s.\]

\[20. ~ \delta \lambda o s ~ \delta \epsilon ~ \epsilon p \iota ~ o\pi o\tau e r o n ~ k.t.l. ~ A c c o r d i n g ~ t o ~ E t h . ~ N i c . ~ 8. ~ 12. ~ 1160 ~ b ~ 21 ~ s q . ~ t h e ~ n o r m a l ~ c o n s t i t u t i o n s ~ a r e ~ m o s t ~ a p t ~ t o ~ c h a n g e ~ i n t o ~ t h e i r \pi a r e k\beta\alpha \sigma \epsilon i s — k i n g s h i p ~ i n t o ~ t y r a n n y, ~ a r i s t o c r a c y ~ i n t o ~ o l i g a r c h y, ~ t i m o c r a c y ~ (i.e. ~ p o l i t y) ~ i n t o ~ d e m o c r a c y. ~ B u t ~ a c c o r d i n g ~ t o ~ P o l . ~ 7 ~ (5). ~ 12. ~ 1316 ~ a ~ 18 ~ s q q . ~ c o n s t i t u t i o n s ~ a r e ~ m o s t ~ a p t ~ t o ~ c h a n g e ~ i n t o ~ t h e i r ~ o p p o s i t e s — d e m o c r a c y, ~ f o r ~ i n s t a n c e, ~ i n t o ~ o l i g a r c h y, ~ a n d ~ \nu i c e ~ v e r s a. ~ \textit{H \pi o l i t e i a, ‘t h e ~ c o n s t i t u t i o n,’ ~ a s ~ i n ~ 19.}\]

\[21. ~ \epsilon \kappa a t \epsilon r o n, ~ ‘e i t h e r ~ f a v o u r e d ~ c l a s s,’ ~ w h e t h e r ~ i t ~ b e ~ t h e ~ r i c h ~ o r ~ t h e ~ p o o r.\]

\[22. ~ \tau o \sigma f \e' t e r o n, ~ ‘q u o d ~ s u m ~ e s t’ ~ (V i c t .) . \]

\[23. ~ e i s ~ \tau \alpha \nu \alpha \nu \tau i a. ~ W e ~ e x p e c t \epsilon i i ~ \tau \alpha \nu \alpha \nu \tau i a ~ (c p . ~ 21, \epsilon i i ~ \tau a \nu \tau i a), ~ b u t ~ e i s ~ i s ~ c o n t i n u e d ~ f r o m ~ e i s ~ \delta \eta \mu o n, ~ e i s ~ \delta \lambda i g a r \chi i a n, ~ a n d ~ t a k e s ~ t h e ~ p l a c e ~ o f \epsilon i i ~ i n ~ e i s ~ \tau \alpha \nu \alpha \nu \tau i a. \]

\[26. ~ \mu o n o n ~ \gamma \alpha r ~ \mu o n \mu o n ~ k.t.l., ~ i.e. ~ f o r ~ a l l ~ c o n s t i t u t i o n s ~ a r e ~ w a n t i n g ~ i n ~ d u r a b i l i t y ~ i n ~ w h i c h ~ t h e r e ~ i s ~ a n ~ u n f a i r ~ l e a n i n g ~ t o ~ o n e ~ s i d e ~ o r ~ t h e ~ o t h e r ~ (20) ~ a n d ~ a d v a n t a g e s ~ a r e ~ n o t ~ d i s t r i b u t e d ~ i n ~ s t r i c t ~ a c c o r d a n c e ~ w i t h ~ d e s e r t. ~ F o r ~ t h e ~ t h o u g h t ~ c p . ~ I s o c r . ~ N i c o c l . ~ § 14. \]

\[27. ~ \tau o ~ \epsilon \chi e i n ~ \tau a ~ \alpha u t \omega n, ~ ‘t h e ~ p o s s e s s i o n ~ o f ~ o n e’ s ~ d u e’ ~ : ~ c p . ~ E t h . ~ N i c . ~ 5. ~ 7. ~ 1132 ~ a ~ 28, ~ b ~ 17, ~ a n d ~ 5. ~ 8. ~ 1133 ~ b ~ 3.\]

\[28. ~ \tau o ~ \epsilon i r h \mu e \lambda \nu o n, ~ i.e. ~ t h e ~ c h a n g e ~ o f ~ a ~ c o n s t i t u t i o n ~ i n t o ~ i t s ~ o p p o s i t e, ~ i n ~ t h i s ~ c a s e ~ t h e ~ c h a n g e ~ o f ~ a r i s t o c r a c y ~ i n t o ~ d e m o c r a c y. ~ A t ~ T h u r i i t h e ~ p r o p e r t y-q u a l i f i c a t i o n ~ f o r ~ o f f i c e ~ w a s ~ h i g h, ~ w h e r e a s ~ i n ~ a n ~ a r i s t o c r a c y ~ t h e r e ~ o u g h t ~ t o ~ b e ~ n o ~ p r o p e r t y-q u a l i f i c a t i o n ~ f o r ~ o f f i c e ~ a t ~ a l l ~ (6 ~ (4). ~ 9. ~ 1294 ~ b ~ 10 ~ s q q .) . ~ A r i s t o c r a c y ~ o f ~ T h u r i i ~ f a v o u r e d ~ t h e ~ r i c h ~ t o o ~ m u c h, ~ a n d ~ t h i s ~ i n f r a c t i o n ~ o f ~ j u s t i c e ~ i n ~ t h e ~ c o n s t i t u t i o n ~ l e d ~ t o ~ i t s ~ c h a n g e ~ i n t o ~ d e m o c r a c y. ~ I t ~ s h o u l d ~ b e ~ n o t i c e d, ~ h o w e v e r, ~ t h a t ~ t h i s ~ a r i s t o c r a c y ~ w i t h ~ o l i g a r c h i c a l ~ l e a n i n g s ~ w a s ~ r a s h e n o u g h ~ t o ~ e m p l o y ~ t h e ~ d e m o s ~ i n ~ w a r, ~ a l w a y s ~ d a n g e r o u s ~ t h i n g ~ f o r ~ a n ~ o l i g a r c h y ~ t o ~ d o ~ (c . ~ 6. ~ 1306 ~ a ~ 25 ~ s q q .) . ~ S c h l o s s e r ~ (A r i s t o t e l e s ~ P o l i t i k, ~ 2. ~ 199, ~ n o t e ~ 104) ~ a n d ~ G i l b e r t ~(G r. ~ S t a a s a l t. ~ 2. ~ 244. ~ 1) ~ r e f e r ~ t h e s e ~ e v e n t s ~ t o ~ t h e ~ e a r l y ~ d a y s ~ o f ~ t h e ~ c o l o n y ~ o f ~ T h u r i i, ~ w h e n ~ t h e ~ S y b a r i t e ~ s e c t i o n ~ o f ~ t h e ~ c o l o n i s t s ~ w a s ~ e x p e l l e d ~ o r ~ p u t ~ t o ~]
death (see note on 1303 A 31) for various acts of encroachment, one of them being (according to Diod. 12. 11) that they allotted to themselves all the land near the city, and it is true that at this time (Diod. 12. 23) a war was waged by Thurii with Tarentum which might be the war referred to in 1307 a 32, and that the word πλεονεκτεῖων, which is used in 31, is applied in c. 3. 1303 a 32 to the encroachments of the Sybarite section of the colonists, but Sus.² (Note 1602) is probably right in questioning the correctness of this view. The grievance at Thurii at that time, in fact, was, not that a high property-qualification was required for office, but that the Sybarite citizens of Thurii claimed all the chief offices for themselves; not that the leading citizens had bought up all the land, but that the Sybarites had allotted to themselves all the land near the city; nor was the penalty inflicted on the Sybarites simply deprivation of the land, for they were slain or expelled from the State. Sus.² (Note 1602) holds that the events narrated by Aristotle occurred during the time which followed the disastrous defeat of Athens at Syracuse, when the party friendly to Athens at Thurii was expelled (Plut. Decem Orat. Vitae, 3, Lysias, 835 D sq.). An aristocracy with a leaning to oligarchy may well have then been introduced and have been overthrown later on in the way described by Aristotle. Busolt, on the other hand (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 533. 4), places the constitutional change at Thurii described in 1307 B 6–19 before the constitutional change described in 1307 A 27–33, and takes that which he regards as the later of the two changes to have occurred in the fourth century B.C. He argues that the concentration of the whole of the landed property of the State in the hands of the γνώριμοι and the language of Plato in Laws 636 B, ἐπει καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ταύτα καὶ τὰ ξυστία πολλὰ μὲν ἄλλα νῦν ὄφελεῖ τὰς πόλεις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς στάσεις χαλεπὰ δηλοῦσι δὲ Μιλησίων καὶ Βωιωτῶν καὶ Θουρίων παιδεῖς, point to the fourth century B.C., but I do not find this argument convincing. Nor can I think that the constitutional change described in 1307 A 27–33 occurred in the δυναστεία the establishment of which is described in 1307 B 6–19, for a narrow oligarchy of this type would hardly be based on a property-qualification, however high; the constitution in which the change occurred seems rather to have been, if we may judge from the context, an oligarchical kind of aristocracy.

διὰ μὲν γάρ κτ.λ. For the form of the sentence cp. 8 (6). 4. 

1318 B 11 sqq.
NOTES.

28. εἰς Ἑλληνικόν μετέβη, i. e. εἰς Ἑλληνικόν τίμια μετέβη ἡ πολιτεία, not τὸ τίμια. So Bonitz (Ind. 458 a 35 sqq.).

29. καὶ εἰς ἀρχεία πλείω. This also was a change in a democratic direction, for it gave access to office to a larger number of citizens, and the democratic principle is τὸ ἀρχεῖον πάντας μὲν ἕκαστον ἐκαστὸν δὲ ἐν μέρει πάντων (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 19: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.). Cp. also Plato, Polit. 303 A, where τὸ τὰς ἀρχας διανεμήσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλοῖς is said to be characteristic of democracy.

30. συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Συγκτήσασθαι, \( \text{'bought up,'} \) like συνωνείσθαι, συμπρίσθαι (1. 11. 1259 a 24). The law referred to seems to have resembled those mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 16 sqq.

31. ἡ γάρ πολιτεία κ.π.λ. This is added to show that the constitution was in fault, for the point which the example is adduced to illustrate is that a deviation from justice in the constitution itself often causes the overthrow of polities and aristocracies (cp. 5 sqq., 20 sqq.).

32. 

33. πλείω, \( \text{'more than the law allowed,'} \) (Vict. \( \text{'plus aequo.'} \)). Πλείω ἦσαν ἐχοντες takes up πλεονεκτεῖν, 31.

34. ἐτι διὰ τὸ κ.π.λ. The meaning is \( \text{'besides (apart from any deviation from justice in the constitution) the mere fact that aristocracies give office to a few only makes it possible for the γνώριμοι to have their own way too much.'} \) Μᾶλλον goes with πλεονεκτοῖσιν (cp. 36, ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἐν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον).

35. οἴον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κ.π.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 a 15 sqq.

36. κηδεύειν δήθη θέλουσιν. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 a 26 sqq.

37. διὸ καὶ ἡ λαοῦ πολίς κ.π.λ. Aristotle implies that the Epizephyrian Locri was under an aristocracy, and an aristocracy not well compounded but favouring the rich too much in its mixture of elements, at the time when it voted the acceptance of Dionysius the Elder’s proposal to marry the daughter of one of its citizens (Diod. 14. 44. 6: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 82, vol. 10. 663). Forty years later Locri suffered for its acceptance, for when Dionysius the Younger, the offspring of this marriage, abandoned
Syracuse in B.C. 356 and removed to Locri, the tyranny which he exercised there for six years was of so outrageous a kind that the Locrians rose in insurrection as soon as his absence from Locri made a successful insurrection possible, and avenged his misgovernment on his wife and family (Clearch. ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 541: Justin, 21. 2 sq.: Strabo, p. 259 sq.: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 85, vol. II. 188 sq.). The city, however, would probably have suffered still more if it had rejected the proposals of Dionysius, for Rhegium, which did so, was pursued by the tyrant in consequence with relentless hostility till it was destroyed and its inhabitants enslaved in B.C. 387. The Epizephyrian Locri is here called simply η Λοκρών πόλις because the mention of Dionysius makes it unnecessary to add, as in 2. 12. 1274 A 22 sq., τῶν ἐπιζήφυριών. Τοῦ ἐπιζήφυρίου is omitted for a similar reason in Rhet. 2. 21. 1395 a 1. Its omission in Pol. 2. 7. 1266 b 19 cannot be thus explained, but the Italian Locri may nevertheless well be referred to there, for in 3. 16. 1287 a 8 the Opuntian Locri is called simply Ὄποιος.

39. δ εἰ δημοκρατία οὖκ ἄν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἄν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εἴ μεμιγμένη. "O refers to τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας: for other instances of a neuter referring to words not in the neuter, see notes on 1263 a 1, 1289 b 25, and 1291 a 16. Rhegium was probably democratically governed when it refused Dionysius' matrimonial proposals (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 239): this may be present to Aristotle's mind. Was Croton under an aristocracy when Philippus, one of its citizens, had to retire into exile after his betrothal with the daughter of Telys, the tyrant of Sybaris (Hdt. 5. 47)? Whether Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian constitution as a 'well-tempered aristocracy' is uncertain, but at any rate the Lacedaemonian kings were not allowed to marry any but Spartan women (Schömann, Gr. Alterth. 1. 233 sq., who refers to Plut. Agis, c. 11: see also Hdt. 5. 32). Athens was under an oligarchy when Cylon married the daughter of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara (Thuc. 1. 126), but the Solonian democracy must have been in existence when Megacles married Agaristē, the daughter of Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon (in B.C. 576 or 572, according to Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 661. 4). Whether Peisistratus was tyrant of Athens when he married the Argive woman Timonassa is doubtful ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 17), so that we need not ask what the government of Argos was at the time. Demosthenes says in Phil. 2. 21, οὗ γὰρ ἁφαλεὶς ταῖς πολιτείαις αἱ πρῶς τοὺς τυράννους αὐταί λιαν ὀμιλίαι. 'The nobles of Venice cannot
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marry alien women, nor give their daughters in marriage to subjects of a foreign Prince’ (De La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, i. 30). In a few exceptional cases noticed by De La Houssaye in which Venetian women had married foreign Princes, the Senate adopted the brides (ibid.).

40. μάλιστα δὲ λαυθάνεισιν κ.τ.λ., ‘and aristocracies are most apt to undergo insensible change through being overthrown little by little.’ Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Phaedr. 262 Α, ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμερμάτων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἥ κατὰ μέγαν, and see note on 1307 b 30. In what other ways aristocracies undergo insensible change, he does not tell us. They would probably do so if the numbers of the rich or the poor insensibly increased (c. 3. 1303 a 1).

1307 b. 2. ὅπερ εἰρήται ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις καθάλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτείων.

Ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, in c. 3. 1303 a 20 sqq. For εἰρήται κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτείων Bonitz (Ind. 368 a 34 sqq.) compares among other passages De An. 1. 4. 408 a 1, ἀρμοδίες δὲ μᾶλλον καθ’ ἐγγείων λέγειν ἄρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλος τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἥ κατὰ ψυχής.

4. τῶν πρὸς τήν πολιτείαν, ‘of the things which pertain to the constitution’: cp. Metaph. Z. 15. 1040 a 6, τῶν πρὸς ὀρὸν (‘quod ad definitionem attinet,’ Bonitz). In 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 18 we have τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, and in 1298 b 31 τῶν περὶ τήν πολιτείαν.

5. πάντα τῶν κόσμων (sc. τῆς πόλεως, Bon. Ind. 406 a 30) is explained by ἡ τάξις τάσσα τῆς πολιτείας, 18.

6. συνέβη δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θουρίων πολιτείας, ‘and this happened in the case of the constitution of Thurii for example’ (see note on 1255 a 36). If this sentence followed more closely than it does on 1307 a 27, I should read with Garve καὶ τούτῳ in place of τούτῳ καὶ. It is not quite clear that the constitution of Thurii was an aristocracy when the change into a δυναστεία described in the text occurred. The displaced constitution may have been the democracy the origin of which is traced in 1307 a 27 sqq., for it is evident that under it the stratēgi were elected by the demos and that ρεύτεροι were eligible subject to the restriction mentioned in respect of a repeated tenure of the office. The existence, however, of σῶμβουλοι charged, it would seem, with the duty of guarding the laws against alteration savours rather of aristocracy (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 8), and if the displaced constitution was a democracy, it was one of a qualified character. Democracies were especially opposed to the repeated tenure of most offices, but
the law prohibiting a repeated tenure of the office of stratēgus, except after an interval of five years, was an unusual one even in them (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23 sq.), and it strikes us as out of place in a State like Thurii, which needed generals of experience if it was to hold its own against its Lucanian neighbours. A similar law, however, existed at Tarentum (Diog. Laert. 8. 79), though it was contravened in favour of Archytas, and a law was enacted at Rome in b.c. 342, ‘ne quis eundem magistratum intra decem annos caperet’ (Liv. 7. 42. 2: cp. 10. 13. 8), but instances of the contravention of this law occur from time to time (see Plut. Marius, c. 12, and Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 1. 424. 3), and then again Rome was a much larger State than Thurii, and fit candidates for military offices would be more plentiful there. The law was no doubt a safeguard against the rise of tyrants, and the feeling against a monopoly of important offices by a few men would be all the stronger at Thurii because the attempt of the Sybarite section of the colonists to keep the more important offices to themselves would be remembered with bitterness. The revolution described in the text seems to have been due to a combination between certain younger members of the wealthy class, the φρονοι, and the demos against the chief magistrates of the State (τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, 9), who were probably for the most part older men of the wealthy class. If, as is likely, it occurred in the fourth century b.c., the aim of its promoters may have been in part to meet an increasing pressure from the Lucanians and Bruttians who threatened the existence of the State by preventing the removal from office of capable and experienced generals. The narrow δυναστεία, however, to the establishment of which the movement actually led, was not likely to be a source of strength to Thurii, which declined greatly in power in the course of the fourth century b.c. Indeed, if Diod. 16. 15. 2 is to be trusted, it was reduced by the Bruttians.


10. νομίζουσι ήδίως κατασχέσειν, i.e. ‘fore ut obtinerent, perferrent id quod susceperant’ (Bon. Ind. s.v.). Cp. (with Liddell and Scott) Lys. Or. 3. in Simon. c. 42, εἰ δὲ μὴ κατέσχον, and Pol.
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7 (5). 10. 1312 a 32, ἐν μῆ κατασχῆσεν τὴν πράξιν, where we have the full phrase.

13. οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἄρχοντων, οἱ καλοῦμεν οὗμβουλοι. For οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι, cp. Plato, Laws 952 E, τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτους ἄρχοντας τεταγμένους: Pol. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 22 sq.: and Sandys’ note on ‘Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 15. l. 20, οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι. The οὗμβουλοι at Thurii appear to have been entrusted with the duty of guarding the laws against change, but they cannot have possessed a veto on proposals of change, as otherwise their ultimate resistance would not have been in vain. Probably all they could do was to advise the popular assembly against such proposals, and hence their name, a softened version of πρόβουλοι. It is interesting to find at Thurii, a colony founded under the supervision of Pericles, a magistracy designed to protect the laws against change, like the Council of the Areopagus, the powers of which he had done so much to curtail. But it must be remembered that the Council of the Areopagus had not confined itself to its function of guarding the laws, but had drawn to itself a large share of administrative authority (‘Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 34 sqq.: c. 23. l. 2 sqq.). Hence probably its fall (see note on 1299 b 16).

18. ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτέριζειν. Something like this probably often happened: see as to Megara 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq., and cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 1, ἢν δὲ τοῦτο εὑρεσία πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξεν γε τὴν τάδην οἴσπερ καὶ μεθιστάναι ἔμελλον.


22. ἐπ’ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ‘in the days when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece.’ So Lamb. followed by Schneider in his translation (vol. i. p. 494). Cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 7, οὔτε δημοκρατίας ἐτί οὕσης, ὅσπερ ἐπ’ Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὅσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσίπδου, and [Demosth.] Phil. 4. 51, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἄγαντα (χρόνον) εἰς δύο ταύτα διήρητο τὰ τῶν Ἐλλήνων, Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ ἡμᾶς, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων Ἐλλήνων οἱ μὲν ἡμῖν οἱ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι ὑπήκοοι. Dr. Welldon translates ‘in the case of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians,’ not, I think, rightly. As to the fact compare 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 32 sqq., Thuc. 1. 19 and 3. 82. 1, and
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(7 (5). 7. 1307 b 13—8. 1307 b 30.

(with Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 225. 2) Isocr. Paneg. § 105
and Panath. § 54. Busolt, however, remarks (p. 224) that we find
oligarchical governments existing in Samos and Mytilene, not-
withstanding their alliance with Athens (Thuc. i. 115: 3. 27. 47:
cp.'Ath. Pol. c. 24. l. 7 sqq.). It is to be noted that Aristotle does
not say of the Thebans what he says of the Athenians and Lase-
daemonians. At a later date than that of which Aristotle is here
speaking (in b.c. 375) the Athenian commander Timotheus acted
very differently, not interfering with the political constitutions of
the States whose alliance he won for Athens (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 64). See
also Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2, 7 as to the Lacedaemonian ephors.

23. oî ðē Λάκωνες. We have Δακεδαιμονίων in 22, and oî ðē Λάκωνες
here. The same thing occurs in 2, 9. 1271 b 17 and 2. 10. 1271 b
l. 7 and c. 23. l. 18 sqq. (cp. also c. 19. l. 20 sqq.). If we examine
the Ninth chapter of the Second Book, we shall find that after the
formal use of the long name Δακεδαιμονίων at its commencement
(1269 a 29), the shorter name Λάκωνες is preferred throughout
(1269 a 38, b 3, 31, 36 sq., 40, 1271 a 29). Xenophon sometimes
uses the two words in a similar way (see Anat. 7. 6. 4, τῶν Δακε-
δαιμονίων, and 7, τῶν Λάκωνας, τῶ Λάκωνε, and 7. 7. 12, 15, 19). 'In
Attic writers, e.g. in Aeschylus, Euripides, Isocrates, Lysias,
Andocides, etc., the word Λάκων is either not used at all, or for
the most part in the singular only . . . Aristophanes, however, often
uses it. Plato uses it in the plural in Meno 99 D' (Pape-Benseler,
Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen, s.v. Λάκων).

cc. 8 and 9 (1307 b 30—1308 b 10) are mostly addressed to
the two least safe constitutions, aristocracy and oligarchy, but
from 1308 b 10 onwards to 1310 a 36 (end of c. 9) Aristotle's
recommendations are for the most part applicable to all constitutions.
As to the counsels given in these two chapters see Appendix A.

27. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. There is nothing to answer to this
μὲν οὖν.

29. τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων κ.τ.λ. So that the opposite of what pro-
duces φθορά will produce σωτηρία.

30. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. This μὲν οὖν
is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 39, and then answered by ἐπειτα, 40.
Aristotle has before him in this passage Plato, Rep. 424 B–D:
compare especially τοῦτον ὑπεκτέου τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως
NOTES.

ἀν ... παρά πάντα αὐτῷ φιλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν περί γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ μοναστικῆς παρά τιν τάξιν, ἄλλα ὑπὸ αὐτὸ τε μίνιστα φιλάττειν, καὶ ή γοῦν παρανομία ῥαθίως αὐτῇ, ἐφη, λανθάνει παρανόμαινην, καὶ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἐφη, ἄλλο γε ή κατὰ σμικρὸν εἰσοκασαμεῖν ἥρεμα ὑπόρρειν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle, however, seems to have in view small changes or infractions of law, such as those which led to the overthrow of the constitution of Thurii, rather than the small changes in education of which Plato speaks. These small changes of law would be especially dangerous to well-tempered constitutions, for 'a constitution made up of balanced powers must ever be a critical thing' (Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, Nov. 3. 1774: Works, i. 448 Bohn).

Hesiod's lines (Op. et Dies, 361),

εἰ γὰρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο, καὶ θαμά τοῦτ' ἐρδοῖς, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιο, are remembered by Plato in Rep. 401 C and Laws 843 B and by Demosthenes, De Fais. Leg. c. 228, and are no doubt present to Aristotle's memory here. Greek physicians dreaded those fevers most which begin κατὰ μικρῶν (Plut. Praec. Coniug. c. 22). Aristotle appears to have said elsewhere much the same thing as he says here: cp. Plut. Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 11. 17 (Comm. in Hesiod.). καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς, ὡς δὲ 'Ἀριστοτέλης ἔλεγεν, ὅτι χείριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὸ 'μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο' λεγόμενον: εἰ γὰρ καταφρονώντο ὡς μικρῶν ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἐπιλέγομεν 'μη παρὰ τοῦτο,' κακῶς πράξομεν ... ἣ γὰρ καθ' ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐλεύφεσιν μεγάλην ἀδφοίζει τοῖς παρορθῶν τῆς βλάβης, with which Wytenbach compares De Profect. in Virt. c. 17, ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὸ πλούσιον ἀπέχουσιν ἐν οὐδενὶ τίθενται τὰ μικρὰ δαπανήματα, μηδὲν οἴομεκοι ποιεῖν μέγα τὸ μικρὸν τινὶ προστιθέμενον. Cp. also Plut. Cleom. c. 9, where Aristotle is said to have explained the object of the ephors' proclamation to the citizens, κείσεθαι τοῦ μιστακα καὶ προσέχειν τοῖς νόμοις, to have been, ὅπως καὶ περὶ τὰ μικρῶτα τοὺς νέους πειθαρχεῖν ἐδίκως. Theramenes, whose political views were in some respects akin to those of Aristotle, was a great foe to illegality (see Meineke's notes in Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 867 and 1165, where he quotes Hesych. τῶν τριῶν ἐν: ὑπομένης ἐγνήσιστο τρεις τιμωρίαι κατὰ τῶν παράνομων τι δρόμων, and Ἁθ. Πολ. c. 28 end, ed. Sandys, where I have already referred to these notes of Meineke). Aristotle's advice is probably addressed to the Lacedaemonians among others, as to whom we read in Diod. 7. 14. 7 that 'after a while annulling each of the laws little by little and turning aside into luxury and idleness, and
further being corrupted by using money and accumulating wealth, they lost the hegemony of Greece.'

31. παρανομώσι, sc. oi polítaí.

34. λανθάνει ἵνα ἐπικαλεῖται. Cp. c. 6. 1306 b 14 sq.

35. παραλογίζεται γαρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the mind is misled by the small outlays in the fashion indicated by the sophistical puzzle, "if each is small, all also are small.' For παραλογίζεται ἡ διάνοια, Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Probl. 5. 25. 883 b 8 sq. and 30. 4. 955 b 15 sq. 'Υπ' αὐτῶν, 'by the repeated small outlays': cp. c. 10. 1311 a 33, τῆς δ' ἀβρεως οὕς ἔτοιμοι, ἐκπαινοῦν αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν μερών τῆς ἄβρεως) αὐτῶν γίγνεται τῆς ἀργῆς. The sophistical puzzle referred to turned on the difficulty of supposing that what holds of each of a number of things does not hold of the whole which they make up. If each is small, all are small, and the whole, it is inferred, must be small. But 'all' may mean either 'all taken individually' or 'all gathered into a whole.' 'All taken individually' are small, but not so 'all gathered into a whole.' What is true of each individual thing is not necessarily true of the whole which the individual things make up. For instance, the parts may be odd and the whole even (2. 5. 1264 b 20 sqq.). That the converse of this is true, and that what holds of the whole does not necessarily hold of each of its parts, we see from 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq. and from 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. Compare Plato, Laws 901 B, ἡ διαφέρον ὀδὸν ὀλόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὀλφ' ἀμελουμένον τῶν ἀμμερῶν, and 902 D sq.

39. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, sc. μεταβολῆς ορ φθοράς: cp. c. 7. 1307 a 7.

40. ἐπείτα μὴ πιστεύειν κ.τ.λ. Plato's language in Rep. 459 C sqq. had given some encouragement to the opposite view, and Aristotle probably regarded some of the arrangements in his Laws as σοφίσματα of the kind which he disapproves (see note on 1297 a 14 and vol. i. p. 502, note 2).

2. ποια δὲ λέγομεν κ.τ.λ., 'and what constitutional sophisms we 1308 a. refer to, has been explained before,' i.e. in 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 14 sqq.

3. ἐπὶ δ' ὀράν κ.τ.λ. Some aristocracies and even some oligarchies—for oligarchies are less safe than aristocracies—held their ground because those who from time to time were in office dealt justly and kindly with those outside the constitution, not wronging them and bringing those fit for rule within the privileged class, and treated those within the constitution in a democratic spirit of
equality, making office accessible to all. Cp. Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, γεννάσκων ὁτι καὶ τῶν ἀληθεριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτεῖων αὐτὰ πλείστων χρόνων διαμένονσιν, αὕτως ἂν ἀριστα τὸ πλῆθος θεραπεύοσιν. Aristotle perhaps also remembers a saying of the Lacedaemonian king Theopompus, Θεόστρομος πρὸς τῶν ἐρωτήσαντα πῶς ἂν τις ἀσφυλὸς τηροῖ τὴν βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς μὲν φίλοις, ἐφι, μεταδοθῆ παρρησία δυκαία, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχομένους κατὰ δύναμιν μὴ περιωρᾷ ἀδικουμένου (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Theopomp. 1). It will be noticed that the passage before us implies that there may be persons outside the constitution not only in oligarchies, but also in aristocracies. It is uncertain to what aristocracies Aristotle here refers. Carthage (2. II. 1273 b 18 sqq.: 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4 sqq.) and Tarentum (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 9 sqq.) to a certain extent answer to his description, but the practice which obtained at Carthage of allowing one man to hold several offices (2. II. 1273 b 8 sqq.) is not at all in harmony with the advice which Aristotle gives in 1308 a 10 sqq. The Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία erred in its treatment of those outside the constitution, as the conspiracy of Cimadon proved (see note on 1306 b 34), and also in its treatment of those within it, for though the ephorate was open to all citizens, some of the chief offices at Sparta were tenable for life and therefore accessible only to a few, and the mode of electing senators was δυναστευτική (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 sqq.). As to oligarchies, those of Massalia (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq.) and Pharsalus (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 10 sqq.) are probably present to Aristotle’s mind, though we do not hear from him of any oligarchy which combined all the merits he mentions. The oligarchy of Elis seems also to have been one of those which dealt kindly with the many, so much so that they were quite content to remain in the country on their farms (Polyb. 4. 73. 8, τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μεγάλην πολείσθαι σπουδὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν τῶν πολιτευομένων τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας κατοικοῦντων, ἵνα τὸ τε δίκαιον αὐτῶς ἐπὶ τόπον διεξάγηται καὶ τῶν πρὸς βιοτικὰς χρεὰς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ). At Naxos, on the contrary (7 (5). 6. 1305 a 38 sqq.), the oligarchs oppressed the many. Oppres-
sion of this kind was one of the causes which led to the French Revolution. ‘It was not a question of the power of the king, or the measure of an electoral circumscription, that made the Revolution; it was the iniquitous distribution of the taxes, the scourge of the militia service, the scourge of the road service, the destructive tyranny exercised in the vast preserves of wild game, the vexatious rights and impost of the lords of manors, and all
the other odious burdens and heavy impediments on the prosperity of the thrifty and industrious part of the nation' (J. Morley, Burke, p. 159). But Aristotle holds that it is just as dangerous to insult the aspiring few among those outside the constitution, or even to fail to bring within it those who are fit for rule, as to oppress the many. We read of the Spanish colonies in America:—"If as an exception to the rule an aspiring, and therefore dangerous, individual appeared in the ranks of the negroes, recourse was had to the means by which so many demagogues have been reduced to silence; a patent was given him "that he should count for a white." If he did not thus become a direct adherent of the privileged class, at any rate he was made an object of suspicion to the men of his own race. So in the Dutch East Indies every child which an European father recognized as his own was counted as European, and the great danger to which the State would otherwise have been exposed from the half-breeds was thus diminished' (Roscher, Politik, p. 156).

5. τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γυνομένους. Cp. Thuc. 4. 74, ἔπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένετο.

6. καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι. Πολιτεία and πολιτεύμα are here evidently used as terms not far removed from each other in meaning: cp. c. 6. 1306 a 14, 16, and see 3. 6. 1278 b 11 and 3. 7. 1279 a 25 sq.

9. τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εἰς κέρδος. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. For the use of εἰς see Bon. Ind. 222 b 55 sqq. Κέρδος does not quite answer to ἀτιμίαν, but the same thing may be said of c. 11. 1315 a 17 sqq., where ἢ εἰς τὰ χρήματα ἀδικοφρία is distinguished from ἢ εἰς ἀτιμίαν. I cannot follow Schmidt and Sus., who would read ἰσοτιμίαν for ἀτιμίαν.

10. πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας κ.τ.λ. Καὶ is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 10 and often elsewhere. Δημοτικός = ἵσος, as we see from the next sentence. In many Greek oligarchies a few members of the privileged class seem to have monopolized the whole authority. The chief offices might be held for long terms, so that vacancies would occur only at long intervals, or more than one might be held by a single individual (c. 10. 1310 b 22 sq.), or re-election might be made too easy, or only one member of each family might be allowed to hold office at the same time (c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq.), or the most important offices might be confined to a few
(c. 6. 1306 a 12 sqg.). Aristotle’s wish is, on the contrary, that all the members of the privileged class should as far as possible stand on the same footing, and that all should have a turn of office. Compare Isocr. Nicocl. § 15, αἳ μὲν τῶν γάρ ὀλίγαρχα καὶ δημοκρατίαι τὰς ἰσότητας τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑξῆς, καὶ τὸ υἱόν εὐδοκιμεῖ παρ’ αὐτάς, ἵνα μὴν ἐπερος τέρας διώγῃ πλέον ἐχαίν, and Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 39 sq. ‘Within the Roman Senate itself precautions were taken to prevent any one man from aspiring to rise above the little circle of his peers; the offices of the State must be held at fixed intervals, and no man might hold the same office twice except after the lapse of ten years’ (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 28 sq.). In the oligarchy of Berne the offices were awarded in the eighteenth century by lot (Von Müller, Bern’s Geschichte, p. 179). ‘Within the circle of the ruling families of Berne an equalizing spirit prevailed. Pensions and promotions from foreign princes were forbidden, and in order that no family might have any advantage over its fellows, it was decided in 1783 that each family should have the right of prefixing “von” to its name’ (ibid. p. 180). Macaulay remarks in the margin of his copy of the Politics (Macmillan’s Magazine, July, 1875, p. 221), ‘The Venetian aristocracy carried this rule as far as it could be carried.’ The advice which Aristotle gives here, however, seems hardly consistent with the advice which he gives to the first form of oligarchy in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq., to make the property-qualification higher for the higher offices than for the lower.

11. δὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλῆθους κ.τ.λ. Democrats claimed equality with the few for the many, though the many are not like the few; what they claimed without good ground for the many may justly be claimed for those who are alike.

13. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Ἐὰν πλείους διαν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι is added because, if the number of those who enjoy political rights under the constitution is small, the difficulty referred to is not likely to arise, for there will be offices enough for all the Homoei, and all of them may be in office simultaneously. Indeed, there may conceivably be more offices than Homoei to fill them (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle would probably recommend the adoption in aristocracies and oligarchies not only of the democratic practice which he here recommends for their adoption, but also of others, such as the prohibition of a repeated tenure of most offices and of the cumulation of offices. It is evident, however, from c. 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.
that he would not recommend the use of the lot in appointments to important offices.

15. οὗτον τὸ ἐξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι. So at Venice the six Counsellors of the Doge, ‘who kept him in a state of absolute vassalage,’ held office only for eight months, the six Savii Grandi and the five Savii agli Ordini only for six (Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, pp. 35, 36, 348, 349).

16. ἐστι, not εἰσι, cp. (with Richards) Rhet. i. 1. 1354 a 13 sq.: Thuc. 3. i12. 1, ἐστὸν δὲ δύο λόφῳ ἡ ἵδομένη ὑψηλῷ, and 5. 66. 4, σχεδὸν γὰρ τι πάν πλὴν ὁλέγον τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Δακεδαμονίων ἀρχόντες ἀρχῶντοι εἰσὶ: Plato, Rep. 422 E: Aristoph. Thesmoph. 21, Nub. 247 sq. The singular verb is due to the number of the predicate.

18. πρῶτερον, in c. 6. 1305 b 24 sqq.

ἐπειθ' ἦττον κ.τ.λ. The measures just recommended—the fixing of a short term for the tenure of offices and other similar measures—will not only serve to content the members of the class favoured by the constitution, but also to save oligarchies and aristocracies from becoming δυναστεία. An oligarchy or aristocracy might easily become a δυναστεία, if the holders of the chief offices in them held office for long terms, for these men would be enabled to become very rich and to gather round them a large body of dependent friends, and so not only to secure the reversion of their offices for their sons, but also to make their will supreme over the law. A δυναστεία would then arise (6 4). 5. 1292 b 5 sqq.: 6 4. 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.). Cp. Liv. 4. 24. 4, maximam autem libertatis custodiam esse, si magna imperia diuturna non essent, et temporis modus imponeretur, quibus iuris imponi non posset (quoted by Meier, Aristotelis Politicorum Analysis ac Expositio, p. 479). For the meaning of κακοφρυγείν, which includes embezzlement of public money, see Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 109 sq.

20. ἐπεὶ διὰ τούτο κ.τ.λ. Διὰ τούτο, i.e. διὰ τὸ πολὺν χρόνον ἀρχεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. It is evident from what follows that both in oligarchies and in democracies men sometimes won tyrannies simply through holding important offices tenable for long terms—especially, it would seem, the offices of δημοψυχος and θεωρος (c. 10. 1310 b 21 sq.)—even though they were not demagogues or men of the chief oligarchical families. Compare the Argument to Demosthenes’ speech against Andration (p. 590), where the Epistatês of the Athenian Boulê of 500 is referred to, ἐκαστὸς δὲ ἀρχεῖν ἐν μία ἡμέρᾳ ἐκλείπῃ ἐπιστάτης. διὰ τί δὲ μίαν μόνην ἄρχειν; ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς
NOTES.

23. οἱ δημαγωγοί. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 466 Β, ΠΩΛ. πῶς οὐ νομίζεις; οὐ μέγας διό τι εἰς τάς πόλεις (οἱ γάτας δέ τοι); ... τί δέ; οἷος, ὡσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτείνασι τοῦ ὄντων βούλευται καὶ ἀφανίζον- 

tα χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὅν ἄν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

24. σώζονται δ' αἱ πολιτείαι κ.τ.λ. This refers back to and 
corrects c. 7. 1307 b 19 sqq., where we have been told that constitu- 
tions are overthrown when an opposite constitution is near at 
hand. This is not always so. Sometimes, on the contrary, the 
nearness of those who would be glad to overthrow the constitution 
is a cause of its preservation; it engenders fear in the minds of the 
rulers of the State and makes them vigilant. Hence the wise 
statesman will produce fears in the minds of those entrusted with 
the charge of the constitution, so as to prevent them from relaxing 
their vigilance. Cp. Xen. Οecon. 7. 25, ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν 
tὰ εἰσενεχθέντα τὴ γυναῖκι προσέταξε, γεγραμμένων ὥ θεος ὅτι πρὸς τὸ 
φυλάττειν οὐ κάκων ἐκεῖ φοβόρων εἶναι τὴν πυγὴν πλείον μέρος καὶ τοῦ 
φῶσον ἔδαγα τῇ γυναίκι ἢ τῷ ἄνδρι, Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 5, τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
θάμνος ἀμέλειαν τε καὶ ῥᾳδυμίαν καὶ ἀπείθειαν ἐμβάλλει, ὃ δὲ φῶς 
προσεκτικότερος τε καὶ εὐπεθεστέρος καὶ εὐτακτοτέρος ποιεῖ, and 
Demosth. Prooem. 43. p. 1450 sq. By what measures this state 
of fear is to be produced, Aristotle does not tell us. Partly perhaps 
by laws and penalties (compare the use of φοβείσθαι in reference to 
ζημία in 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 34), partly by magistracies enforcing 
vigilance on the magistrates, like the Council of the Areopagus or 
the Ephorate, partly by a policy resembling that recommended by 
the Chian statesman Onomademus, who advised his party, when 
they had won the victory, not to banish the whole of the opposite 
party for fear lest for want of foes they should proceed to fall out 
among themselves (Plut. De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, c. 10). 
In a similar spirit Scipio Nasica (Corculum) advised that Carthage 
should not be destroyed, wishing τούτον γοῦν τῶν φῶσον ὡσπερ χαλινῶν 
ἐπικείσθαι σωφρονιστήρα τῇ θρασύτητι τῶν πολλῶν (Plut. Κατο Censor, 
c. 27: cp. Plut. De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, c. 3 sub fin.; Σαλλυστ, 
De Bell. Iugurth. c. 41, nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et 
senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rempublicam tractab- 
bant, neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter cives erat; 
metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Sed ubi illa 
formido mentibus decessit, scilicet ea quae secundae res amant,
lascivia atque superbia, incessere; Plin. Nat. Hist. 33. 150, pariterque luxuria nata est et Carthago sublata, ita congruentibus fatis ut et liberet amplecti vitia et liceret; and Vell. Paterc. 2. 1. 1). Compare the unwillingness of Dionysius the Elder that the power of Carthage should be entirely destroyed lest Syracuse should have leisure to regain its liberty (Diod. 14. 75. 3). To what States does Aristotle refer when he says that constitutions are sometimes preserved by the nearness of those who desire to overthrow them? He may possibly, like Plato (Laws 698–9), connect the preservation of the moderate democracy at Athens till after the Persian War with the fear of Persian attack which prevailed there until the repulse of the invasion of Xerxes. Perhaps he also refers to Pharsalus, which was within easy reach of the tyrants of Pherae, and yet retained its oligarchical constitution (c. 6. 1306 a 10 sqq.). Megara, again, long retained the oligarchy which was set up there in b.c. 424 (Thuc. 4. 74), notwithstanding that, or perhaps because, it was close to Athens (cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 118). The same thing may be said of Corinth, which retained its oligarchy though it lay between the two powerful democracies of Athens and Argos. Compare the case of the Lacedaemonian State, which was surrounded by foes (2. 9. 1269 b 3 sqq.). It is probably to it that Plutarch refers when he says (De cap. ex inim. utilitate, c. 3), κινούσε αἱ πόλεις ἀστυγετουκοίς καὶ στρατείαις ἐνδελεχείσι σωφρονιζόμεναι πόλεις εὐνομίαν καὶ πολιτείαν ἐγναίνονσαν ἡγάπησαν. It was in moments of elation and self-confidence that changes in the direction of extreme democracy were made in the Athenian constitution (see note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22. § 3 in Sandys' edition). Machiavelli remarks in his Discourse on reforming the government of Florence (init.), that the constitution introduced at Florence by Maso degli Albizzi `would not have lasted so long as forty years, had it not been for the wars with the Visconti, Dukes of Milan, which happened in that period and kept the State united.' It may be noticed that the entire absence of any check of the nature here referred to by Aristotle (see Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 335) has not so far interfered with the preservation of the United States' constitution.

26. φοβοῦμενοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. οἱ πολίται.
NOTES.

Ind. s. v. φόδος) Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 18, πάντες γὰρ ἡ διαβάλλουσιν ἡ φόδος οὐκ ἀπολέσται ἐν τοῖς προσομίοις.

29. φιλάττωσι, sc. οἱ πολίται.

μὴ καταλύσων ὁπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακῆν τήν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν. For καταλύειν νυκτερινὴν φυλακῆν, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 2.

31. ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις κτλ. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 b 6 sq. Contrast the tendencies of tyranny (c. 11. 1313 b 16 sqq.). Among these φιλονεικίαι would be those mentioned in c. 6. 1305 b 22 sq. Καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων, 'by means of the laws also,' as well as by other means, such as the voluntary action of the magistrates or the intervention of private friends. So at Cumae we find a rising στάσις composed by the intervention of the elder citizens (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 4). Aristotle would have wished that 'the first seeds of the bitter and incurable quarrel' between Marius and Sulla, which arose out of Bocchus' surrender of Jugurtha to Sulla, and (in the words of Plutarch, Marius, c. 10) 'went near to overthrow Rome,' had been dealt with as he suggests. By what laws would he seek to prevent the rise of discords and rivalries among the notables? Partly perhaps by laws requiring differences to be at once referred to authorities entrusted with the task of reconciling them (cp. c. 4. 1303 b 27, διαλέειν τὰς τῶν ἴγνωμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις), partly by other laws. The difference, for instance, between the two brothers at Hestiaea may have arisen in part from a failure of the law to provide means of compelling the richer brother to disclose the amount of the patrimony and of the treasure (c. 4. 1303 b 32 sqq.), and that in Phocis (1304 a 10 sqq.) from a failure of the law clearly to settle the question who had the best right to marry the orphan heiress. Again, men hopelessly at feud might be required by law to go into exile, a course vainly recommended by one of the elder citizens at Syracuse before the rise of the στάσις described in c. 4. 1303 b 20 sqq. (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 825 C).

32. καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας ὄντας, sc. φιλάττειν.

33. πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτοὺς, 'before they too have caught' (or 'inherited') the rivalry'; cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 8 sq. and 7 (5).

10. 1312 b 22 sq., and Plut. Ages. c. 4. διὰ καὶ πατρικὴν τινα πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ παλαιοῦ διετέλουε εἰδόθε οἱ βασιλεῖς φιλονεικίαι καὶ διαφανῶν παραλαμβάνωντες.

ὁς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ κτλ. This is added in support of what precedes. Discords and rivalries among the notables should be prevented from
arising, for if they arise in a section of the notables and spread beyond it, no one but a statesman will be able to detect the evil at its beginning, the only time when it can be easily healed. Pittacus had said (Diog. Laert. i. 78: Stob. Floril. 108. 73: cp. Plato, Rep. 564 C, and 'Ath. Pol. c. 14. 1 sqq.), \(\text{συνετῶν ἄνδρῶν, πρῶς γενίσθαι} \text{tά δυσχερή, προνοήσαι ὅπως μὴ γένηται, ἄνδρεών δὲ γενόμενα eò thetba.}\)

Cp. Epicharm. Fragm. 131 Ahrens,

οὐ μετανοεῖν, ἄλλα προνοεῖν χρῆ τὸν ἄνδρα τῶν σοφῶν,
and Manil. Astron. 5. 354 (punctuation uncertain and text of fourth line),

Иле тетен medicas artes ad membra ferarum,
Et non auditos mutarum tolle morbos
(Hoc est aris opus, non exspectare gementis),
†Et sibi non aegros iam dudum credere corpus†.

Solon had detected the design of Peisistratus to make himself tyrant long before it was executed (Diog. Laert. i. 49), and Stesichorus the similar design of Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.) Prince Metternich said to Ticknor, ‘C'est toujours avec le lendemain que mon esprit lutte’ (Ticknor's Life and Letters, 2. 17).

35. Πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα κ.τ.λ. See note on 1306 b 6.

The valuations mentioned in the passage before us were probably made in most Greek States. In oligarchies based on a property-qualification, and in polities they would be made in order to determine who possessed the property-qualification for office or citizenship and who did not; in constitutions not based on a property-qualification they would be made with a view to the imposition of λαστουργία and the εἰσφορὰ. The fact that they were made annually in small States shows that men's property or its value fluctuated a good deal in Greek States (cp. [Demosth.] Or. 42. in Phaenipp. c. 4, διὰ τούτου γὰρ οἱ νόμοι καθ' ἐκατόν ἔτους πωδεῖ τὰς ἀντιδόσεις, ὡς τὸ διαυτοχεῖα συνεχῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὐ πολλοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν διωμένων εἶδοται), and that the authorities took much pains to proportion their demands to these variations. In larger States the labour and cost of making the valuation were greater, and the valuations were consequently made at longer intervals. At Rome the period was five years (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 316 sq.). In mediaeval Florence 'l'estimo ou estimation des biens de toute sorte pour fixer des taxes proportionnelles' was made afresh every ten years (F. T. Perrens, La Civilisation Florentine, p. 99). 'The valuations were probably made in Greece by self-assessment corrected by ἐπιγραφεῖς, as at Athens (Plato, Laws
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734 D : cp. Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 365). Compare the practice at Rome (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2, 363 sq.: Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 273 sq.). In the advice which Aristotle gives in 38 sqq. he appears to ‘assume the population of the State to be stationary. Otherwise it would be the average τίμημα that ought to be taken’ (Richards). He appears also to take it for granted that the increase or decrease of the total valuation of the State indicates an increase or decrease of the wealth of the individual citizens generally, and not of a small minority of them.

37. εὐπορίας δὲ νομίσματος γιγνομένης. For an instance of this at Rome see Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 94.


39. πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, sc. πλήθος.

1308 b.

2. τοῦ πρότερου, sc. πλήθους.


αἰ τιμήσεις τῆς πολιτείας, ‘the ratings of the constitution for political purposes’ (Liddell and Scott, who compare Diod. 18. 18. 4, ἀπὸ τιμήσεως εἶναι τὸ πολιτεία). 3. νόμον εἶναι, sc. συμβέβηκα, καὶ τὰ τιμήματα, ‘the property-qualifications also,’ as well as the total valuation of the State.

4. ἐπιτείνειν ἥ ἀνέκαπτο, sc. τοὺς ἀρχαῖοι.

6. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις μὴ ποιοῦντον μὲν ὀῦτος κ.τ.λ. Sus. brackets the first μὲν and (following Niemeyer) transposes the second μὲν to after ὀῦτος, but I doubt whether the second μὲν is answered by ἐκεῖνος δὲ, as is implied in this transposition. Both the first and the second μὲν appear to be cases of μὲν solitarium, which is not rare in the Politics (see note on 1262 a 6). For the repetition of μὲν cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23 sqq.

9. ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ‘in the opposite case,’ i.e. if the total valuation of the State has increased (so Vict. ‘si facultates privatorum valde creverint,’ and Schn.). I prefer this explanation to that of Lambinus, ‘si altero modo non agant, hoc est, si auctis censibus aestimationes non intendant,’ with which Dr. Welldon appears to agree, as he translates, ‘if there is no increase of the requisite assessment from time to time.’

10. κοινοῦ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here we pass from recommendations chiefly applicable to oligarchy and aristocracy to recommendations
applicable to all constitutions. Aristotle probably at first intended to follow up μήτ' αὐξάνειν by μήτε ταπεινών or some similar words, but the regular sequence of the passage is broken after εὑρισκόντων, 15, and thus μήτε, 11, remains without anything to answer to it. For μήτε followed by ἄλλα, and not by any answering μήτε, see above on 1339 a 17, and cp. also Peri ἀκτηνοῦς 14. 477 b 9–12. As to [καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ] see critical note on 1308 b 11. Demagogues tended to become overgreat in democracies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 25 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22 sq.: cp. Plato, Rep. 565 C, οὐκόν ἐν τινά ἄει δῆμος εἰσεθι διαφερόντως προϊστάσθαι ἵνα τότε καὶ τούτων τρέφειν τε καὶ αὖξειν μέγαν ;), but oligarchies also sometimes made men overgreat (c. 10. 1310 b 22 sq.). At Rome the rule which fixed a minimum age for the tenure of the quaestorship praetorship and consulship was a check on this tendency (see Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 242).

Aristotle has before him Solon, Fragm. 11, Theogn. 823,

μήτε τιν' αὖξε τύραννον ἐπ' ἐπίδιον, κέρδεσιν εἰκὼν,

μήτε κτείνε θεῶν ἄρκαι συνθέμενος,

and Eurip. Fragm. 628 Nauck (626, ed. 2),

μηδ' ἄνδρα δήμῳ πιστῶν ἐκζάλης ποτέ,

μηδ' αὖξε καιρῷ μείζων, οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλές,

μὴ σοι τύραννος λαμπρὸς ἐξ ἀτόμου φανῇ.

κάλοντες δ' ἄνδρα παρὰ δίκην τιμώμενον.

The advice against taking away great honours at a blow was newer than the advice not to make a single individual overgreat. Aristotle no doubt remembers the sudden fall from power of Themistocles (Diod. ii. 27. 3), Alcibiades, and Lysander (Plut. Ages. cc. 8, 20), and the perilous state of affairs which resulted.

14. φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εὑρισκόντων. Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 28 sqq. and Solon ap. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 12,

tίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὑμνοῦν, ὅταν πολὺς ὀλβὸς ἐπηρ[α]

ἀνθρώποις ὅσοις μὴ νόσος ἄρτιος ἔστι.

15. εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ., 'but, if they do not act thus,' etc. Cp. c. i. i. 1315 a 12 sqq.


19. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποθημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν, 'but, failing that, to make removals imposed on such men removals beyond the limits of the State.' Cp. Plato, Laws 855 C, and see
Liddell and Scott. Men in the position described by Aristotle were probably often removed to a distance from the chief city without being banished from the State. Dionysius the Elder acted otherwise. Suspecting the fidelity of his brother Leptines, who was popular with the Syracusans, he sent him on a mission to Himera and on his arrival ordered him to stay there and not return to Syracuse (Aen. Poliorc. c. 10. 20 sqq.). 'The most exciting moment of the reign of King Luis of Portugal was when in 1870 he received the demand of the octogenarian Duke of Saldanha for the dismissal of his liberal adviser Loulé. The request was accompanied with the threat of armed revolt, and Dom Luis, judging the Duke to be strong, consented. Immediately afterwards he followed an excellent example set him by many other monarchs, and sent his inconvenient subject away on a mission of honour. Saldanha came as Minister to England, and died in London six years later' (Times, Oct. 21, 1889). The nomination of Marshal MacMahon as Governor-General of Algeria in 1864 by the Emperor Napoleon III is said to have been made from a similar motive.

20. ἐπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἱδίους βίους, 'on account of their private mode of life also,' as well as on account of public honours heaped on them or suddenly withdrawn. In oligarchies spendthrift ways of life were often unchecked (Plato, Rep. 555 C) and often ended in schemes of tyranny (c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq.), and the same thing must have happened in democracies also. Even habits of luxury were thought to be perilous to constitutions (vol. i. p. 199, note 2). Nothing aroused more suspicion of the designs of Pausanias and Alcibiades than the παρανομία of their habits of life (Thuc. i. 130, 132 and Diod. ii. 44. 5: Thuc. 6. 15. 4). The magistracy which Aristotle wishes to set up would be modelled more or less on the Lacedaemonian Ephorate (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4) and the Council of the Areopagus at Athens (Isocr. Areopag. § 46: Athen. Deipn. 168 a sq., a passage which shows that a similar jurisdiction existed at Abdera: Philochor. Fragm. 143: Plut. Solon, c. 22). It is possible that a magistracy charged with these functions existed in Aristotle's time in the oligarchy of Corinth: compare a fragment of the "Εμπορος of Diphilus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 227 e sqq.: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 388), in which we read of the Corinthians,

ἐὰν δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν διπλανῶν τίχω,
ἀπείποιν αὐτῷ τοῦτο μή ποιεῖν ἔτι,
ὅς ἄν δὲ μὴ πίθηρ', ἐπίβαλον ζημίαν
A law of Solon at Athens punished ὁ τὰ πατρίω κατεδηδοκάς with ἀτμία (Diog. Laert. i. 55), and Theodorus Metochita (see Kluge, Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, p. 213) says of Carthage, ἅπατειών ἀνήρ καὶ ἀκολάστωσ πατρίως κλήρους χρώμειον ὑπεύθυνος ἐν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ δίκαι ἐπράττετο. Compare also the νόμος περὶ τῆς ἁργῆς at Athens, which was ascribed to Draco or Solon or Peisistratus (see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 149. 1, who refers to Hdt. 2. 177. Diod. i. 77. 5, Diog. Laert. i. 55, and Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 32: cp. also Isocr. Areop. §§ 44–46). But Aristotle would not be satisfied with a law. What he asks for is a special magistracy to keep an eye on spendthrifts and to save them from themselves. One of the duties of the Council of Ten in the Venetian oligarchy was 'the conservation of public morals and the discipline of a riotous young nobility' (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 180).

24. ἐκάστη. Supply ἐν. For its absence cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 23, and see Bon. Ind. s. v. Praeposito.

καὶ τὸ εὐμερεῖον δὲ κ. τ. λ. Supply δὲ. Giphanius (p. 620) gives two alternative renderings of this passage—'Adhibenda quoque est cautio ei civitatis parti quae praeter ceteras floreat iisdem de causis, vel cavendum quoque iisdem de causis, ne qua pars civitatis praeter ceteras floreat.' Τὸ εὐμερεῖον τῆς πόλεως ἀνά μέρος may, in fact, either mean τοὺς εὐμερεύοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνά μέρος or may be a similar phrase to τὸ χαῖρον ὑμῶν in Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 1 (see for other instances of this use of the neut. sing. of the present participle with the article Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, ed. 2, § 829 a). Welldon interprets the words in the former way, and Sus. in the latter. If parallel instances of this use of the participle can be adduced from Aristotle's writings, other than τὸ ἀντιτεσσεράς in Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 21 sqq., I should prefer the latter interpretation, but in their absence the former. Διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας, i.e. because νεωτερισμός is apt to result (cp. 20, 30 sqq.). Aristotle remembers the experience of the Lacedaemonian State (c. 7. 1306 b 36 sqq.). He has just been advising that a single individual should not be allowed to tower over the rest, and the transition is easy to the advice given in the passage before us. Giphanius (p. 621) has already referred to Cic. De Offic. i. 25. 85, according to which it was a maxim of Plato's, ut (qui reipublicae praefuturi sunt) totum corpus reipublicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas
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deserant... Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitate inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam... Hinc apud Athenienses magnae discordiae, in nostra republica non solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia.

25. τούτοι δί' ἄκος κ.τ.λ., 'and the remedy for this evil is' etc. (see note on 1267 a 3). If, however, we adopt the second of the two interpretations mentioned above on 24 of το εὐζεοῦν τῆς πάλεως ἀνὰ μέρος, it is perhaps better to render τούτοι δί' ἄκος with Bonitz (Ind. 26 b 50) 'and the means of averting this is' etc. Notwithstanding what Aristotle says here we learn from 1309 a 27 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.) that the classes not favoured by the constitution should not be admitted, at any rate in a majority, το ἀρχαί κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας. For τούς ἀντικείμενους μορίους cp. c. 4. 1304 a 39 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 7-11. For τας πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχαί, cp. Isocr. Panath. § 132, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχαίς καθιστᾶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις τοὺς ἰκανωτάτους τῶν πολιτών, Plato, Polit. 304 A, εὐνυκαιοῦμεν τὰς ἐν ταῖς πάλεις πράξεις, Demosth. Proocem. 55. p. 1461, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων δικαίως, and Plut. Solon. et Public. Comp. c. 2, καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν χρημάτων κύριας γενόμενος.

28. καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι κ.τ.λ. What does Aristotle mean by συμμεγγώναι? He probably refers to measures of various kinds for fusing rich and poor and not letting them form two States within the State (cp. c. 9. 1310 a 4 sq. and Plut. Pericl. c. 11, where we read of Thucydides son of Melesias, ὁ γὰρ ἠσάσε τοὺς καλοὺς καὶ μικροὺς καλομένους ἄνδρας ἐνδιοτήρησα καὶ συμμειώθηκα πρὸς τὸν δῆμον)—measures for their intermarriage (cp. Plato, Laws 773 C and Pol. 2. 7. 1266 b 2 sqq.), for making them mutually useful (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq.), for bringing them together in the deliberative body (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.), and the like. Contrast the ways of tyranny (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 16 sqq.). 'Veneti solent locupletiores ex plebe affinitatibus ac propinquitatibus sibi conciliare ac devincire, mutuasque a locupletioribus pecunias accipere, ut rempublicam amare ac tueri etiam invitam cogantur' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 706). 'Venetorum patriciis cum plebeis iura connexion communitia sunt, Rhagusiorum patriciis non item' (ibid. p. 222).

30. ᾧ τὸ μέσον αὐξένω. Aristotle does not say how he would do this. Perhaps in part by such rules as to inheritances as those mentioned in 1309 a 23 sqq.

τούτο, 'this,' i.e. the increase of the midway class, not, I think, 'this class' (Welldon).
tās διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq.

31. μέγιστον δὲ κ. τ. λ. This recommendation is connected with what precedes. If, in oligarchies especially, it is made impossible for magistrates to derive illicit gain from holding office, one class will not be in the sunshine and the other in the shade, for both will have what they want (40 sqq.); the poor will become rich and the notables will hold office and not be ruled by their inferiors (1309 a 7 sqq.). The making of illicit gains by magistrates might be checked either by laws—e.g. laws against bribery and corruption and laws enforcing the rendering of accounts (2. 9. 1271 a 3 sqq.)—or by administrative arrangements not prescribed by law. At Athens various acts performed by the polêtes and apodectae were required to be performed in the presence of the Boulê, whether by law or not we are not told (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 47. ll. 10, 14. c. 48. l. 3), and the transfer of sacred property from one set of treasurers of Athena to another also took place in the presence of the Boulê (c. 47. l. 6). That all this did not suffice to prevent abuses we see from Lys. Or. 19. pro Aristoph. Bon. c. 57, εἰς δὲ τινα ὁ προανάλυσκοτες ὦ μόνον τοῦτον ἐνεκεν, ἀλλ’ ἐνα ἄρχειν ὑφ’ ὑμὸν ἀξιωθέντες διαλέγεσα κομίσωνται, from Xen. Anab. 4. 6. 16, and from Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 106 sq. (see also Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 222. 4). The institutions of the Lacedaemonian State (2. 9. 1271 a 3 sqq.), of Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 35 sqq.), and of Carthage (2. 11. 1273 b 1 sqq.) were still more defective in this respect, and no doubt the same thing might be said with truth of many oligarchies. Compare with Aristotle’s counsel a saying ascribed to the Lacedaemonian king Alcamenes, son of Teleclus, who, when he was asked how a kingship could best be preserved, is said to have replied, Ἐν περὶ πλείονος τὸ κέρδος μὴ πωσίτο (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Alcam. 1). Giph. (p. 624) has already compared Cic. De Offic. 2. 21. 75 and 2. 22. 77, nulla autem re conciliare facilius benevolentiam multitudinis possunt ii qui reipublicae praesunt quam abstinentia et continentia. Aristotle goes further in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31 sqq. and recommends that in oligarchies the holders of the chief magistracies should not only make no illicit gains but should expend money of their own for public objects. Meier in his Aristot. Polit. Analysis ac Expositio (published in 1668), p. 487, significantly remarks in a note on the passage before us, ‘quid factum in civitatisbus Germaniae, quave occasione causa ac modo in democraticas maximam partem
abierint formas, referre studio supersedemus.' For the construction μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 24 sq. and a fragment of Philemon in Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 6, καὶ έστιν ἐτέρων πιαρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν τύχην.

34. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως κ.τ.λ. This account of the feelings of the many agrees with the account of the γεωργικός δήμος given in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11-26 (cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 4, τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος εὺχ οὕτω τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀγανακτεί στεροῦμενον ἢτε έχει βαρείως υβριζόμενον), but in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 29 sqq. the poor (οἱ πέινητες), who must be identical with the many, are placed in a less favourable light, for they are said to plot against the rich and to covet their goods. Again in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq. we are told that the demos of Erythrae overthrew the oligarchy of the Basilidae, notwithstanding that they ruled well (which implies, we may suppose, that they governed purely), simply because they were so few in number.

36. πρὸς τοῖς ἱδίοις σχολάζειν, 'to have leisure to attend to their own business' (Welldon). Cp. 1309 a 5, πρὸς τοῖς ἱδίοις εἶναι.

37. τότε δὲ κ.τ.λ. We expect γὰρ rather than δὲ, but see notes on 1268 b 30 and 1321 a 19.

38. μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ένδέχεται κ.τ.λ. Καί qualifies the whole sentence. The meaning is, 'and not only is the constitution safer when office is not allowed to be a source of gain, but there is this further advantage, that then, and then only, aristocracy and democracy may exist together.' Democracy will exist, because the demos will have all that it cares about having if office does not bring gain, i.e. a right to hold office, and aristocracy will exist, because the notables will have what they want, i.e. office. Compare 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32 sqq. According to a saying placed in the mouth of Periander in [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 11 sub fin. (cp. Isocr. Panath. §§ 131, 153) democracy is best when it is most like aristocracy. Many had claimed that the Athenian democracy was a mixture of aristocracy and democracy (Thuc. 2. 37. 2: [Plato,] Menex. 238 C sq.), or that it was so at any rate in early days (Isocr. ibid.); Aristotle may here intend to correct contentsions of this kind.

40. ένδέχεται γὰρ ἀν κ.τ.λ., 'for it would then be possible' etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 34 sqq.

1309 a. 2. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξείναι πᾶσιν ἀρχεῖν δημοκρατικῶν. Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 31 sq.
7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34—1309 a 10.

τὸ δὲ τοὺς γυνώριμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἄρχαις ἀριστοκρατικῶν. In strictness perhaps τοὺς καὶ ἄρετήν διαφέροντα should take the place of τοὺς γυνώριμους, for not all γυνώριμοι are διαφέροντες καὶ ἄρετήν (6 (4). 3. 1289 b 40 sqq.), and it is to these that office falls in a true aristocracy (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.).

7. ὤστε συμβῆςεται κ.τ.λ. It was by attention to their regular work, not by pay for attendance in the assembly and dicasteries, that the poor were enriched (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20 sqq.).

9. τῶν δὲ γυνώριμων μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. This was what the notables most disliked (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 35 sqq.).

10. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by δὲ in τὸν δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν, 13. The magistrates might make illicit gains either by plundering public property or by plundering private individuals or receiving bribes from them. To guard against the former evil Aristotle recommends in effect that the whole body of citizens shall be enabled to keep an eye on the public property. It was already the custom at many places—at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 47. 1. 5 sq.), Ephesus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 143. 1), and Delos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 367 init.)—for the outgoing treasurers of sacred property to hand it over to their successors in presence of the Boulê, but Aristotle recommends a still stricter rule in reference to public property; he advises that public property shall be transferred in the presence not of the Boulê only, which might be corrupt or collusive, but of all the citizens (cp. Plut. Timol. c. 10 init.), and that not merely shall a list be kept of the articles, but that copies of this list shall be distributed (τιβέσθωσαν, literally ‘deposited’) by phratries companies and tribes, so that all the citizens may know what articles are comprised in the list. All that was usually done probably was to put up a list in some public spot (see the examples given by Dittenberger in Syll. Inscr. Gr. Nos. 366, 367). Παράδοσις is the technical term for the handing over of property to successors (cp. [πα]παράδοσαν in Dittenberger, No. 366 a. 1. 9). What does Aristotle include under τὰ χρήματα? In 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 25 τὰ ἱερὰ χρήματα must include land. Yet how would it be possible to transfer land or houses or (e. g.) the contents of the dockyards in the presence of the whole citizen-body? With κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λίχους καὶ φιλίας Bonitz (Ind. 368 b 23 sqq.) groups such phrases as κατὰ ζεύγη (‘by pairs’) in Hist. An. 9. 8. 613 b 24. Cp. also 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 1.

Each of these subdivisions must evidently have had some central
place in which to keep its copy. Those of the tribe would be kept in the sacarium of its eponymous hero, or exposed to view in the place where other public notices connected with the tribe were posted (as to Athens see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2, 423). As to public notices to members of the phratry see Busolt, 2, 428. 7. It is not clear why Aristotle does not require copies to be deposited with demes also. When oaths were taken by all the citizens, they were sometimes taken κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δήμοις (Andoc. De Myst. c. 97). As to λόχους see note on 1264 a 7 and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 68 (cp. p. 41), whence it appears that one at any rate of the Spartan λόχοι was a quarter of Sparta, so that the λόχοι may well have usually been a local subdivision. It seems more natural to take τιβέσθωσαν (with Welldon) as passive than (with Sus.) as middle: for the use by Aristotle of a verb in the plural after a nominative in the neuter plural see Bon. Ind. 490 a 51 sqq. Magistrates in Greek States probably in many cases received an inadequate amount of pay, and this may have been one reason why they were often corrupt. If that was so, the remedy for the evil suggested by Aristotle may not have been the true one.


14. οὖν δὲ ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ. The recommendations contained in 1309 a 14–32, like that contained in 1308 b 31–1309 a 14, are made with a view to heal or prevent the ‘prospering by sections’ of which we read in 1308 b 24 sqq. Compare with the passage before us c. 5. 1305 a 3 sqq., Lys. Or. 21. c. 13 sq., and Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 31 sqq. Just as Aristotle holds that the best way of preserving a tyranny is to make it more like the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form (c. III. 1314 a 34 sq.), so he holds that democracies and oligarchies may be preserved by their studying the advantage of the less favoured class and thus making as near an approach as they can to constitutions existing for the common advantage.

16. ἐν ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν. E. g. in the constitution of Rhodes at one time (c. 5. 1304 b 27 sqq.), and perhaps also in that of Athens still (Isocr. De Pace, § 128).
17. καὶ βουλομένους. How willingly liturgies of this kind were sometimes undertaken, we see from Lys. Or. 21. cc. 1-5.

18. τὸς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας. Cr. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4, τῶν ματαιῶν λειτουργιῶν. A triarchy would no doubt be regarded by Aristotle as an useful liturgy. χρησίμως, on the contrary, whether in connexion with dramatic lyrical musical or dancing competitions, are classed by him with the λαμπαδαρχία (the function of providing the expenses of a torch-race), so far at any rate as their utility is concerned. The office of χρησίμως τραγφοδύσι cost in one instance, according to Lys. Or. 21. c. 1, 3000 drachmae, and that of χρησίμως αὐληταῖς ἀνθρώπινοι, according to Demosth. c. Mid. c. 156, was much more costly (see A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalterthümer, in C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 332. 4). In Crete the public liturgies were defrayed from public funds and did not fall on the rich (see note on 1272 a 17). Demetrius of Phalerum, a pupil of Aristotle, seems to have shared his low estimate of the value of the χρησίμα, to judge by a fragment of his writings pointed out by F. Dümmler in Plut. De Gloria Atheniensium, c. 6, where he calls the tripod awarded to the winning chorēgus (if we adopt Reiske's emendations) ἐπίσπεισμα τῶν ἐκκεχυμέων βιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκκελοιότων κενοτάφιων άκων (see U. Köhler in Rhein. Ms. 53. 491 sqq.).

19. δοσι ἀλλὰ τοιαύται, e.g. the ἐστίασις or feasting of the tribe.

20. ἐν δὲ διλιγαρχίᾳ κ.τ.λ. That oligarchies did not commonly act as Aristotle here advises is clear from Isocr. De Pace, § 125. Mutatis mutandis, we can gather what measures he would recommend for giving help to the poor from the counsel which he gives to extreme democracies in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq., b 7 sqq. Aeneas (Poliorc. c. 14) suggests that during a siege the poor should be excused the payment of the interest or even the principal of debts, but Aristotle is silent as to that. It would have been well if the policy he recommends had been followed when the English Inclosure Acts of the early part of the present century were passed. 'They may have been good for the country as a whole, but there is no doubt that the interests of the poor were treated with a carelessness which has led to very evil results' (Mr. C. Elton, Academy, March 10, 1888). The class which then ruled in this country often acted more wisely. 'In the eighteenth century it was the poor who enjoyed exemption from taxation in England, in France it was the rich. In the one case the aristocracy had taken upon its own
shoulders the heaviest public charges in order to be allowed to govern; in the other case it retained to the end an immunity from taxation in order to console itself for the loss of government’ (De Tocqueville, L'Ancien Régime, p. 146 sq., quoted by Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, ed. i, i. 279).

21. τὰς ἀρχας ἀφ’ ὧν λήμματα, ‘the offices from which gains accrue.’ Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 3, ὅποια δὲ εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ μεσοθορίαι ἐνεκα καὶ ὀφελεῖς εἰς τὸν οἶκον, τὰύτας ἐμεῖ πόρος ἀρχεῖ. What offices are referred to we are not told, except that those of the stratēgi and hippocarchs are not among them. See as to the emoluments of offices at Athens, Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 222, note 4. Aristotle can hardly refer here (as in 2. 10, 1272 a 40 sqq.) to illicit gains, for in recognizing them he would abandon the ground taken up by him in 1308 b 31 sqq. If, as he holds (c. 10. 1311 a 9 sq.), the end for which oligarchies exist is wealth, he is asking much from them in asking them to abandon the offices of which he speaks to the poor. But some oligarchies have done what he recommends. ‘Veneti cum plebe communicare solent minores aliquot magistratus et cura-tiones—immo vero primicerium, cuius summa in republica dignitas est—ac fructuosissima scribarum munera plebeiis attribuere, ac patricios ab huiusmodi honorum petitione summovere’ (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 706).

22. καὶ τις ὑβρίσθη κ.τ.λ., ‘and if any one among the rich outrages these, the penalties should be greater than if he outraged one of his own class.’ So Vict. Sus. and others. The sentence ἦ ἀν σφῶν αὐτῶν, if complete, would apparently run ἦ ἂν τις ἴμπριη τῶν εὐπάρων εἰς τινα σφῶν αὐτῶν, not that it is necessary to supply τινα, for the same meaning may be expressed by the partitive genitive σφῶν αὐτῶν (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, τῶν ἅλλων θηρίων). Sepulveda, followed by Lamb. and Giph., takes σφῶν αὐτῶν to refer to the poor, translating ‘et graviori poena sanciendum, si quis locupletum in pauperes, quam si quis ipsorum contumeliam inferat,’ but not, I think, rightly. For the thought cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 3 sqq. Aristotle’s suggestion is perhaps modelled on a similar provision in the laws of Charondas for the protection of slaves (Herondas, 2. 46 sqq.: cp. Plato, Laws 777 D). We read of the Venetian oligarchy in Bodinus, De Republica, p. 771, ‘iniurias plebeiis ob optimatibus illatas accerri ac ulciscuntur.’

23. καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently thinks that if
in an oligarchy inheritances pass not by kinship but by gift or bequest (for δόσις includes the two things: see Liddell and Scott), they will tend to go to those who are already rich. This had been the experience of the Lacedaemonian State, where land at any rate, if not property of all kinds, could be given or bequeathed by its owner to any one whom he chose to select, and indeed an orphan heiress might be given in marriage not only by her father, but also after his death by his representative, to any one, however rich, whom the father or his representative chose to name (2. 9. 1270a 18-29). Whether in the Lacedaemonian State or elsewhere there existed a right of gift or bequest so absolutely free that a father could disinherit his own children without cause, may well be doubted, but the owner of property may often have been in a position to disappoint less near relatives. What Aristotle would wish to be done if a man had no kin, we do not learn. He would no doubt wish that the policy which he suggests should be followed in reference to the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage. See on the whole subject note on 1270a 21. The Thirty at Athens appear to have taken exactly the opposite course to that which Aristotle here recommends to oligarchies (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 35. I. 14, ὃο[ν] περὶ τοῦ δοῦναι τὰ εαυτοῦ ὃ ἄν εὐθὺς κύριον ποιήσαντες καθίσας κ.τ.λ.). He would evidently be opposed to succession by primogeniture in oligarchy, and indeed to the succession of any single son exclusively of the rest. There was no right of primogeniture in the case of the Venetian nobility (De La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, I. 32 sq.).

27. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and it is expedient both in democracy and in oligarchy to allow to those whose share in the advantages of the constitution is less either an equality or precedence in all other things . . . except only the magistracies which are supreme over the constitution.' These 'other things' include the less important offices and other positions of dignity and emolument, though not of power, such as priesthoods, and marks of respect such as those referred to by Xenophon in De Vect. 3. 4, ἀγαθῶν δὲ καὶ καλῶν καὶ προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένων γ' ἐστιν ὅτι καλείσθαι, οἱ ἄν δοκῶσιν ἄξιολόγους καὶ πλοίους καὶ ἐμπορεύσαντι ὄφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 5 and Athen. Deipn. 235 a. Yriarte (Patricien de Venise, p. 94) says of Venice, 'Si la politique est réservée aux nobles, l'administration est ouverte aux citoyens; mais les hautes directions sont toujours données.'
aux patriciens." Much the same thing may be said of Ragusa (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 309).

30. πλην δεν άρχαί κύριαι τής πολιτείας. The expression κύριαι τής πολιτείας is often used in the Politics of the rich or the few or the poor (3. 8. 1279 b 17 sq. : 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 33, etc.), but nowhere else of magistracies. In Antiphon, Tetr. 2. 1. I we read ὑπὸ τῶν ψυφισμένων, οἱ κύριοι πάσης τής πολιτείας εἰσίν.

31. ταύτας δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 40, ταύτων δὲ (i. e. τῶν ἀρχῶν) εἶναι τὰς μὲν πλείστας κληρωτάς, τὰς δὲ μεγίστας κρυπτὴ ψῆφῳ μεθ' ἀρκῶν καὶ πλείστης ἀκμῆθειας διαφημιστάς.

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ὁ πλείστος, 'or in a majority.'

C. 9. 33. Τρία δὲ τίνα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle adds this advice because if the holders of the supreme magistracies in a State are not what they should be, the safety of the constitution will be imperilled: cp. c. 3. 1303 a 16 sqq. What offices are meant by οἱ κύριαι ἀρχαί? Not perhaps exclusively those which are κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας (30), but the chief offices generally, those for instance of a stratēgus or tamias (1309 b 4 sqq.). In c. 10. 1310 b 20 sqq. the offices of demiurgus and thecorus are given as instances of κύριαι ἀρχαί. Here, as in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. and 3. 13. 1284 a 5 sqq., Aristotle requires the ruler to possess not only virtue but also political skill (see note on 1284 a 6). Giphanius (p. 636) has pointed out the resemblance between the passage before us and a passage in a speech of Pericles in Thuc. 2. 60. 5, καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτο ἄνθρωπος ἄργίζεις ὅσον δέν ἔστω τί μιᾶς ἡμέρας οὖσαν 

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men devoted to the constitution but also men of worth and good character, and Aristotle follows in his track. Compare the view of Cicero in pro Planc. 25. 62. It is evident that Aristotle cannot have approved of the use of the lot even in a democracy in appointments to the κύριαι ἀρχαί of which he speaks here, unless indeed the subsequent δοκιμασία was made very strict and inquisitorial. See note on 1309 b 3.

35. δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἑργῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς. This is explained by ἔμπειρα in 1309 b 5 and by ἐπιστήμη in 1309 b 8 (cp. εἰδότες, 1309 b 12). Compare such expressions as τὴν τοῦ λόγου δύναμιν (Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragn. 52: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 250).

36. τρίτον δ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην κ.τ.λ. For ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, ἀγαθὸν καὶ δικαίον (where see note), and Lys. Or. 12. c. Eratosth. c. 5, ἐσ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην. For τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 30 and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 25. 1. 5. Δικαιοσύνη is the ἔξις ἀφ’ ἦς πρακτικοί τῶν δικαίων εἰσίν (Eth. Nic. 5. 1. 1129 a 6 sqq.), so that if what is just varies in relation to each constitution, justice, the habit which enables men to do what is just, will do so too. The kind of justice which the citizen, for instance, of a democracy will possess will be different from true justice, for it will be unduly favourable to numbers and free birth as contrasted with wealth and virtue. Aristotle seems to imply here and in 3. 4. 1276 b 30 that not merely the justice of a good citizen, but also his virtue generally, will vary with each constitution, but he does not trace in detail how his courage, temperance, and moral prudence will do so. Probably in a παρέκδοσις each of these virtues will be adjusted to an end which is other than the true one.

37. μὴ ταύτων . . . κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, 'not the same in relation to all constitutions': cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 20, καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δὲ, πότερον διαφέρει καθ’ ἐκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος.

39. ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. 'Απορίαι are rare in this Book, but here we have one. Aristotle probably has before him some sharp sayings of Themistocles and Aristides which are recorded in Phut. Aristid. c. 24, μέγα δ’ οὖν ἄνω τοῦ Ἀριστείδου καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἔχοντο ἐπὶ τῇ διατάξει τῶν φόρων ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς λέγεται καταγελᾶν, ὡς οὐκ ἀνδρὸς δυτα τῶν ἐπαινοῦ, ἀλλὰ θυλάκων χρυσοφυλάκως ἀνομοίως ἀμφότερος τὴν Ἀριστείδου παρρησίαν ἐκείνος γάρ, εἰπόντος ποτὲ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀρετὴν ἡγεῖσαί μεγάστην στρατηγοῦ τὸ γινώσκοι καὶ προσαναθέσθη τὰ βουλεύματα τῶν πολέμων, "Τούτο μέν," εἰπεῖν, "ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν, ὡς Ἰθμιστοκλέεις, καλὸν δὲ καὶ στρατηγικὸν ἅληθίος ἢ περὶ τὰς χείρας ἐγκράτεια"
NOTES.

(c.p. Aristid. c. 4). Aristotle, unlike Aristides, regards generalship as the quality to be most insisted on in a general (c.p. Eth. Nic. 9. 2. 1164 b 24 and 'Ath. Pol. c. 23. I. 12 sqq.: Vict. compares the rejoinder of Cicero in Plut. Cic. c. 38 to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, who wished to appoint a man who was no soldier to a military command and dwelt on his moral excellence, Ti oûn oûk épírrropov aútov tois téknav philásovs;). So far he agrees with Themistocles, but he does not agree with him in setting little store by the virtue of a treasurer. A treasurer needs to have virtue much above that of most men.

1309 b. 3. ἐοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle tells us to prefer the man who possesses the rarest of the three qualities demanded by the office. Should we not rather say the man who possesses the most indispensable of them? It was on this principle that St. Theresa's sage advice was based, to choose, if possible, a confessor both wise and pious, but, if that was not possible, to prefer the former quality. Aristotle appears to take it for granted that ταμία will be chosen by election, not by lot: this was the case with the ταμίαι στρατιωτικῶν at Athens ('Ath. Pol. c. 43), but not with the ταμίαι τῆς 'Αθηνᾶς ('Ath. Pol. c. 47). In the passage before us, as in 3. 11. 1282 a 31 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq., ταμίαι and στρατηγοὶ are taken as instances of high officials.

5. στρατηγιάς = στρατηγικῆς, as in Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 40 (Bon. Ind. s.v.): see also Liddell and Scott. Μετέχουσι, sc. πίνακες.

6. ἐν δὲ φιλακῇ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 11, καὶ δεὶ μὲν δῆπον τοὺς φιλάκας μυθεῖν οὕτω ποιεῖν δίνασθαι ὡς πιστοὺς εἶναι. Φιλακή is here used not in a military sense, as in 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10, but in a financial sense, of the custody of property and especially money, as in Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 9. Καὶ ταμεία is added to make this clear.

7. τάναντία 'prope adverbii instar usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 247 b 26): cp. Plato, Laws 636 E.

8. ἥ δὲ ἐπιστήμη, sc. τοῦ φιλοτήτων καὶ ταμείεων. The knowledge how to keep things is possessed even by women (3. 4. 1277 b 24 sq.). See note on 1277 b 24.

9. καὶ, 'if also': see note on 1298 b 23.

For τῆς πολιτείας φιλία cp. c. 3. 1303 a 17, τοὺς μὴ τῆς πολιτείας φιλούς: Xen. Anab. 1. 3. 5, τῆς Κύρου φιλία, and 5. 6. 11.

10. ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δῦο. Cp. Rhet. 3. 12. 1414 a 21, τὸ γὰρ ἤδειαν εἶναι ποιήσει δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα,
11. ἣ ὅτι ἐνδεχέται κ.τ.λ. Aristotle implies that though a man who possesses full knowledge and is friendly to the constitution may be ἀκρατής, a man who possesses virtue cannot be so. The same thing is implied in 1310 a 14–19 of men ‘habilitated and educated by the rule of the constitution,’ no doubt because habituation and education result in virtue. That knowledge is no security against wrong action is well known to Euripides (Hipplol. 358 sqq. Bothe, 380 sqq. Dindorf: Fragm. 838 Nauck (841, ed. 2) etc.): cp. Eth. Nic. i. 1. 1095 a 8 sqq. and 7. 2. 1145 b 12 sq. That friendliness to the constitution is no security against wrong action would be proved by daily experience, for many men who betrayed constitutions would be observed to do so not because of any unfriendliness to them, but because they were corrupted by bribes or the like.

14. ἀπλῶς δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and broadly whatever provisions in the laws we speak of as advantageous to constitutions.’ See vol. i. p. 537, note 2. Cp. Diod. 5. 82. 4, αὐτῶς δὲ ὁ Μακαρέως ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ βασιλείων νόμον γράφει πολλὰ τῶν κοινῆ συμβεβηκότων περιέχοντα, and [Plut.] De Fato, c. 4, ἡπείτα μὴν καθόλου (ὁ πολιτικός νόμος) τὰ πόλει προσέχοντα εἰς δύναμιν περιλαμβάνει. I follow Sus. and others in my interpretation of this passage. Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. xxxvi, note 3) interprets it otherwise. He takes Aristotle to refer to a συναγωγῇ τῶν νόμων drawn up by himself and Theophrastus, ‘a compilation of the laws obtaining in the various States and a description of the various authorities entrusted with their execution.’ See also Zeller, Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 506 foot.

16. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχείον κ. τ. λ., ‘and the often mentioned elementary principle of paramount importance.’ For the order of the words see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm. (ed. 2 and ed. Gerth), §§ 405. 4 and 464. 7, and cp. Plato, Laws 708 D, τὸ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταῦτα ἐξερευνήσας γένος. For στοιχείον see note on 1295 a 35. Πολλάκις, in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 14 sqq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 4 sqq. It is again alluded to in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25 sqq. As has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 491, this principle was inherited by Aristotle from Theramenes. It was forgotten by those who made oligarchies too narrow (c. 6. 1305 b 2–22), or who took no pains to conciliate those outside the constitution (c. 8. 1309 a 20–32) or the ‘moderately well-to-do’ (6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36 sq.), or who in planning aristocracies trusted to puerile devices.
intended to conceal from the many their exclusion from power (6 (4).
12. 1297 a 7 sqq.). 'Like Dumouriez and at a later period Bonaparte, Danton was of opinion that in politics everything depends on being the strongest' (Von Sybel, French Revolution, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 474). It should be noticed that while Aristotle regards it as essential to every constitution that those who are on the side of the constitution should be stronger than those who are against it, he is still better pleased when the constitution is so framed that there is not even a minority which wishes for a different constitution from the existing one (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36 sqq.).

18. παρά πάντα δὲ ταύτα κ.τ.λ. For παρά πάντα ταύτα cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 23, 32. Παρά πάσας is used in a slightly different sense in c. 11. 1315 a 15. This warning is suggested by Plato, Laws 701 E, λαθόντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκατέρας μετροπτή των, τὼν μὲν τοῦ δεσπόζεσιν, τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθεράσιον, κατείδομεν ὅτι τότε διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο εὐπραγία, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἀκρον ἀγαθόντων ἐκατέρω, τῶν μὲν δυσλείας, τῶν δὲ τοιναντίαν, οὐ συνήργητεν οὐτε τοῖς οὐτε τοῖς, and Rep. 562. Compare with the passage before us Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 21–30. Roscher (Politik, p. 319, 11) quotes from Mommsen the remark, 'die Demokratie hat sich immer dadurch vernichtet, dass sie die äussersten Consequenzen ihres Princips durchführt.' Compare also the following passage from J. S. Mill, System of Logic, vol. ii. p. 521, ed. 3: 'Inasmuch, however, as no government produces all possible beneficial effects, but all are attended with more or fewer inconveniences, and since these cannot be combated by means drawn from the very causes which produce them, it would be often a much stronger recommendation of some practical arrangement, that it does not follow from what is called the general principle of the government than that it does. Under a government of legitimacy the presumption is far rather in favour of institutions of popular origin, and in a democracy in favour of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will. The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philosophy tends to the practical conclusion that we should exert our utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live.'

20. πολλά γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 35 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq., and Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 21–30. Aristotle's remark is based on Plato, Rep. 562 B. Among the δοκοῦντα δημοτικά and
ολιγαρχικά referred to by him as fatal to democracy and oligarchy are probably the exaggerated devotion to wealth in oligarchies and to liberty in democracies on which Plato had commented: cp. 1310a 25 sqq. as to democracy and 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 26 sqq. as to oligarchy.

21. οἱ δὲ οἵμενοι κ.τ.λ., 'but they' (i.e. the adherents of deviation-forms) 'thinking that this' (i.e. τὸ παρεκβεβηκός) 'is the only right thing.' For the attraction in ταῦτα, cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32, αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχή πάντων. For μίαν ἀρετήν, cp. Menand. 'Ηνίοχος, Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 127),


µι' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τῶν ἄτοπων φεύγειν αὐτί.

For the thought, cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 82.


23. ἀγνοοῦτες ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The verbs ἀποβαλέτη (27), ποιόσε (28), ἔκει (29), and συμβαίνει (30) appear to be all of them dependent on ἀγνοοῦτες ὅτι. Οὐ μὲν ἄλλα, 25, i.e. though this is so, still etc.

26. πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'first he will let slip all the moderation of the feature, and at last will carry matters to such a point that it will not even seem to be a nose at all owing to the excess and defect in it of the two opposite elements (hookedness and snubness).'</p>  

Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 3. 769 b 6, καὶ πάλιν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προγόνους ὁμοίωσατο, ἢτι δὲ διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν ὅτε μὲν ἀνθρωπος μὲν τούτων δ' ὀυδεὶς προσόρως, ὅτε δὲ προῖνν οὐτός τέλος οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπος ἄλλα ζώον τι μάνον φαίνεται τὸ γεγράμενον, ἢ δὴ καὶ λέγεται τέρατα. For the strangeness of the order in τέλος δ' οὕτως κ.τ.λ., see vol. ii. p. ii, note 3. Ποιόσει is displaced in order that special emphasis may be thrown on οὐτός ὅστε μηδὲ μένα.

30. τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας. Vict. suspects that ἄλλας is a mere repetition of ἄλλων in the preceding clause, though he does not venture to omit it. Schneider brackets and Coray omits it. Sus. thinks that Vict. may be right, but leaves ἄλλας in his text. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand, holds (Politics of Aristotle, 2. 213), that ἄλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of "likewise."

Perhaps this is so: compare the use of ἄλλας in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30 (see note) and in Περὶ μακροβιότητος 6. 467 b 5, περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων.

31. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν κ.τ.λ. In his reference here to democracy Aristotle may possibly have Pericles in view; at any rate Isocrates says of Pericles in De Pace, § 126, παραλαβὼν τὴν πόλιν χείρον μὲν φρονούσαν ἢ πρὸς κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἢτι δ' ἅνεκτῶς πολιτευομένην.
Compare 2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq. For ἐστὶν ὡστ’ ἔχειν cp. (with Bon. Ind. 220 b 8) Probll. 31. 17. 959 a 13, ἐστὶν ὡστε φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐν δίο.
34. οὐδὲ πολιτείαν. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq.
35. τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See note on 1274 b 36.
38. οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ, ‘I say “destroys,” for’ etc. Μέν is answered by ἄλλα in the next line. For ἐπίσκεψις καὶ διαμένειν cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 22. It would seem that in Aristotle’s view neither oligarchy nor democracy can be said to exist in a State all whose citizens have an even amount of property.
40. ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν, i.e. the constitution of a State in which an even amount of property is possessed by all. Ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν = τὴν τοῖς πολιτείαν, as in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 6.

1310 a.
1. φθείροντες, sc. τοὺς εὐπόρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος.

2. ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle passes on to another mistake common to democracies and oligarchies like the last. Statesmen in each often make the State two and thus produce στάσεις and constitutional change (cp. c. 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). As to the structure of the sentence see Vahlen, Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 24, who remarks that ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπέρ τοῦ δῆμου τῶν ἀληθείων (6 sq.) should have been adapted in structure to 3 sq., whereas in fact the structure of this clause is affected by what immediately precedes. He compares c. 10. 1310 b 9–14 and 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 7–11.

3. ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγογοί, ὕπο τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων. This is the mark of an ultimate democracy (c. 5. 1305a 31 sq.). According to 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 10 sq., it is only in a democracy of this kind that demagogues exist; at any rate it is in such a democracy that they are most likely to court the many by fighting with the rich. There may be a reference here to Pericles’ struggle with Thucydides son of Melesias (Plut. Percl. c. 11), which is said by Plutarch to have broken the State into two sections, the few and the demos. It was characteristic of a demagogue to boast that he ‘fought for the many’ (Aristoph. Vesp. 665 sqq.).

5. δεὶ δὲ τούναντίον κ.τ.λ. Solon had done this, as Aristotle probably remembers: cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 5, καὶ γὰρ ... πρὸς ἑκατέρους ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρων μάχεται καὶ διαμφισβήτει, and Aristid. 2. 361, quoted by Sandys in his note on this passage, καὶ τοὺς Σάλων τὰ μὲν εἰς Μεγαρίας ἔχοντα ἑπίλεγεν, τοὺς δὲ νόμους οὐκ ἦδεν περιών. οὐδὲ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑυπόρων πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους οὐκ ἦδεν. Cp. [Demosth.] Phil. 4. c. 45.

6. ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων. For the omission of the article cp. 3. 13.
1283 b 6, ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, where see note. See also note on 1307 a 22.

7. καὶ τοὺς ὀρκοὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle speaks of the oaths to which he refers being taken only ‘in some oligarchies’; they would probably be especially taken in oligarchies set up after an actual battle with the demos (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27 sqq.), or in oligarchies ruled by ἐταμίαι, though of course not in those oligarchies of this type in which the demos elected the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). They resembled in their terms the oaths taken by hostile States against each other. So the ἀγελάω of Drerus in Crete swear by Hestia and other deities, μὴ μὰν ἐγὼ ποικ τοῖς Λυπτίων καλὸς φρονοῦσιν μὴ τέχνα μὴ τα μαχανῷ μῆτε εὐ νυκτὶ μῆτε πεθ' ἀμήρια καὶ σπευσία, οὔτι καὶ δύναμι, κακὸν τὰ πολε τῶν Λυπτίων (Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 121, already referred to by Prof. Jowett). We read of oaths sworn by oligarchs against the Athenian demos in Andoc. De Myst. c. 98, but we are not told what their terms were. Compare also a Thasian decree in Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8. 402, ὀρκον δὲ ὄμωσι πάντας Ἄ[θηραίους τοὺς] διηγάρχην καταστήσαντας, κ[αὶ ὄμωσι τοῦ δ]ήμου ὅν ἄν ἡ βουλή συγγράψῃ. Mr. Freeman (Sicily, 2. 175, note 3) quotes a remark as to the ‘scoffing anapaestic cadence’ of the oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle here. Oaths to maintain democracy were sometimes taken by its partisans (Thuc. 8. 75. 2).

10. χρὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but the right thing is both to hold and to simulate the opposite opinion’ (that it is against the interest of an oligarchy to wrong the demos), ‘signifying in the oaths that ‘I will not wrong the demos.’” So the tyrant is advised in c. 11. 1314 a 40 to simulate the ways of a king.

12. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 552 E (cp. 554 B, ἀπαθενεῖαν) and Laws 793 and 870 A, and of Isocrates, Areop. § 40 sqq., a passage which Eaton has already compared. For the thought cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 3 sqq.: also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4, μικρὸς γὰρ ἦν ὁ τῶν ὀρκῶν φόβος, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς παιδείας καὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς οἶον ἀνέδευσε τοὺς ἰθεσι τῶν παιδῶν τῶν νόμων καὶ συνφρειώσας τῇ τροφῆ τῶν ζηλῷ τῆς πολιτείας, ἅστε πεντακοσίων ετῶν πλήρω χρῶν τὰ κυρώτατα καὶ μέγατα διαμεῖναι τῆς νομοθεσίας, ὡσπερ βασιλέα ἀράτου καὶ ἀγχόρου καθάναμεν. Education and habitation must make the fulfilment of the behests of the law second nature to the citizens, or else the State will always be liable to accesses of ἀφροτια fatal to that obedience to the laws which is essential to the maintenance of
the constitution (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 3 sq. and 2. 8. 1269 a 20 sqq.). Compare the saying of Vinet, 'qu'on est malheureux quand on n'a pas le tempérament de ses principes.' What sort of education would be favourable to the maintenance of an oligarchy? An education which excludes luxury (22 sqq.) and an excessive love of gain or honour or both (2. 7. 1266 b 35 sqq.) and which inculcates justice and considerate treatment of those outside the privileged class. An education favourable to the maintenance of a democracy, on the other hand, would be one which discountenanced the disregard of law and the ἀτραχία καὶ ἀναρχία which often proved fatal to democracies (c. 3. 1302 b 27 sqq.) and inculcated justice to the rich and considerate treatment of them. Compare also Isocr. Areop. § 24, and see note on 1337 a 14. Aristotle does not repeat here what he has said in 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq., that this training must be extended to women and girls. It is evident that when a constitution was suddenly introduced, it must have been very liable to overthrow till habits and ideas grew up to support it, and some time must have been needed to develop these. For μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων cp. Isocr. Philip. § 136, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶν εἰρημένων.


15. συνδεδοξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πολιτευμένων, 'ratified by the consentient voice of the whole civic body' (Welldon). For τῶν πολιτευμένων, 'those who exercise the rights of citizenship,' see note on 1328 a 17. All the citizens of Athens took an oath to observe the laws of Solon (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 7). It is evident from Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq. that those laws were held to be laws in the fullest sense, τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε. Συνδοξασμός is a rare word, especially as used here. It is possible, as Richards points out, though perhaps hardly likely, that συνδεδοξασμένων here means 'extolled,' not 'ratified.'

16. εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαθεμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 'trained through habituation and education by the rule of the constitution': cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 2, ἐπαιδεύθη γε μὴν ἐν Περσῶν νόμοις. In 14 we have τὸ παθεϊσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας and in 19 sq. τὸ παθεϊσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14). For εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαθεμένοι cp. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, καὶ παιδεα καὶ ἐθν. Aristotele probably regarded Athens as ἀκρατής: cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1152 a 19, καὶ ἔσοκε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατής πολει.
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7 (5). 9. 1310 a 13—27.


21. οἷς δυνάμεστα κ.τ.λ. For the dative cp. Plato, Rep. 477 B, φύσιμεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἰς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἄ δυνάμεθα, καὶ ἀλλο πάν ὅ τι περ ἀν διώγητα;

22. νῦν 8' εν μὲν ταῖς διλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ. Plato (Rep. 556 B) had already said of the rulers in an oligarchy, σφαῖ δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τούς αὐτῶν, ἄρ' ὅ τι τριφῶν τοῖς τούς νόσους καὶ ἀπάνως καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρπηρεῖ πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργοὺς; Cp. also Rep. 556 C sq., Eurip. fragm. 55 Nauck (54, ed. 2), and Aristoph. Plut. 559 sqq. 'The Roman Noble was encouraged to spend his youth in luxury and extravagance' (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 44).

25. εν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ. See as to this expression note on 1298 b 13. It is implied in the passage before us that 'living as one pleases' was realized only in the extreme form of Greek democracy. But in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 11 sqq. this is said to be a concomitant of democracy in general. If a νόμος περὶ τῆς ἀργίας existed in the Solonian democracy (see note on 1308 b 20), 'living as one pleases' cannot have been permitted in it.

27. αἰτίων δὲ τούτου ὅτι κακῶς ὅριζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον. 'Ὅριζονται, 'men define.' The passage before us makes it probable that Aristotle would define freedom as obedience to rightly constituted law: cp. Metaph. A. 10. 1075 a 19, ἀλλ' ὡσπέρ ἐν ὁικίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθεροῖς ἦκιστα ἐξεστίν ό τι ἐτυχε ποιείν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅ τι πλεῖστα τέτακτα, τοῖς ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μυκρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολύ δʼ τι ἔτυχεν. Compare also Cic. pro A. Cluentio, 53. 146 (quoted by Giph.), legibus denique idcirco omnes servimus, ut liberi esse possimus, and Plut. De recta ratione audiendi, c. 1 sub fin., ἀντὶ μισθωτοῦ τινὸς ἢ ἀργρωφυγὴν θεῖον ἡγεμόνα τοῦ βιοῦ λαμβάνομεν τῶν λόγων ὃ τοὺς ἐπομένους αξίων ἄτι μᾶνον ἐλευθερούς νομίζειν, μόνοι γὰρ, ἢ δὲ βούλεσται μολὼντες, ὥς βούλονται ζωῆ; For the view that freedom is doing as one likes cp. Plato, Laws 701 A sqq., Rep. 557 B, 560 E, 572 E: Isocr. Areop. § 20, Panath. § 131. When a slave was manumitted, he was declared to be ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ ἀνίφαπτοι ἀπὸ πάντων τῷ πάντα
NOTES.

βίον, τοιων ὁ κα θελη καὶ ἀποτρέχων δις κα θελη (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 462: cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 13). There was a proverb, ἐλεφθέρα Κέρκυρα, χεί' ὅπου θέλεις. ‘The Stoics defined freedom, no doubt in agreement with the Cynics, ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγιαίας (Diog. Laert. 7. 121): cp. also Arrian, Diss. Epictet. 4. 1. 1, ἐλεφθέρος ἐστιν ὁ ζών ὁς βούλεται, Cic. Paradox. Stoic. 5. 1. 34, quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis, and De Offic. 1. 20. 70, libertatis proprium est sic vivere ut velis’ (Kaerst, Studien zur Entwickelung und theoret. Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum, p. 29, note).

28. δῶ ἅπρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here uses the word δοκεῖ, but in 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40—b 17 he adopts this view as his own. The two characteristics of democracy here mentioned are not quite consistent with each other. If the will of the majority is supreme in democracy, the individual citizen cannot be free to live as he likes; he must live in subordination to the will of the majority. It should be added that Aristotle’s teaching more often is that in democracy it is not the will of the majority that is supreme, but the will of the poor (3. 8. 1279 b 16 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 30 sqq.). Richards draws attention to the attraction in this passage, the dative τῷ taking the place of the nominative, and refers for parallel instances to Riddell’s Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 192 (Apology of Plato, p. 192).

30. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ. Δοκεῖ, i.e. seems to democrats. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3—10 and 3. 9. 1280 a 11. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that justice requires that the will of the multitude should be supreme. In Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 20 ἱν. we read ἤτοιμον ὑπὲρ ταύτα ἐταμιεύεις ὁ Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο τὸν δῆμον, ἀποδιδόει τῷ πλῆθει τὴν πολιτείαν.

31. ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ ἰσόν, and therefore suitable to democracy, for freedom and equality are thought to be accompaniments of democracy (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq.).


33. εἰς δ' χρήσιν, sc. τυγχάνει (Eurip. Fragm. 883 Nauck : 891, ed. 2). Cp. Cratin. Νόμοι, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 87), where Solon is probably the speaker,

νῦν γὰρ δὴ σοι πάρα μὲν τὴν

τῶν ἠμετέρων, πάρα δ' ἄλλ' δ' τι χρῆς.

34. τούτῳ δ' ἐστι φαύλον. Cp. Plato, Laws 780 A.

οὗ γὰρ δει κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably has before him Plato,
Laws 715 D. But a similar view is expressed in Andoc. c. Alcib. c. 19, νομίζω δὲ τοίτην εἶναι σωτηρίαν ἀπαί, πείθεσθαι τούς ἄρχουσι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 6, ἐκείνῳ γε εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι ἄνω διατηρήσων οἱ νόμοι τῇ πάλι, σώζεται καὶ η δημοκρατία: Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 19, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἑστίν η σωτηρία τῆς πάλεως: and Demosth. c. Mid. c. 126 (cp. [Demosth.] c. Aristog. i. 21).

39. καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας. As to the distinction here implied C. 10.

between πολιτείας and μοναρχία see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii.

It should be noticed that Aristotle deals with the causes of the fall of monarchy and the means of preserving it at very considerable length, and is especially full on the subject of tyranny, notwithstanding that he has told us in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 1 sqq. that there is not much to be said about it. He probably wished to do what could be done to amend the worst of Greek institutions, and he may also have desired to keep the Macedonian kingship in the right track (see below on 1313 a 34).

40. σχεδόν δὲ παραπλησία κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1311 a 22 sqq. and 1312 b 34 sqq.

2. η μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἑστίν. Cp. 31 sq. 1310 b.

and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq. Kingship is κατὰ τὴν ἄριστοκρατίαν because it is κατὰ δέξια (31 sqq.). Yet we are told in 1313 a 10 sqq. that in hereditary kingships the sceptre often falls to contemptible persons. For the use of κατὰ cp. 32, 3. 14. 1285 b 31, Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 20, and Plato, Rep. 555 A. As kingship corresponds to aristocracy, the causes of its fall will resemble the causes of the fall of aristocracy. Aristocracy is especially destroyed by infractions of law and justice (c. 7. 1307 a 5 sqq., 40 sqq., c. 8. 1307 b 30 sqq.), and kingship will be so too (c. 10. 1313 a 1 sqq.).

3. η δὲ τυραννίς εἶς ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἑυτάτης σώγειται καὶ δημοκρατίας. Cp. 1312 b 34 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sq. The grounds on which tyranny is said to be composed of ultimate oligarchy and democracy are explained in 1311 a 8 sqq. Tyranny being thus composed, the causes which overthrow it are the same as those which overthrow the constitutions of which it is composed (1312 b 34 sqq.). For ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἑυτάτης cp. 1312 b 35, τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀρχαίου καὶ τελευταίας. Τῆς ἑυτάτης probably qualifies both ὀλιγαρχίας and δημοκρατίας: see note on 1296 a 3.

5. διὸ δὴ κ.τ.λ. For διὸ δὴ, 'just for this reason,' cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 and Poet. 24. 1460 a 22. Διὸ is followed by δὴ just as the relative pronoun is often followed by δὴ. For δνων κακῶν cp. 3.
5. 1278 a 34, ὠμφοῖν ἀστῶν. To be visited with two evils was
proverbially bad: cp. Hdt. 3. 80, διὸ δ’ ἔχων ταιτα ἔχει πάσαν κακότητα,
Eurip. Ion, 531 Bothe (591 Dindorf),
τὸν ἐσπεσοῦμαι δύο νόσω κεκτημένος,
Plato, Rep. 391 C, and Aristoph. Eccl. 1096,
ἐνὶ γὰρ ξυνέχεσθαι κρείττον ἣ δύον κακῶν.

Κακῶν ἐπὶ κακῷ was a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 148 and 2. 177, where we are referred to Hom. II. 16. 111
and 19. 290). Compare also the prophecy (Thuc. 2. 54),
ηὐξαὶ Δωρικὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς ἂμ’ αὐτῷ.

And that which is bad is harmful: cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter
vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, οὐτε γὰρ θερμὸν τὸ ψύχειν, ἄλλα τὸ
θερμαίνειν, ὀσπέρ οἰδ’ ἀγαθῷ τῷ βλάστειν.

7. τὸς παρ’ ἄμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτείων. See note on 1276 a 14.
ὑπάρχει δ’ ἡ γένεσις κ. τ.λ. To show how different kingship and
tyranny are, Aristotle points out that they are different in their
very origin (cp. I. 5. 1254 a 23 sqq.). Kingship comes into existence
for the defence of the good against the many, and the king belongs
to the élite of the good, whereas the tyrant is a bulwark of the many
against the good. This is true of those tyrants who became tyrants
after being demagogues, but does it hold of the earlier ones who
became tyrants through being kings or through holding important
magistracies? Aristotle does not make this clear, but he apparently
regards these tyrants also as owing their position to the force
(κατεργάζεσθαι, 1310 b 24) which their position as kings or high
officials enabled them to exercise, and not to virtue and desert.
Tyranny, in fact, in his view owes its origin to δύναμις, not to ὀρετή.
For the view that the tyrant must be a bad man cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a
35 sqq. and Strabo, p. 310, ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ τῦραννοι, καὶ περὶ οἱ πλείους
ἐπικείεις γεγονότες. That tyranny is hostile to the ἐπικείεις we see
from 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 19. The view that kingship is on the side
of the ἄρωτοι against the many is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 19.
Aristotle here traces kingship in general to much the same origin to
which he traces the heroic kingship of Greece in 3. 14. 1285 b 4
sqq. He seems to forget that he has traced kingship back to
a family origin in the rule of the father in 1. 2. 1252 b 19 sqq.
He is led to take a too favourable view of the origin of kingship
partly by the ambiguity of the word ἐπικείεις, partly by myths like
those of Bellerophon (Hom. II. 6. 189 sqq.) and others (see note
on 1285 b 7). According to Bacon (Essay on Nobility), 'there is rarely any rising but by a commixture of good and evil arts.'

9. πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δήμον τοῖς ἐπεικεῖστα γέγονεν. All the MSS., including γ, have τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου in place of τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν δήμων, but I have not found any parallel to the use of ἀπὸ in the sense of 'against' with βοήθεια, though in De Part. An. 4. 6. 682 b 33 we have πρὸς βοήθειαν τῶν βλαπτῶντων ('for repelling those who injure them'), and other instances of a similar use of βοήθεια with the genitive are to be found in Bon. Ind. s. v. It seems, therefore, best to read ἐπὶ τῶν δήμων with Rassow Sus. and Welldon.

11. καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἡ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, i.e. especially εὐφρεσία, for ἀρετή is defined in Rhet. i. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq. as δύναμις εὐφρεστικὴ πολλάν καὶ μεγάλων (cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 10 sq.). According to Paus. 8. 1. 4 Pelasgus was made king of the Arcadians for the first of these two reasons (μεγέθει μέντοι καὶ κατὰ ἄλλην καὶ κάλλος προεῖχεν ὁ Πελασγὸς, καὶ γνώμην ὑπὲρ τοῦν ὄλλους ἦν, καὶ τούτων ἔνεκα ἀρετὴν ἔχει τινὰ οἰκείου οὐκ ἔχει τίνα). Many were made kings in return for benefits conferred (34 sqq.). Τῆς is added before the second ἀρετῆς because ἀρετή has been mentioned just before (see note on 1286 b 17).

12. καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους, 'by reason of superiority in respect of a family stock of like character' (i.e. virtuous or given to action which flows from virtue): cp. 33, ἢ καὶ ἒ διὰν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους. To be ἄγαθὸς ἐξ ἄγαθῶν was even better than to be ἄγαθος. ὁ δὲ τύραννος κ.π.λ. So in Theogn. 39 sq. the tyrant is referred to as εὐθυνήτης καθήκων ὑβριστὴς, the writer being a γνώμονας. But Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 569 A, where the demos is represented as saying to the tyrant that it begat him and set him up, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κάγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει εὐθυναθεὶς ἐκείνου προστάτευτον.

ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους. The addition of καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους adds emphasis to τοῦ δήμου and places its meaning beyond a doubt. The expression ὁ δήμος might be used, as it was by Hippodamus (2. 8. 1268 a 12 sq.), of the whole citizen-body. See note on 1303 a 38, τοὺς ἕοιμας καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων, and cp. 3. 11. 1281 b 15, περὶ πᾶντα δήμον καὶ περὶ πάν πλῆθος: Plato, Laws 689 B, ὑπερ δημὸς τε καὶ πλῆθος πολεῶς ἦστιν, and 684 C: and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 2. 18, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δήμου ἐστὶν ὡς ἐν τοῦ πλῆθους ὁ κομφοδιαμένων ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. If Aristotle's language implies that the τύραννος was not himself one of the γνώμονας, this was not always the case, as the
instances of Peisistratus and Lygdamis (c. 6. 1305 a 39 sqq.) will suffice to show, to say nothing of the cases in which the тύραννος had been a king. That he was often of low origin, however, seems to be implied in Diod. 19. 1. 5.

14. φανερόν δ' εκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, i.e. that the tyrant is εκ τοῦ δῆμου ἐπὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις.

σχεδόν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων κ.τ.λ. In c. 5. 1305 a 8 sqq. this is said of οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἄρχαίων τυράννων. Many men who won tyrannies in days nearer to those of Aristotle were not demagogues, but leaders of mercenary troops like Timophanes (c. 6. 1306 a 19 sqq.: see note on 1305 a 7). For πιστευεῖτε εκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τῶν γνωρίμων cp. c. 5. 1305 a 21 sqq.

16 sqq. Compare with this classification of Greek tyrants according to the status which enabled them to win their tyrannies the similar classification of tyrants in mediaeval Italy given by J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy—Age of the Despots, p. 100 sqq.

17. ἡδὴ τῶν πόλεων ηὐξημένων. It is doubtful whether τῶν πόλεων here means 'the States,' as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1, 2 and apparently in 3. 15. 1286 b 9 sq., 20 sq., and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 (see notes on these passages), or 'the cities,' as in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. (see note), but perhaps the former interpretation is the true one, for Aristotle may well have before him Thuc. 1. 13, δυνατωτέρας δὲ γεγυμόμενη τῆς Ἐλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς κτήσεως ἐπὶ μάλλον ἢ πρῶτον ποιομένη, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γεγυμόμενων (πρῶτον δὲ ἤσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς γέρασι πατρικί βασιλεία). Thucydides omits to explain why the increase in the wealth of Hellas led to the rise of tyrannies, but his meaning may be that as the revenues of individuals became larger, they became better able to establish tyrannies, or else that tyranny, being a costly form of government, could not exist without a large revenue to support it, and that this revenue could not be provided by States till their wealth had considerably increased. The connexion which Aristotle traces in the passage before us between the increased greatness of the States and the rise of demagogue-tyrants rests on a somewhat different basis, for his view seems to be that as the States grew greater, the demos and the demagogues came to be more powerful (cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 sqq.).

18. αἱ δὲ πρὸ τοῦτων κ.τ.λ. Kingships, which are here contrasted with elective magistracies (ἀπετῆν, 20, and ἀρχομένων, 23), belong to the era of small States (3. 15. 1286 b 7 sqq.). Kings who could
not rest content with the great office of king but sought to become tyrants were ill regarded (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 34 sq.: Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.). They often lost their kingships for their pains (1313 a 1 sqq.). Polybius (6. 7. 6 sqq.) depicts more in detail the steps by which kingship becomes tyranny.

21. Τὸ γὰρ ἄρχαίον κ.τ.λ. As to the time indicated by τὸ ἄρχαίον see notes on 1285 a 30 and 1305 a 7. Οἱ δὲμοι = αἱ δημοκρατίαι, as in 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 13. Magistrates entitled δημουργοί (‘doers of public business’) existed in many Greek States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 327), and θεωροὶ (compare the title ἐφοροὶ) existed at Mantinea (Thuc. 5. 47. 9), Tegea (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 7), and Naupactus (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 183), but Aristotle’s reference is to States which, in addition to possessing these high offices, were democratically governed at an early date, and we do not know of which of the States in which they are found this is true. As the tenure of them was an assistance to the would-be tyrant in the acquisition of his tyranny, it is likely that their functions were in part military. The epithet πολυχρονίουσ ὁρισμός probably implies that they were tenable for more than a year.

22. αἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν διηγαρχίων κ.τ.λ. Compare the practice at Carthage (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.) and at Epidamnus and Opus (3. 16. 1287 a 6 sqq.). As the tyrants of Ionia and Phalaris of Agrigentum, who are referred to in 28 sq. as owing their tyrannies to the fact of their holding offices, probably won them under an oligarchical régime, they may well have held several great offices at the same time. Cp. c. 5. 1305 a 15 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 a 22 sqq. For αἱρεσιθαύμα τινά cp. 20 and Plato, Meno 90 B.

23. πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπηρέτες κ.τ.λ., ‘for in all these ways [those who aimed at tyranny] had it in their power to effect their purpose with ease’ etc. Compare what Callicles says in Plato, Gorg. 492 B, ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ ἄρχης ὑπηρέτην ἢ βασιλείαν νίκην εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσι προ- ἦνος ἐκπορίσασθαι ἄρχην τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν κ.τ.λ., and Diod. 20. 10. 2, ὁ γὰρ Βομιλκας πάλαι μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμητής τυραννίδος, οὐκ ἐξων δ’ ἐξουσίαν οὐδὲ κυρὸν ὁλοκληρίαν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖσ τῶν ἑλθεν ἀφορμᾶς ἀξιολόγουν, τυχῶν τῇ οὕτωσι οὕτωσι, and see note on 1303 a 16. Βασιλική ἄρχη is here contrasted with ἡ τιμή (cp. βασιλείασ καὶ τῶν τιμῶν just below), but in 36 kingship is referred to as τὴν τιμὴν ταύτης and in 1313 a 13 we have βασιλικὴν τιμῆν. Thus Aristotle’s use of the words τιμή and ἄρχη seems to vary a good deal. In 1312 b 22 we read of τὰς ἄρχας of tyrants. Socrates had regarded both kingship
and tyranny as ἀρχαῖ (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12), and Aristotle may perhaps do so too.

27. ἔτεροι τύραννοι, e.g. Charilaus (c. 12. 1316 a 33 sq.), the kings of Cyrene after the first Battus (Diod. 8. 30. 1), and the kings of Achaia (Polyb. 2. 41. 5).

28. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἱμωνίαν κ.τ.λ. This was the case with Thrasybulus of Miletus, who was 'dux Milesiorum' when Miletus was besieged by Alyattes, before he became tyrant (Frontin. Strateg. 3. 15. 6). We hear of tyrants also at Ephesus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141) and at Samos (ibid. 2. 149), where Polycrates won the tyranny. Was it true also of them? As to Phalaris see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 65 sqq. According to Polyagen. Strateg. 5. 1 he was made by the Agrigenines ἐπιστάτης of the work of building a costly temple of Zeus Polieus in the acropolis of the city. But perhaps Aristotle is rather thinking of the story of his appointment as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ of Himera narrated in Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq. The same thing occurred in the municipalities of mediaeval Italy. So Ezzelino da Romano was named captain of the people by the cities of Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Feltre, and Belluno, and 'soon changed into a tyranny the authority which he derived from the people' (Sismondi, Italian Republics, pp. 69, 88). So again Marsilio Zorzi being elected count of Curzola in 1254 changed his elective magistracy into an hereditary principality (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 239).

29 sqq. As to Panaetius see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 56 sqq. He seems, however, to have held the office of polemarch in addition to being a demagogue (Polyagen. Strateg. 5. 47), and the same thing is true of Cypselus (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58 : Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 392). A demagogue was not usually able to make himself tyrant unless he held the office of polemarch or stratēgus, or was, at any rate, a man of military prowess (c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.). As to Peisistratus and Dionysius the Elder see c. 5. 1305 a 21 sqq. and 26 sqq.

32. εἰπομεν, in 1310 b 2 sqq.

tέτακτα κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν. See note on 1310 b 2.

33. κατ’ ἀξίαν γάρ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32, ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς (ἡ κοινωνία) ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαινεται' κατ’ ἀξίαν γάρ ὁ ἄνδρα ἄρχει καὶ περὶ ταύτα ἀ δὲ τῶν ἄνδρα, and Pol. 3. 5. 1278 a 18, ὅπως εἰ τίς ἔστιν ἢν κιλουσίν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ἡ κατ᾽ ἄρετὴν αἱ τιμαι διδοῦσι καὶ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν. Τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἄσλως δίκαιον (7 (5).
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1. 1301 b 35 sq.), and though δία attaches in some degree to wealth, free birth, and the like (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 24–29), it is most truly found in virtue (Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq.). See note on 1278 a 20. In strictness, however, kingship and aristocracy are not κατ’ ἀρετὴν, but κατ’ ἀρετὴν κεχορογημένην (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.).

Η κατ’ ἡδιαν ἀρετήν, as in the case of Pelasgus (see note on 11).

Η κατά γένους, sc. ἀρετήν, as in the case of the Heracleidae (Isocr. Archid. § 20). For ἀρετήν γένους cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 37.

34. Η κατ’ εὐεργεσίας. See notes on 1310 b 11 and 1285 b 6, 7, and Polyb. 5. 11. 6. Cp. also Diod. 11. 26. 6, where we read of Gelon, τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ τυχεῖν τιμωρίας ὡς τύφανος ὡσε-μιά φυῷ πάντας ἀποκαλεῖν εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα καὶ βασιλέα. Benefits conferred create a presumption that the person who confers them is virtuous (see note on 1286 b 10, and cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 12, ὅτως, ὡς ἑοίκεν, οἱ πλείστοι ὁρίζοντα τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἑαυτῶν ἄνδρας ἄγαθους εἶναι), so that to make a man king in return for benefits conferred is much the same thing as to make him king for virtue.

Η κατὰ ταύτα τε καὶ δύναμιν. Vict. ‘extremum ponit eorum quae aliquid perducunt ad hunc honorem, cum iam expositis rebus adiunctae sunt opes et facultas valde iuvandii; neque enim tantum honore afficiuntur qui iam bonum aliquid magnum salutemque dederunt, sed etiam qui potestatem habent id praestandi.’ Cp. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 28, τιμώτατο δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μᾶλλον οἱ εὐεργητήκτες, οὐ μην ἀλλὰ τιμᾶτα καὶ ὁ δυνάμεως εὐεργετεῖν. So Thucydides says of Theseus, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνητοῦ καὶ δυνάτος (2. 15), and Solon ἐλεγε βασιλέα τοῦ ἵσχυρότατον τῇ δυνάμει (Diog. Laert. 1. 58). Welldon appears to take ταύτα to refer not to ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐεργεσίας, but to εὐεργεσίας only, and perhaps he is right.

35. τὰς πόλεις Η τὰ ἔθνη. City-States like Athens and Lacedaemon, nations like the Persians, Macedonians, and Molossians.

36. τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης. See note on 23.

οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον καλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὡσπερ Κόδρος. Κατὰ πόλεμον goes with δουλεύειν, cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 23, τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν. According to the traditional account Codrus was already king of Athens when he delivered his country from a Dorian invasion by the sacrifice of his life, whereas Aristotle evidently takes him, if the text is correct, to have won a kingship by saving his country from enslavement. It is Melanthus, the father of Codrus, whom the prevailing tradition represents to have won the kingship.
of Athens: cp. Strabo, p. 393, οὐδεὶς δὲ (i.e. ὁ τῆς Μεσσηνίας βασιλεύς Μελανθός) καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐξαιτίευσαν ἐκόμων, νικήσας ἐκ μονομαχίας τῶν τῶν Βοιωτῶν βασιλέα Ζάυθον. Some have thought that Aristotle here follows a tradition according to which not Melanthus, but Codrus defeated Xanthus in single combat and won the kingship, and this is possible, for we find that Pausanias (in n. 5. 16: cp. 2. 18. 8) also follows a tradition of his own and ascribes the victory over Xanthus neither to Melanthus nor to Codrus, but to the father of Melanthus, Andropompus. But Toepffer (Att. Genealogie, p. 230), followed by Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 127. 5), objects that the war with Xanthus was a mere border-war and did not, like the invasion of the Dorians, threaten Attica with enslavement, so that, if Codrus saved his country from enslavement, he must have saved it not from Xanthus, but from the Dorians. The probability is that Aristotle follows some tradition or other of his own, as Plato does in Symp. 208 D (Busolt, ibid. p. 129. 1), but it is also possible that he here makes a mistake, just as he makes a mistake in attributing the overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny to Harmodius and Aristogeiton (c. 10. 1312 b 30 sq.).

37. οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὀσπέρ Κύρος. Cp. Hdt. 3. 82, where Darius asks, κώδεν ἦμιν ἡ ἐλευθερία ἐγένετο καὶ τεῦ δῶνος; and adds, ἔχω τοῖν γνώμην ἡμέας ἐλευθερωθέντας διὰ ἐνα ἄνθρα τὸ τοιοῦτο περιστέλλειν, where Cyrus is referred to, and also [Plato,] Menex. 239 D, δῶν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Κύρος ἐλευθερώσας Πέρσας κ.τ.λ.

38. ἡ κτίσαντες, like Dardanus, first founder and king of Dardania, the city which preceded Troy (Hom. II. 20. 215 sqq.).


καὶ Μολοττῶν. Neoptolemus son of Achilles became king of the Molossians after bringing followers and conquering the territory (Plut. Pyrrh. c. 1, referred to by Eaton).

