PACIFICATION
## PACIFICATION

(A Reference Pamphlet)

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FOREWORD

While the issues in the Vietnam war have been clearly stated by our national leadership, the means for achieving a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict have not always been equally clear. There has existed, for many years, widespread agreement that the best way to end the conflict satisfactorily was to "win the hearts and minds of the people." However, only in the past two years has there been a truly coordinated GVN-Free World Forces effort toward gaining the full support of the Vietnamese people, thereby depriving the enemy of his claim to popular backing. This year, the emphasis is on the people, rather then providing them material things. The programs intended to achieve this goal are included in what is called "pacification".

Each American serving in the Republic of Vietnam has, either directly or indirectly, a part in this extensive campaign to demonstrate that the Government of South Vietnam offers citizens the greatest opportunity for a free, peaceful and full life. Yet, because pacification has such extensive and complicated objectives, it is often misunderstood. This pamphlet is intended to "fill a gap" and thereby enable leaders at all levels to ensure that their personnel fully understand what is involved in pacification. It is important that all Americans understand that pacification is our best hope for the future of South Vietnam and which, if it succeeds, offers us the quickest ticket home.
WHAT IS PACIFICATION?

Pacification is a military, political, economic and social process. It means:
- Establishing or reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the citizens;
- Providing sustained credible security;
- Destroying the enemy's underground government;
- Asserting or reasserting GVN political control;
- Involvement of the people in the central government;
- Initiating economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion.

Included in the economic side of pacification is the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity.

The 1969 Government of Vietnam Pacification Campaign is founded on one all-important principle: Community Spirit. Development of a national Community Spirit is based on cooperation among the Vietnamese people, cooperation between the people and the Government of Vietnam and cooperation among government agencies. In other words, pacification places special emphasis on the role of all the people as participants in the military, political, economic, social and educational efforts. These efforts aim at shattering the VC organization, restoring public security, and ultimately, in establishing a stable and viable Republic of Vietnam.

WHY PACIFICATION?

To the people of Vietnam, pacification will provide security, peace and social justice. It will mean a greater degree of personal involvement with their government than the people have experienced at any time in their past. As formerly hostile or apathetic villagers observe the gains achieved through these various programs, as they realize that through
The tranquil life that the people of Vietnam long for lies with their allegiance to a freely elected Government of Vietnam.

Pacification intends to mold a proud, courageous people into a modern, free and prosperous Nation.

Pacification in South Vietnam is not new. In fact, the first intensive efforts began in 1954 shortly after Ngo Dinh Diem became President. Limited, slow, but sure progress was being made, economically and politically in the first few years after the founding of the Republic. Under various names, such as the Strategic Hamlet Program and the Revolutionary Development Program, the GVN's pacification program was intended to mold a proud, courageous and individualistic people into a modern, cohesive and free nation. This meant among other things, generating cooperative public attitudes toward a central government in a people who have been fragmented in opposing religious and ethnic groupings, loyal to family while apathetic to all government, and who only recently had won independence from their colonial masters. With the added pressures of Hanoi-directed insurgency, it was obvious that pacification had a rocky future.
The various pacification programs achieved only spotty success until late 1966 when a major effort was initiated avoiding past errors and embarking upon a meaningful program to, while providing security to the people, deny the enemy the base of popular support without which he can not exist.

In early 1967, the Vietnamese government reviewed and assessed its organization to accomplish the task of pacifying the Republic of Vietnam. The United States Government, principal advisor to the Government of Vietnam, reevaluated its task—organization, and it, too, made sweeping changes. Together both the GVN and USG agreed upon new concepts and began a combined venture to establish new joint plans and missions of the various military and civilian agencies.

On the US side, the responsibility for a combined civil and military pacification advisory effort was assigned to MACV. The basic arrangements for unifying the pacification effort first involved appointing a Deputy (with the rank of Ambassador) to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (DEP/CORDS), at the Saigon level. A major staff section was also formed within the MACV staff under the Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS (MACCORDS).

By using the resources of the US State Department, US Information Agency (USIA), US Agency for International Development (USAID) and MACV, the DEPCORDS MACV supervises the formulation and execution of all plans, policies and programs, military and civilian, which support the GVN’s pacification effort. Policy guidance flows from the Ambassador, to COMUSMACV, to DEPCORDS and on down to the lowest pacification advisory element.

