The Phaedo of Plato

Edited with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices

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PREFACE.

So many editions of the *Phaedo* are already in existence that the appearance of a fresh one would seem to require a word of explanation. The object of the present edition is to assist those who are beginning in earnest the study of Plato's philosophy, and who have advanced far enough to appreciate the peculiar difficulty of his writings. Accordingly my chief aim has been to elucidate the philosophical contents of the dialogue, to indicate as clearly as I was able the succession of its thought, and to determine its position in the Platonic system. It has therefore been no part of my purpose to enter minutely into points of language for their own sake. But since it is utterly impossible to follow Plato's thought without a thorough mastery of his language, I have not abstained from dealing with such points, so far as seemed necessary for the right understanding of Plato's meaning, or where I thought that they had been insufficiently treated by previous editors. Among existing editions I am most indebted to the notes of
those admirable scholars Wyttenbach and Heindorf. And since I have frequently had occasion to express dissent from the views of Prof. Geddes, I am anxious to take this opportunity of acknowledging the advantage I have derived from his scholarly and lucid commentary.

Finally and above all my thanks are due to my friend Mr Henry Jackson, to whose untiring kindness I owe far more than I can possibly acknowledge: the references to him in the notes very imperfectly indicate how fully he carries out the principle κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

Trinity College, Cambridge,
3 November, 1883.
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Scope of the dialogue.

A careful student of the Platonic dialogues can hardly fail to notice a certain peculiarity in their structure: he will observe that for the most part we find not one but several motives underlying the whole composition and artistically interwoven; so that if we put the question, what was Plato's object in writing any one dialogue, the answer can rarely be a simple one. These several motives are indeed formally subordinated to one definite end—for a Platonic λόγος is always ὑπεροχήσθαι—but this end is not always, nor indeed often, the most important result of the dialogue or that which Plato had most at heart in its composition. A very good and simple illustration of this is supplied by the Sophist. The declared object of that dialogue is to define the sophist (218 b); and this object, amid all the intricacies of the argument, is held steadfastly in view until its final accomplishment, when the sophist is tracked down, captured, and bound hand and foot in the humorously labyrinthine paragraph which closes the Eleate's discourse. But as a means of obtaining this definition Plato employs his method of διαίρεσις; and the extreme elaboration with which this process is worked out, together with the high value which we know Plato set upon it, leaves no doubt that the exposition and illustration of this dialectical method is one of the motives of the dialogue. Thirdly, a point suddenly turns up, quite by accident, as it were, and without the slightest premeditation (236 d): the sophist, on the point of being convicted as a dealer in shams, takes shelter in the old puzzle about μὴ ὅν: which puzzle must be solved before the definition can be accomplished. Now it will be observed that the material and formal importance of these three motives are in reverse order. The definition of the sophist, the formal object of the dialogue, is simply a piece of pungent satire; but the method by which this object is attained is a matter of high interest and significance. By far the most momentous issue, however, is that which turns upon μὴ ὅν: the searching criticism of ὅν and μὴ ὅν, as conceived in various philosophies; the masterly
analysis of the five \( \gamma \varepsilon \eta \), which clears up the problem of predication; the solution of the hitherto hopeless enigma concerning false judgments; all this constitutes one of the most memorable achievements of the human intellect: a science of logic is now first founded, and philosophy is placed upon a new basis. Yet in form this all-important metaphysical inquiry is merely an accidental difficulty involved in the definition of the sophist, which need not have arisen, had not the sophist turned out to be a sham. We see then how Plato proposes to himself an end mainly for the sake of the means: we may be sure that he cared little about defining the sophist, but very much about the metaphysical questions to which the process of definition was to give rise. Now this indirect way of going about his work is a peculiarity of Plato's which must be steadily kept in mind if we are to have any hope of understanding him at all. Also we must remember that Plato is before all things a metaphysician: ethics, politics, logic, physics are to him so many forms of applied metaphysics; and if we would rightly follow the current of his thought, it is from a metaphysical source that we must seek to trace it.

Bearing this in mind, let us see what is the result of a similar analysis applied to the structure of the *Phaedo*. Most persons who should be asked to describe this work would probably reply that it was a treatise in which Plato endeavours to prove that soul is immortal; and this is no doubt a correct account of one motive of the dialogue. But the demonstration of immortality is neither the express purpose nor the most important philosophical result; it holds a position more nearly corresponding to that of \( \delta \omega \alpha \pi \rho \epsilon \sigma \varsigma \) in the *Sophist*. As to the main subject of the dialogue Plato leaves us in no uncertainty. Sokrates makes two statements, which appear to Kebe to be mutually conflicting: (1) in this life we are under the protection of good and wise gods, (2) the philosopher will be glad to quit this life. Simmias adds that it seems a little unkind of Sokrates to be pleased at leaving his friends. Sokrates admits that it is only fair that he should clear himself on both these charges. Then, after an interruption on the part of Kriton, which is clearly designed to mark that the serious business of the dialogue is now about to begin, Sokrates proceeds in the following words: 'Now I desire to render an account to you my judges and to show that it is reasonable for a man who has passed his life in the true love of wisdom to be of good cheer on the threshold of death and to be hopeful of enjoying the greatest blessings, when he is dead, in the other world. How this may be the case, Simmias and Kebe, I shall try to tell you (63 \( \varepsilon \)).' Thus we see that the leading motive is to
show that the wise and virtuous man will meet death with cheerfulness, on the ground that his lot will be happy in the world of the departed. And, as in the *Sophist*, Plato never once loses sight of this motive from beginning to end of the work.