40. βουλεῖται δὲ ὁ βασιλεύς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηδὲν ἄδικον πᾶσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ δήμος μὴ ὑβριζόμεθα μηδὲν. Aristotle has been dwelling on the difference in the origin of kingship and tyranny, and now he turns to the difference of their aim. He here repeats what Isocrates had said to Nicocles king of Salamis
in Cyprus (Ad Nicocl. § 16, καλός δὲ δημαγωγήσεις εάν μήθη υβρίζειν τῶν ὁχλῶν ἐξίπ τις ὑβρίζομεν περιοράς, ἄλλα σκοπῆς ὅτος οἱ βελτιστοὶ μὲν τις τιμᾶς ἐξοινίζοντο, οἱ δ' ἄλλα μηδὲν ἀδικήσοντοι ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστὴς πολιτείας ἐστίν). Cp. also Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 1 sq., Solon, Fragm. 5. 5 sq. and ap. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 12 sub fin., and Plut. Aristid. c. 6, θεῖν ἄνὴρ πένης καὶ δημοτικὸς ἐκτήσατο τὴν βασιλικωτάτην καὶ θειοτάτην προστηγορίαν τῶν Δίκαιων. Kingship has occasionally in modern times also been useful in the way pointed out by Aristotle. Thus Mr. S. R. Gardiner (The Thirty Years' War, p. 197 sq.), speaking of France in the time of Cardinal Richelieu, says, 'The establishment of a strong monarchical power was, as France was then constituted, the only chance for industry and commerce to lift up their heads, for the peaceable arts of life to develope themselves in security, for the intellect of man to have free course, and for the poor to be protected from oppression... The late growth of the royal power and the long continuance of aristocratic oppression threw the people helpless and speechless into the arms of the monarchy.' See also Sir J. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 169 sq.  


8. ὅτι δ' ἢ τυραννις κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1310 b 3 sqq.  

10. τὸ τοῦ τέλους εἶναι πλοῦτον. This is the end of oligarchy (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 15), though in Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 41 sqq. the quest of gain is connected rather with democracy, and it is also the end of tyranny, for if in Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 6 we read that the end of tyranny is self-defence (φυλακῆ), wealth was a condition both of the maintenance of a bodyguard and of the luxurious life which tyrants sought to live, and hence the first aim of a tyrant was to amass a treasure (Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 10). Thucydides (1. 17, ἐς τὸ τῶν ἱδίων ὅκουν αἰθέοι) virtually says the same thing.
NOTES.

kai διαμένειν, 'to continue his also,' in addition to being originally acquired. Cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 14, καὶ βιαίσεσθαι.
12. καὶ τὸ τῶν πλήθει μηδέν πιστεύειν. Cp. c. 6. 1306 a 21, where we read of ἡ πρὸς τῶν δήμων ἀπωτίες of oligarchies.

διό καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὀπλῶν. We find oligarchies resorting to this measure in Mytilene (Thuc. 3. 27), and Athens (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 20), and tyrants frequently (e.g. Peisistratus at Athens in 'Al'. Pol. c. 15 and Aristodemus at Cumæ in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8). See Eaton's note. It is here implied that the πλήθος possessed heavy arms (see note on 1294 a 41).
μητ' αὐ τακώσης, πλοῦτον ἑπτάροιαν τιβείς,
and Lys. Or. 13. c. Agorat. c. 91, τῶν δὲ δήμων, όν αὐτὸς ὕπτα πιστέα αὐτός εἶκαν, φαίνεται κακώσες, which is illustrated by ἴτυπε καὶ οδεν παρείχε τῶν ἐπιρρηδίων καὶ ἀφείλετο ἢ ὄν ὑπάρχων ἐκείνῳ ἄγαβα. Herodotus (2. 124) says of Cheops the pyramid-builder, μετὰ δὲ τῶν βασιλεύσαντα σφενω Χίστα εἰς πᾶσαν κακώσητα ἐλάσαν. That oligarchies often ill-used the demos we see from c. 9. 1310 a 8 sqq., and that tyrants often did so may be inferred from the conduct of Gelon to the demos of the Sicilian Megara and Euboea (Hdt. 7. 156): cp. c. 11. 1314 b 1 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 568 E sqq.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικεῖν. The Thirty at Athens drove the demos from the city to the Peiraeus and elsewhere (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 1: Lys. Or. 12. c. Eratosth. c. 95: Diod. 14. 32. 4: Justin, 5. 9. 12), and it was in the interest of oligarchy that the διοικασμός of Mantinea by the Lacedaemonians took place. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 177 sqq., where the Lacedaemonians are charged with having made the demos perioeci, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα διελυντας τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ὡς οἶν τ' ἐν εἰς ἑλαχίστους εἰς τόπους κατοικίσαι μικροὺς καὶ πολλούς, ἀνάμειν μὲν προσωρινομένους ὡς πόλεις ὀλκοῦντας, τὴν δὲ ὀδανάμ ἐξοντας ἑλάστω τῶν δήμων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 7, where oligarchies are advised μὴ συνάγειν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν δραχμ ἢ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων συνόδων συστρέφεται τὰ πλῆθο καὶ καθάλυε τὰς ἀλγαρχίας. Tyrants are here charged with driving the demos from the city, as oligarchies did, and we know that Gelon held a demos to be συνοίκημα ἄχριστως (Hdt. 7. 156), and that many tyrants sought to induce their subjects to live in the country and to follow country-pursuits, e.g. Periander (Diog.
Laert. 1. 98), Peisistratus ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 16: cp. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1150–1156 and Pollux, 7. 68), and the tyrants of Sicyon (Pollix, 7. 68): see also [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 32. Here and in 8 (6), 8. 1321 b 29 all MSS. have ἀστειος. In Poet. 3. 1448 α 38, on the other hand, we find ἀστεως, and this form is exclusively used in the 'Aθ. Πολ. (see Sandys' Index). It is the only form which appears in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 108: see also Kühner, Ausfühl. Gramm. der gr. Sprache, ed. Blass, 1. 441, Anm. 2).

15. ἐκ δημοκρατίασ δὲ κ. τ. λ. So we read of the Athenian democracy in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 14, διὰ ταύτα δόν τοις μὲν χρηστοῖς ἀτιμοῦσι καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦσι καὶ εξελαύνουσι καὶ ἀποκείνουσι, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς αὐξοῦσι (cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 42, whence we gather that the leading citizens were often banished when democracy was introduced). The same thing is said of Euphran tyrant of Sicyon in Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8. Cp. also c. 11. 1314 α 19 sqq., Isocr. Epist. 7. 8, and Diod. 14. 45. 1. See, however, as to democracy note on 1304 b 21. For other measures adopted both by tyranny and by democracy see c. 11. 1313 b 32 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq.

16. διαφθείρειν λάθρα, as the Peisistratidae made away with Cimon, father of Miltiades (Hdt. 6. 103).


καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄρχην ἐμποδίους. Cp. c. 11. 1314 α 9 sqq., 19 sqq.

18. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιστηλάς, 'for it is from these that the conspiracies also [as well as the passive hindrances to the tyrant's rule] in fact proceed.' For the use of ἐκ cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 38 (quoted on 1311 b 6). Cp. Polyb. 6. 7. 9 and Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 3. c. 6, 'We find in history that conspiracies are always formed and conducted either by great men or by such as are intimate with their Prince.' Were those who were led to plot by ἓρμη, however, always γράφομεν? Aristogeiton is said by Thucydides (6. 54) to have been a μέσος πολίτης.

19. τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν αὐτῶν βουλομένων. Αὐτῶν has been interpreted in different ways. Sepulveda translates the clause, 'dum quidam eorum imperare volunt' (so Lamb.), and Vict. 'cum hi velint
imperium in ipsos habere,' but Giph. is probably right in translating it 'quorum hi quidem imperare ipsi velint' (so Stahr and Sus.).

20. ἰδεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβουλευμά ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Here, as in 3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq., the famous counsel is said to have been given by Periander to Thrasybulus, and not by Thrasybulus to Periander (see note on 1284 a 26).

22. καθάπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ. In c. 2. 1302 a 34 sqq. several aitiai καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων in constitutions are enumerated. They are the following—the sight of others justly or unjustly enjoying a superior share of gain and honour, ὑβρις, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφρονήσις, αὔξησις ἡ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἐρίδεια, διλογορία, μικρότης, ἀνωμαλίας. That the first of these causes operates in the case of monarchies, or at any rate tyrannies, we see from 1312 a 22 sqq. Of ὑβρις φόβος and καταφρονήσις as causes of attacks on monarchs we hear much. As to ὑπεροχή see c. 11. 1315 a 8 sqq. Of the operation in reference to monarchies of the five last causes we hear little, if anything. As to the order followed in the enumeration see note on 1302 a 34.

26. ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις. Cp. 1312 b 18, ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίαις, and see note on 1305 b 41.

27. τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας κ.τ.λ. In c. 8. 1308 a 9 sqq. (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 17 sqq.) we find a distinction drawn between τὸ ἀδίκεϊς εἰς ἀτιμίαν and τὸ ἀδίκεϊς εἰς κέρδος, which corresponds roughly to that which is drawn here.

ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. As Giph. points out (p. 665), the conspiracy of the Pazzi against the Medici at Florence was in part brought about by Giovanni de' Pazzi's loss of a rich inheritance owing to a law enacted through the influence of the Medici (Machiavelli, Discorsi, Book 3. c. 6: Sismondi, Italian Republics, p. 267 sqq.).

28. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τελη ταυτά κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τὰ τέλη, i.e. peri δὲν ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις (cp. c. 2. 1302 a 31 sq.), as well as αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν (23 sq.). It appears from 1312 a 22 sqq. that some assailants of tyrants were led to make their attempts by the sight of the gains and honours enjoyed by tyrants, and from 1312 a 15 sq. that others were influenced partly by a desire for gain and partly by contempt, but it would seem from 1312 b 17 sqq. that most attacks on tyrannies were prompted by feelings of hatred and contempt, and it may be doubted whether such feelings usually
left much room in the minds of the assailants for a desire of wealth or honour.

29. καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας. For the non-repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1330 b 31, and notes on 1284 a 35 and 1302 a 33.


and Isocr. De Pace, §111. For μέγεθος πλοῦτον καὶ τιμῆς cp. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 34, καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς σοφίας.

31. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ἐπιθέσεων takes up ἐπιθέσεις τῶν μοναρχίας (26 sq.). Aristotle has just been speaking as if the aim of all those who attack tyrannies were to win for themselves the wealth and honour the tyrants enjoy, but now he points out that not all of them direct their attacks against the rule of the tyrant, and that most of those who do not do so seek vengeance, not greatness (35 sq.). In strictness he is only concerned with ἐπιθέσεις aiming at an overthrow of the tyranny, but he does not accept this limitation of his subject. Ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρχην probably means ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἄρχης διαφθοράν, cp. c. II. 1315 a 24, τῶν ἐπιχειροῦντων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σῶματος διαφθοράν. Ἐπιθέσεις are described in 1311 a 32—1312 a 39 as occurring δὲ ὀβρυ (1311 a 32—b 36), δὰ φόβου (1311 b 36—40), δὰ καταφρονήσου (1311 b 40—1312 a 14), δὰ πλείον τούτων (1312 a 15 sq.), δὰ φιλοτιμήσω (1312 a 21—39). Those which occur δὲ ὀβρυ may be caused either (1) by ὀβρυς in the form of insult, verbal or other (1311 a 36—b 6), or (2) by ὀβρυς εἰς τὸ σῶμα, and this may take the form either of ἐρωτική and other ὀβρυς (1311 b 6—23) or of πληγαί (1311 b 23—34). For the various kinds of ὀβρυς cp. c. II. 1315 a 14 sqq. Many successful attempts had been made on the lives of kings and tyrants in the course of the fourth century B.C. Among these attempts the following may be mentioned. Archelaus, king of Macedon, was assassinated in B.C. 399; Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, in B.C. 374; Jason of Pherae in B.C. 370; Euphron, tyrant of Sicyon, in B.C. 367; Alexander of Pherae and Cotys, king of the Odrysae, in B.C. 359; Clearchus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, in B.C. 352; and Philip of Macedon in B.C. 336. It will be noticed that most of these assassinations occurred in Northern Greece, Macedon, and Thrace. It is remarkable that both the elder and the younger Dionysius escaped assassination.

32. αἱ μὲν οὖν δὲ ὀβρυν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. Μὴν οὖν is not, I think,
answered by δέ, 33. Aristotle appears to have intended to pass on to another class of ἐπιθέσεις directed against the throne, not the person, of the monarch, the mention of which would have been introduced by δέ, but he loses sight of his intention in the course of the long enumeration of ἐπιθέσεις caused by ὑβρίς and fails to complete his inquiry in the intended way. He does not say that attacks provoked by ὑβρίς were the only ones directed against the person of the monarch (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 24 sqq.); those provoked by deprivation of property and those caused by fear and contempt will often have had a similar aim.

33. τῆς δ' ὑβρεως—36. ὑπεροχής, 'and though insolence assumes many forms, each of them gives rise to the anger [which animates those who make these attempts]' etc. A further characteristic of attacks on tyrants caused by ὑβρίς is here pointed out. Not only do those who make them assail the tyrant's person, not his throne, but they attack in anger (cp. 1312 b 29 sqq.), and consequently in most cases seek vengeance, not superiority of position.

34. αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν μερών, to be supplied from πολυμεροῖς: cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 24, where νόμος has to be supplied from νομοθέτης: De Gen. An. 4. 5. 773 b 11, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μᾶζ συνουσίᾳ πλείων τὸ ἀνίσον ἐστὶ σπέρμα, δὲ μερισθείν πιοίει πολυτοκεῖν, δῶν (sc. τόκον) ὠστερέζει βάτερον: and Hom. II. 9. 383,

αἰθ' ἐκατομπυλοί εἰσι, διηκόσια δ' ἀν ἐκάστας
ἀνέρες ἐξειχνεῖσι σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν.

τῶν δ' ὄργιομένων κ.τ.λ. Most angry men, not all, for sometimes assailants whose attacks were provoked by ὑβρίς and who attacked in anger sought not only vengeance but also greatness. Crataeas did so (see note on 1311 b 8); see also note on 1316 a 29 as to the Gonzagas of Mantua.


36. ὑπεροχής, 'superiority of position,' as in c. 7. 1307 a 19 and c. 11. 1314 a 8.

οἶνον—b 1, κύει. For the structure of this sentence (οἶνον followed by δέ) see note on 1313 b 13.

οἶνον ἢ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων, sc. ἐπιθέσεις ἐγινέτο (cp. 1311 b 7, γεγένηται) 'the attack on the Peisistratidae happened.' For the
objective genitive cp. 1311 b 30, τῆς Ἀρχελάου ἐπιθέσεως, and see Bon. Ind. 149 b 10 sqq., where Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, τὴν ἐκάστον (i. e. πρὸς ἐκαστὸν) ὀργῆν, is given as an instance. For the fact cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 18, ἔρασθις γὰρ (Θετταλὸς) τοῦ Ἀρμοδίων καὶ διαιρή- τάνων τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίας, οὐ κατείχε τὴν ὀργῆν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνεσμαίνετο πικ[ρ]ῶς, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀδελφῆς κανηφορεῖν Παναθηναίοις ε’[κό]λος λοιπον ἔσται τὸν Ἀρμοδίον ὡς μαλακὸν δυνα, δὲν μιμηθή παροξυσμήν τοῦ Ἀρμοδίων καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα πράττει τῆς πρᾶξιν μετεχόντων πολλῶν. Whether Aristotle in the passage before us ascribes the ὀβρίς to Hipparchus (with Thuc. 6. 54) or to Thessalus (with the 'Αθ. Πολ.), it is impossible to say, nor is it clear whether (with the 'Αθ. Πολ.) he conceives that a separate insult was offered to Harmodius in addition to that offered to his sister. It would rather seem from 38, ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμοδίων διὰ τὴν ἀδελφῆν, that he does not. In 1312 b 30 sqq. (cp. Rhet. 2. 24. 1401 b 11 sq.) Aristotle evidently connects the overthrow of the Peisistratidae with the act of ὀβρίς here referred to, unlike both Thucydides and the 'Αθ. Πολ., but like Plato (Symp. 182 C). A similar story is told of Antileon and Hipparchus at the Italian Heracleia (Phan. Eres. Fragm. 16 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 298: Plut. Amat. c. 16. 760 C). Many of the illustrations which Aristotle gives in this chapter of plots arising from ὀβρίς are derived from the history of Macedon Thrace and Mytilene, regions with which he was personally acquainted.

37. ἐπηρεάσατο δ’ Ἀρμοδίων, ‘and treated Harmodius with spiteful contumely.’ Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 17, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεάσας ἐμπιστευμένος ταῖς βουλήσεσιν οὐχ ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἀλλ’ ἦν μὴ εἰκῶν, and see Wytenbach on Plut. Praec. Sanit. Tuend. p. 135 D. ‘Ἐπηρεάσας’ usually takes a dative after it, and Ms (possibly with γ: see critical note) has ἁμοδίως here, but in c. 4. 1304 a 17 we have the passive ἐπηρεασθεῖν, and in Plut. Lucull. c. 42, εἰς δὲ τὴν σπειράγοντα (κατέβαινον) εἰ Πομπηίου τινά δείω σπουδήν ἡ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπηρεάσα, the construction with the accusative.

38. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμοδίος κ.τ.λ. Lamb. apparently supplies ἐπιθέτο, for he translates ‘in eos impetum fecerunt’: Vict., on the other hand, translates ‘commotus est,’ and Sus. ‘aufgebracht ward.’ I incline to follow Lamb.

39. ἐπεβουλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιανδρὶ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίῳ τυράννῳ κ.τ.λ. As to this Periander see note on 1304 a 31, and Plut. Amat. c. 23. 768 F. Compare the circumstances of the assassination of
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Caligula by Cassius Chaerea (Merivale, Romans under the Empire, c. 48, vol. 6, 95, note 3).

1311 b. 1. ἦ δὲ Φιλίππου κ.τ.λ. Supply ἐπίθεσις ἐγένετο. See Diod. 16. 93 sq., and Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 90. Τῶν περὶ "Ἀτταλοῦ, i.e. Attalus himself (see note on 1305 b 25). Aristotle perhaps thought that the honours with which Philip sought to console Pausanias for the indignities inflicted on him (Diod. 16. 93. 9) were inadequate (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 23 sq.).

3. καὶ ἦ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Δέρδα κ.τ.λ. It is not known what Amyntas and Derdas are referred to. 'Amyntas the little' was evidently a king or prince, but whether he was one of the kings of Macedon of that name is doubtful; he may, for instance, have been a king not of Macedon, but of Elimeia. It is hardly likely that Amyntas III of Macedon, the father of Philip, is referred to, for if he were, we should expect that he would be described not as ὁ μικρὸς, but as Philip's father, especially as Philip is named in the preceding sentence. Besides, it is probable that Derdas succeeded in his attempt on the life of Amyntas the little, as those in connexion with whom he is named did so, but we are nowhere told that Amyntas the father of Philip died a violent death (see Isocr. Archid. § 46: Diod. 15. 60. 3: Justin, 7. 4. 8). The addition of ὁ μικρὸς is not altogether respectful: see Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 497, and note on 1335 a 13, and cp. Plato, Protag. 323 D. Nor is it likely that Amyntas the little was the son of Archelaus king of Macedon who is mentioned in 14, and who became king of Macedon himself as Amyntas II for a short time in B.C. 392 (see as to him Sus.², Note 1678, Curtius, Hist. of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 35, note, and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 60, note, and Addenda, p. 659: No. 77, ed. 2), for, if he was, he would probably be called ὁ μικρὸς again in 14, or some indication would be given in 14 that he had already been mentioned in 3. Whether the Derdas here mentioned is the Derdas who was king or prince of Elimeia in B.C. 382 and an ally of Amyntas III against Olynthus (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 38 and 5. 3. 1 sq.) is quite uncertain.

4. καὶ ἦ τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Supply ἐπίθεσις ἐγένετο τιμωρίας χώριν, ἄλλ' ὅχ' ὑπεροχῆ. Τῷ Κυπρίῳ is added to distinguish this Evagoras from other men of the same name, and perhaps especially from the famous Olympian winner Evagoras the Lacedaemonian (Hdt. 6. 103). A short abstract by Photius of the story of the murder of Evagoras as told by Theopompos
will be found in Theopomp. Fragm. 111 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 295): see also Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76. According to this story Nicocreon, the master of the eunuch mentioned in the text, the eunuch being an Eleian named Thrasydaeus, had been detected in a conspiracy against Evagoras and had fled from Salamis. Thrasydaeus in revenge decoyed Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras into successive visits to a daughter whom Nicocreon had left behind, and seized the opportunity to slay both of them. Aristotle's brief reference to the event is not wholly inconsistent with the account of Theopompus, but he does not mention the fact that Pnytagoras shared his father's fate, and he gives a different account from Theopompus of the cause of the assassination, for according to him Thrasydaeus acted as he did not to avenge the failure of his master's illegal enterprise, but to avenge a wrong done to himself by the son of Evagoras, a wrong which under the singular circumstances of the case would be felt with especial bitterness. Machiavelli mentions a somewhat similar plot in his Discourses, Book 3. c. 6. 'Even in our own times Giulio Belanti conspired against Pandolfo lord of Siena, who, though he had given him his daughter to wife, afterwards took her away from him.' Looking to the tragical end of Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras after glorious careers, it is natural that Isocrates in the Ad Nicoclem (§ 29) should exhort Nicocles, the son and successor of Evagoras, to control his desires, and that Nicocles himself in the address to his subjects written for him by Isocrates (Nicocl. §§ 36–47) should lay special stress on his own practice of σωφροσύνη, dropping (§ 39) the significant remark that even the best men are sometimes mastered by desire, which appears to be an allusion to his father's fate. Nicocles does not seem to have long continued a model of σωφροσύνη (see note on 1314 b 28). Prof. W. Ridgeway (Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc. 2. 152) remarks that, in proof of the fact that married eunuchs were by no means uncommon, 'it is sufficient to quote the case of Potiphar (Genesis 37. 36), where the Septuagint version states, ὁ δὲ Μαδηναίος ἀπέδωτο τῷ Ἰωσήφ εἰς Αἰγυπτόν τῷ Πετεφρῷ τῷ σπάδωτι Φαριώ ἄρχομαι εἰρήνης. Again, Montesquieu (Esprit des Lois, 15. 19) says, "Au Tonquin, dit Dampier, tous les Mandarinis civils et militaires sont eunuques. Le même Dampier nous dit que dans ce pays les eunuques ne peuvent se passer de femmes et qu'ils se marient." Juvenal (1. 22) alludes to the same custom:

Cum tener uxorem ducat spado.'
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6. πολλαὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεις κ.τ.λ. Here we pass to the second main division of acts of ἰδίμες (see note on 1311 a 31), that of acts into which τὸ εἰς τὰ σώμα αἰτχύναι enters, a term which Aristotle uses here in a sense inclusive of both the kinds of ἰδίμες which he distinguishes in c. ii. 1315 a 15 sq., ἣ εἰς τὰ σώματα and ἥ εἰς τὸν ἥλικιον, where ἥ εἰς τὰ σώματα ἰδίμες is restricted to ἰδίμες shown in punishment. For the fact mentioned in the text cp. Xen. Hiero, i. 38, καὶ τοῖνοι αἱ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐδὲν πλέον τοῖς τυράννοις εἰσίν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστα φιλεῖν αὐτοῖς προσποιηθηκέναι.

8. οὗτος καὶ ἡ Κραταίος εἰς Ἀρχέλαον κ.τ.λ. The name is variously given—Aelian (Var. Hist. 8, 9) has Crateus, Plutarch (Amat. c. 23) Crateas or Crateusas, Diodorus (14. 37. 5) Craterus (Sus. 9 Note 1675). The conspiracy of Crataesas, Hellanocrates of Larissa, and Decamnichus against Archelaus was memorable, because, though two at least of the conspirators were mere youths and one of the two not even a Macedonian, Crataesas actually succeeded in seating himself on the throne of Macedon for three or four days (Aelian, Var. Hist. 8. 9). Decamnichus, however, was the chief author and leader of the conspiracy (1311 b 30 sqq.). As Grote points out (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76, vol. 10. 63), his grudge against Archelaus must have been nursed for fully six years, for Euripides died in B.C. 406 and the assassination of Archelaus did not take place till B.C. 399. How powerful Archelaus was we see from the fact that Hellanocrates of Larissa looked to him to restore him to his country. A little later Macedon became 'partially dependent on' Jason of Pherae for a time (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 78, vol. 10. 265).

10. ἡ διότι κ.τ.λ., 'or perhaps [he attacked Archelaus] because,' etc. Crataesas' aspiring character appears in the bargain he made with Archelaus for the hand of one of his daughters. He can hardly have been a welcome suitor, and it is not surprising that Archelaus, pressed in war by the Lyncestae and their chiefs Sirras and Arrabaeus, gave his elder daughter in marriage to the king of Elimeia, whose territory bordered that of the Lyncestae on the south and who would therefore be valuable as an ally against them, and his younger daughter to Amyntas (afterwards Amyntas II, see note on 3), his son by an earlier wife than Cleopatra, his object being to reduce to a minimum the quarrels which he foresaw between him and his son by Cleopatra, his destined successor on the throne.

11. τὴν μὲν προτέραν. Προτέραν probably means simply πρῶτοις: cp. 1312 a 4, Διονυσίω τῷ ὑστέρῳ, where τῷ ὑστέρῳ perhaps
means the younger, not the second, for in Theopomp. ap. Athen.
Deipn. 435 d we find Διονύσιον τῶν νεώτερον Σικελίας τύγαφον dis-
tinguished from Διονύσιος ὁ πρότερος (435 f, 436 a).
κατεχόμενος, and Demosth. Or. 50. in Polycl. c. 5, ὑπὸ Κυμίκην
κατέχασται τῷ πολέμῳ.
Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιοιν. We read of an Arribaeus king of the
Lyncestae in Thuc. 4. 79 (b.c. 424): cp. Strabo, p. 326, οἱ δὲ
Λυγκησταὶ ὑπὸ Ἀρράβαιον ἐγένοντο τοῦ Βακχιαδῶν γένους ὁπίν τοὺς δ᾽ ἦν
θυγατριδὶ ἡ Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμώντος Εὐρωδίκη, Σίρρα δὲ θυγατρὶ.
The Arrabaeus of the text may be the same man, or he may have died
and been succeeded by a son named Sirras (his daughter being named
Sirra), who may himself have had a son named Arrabaeus. The
name Sirras may probably be connected with that of the city Siris
or Serrae on a tributary of the lower Strymon (Hdt. 8. 115), for it
is called Σίρρα by Steph. Byz. (Pape-Benseler, art. Σίρρα).
13. τῷ βασιλείᾳ τῷ τῆς Ἐλιμείας. Cp. Thuc. 2. 99, τῶν γὰρ Μακε-
δώνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταί καὶ Ἐλιμεῖοι καὶ ἄλλα ἔποι ἐπάνωθεν, δὲ ἐξώμαχα
μὲν ἐστὶ τούτους καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ αὐτοῦ.
15. ἄλλα τῆς γε ἄλλοτριότητος κ.τ.λ., 'but [if this was the cause
of the actual attack,] his estrangement from Archelaus at any rate
was brought about by,' etc. For ἄλλα ... ἐφι epsilon c. 3. 17. 1287 b 41 sq.
and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 9. Aristotle's statement is confirmed by Plut.
Amat. c. 23.
16. τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν χάριν. The use
of βαρέως φέρειν with πρὸς appears to be rare: Liddell and Scott
refer to Julian, Or. 1. Enc. Const. 17 C, χαλεπῶς φέροντες πρὸς τὸ
δουλεύειν.
17. Ἐλλανοκράτις ὁ Λαρίσας. The termination of the name is
Atticized, the Thessalian form being Ἐλλανοκράτις. See Cauer²,
Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 409. 72, where an Hellanocrates of Cran-
non is recommended with many others for the citizenship of Larissa by
Philip V of Macedon in b.c. 214. As Hellanocrates was a youth,
he must probably have been exiled from Larissa in company with
his father.
18. οὗ κατῆγεν, 'persistently refrained from restoring him to his
city': cp. οὗ κατάγεν in Timocreon, Fragm. i (ap. Plut. Themist.
c. 21).
19. δὲ ὀδρὶ καὶ οὐ δὲ ἑρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. Cp. Eubul. Νάνων,
Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 238),

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² Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 409, 72.
NOTES.

καὶ μὴ λαθραίαν κύρπα, ισχιστὴν νόσων πασῶν, διώκειν, ἐβρεός οὐ πάθου χάμα, and Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 337 Nauck (409, ed. 2), ἐβρεὸς ταῦτα, ισχίς Κύρπας, ἐξεργάζεται.

20. εἶναι, 'was.'

Πάρρων δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Λίνοι Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τιμωροῦντες. As to Πάρρων see critical note. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2.c. 80, vol. 10. 516 sqq., and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 138. This happened in b.c. 359. What bodily outrage their father had suffered from Cotys, we do not learn here or elsewhere. Hardly blows or flogging, though Cotys was severe in punishing (Stob. Floril. 48. 45), for then the case would be grouped with those mentioned in 23 sqq. Of Λίνοι is added to distinguish this Heracleides from Syracusans of the same name and from Heracleides Ponticus.

22. 'Αδάμας δ' ἀπέστη Κότυος κ.τ.λ. Adamas was apparently an eunuch in the service of Cotys.

23. πολλοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We come now to those who took vengeance for ἐβραὸς in the form of blows or flogging. 'And on account also of indignities inflicted on the body through blows many have been roused to anger and have either destroyed or attempted to destroy, as having been outraged, even holders of magistracies and persons connected with regal supremacies, [so that this is much more likely to befall tyrants].' For βασιλείας δυναστείας, cp. Plato, Critias, 114 D, ἐν δυναστείαις τισὶ βασιλεῖσι. Βασιλείας is added because not all δυναστείαι are regal or even monarchical, cp. Plato, Laws 711 D, μεγάλοις τισὶ δυναστείαις, ἡ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευόντας ἡ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφεροῦσαι ἡ γενῶν. In Diod. 15. 60. 3 the words τῶν ἐν δυναστείαις ὡστόν τρίς are used of three persons, only two of whom were kings, the third being tagus of Thessaly.

26. οἶνον ἐν Μυτηλήνῃ κ.τ.λ. As an instance of holders of offices to whom this happened the Penthileidas or Penthalidae are mentioned, and as an instance of royal personages Archelaus. The Penthileidas claimed descent from Penthillus, an illegitimate son of Orestes, who was believed to have headed the Aeolian emigration to Lesbos (Paus. 3. 2. 1: Strabo, p. 582: Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 273. 5). They appear to have been the ruling gens in the early oligarchy of Mytilene, as the Basilidae were at Erythrae and the Neleidae at Mileus (see note on 1305 b 18). As to the Penthileidas see Myrsil. Methymn. Fragm. 12 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 4. 459). Megacles
cannot have slain all the Penthiilidae, for Penthiilus, who fell later on (28 sqq.), must have been one of them. For misdeeds resembling those of the Penthiilidae cp. Demosth. Or. 54. c. Conon. c. 37. The young nobles of Venice played the same pranks (Brown, Venice, p. 259).

29. Σμέρδις. See critical note. ΤΠ have σμέρδης. The forms Σμέρδις (Hdt. 3. 30 etc.: Anth. Pal. 7. 29), Σμερδίς (Anth. Pal. 7. 31), and Σμέρδις (king of Naxos in mythical times, Diod. 5. 51. 3) occur (see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der griech. Eigennamen, under these titles), but not Smerdes, which may however possibly be right. Pape-Benseler quotes Hesych. σμέρδης: ρώμη, δύσμος, and ευσμερδής: εὔφωστος. Compare the names, also Mytilenean, of Alcaeus and his two brothers, Antimenidas and Cicis, as to which see note on 1285 a 36.

30. διέφθειρεν is probably the aorist: cp. 21 and 24, διέφθειρον.


33. ο δ' Εὐριπίδης κ.τ.λ. As Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76, vol. 10. 65) and others remark, the story gives us an unfavourable impression of Euripides' character, but we do not know exactly what Decamnichus said. The defect in question was sometimes made the ground of scandalous imputations on character (Martial, 11. 30). Comments on it were not readily tolerated in antiquity (Plut. Sympos. 2. 1. 9, referred to by Giph., p. 672, εἰς δὲ δυσωδίαν μουκτήρας ἢ στίματος ἀχισναι σκοπτόμενοι).

34. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πόλλοι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle may probably refer among others to Jason of Pherae: see Valer. Max. 9. 10. Ext. 2, where the youths who murdered Jason are said to have done so to avenge a flogging inflicted on them by his command. Others, however, gave a different account of the circumstances of his death (Diod. 15. 60. 5).

36. ἐν γάρ τι κ.τ.λ., 'for this was one of the causes we mentioned, as in the case of constitutions, so also in the case of monarchies.' This refers to 1311 a 25. For ἤν see note on 1259 a 37. For ὄσπερ καὶ followed by καὶ cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 9 sq. and 2. 9. 1270 b 40 sq. (Sus. 1 Ind. Gramm.). For the omission of περὶ before τὰς μοναρχίς see notes on 1269 a 9 and 1311 a 29.

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37. οἷον Ζέρβην Ἀρταπάνης κ.τ.λ. According to the story as told (with some variations) in Diod. 11. 69, Justin, 3. 1, and Ctesias, Persica ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 72 (Bekker, p. 39 b foot), Artapanes or Artapanus or Artabanus, the captain of the bodyguard of Xerxes, in the hope of winning the throne of Persia, first murdered Xerxes and then induced Artaxerxes, a younger son of Xerxes, to murder his elder brother Darius by falsely charging Darius with the murder of his father, following up these acts by an attempt to murder Artaxerxes which failed and led to his own execution. If we supply ἀνέλευ with the words οἷον Ζέρβην Ἀρταπάνης (and this is the word which it is natural to supply here, as in 1312 a 1 with Σαρδαναπαλλον), the difficulty arises that Aristotle evidently takes the murder of Darius to have preceded that of Xerxes, and not to have followed it, as in the received account. Schneider (whose view is adopted by Sus.², Note 1686) escapes this difficulty by taking Ζέρβην to mean Artaxerxes, not Xerxes, but then a new difficulty arises, for in the received account Artaxerxes is present at the murder of Darius, if indeed he does not himself murder him, and this does not agree with Aristotle’s version of the story. Another difficulty is that if we adopt Schneider’s interpretation of Ζέρβην, we must supply with οἷον Ζέρβην Ἀρταπάνης, not ἀνέλευ (for Artapanes failed to slay Artaxerxes), but ἐπεξείρησεν ἀνέλευ or some such words, whereas in the closely similar passage, 1312 a 1, ἀνέλευ has to be supplied. It seems to me that Aristotle follows a different version of the story from that which Diodorus and the rest follow, one which made the murder of Darius precede that of Xerxes, Artapanes being led according to it to murder Xerxes not by a hope of winning his throne, but by a fear that Xerxes would put him to death for murdering Darius. The Emperor Commodus perished in a similar way. It was from fear of being put to death by him that Marcia Laetus and Eclectus conspired against his life and killed him (Herodian, 1. 16 sq.; Dio Cass. 72. 22). According to Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 3, Xerxes ‘was slain at night in his bed by his son.’ Nöldeke (Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte, p. 49) appears to reject Aristotle’s version of the murders of Xerxes and Darius. He remarks that ‘we can reconstruct from different Greek writers two accounts of the murder of Xerxes, those of Ctesias and Deinon, differing from each other in a number of particulars. A third is given by Aristotle in Pol. 1311 b. As to scenes of this kind enacted within the seraglio it is not easy for persons outside to
arrive at a trustworthy conclusion, but thus much is clear. Artabanus, captain of the bodyguard, murdered Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, the youngest of Xerxes’ sons, in complicity with the murderer, put his elder brother Darius to death, who had a better claim to the throne than he had. It does not follow that he was a parricide.’

40. ai δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but other attacks on monarchs are made on account of contempt.’ Aristotle has told us (1311 a 32 sq.) that attacks provoked by ἤβρις are directed against the person of the monarch, but he does not say whether attacks arising from contempt and from φιλανθρωπία are directed against his person or his throne. Dion at any rate attacked only the latter.

1. ἄσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον κ.τ.λ. ‘Ανέκλευ must apparently be supplied. There were two accounts of this event (Athen. Deipn. 528 e sqq.). According to one of them, that of Duris, Arbaces, the πτέρως referred to here, who was a Median and one of Sardanapalus’ generals, put Sardanapalus to death on the spot, while according to the other, that of Ctesias, Arbaces made war upon him and drove him by defeat to put an end to his own life. Aristotle appears to follow the former account, whereas Diodorus (2. 23–27) and Justin (1. 3) follow the latter. Compare with the story of Sardanapalus that of Midas king of the Lydians in Athen. Deipn. 516 b. The dressing of wool (ἐλαστίν) in order to prepare it for use in spinning was regarded as work for women, not men (Aristoph. Lysistr. 536 Didot: Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 7 Nauck—9, ed. 2).

2. οἱ μυθολογοῦντες. Aristotle refers to Herodotus as ὁ μυθολόγος in De Gen. An. 3. 5. 756 b 6, and Strabo (p. 507 sq.) speaks thus of Ctesias Herodotus and Hellanicus. It is to Ctesias, who probably added much to the legend of Sardanapalus, that Aristotle especially refers. As Sus. 2 (Note 1687 b) points out, Aristotle expresses distrust, at any rate of his marvellous stories about India, in Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 a 25, 3. 22. 523 a 26 sq., and 8. 28. 606 a 8. Add De Gen. An. 2. 2. 736 a 2 sqq.

3. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου γε κ.τ.λ. For ἄλλα ... γε thus used cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 18 sq. and 2. 9. 1269 b 7 sq.

4. καὶ Διονυσίω τῷ ὄστερῳ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1311 b 11 and cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 12, τοῦ πρῶτου Διονυσίου, Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 435 f and 436 a, Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, and Plut. Dec. Orat. Vitae, 1, Antiphon, 833 B, τοῦ προτέρου Διονυσίου. It is implied in 21–39 that Dion attacked Dionysius II also from φιλανθρωπία. Aristotle probably has the habitual drunkenness of Dionysius II before

Γ f 2
him in c. 11. 1314 b 28 sqq. Cp. also Plut. Dion. et Brut. inter se comp. c. 4 and Justin, 21. 2. That Dion saw the weak points in the position of Dionysius II is clear from Plut. Dion, c. 23; the immediate occasion of his attempt was, however, the fact that Dionysius had given his wife to Timocrates in addition to confiscating his property (Plut. Dion, cc. 18, 21).

6. I propose the insertion after μεθίσσα of 17, μάλιστα δὲ—20, ἐπιθέσεις, which seems to be out of place where it stands. I cannot regard it with Sus. as a double recension of 11, ὄσπερ—14, ὄν.

καὶ τῶν φίλων δέ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed some friends attack monarchs on account of contempt,' not merely the high officers of whom Aristotle will have just been speaking if, as I suggest, we place 17, μάλιστα δὲ—20, ἐπιθέσεις, after μεθίσσα, 6. Διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιατεύσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὃς λήσοντες will then also correspond to δὲ ἂς ἀμφοτέρας, ὃς ράδιος κρατήσοντες, ποιοῦσιν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις in the preceding sentence. As to attempts of this kind, cp. Rhet. 1. 12. 1372 a 5—21.

8. καὶ οἱ οἴδαμεν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on to assailants who are led to attack monarchs by a confident belief that they will be able to win the throne for themselves, a belief which practically amounts to a contempt of the monarchs' power, though it is not quite the same thing. Here again compare the passage from the Rhetoric referred to in the last note.

12. οἶνον Κύρος Ἀστυάγει κ.τ.λ. Aristotle speaks of Cyrus as the general of Astyages, and says nothing of his being Astyages' grandson. Ctesias (ap. Phot. Biblioth. p. 36 a 9 sq. Bekker) had denied that there was any relationship between them, against Hdt. 1. 107 sqq. and other authorities, and it is possible that Aristotle here follows him as to this. Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 a sq. perhaps follows Ctesias.

13. τῆς δυνάμεως is rendered by Sepulveda 'exercitum' and τῆς δύναμιν 'milites,' and Sus. renders these words similarly 'Kriegsmacht,' but Vet. Int. renders them by 'potentia,' and I incline (with Welldon) to interpret them thus.

14. καὶ Σεύθης ὁ Θράσ' Ἀμαδόκῳ στρατηγὸς ὄν. Seuthes regained with the help of Xenophon and his troops about b.c. 400 a principality or ἄρχη (over the Melanditae Thyni and Thrapias) which his father Maesades had held, but lost (Xen. Anab. 7. 2. 32 sqq.), and we find him described about b.c. 390 as ὁ ἐπὶ βασιλίτη ἄρχων in Thrace and as being at variance with Amadocus, King of the Odrysae, till he was reconciled to him by Thrasybulus about that year (Xen.
Hell. 4. 8. 26, where Keller reads 'Αμαθόκου in place of the vulg. Μηδόκου), when both Amadocus and Seuthes became allies of Athens. Aristotle probably refers in the text to events subsequent to this. It is not clear from his brief allusion whether Seuthes dispossessed Amadocus of his kingdom or only attempted to do so. His attack apparently was made between the year in which Thra-sybulus reconciled the two men and B.C. 386, for in the latter year an inscription discovered at Athens (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., ed. 2, No. 76) mentions Hebrelymias as king of the Odrysaes. Dittenberger thinks that Hebrelymias was probably the successor of Amadocus, and that Cotys, who was king of the Odrysaes from B.C. 383 to 359, may have been the son of Seuthes. Diodorus (13. 105. 3 and 14. 94. 2) describes Seuthes as king, but neither Xenophon nor Aristotle does so (Dittenberger, ibid.). He is called 'the Thracian' in contradistinction to others of the name who were not Thracians, for though most of the bearers of the name known to us were Thracians, it is also traceable at Cyme in Aeolis, and the father of the philosopher Arcesilaus, who belonged to Pitane in Aeolis, was named Seuthes or Scythes (Diog. Laert. 4. 28: Pape-Benseler, art. Σεύθης).

16. ὥσπερ 'Αριοβαρζάνη Μιθριδάτης. The same event is probably referred to in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 4, ὥσπερ Μιθριδάτης τὸν πατέρα 'Αριοβαρζάνη προδούσ. Sus.2 (Note 1692) takes both passages to refer to the Ariobarzanes who was satrap of Pontus from B.C. 363 to 336, and who was succeeded by his son Mithridates II, but Nöldeke (Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte, p. 72) thinks that the reference is to Ariobarzanes the successor of Pharnabazus in the Helles-pontine satrapy, who revolted from Persia about B.C. 367, and was captured and put to death by the Persians, probably about two years later.

17. μάλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. If we transpose 17—20 to after μεθύσατα, 6, it becomes easy to give δά ταῦτα τὴν αἰτίαν the meaning of 'con-tempt.' For the fact cp. c. 11. 1315 a 10 sqq. and Polyb. 6. 7. 9.

18. τιμὴν πολεμικήν. Cp. Plato, Laws 943 Α, τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄρχοντας. The term τιμὴ πολεμική includes many offices besides that of general (see 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.).

19. ἀνδρία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἔστιν. I incline to think that Giph. (p. 678), whom Sus. follows, is right in reading θάρσος in place of θράσος: cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sq. There was a proverb λέων ἔφος ἔχων, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀνδρείων, ἐπέραν δὲ προσλαμβανότων ἔξωθεν
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Βοήθειαν (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 429). See also note on 1255 a 13, and cp. Rhet. 2. 19. 1393 a 1, τὸ τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει διὸ ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὁργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ἀποκριθήσεται.

21. τῆς αἰτίας, sc. τῆς ἐπιθέσεως.

22. ἐνοικοί, those, for instance, who seek to possess themselves of the wealth and honour which tyrants possess or who envy them for possessing these things (cp. 1311 a 28 sqq. and c. 2. 1302 a 31 sqq. and 38 sqq.).

26. οὐτοί δ’ οὔσπερ κ.τ.λ., ‘but these men, just as [they would wish to be allowed to take part] if any other action out of the common were done on account of which men become noted and well known to their fellows, in the same spirit attack monarchs also.’ Aristotle’s language here is modelled on that of Plato in Symp. 208 C sq., which Isocrates imitates in Evag. § 3 (cp. Philip. §§ 133–136). Phoebidas, who seized the Cadmeia of Thebes, was a man of this type (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 28). ‘Iason, Phæaerorum tyrannus, a septem adolescentibus coniuratus δόξης ἐνεκα interfectus est, teste Ephoro (Diod. 15. 60. 5), et C. Mucius Scaevola Romanus eodem animo Porsennam regem Etruscorum est aggressus (Liv. 2. 12). Eadem quoque causa Arato ad patriam Sicyonem tyranno liberandam fuit, et eadem Bruto coniurationis in Caesarem’ (Giph. p. 679). Brutus’ motive, however, was rather an hostility on principle to the absolute rule of a single man, a motive for assailing tyrannies which Aristotle omits to notice (Plut. Brut. c. 8, λέγεται δὲ Βρούτος μὲν τὴν ἀρχήν βαρώνεσθαι, Κάσσιος δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα μησεῖν).

30. For οὗ μὴν ἄλλα ... γε cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 25.

31. ὑποκείσθαι γὰρ δεὶ κ.τ.λ., ‘for underlying their enterprise there should be an utter disregard of their own preservation in the event of their not being in a position to make it a success.’ See critical note on 1312 a 32. For the absence of τίς after μελλή see Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

33. οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ., ‘for they must have present in their minds the view of Dion.’ For οἷς cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 29.

36. οὕτως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ., ‘huius animi se esse praedicans’ (Vikt.). Supply ἦν with ἵκανον. For its omission compare the omission of ὅταί with πολέμουσ in c. 11. 1314 a 11 sq. (Richards). For the construction cp. Plato, Rep. 461 C, ἅπα κρίνεται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὅσ αὐξ ὡσ εἰς τριβής τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, and Tim. 29 B, ὅπερ οὐ περί της εἰκόνος
καὶ πεί τοῦ παραδείγματος αὐτῆς διαριστέων, ὡς ἄρα τοῖς λόγοις, ὄντες εἰσὶν ἐξηγηταὶ, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ ἔξυγγειος ὁ τότε. Ἀστὸς ὑπὸν, καὶ Κίκαμερ, Αυστρ. γρ. Γραμμ., ed. Γερθ, § 447. Ανν. 4.

39. φθείρεται δὲ τυραννής κ.τ.λ. Ηθικητομενες ως προς τοὺς μέτοχους τῶν μοναρχιῶν, καὶ μετὰ της καταστάσεως τῶν μοναρχιῶν, ἐγέρθη τοῦτος καὶ παραδέχεται τῶν μετοχικῶν τιμῶν. Αντὶ δὲ τοῦτον βασιλεῦσαι, καὶ τις τοῖς τυραννοῖς νομιμοποιοῦσαι, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγητικός ἐστιν. Οὕτως ἐπιστὰ, καὶ Κίκαμερ, Αυστρ. γρ. Γραμμ., ed. Γερθ, § 447. Ανν. 4.

40. ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη πολιτεία. Ηδὲ τὴν τυραννίαν, ὡς την πολιτείαν, ὥς τοιοῦτος καὶ τοῦτος καὶ τοῖς μετοχικοῖς τιμῶν, ἐκεῖνος ἐστιν. Ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦτον βασιλεῦσαι, καὶ τις τοῖς τυραννοῖς νομιμοποιοῦσαι, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγητικός ἐστιν. Οὕτως ἐπιστὰ, καὶ Κίκαμερ, Αυστρ. γρ. Γραμμ., ed. Γερθ, § 447. Ανν. 4.
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7. διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Thuc. i. 18. 1, Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 21, where instances are given, and Abbott, Hist. of Greece, i. 436, note. When the Lacedaemonians gave countenance and support to Dionysius the Elder, they departed greatly from their earlier policy.

8. καὶ Συρακούσιοι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers to the period between the fall of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse in B.C. 466–5 and the substitution in B.C. 413 or 412 of a democracy for the aristocracy (or polity, c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.) which had existed since B.C. 466–5 (see note on 1304 a 27). Cp. Diod. ii. 72. 1, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν ἄρτι καταλέλυμινς τῆς ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσιαις τυραννίδος καὶ πασῶν τῶν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον πόλεων ἡλευθερομένων. What Aristotle means by πολιτείαςθαι καλῶς will be seen from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32 sqq.

9. ἡνας τὰς αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. For the phrase οἱ μετέχοντες (sc. τῆς τυραννίδος) cp. 1313 a 1, τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, and see note on 1312 b 40. I do not notice that Aristotle anywhere suggests any remedy for the rise of discords within the ruling family of a kingship or tyranny.

10. ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα, sc. τυραννίς. νῦν, in B.C. 356, a good many years before this was written, for as Sus.2 points out (Note 1699), Aristotle is speaking of the expulsion of Dionysius II from Syracuse by Dion, not of his final departure from Syracuse in B.C. 344. We see that Aristotle uses νῦν of events not so very recent (Sus.2, ibid.).

11. ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος κ.τ.λ. The tyrannies founded by Gelon and Dionysius the Elder both of them came to an end owing to discords arising within the ruling family, but in different ways, the former through a maladroit attempt on the part of the ruling family to save it from destruction by overthrowing one of their own number, the latter through open war waged against it by a member of the ruling family, who called the demos to his assistance.

13. ὁρμῶντος. The transitive use of ὁρμᾶν is rare in Aristotle’s writings: the Index Aristotelicus omits to mention the passage before us, and gives instances only of the passive, or what it takes to be the passive, in this sense.

ἲν αὐτὸς ἀρχή, ‘in order that he himself might rule.’ This seems to imply that the son of Gelon (whose name we nowhere learn) was tyrant of Syracuse in however nominal a sense, perhaps from the time of his father’s death, but certainly after the death of his uncle Hiero, whereas according to Diod. ii. 66. 4 Thrasybulus
succeeded his brother Hiero in the tyranny. In c. 12. 1315 b 38 also Thrasybulus is treated as Hiero’s successor, but the authenticity of c. 12. 1315 b 11—39 is very doubtful. See also Timaeus, Fragm. 84 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 212), and Freeman, Sicily, 2. 304. A similar aim to that here ascribed to Thrasybulus was in later times falsely ascribed to Dion in reference to Dionysius the Younger ([Plato,] Epist. 7. 333 C).

τὸν δὲ οἰκεῖν συστησάντων κ.τ.λ., ‘and the connexions (of Gelon’s son) having banded together a body of confederates.’ See Prof. Postgate, Notes on the Politics of Aristotle, p. 23, whom I follow in this note and the next, not having any better interpretation to suggest, but with some hesitation. Verbs are often used in the Politics without an expressed object (e.g. in c. 5. 1305 a 31 καθιστάων is thus used, in 2. 11. 1273 b 18 ἐκφεύγωνοι, in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 29 μετέβαλεν, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 διορθῶν: see also note on 1313 a 1), but still the use of συστησάντων here without an object is remarkable. Τὸν οἰκεῖον perhaps refers to Chromius and Aristonous, who had married sisters of Gelon and were left by him guardians of his son in the event of the death of his brother Polyzelus (Tim. Fragm. 84: Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 798). Οἰκείότης is connected with ηθεία in 2. 3. 1262 a 11, and distinguished from blood-relationship there and from συγγένεια in Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 b 34.

14. οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ., ‘but their band of confederates,’ etc. Perhaps, however, Sus.² is right in suggesting that μετ’ should be added before αὐτῶν (see critical note on 1312 b 15).

16. στρατεύσας, κηδεστής ὄν, καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν δήμον, ‘having made an expedition, though a connexion by marriage, and having added the demos to his side.’ Dion had married Arete, the half-sister of Dionysius II. It was because Dion accepted the help of the demos, and yet after winning the day did not introduce a complete democracy, that he ultimately came to a violent end.

17. For the pleonasm of ἐκεῖνον cp. Plato, Phileb. 30 D, ἀλλ' ἐστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφημαμένοις ὅς ἦλε τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει ἡμών τοίς ἐκεῖνος, and see Stallbaum ad locum.

δύο δὲ οὖσών αἵτων κ.τ.λ. This results from 1311 a 31—1312 a 20. Aristotle here points out which causes of attack are most fatal to tyrannies, just as he has pointed out how democracies, oligarchies, and aristocracies are most apt to be overthrown in c. 5. 1304 b 20 sqq., c. 6. 1305 a 37 sqq., and c. 7. 1307 a 5 sqq.

19. θάτερον μὲν δεὶ τοῦτων ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μίσος.
Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Rep. 567 C, ἐν μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη δέδεται, ἢ προστάτει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαῦλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενοι, ἢ μὴ γὰρ: compare Laws 691 C sq. and Polyb. 5. 11. 6, τυράννου μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἔστι τὸ κακὸς ποιοῦντα τῷ φῶς δεστοίν ἀκούστων, μισούμενοι καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς ὑποταττομένους. Yet in c. ii. 1315 b 7 Aristotle seems to imply that the tyrant may escape being hated. For the use of δὲ in a sense not far removed from that of ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν cp. c. ii. 1315 a 10, δέ, and Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 36, ἀτε δὲ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρὼν τῶν Ἀρκάδων ... πολλοῖς ἔδει τοὺς συλλαμβανόμενους εἰναι.

20. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ., 'but it is in consequence of tyrants being despised [which they might have avoided] that many of the overthrows of tyrannies occur.'

21. For σημείων δὲ followed by γάρ Bonitz (Ind. 146 b 16) compares 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 17 sq. and other passages.


22. καὶ διεφύλαξαν τάς ἀρχάς, 'kept their thrones also' (in addition to winning them). A πυραννής is here implied to be an ἄρχη (see note on 1310 b 23).

οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες κ.τ.λ. There are many exceptions to this rule—Hiero, Periander, the successors of Clearchus at Heraclea on the Euxine, etc. Aristotle is probably thinking of cases in which the founder of a tyranny was succeeded by a son brought up in luxury, and especially of Dionysius II of Syracuse. It deserves notice that his remark does not hold good of the tyrants of mediaeval Italy, for they often founded dynasties which lasted long.

25. πολλοὺς καρποὺς παραδιδόσατο τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. Cp. Antiphanes, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 70 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 155), δὲ γὰρ, ὡς ἀπαντᾷ τοῖς ἄνθρωποι σε "ψεύδειν ἀφομάς παραδίδως τοῦ πράγματος, μόριον δὲ τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὀργήν δὲι τιθέναι. Cp. Poet. 5. 1449 a 33, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀισχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον, where Bonitz (Ind. 473 b 60) explains μόριον as = ἐδός τι. In Rhet. 2. 4. 1382 a 1 sqq., where the difference between ἔχθρα (ἐςμόσος) and ὀργὴ is explained, ὀργὴ is said to be one of the things which produce ἔχθρα. 27. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρακτικῶτερον τοῦ μίσους. Πρακτικῶτερον takes up πράξεων. Λογισμὸς often hampers action (Amphis, Φιλάδελφον, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, 3. 316) : cp., with Richards, Thuc. 2. 40. 4).
28. συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται, sc. οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι. 
διὰ τὸ μὴ χρῆσαι λογισμὸν τὸ πάθος. Cp. Thuc. 2. 11. 8: 
Demosth. c. Mid. c. 41: Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 64 (Meineke, 
30. τοῖς θυμοῖς. For the plural cp. (with Bon. Ind. 336 a 35 
sqq.) Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 11 and De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 2.

η τε τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυράννισ. See note on 1311 a 36.
32. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μίος. Sepulv. ‘odium tamen magis est 
in causa,’ and Vict. ‘odium tamen magis efficit quod gerendum 
suscipit,’ but Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 243), who is followed 
by Schneider, Eaton, Sus., and others, is probably right in supplying 
χρῆσαι λογισμὸν.

34. ὅσα αἰτίας, sc. τῆς φθορᾶς. The oppression of the rich, for 
instance, which is fatal to extreme democracy, and the oppression 
of the poor, which is fatal to extreme oligarchy, will also be fatal 
to tyranny. Aristotle speaks here as if he had described the 
causes of the overthrow of extreme democracy and extreme 
oligarchy separately from those of the overthrow of democracy 
and oligarchy in general, but this he has not done.

35. τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας. We often hear 
of ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία, but not elsewhere of ἡ τελευταία ὀλιγαρχία, 
though in 1310 b 4 we have ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς υπάτης. ‘Ἡ τελευταία 
dημοκρατία is not only τελευταία in the sense of ‘extremeness’ (cp. 
Soph. Electr. 271, τὴν τελευταίαν ὀβρυν), but also τελευταία τοὺς χρόνους 
(6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq.); it is doubtful how far this is true of 
ἡ τελευταία ὀλιγαρχία (cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.), though perhaps 
the decadarchies of Lysander were narrower, and therefore more 
‘ultimate,’ than even the early oligarchies of knights.


40. ἕνα μὲν σταυσισάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας. Οἱ 
μετέχοντες τῆς βασιλείας are those who share in the advantages 
and power of the kingship. Vict. ‘intelligit fratres ac liberos eorum 
qui regnant, hi namque participes amplaee illius fortunae non sine 
causa vocari possunt, degustant enim ipsi quoque plurimum eorum 
bonorum.’ The quarrels of Arcesilaus II of Cyrene with his 
brothers were one of the causes of the fall of the kingship (Hdt. 4. 
160). The success of the royal house of Pergamum was largely 
due to its freedom from these dissensions (Polyb. 23. 11. 6 sqq.). 
The Duke of Wellington said that Philippe Égalité, Duke of
Orleans, ‘was first driven into opposition by the misconduct of Marie Antoinette, who had taken a violent dislike to him, and encouraged the courtiers to insult him’ (Lord Stanhope’s Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 64). ‘Queen Isabella of Spain’s caprices might have been condoned in 1868 as they had been condoned before ... if there had been no family dissensions and parties. Admiral Topete rose to crown the Duc de Montpensier as much as to punish the lawlessness of the Duke’s sister-in-law and her counsellors’ (Times, Nov. 6, 1885). In ancient Greece these family discords would be all the more likely to arise, because the kings often had families by concubines as well as by their wives, and sometimes indeed appear to have had more wives than one.

1313 a. 1. διδος δὲ τρόπον τυραννικάτερον πειρωμένοις διαικεῖν. Supply τῶν βασιλέων with πειρωμένοιν, and probably τὴν ἄρχην (rather than τὴν πολιτικὴν) with διαικεῖν (cp. c. ii. 1313 a 35 sq. and 3. 15. 1286 b 30 sq.). Διαικεῖν is similarly used without an expressed object in c. ii. 1314 b 6, ὁτῳ γὰρ ἀν τίς διαικών κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1310 b 18 sqq.: Plato, Laws 690 D–691 A: Polyb. 6. 4. 8 and 6. 7. 6 sqq.: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74. This is the cause to which the fall of kingship is most usually attributed by ancient writers. It was thus that kingship fell in the Lacedaemonian State under Charilaus (c. 12. 1316 a 33 sq.), in Achaia (Polyb. 2. 41. 5), at Megara (Paus. 1. 43. 3), and in part at Cyrene under Arcesilaus II (Diod. 8. 30. 1). If the story of Tarquinius Superbus’ reign at Rome is to be trusted, the same thing happened there.

3. οὔ γὰρ νονται δ’ ἐτι κ.τ.λ., ‘but kingships do not come into existence any longer now, or if they do come into existence, it is monarchies or tyrannies rather that do so.’ This remark appears at first sight to be hardly relevant, occurring as it does in the midst of an account of the causes of the fall of kingship, but the transition is easy from the fall of kingships through tyranny to the fact that they no longer arose for want of men deserving the willing obedience presupposed by the office. Καὶ in μοναρχία καὶ τυραννίδες probably means ‘or’ (see note on 1262 a 6), unless indeed we take it as explaining and limiting μοναρχία (see note on 1257 b 7). Μοναρχία is commonly used by Aristotle in a sense inclusive of kingship and tyranny, but here the word seems to be used in a sense approaching that of tyranny, as in c. 3. 1302 b 17. The kingship of the Archaeanactidae of Panticapæum arose
in the fifth century B.C., but they were βασιλεῖς only in their relation to their barbarian subjects; they ruled the Greek cities which were subject to them as ἀρχοντες for life (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 188 sq.).

4. ἀν περ γίγνονται. 'Εάνπερ non saepe inventur' (i.e. in Aristotle’s writings), ‘cf. Rhet. 3. 16. 1417 b 13, Metaph. B. 6. 1003 a 16 (άνπερ), Metaph. Z. 12. 1038 a 13, Phys. 4. 8. 215 a 2 (άνπερ), and Phys. 4. 10. 218 a 4,’ in addition to the passage before us (Eucken. De Partic. Usu, p. 65).

8. πολλοὺς 8’ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 11 sqq. and Plato, Polit. 301 C.

7. τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cp. Plut. Ages. c. 4, τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς (i.e. τῶν ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν γεράντων). Compare also Arifphon, Fragm., τὰι ἵσοδαιμόνων ἀνθρώπων βασιλεῖδος ἀρχὴς. As to τῆς ἀρχῆς in reference to kingship, see notes on 1310 b 23 and 1301 b 18.

8. ἦστε διὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐκώντες οὐχ ὑπομένονσιν. Μέν should be subjoined to ἐκώντες rather than to διὰ τούτῳ, but 'μέν interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur’ (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

9. ἄν δὲ δεὶ ἀπάτης ἂρβη τις ἡ βίας κ.τ.λ., 'but if a man has won rule by deceit or force [so that those over whom he rules submit to him, though unwillingly],’ etc. It is implied here that persons who are induced to submit by deceit submit unwillingly: contrast the use of ἐκώντες in c. 4. 1304 b 10–17. For ἂρβη cp. ἂρξαντες in 2. 9. 1271 b 4. Diogenes Laertius ascribes a definition of tyranny in similar terms to Plato (3. 83, τυραννίς δὲ ἐστιν ἐν ἥ παρακρονοὐσθέντες ἢ βασιλεύσει ὑπὸ τινος ἀρχοντα: cp. 3. 92). Compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10. For the order of the words, ἦδη δοκεῖ τούτῳ εἶναι τυραννίς, cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 3, δοκεὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικῶν. Π’ Sus. place the words in a different order, ἦδη τούτῳ δοκεῖ τυραννίς εἶναι.

10. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατά γένος βασιλείαις κ.τ.λ. Αἱ κατὰ γένος βασιλείαι are kingdoms in which succession to the throne is confined to members of a certain family (Diog. Laert. 3. 83) ; the phrase does not necessarily mean that the throne passes always from father to eldest son, or even from father to son. Aristotle’s language implies that there were kingdoms not κατὰ γένος, and we know that the aësymneteship was not so (3. 14. 1285 a 32 sq.), and that the absolute kingship might or might not be so (3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.). But it is not likely that Aristotle is thinking here of either the one or the other; he must be thinking of some forms of Greek or
NOTES.

barbarian kingship which were not κατὰ γένος, but freely elective without any limitation to a particular family. Of these forms we hear nothing in the classification of kingdoms contained in 3. 14, for the barbarian kingdoms described there are hereditary as well as elective, but possibly the barbarian kingdoms referred to in 6 (4).