Through its US advisory organization, MACCORDS advises the GVN on all pacification activities. Technical matters including actions involving refugees, agriculture and police, are also handled by MACCORDS through direct technical channels by either technical staff elements within MACV.
The progress achieved since May 1967 may have been instrumental in prompting Hanoi's decision to launch a major offensive in 1968 to assist in halting pacification of the countryside. While the need to assist the victims of the Tet and May assaults impeded pacification's progress, by year-end the programs were more effective than ever before.

In November 1968 the GVN implemented an Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The GVN's success in this campaign can be measured by the frequent, loud denunciation of the program by the VC as well as his latest offensive.

With the establishment of a Central Pacification and Development Council in 1968 and the eight new objectives for the 1969 Pacification Campaign described below, pacification has received new impetus.

PROVIDING TERRITORIAL SECURITY FOR 90% OF THE POPULATION BY THE END OF 1969.

The key to pacification is providing continual security in villages and hamlets from VC local forces, guerrilla units, and VC/NVA main forces. Other aspects of pacification cannot proceed until the countryside is relatively cleared and secured. The most important GVN elements providing Territorial Security include:

ARVN: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) regular forces, augmented by Regional Forces when available, have the primary responsibility for clearing operations. ARVN maneuver battalions move into the target area, destroy or eject the enemy and saturate the area with friendly troops. At the end of the clearing phase Regular Force/Popular Forces take over the area and begin the task of security thus relieving ARVN to move on to clear new areas.

RF/PF: Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF) can be compared with the US National Guard on full time duty in their ARVN, U.S. and FWMAF keep hamlets and villages safe from VC attacks so Pacification objectives can be achieved.
own home state and town. They are the backbone of Territorial Security and constitute approximately one-half of the manpower in the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Where RF/PF strengths are adequate, they may conduct the clearing phase. However, their primary concern is continual security for areas undergoing development. The PF units provide local security for the hamlet in which they are based, by conducting small military operations and ambushes in the vicinity of the hamlet. RF soldiers are recruited from and serve in their home provinces and provide security for the district in which they are based. They conduct military operations against local guerrilla forces, often working with PF, ARVN, and other Free World Forces.

NP: Following the clearing of an area, National Police (NP) maintain law and order, protect life and property, and perform regular police functions. They also support and assist RVN Armed Forces on search operations that involve civil population. When required, they assist military forces in suppressing VC insurgency.

PSDF: People's Self-Defense Force are local self-defense volunteers organized as units and trained by the RD Cadre or by RF/PF personnel. The PSDF provide continual active and passive defense for the hamlet which includes gathering information and intelligence and warning the population of attack and similar actions. When these forces are armed they also provide internal security of the hamlet, establish guard posts, listening posts and patrols.

US/FWMAF: U.S. and Free World Military Armed Forces engage in territorial security operations to destroy VC/NVA main force units and neutralize VC/NVA base areas. They also conduct military operations in support of pacification within their tactical areas of responsibility.

The presence of PF, RF, NP, ARVN, PSDF or US/FWMAF unit in the neighborhood has a dramatic effect on the rural construction activity, for territorial security is an essential
SPIRIT PRINCIPLE
OBJECTIVES

2
ESTABLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN VILLAGES
HAMELET MGMT BOARDS
TRNG PROGRAMS FOR OFFICIALS
CENSUS GRIEVANCE RD CADRE

Motivate To Protect And Dev Village
Effective Adm & Mgmt

SELF-HELP PROJECTS
PUBLIC WORKS AGRICULTURAL SERVICES

3
ORGANIZE PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE
PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE GROUPS
TRAINING DISTRIBUTION OF WEAPONS
PSDF Cadre

5
REDUCE THE VCI
CENTRAL PHUNG HOANG COMMITTEE
NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE
RD CADRE DIOCC
Detention Facilities RD Teams Hoi Chanh PSDF PF PRU APT

7
STIMULATE RURAL ECONOMY
INCREASE RICE PROD INCREASE LOW INTEREST LOANS AGRIC DIVERSIFY FARMER'S ASSOC

8
REDUCE THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES
RESETTLEMENT WELFARE RELIEF PROGRAMS
In Camps In Home Village Relief Grants Civic Action

Relocation Objectives Established By RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Capturing and rallying members of the VC Infrastructure helps eliminate the VC control over hamlets and villages.