12. καὶ τὸ δύναμιν κ.τ.λ., 'and the fact of their possessing not the power of a tyrant, but only the dignity of a king, and yet being guilty of outrages.'

δύναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 18, ἔχουσι ἐ' αὕται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίων τυραννίσων, and Plato, Gorg. 469 D, ὁ Πάλας, ἐμαὶ δύναμις τις καὶ τυραννίς βασιλεία ἀρτι προσγέγονεν.


18. As to δῆλον see critical note.

19. ὡς δὲ καθ' ἐκαστὸν, sc. εἰπεῖν.

τῷ τάς μὲν βασιλείας ἀγεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. Μὲν is taken up by αὐτεὶ τυραννίδες, 34. Aristotle's counsel to tyrannies is, however, substantially the same (see 1314 a 34 sqq.). For ἀγεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον cp. Plato, Tim. 48 A, Phaedr. 237 E. Plato had given the same advice as to kingship (Laws 690 D-E, 691 D sqq., esp. εἰς τὸ μέτρου μᾶλλον συνείσειλε). Aristotle probably has the Macedonian kingship in view, for the Molossian and Lacedaemonian kings did not need this advice, and there were not many other kingdoms for him to advise. As to the tendencies of the Macedonian kingship even previously to the Oriental triumphs of Alexander see vol. i. p. 278 sq.

21. πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν, 'the office in its completeness': see notes on 1253 b 33 and 1271 b 34. Aristotle has before him in 19 sqq. Plato, Laws 691 D sqq.; perhaps he even remembers the phrase used by Plato in 691 D, πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἥψώσειν αἰτήσ (i.e. τῆς ἀρχῆς).

αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The kings themselves become less despotic in authority and less disposed in character to exalt themselves above their subjects, and their subjects envy them less. Here Aristotle probably has in his memory Xen. Rep. Lac. c. 15, 8, αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὶ τιμή ὅσοι ἔστω ταὐτά βασιλεῖς δήθοσαν, οὐδέν τι πολὺ ὑπερφέρονσι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἐσουληθῇ οὕτω τοῖς βασιλεῖσι τυραννικὸν φρόνημα παραστήσασι οὕτω τοῖς πολῖταις φθόνον ἐμπούσατα τῆς δύναμεος.

23. διὰ γὰρ τούτο κ.τ.λ. Τούτο, the limitation of the royal
authority (cp. 20 sq.). Among the Chaonians and Thesprotians of Epirus, or at any rate among some of them, kingship had disappeared before the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2. 80). We infer that the power of the Chaonian and Thesprotian kings had been less limited. One indication of the limitation of kingship among the Molossians was that kings and people took an oath to each other from time to time, the kings engaging to rule in accordance with the laws and the people to preserve the kingship (Plut. Pyrrh. c. 5).

24. ή περι Μολοττών βασιλεία is followed in 25 by ή Λακεδαίμονιών, just as in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18 περι τούτων is followed in 25 by τούτων. See Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.

Dieμεμεν does not imply that the Molossian kingship had ceased to exist, which was not the fact. For the aorist where we might expect the perfect see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 58, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 386. 14 (ed. Gerth, § 386. 13).

25. καὶ ή Λακεδαίμονιών κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle continues to follow in the track of Plato, Laws 691 D sqq. (cp. Epist. 8. 354 B, where however the institution of the ephorate is ascribed to Lycurgus), but, unlike Plato, he does not refer to the senate as a check on the kings. Perhaps he did not think it an effective check (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 35—1271 a 18). Aristotle approves of the ephorate as a check on the kings, but not of the ναυαρχία (2. 9. 1271 a 37 sqq.). Plato (Laws 692 A) had ascribed the institution of the ephorate to a lawgiver later than Lycurgus, but Aristotle is the first to name Theopompus as its author. Herodotus (1. 65), Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 8. 3) and others (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 16, note 1) attribute its institution to Lycurgus. ‘Plato (Laws 692 A) and Aristotle in the passage before us (cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 7: Cic. De Rep. 2. 33. 58 and De Leg. 3. 7. 16: Valerius Maximus, 4. 1. Ext. 8) represent the establishment of the ephorate as a weakening of the power of the kings, but this view is obviously an inference from the position of the ephors in the State in later times’ (Gilbert, ibid., p. 17, note 1). It does not appear in what other ways besides the establishment of the ephorate Theopompus moderated the power of the kings. With the double Lacedaemonian kingship compare the two kings of the Cadusii (Plut. Artox. c. 24, ὅταν γὰρ δυνέων ἐν τοῖς Καδούσιοι βασιλέωι, ἐκτικόρον δὲ χωρίς στρατοπεδεύοντος κ.τ.λ.): it is not clear, however, whether the Cadusii had two royal
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See as to
houses, like the Lacedaemonians, or only two kings.
Siam Frazer s Pausanias, 3. 312. Instances of more kings than
Waitz (Deutsche
one reigning at the same time are not rare
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cases of this among

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sq.) refers to

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and Franks.

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26. fieTpido-avTos,
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cp. Plato,

sc.

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Laws 692 B,

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opKOts yLfrpuicrai ^v^r/v viav \a@ovcrav

29. eXdrrova and 30. /iei^oka.

These forms of the

ace.

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are less frequently used by Attic writers than the shorter forms.

Kiihner, Ausfiihrl. gr.

Gramm.

(ed. Blass), i.

of their occurrence in Xen. Cyrop.

where KaXXiova

5. 4.

43

427, gives instances

(ptiovn)

and Hiero,

8. 5,

followed in the next line by KaXXt w.
XvSpa
also
Tim.
A
and
Plato,
39
Cp.
Gorg. 486 B.
The story is told also by
30. oTiep KCU irpos TT)f yukcuKd K.r.X.
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Plutarch in Lycurg.
Valerius Maximus, 4.
31. euroucrcu

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than a question.

by no means
Gorg. 449 E.

33. ou Sfjra,
Plato,

Ad

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Ext. 8.

34. at Se rupacviSes K.r.X.
in the first it

differ in this

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cp.

Rhet.

3.

1419 a 34 and

18.

The two ways
is

of preserving a tyranny
taken for granted that the subjects

of a tyrant are necessarily hostile to him, and the aim is to make
them unable to conspire against him by making them too poor and
mean-spirited and too distrustful of each other, and also too busy

and too well-watched,

to

do

so,

whereas in the second the aim

is

to

make

the subjects of the tyrant indisposed to conspire against him
by inducing them to regard him as an oiKovofios and tmTpoTros of the
State

and not a

a-farepia-Tris

(i3i5b

i

sq.).

The

first,

again,

is

demoralizing both to the tyrant and to those over whom he rules,
not so the second (13 14 a 12-14, I3i5b 4-10).
The first method
is

said

by

Aristotle to be that followed

by most

tyrants, not

by

all

;

he would not say that Peisistratus or Timotheus of the Pontic
Heracleia ruled in this way.
The account which he gives of the
aims of most tyrants is sombre enough, here and there probably
too sombre (as

when he

ascribes to the tyrants

who were

great


builders a deliberate purpose to make their subjects poor); he is partly led to make it sombre by the wish to place their actual mode of rule in the strongest possible contrast to that which he himself recommends. But we shall find when we examine the details of the picture that he borrows most of them from earlier authorities and that he is supported by their testimony. If the Greek race had been less opposed to despotic rule than it was, the methods of Greek tyrants would have been less black. Xenophon had already said that the tyrant cannot rejoice when his subjects are brave soldiers or when they become more prosperous and consequently less submissive to him (Hiero, 5. 3 sq.), and Plato had said of the rulers not only in tyranny but also in oligarchy and democracy, φοβούμενος ἀρχων φοβόμενον οὔτε καλῶν οὔτε πλούσιων οὔτε ἰσχυρῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε τὸ παράτατον πολεμικόν ἐκὼν εὔατε γίγνεσθαί ποτέ (Laws 832 C: cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 4, 14 sq.). Aristotle was not the first to seek to lead the tyrant into a better path; Xenophon in the Hiero (cc. 9-11) and Isocrates in the Ad Nicolem and the Helena (§ 32 sqq.) had already sought to do this; indeed it is possible that the counsel given by Aristotle that a tyrant should assimilate his rule as far as might be to that of a king had already been given by Dion under Plato's influence to the younger Dionysius (Plut. Dion, c. 10: [Plato,] Epist. 3. 315 D sq., 8. 354 A). It is to this method of preserving tyranny that the long examination of the causes of the fall of monarchy leads up, for if hatred anger and contempt are the most frequent causes of its fall, whatever tends to make tyranny less hateful irritating and contemptible must tend to preserve it. The traditional method of preserving tyranny, on the other hand, would in the long run add to its insecurity by intensifying the hatred anger and contempt with which it was regarded. It is possible that not a little in 1313 a 34-1314 a 12 was written in the hope that it might meet Alexander's eye and be useful in strengthening his sense of what is truly kingly in conduct at a time when some of the characteristics which Aristotle ascribes to the tyrant were disclosing themselves in him, but the counsels contained in this passage would also be useful to meamer men. Pupils of Greek philosophers sometimes became tyrants in after-life. Hermias of Atarneus and Clearchus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, had been among Plato's hearers, and Duris of Samos the historian, who became tyrant of Samos, was a pupil of Theophrastus. Nothing is said in 1313 a 34-1314 a 12 of some

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measures to which, according to c. 10. 1311 a 8-15, tyrants often had recourse, such as those of disarming the many (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 38) and driving them from the central city (see however note on 1313 b 4), nor of the emancipation of slaves, of which we hear in c. 11. 1315 a 37. If most Greek tyrants sought to preserve their tyrannies in the way described in 1313 a 34-1314 a 12, they chose rather a round-about way of doing so. According to c. 10. 1311 a 18 sqq., plotters against tyrannies belonged to the class of notables. If so, would not the banishment of the notables have made the tyrant secure? It is noticeable that we hear nothing of the employment by tyrants of a police, as distinguished from soldiers and a body-guard on the one hand and spies on the other.

36. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τούτων = τῶν παραθεομένων τυραννικῶν (cp. 1313 b 10, 1314 a 12 sq.). Tyranny is described in what follows by an enumeration of τὰ τυραννικά, just as democracy is described in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 17 sqq. by an enumeration of τὰ δημοτικά. Τῶν Κορίνθων is added, as in Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 31, to distinguish this Periander from the tyrant of Ambracia (c. 10. 1311 a 39 sq.). It is not, however, added in 3. 13. 1284 a 26, 28, or in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20, or (for obvious reasons) in 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 25, 28. Καταστήσατ, ‘instituted’: cp. Plato, Rep. 410 B, οἵ καθιστάτες μουσικῆ καὶ γνωμαστικῆ παιδεύων. We know that Aristotle regarded Periander as the author of the advice to cut down those who overtop the rest (3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 sqq.). He also probably takes him to have sought to make his subjects busy and poor (1313 b 22: Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), and to have been frequently at war (see note on 1313 b 28).

37. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς Περσῶν ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν. So for instance the cutting down of those who overtop the rest (3. 13. 1284 a 41 sqq.), the encouragement of courtiership, and the employment of spies (see below on these points). The way in which the Persian kings ruled their subjects is well sketched in Plato, Laws 697 C sqq. For ἔστι λαβεῖν cp. 1314 a 32.

39. ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τε πάλαι λεξθεῖτα κ.τ.λ., ‘and the things to which I refer are both the measures mentioned by me some time ago for the preservation,’ etc. Τὰ πάλαι λεξθεῖτα refers according to Sus. to c. 10. 1311 a 15-22. For this use of these words cp. 1314 b 36, 2. 4. 1262 b 29, and 3. 11. 1282 a 15. Τε, which Ms P, but not Γ, omit, is apparently taken up by καὶ μῆτε συστίτα ἐὰν κ.τ.λ., 41.
The rats as also cp. p-TfTf terms. probably which whatever to Kara (fravtpa) Poliorc. soldiers, subjects (41 ascribed to Periander is thus interpreted in c. 10. 1311 a 20 sqq. To make away with men of high spirit would not be enough unless whatever tends to produce high spirit were also discouragement (41 sqq.). For the non-repetition of τó before the infinitives in 1313 a 40–b 6 see note on 1263 a 15.

τούς φρονηματισ. See Liddell and Scott for other passages in which this rare word is used by Greek writers.

41. καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἐὰν μήτε ἑταιρίαν. The term συσσίτια here probably includes not only public meals but also private entertainments. Dionysius the Elder is said to have wished to stop his subjects' convivial dinner-parties (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Sen. 7. 175 F). The tyrants were commonly experienced soldiers, and they seem to have borrowed this feature of their rule from the precautions which were adopted in besieged cities: cp. Aen. Poliorc. 10. 4, τάς τε ἐστάσις κατὰ πόλιν ὄγειν, συλλέγουσε τε ὅδειν μηδαμοῦ μήτε ἡμέρας μήτε νυκτὸς γίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀναγκαίους ἢ ἐν πρωτανεύρῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ φανερῷ τόπῳ: μηδὲ δύσεσθαι μάην ἑδὼν ἄνει τῶν ἄρχοντων: μηδὲ δειπνεῖν κατὰ συσσίτια ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν οἰκίαις ἑκάστους, ἔξω γόμου καὶ περιδίππον, καὶ ταύτα προσαγαγεῖλαντας τοὺς ἄρχοντας. As to the hostility of tyrants to hetaeraiæ see Isocr. Nicocl. § 54, ἑταιρείας μὴ ποιεῖσθε μηδὲ συνώνοις ἄνει τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης: αἱ γὰρ τοιαύτα συντάσσεις ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις πλεονεκτοῦσιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μοναρχίαις κινδυνεύουσιν, where the speaker is a tyrant, and Dio Cass. 52. 36. 2. The hetaeraiæ referred to in the passage before us would be combinations of the wealthy and powerful, but even combinations of traders and artisans were discouraged under the Roman Empire and by Emperors as excellent as Trajan (Merivale, Romans under the Empire, cc. 63, 65, vol. 8. 61 sqq., 146).

1. μήτε παιδείαν. As to the effect of education, and especially 1313 b. philosophical and gymnastic education, in inspiring high spirit see Plato, Phaedr. 269 E sqq. and Symp. 182 B sqq., where it is implied that φιλοσοφία and φιλογυμνασία develop φρονήματα μεγάλα in the ruled, unwelcome to tyrants, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 9: also Plut. Pericl. c. 4, ὁ δὲ πλείστα Περικλῆς συγγενεῖ καὶ καλέστα περιβείς ὅγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημιουργίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅλως τε μετεφείσαι καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἁξίωμα τοῦ ἴδους, Ἀναξιγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαξισκόπος κ.τ.λ. Musical education had a similar effect (Plut. Inst. Lac. § 14).
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Dionysius the Elder had kept his son the younger Dionysius uneducated because of this (Plut. Dion, c. 9 sq.). Contrast Hipparchus as described in the Hipparchus, 228 C, ταύτα δὲ ἐποίει Βουλόμενος παυδεύειν τούς πολίτας κ.τ.λ. It will be noticed that παυδεύειν is tacitly distinguished from σχολαί which are mentioned separately in 3. Tyrants objected to παυδεύειν because it produced high spirit and mutual confidence, to σχολαί because they tended to make the citizens well acquainted with each other.

ἄλλα πάντα φυλάττειν κ.τ.λ. Φυλάττειν, 'to keep an eye upon,' as in c. 8. 1308 a 31 sqq. Among the things referred to would be close friendship between individuals (see Plato, Symp. 182 B–C and Athen. Deipn. 602 a—d).

3. καὶ μὴ σχολάς κ.τ.λ. The word σχολή appears to be here used of a gathering (cp. ἄλλους συλλόγους σχολαστικοί) for the intellectual employment of leisure, probably under a head, and especially a gathering for the study of philosophy or rhetoric (Plut. De Exil. c. 14: Dec. Orat. Vitae, 6, Aeschines, 840 E). The earliest use of the word in this sense appears to be that in Alexis, ἀκομῆς. Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 455), ταύτ᾽ οὖ σχολὴ Πλάτωνος.

The word διατριβή was used in the law of Sophocles the Sunian which in b.c. 316 enacted μὴ ἡγεῖται μηδὲν τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβὴν κατασκευάσασθαι (Pollux, 9. 42). The ἄλλοι σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί would include gatherings in gymnasia and palæstae (Plato, Laws 935 B), to both of which tyrants were occasionally hostile (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 9: Athen. Deipn. 602 d), and in leschae, as to which see Liddell and Scott s.v. We read in Plut. Arat. c. 3 that Abantidas, tyrant of Sicyon in the days of Aratus, attended some gatherings in the agora for philosophical discussion, with the result that the opportunity was seized to assassinate him. Σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί stand in tacit contrast to σύλλογοι πολιτικοί (Rhet. ad Alex. 38. 1445 a 39 sqq.: Plato, Gorg. 452 E), and probably also to other gatherings for business purposes. With gatherings of a purely business character tyrants would be the less disposed to interfere as they liked their subjects to be busy and unable to plot. Some tyrants appear to have sought to limit festivals (see next note). Charles II tried to close the coffee-houses in 1675 (Boase, Oxford, p. 163), but no doubt only with the object of checking inconvenient discussion, not with the object which Aristotle ascribes here to the tyrant. When tyrants did not forbid σύλλογοι, they often sent spies to them to report what was said (13 sqq.).
4. καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. Under this head the measure of driving people from the central city to which tyrants occasionally resorted may possibly be included (c. 10, 1311 a 13 sq.). So in Cephallenia a tyrant, the son of Promnesus, ἵπτρός πλέον διών οὐκ ἐπέτρεπεν οὐδ’ ἐν πόλει διαντασθαι πλέον ἡμέρας δέκα τοῦ μηνός ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. § 32: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 222).

6. καὶ τὸ τούς ἐπιδημοῦντας κ.τ.λ., ‘and the plan that those staying in the city shall be always visible and shall hang about the palace-gates.’ Vict. takes τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας to mean ‘peregrini externique homines qui urbem visunt’: Lamb. translates ‘cives qui non absent peregre,’ and so Coray. But perhaps the words refer to all staying in the city, whether citizens or strangers (Welldon, ‘the residents in the city’). Greek tyrants seem to have expected all persons staying in the city to ‘hang about their palace-gates,’ mainly in order that they might be visible and their doings known, but the original author of the corresponding Persian custom, Cyrus, if Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 6–8, 16–20 may be trusted, enforced this only on subjects of his own of high rank, and his object was to have them at hand for any service which he might require of them. It is in a similar form that the custom survives to the present day in Chitral. ‘Once during the year every leading man in the country is expected to come to Chitral to pay his respects to the Mehtar, and to remain in attendance on him for a couple of months or so. He has to attend the daily durbars and help the Mehtar with advice about the affairs of the State. . . . In this manner there is a constant ebb and flow from the provinces to the capital; the provincial people get to know what is going on at head-quarters, and the Mehtar becomes acquainted with those he rules’ (Capt. Younghusband on Chitral, Times, March 26, 1895).

There is much to be said for the custom in this form; it evidently does something in a rude way to make up for the absence of a representative Parliament. Xenophon, in fact (Cyrop. ibid.), approved the Persian custom, and not without reason, whatever we may think of his approval (see below on ii) of another Persian custom for which there is less to be said, that of encouraging the king’s subjects to act as spies on each other. Philip of Macedon had drawn the sons of the Macedonian nobles to court and made pages of them (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 133), and there was some wisdom in that measure also. But customs of this kind may easily be carried too far. Louis XIV in France ‘turned the governing aristocratic class into courtiers’
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(Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 262). The Duke of Wellington said of the grandees of Spain (Lord Stanhope, Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 1), 'They are all at Madrid: none of them according to the ancient system could leave the Court without a special permission from the king,' and again (ibid. p. 56), 'They are so abased as to consider leaving the Court under any circumstances the greatest misfortune... It has been the constant policy of the government during many reigns to keep them in dependence,' and (p. 188: see also p. 79), 'Long habit has made them neither more nor less than domestics of the Palace; the Royal Household is everything to them.' Aristotle probably has before him Isocr. Paneg. § 151, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς διὰ τὰς μορφὰς ταπεινῶς καὶ περιδεεῖς ἔχοντες, ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὕτοις τῶν βασιλείων καὶ προκαλυνδούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελέτωτες, θυτὴν μὲν ἀνδρα προσκυνῶντες καὶ διάμορα προσαγωγοῦντες, τῶν δὲ θεῶν μάλλον ἢ τῶν αὐθρώπων ὀλιγωροῦντες. For diatriβειν περὶ θύρας cp. Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 252 b, ἁκοῦσιν μὲν τούτο ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν Περσῶν τοὺς περὶ τὰς θύρας διατιβῶσας, οἴομενος δὲ διὰ τῆς θεραπείας ταύτης χρηματιεύσας μᾶλλον παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως: Dion. 14. 26. 7, Τισσαφέρνης δὲ τούς μὲν στρατηγοὺς εἰς τὴν σχημὴν ἔκαλεσεν, οἱ δὲ λοχαγοὶ πρὸς τῶν θύρας διέτριβον: and Dion. 14. 25. 1. See also Dio Chrys. Or. 8. 284 R.


9. καὶ τάλλα κ.τ.λ., 'and the other Persian and barbarian customs of a similar kind.' Among these Aristotle perhaps refers to the προσκυνήσεως or adoration of the Persian king: cp. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 36, τὰ βαρβαρικὰ, οίνον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐσκατίσεις, and Isocr. Paneg. § 151 (quoted on 6), together with Plut. Alex. c. 54.

11. καὶ τὸ μὴ λαυθάνειν πειράσθαι κ.τ.λ. Just as the residents in the city are to be visible (6 sqq.), so the sayings and doings of the tyrant's subjects are to be made known to him. Isocrates advises Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, δεινὸς μὲν φαίνω τῷ μιθέων οἱ λαυθάνει τῶν γεγραμένων (Ad Nicocl. § 23). This custom came from Persia (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12, where Xenophon approves it). We read of Midas, king of the Phrygians, in Conon ap. Phot. Biblion. Cod. 186 (p. 130 b 40 Bekker), Μίδας δὲ πόλεως ἔχων ἀπαγγέλλοντα αὐτῷ τὰ ὧν ἐλέγετο τε καὶ ἐπράττετο τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, καὶ διὰ τούτο ἐν τῷ ἀνεπιθυμεῖτο τὴν βασιλείαν ἔχων καὶ εἰς γῆρας ἐλθὼν, μακρὰ ὡτα ἔχειν.

12. οἱ οὖν περὶ Συρακοῦσας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. De Curios. c. 16, καίτοι τοὺς γε τυράννους, οΐς ἀνάγκη πάντα γυνώσκειν, ἔπαθθετάτους ποιεῖ τὸ τῶν λεγομένων ὄτων καὶ προσαγωγέων γένους ὁτακοῦσθαι μὲν οὖν πρῶτος ἔσχεν δὲ νέος Δαρείος ἀπιστῶν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πάντας ὑφορώμενος καὶ δεδοκιός, τοὺς δὲ προσαγωγέας οἱ Διονύσιοι τοὺς Συρακοῦσιοι κατέμεζαν κ.τ.λ., and Plut. Dion, c. 28, both of which passages speak of these spics as men, not women. Hence Sepulveda (p. 181 sq.) would read οἱ προσαγωγέαδιοι καλούμενοι, and Sus. οἱ ποταμαγίδιοι καλούμενοι, but Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 83, vol. ii. 69) has already pointed out that women may very possibly have been employed on this service as well as men. I may refer to Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 2. 13: compare also the account given by Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) of the Indian caste of spies (ἐφοροι), who συνεργοῦσι ἐποιούστο τὰς ἑταίρας.

13. καὶ τοὺς ὁτακοῦστάς κ.τ.λ. Π¹ Sus. add οὖς after ὁτακοῦστάς, but probably wrongly: compare for the structure of the sentence, in which οἱ οὖν is followed by καὶ, c. 6. 1306 a 1 sqq. (ὁσπερ followed by καὶ) and c. 10. 1312 a 1–6 (ὁσπερ and καὶ), and also 3. 13. 1284 a 38—b 3 (οἱ οὖν followed by δὲ), 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 36—b 1 (οἱ οὖν and δὲ), and 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 4 sq. (οἱ οὖν and δὲ). Findar gives many counsels to Hiero in his Second Pythian Ode (73 sqq. Bergk) against encouraging secret delation. The tyrants of Cyprus employed spics called Gergini (Clearch. Sol. Fragm. 25: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 311).

14. συνουσία καὶ σύλλογος. The word συνουσία tends to be used rather of friendly gatherings for social intercourse than of gatherings of a more formal and public kind (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 22 and Plato, Rep. 573 A), whereas the word σύλλογος, though it is used of convivial gatherings (e.g. in Plato, Laws 671 A) and generally of σύλλογοι σχολιαστικοί (see note on 3), and of gatherings for worship and sacrifice (Plato, Laches 187 E and Laws 935 B), is used fully as much of public as of private gatherings (Phaedr. 261 A), and frequently of public meetings for debate and of deliberative and judicial assemblies. The presence of spies at convivial parties of friends, where ‘in vino veritas’ prevailed, would be especially intolerable.
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10. καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν ἀλλήλους κ.τ.λ. For the construction διαβάλλειν τινὰ τινὶ see Plato, Phaedo, 67 E, εἰ γὰρ διαβάζεται μὲν παρακάτῳ τῷ σώματι (with Stallbaum’s note), and Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 9, ὃ δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ Δίωνα καὶ Σάμων Φιλίππω καὶ Κλεομένη Πτολεμαίῳ διέβαλε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν.

18. τῶν δὴμον τοῖς γυνηκοῖς. We read of Panaitius at Leontini in Polyzen. Strateg. 5. 47, Παναίτιος Λεωντίνων Μεγαρεύσι πολεμοῦσιν περι γῆς ὄρων πολεμαρχῶν πρώτον μὲν τοὺς πέντες καὶ πέζοει τοῖς εὐπάρχει καὶ ἵππεισι συνέκρουσεν κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Hdt. i. 59, τούτων δὴ ὧν τὸν ἐθνῶν τὸ μὲν Ἀττικὸν κατεχόμενον τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ἐπιθυμᾶντο ὁ Κροῖςοι ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου τοῦ ἵπποκράτεως, τούτων τὸν χρῶν τυραννεύσατο Ἀθηναίων.

τοὺς πλουσίους ἐαυτοῖς. It is not easy to set the ἑπικεῖσατι on variance among themselves (1314 a 19 sqq.); hence Aristotle speaks only of the rich.

καὶ τὸ πένθασα ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 567 A, οὐκοῦν (sc. πολέμους καί νὶ ὁ τύραννος) καὶ ἵνα χρῆματα εἰσφέρωτε πένθασα γεγομένοι πρὸς τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάσωται εἰναί καὶ ἦτον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι; Translate, ‘and making the ruled poor is characteristic of the tyrant, in order that not only may no guard be kept on foot (by the citizens), but that they may also be too busy to conspire against their master, being absorbed in their daily needs.’ In 18–29 the tyrant is described as keeping his subjects busy by making them too poor to live without working hard, and by engaging them in constant wars. As to μὴτε ... καὶ compare what is said of οὕτε ... καὶ in the critical note on 1261 b 7. Οὕτε ... καὶ occurs also in Plut. Tib. Gracch. c. 21 init. It appears to be used in a somewhat similar way to οὕτε ... τε, as to which see notes on 35 and 1272 b 19. Μὴτε φυλακὴ τρέφηται has been interpreted in more ways than one. See the notes of Sepulveda, Vict., and Giph. The interpretation given above seems to me the most natural one. That a citizen-force sometimes subsisted side by side with the tyrant’s mercenaries we see from Diod. 11. 67. 5, where we read of Thrasybulus of Syracuse, καθόλου δὲ, μμαῖον καὶ μυσούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδάκουμενοι, μασθοφόρων πλήθος ἐξευνόγησεν, ἀντίταγμα κατασκευάζων ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν. There would of course be an end of this force when the citizens were deprived of their arms, but the tyrant might be glad to make them too poor to keep it up, and so to save himself the trouble of disarming them. Another interpretation of μὴτε φυλακὴ τρέφηται is ‘in order that no guard may have to be kept
on foot by the tyrant; but, as Vict. points out, it would hardly be safe for him to dispense with a guard, however poor his subjects might be. Vict., followed by Giph. Bekk. and others, would read ἦς for μήτε, but Thurol remarks (Études sur Aristote, p. 86), 'un tyran n' appauvrit pas ses sujets pour entretenir une garde, mais en entretenant une garde,' and indeed impoverishing the ruled seems a strange way of securing the maintenance of the tyrant's body-guard, for the poorer they became, the less able they would be to contribute the revenue needed for its support. A design to keep the citizens busily employed is ascribed to the tyrant Aristodemus of Cumae in Plut. De Mūl. Virt. c. 26 (referred to by Dümmler, Rhein. Mus. 42. 186), ἔτυχε δὲ κατ' ἐκείνο καιρῷ τάφρον ἵγων κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν χώραν ὃ Ἀριστόδημος, οὗτος ἀναγκαῖον ἵγων οὕτε χρήσιμοι, ἄλλως δὲ τρίβετε καὶ ἀποκαλεῖν πόνοις καὶ ἀνχολίαις τους πολίτας βουλόμενος· ἣν γὰρ προστεταγμένον ἐκάστῳ μέτρῳ τινῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐκφέρειν τῆς γῆς. The device of preventing plots by keeping men busy was another of those which the experience of tyrants as military leaders would be likely to suggest to them: see note on 1313a 41 and cp. Polyaen. Strateg. 3. 9. 35 and Justin, 20. 1. 1. 'While the embankment' protecting Mandalay from the floods of the Irrawaddy 'was being constructed, Mindone Min,' a recent king of Burmah, 'complacently remarked to an European gentleman resident in Mandalay, "When my troops come back to the palace after a hard day's work, they are too tired to think of conspiring against me"' (Times, Sept. 21. 1886). Slaves were also kept in order in this way (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20 sq., where see note).

21. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου κ.τ.λ. Τούτου=τοῦ πάνησαν ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους κ.τ.λ. The pyramid-building Kings of Egypt had been represented in a similar light by Herodotus (2. 124 sqq.), who dwells on the forced labour which they exacted from their subjects. Aristotle seems rather to have in view the fiscal exactions of the pyramid-builders as well as of the Cypselidae, Peisistratidae, and Polycrates.

22. τὰ ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελίδων. As to the offerings of the Cypselidae at Delphi and Olympia see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 641, and Sus., Note 1720. The chief of them was a colossal golden statue of Zeus in the Heraeum of Olympia, as to which see Plato, Phaedrus, 236 B, and Suidas, Κυψελίδων ἀναθήμα, where we find the following fragment of Theophrastus (Fragm. 128 Wimmer), which shows in all probability that Theophrastus was acquainted with the
passage before us, and γάρ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ περὶ καρών β' λέγει οὕτως. ἔτερον δ' εἰς ἀνθρωπόστερα καταδιάπαυσε, ὕδων στρατείας ἐξάγοντες καὶ πολέμους ἐπαναροίμασε, καθύπερ καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ τύραννος' ἐκείνος γάρ οὐ μόνον ἐξε τῷ τῶν ἄλλων κατακλίσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πρὸ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν εἴδεθι τοὺς ἐπιβουλευόντος' ἑῴκαι δὲ καὶ αἱ πυραμίδες ἐν Αἰγίπτῳ καὶ ὁ τῶν Κυψελίδων κολοσσὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ παραπλησίαν ἐχειν δύναναι. The passage from Didymus which precedes this fragment in Suidas' article may also be based on Theophrastus, Δίδυμος δὲ κατασκευάσαν τῶν κολοσσῶν φησὶ Περιάνδρον ἐπέρ τοῦ τῆς τρυφῆς καὶ τοῦ θράσους ἐπισχείν τοὺς Κορυθίους.

23. καὶ τοῦ 'Ολυμπίου ἡ οἰκοδόμησις ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων. In place of 'Ολυμπίου we should probably read (with Sus.) 'Ολυμπιίου (see Liddell and Scott s.v.). The form τοῦ 'Ολυμπίου, however, is found in the MSS. even of Plato (Phaedr. 227 B). In those of Diodorus and Strabo it is of frequent occurrence (see Diod. 13. 6. 4, 82. 1: 16. 83. 2: 20. 29. 3: 23. 18. 2; and Strabo, pp. 396 and 404). The building of the temple of the Olympian Zeus at Athens, which remained unfinished till the time of Hadrian, is here attributed to the Peisistratidae, but Peisistratus is commonly said to have begun it (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 342), and perhaps he is included under the term Peisistratidae, just as Cypselus is included among the Cypselidae in c. 12. 1315 b 22 sqq. See as to the temple Frazer, Pausanias, 2. 178 sqq. One of the motives of Peisistratus in building it may have been a wish to outshine his old foe Megara, for there was an Olympicum at Megara (Paus. 1. 40. 4). For the absence of a second ἡ before ἐπὶ τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων see note on 1334 b 12.

24. καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμων ἔργα Πολυκράτεια. Schneider appears from his note on this passage (Politica, 2. 350), if I understand it aright, to take τῶν as masc. and to supply τυράννων with it (cp. τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων and τῶν Κυψελίδων in the preceding lines), and if we interpret the passage thus, we might account for the absence of the article in ἔργα Πολυκράτεια as we account for its absence in 3. 14. 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκύπτρου ἐπανάτασις (see note). But it is more likely that the interpreters generally are right in supplying ἔργων with τῶν and taking τῶν περὶ Σάμων ἔργων as a partitive genitive. The meaning of the words will then be 'and among the works at Samos those of Polycrates.' If, however, we take the passage thus, it seems necessary either to read (with Coray) τῶν περὶ Σάμων ἔργων τὰ Πολυκράτεια, or else (with Sauppe and Sus.) to change τῶν into τά and to
read *τά περὶ Ζάμων ἤργα Πολυκράτεια.* Herodotus (3. 60) describes three great works at Samos, but does not say that any of them were built by Polycrates. One of Polycrates’ works was probably the palace which Caligula at one time designed to restore (Suet. Calig. c. 21).

25. καὶ ἡ εἰσαφορὰ τῶν τελῶν κ.τ.λ. Dionysius the Elder’s taxes appear to have been, at all events for a time, at the rate of twenty per cent. not on his subjects’ income, but on their property. According to the comic poet Alexis (Πολαίας, Fragm. ap. Athen. Deipn. 226 a Meineke) the fishmongers went even further,

*λαμβάνοντες βασιλικοὺς φόρους. Β. φόρους μόνον; οὐκὶ δεκατένοις γὰρ τὰς οἰκίας ἐν ταῖς πύλεσι καθῆμενοι, ὅλας δ’ ἀφαιροῦνται καθ’ ἕκαστην ἡμέραν.*

The period at which Dionysius’ taxes were so heavy probably fell within the first ten years of his tyranny, several of which were years of war with Carthage, when the land and sea forces kept on foot by him were very large (Diod. 2. 5. 6), but it is clear from 1314 b. 14 sqq. that in Aristotle’s view Dionysius’ revenue was not levied simply for the defence of the State. Compare the story told of Cypselus in Oecon. 2. 1346 a 32 sqq.

28. ἐστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιὸς ὁ τύραννος κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 566 E, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ κυνεῖ, ἵν’ ἐν χρείᾳ ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ἤ, and the passage from Rep. 567 A quoted above on 18. We read of Periander in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), ἐστρατεύετο δὲ συνεχῶς καὶ ἦν πολεμικός. But both Plato and Aristotle probably have Dionysius the Elder especially in view (cp. Theophr. Fragm. 128, quoted on 22, and Diod. 14. 7. 1, 68. 1, 75. 3). The true king is not φιλοπόλεμος (see Bücheler in *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 198). For ὅπως δὴ (‘in order that forsooth’) cp. ἵνα δὴ, Plato, Rep. 420 E, 610 C, Xen. Hell. 4. 1. 26. It should be noticed that tyrannies ran some special risks in time of war: thus the subjects of Dionysius the Elder rejoiced at his proposal of a war with Carthage, for they looked forward to regaining their arms and hoped that when they had done so, some opportunity would offer of regaining their freedom (Diod. 14. 45. 5).

29. καὶ ἡ μὲν βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Here and in what follows down to 1314 a 12 the tyrant is shown commonly to distress all who in his view are likely to plot against him, and especially those who are likely to plot successfully, to love flatterers and bad men, to
hate and to regard as subverters of his rule persons whose free bearing leaves him with a sense of diminished greatness, and to choose as his daily companions those on whose complaisance he thinks he can count. Thus he distrusts those whom a good ruler would trust, friends and good men, and his favour is for slaves rather than freemen, women rather than men, aliens rather than citizens. The saying that kingship is saved by friends is one of those which are placed in the mouth of the dying Cyrus by Xenophon (Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, which is imitated by Sallust in De Bell. Iugurth. 10. 4). The distrust of tyrants for their friends is dwelt on first by Aeschylus, Prom. Vinct. 224,

\[\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\tau\iota\ \gamma\acute{a}p\ \pi\omega\ \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\ \\\tau\eta\ \tau\iota\upsilon\varrho\alpha\nu\nu\iota\delta\iota\nu\delta\iota\nu\]  
and after him by Euripides (Fragm. 608 Nauck: 605, ed. 2), Xenophon (Hier. 3. 7 sqq. : cp. 1. 38), and Isocrates (Hel. § 33, De Pace, § 112). No one distrusted his friends more than Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 15. 7. 3). He distrusted even his own son Dionysius (see note on 1313 b 1). We read of him in Plut. Dion, c. 9, ἐλεγη δὲ τοὺς φίλους φιλανδεσθαι νοῦν ἠχοντας εἰδῶς καὶ βουλομένους μᾶλλον τυραννεῖν ἢ τυραννεῖσθαι.

31. ὃς βουλομένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων. 'Ultro intelligitur ἐπιτίθεσθαι (confer 2. 10. 1272 b 16), et futilis est quorundam codicum additamentum αὐτῶν καθελεῖν' (Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1453 b 17). For the thought cp. c. 10. 1312 a 6 sqq. and Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 32, ταυτάτα δὲ (i.e. φαβερά) ἐξήμα τε καὶ ὄργη δυναμένων ποιεῖν τι' δήλων γὰρ ὁτι βουλομένα, ὅστε ἐγγύς εἰσι τοῦ ποιεῖν.

32. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq., where much the same thing is said, except that we do not hear of γυναικοκρατία there, but only of ἀναρχία γυναικῶν, and that the further trait of ἀναρχία παιδῶν is added, the tyrant being also alleged to favour 'living as one likes.' Περὶ τὰς οἰκίας is added to distinguish this kind of γυναικοκρατία from γυναικοκρατία in the administration of the State, as to which see 2. 9. 1269 b 31 sq. As to δούλων ἄνεσις in an extreme democracy cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10 sqq., Plato, Rep. 563 B, and Demosth. Phil. 3. 3. Aristotle's statement is borne out by the account given of the state of things at Rome under Domitian in Plin. Paneg. c. 42 (referred to by Roscher, Politik, p. 594), where Pliny addressing Trajan says, reddita est amicis fides, liberais pietas, obsequium servis: verentur et parent et dominos habent. Non enimiam servi nostri principis amici, sed nos sumus,
nec pater patriae alienis se mancipiis cariorem quam civibus suis credit. Omnes accusatores domesti liberasti unoque salutis publicae signo illud, ut sic dixerim, servile bellum sustulisti. One of the cries vociferously shouted by the senate after the assassination of Commodus was ‘servis serviimus’ (Ael. Lamprid., Com- modus Antoninus, c. 19. 5). The freedman Milichus informed Nero of Piso’s conspiracy against him (Tac. Ann. i5. 55). For καὶ . . . δὲ used as here cp. Categ. 13. 14 b 33.

34. εξαγγέλλωσι ‘seems to be used here in the special sense which comes out most in the εξάγγελος of tragedy’ (Richards). See Liddell and Scott s. vv. εξαγγέλλειν, εξάγγελος.

35. οὐτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for slaves and women not only do not plot against tyrants, but must also feel goodwill both to tyrannies and to democracies, if they prosper under them.’ For οὐτε—τε see note on 1272 b 19. Aristotle must be thinking of women unconnected with tyrants, for the murder of Alexander of Pherae was planned by his wife (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 35), and according to Xen. Hiero, 3. 8 the same thing had happened to many other tyrants. The stories of Eryxio and Xenocrite are to be read in Plut. De Mul. Virt. cc. 25-26.


39. διὰ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ κ.τ.λ., ‘the flatterer also,’ as well as slaves and women. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20 sqq.

1. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ὅτι πονηρόφιλον ἢ τυραννὶς. This charge 1814 a.

against tyranny is of early date: cp. Hdt. 3. 80, χαίρει δὲ (ὁ τύραννος) τοῖς κακίστοισι τῶν ἀστῶν, and Eurip. Ion, 566 Bothe (626 Dindorff), τύραννος ὄν,

ὁ τούτω πονηρῶς ἡδονή φιλὸς ἔχειν.

As to Dionysius the Elder see Theopomp. Fragm. 146 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 303). We read in Plin. Paneg. c. 45, where Trajan is addressed, et priores quidem principes, excepto patre tuo, praeterea uno aut altero, et nimiri dixi, viuiis potius civium quam virtutibus laetabantur. Χρυσοτοφιλία is an element in εὐδαιμονία (Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b 18 sqq.). Cp. also Diod. 12. 12. 4, where we read of Charondas, ὁ νομοθέτης ἀντιγράφεσαι τῇ τῶν πονηρῶν φιλία τε καὶ συμφέρεια χρήσασθαι καὶ δίκαι ἐποίησα κακομαλίας, and Eth. Nic. 9. 3. 1165 b 15, οὔτε δὲ φιλητέων (φιλητῶν τὸ Stahr, Bywater) πονηρῶν οὔτε δὲ φιλοσύνην γὰρ οὐ χρῆ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοίωσθαί φαίλοι· εἰρήτα δ' ὦτι τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φιλὸν. Διὰ τούτο, i.e. because tyrants love flatterers.
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2. Κολακευόμενοι γὰρ χαίροντες. So Isocrates (Epist. 1. 4) says to Dionysius the Elder, καίτοι τιμεῖς ἡδῆ με τῶν σοι πλησιασάντων ἐκφερ-βείν ἐπεξερήσαν λέγοντες ὡς σὺ τοὺς μὲν κολακεύουσας τιμᾶς, τῶν δὲ συμβουλεύοντων καταφρονεῖν.

3. φιλούσιν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς ή ὡς κολακεύοντες. "H here = 'aut certe.' For the use of ἡ in this sense see Bon. Ind. 313 a 26 sqq. Friendship excludes flattery, for the flatterer is defined as φανώμενος φίλος (Rhet. i. 11. 1371 a 23 sq.). Aristotle perhaps corrects himself by adding ἡ οὐ κολακεύονται because Plato had said in Rep. 568 A, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσι τε (τῶν τύραννος) καὶ φέυγουσιν.

4. καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά. The tyrant likes bad men not only for the pleasure their flatteries give him, but also because they are useful to him. Leucon, king of Bosporus, once said, ἀπέκτεινα ἐν σε ἡν τοὺς θεοὺς, εἰ μὴ ποιηρὼν ἄνδρων ή τυραννὸς ἔδει (Athen. Deipn. 257 d). Compare also the quotation in Plut. De Aud. Poet. c. 4 sub fin. and De Vitios. Pud. c. 13, ποι ἐν τούς ποιηρῶν οὐκ ἀρχηγοῦν ὁπλον ἀ πονηρία.

5. ἥλιος γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος, ὄσπερ ἡ παροιμία. Ἡλιὸς ὁ ἥλιος, sc. ἐκροίεται. Aristotle’s use of the proverb is not the usual one. It was commonly used of the driving out of a thing by a thing of the same kind (cp. κακὸν κακῷ λάσθαι), but not of the execution of evil deeds by appropriate agents. See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 253, 363 and 2. 116. καὶ τὸ μηδεὶς χαίρειν σεμνῷ μηδ' ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννίκον. Μηδενί is of course masc. Aristotle remembers the lines in the ‘Dionysius’ of the comic poet Eubulus,

αλλ’ ἐστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς μὲν αὐθαδέστερος κ.τ.λ. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 217). He possibly has in view the experience of Plato at the courts of Dionysius I and II (Diod. 15. 7. 1 : Plut. Dion. c. 20), or that of the tragic poet Antiphon at the court of the former ([Plut.] Dec. Orat. Vitae, 1, Antiphon, 833 B : Phot. Biblioth. p. 486 a 35 sqq. Bekker), or that of Diodotus at the court of some tyrant in Asia, narrated by Isocrates in Epist. 4. § 7.

8. ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ύπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος. The flatterer, on the contrary, διαφυλάττει τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῷ κολακεύο-μένῳ (Plut. De Adulator et Amico, c. 10).

10. καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 5, ἐτὶ δὲ ξένους μὲν μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτείας πιστεύει, βαρβάρους δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ Ἕλλησι, where the tyrant is referred to. Συμμερευόμαι are friends and favourites of the tyrant, σύσσυστοι are not necessarily so. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a
8. φιλοι δ’ οὖν πάνω εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἡ δὴ μίλησιν ἐναὶ δοκεῖ φιλικά. See also Liddell and Scott s.v. συμβωτίς.

11. ὡς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς δ’ οὐκ ἀντιποιούμενος, ‘in the view that citizens are hostile, whereas aliens do not act in opposition to him.’ Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. i. 4 and Isoc. De Pace, § 112. The absolute use of ἀντιποιεῦσθαι is rare. For the omission of ἄντας compare the omission of οὔτι in 19 and of οὐ in c. 10. 1312 a 37 after ἰκανίν.

12. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα κ.τ.λ. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

13. οἶδέν δ’ ἐλλείπει μοιχηρίας, ‘but they’ (i.e. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα) ‘leave out nothing of badness’ (so Vict. Lamb. Stahr and others: Welldon, however, following Sus., ‘nor is there any villany from which he’—i.e. the tyrant—‘shrinks ’). Cp. Plato, Rep. 571 D, ἀνοίας οἶδεν ἐλλείπει: Tim. 20 C, ἐλλείψαμεν προθυμίας οἰδέν (with Stallbaums note): Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 178, πολλὰ καὶ δείκνυ αἱραγαμένον . . . οἴδεν ἐλλεοῦστα μοιχηρίας. In Plato, Symp. 210 A we have προθυμίας οἰδέν ἀπολείψω (see Stallbaums note). The line of conduct which Aristotle recommends to the tyrant has on the contrary nothing demoralizing in it (1315 b 8 sqq.).


17. δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις. Cp. 1313 a 40 sqq., b 16 sqq.

18. πρὶν ή πιστεύσωσι τινες ἑαυτοῖς. See note on 1336 b 21 and cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 20 sqq., and see Bon. Ind. s.v. πρίν and Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 6.


22. καταγορευένειν followed by a gen. is rare. See Liddell and Scott.

23. τρίτον δ’ ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων, sc. σκοτος ἑστιν. Bonitz (Ind. 10 b 5) explains τῶν πραγμάτων as = τοῦ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά. Ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων appears to mean ‘powerlessness for political action,’ not, I think, ‘a general incapacity for affairs’ (Welldon). A lack of material strength seems to be especially referred to. Cp. for the expression Top. 6. 6. 145 b 1, ἵππος ἑστιν ἀδυναμία αἰθήσεως, and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 774 b 35, διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν.
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24. ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἄδυνάτοις. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 3. 5, τί ἂν τις ἐπιχειροῖ τοῖς ἄδυνάτοις;

ότε οὖδὲ τυράννιδα καταλύειν μὴ δυνάμεως ὑπαρχοῦσης. Dio Chrysostom seems to have this before him in Or. 1. 64 R, οὐ γὰρ δυνατῶν πόλεις τε ἐξαιρέσαι καὶ τυράννωσιν ἀδύνατους καταλύειν καὶ πάσι πανταχύν προστάτες χωρίς δυνάμεως.

25. εἰς οὐδὲ μὲν οὖν ὄρους—29. φρονῷσιν is bracketed as an interpolation by Schm. Cor. and Bekk.², but Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 424), whom Sus. follows, remarks as to this passage, 'hierin ich mich nicht entschlüsseln kann eine Interpolation zu erkennen oder eine aus der Nachlässigkeit des Lehrvortrags entstandene Wiederholung.' The question is not free from doubt, especially as a somewhat similar difficulty arises as to the recapitulation in 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. (see note on 1278 a 34). "Οροὺς here = σκοπούς, as in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33 (cp. 1342 b 17 sq.).


πλῆν εν τι τῶν πάντων ἄδυνατον ἢν ἄρα εὑρεῖν δι’ οὖ τρόποι τις οὐ λυπήσεται.

In c. 6. 1305 a 37 sq. we have, still more remarkably, διὰ δύο τρόπους τοῖς φανερωτάτοις.

31. οἱ δ’ έτεροι κ.τ.λ. For the phrase see note on 1297 b 18.

34. οὕτω τῆς τυραννιδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικωτέραν. Ποιεῖν, not τό ποιεῖν: see notes on 1330 b 10, 1331 b 28, and 1289 a 3. Plato may perhaps have given this advice to Dionysius II through Dion (see note on 1313 a 34).

38. τὴν δύναμιν, 'his power': cp. c. 10. 1313 a 12, δύναμιν τυραννικὴν.

38. ἱστατορ ὑπόθεσιν, 'as a fundamental postulate' (cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 16 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40).

39. τὰ δὲ δοκεῖ, sc. ποιεῖν. For instance, the tyrant is to seem to care for the public weal.

40. πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν κ.τ.λ. The tyrant will thus seem to resemble a king (c. 10. 1311 a 2 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 a 33 sqq.).

1314 b. 1. μήτε διαπαράσι (εἰς) διώρεις τοιαύτας κ.τ.λ. Μήτε—τε, 'not only not—but also' (see notes on 1313 b 35 and 1272 b 19). For the
addition of *eis* see critical note. For τωµάτας ἐφ' *eis* see note on 1266 b 36. For τὰ πλῆθη χαλεπαίνωσιν, where a neut. pl. substantive is followed by a plural verb, see Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.

2. ὅταν ἄπ' αὐτῶν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Γλίσχροι goes with λαμβάνουσιν (Bon. Ind. s. v. γλίσχροι). Cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 91, τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις ἔθει καθέστηκε τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων πόνοις καὶ κακοῖς αὐτῶν ἴδιων παρασκευάζειν, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 18 sqq. There may be a reminiscence here of some lines of Archilochus (Fragm. 142 Bergk3, ap. Ael. Var. Hist. 4. 14), πολλάκις τὰ κατ' ὀξιλῶν μετὰ πολλῶν πώνων συναχύνετα χρήματα, κατὰ τῶν Ἀρχίλοχον, εἰς πάρης γυναικὸς ἐντερων καταρρέων. The conjunction in the passage before us of the three unpopular classes, ἐταίρων ξένων and τεχνίτων, is significant. Hiero I of Syracuse was famed for his bounty (Ael. Var. Hist. 9. 1), and especially for his bounty to aliens (Pindar, Pyth. 3. 71 Bergk, ξένους δὲ θαυμαστῶν πατήρ). Among the aliens favoured by tyrants would often be found poets and philosophers (Plato, Rep. 568 C: Athen. Deipn. 656 d). The τεχνίται would be of very various types; there would be not only practitioners of the fine arts but also cooks, physicians (Polycrates outbade Athens for the services of Democedes, Hdt. 3. 131), actors, dancers, makers of the remarkable dresses which tyrants loved to wear (Polyb. 6. 7. 7), and the whole tribe of craftsmen required for the outfit of a luxurious court. In addition to these there would be the τεχνίται employed in the equipment of the tyrant’s army and fleet; thus we hear of Dionysius the Elder offering δωρεάς μεγάλας τοῖς κατασκευάσασιν ὀπλα (Diod. 14. 41. 4). Dionysius was no doubt munificent also to those who made the dies for his splendid coins, ‘the finest of all the Syracusan coins both in gold and in silver’ (Head, Hist. Num. p. 154). Τεχνίται are distinguished from aliens in the passage before us, but that many of them would be aliens we see from 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq. The rule of tyrants probably did much to add to the numbers of the metoeci in Greek States. The more luxurious they were, the more they would need the services of τεχνίται, and therefore of metoeci and other aliens.

5. ὅπερ ἡδὴ πεποιήκασι τινες τῶν τυράννων. Gelon (Diod. 11. 26. 5: Polyaeon. Strateg. 1. 27. 1), and Micythus of Rhegium (Diod. 11. 66). We read of Caligula in Sueton. Calig. c. 16, rationes imperii ab Augusto proponi solitas sed a Tiberio intermissas publicavit. Compare what Pliny tells us of Trajan in Paneg. c. 20, where he adds, adsuescat impператор cum imperio calcium ponere: sic exeat, VOL. IV. H h
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sic redeat, tamquam rationem redditurus; edicit quid absumperit. Ita fiet ut non absumat quod pudeat dicere. As to the use of the perfect with ἰδή see note on 1303 a 27.

6. οὕτω γὰρ ἐν τις διοικῶν κ.τ.λ. For the use of διοικεῖν here without an expressed object see note on 1313 a 1.

7. οἰκονόμος ἄλλʼ οὗ τύραννος, 'a steward of the State and not a tyrant': cp. 38, ὥς ἐπίτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον, and 1315 b 1, οἰκονόμοι καὶ βασιλικῶν. A steward had to render an account, whereas a tyrant claimed to be ἀνυπείδουνος (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 20). Οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή is for the advantage of the ruled (3. 6. 1278 b 37 sqq.). οὐ δεῖ δὲ φοβεισθαι κ.τ.λ. Giph. (p. 717) points out the similarity of the advice given by Maecenas to Augustus in Dio Cass. 52. 34. 10.

9. ἄλλα τοῖς γʼ ἔκτοπίζουσι τυράννωις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κ.τ.λ. For ἄλλα . . . γε see note on 1311 b 15. ἔκτοπίζειν is not often used in this sense. Καὶ συμφέρει, 'is expedient also' as well as right. Τοῖς, i.e. the course just recommended, that of rendering an account of receipts and expenditure. It is implied that the adoption of this course would preclude the accumulation of a treasure. The first thing a tyrant usually did was to amass a great treasure by confiscation and heavy taxation (Lucian, Cataplus, c. 8 : Diod. 14. 95. 5 : Isocr. Epist. 7. 1). Aristotle's view was perhaps inherited by him from Dionysius the Elder (see the fragment of Theophrastus quoted above on 1313 b 22).

11. ἐπιτιθεῖτο. See critical note.

12. εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Φοβερώτεροι τῶν πολιτῶν, 'more to be dreaded than the citizens.' For the fear which tyrants felt of those who guarded them and their treasure cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 12 and 6. 4. 11 : Isocr. De Pace, § 112, Hel. § 34 : Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 2. 4 : Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 15 init. Cp. also Hdt. 3. 61 init. Dionysius the Elder often left his brother Leptines in charge of Syracuse, and Dionysius the Younger trusted Philistus in the same way (Dio Chrys. Or. 73 : 2. 389 R).

14. ἑπειτά τὰς εἰσαφόρας κ.τ.λ., 'next the tyrant should evidently collect,' etc. For φαΐνεσθαι with the participle see Bon. Ind. 808 b 40 sqq. Φαίνεσθαι recurs in 18, 23, 33, 39, 1315 a 21, b 1 (in this last passage with the infin.). The tyrant must not only do the things recommended but be seen to do them (cp. 22 sq.). In collecting revenue only to the extent made necessary by the needs of the State he imitates the king (1315 b 1 sqq.). Peisistratus is
made to represent himself as thus acting in a letter to Solon ascribed to him in Diog. Laerct. 1. 53, ἀπαντεῖ δὲ ἐκαστὸς Ἀθηναίων τοῦ αὐτοῦ κλήρου δεκάτην, οὐκ ἦμι, ἀλλὰ ὑπόθεν ἔσται αἰνοῦν εἷς τε θυσίας δημοτελείς καὶ εἴ τι ἀλλο τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἤν ὃ πόλεμος ἤμας καταλύῃ.

16. ἄλος τε κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly,' i. e. not merely in respect of eisphorae and liturgies, but in his whole dealings with the revenue. Cp. 1315 b 2, μὴ σφετερισθῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπίτροπον. So we read in Diod. 8. 30. 1 of the kings of Cyrene after Battus I, τῶν δὲ ὑστέρων δὲ τυραννικώτερον δυναστεύοντος ἐξειδοποιήσασθαι μὲν τὰς δημοσίας προσόδους, ὀλγορήσαι δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείας. Cp. Suidas s. v. βασιλεία (quoted by Kaerst, Studien zur Entwicklung und theoretischen Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum, p. 60), ὅτι ἡ βασιλεία κτίμα τῶν κοινῶν, ἄλλα οὖ τὰ δημόσια τῆς βασιλείας κτίμασα. διὸ τὰς ἐς ἀνάγκης καὶ μεθ' ἱδρεος εἰσπράξεις ὡσπερ τυραννικά ἀκολουθίας μισεῖ δὲ, τὰς δὲ συν λόγῳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ τῶν εἰσφορῶν ἀπατήσεις ὡσπερ κηδεμονίαι τιμῶν. A treasurer of public funds demands no more than the requirements of the State oblige him to demand and makes his demands in a considerate way.

18. καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπῶν ἄλλα σεμνῶν. Tyrants were often χαλεποί: Arcesilaus II of Cyrene was called ὁ χαλεπός (Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 25 ἰνίτ.). As to Dionysius the Elder we read in Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, ἄλλα εἰ μὴ μεῖζον, οὐκ ἔπαιτον γε τὸ κακὸν ἦν Ἀθηναίοις ἡ Δαχάρους, καὶ Συρακοσίοις ἡ Διονύσιον χαλεπότης, ἦστε αὐτῶς ἐκεῖνοις' ταράττοντες γὰρ ἐταράττοντο, καὶ πείσεσθαι κακῶς προσεδόκων ἑκ τοῦ προσιδικῶν καὶ λυμαίνοντα τοὺς προενεχχανόντος. It is implied in Isocr. Epist. 7. 2 that Clearchus, the founder of the tyranny at the Pontic Heracleia, was δύσκολος καὶ χαλεπός. As to Alexander of Phereas see Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 35: Pelopidas, we read in Plut. Pelop. c. 26, ἑπειράτο τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ποιεῖν ἐκ τυράννου πρᾶυν ἄρχοντα τοῦ Θεσσαλίας καὶ νόμων. Compare also [[Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 32, ἐν Κεφαλληνίᾳ Προμήθειον νῦν ἐκράτησε καὶ χαλεπός ἦ, and what Thucydides says of the χαλεπότης of the Lacedaemonian Pausanias, when he was suspected of aiming at tyranny (Thuc. 1. 130. 2). Σεμνότης, on the other hand, is characteristic of a king (Plut. Demetr. c. 2, βασιλικὴ σεμνότης: De aud. poét. c. 8. 26 Ε, σεμνότερος καὶ βασιλικότερος). Isocrates had already given similar advice to Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis (Ad Nicocler. § 34).

19. ἐτὶ δὲ τοιούτων κ.τ.λ. Some tyrants sought to Inspire fear in those who came in contact with them, for instance Clearchus of
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Heracleia on the Euxine, of whom we read in Memnon (ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 222 b 19 Beck.), ἐξαλλάττευε δὲ καὶ τοὺς χιτώνας ἐπὶ τὸ φοβηρόν τε καὶ ἀβρότερον. Thucydidès (6. 55. 3) speaks of τὸ ξύνθης τοῖς πολίταις φοβηρῶν of Hippias. Kings, on the other hand, are ἅδιας (Plato, Rep. 390 E.: cp. Dio Chrys. Or. I. 51 R, τοῖς δὲ προσώπασ (sc. τῷ βασιλεί), καὶ ἀρώτατα οὐκ ἐκπληγίς οὐδὲ φόβος, ἀλλὰ ἅδιας ὑπείπι, πολὺ κρείττον καὶ ἁγιαρότερον φόβον). Pindar had praised Xenocrates, brother of Theron tyrant of Agrigentum, because he was ἅδιος ἅστοις ὁμιλεῖν (Isthm. 2. 37): compare a saying of Pittacus (ap. Stob. Floril. 48. 47), ἐκτὸς δ' ὁ Πιττακὸς (ἐφη εὐδαιμονίαν ἄρχοντος νομίζειν), εἶ τοὺς ὑπηκοόντας ὁ ἄρχων παρασκευάσει φοβείσθαι μὴ αὐτῶν, ἄλλ' ὑπέρ αὐτῶν, and one of Cheilon (ibid.), ὅστατος δ' ὁ Ἑκίλων εἶπε, καλλίστον εἶναι βασιλεία τῶν μὴ μόνον τοῦ φοβηροῦ εἶναι φροντίζοντα. Cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F. Isocrates had said much the same thing as is here said by Aristotle (De Antid. § 122: Ad Nicocl. § 23: Evag. § 45), and a dictum of Epicurus ran (Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 537), οὐκ ἔστων ἄριστον εἶναι φοβηροῦ φαινόμενον. For the contrast of ἅδιος and φόβος cp. Probl. 11. 53. 905 a 5 sqq., Plato, Euthyphro 12 B–C and Laws 886 A (with Stallbaum’s note): see also Pol. 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 41, where genuine ἅδιος is connected with ὁ τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβος.

21. ὃντα εὐκαταφρύνητον, ‘if he is contemptible.’

κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρετῶν ἐπιμελεῖαι ποιήται. Isocrates had said to Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus (Ad Nicocl. § 11), διὸ οὐθυμωνύμενον χρὴ προσέχειν τῶν νοῦν, ὡς διὸσοντερ ταῖς τιμίαις τῶν ἄλλων προχεῖς, τουσώντων καὶ ταῖς ἄρεταις αὐτῶν διοίκεις.

22. ἄλλα τῆς πολεμικῆς (sc. ἁρετῆς). As to πολεμικῆς see critical note. For the connexion of military and tyrannical tendencies see Plato, Soph. 222 C and Laws 831 E sqq. Isocrates had already advised Nicocles, πολεμικὸς μὲν ἵσθι ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς (Ad Nicocl. § 24), and we read of the good tyrant Timotheus of Heracleia on the Euxine, οὗ μὴ ἄλλα γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς τῶν πράξεων ἀνδρείας ἐφέρετο (Memnon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 223 b 19 Beck.).

23. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and further not only should he himself manifestly avoid outraged any of the ruled, whether boy or girl, but also the men connected with him.’ For μὴ φαίνεσθαι ὑβρίζοντα see note on 1261 a 9 sqq., οὗ φαίνεται συμμαθίων. Dionysius the Elder sharply reproved his son Dionysius for seducing the wife of a free-man (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Sen. 3. 175 D sqq.). We
read of Cato the Censor in Plut. Marc. Cato, c. 10, "δυνάμει δ' αὐτών, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐφύλασσε καθαράν πινοῦς λήμματος: cp. (with Giph.) Cic. Epist. ad Quint. Fratrem, i. 1. 3. 10. Cp. also Tac. Agric. c. 19, a se suisque orsus primum domum suam coercuit, quod plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere.

26. ὡς καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ῥήματος κ.τ.λ. Giph. refers to Dio Cass. 60. 8. 4, τάστα μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν τε τοῦ Κλαρνίου ἐργα ἡν καὶ ὑφ' ἀπάντων ἐπηρεῖτο· ἐπάρξθη δ' καὶ ἀλλ' ἀπαρά τότε, οὐχ ὁμοίαρτος, ἤπ' τέ τοῖς ἐξελευθέρων αὐτῶν καὶ ὧμ' τῆς γυναικὸς Οὐαλέριας Μεσσαλίνης. Contrast the account given in Plin. Paneg. c. 83 sq. of the bearing of Trajan's wife and sister.

28. περὶ τὸς ἀπολαύσεως τὰς σωματικὰς κ.τ.λ. Pittacus had advised Periander of Corinth μὴ μεθυσκεσθαι μονὴ κομάζειν, ἢ' ἐφή, μὴ γυναικὴ οἴος ἑν γυγχάνεις, ἀλλ' οἷς οἷος προσποιή (Athen. Deipn. 427 e). Aristotle probably remembers the habits and fate of the younger Dionysius, of whom it was recorded in the Συρακοσίων Πολιτεία ascribed to his pen, that he was sometimes drunk for ninety days together (Athen. Deipn. 435 e: Plut. Dion, c. 7). According to [Plato,] Epist. 3. 315 B he addressed the Delphic Apollo thus, "χαῖρε καὶ ἡδόμενον βίοσθε διάφανα τυράννου.

Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, is also probably referred to, for we read of his competition in luxury with Strato, king of Tyre, in Theopomp. Fragm. 126 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 299), where Theopompus says of both in words which recall the passage before us, ἐσπούδαζεν δὲ δοκεῖν εἰδαίμων εἶναι καὶ μακάριος. The phrase εἰδαίμων καὶ μακάριος indicates the height of felicity: it is used of the gods (4 (7). i. 1323 b 24; Eth. Nic. i. 10. 8. 1178 b 9) and of tyrants (Plato, Rep. 344 B sq.). Cp. also Plato, Rep. 354 A, Laws 718 B etc. Warnings against drinking continued for many days together would not be thrown away on Alexander (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 23). ‘Diocletian flattered himself that an ostentation of splendour and luxury would subdue the imagination of the multitude’ (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 13: vol. ii. p. 166, ed. 1812). For τοῦνατιον ποιεῖν ἡ νῦν (‘as it is’) τινές τῶν τυράννων ποιοῖς cp. (with Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 422 sq.) Anal. Post. 1. 17. 80 b 35, ἥπιτεία γὰρ ἐναντίος ἡ ὡς ἐξαφιον αἱ προτάσεις: cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.

32. θαυμάσωσιν. So Π, except a correction in Πο which is of no authority: θαυμήζωσιν Bekk. Sus. ‘MS. evidence apart, θαυμίζωσι seems much more natural than θαυμάσωσιν, for Aristotle would
naturally speak of a lasting state of admiration, but the aorist may be used here of the entrance upon a state, like ἐθάρση, i.e. "that they may conceive, be struck with, admiration"’ (Richards).


36. τοῦναντίον τοις ποιητέων κ.τ.λ. takes up τοῦναντίον ποιεῖν, 28. τῶν πάλαι λεκθέντων refers to 1313 b 18–25. See note on 1313 a 39. A tyrant builds and adorns a city in order to make his subjects poor, an ἐπίτροπος with a view to their well-being.

38. ἐτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κ.τ.λ. In honouring the gods and men of merit the tyrant imitates the king: cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 49 R, where Dio Chrysostom says of the king, perhaps with the passage before us in his memory, ἔτι δὴ πρῶτον μὲν θεῶν ἐπιμελῆς καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον προτιμῶν ... μετὰ δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελεῖτα, τιμῶν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθῶν τοὺς ἀγαθοῖς, κηδόμενος δὲ πάντων. Some tyrants had been wanting in reverence for the gods, for instance the tyrants of Cyrene after Battus I (Diod. 8. 30. 1), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 14. 67. 4 and 69. 2: [Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1353 b 20 sqq., 1349 b 33 sqq.: yet Dionysius built some temples, Diod. 15. 13. 5, and sent offerings to Delphi and Olympia, Diod. 16. 57). Cypselus (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2. 1. 641) and Peisistratus (ibid. 2. 343 sqq.) followed a very different policy. Alexander of Pherae paid special reverence to the Dionysus of Paphlagonia (Head, Hist. Num. p. 261). Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 36. 1 gives Augustus the same advice as Aristotle gives the tyrant here. According to Machiavelli (Prince, c. 18) ‘a prince should take the greatest care to look and to speak as if he were the incarnation of pity, good faith, humanity, integrity, and religion.’


1315 a. 1. τῶν ἄρχωντα. We expect τοὺς ἄρχωντας, but variations in number of this kind are not rare in Aristotle’s writings: see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1448 b 7.

Cp. also Plut. Timol. c. 16 sub fin., Diod. 14. 69. 2, and Lucian, Dial. Mort. 14. 1, where Alexander says to his father in defence of his claim to be the son of Ammon, οὐδὲς ἐκτὸσον οἴδημοι θεῶν μάχεσθαι, ὅστε ῥῶν ἐκρίνουν αὐτῶν. Dionysius the Elder was probably plotted against all the more because of his acts of sacrilege and impiety.

4. τοὺς τε ἀγαθοὺς περὶ τί γιγνομένους κ.τ.λ., i. e. skilled in the arts of peace or war, in oratory or in philosophy (cp. Xen. Cynerg. 1. 14, ἐγένετο καὶ τέχνας καὶ λόγους καὶ πολέμους ἀγαθοῖς). The honours referred to would consist in social precedence, a place at the tyrant's table, rich dresses, etc. (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 2 sqq. : 8. 3. 3 : 8. 6. 11). We read of the Persian king in Xen. Oecon. 4. 15, φασὶ δέ τινες, ἐφ' ὁ Σωκράτης. . . καὶ ὅταν δύρα διὸ ἥπιον, πρῶτον μὲν εἰσκαλεῖν τοὺς πολέμους ἀγαθοὺς γεγονότας . . . δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς κατασκευάζοντας τὰς χώρας ἀριστα καὶ ἐνεργοὺς ποιοῦντας κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Hdt. 3. 154 and 7. 135, and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 5. It was thought kingly to honour men of merit (Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 49 R, quoted above on 1314 b 38): tyrants were often jealous of such men and ungrateful to them; thus we read in Plut. De tranq. an. c. 12, Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος οὐκ ἦγατα μέγιστον ὑπέρ τῶν τούτων τυράννων, ἀλλ' ὅτι Φιλοζήνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ μὴ βέλτιον ἤδε, μηδὲ περὶ ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι Μάλατων, ὀργισθείς καὶ παροξυσθείς, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὰς λατομίας ἀνέβαλε (ἐνέβαλε;), τὸν δὲ ἀπέδιδο τέμπεσα εἰς Λάγμαν. Memnon (ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 222 b 21 sq. Bekk.) calls Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia on the Euxine, πρὸς τοὺς ἑυρίσκετας ἀριστατον (cp. Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 221 sqq.), and Pindar (Pyth. 3. 71 Bergk) is careful to speak of Hiero as οὗ φθονών ἀγαθὸς (cp. Isocr. Evag. § 43, τοὺς χρηστούς τιμῶν, and Plato, Laws 694 B). Peisistratus paid great honour to Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 31. Philip of Macedon, on the other hand, is described by Demosthenes (Ol. 2. 18) as jealous of his most efficient officers. Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 34. 9 gives Augustus similar advice to that given to tyrants here, and we read of Augustus in Suet. Aug. c. 38, nec parciō in bellica virtute honoranda super triginta ducibus iustos triumphos et aliquanto pluribus triumphalia ornamenta decernenda curavit. Pliny (Paneg. c. 44) perhaps has the passage before us in his memory when he says of Trajan, eadem quippe sub
principe virtutibus praemia quae in libertate, nec bene factis tantum ex conscientia merces.

6. καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς κ.τ.λ., ‘honours of the kind just mentioned,’ i.e. honours paid to men of merit. This advice, as Giph. points out, is borrowed from Xen. Hiero, 9. 3, ἐγὼ οὖν φημὶ ἄνδρι ἄρχοντι τὸ μὲν τὸν ἀνάγκης δεόμενον ἄλλοις προστατεύον εἶναι κολάζων, τὸ δὲ τὰ ἄθλα ἀποδιδόναι δὲ αὐτοῦ ποιήτων. Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 31. 4 gives similar advice to Augustus, and Machiavelli (Prince, c. 19) recommends princes to leave odious functions (‘cose di carico’) to others and to reserve acts of grace (‘quelle di grazie’) for themselves.

7. δὲ ἔτερον, ἄρχοντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, ‘by the agency of others, magistrates and lawcourts.’ For the epexegeesis of ἔτερον by ἄρχοντων καὶ δικαστηρίων cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35, μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαν δικαστήρια ἄρχας, and Athen. Deipn. 21 f, ἀπὸ ποδῶν δὲ πλείους (κυῆσεις φέρεις), ἐμβασινίους καὶ χορευτικὰς. Sus. following Oncken brackets ἄρχοντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, but Welldon rightly abstains from following him in this. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 8 sqq., where the distribution of ungracious functions between magistrates and dicasteries is recommended.

8. κουνὴ δὲ φυλακὴ πάσης μοναρχίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 8 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 b 10 sqq. Aristotle probably thinks that Astyages and Amadocus would have been wiser if they had not heaped greatness on one person. Philip of Macedon made both Parmenio and Antipater great, and Alexander exalted no one of his generals above the rest.

10. ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 17 sqq. It may be safe to make a Burghley great but not an Essex.

For μη τοι . . . γε see critical note on 1308 b 15.

12. καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1308 b 15 sq. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of the sudden removal of Dion from power by Dionysius II. Contrast the way in which the emperor Alexander Severus dealt with Epagathus, the principal leader in the mutiny of the praetorian guards which ended in the murder of Ulpian. Epagathus ‘was removed from Rome by the honourable employment of prefect of Egypt; from that high rank he was gently degraded to the government of Crete; and when at length his popularity among the guards was effaced by time and absence, Alexander ventured to inflict the tardy but deserved punishment of his crimes’ (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 6). The story of
Carmagnola illustrates Aristotle's counsel. Carmagnola had been made great by Filippo Maria Visconti, duke of Milan, but his greatness at length aroused the duke's jealousy. The duke removed him from the government of Genoa with the result that Carmagnola entered the service of Venice (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 284). Wallenstein, suddenly dismissed by the emperor Ferdinand II, intrigued with Gustavus Adolphus (Gardiner, Thirty Years' War, p. 141). Napoleon's dismissal of Talleyrand from the office of High Chamberlain and the insults by which it was accompanied had ultimately important consequences, though they were long delayed (Chancellor Pasquier's Memoirs, Eng. Trans., vol. i. pp. 380–383).

13. The fem. form ἄθροις is rare.

14. πάσης ὑβρεώς. Under the head of ὑβρίς fall, in addition to the two kinds here specified, verbal and other insults and arrogant outrages of all sorts.


τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα [κολάσεως]. See critical note. For the phrase ὑβρίς εἰς τὰ σώματα cp. Demosth. c. Mid. c. 179, πολλὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ μὴ τὸ σῶμα ἐκαστὸν ὑβρίζεσθαι πεποίηκασιν οἱ νόμοι.

17. For the distinction between ἀληθωρία εἰς τὰ χρήματα and ἀληθωρία εἰς ἀτιμίαν cp. c. 8. 1308 a 9 sq. The latter phrase evidently includes both the infliction of bodily punishment in a spirit of outrage and ἤ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὁμilia. The word ἀληθωρία here takes the place of ὑβρίς, but it is properly a wider term (Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 13 sqq.). For ἀληθωρία εἰς τὰ χρήματα cp. Demosth. Or. 38. in Nausim. c. 21, τῶν εἰς χρήματα γιγαντεύον ὀδηγημάτων, For oἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν ἀνδρόπων see note on 1281 b 10.

20. ἤ τάς μὲν κολάσεις κ.τ.λ., 'or manifestly to inflict the punishments which he inflicts in a paternal spirit.' The tyrant Alexander of Pherae is described in Plut. Pelop. c. 29 as inflicting punishment in sport (see J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy—Age of the Despots, p. 138, for an account of the similar atrocities practised by Giovanni Maria Visconti). Aristotle has especially in view the treatment of Smerdis by Penthilus and of Decamnichus by Archelaus (c. 10. 1311 b 28 sqq.). Isocrates had already given tyrants similar advice (Ad Nicocl. § 23, cp. Evag. § 43, νομίμως δὲ τούς ἐξαμαρτότατας
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It will be observed that Aristotle's counsel refers only to the punishment of φιλότιμοι, though he might well have extended it to punishment in general.

23. δίως δέ, 'and broadly,' i.e. in whatever way the apparent slight may have been inflicted, whether in connexion with punishment or θύμλα or other matters. Philip of Macedon did endeavour to conciliate Pausanias in the way which Aristotle recommends, but without success (Diod. i6. 93. 9). See note on 1311 b i.

24. τῶν ἐπιχειροῦντων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σάματος διαφθοράν. For the use of ἐπί with the acc. in Aristotle's writings to express the end or aim, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 30 sq., and see Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 58, where De Part. An. 3. i. 661 a 36, τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἢ τῶν ἄδικων φύσις κοινῆ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐμφασίαν ὑπάρχει, is quoted among other passages. See also Bon. Ind. 268 b 59 sqq.

28. ἡ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὡς κηδόμενοι τυγχάνοντι. Decamnicus, Cratæas, Pausanias belong to the former category, Aristogeiton and the two regicides of Aenus to the latter. For the phrase cp. Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 12 and 2. 6. 1383 b 19.

30. Ἡρακλείτος. Heraclit. Fragm. 105 (Bywater). There is a tacit allusion to the saying in Plato, Laws 863 ב, ὁ δυμός, δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, and Rep. 375 ב (quoted in note on 1328 a 6). Cp. also Seneca, Epist. 4, quisquis vitam suam contempsit tuae dominus est. For ψυχής ἀνίσθαι cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. i. 36, κἂν τῆς ψυχῆς προαίρῃ ὡστε μέσῳτε λατρεύσαι ταύτην, and Eurip. Med. 915 Bothe, 967 Dindorf,

τῶν δὲ ἐμῶν παύδων φυγάς
ψυχής ἀν ἀλλαξάμεθ', οὐ χρυσόν μόνον.

33. μάλιστα μὲν ἁμφότεροις κ.τ.λ. This is the case in a true kingship (c. 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.). So we read of Darius in Plato, Laws 695 D, φιλίαι πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσι Πέρασαι, χρήματι καὶ δώρεαις τῶν Περσῶν δήμων προσαγώγειν. Peisistratus succeeded to a large extent in winning the good will of both classes ('Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 16. 1. 36 sqq.). When in c. 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. tyranny is described as making war on the γνώριμος, Aristotle is no doubt referring to the policy usually adopted by tyrants, though it was not the only policy open to them.

34. καὶ τοὺς ἐτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων ἀδικεῖσθαι μηδέν. Supply διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν ('as a consequence of his rule'), which is common to both clauses, though it is placed in the first. The same thing is
often noticeable in Thucydides: see Classen’s Thucydides, ed. 2, Einleitung, p. lxxxv.

35. ὁπότεροι δ’ ἄν ὡςι κρείττους κ.τ.λ. This is in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. Euripides had placed in the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 171),

dei τοίς πολλοῖς τὸν τύραννον ἀνδάνειν.

Dionysius the Elder sought to win the many (Diod. 14. 70. 3), and Machiavelli (Discorsi, i. 40) advises tyrants always to make the people their friends. Gelon, on the other hand, seems to have favoured the rich (Hdt. 7. 156).


36. ἄν ὑπάρξῃ τούτῳ τοῖς πράγμασιν, ‘if their good will and support are given to his interests.’ For τοῖς πράγμασιν, cp. i. 11. 1259 a 30 sq. and Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 127–8, τὰ Φιλίππου πράγματα, τὰ Κεραυνίτου πράγματα.

37. οὖτε δοῦλων ἐλευθερωσιν . . . οὔτε ὅπλων παραίτησιν. Tyrants often set slaves free in order to add them to their body-guard (Plato, Rep. 567 E). We hear of this being done by Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8): compare what we read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 58. 1 and of Clearchus of Heracleia on the Euxine in Justin, 16. 5. 2. Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 356. 1538 a 24 sqq. Xenophon (Hier. 6. 5) had put in the mouth of Hiero a complaint that the tyrant’s position left him no choice but to set slaves free. Aristotle here tacitly replies to this remark and contends that the tyrant is not obliged either to do this or to disarm the citizens. Success in conciliating both rich and poor, however, does not seem to have enabled Peisistratus to dispense with the latter measure (‘Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 15. l. 13 sq.: c. 16. l. 36 sqq.), though we do not hear of his freeing slaves. Aristotle may possibly have before him the example set by Cleommis tyrant of Methymna (Isocr. Epist. 7. 8 sqq.). In [Demosth.] De Foed. cum Alex. c. 15, δοῦλων ἀπελευθερώσεις ἐπὶ νεωτεραμῷ are grouped with γῆς ἀναδιομοί and χρεῶν ὑποκοπαί and other similar measures.

38. ἴκανὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For ἴκανὸς followed by ὡςε cp. Plato, Laws 875 A, and see Stallbaum on Polit. 295 A. The subject of κρείττους εἶναι appears to be ‘those attacked.’ Ἥ δυνάμει, ‘his power’.
NOTES.

1315 b. 1. οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικόν. See note on 1314 b 7.

2. μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἄλλ’ ἐπίτροπον. See note on 1314 b 16.

The ἐπίτροπος administers for the benefit not of himself but of another (Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 12 sqq.). Compare Spartan. Hadrianus, c. 8, et in contione et in senatu saepe dixit (Hadrianus) ita se rem publicam gesturum ut sciet populi rem esse, non propriam.

καὶ τὰς μετριότητας τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μή τὰς ὑπερβολάς, i.e. moderation in pleasures (1314 b 28 sqq.) and in expenditure on them and on gifts (1314 b 1 sqq.) and buildings (1314 b 36 sqq.).

Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπανούμεν καὶ χρήσει διώκειν φαμεῖ. We read of the well-known physician Mnesithesus (see note on 1335 a 41) in a fragment of the Συντροφοί of Alexis (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 481),

Μησίθεος γὰρ ἦν δείνοντας ὑπερβολὰς ἀπόκεισεν, so that the principle had found its way into medicine.

3. ἢτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν. The difference between καθομιλεῖν and δημαγωγεῖν is illustrated by Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 16, where we read of Peisistratus, ζωούντο γὰρ καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν [δημα]τικῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὁμολογίαις τοὺς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ βοηθείας προ[σ]όκετο (cp. Plato, Laws 695 D), χρησάμενι καὶ δωρεάν τῶν Περσῶν δῆμων προσαγόμενος. Aristotle does not advise the tyrant καθομιλεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς, τοὺς ἄνθρωπος to win the many by daily companionship; he must win them by benefactions (c. 12. 1315 b 17 sqq.). Dionysius the Elder ϕιλανθρώπους λόγους χρησάμενος καθομιλεῖ τὰ πλῆθος, καὶ τινὰς μὲν δωρεάν ἐτήμια, τινὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ συσσιτία παρελαμβάνει (Diod. 14. 70. 3), but companionship of this kind is not what Aristotle recommends to the tyrant.

5. τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sqq. This was the aim of Hipparchus according to [Plato.] Hipharch. 228 C, ταῦτα δ’ ἐποίει βοηλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵνα ὁ βελτιστὸν αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰκειότεροι δείν οὐδεὶς σοφίας φύσεις, ὅτε δὲν καλὸς τε κάγαθὼς.

7. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν κ.τ.λ. The correspondence should be noted between 5–7, τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω, and μηδὲ μισοῦμεν καὶ φοβοῦμεν διατελεῖν on the one hand, and 7–10, τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιστέραν and ἢτι δ’ αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. on the other. For the awkward repetition of τὴν ἀρχὴν see critical note on 1319 a 33. There is more excuse for it than for the iteration in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 10,
7 (5). 11. 1315 b 1—12. 1315 b 12.

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ἐν οὖσα μη γὰρ πολεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον εὑνων ἐστὶ τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάκιστον ἐν ἐκάστῃ ἐστὶ πολεῖ εὑρεῖ τῷ δήμῳ.

8. ἔτι Σ' αὐτὸν διακείσθαι κ.τ.λ. Plato had said of the tyrant in Rep. 580 A, ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἂ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἁρχὴν ἕθους, ἀπίστω, ἀδίκω, ἀδίκω, ἀνοσιώ, καὶ πάσης κακίως πανδοκεί τε καὶ τροφεῖ. Isocrates, on the other hand, had claimed in Hel. § 34 that Theseus ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι μηδενὸν ἐστὶν ἁμα τυφάνειν καὶ μηδὲν χείρον διακείσθαι τῶν εἴ ίσον πολιτευομένων. Aristotle agrees rather with Isocrates than with Plato.

9. The phrase (διακείσθαι) ἡμῖν εὐθυτον ὅτα is a remarkable one, and I have not noticed any parallel to it.

11. [Καίτει—39. παντελώς]. I follow Sus. in bracketing this C. 12. passage. See Sus.² Note 1745. As Spengel (Aristot. Studien, 3. 63) has already pointed out, the reference to oligarchy seems quite out of place in a part of the Book which is concerned with monarchies only. Nothing further, indeed, is said on the subject of oligarchy. Again, it is implied in 11, πασῶν τῶν πολιτεῶν, that tyranny is a constitution, whereas (with the one exception of c. 10. 1312 a 39 sq.) monarchies are distinguished from constitutions throughout the Book. Sus.² remarks in Note 1756 on the omission of any reference to the tyranny of Dionysius I and his successors at Syracuse, which lasted (with a break under Dion and Callippus) fifty-seven or fifty-eight years, but neither is there any reference to the tyranny of Heraclea on the Euxine, which was founded by Clearchus in B. C. 364 and lasted till B. C. 285 (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190), so that at the time at which the Politics was written it had already lasted more than thirty years. Nor is anything said about the tyranny of Phraeæ, which seems to have been founded by Lyco- phon towards the end of the fifth century B. C. (Diod. 14. 82. 5) and which lasted till B. C. 352 (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 11. 13). It is hardly likely that Aristotle would have omitted to take these tyrannies into account, though we can understand the omission of semi-Oriental tyrannies like those of Cyprus and of tyrannies like those of Cyrene and Panticapaeum, which might be regarded as kingships. As to the short duration of tyrannies cp. Isocr. Epist. 4. § 6 and Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 13. Some Greek oligarchies lasted a long time; that of Corinth, for instance, lasted (with a break of five years in B. C. 392—387) from B. C. 583 till long after the Politics was written (Gilbert, 2. 90).

12. πλείστον γὰρ ἔγενετο χρόνον κ.τ.λ. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2,
1. 661. 4) takes the tyranny of the Orthagoridae to have lasted from about B.C. 665 to an uncertain date in the sixth century, probably several years later than B.C. 576 or 572 (p. 666 sq.). Cp. Strabo, p. 382, ἑτυπανήθη δὲ (ὢ Σικυόν) πλείστων χρῶνον, ἀλλ’ ἄτι τοῦς τυράννους ἑπεικεὶς ἄνδρας ἔσχεν. As Eaton remarks, the Delphic oracle had predicted for this tyranny a duration of a hundred years (Diod. 8. 24). For πλείστων ἐγένετο χρῶνον, cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 44 ἓπλ., καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν οὕτε πλεῖω χρῶνον οὕτε δις τῶν αὐτῶν γενέσθαι (sc. ἐπιστάτην).

13. ή τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὀρθαγόρου. These words imply, as Busolt points out (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 661. 4), that the tyrants of Sicyon after Orthagoras were his sons, whereas, according to Hdt. 6. 126, Andreas, who is thought to be identical with Orthagoras, was the great-grandfather of Cleisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon. See note on 1316 a 29. Busolt prefers the account of Herodotus, as he does not think it likely that a tyranny of two generations only can have lasted a hundred years.

14. τούτου δ’ αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. Those who assailed tyrannies were commonly influenced by feelings of hatred or contempt (c. 10. 1312 b 17 sqq.), and the Orthagoridae could be neither hated nor despised. They courted their subjects, and one of them at any rate, Cleisthenes, was formidable in war; and the fact that they exercised their power for the most part in subordination to the laws would tend to assimilate it to that of a king (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq.) and to make it more durable.

17. ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἐθημαγώγουν, ‘they courted their subjects by their acts of attention.’ Cp. Isocr. Hel. § 37, τῇ μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυραννῶν, ταῖς δ’ εὐεργεσίαις ἐθημαγώγων, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 16, l. 37, τούς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ τίδα βοθεῖαις πρὸ[σ]’ ἡγετο.

18. λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης... ὡς ἐστεφάνωσεν. For the construction cp. Xen. De Vect. i. 1, ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀδήμησι προσητηκότων ἐλέγωτο τινες ὡς γαρφώσκοι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.

τὸν ἀποκρίναντα τῆς νίκης αὐτῶν. The construction in Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 149, τῶν Δεοκράτους ἀποψηφαζόμενον βάναυσον, or in Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 26, καλὸς ἀπεδοκιμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρώτερον τὴν χρήσιν ἐκ τῶν νιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, is not quite similar, and I have not happened to meet with an exact parallel to this use of ἀποκρίνειν.

19. ένιοι δ’ εἰκόνα κ.τ.λ. If Cleisthenes placed in the agora, or allowed to be placed there, a statue of the judge who refused him the victory, this would be to do him a still greater honour than

21. fasi die kai Peisistratou k.t.l. 'Ypomeiina is probably 'to be taken closely with the participle: see Liddell and Scott' (Richards). For the fact cp. 'Ath. Pol. c. 16 and Plut. Solon, c. 31, where we learn that the charge was one of homicide and that the accuser was afraid to appear. Compare as to Augustus Suet. Aug. c. 56, and as to Trajan Plin. Paneg. c. 36.

22. deutéra die peri Kórimhoun h twn Kypselidwv. The term Cypselides, as here used, seems to include Cypselus. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, t. 638. 1, 639. 1) places the tyranny of Cypselus in B.C. 657–627, that of Periander in B.C. 627–586, and that of Psammetichus in B.C. 586–3.

20. tétparad. See critical note.

Ψαμμίτιχος. In Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 60 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394) the name of the son of Gorgus who succeeded Periander at Corinth is given as Cypselus, not Psammetichus.

27. kai taútῆς, 'of [the durability of] this tyranny also.'

δ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 29 sqq. Cypselus is described as king, and Periander as tyrant, of Corinth in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), and we read in Fragm. 58, Κύψελος δὲ Κορίνθου πρῶτος ἄρχεν οὔτε δορυφόρως ἔχων οὔτε ἀποθέμασιν οὖν Κορινθίους. Cp. [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebus-publ. 5: Diog. Laert. i. 98. Herodotus' account (5. 92. 5) is different and less favourable to Cypselus. For kata tìn ðραχύν ('omni suo principatu,' Vict.) cp. c. 7. 1307 a 4, δ ἄπρατηγῆσας κατὰ τῶν ἴδιων πόλεμον.


31. ὁστὶ ἐν ἔτεσι κ.τ.λ. According to 'Ath. Pol. c. 17 init. and c. 19 sub fin. Peisistratus ruled not seventeen but nineteen years, and his sons not eighteen but about seventeen, so that the total would be not thirty-five years but thirty-six, which agrees with Hdt. 5. 65. 'Ath. Pol. c. 17 is in accord with the passage before us in reckoning thirty-three years from the time when Peisistratus first became tyrant to his death, but 'Ath. Pol. c. 19 reckons forty-nine years from the first acquisition of the tyranny to the fall of the dynasty, whereas
the passage before us reckons fifty-one (33 + 18). As Kirchner (Rhein. Mus. 53. 383 sqq.) points out, the two passages in the 'Αθ. Πολ. are not in agreement with each other as to the number of years which elapsed between the time when Peisistratus first became tyrant and his death, for according to 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 19 thirty-two years (forty-nine, minus seventeen) elapsed, and according to 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 17 thirty-three. Kirchner thinks that the inconsistency arises from a difference in the mode in which the years are counted in the two passages. In 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 17 (as also in the passage before us) the year which forms the 'terminus ad quem' is reckoned in, while in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 19 it is not.

34. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ. Supply πλείστων ἐγένετο χρόνον (cp. 1315 b 12). 'This again is not correct, for Anaxilas of Rhegium (e.g.) himself reigned eighteen years from B.C. 494 to 476 (Diod. 11. 48. 2), and his sons were not expelled till after the fall of Thrasybulus (Diod. 11. 76. 5). I translate from Sus.², Note 1760. The fall of Thrasybulus happened in B.C. 466.

For ἡ περὶ ίέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα (sc. τυραννίς) cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 2, τὴν περὶ Φιλίστηνν τυραννίδα. Hence there is no need to insert τῶν (with Bojesen and Sus.) before περὶ ίέρωνα.

35. ἡτῆ δ᾽ οὖν᾽ αὐτῇ κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 779. 3. Diod. 11. 38. 7 makes Gelon reign seven years, but Hiero eleven and eight months, and Thrasybulus his successor is said in Diod. 11. 66. 4 to have reigned one year. Busolt adopts Diodorus' account of the duration of Hiero's reign in preference to that of the passage before us, thinking that it rests on the testimony of Timaeus, who is said to have had the merit of chronological exactness. As Sus.² (Note 1700) points out, in the passage before us Thrasybulus is regarded as the successor of Hiero, whereas in c. 10. 1312 b 10 sqq. it is apparently implied that the son of Gelon was on the throne after Hiero's death.

37. δέκα δ᾽ ιέρων, sc. ἐτυράννευσε.

40. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Here after a nominative prefixed to the sentence a change of construction occurs in σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων: see note on 1306 b 9. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if its closing words had been ἢστω τεθεώρημενα τῶν τρίτων τοῦτον, as in 2. 12. 1274 b 27 sq., and not σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων.
because the Socrates of the dialogue is referred to (see critical note on 1261 b 19). In 21, 1261 a 6 we have ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, but in 5 (8). 7, 1342 a 32 sq. and 6 (4). 4, 1291 a 10 sq. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ as here. Compare as to the fault here found with the Platonic Socrates Magn. Mor. I. i. 1182 a 11, πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησε Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἄρθροι δὲ τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἄριθμους ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκεῖαν τῶν ἄρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἄριθμος ἵσσις ἱσος. Aristotle goes even further here. He holds that the overthrow of the best constitution should be traced to causes not only special to constitutions in general as distinguished from other things, but special to it. In a similar spirit he undertakes in c. 5, 1304 b 19 sqq. to trace the causes of overthrow special to each existing constitution.

3. τῆς τε γὰρ ἁρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὐσίας κ.τ.λ. Cr. 28, τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἁρίστην 6 (4). 7, 1293 b 19, παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἁρίστην πολιτείαν 6 (4). 8, 1294 a 24, τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην. Πρώτης here probably means something more than merely ‘first on the list’; it means rather τῆς κυριωτάτης, for the word is often used by Aristotle in this sense (Bon. Ind. 653 a 26 sqq.). It is implied that to omit to assign a mode of change special to itself to an entity so supreme as the best constitution, the constitution καὶ ἔξοχὴν, is a very serious omission.

4. φθορὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for he says that the cause [of its change] is that nothing [that comes into existence] abides, but that everything changes in a period of some kind, and that the source [of change] is contained in those things whose ratio 4 : 3 taken in its lowest terms, wedded to the number 5, furnishes two harmonies, meaning [that this happens] when the number of this diagram becomes cubed, his view being that nature occasionally brings into existence individuals bad and beyond the influence of the education, speaking perhaps truly so far as this particular remark is concerned’ etc. See on the subject of the Nuptial Number of Plato Sus., Note 1763; Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 423, note 110; Mr. J. Adam, The Nuptial Number of Plato, its Solution and Significance, and Mr. D. B. Monro’s remarks in Class. Rev. 6. 152 sqq., 242 sqq., together with those of Mr. Adam, ibid. 6. 240 sqq. The words ἐν ἐπίτροποι πνεῦμα περιπάτην συγγεῖς δύο ἀρμονίας παρίσχεται are quoted verbatim from the famous passage of Plato, Rep. 546 C, where they are followed by the words τρισ αὐξηθεῖαι: Aristotle omits these two words, substituting for them (by way of explanation, VOL. IV.
according to Zeller, *loc. cit.*, and Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 154 b) the words λέγων ὅτιν ο τοῦ διαγράμματος ἁρμόν τούτου γένεται στρεμός. 'In Plato's language τρίς αὐξήσεως means the "third dimension" or so-called "solid" numbers, and in particular the cube' (Mr. Monro, *ibid.* 6. 154 a), so that τρίς αὐξήσεως would seem to mean 'when cubed.' The antecedent of ὅν in the passage before us is τούτου and in the passage of the Republic probably αὐξήσεως, though Zeller prefers to take πάντα as the antecedent. 'The ἐπίτριτον πυθμήν can only be the numbers 3 and 4 themselves, for πυθμένεις means (Theon, Math. 125 sq. Bull.) for any arithmetical relation ὅτι ἐν ἑπτά πρώτου πρὸς ἀλλήλους λόγους ἀνόητον (ἀρμονίοι) ... ἐπίτριτων δὲ ὅ τοὺς ἐπὶ πρὸς γ', (Zeller, *loc. cit.*) 'No one doubts that the explanation' of ὅν ἐπίτριτον πυθμήν—τρίς αὐξήσεως 'turns upon the figure known as the Pythagorean triangle, that is to say, the right-angled triangle whose sides are represented by the numbers, 3, 4, 5' (Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 153 b). 'Περιπάτῳ συζυγεῖς seems a natural phrase to express the circumstance that the two sides which exhibit the ratio 4:3 are "yoked together" in the Pythagorean triangle with the number 5, which is the hypotenuse' (Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 154 a). As to ὅ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἁρμόν τούτου see Mr. Adam, Nuptial Number of Plato, pp. 15, 23 sq. Zeller (*loc. cit.*) explains δίον ἀρμονίας as 'two series of numbers progressing in a definite arithmetical ratio.' As to the question what the 'two harmonies' are and how they are generated from the wedding of the ἐπίτριτον πυθμήν with the number 5, reference must be made to the authorities cited above. Not a little light has been thrown on this question by the labours of a succession of learned men, but there is much that remains obscure, and as Plato himself places his dark and oracular deliverance on this subject in the mouth of the Muses and hints that they utter it in a playful mood, it is doubtful whether he meant the enigma to have a solution. Some, however, among whom are Zeller and Sussemihl, believe that it was comprehended by Aristotle and others, which implies that it is not incomprehensible. It is not perhaps certain that Aristotle understood it. It is true that he does not complain of the obscurity of the passage, as we should expect him to do, but his words of approval, as Mr. Monro points out (*Class. Rev.* 6. 243 b), relate only to the remark of Plato that nature sometimes brings into being individuals incapable of being made what they ought to be even by the best
education. Some light may possibly be thrown on the reason why Plato introduced this mathematical puzzle into the Republic by a story told of him in Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 7, where he is made to account for an oracle commanding that the altar at Delos should be doubled, a command which the Delians for want of geometrical knowledge were unable to obey, by saying προσπαίζων τὸν θεὸν Ἐλλησιών, διαγωροῦντες παιδείας, οἷον ἐφυβρίζοντα τὴν ἀμαθίαν ἡμῶν καὶ κελεύοντα γεωμετρίας ἀπεστάθη μὴ παρέργως. Cp. Plato, Laws 819 D sq.

8. ὡς τῆς φύσεως κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 25 sqq., with which Dr. Sandys (Class. Rev. 5. 308) compares Pindar, Nem. 6. 9 sqq. Bergk and ii. 40 sqq. Compare also a saying of Plato’s quoted by Plutarch in De Cohib. Ira, c. i6, καὶ γὰρ Ἑλικῶνα τὸν μαθηματικὸν οὖτως ἐπαινεῖν φησιν (ὁ Πλάτων), ὡς φύσει εὐμετάβολον ξήρος, καὶ τοὺς τεθαρμένους εἰ τῇ πόλει καλὸς διδεῖναι, μὴ ἀνθρωποί καὶ σπέρματα ἀνθρώπων ἀντε ἐκφηνοσί ποι τῆς φύσεως τῆν ἀσθενείαν.

14. καὶ διὰ γε τοῦ χρόνου κ.τ.λ., ‘yes, and is it through the influence of time, to which he ascribes the change of everything, that things also which have not come into being contemporaneously change contemporaneously? For instance, if a thing came into being the day before the revolution of things, does it then change contemporaneously [with things which came into being long before]?’ For καὶ ... γε, ‘yes, and,’ cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12 and 2. 5. 1263 b 37: Xen. Hiero, 2. 1: Plato, Gorg. 450 D, Epist. 7. 325 C. Mr. Adam (Class. Rev. 5. 446) identifies the τροπή here mentioned with the μεγίστη καὶ τελεστάτη τροπή of Plato, Polit. 270 B.

18. ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει, sc. ἡ πολιτεία: cp. c. 1. 1301 a 22, ἐκ ποιῶν εἰς ποίας μᾶλλον μεθύσταται (sc. αἱ πολιτείαι), and c. 7. 1307 a 28, εἰς Ἐλλάτων (τίμημα) μετέβη (sc. ἡ πολιτεία). Ἡ πολιτεία ὁρ ἡ πολιτείαι ὁρ τὴν πολιτείαν should similarly be supplied in 21, 23, 35, 40, b 11, and 20.

πλεονάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1307 a 20–27 and Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 21 sq. What constitutions are ‘contrary’ to each other may be gathered to some extent from the former passage and from c. 10. 1312 b 4 sqq. It should be noticed that though we often hear of the normal constitutions changing into the deviation-forms (i.e. of kingship changing into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and polity into democracy), we seldom hear of the deviation-forms changing into the normal constitutions, and never of tyranny changing into kingship, though in 33 we hear of tyrannies changing 112
into aristocracies. Deviation-forms, however, seem freely to have changed into each other. Perhaps what Aristotle says here of constitutional change is less true of modern Europe than it was of ancient Greece, where constitutional change was usually sweeping and sudden.

22. εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. For the reversal in the order of the words in ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας see note on 1277 a 31, and cp. 1316 b 11, 12, where εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλυμπρίας is followed by ἐκ δῆμου ἐξ ὀλυμπρίας.
24. ἐκ δῆμου εἰς ὀλυμπρίαν. Cp. c. 5. 1304 b 20—1305 a 7. καὶ μᾶλλον ἐς μοναρχίαν. Aristotle thought that democracies were less apt to change into tyranny than they once were (c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.), though he held that they were still liable to do so (c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.), and that this was especially true of the extreme democracy (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq.).

27. ἀδριστον γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for this is not determinable, since [the only account which it was open to him to give of it is an unsatisfactory one, for] according to him the change from tyranny ought to be into the first and the best constitution, [which is absurd].’ The words ἀδριστον γὰρ have been interpreted in two ways: see Giph. p. 752, who apparently prefers the second of the two interpretations given by him—’proptera quod res sit infinita . . . id est, quod non ita una mutatio ut priorum quatuor, sed multiplex et infinita sit tyrannidis, quae alias aliter et in aliam rempublicam mutatur . . . Haud scio tamen an non aliter accipii possit illud ἀδριστον γὰρ, non pro infinito sed pro inexplicabili.’ Sus., followed by Welldon, who translates, ‘no precise determination of the question is possible,’ appears to adopt Giphanius’ second interpretation, and is probably right in this.

28. οὖτω γὰρ ἐν ἐγνύνετο συνεχῶς καὶ κύκλος. Just before Plato reveals his Nuptial Number in Rep. 546 B sqq., he has spoken of κύκλοι in 546 A, οὗ μένων φυτοὶ ἐγγέγειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐγγεῖοις φύσεις φορά καὶ ἄφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γένοιται, ὅταν περιτροπὴ ἐκάτοικος κύκλων περιφερόμει ξυνάπτωσι. Thus he might be expected to make his series of constitutional changes move in a circle and repeat itself. There was a proverb κύκλος τὰ ἀνθρώπων (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 492): see Bon. Ind. 570 b 1, where reference is made to Phys. 4. 14. 223 b 24 sqq. and Probl. 17. 3. 916 a 24 sqq.
Polybius *does* thus arrange changes of constitution (6. 9. 10, αὕτη πολιτείων ἀνακύκλωσις, αὕτη φύσεως οἰκονομία, καθ' ἑν μεταβάλλει καὶ μεθίσταται καὶ πᾶλιν εἰς αὐτὰ καταντᾷ τὰ κατὰ τάς πολιτείας). The view that Nature moves in a circle and returns into herself was held by Heraclitus: see Plut. De El Delphico, c. 8. 388 C–E, and Bywater on Heraclit. Fragm. 22.

29. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς κ.τ.λ. Cleisthenes of Sicyon seems from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 61 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394) to have won the tyranny from his brothers Myron and Isodemus, grandsons apparently of the Myron whom Herodotus (6. 126) and Pausanias (2. 8. i) name as the grandfather of Cleisthenes (see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 661. 4). According to this account Isodemus was induced by Cleisthenes to slay the tyrant Myron, who had seduced his wife, and to share the tyranny with Cleisthenes. To purge his homicide, however, he went into exile for a year, and Cleisthenes forbade his return. The succession of one tyranny to another may be traced also in the history of mediaeval Italy. Thus, when the Gonzagas acquired the tyranny of Mantua, which they retained till the eighteenth century, they dispossessed an earlier tyrant. Passerino de Bonacossi, tyrant of Mantua, had offered an affront to the wife of one of them, and they assassinated him on Aug. 14, 1328, and took his place (Sismondi, Italian Republics, p. 141).

31. ὡσπέρ ἢ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἢ Ἀντιλέοντος. See note on 1304 a 29.

32. καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὡσπέρ ἢ τῶν Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις. Elsewhere in the Politics we gather that ‘the tyranny of Gelon’s house’ (τῶν Γέλωνος: see, with Richards, Krüger, Gr. Gr. § 47. 5. 2) was succeeded by a polity or aristocracy (see note on 1304 a 27).

33. καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὡσπέρ ἢ Χαριδοῦ ἐν Λακεδαίμον καὶ . . . ἐν Καρχηδόνι. There were two traditions as to the rule of the Lacedaemonian king Charilaus, one that it was too mild (Plut. Lycurg. c. 5), the other that it was tyrannical ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 2. 3 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 210: [Plato,] Epist. 8. 354 B). Aristotle here follows the latter tradition, and may possibly refer to Charilaus among others in c. 10. 1310 b 18 sqq. and 1313 a 1 sq. Contrast the statement in Xen. Ages. 1. 4, σὺ τε βασιλεῖς (i.e. the Lacedaemonian kings) οὐδεπώποτε μειζόνων ὀρέχθησαν ἢ ἐφ' ὡσπέρ εἰς ἀρχής τὴν βασιλείαν παρέλαβον. When Aristotle implies here that a tyranny once existed at Carthage, it is difficult to reconcile his statement with 2. 11. 1272 b 32 sq. But
more than one statement in this part of c. 12 is inconsistent with statements contained in other parts of the Politics (see vol. i. p. 519, note 1, and above on 1316 a 32). As to the existence of a small lacuna before ἐν Καρχηδόνι see critical note on 1316 a 34.

34. καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἦ διλιγαρχίας, sc. ἡ πολιτεία (see above on 1316 a 18). This remark is made in further correction of Plato, who had represented tyranny as preceded by democracy.

35. ἄσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλείσται τῶν ἀρχαίων, sc. διλιγαρχίας. Gelon’s tyranny at Syracuse was preceded by a democracy (c. 3. 1302 b 31 sq.), but this was an exception.

36. ἐν Λεοντίνοις κ.τ.λ. For Panaxius cp. c. 10. 1310 b 29 sqq., and see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 56 sqq., for Cleander Freeman, 2. 104, and for Anaxilaus of Rhegium (which is mentioned here as if it were in Sicily) Freeman, 2. 107.


1316 b. 1. ἄλλ’ οὐχ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq.

3. ἐν πολλαῖς τε ἀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ., ‘and [so far from its being an accompaniment of oligarchy that the holders of office engage in money-making occupations,] in many oligarchies they are not allowed to do so and there are laws to prevent it, and in Carthage, though it is a democratically governed State [and not an oligarchy], the holders of office do engage in occupations of this kind and yet no change of constitution has so far taken place.’ The statement that Carthage was a democratically governed State is of course inconsistent with 2. 11 and with 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq., where it is said to be aristocratically governed. This, however, affords no ground for rejecting the reading δημοκρατουμένη, for several remarks made in this chapter are inconsistent with statements contained in other parts of the Politics (see note on 1316 a 33). Still the sense of the passage would be improved if we read τιμοκρατουμένη in place of δημοκρατουμένη. I cannot give any reference for the word τιμοκρατουμένη except to Mich. Ephes. in Eth. Nic. K, p. 611. 10 Heylbut (quoted in Sus. p. xli), but in Plato’s view (Rep. 545 B, 550 D) it is the τιμοκρατία that changes into oligarchy when the rulers come to be lovers of gain, not the διστοκρατία, and Schneider’s emendation ἀριστοκρατουμένη, which is adopted by Sus. and also by Meltzer (Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 459), seems to be open to objection on this ground, as well as on that of the difficulty of accounting for the
change of ἀριστοκρατουμένη into δημοκρατουμένη. I must admit, however, that I cannot prove that Aristotle regarded Carthage as a τιμωρκατία of the kind described in the Republic, though he may well have done so. As to the existence in oligarchies of laws forbidding holders of offices to trade, see note on 1278 a 25. Laws forbidding the ruling nobility to trade existed in the oligarchy of Venice (Houssaye, Hist. du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 25).

6. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις κ.τ.λ. This refers to Plato, Rep. 551 D. Aristotle thinks (2. 5. 1264 a 24 sqq.) that Plato's own ideal State described in the Republic is open to this criticism, and indeed many democracies (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 4 sqq.).

8. τι γὰρ αὐτὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for what happens to this more than to the Laconian,' etc.?

10. οὐδενός δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου κ.τ.λ. This refers to Plato, Rep. 552 A sqq., 555 B sqq. Aristotle passes on here to another assertion of Plato's, the assertion that oligarchies change into democracies through the impoverishment of the citizens. This assertion also he probably regards as ἀτοποκ. Sus. transposes οὐδενός, 10—νοῦν, 14, to after πολιτείαν, 21, where however the passage interrupts Aristotle's enumeration of the 'many causes' which bring about the fall of oligarchies. Καὶ ἕκ δῆμον εἰς ἀλεγαρχίαν κ.τ.λ. is added in further correction of Plato, who had made democracy change into tyranny.

14. πολλῶν τε οὖσῶν αἰτίων δὲ ἐν γίγνονται αἱ μεταβολαί. This refers to Plato, Rep. 555 D. Aristotle has just said that Plato attributes the change of oligarchy into democracy to a cause to which it is not always attributable, and now he adds that Plato passes over many causes of that change in silence. Thus over and above an error of commission he is guilty of a huge error of omission. For δὲ ἐν (αἰτίων) cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 9, δὲ ἀλλας αἰτίας τοῦτο (πορίειν) πειρώνται, and Plato, Tim. 57 C, ὅσα μὲν ὧν ἀκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα, διὰ τοιούτων αἰτίων γέγονε. Αἱ μεταβολαί appears to mean 'the changes of oligarchy into democracy.'

15. οὐ λέγει ἄλλα μίαν. For ἄλλα thus used see Bon. Ind. 33 b 14 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176 a 21, ἥδεα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄλλα ταύταις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένως, is quoted among other passages.

18. ἄλλον δὲν μὲν κ.τ.λ. As to the consequences of the impoverishment of leading men see c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq., Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 12 sqq., and Plut. Aristid. c. 13. Aristotle does not always treat the impoverishment of others leading men so lightly as
22. καν ἀδικώτατι ἢ υβριζωνται. Here ἀδικία is distinguished from ὑβρις (cp. Plato, Soph. 229 A, Laws 691 C and 906 A), though in c. 10. 1311 a 27 (cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1391 a 18 sq.) it is implied that ὑβρις is a kind of ἀδικία (compare the Definitions ascribed to Plato, 415 E). See also note on 1302 b 6.

23. καν μη καταδικανησωσι την ουσιαν δια το ἐξειναι ο τι δν βουλωνται ποιειν. This refers to Plato, Rep. 555 C, άτε, οδη, ἄρχοντες ἐν αυτη οι ἄρχοντες δια το πολλα κεκτησαν, ουκ ἐθελουσιν εὑρειν νομι των νεων υσαι αν ἀκαλαστοι γίγωνται, μη εξειναι αυτοις ἀναλισκεν τα και ἀπολλυναι τα αυτων, ίνα ἰδοιςοι τα των των των και εἰδανειζουντες ἐτι πλαυσιωτεροι και ἐντιμωτεροι γίγωνται, and 556 A, και ουτε γ᾽ εκεινη, ἢν δ' εγω, το τοιοτον κακων ἐκκαιμον εθελουσιν ἀποσβενναία, εὑροντες τα αυτοι ογη τις βοηλεται τρεπειν, ουτε κτλ. It is to the absence in oligarchies of any check on the tendency of improvident rich men to squander their patrimony that Plato traces their fall. I do not agree, therefore, with Schn. Cor. and Sus. that a lacuna exists before δια το ἐξειναι.

24. ου αιτιαν την άγαν ελευθεριαν ειναι φησιν. ου probably does not refer to the whole of the preceding sentence, καν μη καταδικανησωσι—ποιειν, for Plato nowhere says that the squandering of fortunes by spendthrifts is caused by excessive freedom; this squandering, in fact, goes on in oligarchies, and excessive freedom is a concomitant not of oligarchy, but of democracy. ου refers rather to το ἐξειναι δ τι δν βουλωνται ποιειν, which Plato does connect with excessive freedom in Rep. 557 B, ουκοιν πρωτον μεν δη ελευθεροι, και ελευθεραις η πόλις μεση και παρρησια γίγωται, και ἐξουσία εν αυτη ποιειν δ τι τις βοηλεται; where he is speaking of the democratic State. Aristotle's charge against Plato seems to be that, as he traces squandering to liberty to do what one pleases and traces this again to excessive freedom, he in effect traces squandering to excessive freedom. He sneers at him, I think, for doing so, his own view probably being (cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 22 sqq.) that squandering is not caused by excessive freedom but by μοιχθηρια.

25. πλειονων δ' ουσων κτλ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 8 sqq. Aristotle speaks here as if he had himself done in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book what he finds fault with Plato for not doing and had taken account in it of the many sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy which he distinguishes in the Sixth and Eighth (old Fourth and
Sixth) Books, but this is not so; as has been pointed out in vol. ii. p. xxvii, he has noticed in the Seventh only two forms of oligarchy and democracy, ἐννοοῦ δημοκρατίαι καὶ δημουργία and κύριοι (7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20 sq. : compare the mention of the ultimate oligarchy and the extreme democracy in c. 10. 1312 b 34 sqq.).

27. Conring Schneider and Susemihl agree in believing that something is wanting after Σωκράτης. Conring says (p. 729 of his edition), έ μυριάδα πινακίω σε οι εκείνη οἵτως ἀριστοτέλει, etc. Schneider not only misses the ἡμίαθα σολένη αὐτός ἔρρισε. But he has noticed (p. xxvii, p. 729 of his edition), cum haec disputatio non fniatur sueto Aristotelis more, facile patet quaedam deesse. Conring says (p. 729 of his edition), cum haec disputatio non fniatur sueto Aristotelis more, facile patet quaedam deesse. Schneider not only misses the "formula solennis et clausa" with which Aristotle is wont to wind up his discussion of a subject, but holds that he cannot have brought to a close here the illustrations and arguments with which he combats the views expressed in Plato's Republic on the subject of constitutional change. Susemihl (Sus. 2, Note 1786) thinks that Aristotle is not likely to have left unassailed the account given by Plato in the Republic of the change of democracy into tyranny. He also thinks (see Sus. 3a, Appendix, p. 368) that, looking to what is said in 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11 sqq., an inquiry respecting laws is wanting. Be that as it may, the abrupt way in which the chapter ends certainly seems to indicate that it is not complete.

BOOK VIII (VI).


34. έτι δὲ peri φθοράς τε κ.τ.λ. In the Seventh (old Fifth) Book.

35. εκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας. See note on 1301.
NOTES.

a 22, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 23—26, 7 (5). i. 1301 a 20 sq., 7 (5).
4. 1304 b 17 sq., 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 34 sqq., and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 16 sq.

γίνεται: is in the sing., though φθορά καὶ σωτηρία must be sup-
plied: cp. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 16, ἐπεμψε μὲ Ἀραίους καὶ Ἀρτάκος, and
Plato, Lysis, 207 D, ἦ τοὺς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δ' Ἀσι, σφύδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατήρ
καὶ ἥ μὴτηρ. In these passages, however, 'the verb precedes the
still indeterminate noun,' and this is the more usual case (Prof. J. B.
Mayor in Class. Rev. 10. 111), whereas in the passage before
us γίνεται follows περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας: see also 4 (7). i.
1323 b 33 sqq.

38. ἐπεί δὲ τετώχηκεν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here tells us that he will
point out what is the appropriate and the advantageous way
of constructing the various sub-kinds of each constitution, and will
also investigate any points which remain to be investigated with
respect to each. Under the latter head of inquiry may possibly fall
such questions as that which is dealt with in c. 4. 1318 b 6—1319
a 6, the question which is the best form of democracy and why it is
the best. Here and also in 1317 a 15 Aristotle leads us to expect
that he will deal with the sub-kinds of all constitutions, but we shall
find that in fact he confines his attention to the sub-kinds of demo-
cracy and oligarchy, in conformity with his announcement in 6 (4).
2. 1289 b 20 sqq.

38. καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέρωντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς
ἐκάστην, 'and to determine the mode of organization which is
appropriate and advantageous to each.' For ἀποδοῦναι in this sense
cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 b 7, ποιὰ δ' ἀντὶ ποιῶν αἰρετῶν, οὐ ῥήμιον
ἀποδοῦναι, and see Bon. Ind. 80 a 51 sqq. Πρὸς ἐκάστην should
apparently be taken with τὸν οἰκείον καὶ τὸν συμφέρωντα τρόπον, not
with ἀποδοῦναι: see note on 1317 a 36. For the meaning of οἰκεῖος
cp. 1317 a 29 sqq., and for the distinction between οἰκεῖος and συμ-
φέρων c. 4. 1318 b 27, διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρουν ἔστι τῇ πρὸτερον ῥηθείσῃ
dημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἑπάρχειν εἰσιθεν. There may be ways of organizing
each sub-kind of democracy and oligarchy which are appropriate
but not advantageous. An 'advantageous' mode is one which
makes the constitution durable (c. 5. 1319 b 33—1320 a 4: Rhet.
i. 8. 1355 b 26).

39. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and further we must
investigate the combinations also of all the modes of organizing the
above-mentioned departments,' i.e. the deliberative, magisterial, and
judicial (so Heinsius, p. 695, Schneider, and Welldon). Aristotle's instances of these combinations are taken from cases in which a normal constitution is combined with its deviation-form—aristocracy with oligarchy, polity with democracy. We see from this that the classification of constitutions as normal or deviation-forms which we find in 3. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq. is not exhaustive, for there are in fact constitutions which are partly normal, partly deviation-forms. Aristotle does not in all probability mean to imply that the institutions of other constitutions also might not be combined—for instance, those of aristocracy and polity and those of oligarchy and democracy. It is interesting to know that these hybrid constitutions existed in Greece, but our acquaintance with its constitutional history is too imperfect to enable us to point to clear examples of them. Epidamnus at one time had a democratic Boulê, but was in other respects oligarchically governed (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21 sqq.). The Council of the Areopagus was to a certain extent an aristocratic element in the oligarchy which existed at Athens in early times (Αθ. Πολ. c. 2. l. 2 sqq.: c. 3. 1. 34 sqq.), but it is questionable whether Aristotle has it in his mind here. It should be noticed that as the deliberative is κύριον τῆς πολιτείας (6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 sq.), the way in which it was organized must have gone far to determine the character of the constitution. The deliberative had the right of legislating, and therefore it might modify the constitution at any moment.

1. ταύτα, 'these modes,' referring to τρόπων.

2. For ἐπαλλάττειν see note on 1255 a 13.

4. οἷον αὖ τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τᾶς ἁρχαιρεσίας ἀλγαρχήκως ἦ συντεταγμένον. For the way in which the deliberative is organized in oligarchies see 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 34 sqq. The oligarchical mode of election to office is τὸ τιμῶν ἐκ τιμῶν (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 1 sq.).

6. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς. Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 19 sq. As to the oligarchical mode of organizing dicasteries see 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 12 sq. For τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια cp. 8. 1322 b 34, but we expect τὸ (which Spengel and Bekk. read) instead of τὰ.

8. ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τᾶς ἁρχαιρεσίας, i.e. when office is awarded for virtue (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2 sq.: 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sqq.).

15. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. See note on 1316 b 36.

17. φανερῶν, sc. ἔσται, which is omitted as in 2. 5. 1263 b 34, where however ἔσται is easily supplied from the preceding line, which is not the case here. See note on 1306 a 24 for instances of similar omissions. It may be added that ἤν is omitted in 1. 9. 1257 a 23 and ἤστα in 1. 9. 1257 a 32.

18. ἦν καλοῦσι τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. Cp. Plato, Rep. 544 C, καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπανομένη, καλομενή δ’ ὀλιγαρχία. Ὄλιγαρχία is not quite the appropriate name, for the few rule in aristocracy also (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 25); oligarchy is the form in which the rich rule, and that fact should find expression in its name. See, however, note on 1331 b 9.

19. ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον, i.e. the inquiry how to construct each kind of democracy.


γίνεται. See note on 1304 b 5.

25. πλήθος is here used in the same sense as δῆμος (cp. c. 4. 1319 a 19 sq. and 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq., and see note on 1281 b 15). For the use of the two words in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, see Kaibel, Stil und Text der Pol. Ἁθ., p. 52 sq.

26. ὅν τοῦ πρώτου κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26-31. A democracy in which the peasants and handicraftsmen are supreme seems to be regarded by Aristotle as better than one in which the peasants, handicraftsmen, and day-labourers are supreme.

27. τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, ‘the two previously mentioned’: cp. Plato, Laws 875 A, τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ τοῖν ἀμφοῖν.

οὗ μόνον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ., ‘not only does the democracy differ in respect of its becoming better and worse, but also in respect of its becoming not the same.’ We should probably supply ἡ δημοκρατία with διαφέρει.

32. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττῳ. Thus in the first form of democracy (c. 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.) many δημοτικὰ are wanting: all judge and elect magistrates, but the most important magistracies are not accessible to all, and it is only the less important ones that are filled by lot. Pay is also probably absent, and the assembly is not supreme over everything.
33. χρήσιμον δ’ ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν κ.τ.λ. Αὐτῶν, ἤ. ὁ τῶν τῶν δημοκρατίας ἀκολουθοῦντων. The fact that a knowledge of the institutions which go with each kind of democracy is useful in correcting existing examples of each form, as well as in instituting new ones, is an additional reason for studying them, though the question which Aristotle now has before him is how the various kinds of each constitution should be instituted (1317 a 13 sqq.). For the thought cp. 6 (4). i. 1289 a 3 sqq., and for the language i. 11. 1259 a 33 sq. For πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάζειν καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις, cp. Polyb. 3. 118. 12, καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτευμάτων διορθώσεις καὶ κατα-
σκευάς.

35. ξητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘[for errors are committed for want of this knowledge,] for’ etc. Some δημοτικά are fatal to democracies, and some ὀλιγαρχικά to oligarchies (7 (5). 9. 1309 b 20 sq.), others are not.

36. ἀπαντα τὰ οἰκεία must be taken with πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν: cp. Polyb. 5. 105. 1, οἰκείους χρησάμενος λόγους πρὸς τὴν ὁμορρ. αὐτοῦ τὴν ᾧ διακατασκευασμένη ὑπὸ τῶν τῶν Δημητρίου παραμέτρων.

37. καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.

39. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἄξιόματα καὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ ὅν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν, ‘but now let us speak of the demands of democratic constitutions and their ethical character and the things they aim at.’ Aristotle tacitly distinguishes these matters from the institutions through which democracies seek to attain their aims (τὰ δημοτικά). Nyn it must occur but rarely in Aristotle’s writings, for it is omitted in the Index Aristotelicus. Τὰ ἄξιόματα = ‘quae requiruntur in democra-
tia, cf. ἄξιοιν, postulare, et ὑπόθεσις τῆς δημοκρατικῆς ὁπλιτείας, 40’ (Bon. Ind. 70 a 46: see also Coray’s note). So in Plato, Laws 690 A, ἄξιόματα τοῦ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι is rendered by Stallbaum ‘Ansprüche.’ With τὰ ἄξιόματα καὶ τὰ ἥθη should probably be supplied τῶν δημοκρατιῶν, not τῶν πολιτείων, and al δημοκρατίαι with ἐφίενται. For τὰ ἥθη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν cp. 5 (8). i. 1337 a 14 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 12, and for ὅν ἐφίενται 1366 a 2 sqq.

40. ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 4. Stahr C.2 and Welldon apparently take ὑπόθεσιν to be the subject of the sentence, but perhaps it is better (with Sus.) to make it the predi-
cate. In either case it takes up τὰ ἄξιόματα, 39, and means ‘the fundamental postulate’ (cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 38 sqq.).

41. τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 562 B sq. and see note on 1291 b 34. The words τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν,
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ὅς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχονται (sc. τοῖς πολίταις) ἐλευθερίας have been interpreted in two different ways. Sus. translates them thus, 'ist es doch Dies, was man immer im Munde zu führen pflegt, als ob man in dieser Verfassung allein der Freiheit genössse'; he seems, therefore, to take τοῦτο to refer to the preceding sentence, ἐπόθεσε μὲν ὄν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτείᾳ ἐλευθερία, but Sepulveda, who translates, 'sic enim dici consuevit, in sola populari republica homines libertate frui,' appears to refer τοῦτο to ὅς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχονται ἐλευθερίας, i.e. not to what precedes, but to what follows, and so do Giph. and Stahr, the latter translating, 'und es ist eine ganz gewöhnliche Behauptung, dass nur die Bürger einer solchen Verfassung die Freiheit wirklich genössen.' Perhaps the latter interpretation is to be preferred (for the use of ὅς with the participle cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 25 sqq.). Τοῦτον γὰρ στοιχάζονθαι φαθεί πάσαν δημοκρατίαν seems to be added not in proof of the assertion which precedes it, that freedom is enjoyed only in a democracy, for obviously it does not prove the truth of this assertion, but in justification of the mention of freedom—' [freedom, I say,] for' etc. Aristotle probably has Plato, Rep. 562 B sq. before him, where the two things had already been brought into connexion with each other, democracy being described as insatiable in its quest of freedom, and democrats being represented as holding that no one who is by nature a freeman will deign to live under any other constitution.

1317 b. 1. τοῦτον = τῆς ἐλευθερίας. See note on 1330 b 8. 2. ἐλευθερίας δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eurip. Suppl. 390 Bothe, 404 Dindorf,

οὐ γὰρ ἄρχεται ἐνός πρὸς ἄνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρα πόλις.

δῆμοι δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαίσιν ἐν μέρει ἑναντίασιν.

Aristotle is here reproducing the conception of freedom entertained by οἱ δημοτικοὶ (cp. 11), not giving his own, as to which see vol. i. p. 246 and notes on 1259 a 39 and 1310 a 27. It should be noticed that in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq. ἐλευθερία is distinguished from τὸ τὸ πλέον ἐχον κύριον. The δημοτικοὶ read much into the conception of freedom which does not strictly belong to it. According to them freedom implied two things—1. an equal share for each citizen (7)—whether in everything, property included, or not, we do not learn—and consequently an interchange of ruling
and being ruled, and also the supremacy of the will of the majority, or in other words of the poor, for the poor are in a majority; and 2. living as one likes. Both these sides are recognized in the conception of freedom by Pericles in his Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2. 37. 3: see the remarks of L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 2. 233 sq.). These notions of freedom differ in one respect from those current among ourselves. We do not hold that freedom implies an interchange of ruling and being ruled, or in other words that no one is free who has not from time to time a turn of office. This was a view likely to prevail in communities like the Greek City-States, in which a person excluded from office felt himself to be on a level with a resident-alien (3. 5. 1278a 37 sq.). We still, however, often identify freedom with 'government by majority' (Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 158), and with 'permission to do what you like' (ibid. p. 119). Among us, again, as among the Greeks, freedom is often construed as bound up with equality, so that it eventually involves the supremacy of the majority, or in other words the poor, over the rich, a state of things in which equality disappears. It will be observed that here as elsewhere Aristotle regards the demands characteristic of democracies as originating not in conscious self-seeking, but in a mistaken, perhaps a biassed (3. 9. 1280a 14 sqq.), theory of what is just and of what freedom implies. The teaching of the passage before us does not quite agree with that of 3. 8, where it is implied that democracy is a constitution in which the poor are supreme, whether they are in a majority or not, nor with that of 7 (5). I. 1301 b 28-39 and Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq., where τὸ δημοτικόν δίκαιον is treated as a form of τὸ κατ' ἄξιον δίκαιον. See note on 1288 a 22. It will be noticed that Aristotle says nothing about παρρησία, or the free expression of opinion, in connexion with freedom, and nothing about publicity of government. Nor does he mention the tendency of Greek democracy to extend citizenship to persons of semi-alien or semi-servile or illegitimate birth, of which we read in 3. 5. 1278a 26 sqq. His account of freedom, indeed, can hardly be made to include this tendency.

3. τὸ ἵσόν ἔχειν, sc. τοὺς πολίτες (cp. 7).

4. τοῦτον ὁ ἱερός κ.τ.λ. This conclusion appears not to be accepted in c. 3. 1318 a 11-b 1, where it is argued that if all are to have an arithmetically equal share, the rich and the poor must not be thrown together into one undivided aggregate and supremacy.
given to a majority of that aggregate, but that supremacy should be given to a majority of the rich and a majority of the poor, or if the two majorities do not agree, to that combination of rich and poor which possesses the larger amount of property.

5. καὶ ὃ τι ἀν δόξη τοὺς πλείους, τοῦτ’ εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον, ὁτι καὶ τὸ αὐτόν εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον, ‘and that what is decided by the majority, this is the crown of the matter, and this is that which is just.’ Τέλος here is ‘operis perfectio et absolutio’ (Bon. Ind. 753 a 47, b 6 : Sus.5 Ind. s.v.). For the repetition of τοῦτο cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 11, τοῦτο καλὸν ἀκολούθειν καὶ τὸν πείθει οἱ δίκαιοι: 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 11 sq.: Xen. Mem. 2. 2. 13, τοῦτο δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησα καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζομαι οὐκ ἐγὼ ἄρχειν τούτον: Plato, Gorg. 510 C, οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνηστεια, τούτον οδηγεῖς χαρὰν ἀδικήσας: [Demosth.] Or. Fun. c. 36: Polyb. 6. 8. 2, οἱ πολλοὶ τούτων εἴρημος προστάτωσι καὶ τούτως εἴπετρον ἐκεῖνον περὶ σφῶν. See also note on 1284 b 28.

10. For the attraction of δὲ into the gender of ἄρον cp. ἤν in i. 9. 1256 b 40.

11. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὡς βουλεταί τις. See note on 1310 a 27, and compare the appeal of Nicias to the Athenians in Thuc. 7. 69, πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομονήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτων πόλις ἐστὶν διαμαντ ἡπονίας: cp. also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 28 sq., where it is implied that democracy is an ἀνεμένη καὶ μαλακὴ πολιτεία. Aristotle does not say, as he says of the other sign of freedom, that all the δημοσικοὶ regarded this as a mark of democracy, and it appears from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq. that ‘living as one pleases’ was a concomitant only of extreme democracies, notwithstanding that it is treated here as a characteristic of democracy in general. It would seem, indeed, from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sqq.) that in oligarchies also the oligarchs were allowed to do what they pleased. That a ‘desire of the individual to be let alone, to do as he pleases, indulge his impulses, follow out his projects,’ ‘has been extremely strong’ in the United States is remarked by Mr. Bryce (American Commonwealth, 3. 268). On the other hand, Mr. Lecky remarks (Democracy and Liberty, ed. i. 213) that ‘in our own day no fact is more incontestable and conspicuous than the love of democracy for authoritative regulation,’ extending in his view apparently to habits of life (ibid. i. 462).

13. εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύωντος, sc. ἐστὶ. See note on 1310 a 27.

16. καὶ συμβάλλει ταύτη κ.τ.λ., ‘and in this way [this second criterion of freedom] contributes to the freedom based on equality.’ See Bon. Ind. 714 b 57 sqq. Bonitz, however (715 a 2 sq.), places a note of interrogation after his quotation of the passage before us, possibly regarding it as corrupt.

17 sqq. The logical connexion of 1317 b 17-1318 a 3 with what has preceded in 1317 a 40-b 17 is as follows:—democracy means a turn of office for all and a share for all in deliberative and judicial work, and also the supremacy of the many; hence whatever facilitates the access of all to office and to deliberative and judicial work is democratic, and also the aggrandizement of the assembly and the enfeeblement of the magistrates. Now the access of all to office is facilitated by the use of the lot in appointments to most offices, by the absence or smallness of property-qualifications for office, by the prohibition of a repeated tenure of most offices, and by a short tenure of most offices; hence all these things are democratic. So, too, is the provision of pay for office-holders and for members of the assembly and dicasteries, for this measure facilitates the access of all to office and to deliberative and judicial work. The enfeebling of offices of life-long tenure, if any such offices are permitted to exist, is also democratic, and the substitution of the lot for election in appointments to them. This follows from the rule that the tenure of office should be short, and that appointments to offices should be made by lot. The sentence 1317 b 38-41 stands in no logical connexion with 1317 a 40-b 17, and Sus. is probably right in bracketing it.

17. τούτων δ' ὑποκειμένων κ.τ.λ., ‘and these things being the starting-point and the principle [of democracy] being such, the following institutions are democratic.’ For δ' τοιοῦτος in the sense of ‘the following’ and referring not, as it commonly does, to something already mentioned but to something about to be mentioned, cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 6 sqq. and see note on that passage. For τούτων ὑποκειμένων compare (with Bon. Ind. 797 b 46 sqq.) Phys. 4. 4. 211 a 6 sqq., De Gen. An. 4. 1. 766 a 16 sqq., and Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 3 sqq., and for τοιαύτης οὕση τῆς ἀρχῆς Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 5 sqq. By ‘the principle of democracy’ Aristotle means freedom in the two senses mentioned by him. He arranges his list of democratic institutions under the three heads of ἀρχαί, τὸ δικαστικόν, and τὸ βουλευόμενον. It is evident from this list that the aim of Greek democracy was twofold—1. to give all the citizens a turn of office,
at any rate so far as regards offices not needing special experience, and also a share either in all kinds of judicial work or in the more important kinds of it, and to enable the poor by pay to act as officials and dicasts: 2. by making the assembly supreme over all matters, or all important matters, and providing pay for its members to secure the supremacy of the poor over the rich. In modern democracies a popular assembly and popular dicasteries no longer find a place, nor does the lot, but the two aims indicated by Aristotle are still traceable in democratic institutions. ‘Rotation in office’ is demanded by democratic feeling in the United States (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 482), and the supremacy of the will of the poorer class is an universal accompaniment of democracy. It will be noticed that the uniformity of nurture education and dress which is dwelt upon as democratic in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq. is not referred to here, nor are the matters which are so described in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq. and in ‘Aθ. Πολ. c. 9. No mention is made of the preference of democracy for boards of magistrates in comparison with single magistrates (Plato, Polit. 303 Α), or of its disapproval of the holding of two paid offices together (Demosh. c. Timocr. cc. 123, 150), or of the ostracism, or of the democratic tendency to publicity in government and in judicial proceedings, or of secret voting. Nor, as has been noticed already (see note on 2), is anything said of the tendency of Greek democracy to admit to citizenship persons of semi-alien or semi-servile or illegitimate birth, of which we read in 3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. In Hdt. 3. 80 the Persian Otanes says of democracy, πάλι μὲν ἄρχας ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἄρχῃν έχει, βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει. The second of these characteristics of democracy is not included by Aristotle in his enumeration of τὰ δημοσικά.

18. τὸ αἴρεισθαι τάς ἄρχας πάντας ἐκ πάντων. Not many offices will be elective (cp. 20 sq.), but to those that are all the citizens will elect out of all. In the case both of electors and of elected restrictions will be eschewed, whether connected with wealth or birth or age. An ‘ordo certus magistratuum’ will not be in harmony with the spirit of a democracy, because it places restrictions of age on the choice of the electors. A democracy, however, will be apt to place restrictions on the repeated tenure of the same office, unless it is connected with war. It deserves notice that Greek democracies do not appear to have attempted to make the rich and noble ineligible.
for office, whereas at Florence the nobles were made incapable of holding most offices (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 163).

19. τὸ ἀρχεῖν πάντας μὲν ἐκάστου ἐκάστον δὲ ἐν μέρει πάντων. The democratic principle is that all the citizens rule over each individual, and yet that their rule over him is balanced by the fact that he has his turn of ruling over all. If the individual citizen submits to be ruled by all, he does so not as one excluded from rule, but as one who has his turn of ruling. This does not seem to be true of the first form of democracy, for in it only γνάρμας will hold the greatest offices (c. 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.). It is also obvious that the rule exercised by all over each individual citizen is of a more absolute nature than the rule exercised over all by the individual citizen as a temporary holder of office. We see, however, that the Greek conception of democracy involved not only the rule of all the citizens over the individual citizen, but also a rotation of office among the individual citizens. The individual citizen in a Greek democracy expected, in fact, not only to rule as a part of the collective citizen-body, but also individually as an official. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq.

20. τὸ κληρωτάς εἰναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ης πάσας η δόσαι μη ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης. It is not the mere use of the lot in appointments to magistracies that is characteristic of democracy, but its use in appointments to all magistracies or all but a few. In Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 31 sq. democracy is similarly defined as a constitution ἐν τῇ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχὰς: cp. Plato, Rep. 557 A. Aristotle omits to add ἐκ πάντων with κληρωτάς, but this is what he means, for the lot would not be democratic if it was not ἐκ πάντων. A limited lot finds a place in oligarchy (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 2). Isocrates (Areop. § 23) had already urged that the lot is not really as democratic as a well-regulated system of election, inasmuch as it allows persons not friendly to democracy to find their way into office. At Athens, however, all persons appointed to office had to undergo a strict δοκιμασία, which would exclude persons of this kind (Lys. Or. 13. c. Agorat. c. 10). For the exception from the rule prescribing the lot of offices demanding experience and skill cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 27 sq. Among these offices would be those of the στρατηγί (c. 8. 1322 a 32 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 4 sqq.), of some great financial officers, of envoys, though envoys were not in strictness ἀρχιερεῖς (see note on 1299 a 19), and perhaps in some States of auditors and bouleutae, for these offices are said in c. 8. 1322 a 32—b 17
to require much experience. The following offices are mentioned in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 43 init. as elective at Athens in the time of Aristotle—those of the ταμίας στρατωτικῶν, of οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεαρικόν, and of ὁ τῶν κρητῶν ἐπιμελητῆς, as well as all those connected with war. It is difficult to think that there ever was a democracy in which all offices without exception were filled by lot—one, for instance, in which the generals were appointed by lot.

22. τὸ μῆ ἀπὸ τιμήματος κ.τ.λ. See note on 1294 b 7.
23. τὸ μῆ δις τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχεῖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 10, and 3. 1. 1275 a 24 sq.: also 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 62, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρχαῖς ἐξεστὶν πλευρίας, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶν, πλὴν βουλεύσαι δις (see Sandys' note on this passage). It is easy to see how much this exception must have added to the influence of the magistrates connected with war, and especially to the influence of the strategi, for they must have stood to the other magistrates, or most of them, in the relation in which skilled persons stand to novices. Pericles was elected strategus at Athens fifteen years in succession (Plut. Pericl. c. 16) and Phocion forty-five times (Plut. Phoc. c. 8). ‘The re-election of strategi of proved efficiency was the rule at Athens’ (Beloch, Attische Politik seit Perikles, p. 267). There seems to have been some laxity at Athens in the application of the rule against a repeated tenure of the same office, for Lysias (Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 29) and Demosthenes (Prooem. 55. p. 1461) complain that it was applied to unimportant offices and neglected in the case of important ones. Restrictions on the repeated tenure of offices were not peculiar to democratic States; aristocracies like the Lacedaemonian went even further than democracies usually did, and imposed restrictions on the repeated tenure of some offices connected with war; thus the Lacedaemonian office of ναύαρχος could not be held twice (Xen. Hell. 2. 1. 7: see however Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 359 and note 3). In the aristocratical Republic of Ragusa the Rector held his office but for one month and was re-eligible only after an interval of two years (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 311). At San Marino, the constitution of which is a sort of ἀριστοκρατία, the two Captain Regents hold office for six months and are not re-eligible for twelve years (E. Armstrong in Macmillan's Magazine, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 200). Some democracies are less rigid in this matter than others. Mr. Bryce remarks (American Commonwealth, 2. 405, note), that ‘the tendency in Switzerland to re-elect the same men to the legislature and to

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public office has doubtless worked as much for good in politics there as the opposite tendency works for evil in the United States.'

ἡ διλαγάς ἡ διλαγα. See Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1454 a 1, and note on 1296 a 38.

24. τὸ διλαγορρονίους κ.τ.λ. The aim in this matter, as in prohibitions of a repeated tenure, was that as many might share in office as possible: cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq. In the early days of Greek democracy this principle was neglected (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sq.).


τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων. Some causes of this kind at any rate involved large interests (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22 sq.).

τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 28 sqq. and see note on 33. Compare also Cic. pro Flacc. c. 7, Graecorum autem totae respublicae sedentis contionis temeritate administrantur, and Plato, Polit. 303 Α, τὴν δ' αὖ τὸν πλῆθος (ἀρχήν) κατὰ πάντα ἀσθενή καὶ μηδὲν μήπε ἀγαθῶν μήτε κοκών μέγα δυναμινήν ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταύτῃ διανεμεῖσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλοὺς. But I do not remember that Plato, or indeed any one else before Aristotle, calls attention to the characteristic of democracy pointed out in the passage before us. 'All the main features of American government may be deduced from two principles. One is the sovereignty of the people. . . . The second principle, itself a consequence of this first one, is the distrust of the various organs and agents of government' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 1. 407). It is an accepted principle in the United States that 'legislatures, officials, and all other agents of the sovereign people ought to be strictly limited by law, by each other, and by the shortness of the terms of office' (ibid. 3. 267). For κυρίαν τῶν μεγίστων cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 7 sqq. and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 22.

30. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν δημοσιόκτατον βουλῇ κ.τ.λ. One reason for this may be gathered from 3. 11. 1282 a 29 sqq., where it appears that the property-qualification for membership of the Boulē was
commonly small, while the property-qualifications for the offices of στρατηγὸς and ταμίας were larger.

33. εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἁνάγει κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4), 15. 1300 a 4, ἀπαντά τοι δὲ κρῖσεις, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41, ἀπάνων γὰρ αὐτὸς πεποίηκεν ὁ δήμος κύριον, καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασι καὶ δικαστηρίωις, ἐν ὧν ὁ δήμος ἑταίρον καὶ γὰρ αἱ [ἰ] ἡς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δήμον ἐξηλύσατο. Deliberative and administrative decisions are referred to, as well as judicial ones: see vol. i. p. 230, note 1, and cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 26 sq., 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 sqq., and 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6 sqq.

34. καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης. This refers to 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38–1300 a 4. For this reference cp. c. 4. 1318 b 7, ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων λόγοις, and see vol. ii. p. xxvii. It is possible that η μέθοδος ή πρὸ ταύτης includes both the Sixth (old Fourth) and the Seventh (old Fifth) Book. The Eighth (old Sixth) Book is supplementary to them.

35. ἐπείτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν κ.τ.λ. It appears that the burden imposed on the revenue by the payment of the assembly dicasteries and magistracies was often diminished by restricting payment in the case of the assembly to those of its meetings which were termed κύριαι, meetings which took place at Athens only once in each prytany (ˈΑθ. Πολ. c. 43 : Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 285 sq.), or indeed by going farther and paying not all the magistracies, but only ‘those whose members required to have a common table,’ for this appears to be the meaning of τῶν αρχῶν ἕως ἡμῶν. It is possible that the magistracies which required to take their meals with each other. At Athens after the disaster at Syracuse it was ordained τὸς αρχηγὸς αἰμάθεις αρχείων ἀπίστικὸς ἥν ἐν ὧν πόλεµος ἥ, πλὴν τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχηγῶν καὶ τῶν πρυτάνεων ὡς ἐν διακ. (ˈΑθ. Πολ. c. 29. l. 30). We know that at Athens the prytaneis of the Boulé and their secretaries took their meals together (ˈΑθ. Πολ. c. 43. l. 10 sq. : Demosth. De Fals. Leg. cc. 190, 249), and that the archons did the same (ˈΑθ. Πολ. c. 62: c. 3. l. 30 sq.), and also the stratēgêi (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 190: Gilbert, Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Athens, p. 30).

This custom no doubt did much to alleviate the defects of an administrative system in which boards of magistrates were largely employed. We hear the same thing of the ephors at Sparta (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 52 sq.), and of magistrates elsewhere (Plut. Cimon, c. 1 : Aen. Poliorc. i. 3). Aristotle himself evidently intends the most important boards of
magistrates in his ‘best State’ to have each its common table (4 (7). 12. 1331 a 25), among them apparently those of the stratēgì and ταμίαι (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.), and he probably means his agronomi to have a common table too (4 (7). 12. 1331 b 14 sqq.). The question, indeed, arises, what boards of magistrates in Greek States had not a common table, and the answer is not easy. Those boards would be least likely to have one whose business was not of a nature to call for promptitude in joint action. A similar custom prevailed in the cities of mediaeval Italy. The priors at Florence not only took their meals together, but ‘slept together’ (Perrens, La Civilisation Florentine, p. 49). As to the κόμμα ἐκκλησίας it should be noticed that at Athens attendance at them was paid at a higher rate than attendance at other meetings of the assembly (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 62).

38. [ἐν ἑπείδη . . . 41, βαναυσία]. I follow Sus. in bracketing this sentence, mainly for the reason given in the note on 1317 b 17 sqq. (which see). It may possibly have been written by Aristotle himself in the margin of his MS., but, if it was, he can hardly have intended it to be inserted in the text where it stands. Oligarchy is defined by the attributes to which it allots office (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.), and these are here said to be birth wealth and culture; therefore democracy allots office to the opposite attributes. More usually oligarchy is said to allot office to wealth (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq.), and culture is treated rather as a note of aristocracy than of oligarchy (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq.), but its connexion with oligarchy is explained by 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37 sq. Notwithstanding what is said here as to the liking of democracy for βαναυσία, Aristotle tells us in 3. 4. 1277 b 1 sqq. that in some States handicraftsmen (i.e. βαναυσοί) did not share in office till the extreme form of democracy came into existence. As to the preference of democracy for the lowborn and poor cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 7, 2. 19, and 3. 10, Aristoph. Eq. 180 sq., 185 sqq., 217 sq., and Isocr. De Pace, § 53. No doubt in a certain sense, as L. Schmidt points out (Ethik der alt. Griechen, 1. 161), ‘indifference to the advantages of birth was alien to the spirit of Athenian democracy,’ but it is one thing to respect high birth and another to accord it political power. ‘A gentleman having been recommended to Mr. Buchanan as eminently qualified to fill the post of Minister to Spain, because to all other qualities requisite for the position he added that of understanding and speaking Spanish, the President’s sole reply was
"Oh, that is too damned aristocratic," and another candidate for the office was named' (Frances Anne Kemble, Further Records, 1848–1883). As to this story I may say with Aristotle (7 (5). 10. 1312 a 3), εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπὶ ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο τούτο ἀληθὲς.

41. ἐτί δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Yet cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle here refers to the fate of the kingship in many Greek States; this was originally an office held for life, but its powers were curtailed (3. 14. 1285 b 13 sqq.), and it often came, as at Athens, to be filled by lot. For the change by which the archonships at Athens, and among them the office of archon basileus, ceased to be elective and came to be filled by lot, see 'Ath. IIol. c. 22, i. 20 sqq.

1318 a. 3. τὰ μὲν οὖν ... b 5, φροντίζουσιν is bracketed by Sus. The passage, or at any rate all of it but its first clause, τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταύτῃ ἐστὶ, looks like a subsequent addition, but it may well have been added by Aristotle; the reminiscence of Plato, Laws 663 E in 1318 b 1 sqq. (see note) points to this, as well as the general character of the passage.

5. ἡ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30–38. In 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sq., however, Aristotle refers to extreme democracies as αἱ δημοκρατίαι αἱ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκοῦσαι δημοκρατίαι: cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. As to δῆμος, a demos comprising both rich and poor would have the best claim to the name.

6. ἵσον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Probably δοκεῖ should be supplied from δοκοῦσα in the preceding sentence, for it is clear from 9, οὕτω γὰρ ἰν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοντες κ.τ.λ., that Aristotle is expressing the opinions of others.

C. 3. 11. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, 'in the next place:' cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 6, τὸ μετὰ ταύτα.

12. τὰ τιμήματα διελέειν χιλίοις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων, 'place the assessed properties in two groups, so that those of a thousand will be equal in value to those of five hundred.' Cp. c. 6. 1320 b 22 sq., where the phrase recurs, with this difference, however, that τὰ τιμήματα is there used in the sense not of 'assessed properties,' but of 'property-qualifications.'

13. ἡ οὖχ οὗτω δὲ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἵσοτητα, 'or ought we to institute equality in respect of property-qualification not in this way, but otherwise?' For τιθέναι ('statuere') cp. Plato, Laws 801 A, ἡ μηδὲν ἐπαινερωτὸ, τιθῶ δὲ τούτῳ οὖτω; ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τίθεν' νικὴ γὰρ πάσαις ταῖς ψήφοις οὗτος ὁ νόμος.
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15. ἐπεῖτα ... λαβόντα ... τούτους κυρίους εἰναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21 sqq. For the construction, or want of construction, cp. Meteor. 1. 3. 341 a 23, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα γίγνεσθαι ἥμα τῷ ἠλέῳ αὐτῷ τὴν θερμότητα εὑλογον, λαμβάνοντα τὸ ὀμοῦν ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν γεγομένων, and Pol. 2. 9. 1269 a 40 sqq., τὰς γενικῶσας πλέοις ... μηδείμαν εἰναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις, and see the examples from Plato of 'inversion of government' collected by Riddell in his edition of Plato's Apology, p. 223, § 271.

16. τούτους, 'these' and not the 1000 and 500 themselves. The advantage of this arrangement would be that supremacy in the State would rest with one body of men and not two.

18. ή κατὰ τὸ πλήθος, sc. τῶν ἄνθρωπων. 

For the omission of εἶναι cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22, ἕκαστος γὰρ ὑπὸν ἐαυτὸν φήσει τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γνωάσα ἤλθη τὴν αὐτὴν, and 3. 10. 1281 a 34 sq., and Menand. Monost. 737 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 361), φασὶν κακίστους οἱ ποιηροὶ τοὺς κακοὺς. For the fact cp. c. 2. 1317 b 5 sqq.


21. κρίνεσθαι δεῖν, 'iudicium esse faciendum' (Sepulv.).

22. δ' τι ἄν οἱ ὀλγοῖ. It is not clear what Greek word or words exactly should be supplied (possibly βούλωνται), and a similar doubt recurs in 33, but the sense is clear, 'whatever the few decide.'


26. τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἑλπίδων. See note on 1290 a 35. καθάπερ έιρηται πρότερον, in 3. 10. 1281 a 14–17.

30. μὴ μέντοι πάντως, 'but not in all ways' : cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 31, δὲ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πώς μῖαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πολίν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως. 

32. ἡ τοῖς πλείοσι, sc. ἀμφοτέρως, 'or to the majority of each,' i.e., for example, if six rich out of ten and twelve poor out of twenty agreed.

ἐὰν δὲ τάναντα διάξη, i.e. if the majority of the rich decide in one way and the majority of the poor in the opposite way.

33. δ' τι ἄν οἱ πλείους καὶ ἄν τὸ τίμημα πλείον, 'whatever is decided by the majority, that is by those whose property-qualification is greater.' I take καὶ here to be explanatory, as often else-
where (see for instance note on 1257 b 7). Welldon translates the passage in much the same way. Spengel would bracket καί or read ἕν καί in place of καί ἕν, which is the reading of γι, and Susemihl, who follows him in the latter change, translates, 'das, für welches sich diejenige von beiden Mehrheiten ausgesprochen hat, welche zugleich (mit der übereinstimmenden Minderheit zusammen) die höhere Schätzung aufweisen kann,' but Susemihl's equivalent for οἱ πλείον is hardly that which would most naturally suggest itself to a translator, and it does not seem to me that any change is necessary. Aristotle's language implies that each man's τίμημα was recorded and could be readily ascertained, but would this be the case with the poor? We gather from 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 19 sqq. that οἱ ἄποροι οὐκ ἔχουσι τίμημα. His solution differs from that which the advocates of oligarchy would put forward because it takes account of the property of the poor and adds it together, whereas oligarchs would claim that the will of those who own property in large amounts should prevail, even if the total amount of their property is less than the total amount of the property of the poor. But if, as Aristotle often tells us, democracy implies the supremacy of the will of the numerical majority, is the arrangement which he recommends here suitable to a democracy?

34. ἐδοξε δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. τίνατία, 'and a conflicting decision was arrived at by six of the rich and fifteen of the poorer.' For τοὺς ἐξ see note on 1259 a 27, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 465. 13 (ed. Gerth, § 465. 13. 6).

38. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ τοῦτος δόξαν. Cp. τοῦτα in 1. 2. 1252 a 33. "Επτα is apparently to be supplied (cp. 32). See notes on 1306 a 24 and 1317 a 17.

ἐὰν δὲ ἵσοι συμπέσωσι, i. e. τύχωσι ὄντες (Bon. Ind. s.v. συμπέσωσι).

40. For δίκα γένηται see critical note.

1318 b. 1. ἀποκληρωτέον, 'sorte decernendum est' (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

ἡ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. Aristotle would perhaps suggest that if the votes should be equal, those voting No should win (cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 34 sqq.). For other modes of meeting the difficulty referred to in the case of a dicastery cp. Julian, Or. 3. 114 D. 'Αθήνησι μὲν οὖν φασίν, ὅτε τοὺς πατρίους ἔθεσιν ἐχρώντο καὶ ἐξων τοῖς οἰκείοις πεθόμενοι νόμοις μεγάλην καὶ πολυωθροπόν οἰκούντες πόλιν, εἰ ποτε τῶν δικαιώτων αἱ ψήφοι καὶ ίσοι γένωστα τοῖς φεύγουσι πρῶτοι διώκοντας, τὴν τῆς 'Αθηνᾶς ἐπιτεθεμένη τῷ τὴν δίκην ὀφλησεῖς μέλλοντι.
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... unable but is Cp. Meister, 13173, ycupyiKos SCC dtroviv not the allusion Chaleion Aristotle also remembers Plato, Laws 663 E, kalon mèn η ἀλήθεια, δ ἦνε, καὶ μόνον ἄνεκ μην οὐ ῥάδιον εἶναι πείδεαν: cp. Eryxias, 405 B, καταμαθὼν δ' αὐτῶν ἐγὼ ὅτι ἢσθαν εἰπεῖσαι, ὅπερ ἃν τοῦ λεγόμενον λίθων ἐφήσα Κ.Τ.Λ. For τὸς δυσμένους πλευρεκτέον cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 10.

4. δεῖ γὰρ ξητούσι k.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. i. 3. 1358 b 36, ὡς δρ' οὐκ ἀδικὸν τοὺς ἀστυνεῖτονας καταδουλώσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦτας, (οἱ συμβουλεύοντες) πολλάκις οἰδέν φροντίζουσιν.

6. Δημοκρατίων δ' οὖσών τεττάρων k.τ.λ. Five in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b C. 4. 30 sqq., four in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 22 sqq. In βελτίστη μὲν k.τ.λ. and in c. 6. 1320 b 21 sqq. a question is answered which has been raised in c. i. 1317 a 13 sq.

7. καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις. The reference is to 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 3 sqq. For ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων λόγοις cp. c. 2. 1317 b 34 sq.

6. βελτίστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν. The agricultural demos is best, 1. because it is unable owing to the small amount of property it possesses to attend the assembly frequently, and further because owing to its need of the necessaries of life it devotes itself closely to its work and does not covet the goods of others, and indeed prefers a life of business to a life of office-holding.
and politics (compare for the antithesis c. 4. 1319 a 30-32), unless office offers a prospect of large gains, so that, if it asks for any share of political power, it asks only for the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office: 2. because its life is not devoid of virtue, like the lives of handicraftsmen, shopkeepers, and day-labourers (this is implied in 1319 a 24 sqq.). The γεωργοί were often hoplites (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 30 sq.), and they would make good soldiers, like the herdsmen and shepherds whose military efficiency Aristotle praises in 1319 a 22 sqq. The members of both these classes probably had less alien or servile blood in their veins than the members of the classes to which Aristotle prefers them, but of this he says nothing. It seems clear from his language in 1319 a 6 sqq., which implies that when the demos sold or lost its land it ceased to be an agricultural demos, that his agricultural demos is a demos of peasant-proprietors (see Liddell and Scott s.v. γεωργοί), but he does not, like modern believers in the 'magic of property,' trace its good qualities to this fact. Most of the Greek States which were still vigorous in the third century B.C. were States with a demos of small cultivating landowners or else a pastoral demos (e. g. the Achaeans, Arcadians, Macedonians, and Aetolians), and ancient States in general often began to decline when these classes disappeared and were replaced by slaves or serfs, but Aristotle does not seem to have observed this, or he would not have advised that the tillers of the soil in his 'best State' should be slaves or serfs, as he does in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. We see that he is not so much enamoured of an agricultural demos as to introduce it into his 'best State,' though he holds that it forms the fittest basis for a democracy. 'We scarcely ever find [in Greek writers] any recognition of the fact that a strong and healthy race of peasants together with an industrious middle class is the best means of maintaining the life of a State' (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 493). 'Jefferson regarded agriculture as so much the best occupation for citizens that he was alarmed by the rumour that the cod-fish of the north-eastern coasts were coming down to the shores of Virginia and Carolina, lest the people of those States should "be tempted to catch them, and commerce, of which we have already too much, should receive an accession"' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 359 note). Aristotle nowhere includes in his enumeration of the different kinds of δῆμος
such a δήμος as existed in the Lacedaemonian State, one composed not of small cultivating landowners resident in the country, but of small non-cultivating landowners resident in Sparta. Would he prefer a demos of the cultivating type to a demos of this sort?

10. οὖτε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπιδέχεται δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ., 'and so it is also possible to institute a democracy [as well as other forms of constitution, such as oligarchy], where the mass of the citizens lives by agriculture or pastoral farming,' for—Aristotle in effect continues—a demos of this kind will claim only a small measure of political power. He probably intends here to correct a common impression that under these circumstances an oligarchy was the only constitution in place: cp. Plut. Themist. c. 19, οἱ τριάκοντα... οὐδεμιον τὴν μὲν κατὰ θαλατταν ἀρχὴν γένεσιν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, ὠλιγαρχία δὲ ἢτον διοχεραίειν τῶν γεωργοῦντας, and Eurip. Suppl. 406 Bothe (420 Dindorf),

γαπόνοι δὲ ἁνὴρ πένης,
εἰ καὶ γένοιτο μὴ ἀμαθῆς, ἔργων ὑπὸ
οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοιν' ἀποδέλενων.

An oligarchy existed at Epidaurus (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 1), and no doubt in many other places, when the demos consisted for the most part of cultivators of the soil. However, democracies of the agricultural type may be traced at Athens in the days of Solon and Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq.: Isocr. Areop. § 52), and in far later times at Elis (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 102), at Mantinea (1318 b 23 sqq.), at Aphytis (1319 a 14 sqq.), in the cities of Achaia (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 105), and probably elsewhere in the Peloponnesus.

11. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἐχειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1319 a 30 sqq., 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 25 sq., and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq. If they had had a large amount of property or none at all, they would have had more leisure (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 6 sqq., 18 sq.). Compare the picture of the Roman demos in early times which we find in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 58. The ruling class in the first form of oligarchy has 'not a very large amount of property' (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 12 sq.), but that is a different thing.

13. διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐχειν τάναγκαία κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq., where we read of τὸ γεωργικῶ, that ἐχουσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ζην, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν. The cultivators had a small amount of property, but had not the necessaries of life. There is no inconsistence in this, for in 2. 7. 1267 a 9 sqq. οὐσία βραχεία καὶ ἐργασία
are said to be the means of obtaining necessaries. Men who were busily engaged in attending to their own property were thought to be least likely to covet the goods of others (Plut. Aristid. et Cat. Comp. c. 3, ός τούς αυτούς ἀμελοῦντας οἰκίας καὶ ποριζομένους ἐξ ἀδικίας, and Philoepomen, c. 4, πάνυ προσήκειν οἰόμενος οἰκεία κεκτήσατα τὸν ἀλλοτρίων αἰφεύμενον: Isocr. Areop. § 24).


A. ἐδέλω γεωργεῖν, εἶτα τίς με κωλίει;
B. ἡμεῖς. Α. ἐπεὶ δίδωμι χιλίας δραχμάς,
εάν με τῶν ἄρχων ἀφήτη.

As to πολιτείεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν see note on 1293 a 4, and cp. [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 3.

16. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 9 sq., and Heraclit. Fragm. 111, αἱρέεται γὰρ ἐν ἄντια πάντων οἱ ἀριστοί, κλέος ἀέναι τιθητῶν. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκυροῦνται ὀκωστερ ὁμηρεία. Plato had said the same thing in Laws 870 Α. τοῦτο δ' ἐστι μάλιστα ἐνταθή, οὐ πλείστος τε καὶ ἴσχυροτατος ἰμέρος ἀν τυγχάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἢ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπλήστων καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἐρωτας μνήμους ἐντύκτουσα δύναμις διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀσυνεχεῖς τὸν κακόν: cp. 918 D. Compare also Demosthenes' account of the feelings of οἱ πολλοὶ Μακεδόνων in Olynth. 2. 16.

17. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1312 b 21. Machiavelli gives much the same account of the tendencies of the 'ignobili' in Discorsi, 1. 5.

19. εάν τις αὐτοῦς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ καλή. How did oligarchies hinder the many in their business? Possibly in part by discouraging the residence of the urban poor, or some of them, in the central city (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sqq.).


21. ἵπτι δὲ τὸ κυρίου εἶναι τὸν ἐλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν κ.τ.λ. It is not often that we find the aer. infinit. used in conjunction with the pres. infinit. as here. In 29 we have αἰρέσθαι μὲν τὰς ἄρχες καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ δικαίειν πάντας (cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 16, τὸ τὰς ἄρχας αἰρείναι καὶ εὐθύνειν). But in Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 8 sq. we have μεῖζων γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεος φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶσειν, where λαβεῖν seems used of an instantaneous and σῶσειν of a continued act: cp. Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 29 sq. (γενομένα followed by σώζωστο) and 1289 a 3, ὡς ἅστιν οὐκ ἔλατον ἔρχον τὸ ἐπαισθήσασον πολιτείαν ἡ κατασκευάζειν εξ ἄρχες, and Demosth. De Cor. c. 254 (προκείμενα followed by πράττειν). Cp.
also Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 30. l. 17, τοὺς δ' ἐκατόν ἄνδρας διανείμας σφάς τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τέταρτα μέρη ὡς ἰσαίτα καὶ διακληρώσατ, καὶ εἰς ἐνασυνον βουλεύειν. Perhaps the tenses in the passage before us should be explained in a similar way. As to the fact the following may be quoted. 'A very little voting would be enough for the [Bulgarian] peasant, who grudges a walk to the polling-place as so much time taken from the more serious business of field-labour. In some districts it is difficult to find candidates for the Sobranje, and the village patriarch who lets himself be elected makes a virtue of his self-denial' (Times, Oct. 29. 1886).

22. εἰ τι φιλοτιμίας ἐξουσίαν. Cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 9, ἔχει τι πολεμέων ἡ τάξις. Φιλοτιμίας takes up τῆς τιμῆς, 17.

23. ἐπεί παρ' ἐνίοις δήμοις κ.τ.λ. It is not clear why the whole citizen-body of Mantineia met for purposes of deliberation, while the election of the magistrates was made over to sections of it selected in succession for the purpose. And does alperoi imply that these sections were elected, or that they were selected by some system of rotation similar to that described in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 15 sqq.? If they were elected, by whom were they elected? By the whole citizen-body? Perhaps it was thought that, while deliberation was best left to gatherings of the whole citizen-body, in elections to offices a small body of electors would make a better choice than a large one. The fact that this arrangement existed in some democracies is a remarkable one, because there were oligarchies in which the magistrates were elected by the entire demos (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). Gilbert (Gr. Staatslt. 2. 126. 2) takes Aristotle to refer in the passage before us to the democracy which existed at Mantineia in b.c. 421.

27. ὧσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ᾧν is added in explanation of καὶ τοῦτο.

διὸ δὴ κ.τ.λ. For διὸ δὴ see note on 1310 b 5. It would seem from the passage before us that Aristotle regarded the Solonian democracy as a democracy of the first kind, for many of the institutions here referred to existed in it: for instance, all the citizens possessed the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.) and of acting as dicasts (2. 12. 1274 a 3), while the magistracies were filled by election (2. 12. 1273 b 40 sqq.), and a higher property-qualification may probably have been required for the most important of them (see note on 1274 a 18). A similar distinction between the property-qualifica-
tion required for some offices and for others was made in the first form of oligarchy (c. 6. 1320 b 22 sqq.).

32. ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους, sc. ἄρχειν: cp. 6 (4). 1291 a 36 sq. This restriction would probably exclude poor men: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 6 sq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 24 sq.

33. αἱ τε γὰρ ἄρχαι κ.τ.λ. For τε γὰρ here see note on 1333 a 2, and for τῶν βελτίστων note on 1292 a 9. Οἱ βελτίστοι is an ambiguous term, meaning either 'the best men' or 'men of high social position.' In order that the conclusion, ἀνάγκη πολιτευόμενοι οὖτω πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς, may be justified, οἱ βελτίστοι should here bear the former meaning. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 20) points out the resemblance of the passage before us to Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 12-19.

35. τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις. The omission of the article before γνωρίμοι shows that the ἐπιεικεῖς are regarded as not far removed from the γνώριμοι. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 31, τὸ τῶν εὐτόρων καὶ γνωρίμων (sc. πλήθους), and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 28. l. 6, τῶν εὐγενῶν καὶ γνωρίμων, and contrast 1319 b 13, τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέσων.


40. For φυλάττειν in the sense of 'watch and check,' cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 19, and Plato, Laws 867 Α, ὥ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων, and for τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἄθροιπων φαιλον cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 30 sqq. and Plato, Timeaus, 71 D, τὸ φαύλον ἡμῶν.

1319 a. 2. ὑπὲρ ἐστὶν ὡφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here has in his memory Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγήσεις, εἰν μὴ δ' ὑπερικεῖν τὸν ὀχλον ἐὰs μὴ δ' ὑπερικεῖν περιόρας, ἀλλὰ κοσμήσει ὅπως οἱ βελτίστοι μὲν τὸς τιμᾶς ἐξουσίαν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι μηδὲν ἀντικρίζονται: ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεία πρώτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστὶς πολιτείας ἑστίν. Φor ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 18, τῶν ὑπὸ υπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν.

6. πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργόν τὸν δήμον κ.τ.λ. Τε in τῶν τε νόμων τινές has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's attention
appears to be distracted by the task of adducing examples, or he would have gone on to mention administrative measures (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 32) likely to produce a similar effect. Some of the laws referred to by Aristotle may have been due to tyrants who wished to keep the citizens away from the city and to make peasants of them (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sqq.). According to Plutarch, however (Themist. c. 19), the ancient kings of Athens sought to induce their subjects to occupy themselves with the cultivation of the olive, and not with sea-faring pursuits. It is evident from what Aristotle says that there were two ways at least in which an 'agricultural demos' might cease to exist in a Greek State. It might cease to exist because its members lost their land altogether, or it might cease to exist because they lost the fixed *quantum* of land the possession of which secured them political rights. There were, therefore, two ways of making the demos agricultural; one of them was to prevent the loss of its land, and the other was to avoid fixing too high the amount of land on the possession of which its political rights depended. When the demos lost its land, it appears most commonly to have done so either by mortgaging it and failing to pay the interest due or by selling it, the result being in either case that a few large landowners took the place of a number of small ones. The laws mentioned by Aristotle were intended to prevent this happening. They would be especially in place in colonies and in those States of Greece Proper in which a conquest had at one time taken place, for when the colonists or conquerors lost their lots, they ceased to be in a position to serve as hoplites, and, if many did so, the dominant race might find it difficult to hold its own. It will be noticed that Aristotle takes it for granted throughout that small owners will reside on the land they own and cultivate it. This is not always the case; it often is not the case in Flanders at the present day, as readers of Laveleye's *Économie Rurale de la Belgique* will remember, but perhaps small owners of land in Greece had more difficulty in finding tenants and could hardly trust a slave, except under their own eye. The laws to which Aristotle refers would not avail to make the whole of the demos agricultural, for, notwithstanding their existence, a large element of handicraftsmen day-labourers and *dyuπανος* might find a place within the demos, unless indeed these classes were excluded from citizenship. One incidental result of making the whole demos of a State agricultural should be noticed. This is that a body of
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metoeci (or other aliens) and slaves would develope within it who would practise the handicrafts and trades in the absence of which the State could not prosper. It was the ease with which metoeci and slaves could be drawn from surrounding regions that made it possible for the Greeks to leave the practice of handicrafts and trade to a large extent to aliens and slaves (3. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq.), and to reserve themselves for agriculture, war, and politics.

8. πάντες. Πάς is often placed either at the beginning (as in 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10) or at the end of a sentence (as in the passage before us and 1319 b 27 sq.: cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 12. 1. 1 sq.). For τινες ... πάντες cp. 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 38 sq.

η τὸ ὀλεως μη ἐξεῖναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 17 sq. The law broken by the γνώριμαι at Thurii may have been a law of this kind (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sqq.). Evasion of a law to this effect would probably also be easy. Harrington, however, in his Oceana (pp. 87, 100, ed. 1656) provides that no one shall own land of a greater annual value than £2000. For the use of τὸ with the infin. to express the effect of a law cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 4 sqq.

9. ἢ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. No land was so likely to be bought up by rich men as land lying within an easy distance of the central city. The owner of land thus situated would have a better market for his produce, would find it easier to obtain whatever he needed to purchase (see Hom. Il. 23. 824 sq.), and would be better able to combine a life of political activity with attention to his estate. That land lying near the city was usually the most valuable we see from Xen. De Vect. 4. 50. Thus in the newly-founded colony of Thurii the Sybarite portion of the colonists appropriated to themselves all the land lying near the city (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The rising of the Attic Diacrii under Peisistratus against the Pedieis was a rising of the owners of land at a distance from the city against the owners of land near it. Και τὴν πόλιν is perhaps added after τὸ ἄστυ because τὸ ἄστυ was sometimes used to designate a part only of the central city, at Athens the acropolis (see Schn. 2. 373).

10. ἢν δὲ τὸ γε ἄρχαιον κ.τ.λ. Μηδὲ πωλεῖν, 'not even to sell,' to say nothing of buying or owning. Leucas was probably one of the States referred to (2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq.). We hear of a similar law in the Lacedaemonian State (see note on 1270 a 19). Laws of this kind will hardly have existed in the States with which Hesiod was familiar, for he speaks in Op. et Dies, 341, as if the
buying and selling of lots was a common occurrence (see Prof. Ridgeway in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 6. 338 sq.). Yet it is likely that the sale of the lot was forbidden at Corinth and Thebes when Pheidon and Philolaus legislated there, for otherwise the legislation by which the former sought to maintain the number of the lots intact (2. 6. 1265 b 12 sq.), and the latter to prevent a diminution of their number through the extinction of families (2. 12. 1274 b 2 sq.), would have been of little avail. According to Plato, Rep. 552 A sq., 555 C, laws forbidding men to sell their property were not favoured in oligarchies and did not exist in them. As to the provisions respecting the lot in the Laws of Plato see vol. i. p. 441. According to Professor Mahaffy (*Times*, Sept. 10, 1892), the Macedonian and Greek εληρωθίοι in the Fayoum whose position is made known to us in the Petrie Papyri were not allowed to alienate their farms. Measures of this kind are still resorted to in India. ‘Acting on the advice of Mr. Lawrence, the Kashmir Government has decided that the title given by the new settlement of Kashmir to the cultivators, heretofore serfs, may not be alienated by sale or mortgage. This means, of course, that the Kashmir cultivator will have to pay a higher interest for borrowed money than he would have to pay if he could pledge a first-class security such as his homestead. Mr. Lawrence was perfectly aware of the fact, but he considered that high interest was a less evil than the expropriation of the cultivators from their land, if they were allowed to alienate it’ (*Times*, Oct. 14, 1895).

12. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν λέγουσιν Ὄξυλου νῦν ἐίναι κ.τ.λ. The mention of Oxylus indicates that this law existed at Elis. This State seems to have studied with especial care the convenience and well-being of the small landowners scattered over its territory (Polyb. 4. 73. 8). Solon, on the other hand, does not appear to have placed any check on the mortgaging of land, though he did much to diminish the occasion for mortgaging it by checking expenditure (Plut. Solon, c. 21). Laws not unlike that ascribed to Oxylus have found advocates in some States in recent years. The National or Slovene party in Carniola, finding that the peasants were being pauperized by excessive partition, the population increasing rapidly, in 1883 favoured the proposal that ‘the minimum amount of land required for the support of a family should be made indivisible and should not be capable of being mortgaged beyond a fixed proportion—say a third—of its value’

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(*Times*, Dec. 26, 1883). So in the United States individual States have legislated to exempt 'homesteads, or a certain amount of personal property, from the claims of creditors' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 275, 276 note). But here a wider object is sought than the preservation of a class of small cultivating landowners.

14. νῦν δὲ δεὶ διορθὸν καὶ τῷ Ἀφύταῖων νόμῳ κ.τ.λ., 'but, as things are, [the evil having already made its way into the State,] it is well to amend matters by the law of the Aphytaeans also [as well as by those previously mentioned].' The laws previously mentioned, as Vict. points out, tend to prevent the evil finding its way into the State; this one tends to mitigate its effects after it has found its way in. The law of Aphytis to which Aristotle refers appears to have been a law fixing the property-qualification which any one enjoying political rights under the constitution was required to possess at a certain portion of a lot of land. Thus at Aphytis those who owned no land at all were excluded from political rights and apparently from citizenship (cp. 16, πάντες γεωργοίς). Compare the law proposed by Phormisius at Athens after the restoration of the democracy (Lysias, Or. 34: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 66, vol. 8. 493 sqq.). Phormisius, however, seems to have been prepared to admit to citizenship any one who owned land, however small might be the quantity held by him. Aphytis, like the other cities in Pallene (Kuhn, Entstehung der Staedte der Alten, p. 296), had evidently escaped when Philip of Macedon destroyed Olynthus and many other Thraceward cities (Demosth. Phil. 3. 26). Pallene had a fertile soil and was especially well-suited for the cultivation of the vine (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2. 1. 453); this was one reason why the demos of Aphytis was agricultural. It should be noticed that in sketching the measures by which an agricultural demos might be created Aristotle does not suggest anything resembling what Tiberius Grachus proposed at Rome two centuries later (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., 3. 90, 95), the establishment by the State of a new class of small landowners. Greek States had not in all probability a sufficient amount of ager publicus at their disposal to effect this.

17. τιμῶται γὰρ οὐχ ἡλικ τὰς κτήσεις κ.τ.λ., 'for they value the lots of land not in their entirety, but dividing them up in parts so small that even the poor can exceed in the valuations of their property [the value of one of these parts].' Many have taken the suppressed object of ἀπερβᾶλλειν to be τῶν πλουσίων, but not,
I think, rightly: Welldon’s version is right, ‘can more than attain the necessary standard of assessment.’ See as to this law at Aphytis vol. i. p. 375, and cp. Oecon. 2. 1347 a 18 sqq. In States in which the sale of the original lots was forbidden the property-qualification required for citizenship would be the ownership of a lot, but at Aphytis the lots had come to be broken up. Aristotle does not say that the law was enacted at Aphytis with the object of creating an agricultural democracy; its object more probably was to prevent the owner of a portion of a lot escaping such imposts as the eisphora.

19. μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. For the use of πλῆθος here as an equivalent to δῆμος see note on 1317 a 25, and cp. c. 7. 1321 a 5 sq. Whether the νομεῖς—a term including herdsmen of all kinds and shepherds—were generally small owners of land like the γεωργοὶ, or owners of the herds and flocks tended by them, is not clear, but they resembled the γεωργοὶ at any rate in this, that they were too busy to attend the assembly often or to take an active part in politics. In summer, indeed, they would be far from the city on mountain-pastures with their cattle and sheep. Many citizens of Achaean and Arcadian cities (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 169) and also of Elis (E. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alterthums, 2. 286) would be herdsmen and shepherds.


foot. Aristotle has before him in this passage Plato's description of the Persians in Laws 695 A, ἡγεύσας τὴν πατρῴαν οὐ παιδευμένως τέχνην, οὔσαν Περσικήν, ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν, τραχείας χώρας ἐκγόνων, σκληρῶν καὶ λκανὴν ποιμένα σπαργάζεσθαι μᾶλα ἴχνυον καὶ δυναμίνων θυραυλεῖν καὶ ἄγρυπνεῖν καὶ, εἴ στρατεύεσθαι δέων, στρατεύεσθαι. In ancient Greece, as in the East, it was necessary for shepherds to 'abide with their flocks by night' in order to protect them from wild beasts.

The nomad shepherds of modern Greece 'live out among their flocks on the barren mountains, where the sheep in the summer find precarious subsistence. In wet or dry, by day or by night, these men have no shelter but their coarse frieze cloaks, a blanket stretched on a couple of sticks, or in the winter a rude hut of brushwood and reeds' (Review of Mr. Rennell Rodd's 'Customs and Lore of Modern Greece,' Times, July 7, 1892). So we read of Daphnis in Timaeus, Fragm. 4 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 193), Βουκολῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν Αἰτνην χείματος τε καὶ θέρους ἱγραύλει. The military achievements of the herdsmen and shepherds of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden illustrate the truth of Aristotle's remark.

24. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πλῆθος κ.τ.λ., i.e. βάνανσοι τεχνίται, ἀγοραῖοι, and θητεῖς, as appears from 27 sq. (cp. c. 7. 1321 a 5, ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἔστι μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλῆθους, γεωργικῶν βανανσικῶν ἀγοραίων θητικῶν). In c. 1. 1317 a 24 sqq. only τὸ γεωργικὸν, τὸ βάνανσον, and τὸ θητικὸν are mentioned. We hear nothing in this Book of the more varied εἶδος τοῦ δήμου enumerated in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 17 sqq., except so far as οἱ νόθοι καὶ οἱ εἰς ὑποτερονοῦν πολίτων are regarded as parts of the demos in 1319 b 9 sq., but Aristotle would probably say of all of them except the γεωργοὶ what he says here of the βάνανσοι, ἀγοραῖοι, and θητεῖς (compare what he says of the trireme-oarsmen in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 7 sqq.). In Aristoph. Eccl. 432 τὸ σκυτοτομικὸν πλῆθος is contrasted with οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων. For εἰ δὲν οἱ λοιποὶ δημοκρατίας συνεσταῖ, cp. Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 79, τρία γάρ ἐστιν εἰ δὲν ἡ πολιτεία συνεστηκεν, οἱ ἄρχον, οἱ δικαστής, οἱ ἰδιώτης. As to οἱ ἀγοραῖοι see note on 1291 a 4.


28. τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. There is a slight shade of contempt in the use of ἀνθρώπων here, as in Plato, Gorg. 518 C, διακώνου μοι λέγει καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν παρασκευασταίς ἀνθρώπους, and
Phrynichus, Inc. Fab. Fragm. i (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 601), ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ ἕνα παραπότας.

ἐτε δὲ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἁγοράν καὶ τὸ ἀστυ κυλίεσθαι κ.τ.λ. The βάλανους τεχνηταί and the ἁγοραῖοι came to the marketplace to sell what they had to sell, and the δῆτε to be hired (Matth. 20. 3). The Sausage-seller in the Knights of Aristophanes (636) prays to the ἁγορά, εἷς ταῖς ἡπαίδευσθαι εὖ. The δῆμος of Byzantium spent its time περὶ τὴν ἁγοράν καὶ τῶν λιμένων (Theopomp. Fr. 65: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 287). Diodorus, contrasting Egyptian ways with Greek to the advantage of the former, says of Greek handicraftsmen, πλείστοι δὲ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις πόλεσι εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας συντρέχοντες τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν λυμαίνονται, τὸ δὲ λυστελές περιποιοῦνται παρὰ τῶν μισοδοτοῦντων (1. 74. 7). The assembly in many cities probably met in the marketplace (Polyb. 28. 7. 3: 29. 24. 5 Hultsch). At Delphi meetings of the assembly were called ἁγοραί (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 313: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 37). For some purposes the assembly at Athens met in the agora (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 288). We ask, were not the ψευδογραφοί also, like farmers among ourselves, frequently to be seen in the marketplace? Did they not take their own produce to the marketplace and sell it there? Probably they often did (cp. Plut. Arat. c. 8, ἡ δὲ ὁμα κατήπειγεν ἢ δὴ φθεγγαμένων ἀλεκτρων καὶ ὅσον ὁμω τῶν εἰς ἁγορά τι φέρειν εἰσβάλοντα πρὸς ἁγορὰν ἐπερχομένων), but Büchenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 456 sq.) thinks that it was more usual for them to sell their produce to retail-dealers, who sold it again at a profit. As to the form κυλίεσθαι, which seems to be that commonly used by Aristotle, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 2. 453.

31. οὐτέ ἀπαντῶσιν οὐδὲ ομοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης, 'neither attend this gathering nor have a similar need of it.' For the suppression of εἰς τὴν συνόδου ταύτην after ἀπαντῶσιν see note on 1339 a 19. For ἀπαντῶν cp. (with Bon. Ind. s. v.) 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 24 sq. The term συνόδος is applied to gatherings of different kinds, in 2. 9. 1271 a 28 to the Lacedaemonian syssitia, in Pollux, 8. 131 to the dicasteries, and in Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 42 (cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 10) to markets; it is often applied by Polybius to meetings of an assembly (e.g. in 4. 14. 1 to those of the Achaean assembly).

32. διὸν δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ., 'and where it also happens [in
addition to the demos being agricultural or pastoral] that' etc. "Οπον δὲ takes up 1318 b 10 sq. and 1319 a 19 sqq." This must commonly have been the case in Achaia, where the cities were mostly on or near the seacoast, while much of their pasture-land, and in some cases of their tillage-land and vineyards, lay far from the coast on the mountain-slopes of the interior (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 408–9, 484). In many colonies, again, the city was on an islet or headland, and most of the territory a good way off, if not on the other side of an arm of the sea. As to the repetition of τὴν χώραν see critical note on 1319 a 33.

36. ποιεῖται τὰς ἀποκικιᾶς, 'to make its settlements' (Welldon), or perhaps 'its out-settlements.' Cp. Hist. An. 8. 13. 599 a 4, τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἐκτοπισμοὺς τοῖτον ποιοῦσαι τῶν τρόπων.

ὦστε δεί κ.τ.λ., 'and so, [as democracies are better when the assembly meets rarely,] it is well, even if there is a city-populace in the State, [so that sufficient numbers to form an assembly can easily be got together,] not to hold meetings of the assembly in democracies without the presence of the body of citizens scattered over the territory, [for this will make its meetings rarer].' At Athens the citizens resident in the country were summoned to important special meetings of the assembly (Pollux, 8. 116), but probably the assembly often met there without any citizens from the country being present. For τὸ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθος cp. 4 (7).

14. 1332 b 30.

40. ἐπομένως. Bonitz (Ind. s.v. ἑπεσθαί) compares Metaph. Δ. 23. 1023 a 23, καὶ τὸ ἐν τινὶ δὲ εἶναι ὁμοοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἐπομένως τὸ ἔχειν.

1319 b. 1. τὸ χεῖρον δεί πλῆθος χωρίζειν. Cp. c. 6. 1320 b 28 sq. The γεωργοί are best, then the νομαί, then the βασίλευσι τεχνίται (see note on 1317 a 26), then the ἄγοραῖοι and βήτες, then οἱ νόθοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ ἐποτερονοῦν πόλιτον (1319 b 9 sqq.). Compare the order in which the different kinds of demos are enumerated in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. At the bottom of the list would stand οἱ ἐκ δοῦλον ἥ δοῦλης (3. 5. 1278 a 33).

τὴν δὲ τελευταίαν κ.τ.λ. To what kind of States the ultimate democracy is alone appropriate, will be clear from 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq. As this constitution could not exist in its fullness unless pay was provided for the members of the assembly and dicasteries and for the magistrates, its maintenance imposed a heavy burden on the rich in States which did not possess special sources of revenue
such as an emporium or dependent allies. Aristotle adds that an ultimate democracy would not be durable in the absence of laws and customs favourable to its continuance—preventing, for instance, the spoliation of the rich by lawsuits or eisphorae or heavy liturgies or confiscation (c. 5). See note on 40.

4. ἀ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. Συμβαίνειν with the infin. is sometimes used by Plato not impersonally, but personally (Kühner, Ausfuhrl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 477 c), and, as Richards points out, it may be so used here and in 17 sq.

5. εἴρηται πρότερον, in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book.

6. πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι κ.τ.λ., ' and with a view to institute this democracy the leaders of the popular party are accustomed to make the demos also [as well as the democracy] strong by adding as many as possible to the citizen-body' etc. We are told in 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq. that democracies tend to arise when the πλήθος becomes numerous and strong. For οἱ προεστῶτες, which is explained by οἱ δημοσγωγοὶ in 11, cp. Plato, Rep. 565 A. Aristotle is concerned with τὸ καθιστάναι (or τὸ κατασκευάζειν, 12) down to the end of c. 4, but in c. 5 he passes to measures intended to preserve this kind of democracy. Contrast with his counsels the view expressed in Lys. Or. 20. pro Polystr. c. 13, πῶς δ' ἀν γένοιτο δημοτικότερος ἢ ὁστις ὑμῶν ψηφισμαένων πεντακαστάλως παραδοθῇ τὰ πράγματα καταλογοῦσιν ὃν ἐνακισχίλιος κατέλεξεν ... ; καίτοι οἴχ ὁ ἀν πλείστους πολίτας πιώσιν, οὕτω καταλινοῦσι τὸν δήμον, ἀλλ' οἱ ἅν ἐκ πλεύσων ἔλαττος.

9. τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ζὲ οἴκερον καὶ τοὺς ἄδεην ὅπερονοιν πολίτου. See note on 1278 a 26. This may have been done by the founders of the democracy at Cyrene (see 17 sqq.). Cleisthenes, though he was not the founder of an ultimate democracy, went still further, and brought absolute aliens into the tribes (3. 2. 1275 b 35 sqq.).