ELIMINATING THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

The attack on the enemy infrastructure is a most important program in the clearing and security phases of pacification. This Vietnamese program provides a combined system of GVN/US intelligence gathering and collating agencies from the national level down through corps, province and district levels. The information gathered serves to identify hard-core communists and VC agents operating at all levels of the insurgency. Once identified they are targeted by action forces and killed, captured, or rallied with the objective of eliminating VC influence over the local population and denying important assistance to VC/NVA military forces. The most important sub-programs in eliminating the VC infrastructure are:

PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX: The framework for attacking the VCI is called Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese and Phoenix by the U.S. This organization consists of coordinating committees down to the province level. The operational elements are the Provincial or District Intelligence and Operations Coordination centers (PIOCC/DIOCC). These centers normally consist of representatives from the various military, paramilitary and GVN civilian agencies operating within the province and district responsible to the province and district chiefs. The primary goal of these centers is exploiting infrastructure intelligence, and evaluating and disseminating the information for planning quick reaction operations. These centers also provide intelligence support for military operations. Phung Hoang operations are targeted on disrupting, harassing, capturing, and eliminating local VCI members. Phung Hoang also aims at inducing VCI members to defect, when possible.

NP/NPFF: Once an area has been cleared by FWMAF or ARVN, the National Police
Field Force (NPFF) play a key role in securing the area. NPFF, a component of the GVN National Police, locate and eradicate the VCI in the district, village and hamlet. Once this task is completed, the NPFF continues to secure an area by preventing the VC resurgence, conducting necessary field operations, and safeguard the extension of other National Police present in the rural area. They work in close collaboration with village and hamlet authorities and the GVN Special Police Branch.

Detention System and Facilities: Capturing members of the VCI is not enough. They must be safely confined and restrained until the war is over or until they rally and assist in the further destruction of the VCI. A GVN prison and detention facilities improvement program establishes a penal system capable of providing sufficient and appropriate facilities for captured VCI. Emphasis on the detention system is placed on prisoner vocational training and rehabilitation to induce prisoners to rally and become constructive rather than destructive.

ORGANIZE TWO MILLION PEOPLE FOR SELF DEFENSE AND DISTRIBUTE 400,000 WEAPONS

Securing an area presents two problems—liberating areas from the VC, and keeping the areas liberated. In clearing an area Vietnamese military forces augmented by allied forces conduct the initial operations. But, once an area is liberated from VC control, regular military and government forces cannot "occupy" an area, but must move on to clear new areas. If a newly liberated area does not have sufficient RF, PF, police units or trained and armed citizens, VC control filters back in the area as soon as it is vacated by the main military force. Consequently, if all the cleared areas are to stay liberated the people themselves must ultimately secure themselves by becoming a part of a self defense force. Moti-
vating them and training them to do so is the major objective of the People's Self-Defense Program.

RD Cadre: Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) are Vietnamese nationals trained to become skilled in certain specialties and sent to live in the villages among the rural population. The RD Cadre is directly or indirectly involved in each of the eight Pacification Programs. RD Cadre participate in building the village and hamlet infrastructure and serve as a vanguard element carrying the GVN political doctrine to the people. The RD Cadre are organized into 30-man teams and deployed permanently at the village level under the operational control of the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee.

RD Cadre operate as eight-man teams in the contested hamlets within a village, in close coordination with the Popular Forces or other security elements. Their objective is to assist in upgrading contested hamlets to a security level through the following processes:

A. Identify the VC infrastructure.
B. Organize and train People's Self-Defense Forces.
C. Organize the elections of local officials.
D. Start the implementation of self-help programs.

ESTABLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALL VILLAGES IN THE LAND

As the Paris peace negotiations proceed, the objective of establishing responsive local government becomes increasingly urgent. The Viet Cong has undertaken a crash program to establish "Liberation Committees" in hamlets under their nominal control, conducting "elections," often as their terrorists lurk in the background. The GVN has made the establishment of local administrations an item of high priority.