10. ἄπαν γὰρ ὁικεῖον τὸ ὁ τοιοῦτῳ δήμῳ μάλλον, 'for all this element is congenial to the kind of democracy of which we have been speaking rather than to any other' (cp. 20, χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν τοιαύτην). For μάλλον see note on 1270 b 33.

12. δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν κ.τ.λ., 'it is well, however, to add members to the citizen-body only until the mass of the citizens exceeds in number the notables and the moderately well-to-do.' Cp. 6 (4), 14. 1298 b 23 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq. The advice which Aristotle gives here is hardly in harmony with what he says in the latter of these two passages, for there he tells us that when the poor without the addition of the moderately well-to-
do to their side are more numerous than the rich, democracies do not last long. For μέχρι ἃν ὑπερτείνη cp. De Gen. An. 1. 21. 729 b 31, μέχρι ἃν συντήρηση, sc. τὸ κύμα (Bon. Ind. s. v. μέχρι).


17. ὅπερ, ‘which,’ i.e. the discontent of the notables with the democracy.

περὶ Κυρήνην. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 231. 1) takes the reference to be to the στάσις which Diodorus (14. 34) describes under the date of b. c. 401. Five hundred of the rich were put to death and many of the rest fled from the city, till after a battle in which the losses on both sides were large an arrangement was come to, and the rich were allowed to return. Compare the experience of Syracuse (Diod. 11. 86. 3).

19. ἕτε δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα κ.τ.λ. For τὰ τοιαῦτα οίς κ.τ.λ. see note on 1337 b 6. The measures referred to are measures for re-grouping the citizens in tribes phratries and worship, with a view to mingling them together and putting an end to pre-existing groupings not favourable to democracy. It is unfortunate that Aristotle does not tell us whether all the measures he mentions were adopted both by Cleisthenes and by the founders of the democracy at Cyrene, or, if not, which of them were adopted by Cleisthenes and which by the Cyrenians. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 230) thinks it likely that new and more numerous tribes and phratries were instituted at Cyrene when democracy was introduced there on the death of ArcesilauS IV somewhat after b. c. 462. We know that Cleisthenes introduced new and more numerous tribes at Athens (Hdt. 5. 69) and took pains to mingle the old and new citizens together (’Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21) and to break up the pre-existing political intimacies, but the statement (’Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21. l. 23), τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰς φρατρίας καὶ τὰς ἱεροσύνες ἐσαύρων ἤχειν ἐκάστους κατὰ τὰ πάτραμα, seems to me to imply that he did not introduce new and more numerous phratries, and is perhaps hardly consistent with his having made the change referred to in the worships of the State. Dr. Sandys (’Ἀθ. Πολ. p. 83), it is true, seeks to reconcile the statement in the ’Ἀθ. Πολ. with that before us by taking the former to refer only ‘to those who were already citizens connected with existing γένη and φρατρίαι.’ ‘Cleisthenes,’ he adds, ‘allowed all these to continue as of old in their respective γένη and φρατρίαι with their
religious institutions intact,' but ‘provided new φρατρίας’ for his νεοπολίται. The object of Cleisthenes, however, was to mingle the νεοπολίται with the old citizens (‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 21), and would he have been content to place the former in phratries of their own distinct from the others? Perhaps, if we seek to reconcile the two statements, the safest way of doing so is to suppose that Aristotle refers only to Cyrene in his mention of phratries in 1319 b 24. But even if the 'Αθ. Πολ. is from Aristotle's pen, which is doubtful, there is no reason why all its statements should agree with those of the Politics, for statements which are not in complete harmony with each other are to be found in the Politics itself. It is easy to understand why new tribes and phratries should be introduced on the foundation of a democracy, but why should they be more numerous than the pre-existing ones? Probably because small tribes and phratries do not break up the citizen-body so much as large and powerful ones. An university composed of four large colleges would be less of an unity than one composed of a dozen small ones. Plutarch tells us in Num. c. 17 that Numa softened the contrast between the Roman and Sabine elements in the citizen-body by breaking it up into smaller groups based on trade, διανασθεὶς ὅτι καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ φύσει δύσμικα καὶ σκληρὰ καταβραύσωσε καὶ διαιροῦσε ἀναμιγνύοντα, ὑπὸ μικρότητος ἀλλίως συμβαίνοντα μᾶλλον. The substitution of Departments for Provinces in France at the Revolution may be compared. The increase in the number of the ἐκατοντάδες at the Pontic Heracleia mentioned by Acenaeus in Poliorc. 11. 10 seems to have had a different object, and to have been intended to baffle the reasonable schemes of the rich, not to make the democracy more extreme. So again, when Marshal Boucault, the French Governor of Genoa from 1401 to 1409, 'broke up the old unions under constables and divided the citizens into fresh combinations for military purposes’ (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 233), and further steps of the same nature were taken in 1528 (ibid. p. 401 sq.), the object was to restore peace to the faction-ridden city, not to strengthen a democracy. The same thing may be said of Spenser’s suggestion in his ‘View of the State of Ireland’ (H. Morley, Ireland under Elizabeth and James I, p. 193 sqq.), that a division into tithings and hundreds should take the place of the division into septs. Still schemes of this kind help us to understand the measures referred to in the text.

21. βουλόμενος αὐξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν. Herodotus, on the
contrary, speaks of Cleisthenes as ὁ τὰς φυλὰς καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν Ἀθηναίων καταστήσας (6. 131). Aristotle here represents the object of Cleisthenes in his re-grouping of the citizens of Athens to have been the intensification of the democracy by the destruction of pre-existing unions which were the strongholds of an anti-democratic spirit, but in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21 the aim ascribed to him in his re-grouping is rather that of facilitating and paving the way for the introduction of new citizens. The two aims, however, do not lie far apart. Cleisthenes may, indeed, have had other aims also. The tribe was closely connected with the military organization of the State, and he may well have desired that the former military grouping of the citizens should be altered, for it evidently favoured the influence of the nobles. We may also conjecture looking to the way in which he constituted his new tribes, making each of them to consist of three trittyes, one in the seacoast region, another in the interior, and a third in the city and its neighbourhood (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21), that one of his aims was to put an end to feuds between different districts of Attica and to make the tribes willing and fit to work together in the Boulê and elsewhere by making them as uniform and as free from local feeling as possible.

24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα καὶ κοινά. Private worships were those in which it was not open to all the citizens to take part. So the Gephyraei at Athens had a private worship of their own (Hdt. 5. 61). As to the private worship of the phratry of the Clytidae at Chios see Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 360 (commented on by Prof. Percy Gardner in his Manual of Greek Antiquities, ed. 1, p. 197 sq.), where it appears that the images of the gods of the phratry were at one time kept in the private houses of certain influential members, not in a temple common to all, and that the sacrifices on festal days were long offered in these private houses, a circumstance which must have secured to their owners an ascendency in the phratry. It is to private worships of gentes and phratries and sacrificial unions that Aristotle refers here. He intends, it would seem, to ascribe to Cleisthenes a measure of the kind which he describes, for Cleisthenes certainly sought to mingle the citizens together (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21), but what the private worships were which he converted into a few public ones, it is not easy to say. Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 150) seems to take the reference to be to the worship of Ζεὺς φράτρων, Ἀθηνᾶ φρατρία, and Ἀπόλλων πατρός, but the point is doubtful.
Plato in the Laws (909 D sq.: see vol. i. p. 179) is little tolerant of exclusive private worships. The object ascribed to Cleisthenes by Aristotle (the intensification of the democracy) was probably not the only object he had in view in making private worships public. He sought also to put an end to the ignorance of each other and distrust of each other which the tyranny had probably produced in the minds of the citizens (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 4 sqq.). Common sacrifices drew men together and made them friendly to each other (Plato, Laws 738 D sq.). Herodotus (1. 59) speaks of τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἔθνος as κατεχόμενόν τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ἐπὸ Πεισιστρᾶτον, and Cleisthenes did his best to heal its divisions. Compare with his measures the introduction of the worship of the Emperor in the Roman Empire, as a worship in which all could join, whatever their national or local worship, and consequently a means of union.

25. καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον κ.τ.λ. For ἁναμχθώσι cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 21. ll. 4, 11. In αἱ συνήθειαι αἱ πρότερον the reference appears to be to intimacies based on the tribe, the phratry, and the private sacrificial union, perhaps also the ναυκρατία (cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 21. l. 19 sqq.). The new tribes of Cleisthenes were so constructed (see above on 21) as to mingle together residents in widely severed regions of Attica. Citizens living in districts at a distance from each other and formerly hostile were drawn together by being made members of the same tribe. Another means by which Cleisthenes sought to effect the same object was the classification of the citizens by demes, for this enabled him to make all citizens resident in the deme members of the State, whether they were the sons of Athenian fathers and mothers or not ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 21), and to break down family exclusiveness. Plutarch (Pericl. c. 3) justly says of Cleisthenes, νόμους ἔθετο καὶ πολιτείαν ἀριστα κεκραμένην πρὸς ὀμόσων καὶ σωτηρίαν κατέστησεν. Ὁποις ἂν is rarely used in the genuine writings of Aristotle (see Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, pp. 22 sq., 40 sq., and Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 55). It occurs with the optative in c. 5. 1320 a 35.

27. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικά κατασκευάσματα κ.τ.λ. See notes on 1313 b 32 and 35, and as to κατασκευάσμα note on 1271 a 33. Compare Demosth. Phil. 3. 3, who says, addressing the Athenians, ἤμεις τὴν παραστασιν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτω κοινήν οὐεθε δεῖν εἶναι πάισι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὡστε καὶ τοῖς ἔξων καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδομένην καὶ πολλοὺς ἂν τις ὀκήσας έδο παρ' ὑμῖν μετὰ πλείονος έξοφθασε δ' τε βούλονται λέγοντας ἃ πολίτες ἐν εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων. We read in
Polyb. 15. 30. 9 of a riot at Alexandria, ἐγένετο βοή καὶ κραυγὴ σύμ-μικτος, ὡς ἀν γνωσίων ὄμη καὶ παιδῶν ἀνθράσων ἀναμεμμετέχων· οὐ γὰρ ἀλάτων ποιεῖ τὰ παιδάρια τῶν ἀνδρῶν περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ταραχὰς ἐν τῇ Καρχηδονίων πόλει καὶ κατὰ τὴν 'Αλεξάνδρειαν.

29. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐν εἴη μέχρι του συμφέρουσα, 'and this would be [not only congenial to the extreme democracy, but also] up to a certain point advantageous to it.' For the distinction between what is δημοσιεύων and what is advantageous to democracy cp. 1318 b 27 sqq. For μέχρι του cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 18 sq. and 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 41, μέχρι τινός πλήθους. For the reason why indulgence to slaves is up to a certain point advantageous to an extreme democracy see 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 37 sqq.

30. πολὺ γὰρ ἐσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν, 'for many will be the quarters from which support will come to a constitution of the kind we have described' (i. e. to one which permits living as one likes). Τοῖς πολλοῖς takes up πολὺ.


34. For the order of the words in τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 30, στόματός τινα πλεία γένη, and Plato, Critias 112 E, τινὰ τοιαύτων . . . τρόπων.

36. μεῖναι, 'to hold one's ground' (i. e. τὴν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι: cp. 35): compare 1319 b 3, διαμένων, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 3, ἕναι μένωσιν οὐ μόνον ἀριστοκρατία ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀληθεία. For οὐ χαλεπῶν with the aor. infin. μεῖναι cp. Thuc. 6. 34. 4, χαλεπῶν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μήκος ἐν τάξει μεῖναι. Yet in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 28 we have χαλεπῶν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυίαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. So in 2. 7. 1266 a 40 sq. we have οὐ χαλεπῶν φεύ στοιχεῖν περὶ τοιαύτην καὶ in 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπῶν ἐστι τὰ τοιαύτα νοήσαι, άλλα ποίησαι μᾶλλον.

37. διὸ δεί κ.τ.λ. This passage, which cannot easily be detached from the context in which it stands (vol. ii. p. xxvii), and therefore can hardly have been added by a later hand than that of Aristotle, clearly indicates that the Seventh (old Fifth) Book should precede the Eighth (old Sixth) Book. Indeed, even if this passage were away, we might assume that the inquiry what institutions are most conducive to the preservation of an ultimate democracy would
follow, not precede, the treatment in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the whole subject of the preservation of constitutions. The experience of Rhodes (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 27 sqq.) and other States is as much present to Aristotle’s mind as that of Athens, but still we may gather from the counsels he gives what practical suggestions he would make for the improvement of the Athenian democracy. His recommendations appear very gentle when we compare them with the sweeping and severe change which Antipater made in the constitution in the year of Aristotle’s death (Diod. 18. 18).

We might have expected some reference to be made here to the fact that ultimate democracies have already been counselled in 6 (4).

14. 1298 b 13 sqq. as to the way in which the deliberative should be organized in them. In that passage, however, Aristotle’s aim is to enable the deliberative to do its work better, whereas here the object is to point out how an ultimate democracy should be organized and managed so as to be durable.


40. τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοῦς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους κ.τ.λ. It is here implied that the lawgiver is the source not only of written, but also of unwritten law (see vol. i. p. 75, note 1, and cp. Plato, Polit. 295 A, τῶν νόμων θέσει, καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν ἀποδιδοῦσι, καὶ ἐν ἀγραμμάτοις, πατρίως δὲ, θεαὶ νομοθέτῶν, and Thuc. 2. 97. 4, where an unwritten law is probably referred to).

He may, for instance, create among the γυναῖκαι a custom of starting the poor in trades or making their own property common in use (1320 b 7 sqq.). A custom like this would not be embodied in writing. Cp. Hesych. Miles. Fragm. 4. c. 32 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 4. 152), καὶ στρατηγὸς τῶν παντὸς ἀναδιείχεις δῆμου πάσαν ὁμοῦ τῆν πόλιν εἰς τὸ μείζων καὶ ὀφέλιμον μετερρήμασε, νόμους τε περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν συμβολαίων τιθέμενος καὶ ἡθὴ καθότατα πολιτικὰ τε καὶ ἥμερα, δὲ ἐν ἀστείοις τε καὶ φιλανθρώποι τοὺς πολιτὰς ἀπέδειξεν. As to the relation of unwritten to written law see Plato, Laws 793 A sqq. and note on 1287 b 5. The laws and customs which Aristotle would recommend in an ultimate democracy would be laws and customs preventing oppression of the rich and tending permanently to increase the material prosperity of the poor (1320 a 4–b 16), discouraging living as one pleases (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.), associating rich and poor in the deliberative (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.) and the magistracies (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.), and the like.
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4. οἱ δὲ νῦν δημαγωγοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 29, ὅ νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν, and (with Sus., Note 1458) c. 7. 1321 a 40 sqq., and also 2. 12. 1274 a 10, τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Διὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων is added because confiscation was sometimes decreed by the assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6). See Bernays, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, i. 173, and as to other accounts in the Politics of the ways in which the rich suffered oppression in democracies note on 1304 b 21. The reference is to Eubulus among others (see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 435 on Demosth. De Chers. c. 69, οὔτε μὲν γὰρ ... παριδῶν ἀπονοοῖε τῇ πόλει κρίνει δημοῖει διδώσαν κατηγορεῖ, and c. 71, δυνάμειος ἄν ἴσος, ὀστρεὶ καὶ ἐτέρου, κατηγορεῖ καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεῖσαι καὶ τύλλ' ἀ ποιοῦσιν οὔτω ποιεῖν). Compare Plato, Gorg. 466 λ–ε, and Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 22, where the Boule is said, when it is driven by impecuniosity to resort to confiscation, to do so under pressure from demagogues. The penalty of confiscation was inflicted at Athens either separately or, as more often happened, as an accompaniment of sentences of death, life-long exile, the severer form of ἄτμια, or enslavement, and therefore might be incurred for non-political offences (Meier und SchömAnn, Der attische Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 959: C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, 2. 125 sq.: Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la République Athénienne, p. 121 sq.), but the charges on which rich men whose wealth was coveted would be most likely to incur it would be those of treason, sacrilege, a design to upset the democracy, and wrong to the Athenian people. Plato in the Laws, wishing to preserve the lots of land intact, forbids confiscation except in one extreme case (855 A, 856 C sqq.: vol. i. p. 441), and Aristotle might well have gone a little further than he does and recommended the abolition of this penalty, which ‘has disappeared in our own days from most of the criminal codes of Europe’ (Thonissen, p. 128). Still the change which he suggests would have been very beneficial. At Athens, when the penalty of confiscation was inflicted, only a tenth went to Athena (Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 10). It must be remembered, however, that sacred funds could be borrowed under certain restrictions by the State (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 336), so that the State profited by any addition to them, and thus the dicasts would have a motive for inflicting the penalty, even though the confiscated property became
part of a sacred fund. The rule at Athens by which the expense of keeping the lawcourts on foot was defrayed from the fees of the suitors and the fines imposed on the condemned (Gilbert, ibid. p. 339) was a singularly unfortunate one, inasmuch as it gave the dicasts a direct interest in imposing high fines, their own pay being thus secured. Part of these fines seems, however, to have gone to provide pay for the assembly (see note on 17).

8. πρὸς ταύτα. Cp. c. 7. 1321 a 16, πρὸς τούτο.


7. μηδὲν εἶναι δημόσιον τῶν καταδικαζομένων, ‘that nothing belonging to those who are (from time to time) condemned should be public property.’ Tῶν καταδικαζομένων must be masc., like τῶν κρυμφέμων in 11 and τῶν καταδικασθέντων in c. 8. 1321 b 42, but μηδὲν τῶν καταδικαζομένων is, as Richards points out, curious Greek.

dημόσιον . . . ἱερὸν. The marked distinction between public and sacred property should be noticed: cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 34. In modern times the question has been raised whether Church property is the property of the State or not.

10. ζημιῶσονται. The future middle of ζημιῶω is often used in a passive sense, but the future passive also often occurs (see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v.).

11. τὰς γυνομένας δημοσίας δίκας. Public actions at Athens were those in which an offence against the State, not merely against an individual, was charged, and this offence might be of two kinds, either directly against an individual and indirectly against the State or directly against the State and indirectly against an individual. Public actions, in fact, might be concerned either with political or with non-political offences. See Meier und Schömann, Der attische Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 195 sqq., and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 404 sq. They might be brought by ἰ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἰς ἔξειστι (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. 549), and not merely by persons specially interested. As Aristotle speaks of their being brought against γνώμα, he probably refers mainly to public actions relating to political offences.

12. μεγάλοις ἐπιτιμίοις τὸς εἰκή γραφομένους κολύοντας. At Athens in most public actions, if the prosecutor did not obtain a fifth of the votes given by the dicasts, he became liable to a penalty of 1,000 drachmae and lost the right of bringing similar actions in

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future (Meier und Schömann, Der att. Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 951 sq.: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 413 sq.; C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. 585 sq.). According to Pollux, 8. 41 failure in a charge of ἀσίβεια was punished with death, but see as to this Meier und Schömann, p. 375, note.

15. καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 'to the constitution also,' as well as to οἱ κύριοι under it.

16. μὴ τοῖς γε. See critical note on 1308 b 15.

ἄς πολεμίωσες νομίζειν τοὺς κυρίους. Cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 1, ἥν ὦς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτήν τῇ λεχθέσιν πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γενειασίν.

17. ἐπεὶ θ' αἱ τελευταία δημοκρατίαι κ.τ.λ. The ultimate democracy involved considerable expense to the State, because under it all the citizens expected to share in political functions (c. 4. 1319 b 2), and yet they were both many in number and to a large extent poor men who could not easily attend the assembly without pay; hence when special revenues (as to the meaning of the word πρόσωποι, which is here tacitly distinguished from εἰσφορά, see note on 1292 b 30) were not forthcoming, the heavy burden of paying the fees of the many members of the assembly fell on the rich, and the necessary funds were often exacted from them by means of eisphorae, confiscation, and the imposition of penalties by the dicasteries (cp. Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 22: Or. 27. c. Epicr. c. 1), for part of these penalties would seem from what is said here to have gone to provide pay for members of the assembly. On the other hand, when special revenues were forthcoming (and this was the case of Athens, for even when she had few or no dependent allies, she had a great emporium at the Peiraeus and silver-mines at Laurium), the demagogues often squandered their proceeds in distributions of doles of money to the poorer citizens, which were spent as soon as received and left the recipients as much in need of pecuniary help as ever. In both cases Aristotle recommends that the meetings of the assembly should be few (22 sq. and 1320 b 2 sqq.), and he probably desires in both cases that the dicasteries should meet only for a few days, though he dwells on this explicitly only in the case in which special revenues are not forthcoming (23 sq.). It seems likely from his language here that the provision of pay for the assembly was one of the heaviest of the burdens entailed by the ultimate democracy, and this is not surprising, for we learn from Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 62. 1. 6 sqq. that each
member of the Athenian assembly in Aristotle’s day received nine obols for attendance at a κυρία ἐκκλησία and a drachma for attendance at others. At Athens there were forty ordinary meetings of the assembly in the year, four in each prytany, one of the four being a κυρία ἐκκλησία (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 43. ll. 13 sq., 17), so that the expense would obviously be considerable.

18. τούτο, ‘this circumstance,’ i.e. the circumstance that the citizens are numerous and cannot easily attend the assembly without pay.


20. γίνεσθαι, sc. τὸν μισθὸν, which must be obtained from ἀμίσθους.

18. See notes on 1311 a 34 and 1321 a 21.


δ τολλάς ἡδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέτρεψεν. ’Α, ‘things which,’ probably refers not to δικαστηρίων φαίλων only, but also to εἰσφοράς καὶ δημεσθέντως. For the tense of ἀνέτρεψεν see note on 1303 a 27. Aristotle perhaps has in view the cases of Cos, Rhodes, Megara, the Pontic Heracleia, and Cyme (7 (5). §. 1304 b 25 sqq.: 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 23 sq.). For the fact cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 36 sqq.

22. ὅπου μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν introduces the apodosis, as in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 18 sqq. (Bon. Ind. 540 b 38 sq.). Aristotle speaks here as if the number of the meetings of the assembly and the dicasteries depended on the will of the authorities of the State. But they would hardly be able to limit the number of the meetings without withdrawing matters from the assembly and dicasteries with which they would otherwise have dealt, and empowering the magistrates to deal with these matters. Would this be possible in an ultimate democracy? And would it be possible in such a democracy to make the assembly and dicasteries meet less often and so to reduce the amount of pay received by their members?

23. δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλίγαις δ’ ἡμέραις, ‘dicasteries with many members, but sitting on only a few days,’ costly in the one way but not in the other. Aristotle abstains from making the number of the members few, because that would be unsuitable to an ultimate democracy, and besides would have no chance of acceptance. As to ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις, contrast the practice at Athens, where the dicasteries sat on all days except festivals and unlucky days and days on which the assembly met (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 403 sqq.).
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26. oI δ' ἄποροι, ‘but the poor [alone receive it].’ Here, as often elsewhere, ‘only’ is suppressed. See note on 1282 a 36.

φέρει δὲ καὶ πρόσ τὸ κρίνεσθαι τάς δίκας πολὺ βελτίων. Judicial work, no less than deliberative (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.), is thought by Aristotle to be performed better when rich and poor act together than when the poor act by themselves.

29. ὅπως δ' εἰσιν πρόσοδοι κ.τ.λ. It is not quite clear whether νῦν means ‘as it is’ and stands in contrast to what ought to be, or ‘now’ in contrast to ‘formerly.’ Susemihl and Welldon give it the latter sense. If they are right, there may be an intention tacitly to contrast the conduct of later demagogues with that of Themistocles, who persuaded the citizens of Athens to use the surplus revenues from Laurium for the building of a fleet (Hdt. 7. 144: Plut. Themist. c. 4: ‘Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22). Later demagogues distributed surplus funds as Thoric money to enable the poorer citizens to take part in festivals, and especially the Dionysia and Panathenaea. Aristotle refers perhaps to Pericles (Plut. Pericl. c. 9) and his successors (Plut. Aristid. c. 24, Περικλέους δ' ἀποθανόντος . . . οἱ δημαγωγοὶ . . . τὸν δῆμον εἰς διανομὰς καὶ θεωρίας καὶ κατασκευὰς ἄγαλματων καὶ λεπτῶν προαιρετῶν): more certainly to Eubulus (Theopomp. Fr. 96 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 184: Beloch, Att. Polihek, p. 178. 2), Diophantus (Beloch, ibid. p. 180. 4), and Demades (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 194). Compare Aristoph. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 42 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1186),

κρινάντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καυτολίζει τῶν πένθων,

Demosth. Ol. 3. 33 (also Prooem. 53 suB fín. p. 1459 sq.), and [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 4. Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 87. 1491 a 39 sqq. We expect Aristotle to recommend that the proceeds of the special revenues shall be spent not in distributions of money, but in providing pay for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries, and this is what he would probably wish to be done, as soon as the demos has been sufficiently enriched; for the present, however, he recommends in preference that the proceeds of these revenues shall be spent in promoting the permanent enrichment of the poorer citizens, and that, while they are needed for this purpose, the rich shall be enabled to supply pay for the assembly and dicasteries by being relieved of the burden of useless liturgies.

30. λαμβάνουσι δὲ ἄμω, sc. oI ἄποροι. The poor receive the money distributed and after a little need a fresh supply, just as the leaky pitchers of the Danaides receive water and in a moment need more.
Cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 154, Δαυαϊδων πίθος ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ μὴ πληρομένων, and 2. 161, εἰς τῶν τετρημένων πίθον ἐπὶ τῶν μάτην ἀναλισκόντων. See Frazer’s Pausanias, 5. 388 sqq.

34. τούτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μαχητῶς εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν. A similar view underlies the Areopagitic Oration of Isocrates (see e.g. §§ 44 sq., 54 sq.). He seems to ascribe the poverty prevailing at Athens in his day mainly to the laziness of the Athenian poor and to the absence of any authority like the Council of the Areopagus to compel them to work and to encourage the rich to assist them to do so (§§ 32 sq., 55). He does not ask how far it was due to the competition of metoeci and slaves, and to the provision of pay for attendance in the assembly and dicasteries, which must have tended to withdraw the poorer citizens from the paths of industry and trade. Poverty, he says (§ 44), led to ill-doing, and we gather that, in his view, it lay at the root of the unsatisfactory condition of matters political at Athens. Aristotle appears to agree (cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 10 sqq.), though the remedy suggested by him in the passage before us is not the re-establishment of the Council of the Areopagus. He would perhaps add that when the many are very poor, they need to be maintained by the State (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19); thus they need pay and frequent meetings of the assembly and dicasteries, and in the end become supreme in place of the law (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1–10).

35. τεκναστένον οὖν ὅπως ἄν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος. Eucken (De Partic. Usu. p. 52 sqq.) remarks that this passage and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 10 sqq. offer exceptions to the general rule which prevails in Aristotle’s writings: ‘nullo enim loco optativo post particulas finales utitur, sed promiscue et post tempus praesens et post praeteritum coniunctivum adhibet.’ See Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 40 sqq., who says of the passage before us, ‘in the form of the sentence there is an unmistakable approximation to an indirect question, but on the other hand it is equally impossible to contest with success its indubitably final signification.’ As to ὅπως ἄν see note on 1319 b 25.

ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τούτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle’s advice is—use all the surplus revenue in giving the poorer citizens either simultaneously or by successive sections a start in farming or trade, relieve the rich of all useless liturgies, and make them contribute pay for such meetings of the assembly and dicasteries as are absolutely necessary. The result of this will be that the pauper
demos living by attendance at frequent meetings of the assembly and dicasteries will be replaced by a better-to-do demos occupied in farming and trade, and therefore content with a few meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. It is when the assembly meets frequently that it claims all authority for itself and exalts itself above the magistracies and above the law (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.). Aristotle, indeed, wishes the rich to do more, not merely to contribute pay for the assembly and dicasteries, but to do the same with their private income as the State does with its surplus revenue —to use it in giving the poor a start in business. He gets this idea from Isocrates, as we shall see presently. It will be noticed that Aristotle’s plan for the enrichment of the demos presupposes the existence of special State-revenues and a surplus from them. It would not be applicable to States not possessing surplus revenues. It is not clear whether he intends the advice which he gives the rich in 1320 b 7 sqq. to apply to States which do not possess surplus revenues, as well as to those which do.

37. συναθροίζοντας and αὐρά are emphatic. The surplus revenues are not to be served out in driblets as fast as they come in, but a fund is to be formed and advances made from it, by way of gift, it would seem, not by way of loan.

38. μάλιστα μὲν κ.τ.λ. To give the poor the means of purchasing a piece of land would be to make peasant-proprietors of them, and peasant-proprietors had this merit among others, that they were content with rare meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. If there were not funds enough for that, it might be possible to help the poor to rent a piece of land or to supply them with tools or seed or oxen for ploughing. We might have expected Aristotle to suggest that the State should let some of its public land to poor men, but this he does not do. Probably Greek States had not commonly much at their disposal for this purpose. He seems to have no fear of the success of his paupers in farming; the veterans of Sulla’s Asiatic army, whom he provided with land, do not, however, appear to have prospered as farmers (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 116). He no doubt remembers the advice of Phocylides (Fragm. 7),

χρησιμοι πλούτου μελέτην ἐχει πῖνον ἄγροιν ἄγρων γάρ τε λέγουσιν Ἀμαλβείης κέρας ἐβαλι.

For the brevity of ὅσων εἰς γραμμών κτήσων cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 16 sq. and 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 38.
39. εἰ δὲ μὴν, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ γεωργίας. Καὶ, 'ορ,'
as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 and elsewhere. This advice is based on
Isocrates’ account of the ways of the rich at Athens in the days of
Solon and Cleisthenes (Areop. § 32, ὅταν ὅσεσα ἔχουσα... ἐπὶ ἡμῶν
τῶν ἐνδείκτων (τῶν πολιτῶν), τοῖς μὲν γεωργίας ἐπὶ μετρίας μαθωσοῦσιν παρα-
dιδώσεις, τοῖς δὲ κατ’ ἐμπορίαν ἐκκέποισουσι, τοῖς δ΄ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας
7. 3, and the account given of Peisistratus in Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 16 and
Ael. Var. Hist. 9. 25, where we read how Peisistratus used to send
for those who idled away their time in marketplaces, and ask
them why they did so, καὶ ἐπέλεγεν, Ἐι μὲν σοὶ τέθηκε ἥγιος, παρ’ ἐμὸν
λαβὼν ὅπλα καὶ ἐργάζομαι εἰ δὲ ἄπορες σπερματών τοι, ἐπὶ ἐμὸν σοι γενέσθω
δεδώσ μὴ ἡ σχολὴ τούτων ἐπιζουλὴν τέκη. Ἐμπορία is used here in a
broader sense than in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 5, where it is distinguished from
καπηλεία. Was the advice given here known to Tiberius
Gracchus when he introduced his law respecting Attalus’ bequest
to the Roman people (Plut. Tib. Gracch. c. 14, εἰδὼς ὅ τι βέβαιος
dημαγογούν εἰσήγηκεν νόμον, ὅταν τὸ βασιλικὰ χρήματα κοινωθῆνα τοῖς τὴν
χώραν διαλογισάντω τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπάρχοι πρὸς κατασκευῆν καὶ γεωργίας
ἀφορμὴν;)

2. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ., ‘and in the meantime,’ i. e. while the sur-
plus revenue of the State, which might otherwise be employed in
supplying pay for the assembly and dicasteries, has to be employed
in lifting the poor out of pauperism. Τὰς ἀναγκάσεις συνώδους probably
includes meetings both of the assembly and of the dicasteries.

4. τῶν ματαιῶν λειτουργιῶν. See note on 1309 a 18. Aristotle
evidently thinks that the rich would not be able to pay these liturgies
in addition to providing pay for the assembly and dicasteries. They
were, however, probably often expected to do so.

τοιοῦτον δὲ τινὰ τρόπον κ.τ.λ., i. e. by enriching the demos (2.
11. 1273 b 18 sqq.). Φίλων, i. e. to the constitution and the ruling
class (cp. 1320 a 14 sqq.). The fact that the demos at Carthage
was thus disposed was probably one reason why no one succeeded
in establishing a tyranny there (2. 11. 1272 b 30–33: cp. 7 (5). 5.
1305a 21 sqq.). Compare with the passage before us the humorous
suggestion of the Athenian Epicrates, ψήφισμα γράφειν φάσκοντος
αἵτις τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχῶντων χειροτονεῖσθαι καὶ ἐναιστὸν ἐννέα πράξεις πρὸς
βασιλέα τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ πενήντων, ὅπως λαμβάνωτε εὐπορῶς (Plut.
Pelop. c. 30). The senate at Rome had many opportunities of
enriching members of the demos and used them (Polyb. 6. 17. 1–5).
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7. χαριτών δ’ εστὶ καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle’s meaning is, ‘but if the notables are men of sense and good feeling, they will do more than simply relieve the poor in the aggregate by supplying pay for the assembly and dicasteries, they will in addition each take charge of a section of the poor and start it in some business.’ This will be a sensible course for them to take, for the better able the poor are to support themselves, the less demand there will be for the pay of the State and the lighter will be the burden on the rich. Aristotle’s counsel is no doubt suggested by the traditions as to the ways of the rich at Athens which have been noticed above on 1320 a 39. Probably in his own day this form of charitable activity had died out there. We read of the rich at Rhodes in Strabo, p. 653, οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ ὡς δήμος καὶ οἱ εὐποροι τοὺς ἐνδείκτος ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔθει τοῖς πατρίῳ. At Rome the patricians were helpful in many ways to their clients. See as to the nobles of mediaeval Venice H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 258, and as to those of Switzerland, Roscher, Politik, p. 157. For διαλαμβάνοντες cp. Polyb. i. 26. 5, τοῖς μὲν χαρίσμοι τοῖς πρεσ-βεῦσαι συνέταξε δι’ ἀπορρήτων ὁ Πόλιος ἀπαντῶν τοῖς ἀποστάταις, καὶ διελιμένους ἑκατόν πέντε τῶν ἄρχηγῶν τῆς στάσεως εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν ἀπάν-τησιν φιλανθρωπεία καὶ καλεῖν ὧς αὐτοὺς. If each rich man took charge of a section of the poor, not only would there be no ‘overlapping of charity,’ but a cordial relation would spring up between the rich man and those whom he befriended. ‘The individualizing of the work [of relief], which assigns to each almoner as limited an area as possible,’ is a feature of the Elberfeld system of poor-law administration (G. Drage, Report on Germany to the Royal Commission on Labour, p. 87).

9. καλὸς δ’ ἔχει μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντῖνων. It was probably from their Lacedaemonian ancestors (cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 35 sqq.) that the Tarentines inherited the practice of making possessions common in use. They also made part of their magistracies specially accessible to the poor by arranging that they should be filled by lot. It is not said that Tarentum enriched its poor by these two measures, as Carthage did, but at any rate it won their good-will. Carthage had ἀληθῶτα ἀρχαὶ to give (2. 11. 1273 a 17). The rich at Tarentum were all the better able to be generous to the
demos because the Tarentine demos does not seem, like the Athenian, to have been greedy for State-pay (Theopomp. Fragm. 95: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293).

10. κοινά...ἐπὶ τὴν χρήσει, 'common for purposes of use.' Ἐπὶ is used here 'vi finalī' (Bon. Ind. 269 a 5). See note on 1315 a 24. We have κοινοὶ τῇ χρήσει in 2. 5. 1263 a 38 sq. and 4 (7).

10. 1330 a 1 sq.

11. ἕτε δὲ τὰς ἄρχας πάσας κ.τ.λ., 'and further they made the magistracies as a whole of two kinds, some of them elective and others filled by lot.' Τὰς ἄρχας πάσας stands in contrast to τῆς αὐτῆς ἄρχης. 15. Ἐποίησαν does not imply that this arrangement did not exist at Tarentum in Aristotle's day. A similar plan is recommended in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 12 sqq. At Athens there were both αἱρεταί and κληρωταί ἄρχαι, but those only were αἱρεταί for which the lot would have been unsuitable (c. 2. 1317 b 20 sqq.: [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3). Savonarola introduced a system like the Tarentine at Florence, probably being influenced by the teaching of the Politics. 'He suggested that while all the most important offices should be filled by election, lots might be drawn for the minor ones, by which system every citizen could hope to take some part in the government' (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 354). For the interchange of ὅπος and ἦνα see note on 1333 b 40.

14. ἕτε δὲ τούτο ποιῆσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄρχης μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δὲ αἱρετοὺς. Sepulveda and Vict. connect καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄρχης with μερίζοντας, the latter translating 'licet autem hoc facere, et eiusdem magistratus partientes'; Lamb. with τούτο ποιῆσαι, translating 'licet autem hoc facere etiam in eodem magistratu.' The sentence is mostly translated more or less as Lamb. translates it, but, if we take it thus, the use of the genitive seems strange, though it is true that Aristotle sometimes uses the genitive in the sense of 'in respect of': cp. De Part. An. 4. 11. 691 a 18, ἵσχυρότεραι γὰρ γίνονται τῶν ὀστῶν ('in respect of the bones') ὡς οὖσα τακτᾶται τὴν φύσιν. I incline myself to suggest a third interpretation. Is not τῆς αὐτῆς ἄρχης in the gen. after τούς μὲν and τοὺς δὲ? Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 8, οὗν εἶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δικαστηρίῳ εἶν τοίς μὲν ἐκ πάντων οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν. If this is so, we should translate, 'but it is possible to do this also by parting off some members of the same magistracy from others [and making] the former appointed by lot and the latter appointed by election.' The plan suggested by
Aristotle would hardly be applicable to military offices. It would not be advisable to appoint any generals by lot.

C. 8. 18. πῶς δεῖ, sc. κατασκευάζεων τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.

19. έκ τῶν ἑναντίων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This passage has been interpreted in different ways. Vict. and Sus. take συνάγεις ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν together and translate these words 'put together each form of oligarchy.' Lamb., on the other hand, followed by Giph., takes ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν not with συνάγεις, but with ἀναλογιζόμενον, translating 'oportet enim ex contrariis colligere, unaquaque oligarchia ad contrariam democratiam spectata et relata.' Welldon takes ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν with συνάγεις, but translates 'infer the characteristics of the several forms of oligarchy.' Jowett translates, 'we have only to reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy'; he seems, therefore, to agree with Welldon as to the meaning of συνάγεις, but to take ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν, like Lamb. and Giph., not with συνάγεις, but with ἀναλογιζόμενον. The true interpretation of the passage is doubtful. The rendering of Vict. and Sus. attaches an unusual meaning to συνάγεις, but cp. Plato, Polit. 310 E, λείον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον εὔπτρον ὑφασμα ξυνάγοντα ἐξ αὐτῶν. I incline on the whole to adopt it (cp. c. 1. 1317 a 18 sqq.) and to translate, 'for it is from the opposite institutions [to those which go with each form of democracy] that we must put together each form of oligarchy, calculating the structure of each in relation to that of the opposite democracy, the most tempered of the oligarchies and first in order [in relation to the first kind of democracy].'

Aristotle would have added 'in relation to the first kind of democracy,' if he had not been prevented doing so by the length to which his comparison of this oligarchy to the polity extends. The adoption of two property-qualifications, one for the major offices and the other for the minor, evidences a readiness to pay regard to the claims of both the rich and the poor, which relates this oligarchy to the polity, and indeed also to the first form of democracy (c. 4. 1318 b 30 sqq.). Is this double property-qualification, however, quite consistent with that equality within the privileged class which is recommended in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 10 sqq.? One difference between the first form of oligarchy and the polity is that while in the polity those who possess political rights are, or ought to be, more numerous than those who do not (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 2-6), the reverse is the case in the first form of oligarchy (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.).
22. ἕν 'for which.'

τὰ τιμῆμα διαμένσι. See note on 1318 a 12.

25. τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1321 a 26 sqq. and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 29 sq. Supply δεῖ with ἐξέινα from what precedes. Sus. 2 (Note 1444) explains that the lower of the two property-qualifications is referred to here.

26. τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένους κ.τ.λ. This reminds us of Theramenes' speech in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 42, εὐθέ γε τὸ φρουρῶς μισθοῦσθαι συνήρεσκε μοι, εἴον αὐτῶν τῶν πολιτῶν τοσοῦτον προσλαμβάνει, ἐως ὁρισμός ἐρμηνευτέοι τῶν ἀρχομένων κρατήσειν. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. for the acc. plur. participle is introduced without any strict grammatical connexion with the rest of the sentence, cp. c. 7. 1321 a 30 and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 60, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν καὶ τούτων εἰς[α] ἐξαγωγήν, εἰσέχεται 'Αμύντα τοῖς ἐξήγεισι, τελεύσατο τὰ τέλα τὰ γεγραμμένα, and see Stallbaum on Laws, Platts 759 B.


34. καὶ πλοία τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα . . . τοῖς πλωτήριοιν, 'and vessels well constituted for navigation and' (or 'both in other respects and') 'in respect of their crews.' See critical note on 1320 b 35.

37. τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα, 'ships whose joints are unstrung.' Cp. Pollux, i. 114, διαλεύθεσις τῆς νεώς. In τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα we have 'an unusual order of words for a partitive genitive, but cp. Thuc. 1. 25. 4, τοῖς 'Ελλήνων πλοιονιστάτοις, and 6. 62. 5: Plato, Soph. 247 C, Laws 906 C sq., 952 E' (Richards).

1. τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., 7 (5). 1821 a. 7. 1307 a 16, ὀσπέρ ἀσφαλείστερα αἱ τοιαῦται (i.e. αἱ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποκλίνουσαι πολιτείαι) τῶν ἐτέρων εἰσίν' κρείττον τι γὰρ τὸ πλείον κ.τ.λ., and 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36, καὶ δ' αὐτῆς (σώζεσθαι) μή τὸ πλείου εἴων τοὺς βουλευόμενους (εἰς γὰρ ἄν καὶ ποιηθῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦθ' ύπάρχῃ). 'Ἡ πολιονισμία, 'the largeness of the citizen-body': see note on 1327 a 11.

2. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντικεῖται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἄξιάν, 'for this is the antithesis to justice according to desert [which is the
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safeguard of the constitutions opposed to democracy].’ Cp. 7 (5).
i. 1302 a 2 sqq., and for κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν (not κατ’ ἀξίαν, as usually),
7 (5). 2. 1302 b 14.

3. For ὢντι τῆς εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας cp. Xen.
Mem. 4. 8. 10, οὖν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμελεῖα τεῦχομαι ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων, and
Cyrop. 1. 6. 10, ἐπὶ ἄλλοιν αἰδοὺς τεῦξει: also Plato, Soph. 225 C.
Good order is the opposite of πολιονθρωπία, for it is inapplicable to
a great multitude (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31 sq.). In Thessaly oligarchy
often found a home, yet we read of it in Plato, Crito, 53 D, ἐκεὶ γὰρ
δὴ πλείοτη ἄταξια καὶ ἀκολασία (cp. Athen. Deipn. 527 a).

C. 7. 5. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέταρα μὲν ἔστι μέρη μᾶλλον τοῦ πλῆθους κ.τ.λ.
See note on 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 32, where three kinds of demos
only are enumerated. Τέταρα μᾶλλον, ‘about four’: cp. Hist.
An. 9. 14. 616 a 33, τίτκει δὲ περὶ πινύτε μᾶλλον ὃν ὁ ἄλκων).
The fact that there are four parts of the πλῆθος seems to be
mentioned not because it has any bearing on what follows, but
to prepare the way for a mention of the similar quadruple division
of τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον. Founders of oligarchies must not
introduce narrow oligarchies anywhere and everywhere, but only
where the character of the State-territory makes cavalry the most
important force. This remark was needed, for Lysander had set
up narrow oligarchies in a number of States, and in particular at
Athens. It slightly qualifies the advice given in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b
31 sqq. (see note on that passage). Aristotle further counsels
founders of oligarchies, if they have to do with a State in which
light-armed troops are numerous, to take measures to secure
a supply of such troops on the side of the oligarchs. Some
oligarchies had been driven by a pressing need of troops to
give the many a share in the constitution (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 25
sqq.), and Aristotle perhaps remembers the fatal results of this
step when he recommends in 26 sqq. that this should not be done
in a wholesale fashion, but in one of three ways which he
enumerates. As a further means of contenting the demos, he
recommends that the tenure of high office in oligarchies should
be connected with the discharge of costly liturgies.

8. ὅποι μὲν συμβέβηκε κ.τ.λ. For ὅποι μὲν—ἐνταξία μὲν cp. 3. 6.
1279 a 17 sqq. This was the case at Chalcis and Eretria and at
Magnesia on the Maeander and many other cities of Asia Minor
(6 (4). 3. 1289 b 39 sqq.). In the broad open plains of Asia Minor
cavalry was the most important force, as both Agesilaus (Xen.
8 (6). 6. 1321 a 3—7. 1321 a 16.

Hell. 3. 4. 15: Plut. Ages. c. 9) and Alexander (Plut. Alex. c. 16) found. The same was the case in Thessaly (see the account in Diod. 15. 71. 4 sq. of the successful resistance offered by Alexander of Pherae and his cavalry to the invading Boeotian army), and Aristotle perhaps remembers that Philip of Macedon introduced narrow oligarchies (decadarchies) there (Demosth. Phil. 2. 22: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 324). Crete, on the other hand, was not suited for cavalry (Plato, Laws 625 D), nor Attica (Hdt. 9. 13: cp. 5. 63).

11. αὶ δὲ ἵπποτροφεῖα κ.τ.λ. See note on 1289 b 35. For μακρὰς οὐσίας cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16.

12. δοκεῖ δὲ ὀπλιτικήν, sc. συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἰσα. Boeotia was of this character (Plut. Aristid. c. 10, καλὸν δὲ τὸ Βοιωτίου πεδίου ἀγαθὸς ἵππεσκέλει καὶ ἐπίλημα ἐναγωνισαμένοι). That plains were suited to hoplites is clear from Polyb. 4. 14. 6. See note on 1289 b 31.

13. ἡ δὲ ψυλὴ δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοτικὴ πάμπαν. Hence it is not surprising to find the oligarchies of Chalcis and Eretria, when at war with each other about the Lelantine plain, agreeing μὴ χρῆσθαι τηλεβόλου (Strabo, p. 448). When Aristotle speaks of light-armed and naval forces as supplied by the demos, it must be borne in mind that mercenaries were often employed in both these kinds of force. Light-armed troops were obtainable from Crete, Acarnania, and elsewhere (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 25). The fleet of Dionysius the Elder was partly manned by citizens, partly by aliens (Diod. 14. 43. 4), partly by emancipated slaves (Diod. 14. 58. 1). See also notes on 1327 b 11 and 1291 b 20.

14. εἶν μὲν οὖν οὕν κ.τ.λ., ‘as things are, indeed, where there are large numbers of light-armed and trireme-oarsmen, when the citizens have fallen asunder into two hostile bodies, the oligarchs often get the worst of it.’ There were probably many light-armed at Argos when the many defeated the few (Thuc. 5. 82. 2: cp. Paus. 2. 20. 2), and many light-armed and trireme-oarsmen at Corcyra when the same thing happened there (Thuc. 3. 74). Ἄτων διαστῶσι, cp. 19, ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 196 a 23 sqq.) groups the passage before us with Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 15, οὗ φίλοι ἐκαυτοί, ἀλλὰ διαστάσεις, and Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 19 sq. Cp. also Thuc. 1. 18. 6, εἰ τινὲς πολεοδομοί. For πρὸς τούτο cp. c. 5. 1320 a 6.
The combined use of hoplites and light-armed is traceable at a very early date: see Tyrtaeus, ii. 35 sqq. Aristides (Plut. Aristid. c. 14) sent Olympiodorus against the Persian cavalry under Masistius, ἐξοστά τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτῷ τεταγμένους λογίδας τριακοσίους καὶ τοξότας ἀναμεμειγμένους σὺν αὐτοῖς. As to the combination of light-armed and cavalry, an early instance of this occurs in the defeat of the Athenians at Spartolus by the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans in B.C. 429 (Thuc. 2. 79). We first hear of ἄμιπτοι in connexion with Boeotian troops (Thuc. 5. 57. 2, Βοιωτοί μὲν πεντακισχίλιοι ὄπληται καὶ τοσοῦτοι ψυλοὶ καὶ ἵππης πεντακόσιοι καὶ ἄμιπτοι ίσοι). Epaminondas made a great point of the use of them (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 23 sqq.: cp. Diod. 15. 71. 6, 85. 4). We find Agesilaus using peltastae intermingled with cavalry against the cavalry of Tissaphernes (Plut. Ages. c. 10, τῶν ἵππεων ἀναμίκτως τὸ πελταστικόν). Whether Gylippus used his javelin-throwers as ἄμιπτοι at Syracuse in the fight described in Thuc. 7. 6. 2, is not clear, but at any rate he grouped them with his cavalry, and the same thing may be said of Xanthippus and the Carthaginians in Polyb. i. 33. 7. Xenophon strongly recommends the use of ἄμιπτοι (Hipparch. 5. 13, ἰππαρχικόν δὲ καὶ τὸ διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν ὅσο άσθενες τὸ πεζὸν ἔρημον ἵππικον πρὸς τὸ ἄμιπτον πεζόν ἐχον). See Sandys on Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 49, ἄμιπτοι. Light-armed troops, however, were used with cavalry both as ἄμιπτοι and otherwise; sometimes they were ranged behind cavalry and made to start out suddenly (Xen. Hipparch. 5. 13, 8. 19: C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 51 sq.).

19. ταύτη δ’ ἐπικρατοῦσιν κ.τ.λ. Aristodorus may perhaps remember Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 8, ἀνάγχη γὰρ οὖν, ἐφε οὐκ ἔχειν οὗτοι ἐν τούτῳ μὲν (i. e. τὸ ἀκροβολίζοντα) τῶν πλευρῶν ἥ νίκη πολὺ γὰρ ἰσότον οἱ ἀλίγου ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν τυρτροχόντων ἀναλωθείσιν ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων. For οἱ δὴμοι cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 28. As to δε see note on 1308 b 37.

20. ψυλοὶ γὰρ διπτες κ.τ.λ., ‘for though they are light-armed’ etc. That light-armed troops were a match for cavalry, we see from Diod. 15. 85. 4; that they were a match for hoplites, from Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 16 and 7. 1. 19. It was with archers and slingers that the Romans forced the heavy-armed phalanx of Antiochus to give way in the battle of Magnesia (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 271).

21. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι κ.τ.λ. ’Εκ τούτων, i. e. ἐκ τῶν δημοσικῶν, which must be obtained from οἱ δήμοι, 19. See note
on ὰ 1320 a 20. Aristotle tacitly discountenances the alternative of employing mercenary light-armed troops, no doubt on account of the risks attaching to the practice (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21 sqq.). The Roman nobles employed Cretan archers against C. Gracchus (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., vol. iii. p. 127 sqq.).

22. Dei δε διηρημένης τής ἡλικίας κ.τ.λ. Does Aristotle mean by διηρημένης that the oligarchy is to mark off the older from the young, or that nature has done so? Vict. interprets the word in the former way—'requiri igitur in dominatione paucorum oportere inquit, ut autas eorum qui participes sunt eius dividatur, distinguanturque senes ab adolescentibus': Sepulveda in the latter—'sed cum duplex sit autas, sintque alteri seniores, alteri adolescentes,' and Lamb. in much the same way, 'opportet autem, cum autas non sit simplex sed in aliquot partes divisa, aliquique sint actate grandiores, ali iuvenes.' The latter interpretation seems to me to be preferable. Cp. Pindar, Pyth. 4. 157 Bergk, ἄλλ' ἣδη μὲ γηραιών μέρος ἡλικίας ἀμφιπολεῖ. See also 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 5 sq. οἱ πρεσβύτεροι are here contrasted with οἱ νέοι, and the term probably refers to a much less advanced age than in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 15 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 29 (see notes on 1329 a 13 and 1335 b 29). For τοὺς αὐτῶν νόει see note on 1262 a 9. Διδάσκεσθαι is probably in the middle voice ('have their sons taught'). In τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψυλάς ἑργασίας light-armed exercises (cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 27, ὀπλισμένους κούφοσιροι ὀπλοῦς) are distinguished from exercises without ὀπλα of any kind. Plato had already advised that boys and girls should be taught military exercises (Laws 813 D sq.), but he had not favoured exercises without ὀπλα (Laws 833 A, 834 C). Compare with Aristotle's advice Socrates' suggestion to Pericles in Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 27. In the cities of Boeotia the young men of twenty were enrolled first among the peltasts and did not become hoplites till some years later, when their physical strength had increased (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 58 sq.). The κούφαι καὶ ψυλαὶ ἑργασίαι referred to no doubt include exercises in the work of javelin-throwers, peltasts (i.e. javelin-throwers with a sword and light shield: see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 25), archers (though archers are distinguished from ψυλαὶ in c. 8. 1322 b 1), and slingers. The Cyrus of Xenophon's Cyropaedia has a great contempt for slinging, which he regards as fit only for slaves (Cyrop. 7. 4. 15). Compare Eustath. on Hom. II. 13. 600, θεραποντος δὲ ὀπλον αὐτή (i.e. ἡ σφενδόνη), οὐ μὴν ἡρως, οὐδὲ γαρ
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éχρην (quoted by Sturz, Lex. Xen. s. v. σφενδομένον). The suggestion that the sons of the oligarchs should be taught to serve as light-armed soldiers, a kind of service usually abandoned to men of the demos or to mercenaries, was a bold one and would offend many prejudices.

25. ἐκκεκριμένοις δὲ ἐκ παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτούς τῶν ἔργων, 'and when they have been taken out of the ranks of the boys, they should themselves be skilled practitioners of the duties of soldiers of this sort.' It would seem, however, from Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 27 that men would only be fit for service as light-armed soldiers μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας. For ἐκκεκριμένοις ἐκ παίδων, compare διέκρινον τῶν νεωτέρων παιδών in Phot. συνεφηδος (quoted in note on 1337 a 1). and see Bon. Ind. s. v. ἐκκρίνειν. For ἀθλητὰς τῶν ἔργων, cp. Polyb. 1. 6. 6, ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀδριμοί τῶν κατὰ τῶν πύλεων ἔργων, 2. 20. 9, and 15. 9. 4, and Diod. 12. 75. 7.

28. τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλῆθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος κ.τ.λ. By a share in the πολίτευμα is meant a share in the magistracies, and especially the supreme magistracy (3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq.). Thus what is here termed a μετάδοσις τοῦ πολιτεύματος in reference to Thebes is referred to as the bestowal of a share of office in 3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq. This counsel is probably given because in some oligarchies the many had been brought within the constitution in a more wholesale way (see note on 5). For the phrase μετάδοσις τοῦ πολιτεύματος cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 15, τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

27. καθάπερ εἰρηταὶ πρὸτερον, in c. 6. 1320 b 25 sqq.

28. ἧς, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις κ.τ.λ. For the dative Θηβαίοι see critical note on 1292 a 22, and cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 1, καθ᾽ ὑπὸ νῦν τρόπον ἐχει πᾶσι. For the fact cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq. It was not enough in the Theban oligarchy of which Aristotle speaks that a man should have acquired a certain property-qualification; he was also required to have abstained for ten years from βάναυσα ἔργα, or, which comes to much the same thing, from the sale of the products of a handicraft in the market (1278 a 25 sqq.). As βάναυσα ἔργα are unfavourable to virtue (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq.: 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.), this rule showed some regard to virtue, and to some extent fell in with Aristotle's own recommendation that those who belonged to the better kind of demos should be admitted to the privileged class in preference to others (c. 6. 1320 b 28 sqq.). It will be noticed that the practice of agriculture did not exclude men from the πολίτευμα at Thebes, but only the practice of a handicraft.
29. ἡ, καθάπερ ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κ.τ.λ. The exact nature of the process to which Aristotle refers is obscure. Vict. understands it thus—'Massilienses narrat solitos diligenter existimare de vita ac moribus eorum qui participes reipublicae forent, et eorum etiam qui expertes, atque ita delectum habere ut deteriores inde eicercet et meliores, extra ipsam positos in eum ordinem recipent.' Giph. (p. 845) takes much the same view of the passage. Following Vict., I think that what Aristotle means is this—the Massaliots framed a list of those who deserved to be members of the πολίτευμα, taking into account not only those who were already members but also those who were not, so that the admission of members of the demos to the πολίτευμα was an incident of the framing of this list. This method gave more weight to virtue than that followed in the Theban oligarchy, for while at Thebes no security was taken that those admitted to the πολίτευμα were virtuous and all that was done was to exclude from it those whose occupation was unfavourable to virtue, at Massalia those only were admitted to the πολίτευμα who deserved to be so on the ground of virtue. It is not certain that the method here described was practised at Massalia in Aristotle’s own day, for the law to which he refers at Thebes had apparently been repealed (3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq.). Κρίσιν ποιήσαι occurs in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 333 init. For the acc. κρίσιν πιουμένον see note on 1320 b 26. For τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 24, 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 34, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 6 sq. In the Venetian oligarchy membership of the Patriciate with a seat in the Great Council was given in 1381 to thirty commoners as a reward of merit (Brown, Venice, p. 237), but in later times this privilege commonly passed by sale (Houssaye, Hist. du Gouvernement de Venise, i. 97, 98).

31. ἢ τι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄρχαις ταῖς κυριωτάταις κ.τ.λ. 'The most supreme magistracies also' as well as the rich, who were always subject to these burdens. For ἢ τις τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 31 sq. For προσκέισθαι see Bon. Ind. 646 b 44 sqq., where the word as used here is explained by 'iniungi' and προστεθεῖσθαι. It was the custom at Rome for the aediles to contribute largely from their private fortunes to the celebration of games (Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 289). In the cities of Italy under the Roman Empire office was confined to those who possessed a fixed amount of property, and office-holders were required by usage, and in part also by law, to spend money on
public buildings and games and in other ways (Friedländer, Petronii Cena Trimalchionis, pp. 29, 31, 37). At Venice the Doges sometimes 'ruined themselves in the service of the State' (Vriarte, Patricien de Venise, p. 350). In the oligarchy of Bern in the middle ages the members of the Small Council 'mainly belonged to the most respected families and often had to make important sacrifices for the commonwealth' (Geiser, Gesch. der bern. Verfassung von 1191-1471, p. 39). In England during the last century and the earlier part of this the upper class paid dearly for their position in election expenses. The objection to Aristotle's recommendation of course is that it practically confines office to the very rich. Office-holders might also be tempted to recoup their expenditure by illicit practices (cp. 2. u. 1273 b i sqq.).
are as eager for gain as the many who rule in democracies (c. 4. 1318 b 16 sq.).

1. τῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In c. i. 1317 a 14 sqq. an inquiry has been 1321 b. promised as to the best way of constructing not only democracies and oligarchies, but also other constitutions, but this latter part of the promise is here left unfulfilled.

4. Ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις κ.τ.λ. The question how to C. 8. institute a democracy or an oligarchy leads on to a consideration of the questions arising as to magistracies, for magistracies must exist in every State. Besides, as we are told in 1323 a 3 sqq., some magistracies are suitable to democracies and others to oligarchies. For Ἀκόλουθον cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 4. 1122 a 18 sq. The chapter before us takes up the investigation contained in 6 (4). 15 (see vol. i. p. 516 sqq.): cp. also 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἁρχὰς (τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἄγω καὶ τίνος εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποῖαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῷ ἄρεσθαι αὐτῶν). Aristotle's enumeration of magistracies and their functions begins with the most necessary ones (1322 a 29 sq.) and gradually rises to ἠ μάλιστα κυρία πάντων ἁρχῆ (1322 b 12 sq.), then to magistracies, or rather charges (ἐπιμέλεια, 1322 b 18 sq.), connected with the worship of the gods, and lastly to magistracies peculiar to leisured and prosperous States which study good order. He groups the magistracies otherwise in 1322 b 29 sqq. (see note). He bases his classification of magistracies on the practice of Greek States; he follows this in separating military from civil functions, for this was the general rule at any rate in democratic States; he follows it also in instituting magistracies for the audit of the accounts of outgoing officeholders, and in reserving the initiative for the Boulé and its equivalents (1322 b 12 sqq.). In these three points Roman practice differed from Greek, at any rate originally (see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, 1. 238). We note that the functions of archons escape enumeration except so far as they were sacrificial (1322 b 26 sqq.). Not a few magistracies are omitted from the list which we expect to find included in it. It includes no magistracy explicitly commissioned to make the valuations of property referred to in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq., or to guard the public health, notwithstanding what is said in 4 (7). 11. 1330 a 38 sqq., or to check spendthrift habits, though the need of such a magistracy is pointed out in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 20 sqq. To which, again, of the magistracies on the list will the operations

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for the relief of the poor described in 8 (6). 5. 1320a 35 sqq. be entrusted? Which will manage the coinage or the farming of the taxes? We hear of no magistrates whose duty it is to keep a list of the citizens, or to take charge of and exhibit copies of laws, decrees, lists of public property, and the like. Some magistracies which played a great part in oligarchies and aristocracies escape without mention, such as the gerusiae and judicial magistrates of the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian States, and the Lacedaemonian ephorate. It should also be noticed that Aristotle makes all his magistracies boards, whereas at Athens in his day some important magistracies were held by single individuals ("Ath. Pol. c. 43. 1. 2 sqq.).

tò διηρήθαι καλῶς τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς. Διαφέρειν seems here to be used in the sense of διαφέρεω, as in 6 (4). 2. 1289b 12 and elsewhere: compare the use of διαφερέως in 6 (4). 15. 1299a 3, ἐχομένη δὲ τοῖσών ἑστὼν ἣ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαφερέως.

5. καθάπερ ἐίρηται καὶ πρότερον comes in here rather awkwardly, for it has not been said before that this inquiry is ἀκελθοῦν τοῖσ ἐιρμένοισ, but the reference is no doubt to 6 (4). 14. 1298a 1 sqq. and 6 (4). 15. 1299a 3 sqq.

6. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare 3. 12. 1283a 20 sqq. Magistrates are divided into ἀναγκαῖοι and κυριώτεραι in c. 6. 1320b 24 sq. For magistrates πρὸς ἐπιταξίαν καὶ κόσμον cp. 1322b 37 sqq. For the conjunction of ἐπιταξία and κόσμος Bonitz (Ind. s. v. κόσμος) compares that of τάξις and κόσμος in De Caelo, 3. 2. 301a 10 and Metaph. Α. 3. 984b 16 sq.