In each village and hamlet the local political administration must react satisfactorily to the programs of the central government and
at the same time respond to the needs of the local people. As contested areas are secured, democratic institutions are initiated. Village administrative committees and councils are appointed, Village officials are selected and provided with the training necessary to perform day-to-day tasks with reasonable efficiency. Pending the organization of elections or if qualified officials cannot be found locally, the province and district government may temporarily appoint qualified personnel from the RF/PF or RD Cadre. Village/hamlet elections, Census Grievance committees, new decrees providing for additional political and economic autonomy to the village, an active RD effort, and the planned village development program improves the villager’s life and gives him more control over it.

Self-Help: Once security has improved whereby a hamlet can be assured of reasonable protection, the developing phase of pacification begins through the Self-Help Program. This program is designed to have the government and the people cooperate on small (village/hamlet) construction projects. RD Cadre teams, already placed in the hamlets and villages, assist the economic and social aspect of the developing process. Projects begun during the securing phase are carried to completion and new projects are instituted which are of greater permanence and depth than those begun earlier.

Operations to be carried out include: 1) Public Health—Provide basic health facilities, improve living conditions and lay a foundation for a better life; 2) Education—Provide adequate educational facilities, training of teachers, conduct youth affairs, teach the people how to adapt to new and aggressive ways of life; 3) Agriculture Services—Teach the people how best to use their land, irrigate, and improve crop production, organize the people into cooperatives and associations to produce and earn more, teach the people new animal breeding techniques, livestock care, improved fishery techniques; and 4) Public Works—Show the people that if they will help, they
Pacification helps provide adequate education facilities and trained teachers.

A strong village government freely elected by the people enables Pacification to succeed through the principle of The Community Spirit.

can have new roads, bridges, homes, schools, lines of communications, dams, electrification and other improvements in their hamlets and villages through the use of government materials and technical assistance.

Emphasis on people and not things is the predominant theme in pacification in 1969. The Government will assist the people by providing financial support to the villages for carrying out self-help programs. The Government has established pacification and development councils at the national, corps, provincial and district levels to provide technical assistance and coordinate the whole effort. The village, however, is the primary focus of the 1969 program.

The people through the village council decide on the projects ranging from road repairs to pig pens. Then with technical and material assistance from the GVN, CORDS Field representatives, and military civic action groups, the people carry out their projects, contributing labor and often money or construction materials.

A successful pacification campaign will provide the environment for greater political support for the GVN at the grass roots level and the achievement of economic and social development goals.

During the past decade the Viet Cong have assassinated thousands of village and hamlet leaders, knowing well that leaderless masses are easily influenced and intimidated. The GVN has, therefore, placed special emphasis on the training of local administrators, so that they will be capable of not only effectively managing the administrative apparatus but also leading and motivating the people in the development and protection of the village.

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES TO ONE MILLION – RESETTLE 300,000

Refugees represent a significant percentage of the total population of Vietnam and are a vital factor in the pacification program. By virtue of their numbers and their family and
village connections in contested VC areas, refugees are an exploitable resource for the development phase of pacification.

The GVN Refugee Program is designed to return villagers to their homes, reintegrate them into a normal life, and provide them with the opportunities and skills to participate in the self-help programs. Refugees usually leave their native hamlets because of military operations or to avoid communist pressure. Some take up temporary residence with relatives in pacified areas until they can return to their native areas; others require temporary relief and assistance in resettlement. To provide for refugee reception, care and resettlement or return to their homes, refugee subprograms consist of the following:

Relief Program—Temporary relief is given to all refugees seeking asylum. This includes all aspects of logistics, commodities and services such as medical, sanitation, transportation, food, clothing, and temporary shelter. Relief grants are provided for refugees needing and desiring such funds.

Resettlement Program—This program provides for the creation of resettlement hamlets, with all necessary auxiliary facilities. Refugees who cannot immediately return to their native areas are resettled until they can return. Refugees who settle in a new place or return to their native areas are given resettlement subsidies.

Refugee Welfare—Technical guidance is provided in the fields of self-help programs, handicrafts, cottage industries and the formation of cooperatives. Youth education and vocational training, as well as political and psychological orientation of refugees, also helps transform the refugee population into a useful asset to the pacification effort.