10. ἦσπερ τυχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον, in 6 (4). 15. 1299a 34 sqq.

11. συνάγειν, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299b 13, ποῖας ἀρμότερες συνάγειν ἀρχὰς εἰς μίαν ἄρχην.

12. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., ‘first then there is the charge of things necessary which is concerned with the marketplace,’ etc. For ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων cp. 30, ἀπταὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαι ἐκεῖ τοίσῳ τρεῖς. Aristotle begins with magistracies which make κοινωνία, and especially κοινωνία τῶν ἀναγκαίων, possible (14 sqq., 1322a 5 sqq.). He follows the general custom of ancient Greece in marking off the agoranomoi from the astynomoi, though it probably sometimes happened that these two magistracies were united. Thus it appears from Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 337, that after the Lamian War the functions of the astynomoi at the Peiraeus were transferred for
a while to the agoranomi. In small cities the agoranomi cannot have had a great deal to do, but at Athens and the Peiraeus their hands must have been full. Commodities of all kinds were sold in the agora—slaves, cattle and sheep, provisions, raw and manufactured products—and it was necessary that an authority should exist to marshal the different classes of sellers and their booths in the agora (Plato, Laws 8.49 E), to control the motley mob of buyers and sellers, and to see that the weights and measures used were honest and the goods sold unadulterated and sound, and generally that buyers and sellers were true to their contracts and conducted themselves in a peaceable and orderly way, and that no refuse or the like was left to accumulate. These duties were discharged in Greek States by the agoranomi (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 331), who had authority to hear and dispose of cases judicially (1322 a 12 sqq.) and to inflict fines and other punishments. Sometimes, as at Astypalaeai (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 338), one of their functions was that of seeing that the corn and other commodities sold in the agora were sold at a cheap rate. At Athens the offices of ἀγορανόμος and ἀστυνόμος seem to have been of little account (Demosth. c. Timoc. c. 112: Ol. 3. c. 29). Some of the functions usually discharged by the agoranomi were there entrusted to other magistracies—e. g. to metronomi (’Αδ. Πολ. c. 51. l. 5 sqq.) and sitophylakes (Lys. Or. 22. c. 16)—and in ’Αδ. Πολ. c. 51 the only function ascribed to them is that of seeing that articles sold were pure and sound. At Rome the aediles answer in many respects to the Greek agoranomi and astynomai.

13. ἐπιμελέα (Sepulv. Vict. Lamb.) or ἀγοράν (Welldon) the antecedent to ἡ; For ἐπι cp. 1322 a 37 sq.

14. τὰ συμβολαία. The contracts made in the agora are no doubt referred to (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 11, τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν συμβολαίων). Not all contracts were made in the agora.


σχεδον γὰρ ἄναγκαιον κ.τ.λ. This takes up and justifies the mention of τὰ συμβολαία. Πάσας ταῖς πόλεις, ‘for all States.’ Supply τοῖς πολίταις οὐ τοῖς ἐνοικοικτας or something similar with ὀνείροις and πολίται. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 371 b, ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδόσουσιν ὃν ἄν ἐκατοι ἐργάζονται; ὃν δὲ ἐνεκα
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καὶ κοινωνίαις ποιημένων πόλεις φεύγαμεν. Δὴ λοιπὰ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὑπολογοῦντες. Here, as in 1. 9. 1257 a 14 sqq., Aristotle implies that buying and selling are necessary only so far as the object is the supply of the needs of buyer and seller, and not profit. For ἀναγκαία χρεία cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq.

10. ὁπογοιετατόν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, 'the readiest means' of securing self-completeness (Liddell and Scott).

17. κι' ἂν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν. Συνελθεῖν, 'are thought,' for this is not entirely the case (3. 6. 1278 b 20 sqq.: 3. 9. 1280 a 35 sq.). Εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν, cp. Plato, Laws 680 E, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα γε εἰς τὸ κοινόν, μειοῦσι ποιοῦντες πώλεισ, πλείουσι συνέρχονται, and for μίαν πολιτείαν, 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 32 sq.

18. ἢτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ. Ταυτάς ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς, because the agoranomi cared for εἰκοσσία in the ἁγορα and the astynomai in the ἄστυ (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 16 sq.), and the ἁγορά and the ἄστυ are closely connected with each other (cp. c. 4. 1319 a 29, τῷ ἁγορᾶ καὶ τῷ ἄστυ, and Plato, Laws 881 C). The functions of the astynomai are defined in a very similar way by Plato in Laws 758 E sq., 763 C sqq., and 779 B sqq. Other duties are assigned to astynomai in Laws 849 E and 913 D of which Aristotle says nothing. In States where the astynomai were charged with the preservation and repair of the city-walls, the care of the city-fountains, and the guard of the harbour, functions nearly connected with the defence of the city, these officers were of high importance. Their importance was less in the more populous States, where these duties were withdrawn from them and made over to special magistrates. This step had been taken at Athens, and probably their functions had come to be much contracted in consequence; at any rate 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 50 dwells mainly on their control of small matters like the fees of αἰσθητικὴν and the doings of κοπρολογίαν. See Sandys' notes. We read in 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 46 of the Boulè at Athens, ἠφαίτησε δὲ καὶ τὰ ὀροφοθήκηματα τὰ ἑμώσαν πῶντα, so that at Athens the task of seeing that the public buildings were in a good state of repair seems to have been entrusted to the Boulè. We are not told whose province it was to keep them in repair to the satisfaction of the Boulè. The 'supervision' by the astynomai 'of public and private property in the city with a view to good order' related probably exclusively to the matériel; they prevented encroachments on the street, the opening of window-shutters outwards, the discharge of water-pipes at a high level into the street, and the like. Whether they had control of sacred
property also within the city in relation to these matters does not appear (cp. 1322 b 18 sqq.) According to Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 180, the streets of Greek cities were unpaved, at any rate till the days of Roman predominance, so that their maintenance and repair (nothing is said of cleansing) would not cast a heavy burden on the astynomis. But the expression τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομήματων καί ὀδῶν σωτηρία καί διόρθωσις rather suggests that they were paved. Like the agonomis, the astynomis could hear and dispose of cases judicially (1322 a 12 sqq.) and could inflict fines and other punishments.

21. σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις. Cp. 1322 b 20 sqq. For the absence of the article see note on 1285 b 12.

καὶ τῶν ὄριων κ.τ.λ. Should σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις be supplied, or ἐπιμελεία? Probably the latter. If the boundaries of contiguous properties were not distinctly marked, disputes might arise, and still more if they were moved by either party.

22. ἐκωσι, sc. τὰ ὀρα, for in Aristotle’s writings a substantive in the neut. plur. is often followed by a verb in the plural (Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.).

For ὅσσα ἄλλα τῆς ἐπιμελείας cp. Plato, Soph. 232 C, τί δ’ ὅσσα φανέρα γῆς τε καὶ σφόνευκοι καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταβαίνειν?

23. καλοῦσι τοῦ ἄστυνομίαν οἱ πλείστοι τῆς τοιαύτης ἁρχῆς. At Heraclea in Lucania these magistrates were called πολιανόμοι (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 332). At Thebes magistrates with similar functions were called τελειχοὶ (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 15 initt. Valer. Max. 3. 7. Ext. 5).

24. ἐξεί δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but [though one name is given to it,] it includes more parts than one.’

26. οἷον τείχοποιοῦ καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητᾶς καὶ λιμένων φύλακας. We hear of τείχοποιοῦ at Athens (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 14) and at Cyzicus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 333), of a κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητῆς a. Athens (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 43, where see Sandys’ note), and of λιμενοφύλακες at Carystus (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 343). We read in Aen. Poliorc. c. 29. 12 of τοῦ λιμενοφύλακα τε καὶ ἀποστολεῖας.

That the charge of the city-fountains at Athens was an important one we see from the fact that the office was elective (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 43). The water-supply of the city was of high importance, especially in the event of fires (Tac. Ann. 15. 43) or of a siege. Frontinus (De Aquae Ductibus Urbis Romae, 1. 1) says of the ‘aquarium officium’ at Rome that it was ‘tum ad usum tum ad salubritatem atque etiam
ad securitatem urbis pertinens,’ and that it had always been administered by the leading citizens of the Roman State.

27. ἀλλὰ δ’ ἀναγκαία κ.τ.λ. As to the ἀγρονόμοι or ἀλωροί cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 15, where it appears that these officers were charged with the guard of the country districts, and see note on 1331 b 13. Περὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν ἀστείων is added to show that everything outside the city, whether deserving the name of χώρα or not, fell under their jurisdiction. The agronomi would keep forts and other public buildings, and also roads, in repair throughout the territory of the State, and would have judicial authority so far as might be necessary for the discharge of their official duties. The title ἀλωρόι would probably be especially in use where there were valuable forests of ship-timber belonging to the State. The Chalcidian peninsula was rich in ship-timber (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 130 sq.), and ἀλωροί may have existed there, and possibly at Stageira, Aristotle’s own city. The Lacedaemonian πεδιασώματα perhaps answer to the agronomi (see as to them Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 26). Aristotle says nothing about demarchs, which is remarkable, as the existence of these magistrates in the Athenian State must have been well known to him.

28. περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν is followed by περὶ with the acc. See notes on 1300 a 8 and 1322 b 30.

31. ἀλλὰ δ’ ἀρχή κ.τ.λ. Already in 19 τὰ περὶ τὸ ἀστυ δημόσια have been mentioned, and the transition is natural to a magistracy which receives the public revenues and takes charge of them till they are distributed to each department of administration. This magistracy appears to be referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq. as ἡ κυρία τῶν προσώπων. In Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 9 we read of προσώπων ἀποδεκτήρες καὶ δαπανημάτων δοτήρες. Under the term αἱ πρόσοδα τῶν κοινῶν Aristotle probably means to include revenues from all public sources — taxes, fees, fines, and the like, as well as public property strictly so called—for in the recapitulation in 1322 b 32 τὰς προσώπων represents τὰς προσώπους τῶν κοινῶν here. The collection of taxes is not provided for, because, the taxes being farmed, that duty fell on the farmers of them. Aristotle implies that the apodectae not only received the revenue, but also had the custody of it, but at Athens the apodectae appear not to have had a special exchequer of their own, their duty being to divide the sums they received among the magistrates on the same day on which they
received them ('Αθ.Πολ. c. 48. l. 7 sq.: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 237 sq.). Παρὲ ἔννοιαν μυθιστότων does not necessarily imply that the distribution of the revenues was made by the officials referred to. Παρὰ is not quite the same thing as ἔννοια. For ἔννοια referring to ἄρχη cp. ὑσ in 1. 2. 1252 b 14.

34. ἑτέρα δ' ἄρχη κ.τ.λ. For πρὸς ἵνα ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 344. 25, ἀπογράφωσιται π[ρος] τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 15, λόγον καὶ εἰδώλας ἐγγρά-φεων πρὸς τὸν γραμματέα καὶ τοὺς λογιστὰς. For the absence of τάς before ἐκ in τάς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων see note on 1334 b 12. These κρίσεις stand in contrast to the κρίσεις of the assembly (c. 2. 1317 b 33 sq.) and to the κρίσεις of arbitrators (2. 8. 1268 b 6 sqq.). Aristotle here passes on to other incidents of social life which call for the creation of magistracies to deal with them. Private contracts will be made and lawsuits will arise out of them (2. 5. 1263 b 20 sq.); hence there must be a magistracy to keep a register of contracts and of the decisions of dicasteries, and to preside over the first steps in lawsuits. It will be noticed that Aristotle regards as essential the keeping by a magistracy of a register of private contracts. No such registers are kept in modern States, but the way in which Aristotle refers to them would seem to imply that they were not uncommon in ancient Greece. It is not likely that all private contracts were registered. But a register of gifts in dower was kept in Myconos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 433: Dareste Haussoullier and Reinach, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, série 1, p. 48 sqq.), and a register of sales of land and houses and of gifts in dower in Tenos (Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 64 sqq.). A register of debts was kept in Chios ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1347 b 35 sqq.). At Iasus 'emtiones vendiciones tum demum ratae fuisse videntur, cum a mnemonibus in tabulas relatae erant' (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 77, p. 137 note), and a similar rule seems to have existed at Pergamum (Cic. pro Flacc. c. 30. 74). As to the utility of registers of these various kinds see Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, pp. 61, 118 sqq. In many Greek States there was no register of contracts, but the law required that an intended sale should be announced many days in advance by proclamation through a herald, or, as at Athens, in writing before a magistrate, in order that persons aware of any impediment to the sale might have an opportunity of objecting, a similar purpose to that served among ourselves by the publication of banns before a marriage. Buyers were thus protected against
bad faith on the part of vendors. Theophrastus, however, greatly prefers a register of contracts and of property to these expedients. He says (Fragment 97), "οὐ χρῆ δ’ ἐγκριν ὅτι αἱ προγραμβαι καὶ αἱ προκηρύ-
ξει καὶ ὁλως ὅσα πρὶς τὰς ἀμφιβατήσεις ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ πλείστα δι’ ἀκλει-
ψιν ἐτέρου νόμου τίθεται; παρ’ οἷς γὰρ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κτημάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν
υμβολαίων, ἐξ ἐκεῖνων ἐστὶ μαθεῖν εἰ ἀκλειθὰ καὶ ἀνέπαφα καὶ τὰ σῖτου
πολεῖ δικαίων εἴθεο γὰρ καὶ μετεγγράφει ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐωνημένων. In States
where registers of contracts existed their use must have been comp-
ulsory on the parties, and they must have been open to public
inspection. They would serve not only to record the exact nature
of a contract and to prevent either of the parties receding from his
bargain, but also to facilitate the detection and punishment of fraud.
It would be convenient that the magistracy which kept the register
of contracts should also be that which had to do with the first steps
in lawsuits, for the entry of the contract would commonly form the
basis of the lawsuit, and also that its head-quarters should be
situated near the agora (4 (7), 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.). A register of
the decisions of dicasteries was not kept in all Greek States.
Gortyna at any rate appears to have had no such register at the
time when the well-known Code was drawn up. 'Le jugement,
comme tout le reste de la procédure, est purement oral. Aussi
l'existence de la chose jugée, en cas de contestation ultérieure, ne
can-être établie que par le serment du juge et du mnémon.'
(Daresti, Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 435: cp. Col. 9. 31 sqq.). The magistracy here described by Aristotle appears to have been closely
connected with the dicasteries (cp. 1322 b 34), and that is probably
the reason why it did not apparently register anything but private
contracts and the decisions of dicasteries. It does not seem, for in-
stance, to have registered decrees of the assembly or the valu-
ations of property of which we read in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. As to
ἰερομνήμονες μνήμονες and ἐπιστάται see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 334,
and as to the functions of the μνήμων at Gortyna, Bücheler und
Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 54. In Diod. Laert. 6. 45 we
read of αἱ ἱερομνήμονες τῶν ταμιών, we are not told of what city; these
officials probably kept a list of the valuables in charge of the tamiæ.
Συμβολοφύλαι are mentioned in the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy
Philadelphia, col. 10. 2, etc. At Athens, as we have seen, no
register of contracts was kept; contracts were often deposited with
money-changers or priests (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim,
2. p. 108 sq.), a very different thing. Indictments were entered at the
Metroum before the Archon (Athen. Deipn. 407 c, ἢκεν (Ἀλκιβιάδης) εἰς τὸ μυθόφορον, ὅπου τῶν δικῶν ἦσαν αἱ γραφαί, καὶ ἔβρευσ αὐ τὸν δικτυλόν ἐκ τοῦ στόματος διήλευσε τὴν δίκην τοῦ Ἑγήμονος: Diog. Laert. 2. 40: Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 86: Bocckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 405 note). Were the decisions of the dicasteries also registered at the Metroum? The ‘Greffe’ in the Channel Islands is thus described by Lord de Saumarez (Times, Oct. 11, 1894). ‘There is a land-registry office—locally called the Greffe—in which are entered all purchases, sales, and mortgages. The entries are open to public inspection on payment of a small fee. Thus all trouble and expense as regards title-deeds are obviated. A glance at the register shows the whole history of a property—the prices paid on successive transfers, the mortgages, if any, upon it, and its exact legal status. Arrangements concerning a property which are not thus registered at the Greffe have no legal value.’ The ‘Greffe,’ however, it will be seen, has only to do with dealings with land, not with τὰ ἱδία συμβόλων generally.


37. τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς, sc. τῶν δικῶν (Bon. Ind. 224 a 26). καὶ ταύτην, ‘this magistracy also,’ as well as that of the astynomia (24 sqq.). Little, if anything, would be gained, one would think, by breaking up this magistracy. It would be convenient that the registers of contracts and of the decisions of dicasteries should be kept in the office of one and the same magistracy, and that this magistracy should also have to do with the first steps in lawsuits.

38. ἐστι δὲ μία κυρία τούτων πάλτων, ‘but there is one magistracy supreme over all these things, and its holders are called’ etc. Cp. 1322 a 38 sq. As to τούτων πάλτων see critical note on 1282 a 40.

40. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην κ.τ.λ. There is a singular resemblance in point of language between the passage before us and Metaph. B. 4. 999 a 24, ἐστι δ’ ἐξομένη τε τούτων ἁπορία καὶ παυσών χαλεπωτάτη καὶ ἀναγκαστάτη θεωρήσα, περὶ ᾧ ὁ λόγος ἐφίστηκε νῦν. The word χαλεπωτάτη is translated in the passage before us by Lamb. ‘difficultimus’ and by Jowett and Welldon ‘most difficult,’ but by Sepulv., Vict., and Heinsius ‘molestissimus’ (so Stahr, ‘überaus beschwerlich’), and by Ramus ‘molestissimus et difficillimus.’ In Susemihl’s rendering, ‘welche es am Schwersten von allen hat,’
NOTES.

I am not sure whether 'schwer' means 'onerous' or 'difficult,' and the same doubt arises in a less degree as to Schlosser's, 'einer der schwersten Dienste.' I incline myself to translate the word 'most difficult' or 'most trying' (cp. 1322 a 2). In the very similar passage quoted above from the Metaphysics χαλεπωτάτη evidently means 'most difficult.' We now come to a magistracy standing next to that which has just been described (for it has to do with the execution of sentences of dicasteries, as that has to do with the sentences themselves, and the sentences come first and their execution next), but which is the most necessary and the most trying of all. This magistracy executed, as the last-named registered, the sentences of dicasteries. It had also to put the law in execution against persons publicly placarded as debtors to the State, and to assume the custody of prisoners. Aristotle does not mention the title of this magistracy, as he mentions those of others—perhaps because he is in effect proposing its abolition—but at Athens the functions assigned to it were discharged partly by the practores and polètae, partly by the eleven. Compare the functions of the 'tres viri capitales' at Rome (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 558 sqq.). Τῶν καταδικασθέντων is masc., like τῶν καταδικαζομένων in c. 5. 1320 a 8. Τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἔγγραφας, 'those whose names are posted up in connexion with the entries [in the lists of the practores].' It was the duty of the practores at Athens to enforce payment of the fines imposed by magistrates or dicasteries and to hand them over to the proper authorities, for which reason the names of those who were condemned in these penalties were reported to them and entered in their lists pending payment' (Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 432: see also Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 240). These names were exposed on boards in the Acropolis ([Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 4). It would seem that the Gortyna Code left it to the winning side to levy the fines imposed by the judge: 'c'est à la partie gagnante à pratiquer sur les biens du débiteur, quand et comme elle voudra, des saisies jusqu'à concurrence des dommages-intérêts qui lui sont alloués' (Dareste, Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 448). At Athens the execution of the sentences of dicasteries in private suits was left, except in certain cases, to the plaintiff himself: see Meier und Schömann, Der att. Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 962 sqq., and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 414.

1322 a. 4. οὖθ' ὑπομείνατες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. The
holders of this office probably often infringed the law by undue lenity: cp. Plato, Rep. 558 A. Socrates might have escaped from prison if he had been willing to allow his friends to bribe the gaolers (Plato, Crito, 44 sqq.).

5. ἀναγκαῖα δ’ ἑστίν, διὰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Crito, 50 B, ἦ δοκεῖ σοι ὅλων τε ἐτί ἐκείνη τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἦ ἄν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἵσχυσιν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἀκυροὶ τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται;

8. διὸ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., 'hence it is better that this magistracy' (i. e. that which exacts the penalty) 'should not be one, but should consist of some persons from one dicastery and others from another, and that as to the posting-up of the names of persons registered as public debtors, an effort should be made to distribute the task in the same way, and further that [the whole burden should not be allowed to fall on the dicasteries, but that] the magistrates also should exact some penalties, and especially the incoming magistrates those due to the outgoing ones, and in the case of those due to magistrates actually in office, that, when one magistracy has tried the case and condemned, a different magistracy should exact the penalty.' With τὰς τῶν ἔνων, τὰς τῶν ἐνεστώτων, τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἐγομανόμων, and τὰς παρὰ τοῦτον we should probably supply πράξεις. With a view especially to the efficient exaction of penalties Aristotle seeks to distribute the odium connected with their exaction as much as possible. If the task is assigned to dicasteries, it should not be assigned to the members of one dicastery, but to some from one and some from another, and a part of the burden should be borne by magistrates, but in their case care should be taken that the magistracy which tries and condemns should not be that which exacts the penalty. At Athens the whole of the burden fell on two magistracies, the practores and the polètae (as to whom see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 239-240, and Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 335), and the result probably was that the sentences of dicasteries were not fully carried into effect, and that there was laxity in connexion with the posting-up of the names of public debtors. In some States the authority which tried and condemned also exacted the penalty, and this arrangement is disapproved by Aristotle. Plato had, it would seem, adopted it in Laws 958 B. The Council of the Areopagus (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 8. l. 19 sqq.), and the Boulè of 500 (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 45) at Athens had power at one time both to try cases and to exact the
penalty; the ephors had the same power in the Lacedaemonian State (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4). The podesta at Florence in the thirteenth century executed his own judicial decisions (Perrens, La Civilisation Florentine, p. 26), but then he did not belong to Florence and left it as soon as he laid down his office. We are ourselves familiar with the distinction between the judge and jury, the sheriff, and the authorities of prisons. In the prathy of the Labyadace at Delphi the penalty for infractions of its statutes was assessed by one authority and levied by another (Baumann, Die delphischen Inschriften, No. 2561. D 18, in Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften, aí dé τι τούτων παρξάλλωτο τών γεγραμμένων, θωείλετων τοι τε δαμαργοί καὶ τοι ἄλλοι πάντες Δαβνάδω, πρασοῦτων δὲ τοι πεντεκαίδεκα). At Corinth in the days of the oligarchy of the Baccidae, if we may trust Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 392), fines imposed by dicasteries were levied by the polemarch.

12. τάς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἐνεστώμα) places a query after ἐνεστῶτων here, but compare the use of the word in an inscription of Iasus (Revue des Études Grecques, 6. 155), τὸ δὲ ψῆφισμα ἀναγράφα[1] τοὺς νεώπατος τοὺς ἐνεστῶτας εἵ τῇ [πα]ραστάδι, and in an inscription of Chios (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 126), τοὺς ἐγερτασάς το[ν] ἐνεστικόρ[α].

15. δεῖ γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ., 'for the less odium there is in the business for those who exact the penalty.'

16. τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μέν here, as often elsewhere, = 'while.' Lamb. adds σοιεί after πάσι, and Sus. σοιεί αὐτούς before πολεμίους. I am not certain that any word or words have fallen out of the text, for Aristotle may intend us to carry on ἔχει, which is of course unsuitable (see notes on 1257 a 21, 1287 b 26, and 1297 a 40: see also note on 1294 b 27), or at any rate to obtain the notion of σοιεί from it, but perhaps it is more likely that σοιεί or some similar word has dropped out. In Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6. vol. iii. p. 629 Kühn, ἀγαθοῦσι δὲ ἱπτροῆσιν αἱ ὀμοφώτες πλάνας καὶ ἀποτάς, the omission of παρέχουσι is explained by the fact that the sixth Book of the De Morbis Vulgaribus consists of rough notes written in a very concise and elliptical style.

17. τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους. Observe the difference of tense. The condemnation precedes, the exaction of the penalty follows.

19. πολλοχοῦ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We hear of a φολλάκτης at Cyme (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 2). For διαμείν followed by πρὸς cp. Plato, Polit. 265 A.
20. σιόν Ἀθήνησιν (ἡ) τῶν ἐνδεκα καλουμένων, sc. δύρηται πρὸς τὴν πραττομένην. Susemihl brackets these words and may well be right in doing so (see critical note). They are very possibly a gloss which has crept from the margin into the text, and in addition to that a further difficulty arises in connexion with them (see Sus.², Note 1469). The eleven at Athens were not only charged with the custody of prisoners, but also with the execution of capital sentences, and indeed appear to have been sometimes employed to get in State-debts (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 257). Thus they combined to a certain extent the functions of ἡ φυλάττουσα ἀρχὴ with those of ἡ πραττομένη, and can hardly be with strict accuracy adduced as an instance of the severance of the two sets of functions. No doubt in most cases at Athens the money-fines were levied by the practores, and it is possible (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. 569. 4) that all that is intended in the passage before us is to point out that the practores were a distinct magistracy from the eleven. Still the instance adduced of a severance between the authority charged with the custody of prisoners and the authority charged with the exaction of penalties is not quite satisfactory.

21. καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, 'to part off this magistracy also,' as well as ἡ πραττομένη.

τὸ σόφισμα is translated by Welldon, perhaps rightly, 'the same artifice as before.'

22. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Men of worth appear to have shunned the office which was charged with the custody of prisoners even more than that which had to do with the levying of penalties. That men of worth were inclined to avoid office of all kinds at Athens we see from Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1460 sq.: cp. Plato, Rep. 549 C and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 27. 1. 23 sq. To give bad men the charge of the gaols was not safe, both for other reasons and because aspirants to tyranny (e.g. Aristodemus at Cumae, Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 7) had occasionally set prisoners free and enlisted them in their cause. Vict. compares Cic. in Q. Caecil. Divin. c. 16. 51, custodem, inquit, Tullio me apponite. Quid? mihi quam multis custodibus opus erit, si te semel ad meas capsas admisero?

26. πρὸς αὐτοῖς, 'to attend to prisoners.'

27. ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων κ.τ.λ., 'but successive sections of the young, where an organization of youthful police or guards exists,
and of the magistrates should take charge of the matter.’ It is implied that φρουροί were young as well as ἐφηβοί, and this was probably usually the case in ancient Greece: cp. Chionides, "Ὑποτείχον, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 5), where a father says to his son,

πολλοὺς ἐγὼδα κοῦ κατὰ σε νεανίας

φρουροῦντας ἀτεχνὸς κἀν σάμακα κοιμομένους.

The Lacedaemonian κριτεία was composed of young men (Aristot. Fragm. 495. 1558 b 19 sq.). Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 12.

29. ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. Aristotele sometimes places a thing first, as here, because it is most necessary (e. g. in 4 (7). 2. 1330 a 38), sometimes, as in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 8 sqq., because it is best. See note on 1330 a 38.

31. ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζων τεταγμένας, ‘but ordered in a more imposing guise.’ For σχήματι cp. Plato, Laws 685 C, ἢν γὰρ ἐτι τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκάσις σχῆμα τὸ σωζόμενον οὐ συμφόρω, and Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 210, εἰ ἄρα αὐτοῦντο ὅτι νῦν ἡ πόλις εἰς ὑπερέτου σχῆμα καὶ τάξιν προελήφθη. Compare also Plut. An seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 20, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχαῖς τῶν τηλικοῦτων ὡρα φέρεσθαι, πλὴν ὅσια γε μέγεθος τι κέκτηται καὶ ἀξίωμα. As to the greatness of the position held by the στρατηγὸι at Athens see Alexis, "Ἀπεγελακτομένοι, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 391), and Gilbert, Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens, p. 2 sq., where Lys. Or. 26. c. Evand. c. 20 is referred to among other passages.

32. καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς, ‘for they require [for their due administration] much experience and trustworthiness.’ Vict. ‘egere autem affirmat hos (magistratus) usu et fide multa, nec posse recte sustineri haec munera, nisi ab hominibus peritis et probis.’ I follow Vict. and the earlier interpreters, and also Welldon, in translating πίστεως ‘trustworthiness,’ but Sahr and Sus. translate it ‘Vertrauen’ (‘trust,’ ‘confidence’), and Bonitz also apparently (see Ind. s. v.).

33. τοιαύται δ’ εἶν ἃν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq., where the high dignity of ἡ κυρία τῆς φυλακῆς ἀρχῆ (i. e. στρατηγία) is dwelt upon. The στρατηγοὶ are charged with the φυλακῆ τῆς πόλεως in Plato, Laws 760 A also. In Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 240. 29, the magistrates at Miletus entitled οἱ ἡμιμένοι ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς are probably στρατηγοὶ. That the charge of the gates—a very important and anxious charge (Aen. Poliorc. cc. 18–20)—fell to the στρατηγὸς or polemarch we see from Polyb. 4. 18, where
we read of Cynaetha in Arcadia, πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατεληκυθότων τινώς ἐγεγόνεισαν ταύτῃ δὲ συμβάντει τὴν ἀρχήν κλείειν τῶς πύλας καὶ τῶν μεταξὺ χρόνων κυριεύειν τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιεύεται δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ ἡμέραν τὴν διάταξιν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶν, and from Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25, 29.

The φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας was an important part of the duties of the στρατηγί at Athens (see Sandys on Ἀθ. Π.λ. c. 61), but of this Aristotle says nothing. He distinguishes the 'watch and ward of the city' from 'matters connected with war', because the city needs to be guarded against domestic as well as external foes.

34. δεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ὁμοίως γοες καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ. This remark is added to correct a mistaken view which might be entertained by some that offices of this kind need not exist except in time of war (Vic.). In time of war the στρατηγί and polemarchs would have other duties to discharge in addition.

36. For εξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν, 'inspection of the citizens and drawing them up in order of battle', cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 4. 1, εξετασίω δὲ ποτὲ πάντων τοῦ Κύρου ποιομενοῦ ἐν τοῖς δῖπλοι καὶ σύνταξιν κ.τ.λ.

37. ἔνθα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not describe in detail the way in which the various functions of the στρατηγί and polemarchs were distributed, when distributed they were, but the charge of the walls and gates of the city may well have been occasionally severed from the duties of inspecting and marshalling the army and of commanding it on expeditions beyond the frontier.

39. καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολεμάρχους τοὺς τοιούτους. 'Of these two titles πολεμαρχος was the older, it would seem, and the less frequent, στρατηγός the commoner' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 329). The two offices existed together in Athens Eretria and Paros (Gilbert, 2. 329. 2), and also probably at Leucas (Oberhummer, Akarnanien, p. 272 sqq.). For other duties discharged by στρατηγί and polemarchs besides those mentioned in the passage before us by Aristotle, see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt: 2. 330. 1. As to the functions of the στρατηγί at Athens, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 233 sqq.

1. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅσιν κ.τ.λ. It would seem from Aristotle's language 1322 b. here that cavalry, light-armed troops, and archers were not kept on foot in every Greek State. Light-armed troops (javelin-throwers, slingers, and the like) are here distinguished from archers, as in Plato, Laws 756 A.

2. ἐτὶ τούτων ἐκάστων, 'in charge of each of these': compare VOL. IV.

3. ναυαρχία. Athenian admirals were called στρατηγοὶ, not ναυαρχοί, but the Lacedaemonian ναυαρχία is well known (2. 9. 1271 a 37 sqq.), and ναυαρχοί existed in Achaia (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 178), at Rhodes (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 179), Abydos (Gilbert, 2. 159), and elsewhere.

ταξιαρχία. This term appears to be used here of commands over light-armed troops or archers: cp. Xen. Anab. 4. 1. 28, and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 81. 2. The taxarchs of this kind of force appear to have had λοχαγοὶ under them (1322 b 4).

5. τὸ δὲ πᾶν κ.τ.λ., i.e. τὸ δὲ πᾶν τοίτων εἰδός ἐστιν ἐν τι ἔνδος, εἰδὼς ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. For the epexegetic genitive ἐπιμελείας see note on 1289 b 35 and Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 124 (Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 24).

7. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐναι τῶν ἄρχων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 248. 170, πλείστα χειρίσας τῶν κοινῶν, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 27, τὰ δημόσια χρήματα διεχείριζ. Apodectae, tamiae, polētae, practores, and stratēgī would be among the magistracies referred to. Aristotle evidently holds that an audit was especially necessary in the case of magistracies which had the control of large amounts of public money or public property, and at Rome the only magistrates subject to an audit were those who had to do with the disbursement of public money from the treasury of the State (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 1. 88 sq.), but at Athens all magistracies were subject to audit, and not only magistracies, but also posts like those of priests and ambassadors (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thumser, 1. p. 651). Aristotle often speaks of the right of audit as resting with the deliberative authority (3. 17. 1281 b 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6), and not with any magistracy, but here he takes it for granted that a magistracy will be necessary to exercise it. In τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνόμενον the distinction between λόγος and ἐθνικά appears, as to which see
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, 2. 231 sqq., and Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 945 B. 'The εἰθὺς has primarily nothing to do with the money, but concerns itself rather with the exercise of the powers of the magistracy', remarks Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (ibid. 2. 234), who quotes Lys. Or. 24. 26, οὔτε χρήματα διαχειρίσας τῆς πόλεως δίδωμι λόγον αὐτῶν, οὔτε ἁρχὴν ἡρξας οὗτοι εἰδίως ἐπέχω νῦν αὐτῆς. Notwithstanding αὐτὴν μηδὲν διαχειρίζονταν ἑτέρον, it does not seem that in Greek States the magistracy which exacted an account was always, or perhaps commonly, confined to this function; it was often charged not only with the direction of the finances, but also with particular financial operations (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 336).

10. καλοῦσι δὲ τούτων κ.τ.λ. For the distribution of these titles in Greece see Gilbert, ibid. At Athens both logistae and euthyni existed, but it appears from 'Ἀθ. Πολ. cc. 48 and 54 that the main part of the work of reviewing the conduct of magistrates at the expiration of their term of office must have fallen on the logistae, for the powers of the euthyni were called into action only when some citizen was dissatisfied with the result of the trial of an outgoing magistrate before a dicastery presided over by the logistae; thus they were merely supplementary officials designed to correct any errors in the process before the logistae. See Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 226 sqq. Synegori also existed at Athens, as to whom see 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 54, and Gilbert, ibid.

12. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἁρχὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and besides all these magistracies there is that which is in the highest degree supreme over all State-affairs; [I speak of it thus,] for the same magistracy often has in its hands the final completion and the introduction of a measure, [and so is itself supreme,] or at any rate presides over the many where the demos is supreme, for there must be an authority to convene the supreme element in the constitution'. When a magistracy has in its hands both the inception and the completion of measures, its powers are great: cp. Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 16 sub fin., Σκυθεῖσθαι λέγωντες περί τής λύρας, ἥν ἀρμόζεται Σημεῖον εὐειδὴς τοῖς Ἀπόλλων, πάσαν ἁρχὴν καὶ τέλος συναξάθων, and Polyb. 6. 1. 9 sq. Hultsch. It was the prerogative of kings τὸ τέλος ἐπιθειναί (Plato, Laws 761 E, πλὴν τῶν τὸ τέλος ἐπιθειναί, οὐδὲ βασιλέων: Eustath. on Hom. II. 1. 25, ἦν γὰρ τῷ δήμῳ παντὸς εἰπεῖν, βασιλέως δὲ τὴν ὑπάτην κατ' Εὐριπιδήν ἀρείναι ὡς καὶ κυρώσαι τὸ δοκοῦν): O O 2
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cp. Περὶ νεώτητος καὶ γῆρως 3. 469 a 4, ἣ δὲ καρδία κυριατάτη καὶ τὸ
tέλος ἐπιτίθεσιν. Compare the powers of the consuls at Rome
(Polyb. 6. 12. 4, καὶ μὴν ὅσα δεῖ διὰ τοῦ δήμου συντελεύσατι τῶν πρὸς
tὰς κοινὰς πράξεις ἀνήκορτον, τούτοις καθήκει φροντίζει καὶ συνάγεις τὰς
ἐκκλησίας, τούτοις εἰσφέρει τὰ δόγματα, τούτοις βραβεύει τὰ δικαίωτα τῶν
πλείστων). For προκαθήμενος τοῦ πλήθους cp. Plato, Laws 758 D, διὸ
ξυλλόγων τε ἀπὸ δεὶ τούτο ἐστίν τὸ προκαθήμενον τὴς πόλεως κύριον καὶ
διαλύσων τῶν τε κατὰ νόμους τῶν τε ἐξαισθητῆς προσπιτιτουσῶν τῇ
πόλει.

At Athens the Boule possessed large powers in matters of finance
and administration, but of this Aristotle says nothing here.

10. ὅπου δὲ πλῆθος ἐστι, ‘where the many rule’ : cp. τοῦ
πλήθους, 14. Sus. 3 (Ind. s. v.) explains πλῆθος as = δημοκρατία here
and in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 16, but in the absence of parallel passages
this seems doubtful.

17. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικοὶ τῶν ἀρχων κ.τ.λ. For the distinction here
drawn between πολιτικοὶ ἀρχαὶ and priesthoods cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a
18 sq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 4 sq. Aristotle seems here, however,
to imply that priesthoods are ἀρχαί, though not πολιτικοὶ ἀρχαί. We
note that he distinguishes the offices of archon, king, and prytanis,
as well as priesthoods, from πολιτικοὶ ἀρχαί.

18. ἀλλ' ἦδος ἐπιμελείας κ.τ.λ. It would seem that in small
States, and probably also in the smaller temples of large States,
the priests not only discharged their special function of offering
sacrifices and superintending the temple-worship, but also kept
the sacred buildings and other sacred objects in repair and managed
the sacred property. Plato in the Laws (759 E) creates special
ταμίαι τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων καὶ τεμενών καὶ καρπῶν καὶ μυστήρων, and
arranges that they shall be elected in a particularly careful way,
while he treats the appointment of priests differently, allowing
a considerable place to the lot. In the case of a priest he makes
ceremonial purity the main requirement, whereas in that of
a treasurer of sacred property much would be desirable over and
above this (cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 6 sqq.). It sometimes happened,
indeed, in ancient Greece that the priest was a youth or a very
old man, and where this was so, there would be an additional
reason for making careful provision for the wise administration
of the temple-property. Aristotle says nothing about ἐγγυηταί, though
Plato in Laws 759 C sqq. provides for the appointment of sacred
officials thus entitled, nor about μάρτιες, though Thyrreium and
Ambraacia kept a μάρτιον (Oberhummer, Akarnanien, p. 230).

21. τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ‘of all other things which are set apart for the service of the gods’, is dependent on ἐπιμεληταί, like τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερά. Sacred property, both animate (slaves, herds, and flocks) and inanimate, not falling under the head of τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερά, and sacred revenues are probably especially referred to. For ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 17 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, ὅσα (ἄρχαι) τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας.

24. ἱεροποιοῦσ. At the temple of Apollo in Delos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 367. i sqq.: Gardner and Jevons, Manual of Greek Antiquities, ed. i, p. 189 sqq.), and also in Myconus (Dittenberger, No. 373. 17 sqq.), the ἱεροποιοὶ had the control of the sacred property. The same was the case with the ἱεροποιοὶ of the temple at Eleusis (Dittenberger, No. 13. 9 sqq.). It is to ἱεροποιοὶ attached to temples, not to State-officers like those whose functions are described in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 54, that Aristotle here refers. See Dittenberger, No. 334, note 13, as to the different kinds of ἱεροποιοὶ at Athens.

25. ναοφύλακας. We read of ναοφύλακες in Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1175 Bothe (1284 Dindorf), and ἱεροφύλακες existed in Rhodes and Segesta (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 11. 7).

ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. These existed at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 30: see Sandys’ note) and at the temple of Apollo Didymaeus at Branchidae (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 170. 1). We find ταμίαι τῶν ἱερῶν at Chersonesus Taurica (Dittenberger, No. 252. 53), and ἱεροσαμίαι at Stiris (Dittenberger, No. 294. 20 sqq.) and Ialyssus (No. 357).

26. ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 10, τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαι. Aristotle’s language appears to imply that some public sacrifices were celebrated by priests, while others were ‘celebrated from the common hearth’ by archons, kings, and prytaneis. According to Plato, Polit. 290 E the sacrifices offered by ὁ λαχῶν βασιλεὺς at Athens were τὰ σεμινῶτα καὶ μάλιστα πάση τῶν ἄρχαίων θυσιῶν. The ‘common hearth’ of a State was in the prytaneum (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 347. 6, ἐν τῷ πρυτανείῳ ἐπὶ τῆς
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27. After ἄλλα supply ὅσα. Cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 36 sq. and Isocr. Nicol. § 43, κάλλιστον οὖν ὑπελαβον, εἴ τις δύνατο ταύτας ταῖς ἀρεταῖς προέχειν τῶν ἄλλων, δόν οὖν κρέας τοῖς πονηροῖς μέτεστω, ἄλλα γνησιώτατα καὶ βεβαιότατα καὶ μεγίστων ἐπαύνων ἀξίου τυγχάνοντι ὅσα. 

29. αἴ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the enumeration of magistracies contained in 1321 b 12—1322 b 29 Aristotle begins with the minor ones and ends with the most important, but in this recapitulation he arranges magistracies in a different way. He groups them thus—those connected with the gods, war, and finance; those whose functions are local; and those which are connected with the dicasteries and the deliberative. Matters connected with the gods are grouped with matters connected with war, just as they are in 3. 14. 1285 a 5 sqq. and 1285 b 9 sq.

30. περὶ τούτων is followed in 31 sqq. by περὶ with the acc.: see notes on 1300 a 8 and 1321 b 28.

31. τὰ δαιμόνια is probably a somewhat more comprehensive term than τὰ θεῖα: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 5. 1122 b 19, οὗν τὰ περὶ θεῶν ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ τῶν τὸ δαιμόνιον.


Ident de k.t.l. As to the magistracies here mentioned see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 337 sq. As to the νομοφύλακες cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 14, ἐδίδασκον de αὐτῷ ὅτι καὶ εἰ τοῖς εὐνομομέναις πόλεως ὀφείλει ἄρκειν δοκεῖ τοῖς πολιτείας, ἢν νόμοις καλοῦς γράφωσαται, ἄλλα καὶ νομοφύλακας προσαμοῦνται, ὀτίνες ἐπισκοποῦντες τῶν μὲν ποιοῦντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐπανοίγουσιν, ἢν δὲ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν νόμοις ποιή, ζημιοῦσι. The way in which the νομοφύλακες are here mentioned suggests that their function was to compel adult male citizens to observe εὐκοσμία, as the γυναικοῦμα and παιδωνύμοι compelled women and boys to do so. Cp. 1323 a
6 sqq. We find γυναικονόμοι not only in wealthy communities like those of Samos and Syracuse, but also, which we hardly expect after what Aristotle says here, at Gambreium, not probably a very wealthy one (Gilbert, ibid.: Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 470). The same thing may be said of παιδονόμοι and γυμνασίαρχοι, but these magistracies may well have become more common after Aristotle's time. As to the γυμνασίαρχα see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Blümner, 4. 337 sq. The Athenian citizen who defrayed the expenses of a torch-race is often said γυμνασιαρχεῖν (Lys. Or. 21. c. 3: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 360 sq.), but in the passage before us the reference is not to a χορηγός, but to a magistrate, the magistrate who kept order in the gymnasia: cp. [Plato,] Axiochus, 367 A, γυμνασίαρχα καὶ ράβδοι, and Eryxias, 399 A, and Plut. Amat. c. io, ἐχθρούνει γάρ (οἱ γυμνασίαρχοι) ἵσχυρος τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ προσέχουσι τῶν νοῶν σφάδρα τοῖς ἐναύτῶν πραπτομείνοις. We see from Valer. Max. 9. 10. Ext. 2 that the office existed at Pherae in the time of Jason.

1. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ. It would seem that a special magistracy 1323 a. for the management of the matters here referred to would commonly be found only in prosperous and leisured States which cared for εὐκοσμία. For ἄγωνας Διοινσιακῶς cp. Rhet. 3. 15. 1416 a 32. At Athens the athlotheae managed the musical and gymnastic competitions, and also the horse-races, at the Panathenaea ("Αθ. Πολ. c. 60), while the eponymous archon managed the competitions of the greater Dionysia ("Αθ. Πολ. c. 56. 1. 27 sq.) and the archon basileus of the Lenaeia ("Αθ. Πολ. c. 57. 1. 4 sqq.).

3. θεωρίας. See note on 1342 a 21, ἄγωνας καὶ θεωρίας. There were θεωρίαι which were not ἄγωνες, for instance non-competitive dramatic or musical performances.

tούτων δ’ ἐναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 30—1300 a 8, where much the same thing has already been said, though no notice is here taken of the fact. We can understand why gynaeconomi should object to the employment of women as ἄκολυθοι (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 4 sqq.), but the passage before us implies that paedonomi also would object to the employment of children for the same purpose. Was it one of the functions of the paedonomi to keep boys and girls out of the public streets?

5. τοῖς γάρ ἀπόροις κ.τ.λ. We are often told that a Greek democracy was virtually an aristocracy, inasmuch as most, if not all, of the citizens would be the owners of one or more slaves, but
the passage before us shows the baselessness of this view, for it implies that ἀποροι will have no slaves, and there can be little doubt that in almost all democracies a majority of the citizens were ἀποροι. The same thing is implied of οἱ πέντεσ in 1. 2. 1252 b 12. The fact is no more than one would expect. The maintenance of a slave, to say nothing of the purchase of one, would be too heavy a burden for a poor man’s purse. I find a statement quoted from Mr. Booth’s Life and Labour of the People in London, that out of the 4,200,000 inhabitants of London no fewer than 3,700,000 have no servants at all (Times, June 6, 1895). As to the use of slaves as ἀκόλουθοι (‘pedisequi’) see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 187 sqq. When a Greek citizen went to the market, he needed some one to carry home the provisions or other articles he purchased (Theophr. Charact. c. 22). Hence an ἀκόλουθος was the most necessary kind of slave (Aristoph. Eccl. 593.

6. τριῶν δ’ οὐσῶν ἄρχων κ.τ.λ. Καθ’ ἂς probably means ‘in accordance with whose directions’: cp. Αἰθ. Πολ. c. 44, ποιοῖς δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοσίας στρατηγῶν καὶ ἵππουρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἄρχον ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καθ’ ὅ τι ἄν τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ ποιοῖς δ’ οἱ μετὰ τὴν ἐκτην πρωτανεύοντες ἐφ’ ὁ δὲ ἐσημαία γένηται, δεὶ δὲ προβούλευμα γενέσθαι καὶ περὶ τούτων. If a προβούλευμα of the Boulê was a necessary preliminary to these elections at Athens, similar elections may well have been to a still greater extent under the control of the preconsidering authority elsewhere. As to nomophylakes see notes on 1298 b 27 and 1322 b 37. For the reversal in the order of the words in 8 sq. see note on 1277 a 31.

9. μὲν οὖν implies that this Book is not complete (vol. ii. p. xxvi). For ὡς εἰ τῶπῳ cp. (with Bon. Ind. s.v. τῶπος) Eth. Nic. 5. 1. 1129 a 11 and Hist, An. 1. 6. 491 a 7 sqq. For περὶ πασῶν see note on 1301 a 19.
APPENDIX A.

(See explanatory note on 1307 b 26.)

The counsels given in the eighth and ninth chapters of the Seventh (old Fifth) Book are as a rule deduced from the investigations in the preceding part of the Book as to the causes of the overthrow of constitutions. This will be evident from the following table:

1307 b 30-40. Based on the experience of Thurii (1307 b 6-19) and Ambracia (1303 a 23-25).
1307 b 40-1308 a 3. This does not seem to be based on anything said previously in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book. Aristotle probably has in his mind what has been said in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7-13. 1297 b 1, where the subject is fully dealt with, though advice respecting it is given in that passage not only to aristocracies, but also to democracies.
1308 a 3-24. Based on 1302 b 6-14, 1305 b 2-22, 36-39, 1306 a 12-19, 31-b 5, 1306 b 31-36.
1308 a 24-30. Possibly based on the warning against neglectfulness in 1303 a 16-25.
1308 a 31-35. Based on 1303 b 19-1304 a 17 and on 1305 b 22-39.
1308 a 35-b 10. Based on 1306 b 6-16.
1308 b 24-31. Based on 1302 b 33-1303 a 13, 1304 a 17-38, 1306 b 36-1307 a 2.
1308 b 31-1309 a 14. Based on 1302 b 5-10.
1309 a 14-20. Based on 1304 b 20-1305 a 7.
1309 a 20-32. Based on 1305 a 38-b 1.
1309 a 33-b 14. Based on the experience of Oreus (1303 a 16-20) and also on 1302 b 5-10.
1309 b 14-18. Based on the warning against incurring contempt given in 1302 b 25-33 and on the fact of the
frequent overthrow of narrow oligarchies (1305 b 2-22, 36-39, 1306 a 12-19) and the frequent peril of narrow aristocracies (1306 b 22-1307 a 5).

1309 b 18-1310 a 2. Based perhaps on 1305 a 28-34 and on the reference to the errors of Charicles and Phrynichus in 1305 b 24-27, but probably suggested by Plato, Laws 701 E.

1310 a 2-12. Based on 1304 b 20-1305 a 7 and on 1305 a 38 sqq.

1310 a 12-36. Based perhaps on 1302 b 25-33 and on the experience of Thurii (1307 a 32 sq.), but probably rather suggested by Plato, Rep. 552 E (cp. 554 B, ἀπαιδευσίαν) and Laws 793.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOL. IV.

P. 101, line 1, add καὶ before κατ'.
P. 109, line 19, add Sus. after Bekk.
P. 110, five lines from foot of page, after Π² add except Ald.
P. 120, twenty lines from foot of page, after † add Sus.
P. 138, line 6, after 684 B sq. add and Rep. 426 B sq.
P. 140, line 3, for "Hv read "Hv.
P. 164, fifteen lines from foot of page, dele As to ei δῇ see note on 1331 a 10, and.
P. 189, note on 1293 a 3, and p. 222, note on 1296 b 18. Τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους ἑπεροχήν in 1296 b 18 sq. probably means 'superiority in number', not, as I have taken it in my note to mean, 'the numerical superiority of the many.' The meaning of ἄδι Τὴν ἑπεροχήν τοῦ πλῆθους in 1293 a 4 is, however, more doubtful. It may mean either (1) 'by reason of the excess (or magnitude) of the numbers', presumably of the citizens (cp. Sepulv. 'propter maximam multitudinem', and Lamb. 'propter ingenium multitudinem'); it is thus that I understand Bonitz (Ind. 793 a 35) to take it; or (2) 'in consequence of the predominant influence of the masses' (Sus., Welldon); or (3) 'on account of the numerical superiority of the many' (Vici.). The first rendering has the merit of giving Τὴν ἑπεροχήν τοῦ πλῆθους much the same sense in 1293 a 4 and 1296 b 18 sq., but it is not clear how an excess in the number of the citizens leads to τὸ πάντας μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας. If we have to choose between the two other renderings, I incline to prefer the third, which is that adopted in my note on 1293 a 3, for it seems likely from 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq. and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 24 sqq. that the numerical superiority of the many is referred to, not their superiority in influence.
P. 190, line 1, note of interrogation in place of comma after διέλθαμεν.
P. 199, line 5, after laws add He will not allow that εὐνοία exists where the laws are good, but are not obeyed.
P. 200, seven lines from foot of page, dele of.
P. 215, line 10, and p. 270, line 17, after 1253 b 3 add and iii. Additions and Corrections, p. 595 (on iii. 131).
P. 223, line 3, after 1286 a 36) add As to τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους ἑπεροχήν see above on p. 189.
P. 223, line 10, for τὸντο τὸ μέρος read τοὺς ἄγγελος ἥ τοὺς ἄγγελος.
P. 223, line 11, after 25. add Τὸ τῶν ἀπώρων πλῆθος probably means here, as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 9 and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 29, 'the body' (or 'class') 'of the poor'; not 'the number of the poor' ('die Zahl der Armen'), as Sus. takes it to do: cp. 1296 b 31, τὸ τῶν ἐντόρων καὶ γνωρίμων (πλῆθος), and 34, τοῦ ὅλογαρχικοῦ πλῆθους.
P. 227, lines 9-15. This reference to the late South African Republic should be in the past tense.

P. 245, five lines from foot of page, after spirit add Ἄρσεθ τε Ὑσύ, sc. ὡς κυρίοι τοῦ βουλεύσαν (cp. 1298 b 3).

P. 256, line 11, after lot add For the inference compare explanatory note on 1254 a 28.

P. 256, line 15, for χοιροῖ read χοιρηγοῖ.

P. 282, line 11, after κ.τ.λ. add This is added to show how it is that men of high birth are led to claim more than an equal share. They base their claim not on their own virtue or wealth, like those previously mentioned, but on the virtue and wealth of their ancestors.

P. 302, line 2, after 470 R add Prof. Bywater suggests that in the above quotation from De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27 sqq. the bracketed words τοῦ ζου are 'a dittography of τοῦ προσώπου', the ποσ being represented by 'the well-known compendium which is so easily mistaken for ζ or ξ, as Bast tells us (Comm. Pal. p. 727)'.


P. 312, nine lines from foot of page, for claim read claimed.

P. 323, five lines from foot of page, after uncertain add See as to recent excavations on this site Journal of Hellenic Studies, 21 (1901). 347.

P. 344, nineteen lines from foot of page, after 32. add For ἢς κυρίον εἶναι see explanatory note on 1. 8. 1256 b 11.

P. 459, sixteen lines from foot of page, after 18 add and Hdt. 3. 134.

P. 540, line 3, for 7 (5). 2 read 7 (5). 3.

P. 546, line 9, for last read eighteen and for this read the nineteenth.

Indexes:—P. 578 a, l. 13, for 129 read 219; last line but four, add the comic poet before iii: P. 583 b, l. 27, for 342 read 442: P. 587 a, l. 22, for ii read iii: P. 590 b, l. 12, for 423 read father of Miltiades, iv. 423: P. 591 b, l. 40, add iii. before 268: P. 598 a, l. 39, add iv. before 498: P. 599 b, l. 18, dele 364; l. 38, for 501 sq. read 502 sq.: P. 601 b, l. 39, for 468 read 268: P. 602 b, l. 43, add another before iii: P. 604 b, l. 28, for 328 read 338: P. 607 b, l. 3, for 171 read 172: P. 610 a, l. 38, for iii read ii: P. 610 b, l. 14, for 200 read 201: l. 20, for 490 read 491: last line but three, transfer 551 to Heraclea in Italy: P. 611 b, l. 23 sq., for 260, 286 read 261, 287: P. 614 a, l. 3, for 508 read 503: P. 616 b, l. 36, for 177 read 178: P. 617 b, l. 28, dele l. 312 sq.: P. 622 a, last line but seven, add iv. before 562: P. 622 b, l. 13, for iii read ii: P. 627 a, l. 11, for 53 note read p. liii note, 66: l. 25, for 370 read 371: P. 630 a, l. 37, for 138 read 108: P. 631 b, l. 27, for i read ii: P. 636 a, l. 7, add of Leontini before iv; l. 9, add iv. before 532: P. 655 a, l. 19, for xxxiii read xxiii: P. 656 b, last line but five, dele 370: P. 676 b, l. 15, for ii read iii: P. 678 b, l. 31, for ii read iii: P. 679 b, l. 29, for 455 read 456: P. 682 b, last line but eight, for 201 read 202: P. 686 a, l. 24, add iv. before 508: P. 687 b, l. 5, for 359 read 399: P. 692 a, last line but seven, dele 356: P. 693 a, last line but seven, for 118 read 119: P. 693 b, l. 5, add iii. before 312; l. 19, dele 345: P. 694 b, l. 42, for 200 read 201.
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A. = Aristotle: the full name, however, is retained in headings and references to headings.

The following errata should be added to the list of errata in the Indexes contained in vol. iv, p. 572:

P. 585 a, last line but seven, for iii. 357 note, 524 read i. 357 note; iii. 524.
P. 585 b, last line but thirteen, for 535 read Attalus iii of Pergamon, iv. 535.
P. 596 b, l. 17, transfer iii. 301 to Cyrus, the younger.
P. 623 a, l. 5, add iv. before 477.
P. 635 b, l. 17, add iii. before 385.
P. 638 a, last line but twelve, for 388 read 389.
P. 641 b, l. 36, for 339 read 340.
P. 648 b, l. 35, for 260 read 261.
P. 657 a, ll. 28, 34, for 200 read 201.
P. 657 b, l. 33, for 159 read 140.
P. 666 a, l. 29, for 201 read 202.
P. 697 a, l. 24, for ii read iv.
P. 699 a, last line but thirteen, for 361 read 561.
P. 700 a, last line but nine, for 208 read 308.
P. 700 b, last line but thirteen, or ἀντίνοος read ἀντίνον.


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ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 227, lines 9-15. This reference to the late South African Republic should be in the past tense.

P. 245, five lines from foot of page, after spirit add Αἵρετοι τῷ Σοί, sc. οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλευτήθαι (cp. 1298 b 3).

P. 256, line 11, after lot add For the inference compare explanatory note on 1254 a 28.

P. 256, line 15, for χοηγωι read χοηγωι.

P. 285, line 11, after κ.τ.λ. add This is added to show how it is that men of high birth are led to claim more than an equal share. They base their claim not on their own virtue or wealth, like those previously mentioned, but on the virtue and wealth of their ancestors.

P. 302, line 2, after 470 R add Prof. Bywater suggests that in the above quotation from De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27 sqq. the bracketed words τοῦ ζεῶν before 312 ; l. 19, dele 345 : P. 694 b, l. 42, for 200 read 201.
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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS.

Vat. Pal. = the Palimpsest Fragments of the Third and Sixth (Fourth) Books in the Vatican Library (see vol. i. p. vii sq., and vol. ii. p. xlii sq.).

M* = B 105, ordinis superioris, of the Ambrosian Library at Milan.


P1 = corrections in P1 in ink of the same colour as the MS.

t = corrections in P1 in a paler ink.

Γ = the Greek text rendered by the Vetus Interpres, William of Moerbeke.

P2 = the 1b of Bekker, MS. Coislin 161 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

P2 = corrections in P2 in ink of the same colour as the MS.

P2 = corrections in P2 in darker ink than the MS.

P2 = corrections in P2 in paler ink than the MS.

P1 = 2026 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

P1 = corrections in P1 in ink of the same colour as the MS.

P1 = 2025 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

P2 = 1858 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.


Q = Marcianus Venetus 200.

Mb = Marcianus Venetus 213.

Qb = Laurentianus 81, 5.

Rb = Laurentianus 81, 6.

Sb = Laurentianus 81, 21.

Tb = Urbinas 46.

Ub = Marcianus Venetus Append. 4, 3.

Vb = Vaticano-Palatinus 160.

Lb = Lipsiensis bibliothecae Paulinae 1335.

C' = Florentinus Castiglionensis iv (Acquisti nuovi) in the Laurentian Library at Florence.

O' = 112, Corpus Christi College, Oxford (see vol. ii. pp. xli, 58 sqq.).

corr.1 O1 (see vol. ii. p. 59).


C' = a MS. known to Camerarius, but now lost.

Ald. = the Aldine edition (see vol. ii. p. xlv).

Vet. Int. = the Latin Translation of the Politics by the Vetus Interpres, William of Moerbeke.

Ar. = Leonardus Aretinus' Latin Translation of the Politics.
II = the consent of the Aldine edition and all extant complete MSS., so far as they were examined for Sussehmi's editions (see vol. ii. p. xlix).

II\textsuperscript{1} = the consent of \( \Gamma M^p P^q \).

II\textsuperscript{2} = the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the second family \( (P^{2,3,4,6} Q^{1} M^{1} Q^{3} R^{B} S^{B} T^{b} U^{b} V^{b} L^{s} C^{1}) \), so far as they were examined for Sussehmi's editions.

II\textsuperscript{3} = the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the less good variety of the second family \( (P^{4,6} Q^{1} M^{1} Q^{3} R^{B} S^{B} T^{b} U^{b} V^{b} L^{s}) \), subject to the same limitation.

\( a \) = 19, \textit{sciences et arts, latin}, of the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal at Paris, a MS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of the Politics collated for Sussehmi. (vol. ii. p. xli sq.; see also Sus.\textsuperscript{1}, p. xxxiv sq.).

b c g h k l m = other MSS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation consulted by Sussehmi. (see as to them Sus.\textsuperscript{1}, p. xxxv sqq.).

o = 112. Balliol College, Oxford, a MS. of the same Latin Translation (see vol. ii. p. 61 sq.).


z = 891, Phillipps Library, Cheltenham (see vol. ii. pp. xli sq., 60 sq.).

n (see Sus.\textsuperscript{1}, p. xxxviii).

s (see Sus.\textsuperscript{1}, p. xlii).

Alb. = the commentary of Albertus Magnus (see Sus.\textsuperscript{1}, p. xli).

Bas.\textsuperscript{3} = the third Basle edition of Aristotle published in 1550 (vol. ii. p. xlvii).

Bekk.\textsuperscript{1} = the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle in quarto form, edited by Bekker and published in 1831.

Bekk.\textsuperscript{2} = the edition of the Politics in octavo edited by Bekker, the second edition of which appeared in 1855.

Sus.\textsuperscript{1} = the edition of the Politics published by Sussehmi in 1872.

Sus.\textsuperscript{2} = the edition of the Politics in two volumes published by Sussehmi in 1879.

Sus.\textsuperscript{3} = the edition of the Politics belonging to the Bibliotheca Teubneriana published by Sussehmi in 1882.

Sus.\textsuperscript{5} = the revision of the last-named edition published by Sussehmi in 1894.

Sus.\textsuperscript{4} = the edition of the Politics in English by Sussehmi and R. D. Hicks, of which the first volume was published in 1894.

pr. prefixed to the name of a MS. refers to its original state, and distinguishes an original reading from a correction.

corr. prefixed to the name of a MS. denotes a correction.

rec. prefixed to the name of a MS. denotes a recent hand.

marg. = in the margin.

marg. rec. = a recent hand in the margin.

Half brackets ([ ]) have been used by me in printing the Greek text in passages needing, in my opinion, to be placed elsewhere (see vol. iv. pp. 38, 59).
Aristoteles
The Politics of Aristotle

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