INCREASE NUMBER OF RALLIERS TO 20,000 UNDER THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

Chieu Hoi serves as a bridge over which defecting VC can help the GVN rebuild the country instead of destroying it. The Chieu
Hoi program appeals to VC/NVA military and civilian personnel to defect (rally) to the GVN. A rallier is called a Hoi Chanh (one who has returned to the path of right) and is offered friendship and a new beginning in life. The Chieu Hoi program serves to convert military and civilian VC and NVA ralliers into useful citizens and includes receiving, quartering, reindoctrination, training, motivating and some employment. Chieu Hoi also enables the GVN to obtain valuable intelligence information through the Hoi Chanh; it weakens the communist cause through the loss of personnel, and causes dissension and distrust among the communist military and political agencies. This program includes:

Chieu Hoi Centers. Each province has a Chieu Hoi Center to receive and retain Hoi Chanh. The centers have adequate facilities for classification of returnees, interrogation, feeding and billeting, political indoctrination classes, vocational training, and limited recreation for the returnees.

Rehabilitation. Each Hoi Chanh is guaranteed safety, good treatment and an opportunity for rehabilitation. Based on the information and assistance he provides, many Hoi Chanh are used by US/FWMAF units in tactical operations i.e., locating and capturing VC stores of materials, search and clear operations. Others are tested and incorporated in the Kit Carson Scout Program and employed as full-time scouts or guides for tactical units. Many US units also employ Hoi Chanh in administrative or specialized functions. Sincere ralliers with military rank or experience who have achieved meritorious accomplishments are accepted into ARVN as regulars.

PSYOPS Program. Although psychological operations are employed in each of the eight inter-related pacification objectives its greatest impact is in Chieu Hoi. There is a close correlation between the returnee input rate and the well-organized PSYOPS Committees and Armed Propaganda Teams. These committees and teams utilize an inducement and propaganda program which dramatically affect the success of the Chieu Hoi Program and the overall effort of pacification.

INTENSIFY PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION EFFORTS.

Even though the GVN has attempted in the past to explain the government’s programs to the people, it was only with the onset of the 1969 Pacification Campaign that informing the public was adopted as a major pacification objective. Tackling an area in which the Viet Cong have demonstrated great skill, the GVN Ministry of Information has assigned high priority to disseminating and explaining to the population, particularly in rural areas, the pacification and development campaign. The GVN is employing all available media to encourage and motivate the entire population to actively participate in achieving the national objectives. Village and Hamlet Information Cadre and Mobile Information Teams have been organized to “get the word” to all the people.

STIMULATE THE RURAL ECONOMY

The Republic of Vietnam is potentially a wealthy nation. Its fertile paddy-land and vegetable farms, rubber plantations and untapped lumber tracts stand as a promise that once peace is restored, economic growth will not be far behind.

As stated previously clearing and securing are essential preliminary steps to providing a more promising future to the Vietnamese people. However, the greatest appeal to the populace is the promise of increased prosperity. Therefore, one of the objectives of pacification is economic revival of this once thriving nation, in order to provide all its citizens with a higher standard of living and greater opportunity for personal happiness. The restoration of South Vietnam to its former high productivity is expected to accelerate sharply in 1969.
Lines of communication are being secured and rebuilt, or constructed to provide greater accessibility to markets. Low-interest loans are more easily obtained by rural citizens and economic restrictions are gradually being reduced. Increased rice production achieved through the introduction of new rice strains, improved irrigation and fertilization, and crop diversification hold great promise for productivity and prosperity for the rural Vietnamese.

WHERE DO WE FIT IN?

In 1963 President John F. Kennedy stated of the Vietnamese conflict, "In the final analysis it's their war—we can help them—but they have to win it." This statement is especially true when applied to the achievement of Pacification Objectives. It is the GVN which must enlist the support of the people. US Forces can lend a helping hand only.

Obviously, our forces in Vietnam have played a major role in pacification by the destruction of Viet Cong and NVA main force units. This has enabled ARVN units to devote greater resources to local village and hamlet security.

Then there is the advisory effort; the MACV training mission of assisting ARVN improvement, and the CORDS task of supporting each of the program objectives by establishing close working relationships between US tactical units and GVN officials and organizations with the provinces, villages and hamlets.

THE TICKET HOME

There it is; a plan to end a long and complex war on a note which will offer to the South Vietnamese the hope that they and their children may face a free, peaceful and happy future.

With our help and the help of other Free World Forces, the GVN has inaugurated a massive pacification effort to win peace which has eluded its citizens for many years. Only by understanding the objectives of Pacification can we render the assistance required to ensure the program's success. And succeed it must. For Americans serving in Vietnam, successful pacification is 'The one-way ticket home'.