Now let us observe how the other subjects are connected with this. The line of defence adopted by Sokrates is as follows: The philosopher is not concerned with the gratification of bodily appetites nor with the pomps and luxuries of this world; the pleasures of the intellect alone are precious in his sight, and to the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom his whole life is devoted. Such being the case, the body which is his soul's constant companion not only brings him no advantage but is a positive hindrance and annoyance, impeding by its importunate affections the free action of the soul in her search for the truth. Accordingly he accustoms his soul to be as independent of the body as is possible, to withdraw from communion with it, and to act by herself—by processes of pure thought without aid of the senses. But this deliverance of the soul, her purification from all corporeal taint, can never be perfectly accomplished during this earthly life; consequently in this life the perfect fruition of intelligence can never be attained. There is but one thing which separates soul from body altogether; and this is death: death extricates the soul from her corporeal entanglement and sets her free to exert her unfettered powers upon the highest objects of cognition. Death then is the realisation of the philosopher's dream; it is the fulfilment of that intellectual enfranchisement which by a lifelong struggle he has but in some scanty measure attained: how then can he fail to be of good cheer when the hour arrives of his release from the close confines of his bodily prison into the wide pure air of free intellectual life?

Very well, replies Kebes; but you are assuming that the soul continues to exist as a conscious and intelligent being after her separation from the body. How do we know that she is not extinguished at the moment of dissolution? Before we can accept your defence it is absolutely necessary that you should satisfy us on this point. Sokrates freely admits the justice of this criticism and says he will do his best to fill up the lacuna in his theory.

We see then that immortality is a distinctly secondary issue, subordinate to the principal theme of the dialogue. The particular mode in which Sokrates has chosen to defend his main proposition demands a demonstration of the soul's immortality as a necessary condition, and that is all; so far as regards the purposes of this dialogue Plato is concerned to prove the soul immortal only in order to prove that the
true philosopher will not fear death. It is to be noticed that as soon
as ever the demonstration is, or seems to be, accomplished, Sokrates
at once proceeds to enlarge on its ethical bearings in relation to the
main proposition, 81 a foll., 107 c foll.

Having thus determined two motives, let us see whether an inspec-
tion of the pleadings for immortality will disclose any more. Sokrates
begins with two arguments which are to be regarded as two halves of
one proof. The first is based upon a law of alternation or reciprocity
in nature: given two opposite states, all things which have come to be
in either state have passed into it from the opposite state; thus what is
now better has become so from being worse; and between every such
pair of opposites we have transition in either direction, between hotter
and colder, greater and less, sleeping and waking, &c. Now the op-
posite to living is dead: between these two we daily see the process in
one direction, from life to death, the other we do not see. But though
we see it not, it must exist. For since living souls are continually
being born into the world, and since they cannot come out of nothing,
clearly they must come from the souls which have quitted this life.
These then must exist after their departure from the body; for if they
ceased to be, they could not come again into being. Therefore our
souls exist after death. The second argument rests upon reminiscence.
All sensible objects remind us of certain ideal types, whereof they are
likenesses: they are but adumbrations of these types, faintly reflecting
them but incapable of representing them with perfect accuracy. We
compare these objects with their types and judge that they fall short of
them; whence it is evident that at some time we must have had appre-
hension of the types. Now we cannot possibly have gained this know-
ledge since our birth; we must then have possessed it before we were
born. Therefore our souls possessed intelligent existence before birth.
Putting these two arguments together, we find that our souls existed as
intelligent beings before we were born and will continue so to exist
after we are dead.

Seeing that his young friends are still doubtful whether the condi-
tions for the operation of this law of reciprocity are necessarily satisfied
in the case of soul, Sokrates pushes forward to new ground. He urges
that if a thing is to be decomposed, it must first have been composed;
that which has no parts therefore cannot be subject to dissolution.
This is the fundamental distinction between the objects of sense and
the objects of intelligence; the former are composite and perpetually
suffering resolution into their constituent parts; the latter are simple
and therefore indissoluble. Ideas are changeless and eternal, particulars
are ever-changing and transitory. To which of these natures is soul more akin? clearly to the simple and changeless ideas, which are her proper object of cognition, and which she apprehends by virtue of her likeness to them. Moreover she is mistress over the body, being in her divine simplicity far more powerful. Yet even the body is under certain conditions very durable; how much more lasting then shall the soul not be?

Before proceeding let us pause to mark the stress laid on the affinity of the soul to the ideas, for this will presently play an important part.

We may pass over the objection of Simmias with its refutation as being immaterial to the main argument, and proceed at once to the criticism of Kebes on the foregoing theory. It amounts to this: the above reasoning only makes it probable that soul is much more durable than body and may last a very long time; it does not show that she is actually imperishable nor that she has in her own essence an inalienable principle of vitality. This takes us to the very heart of the matter; Sokrates must trace the causes of generation and destruction down to their very roots.

I do not mean in this place to give any analysis of the marvellously subtle reasoning which serves for the final demonstration, but only to call attention to its fundamental principles. After pointing out the inadequacy of all previous and contemporary theories of causation, Sokrates declares the Ideas to be the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge. The truth of the Ideas is eternally sure, and whatever inference can be certainly drawn from the ideal theory is verily true. Now everything in nature is what it is by virtue of the immanence of some idea informing it: and so intimate is the connexion of particular with idea, that the former can never give admission to an idea incongruous with the latter. Accordingly if we take any pair of opposite and mutually exclusive ideas, a particular informed by such opposite, or by any idea involving such opposite, can never receive the other opposite; we cannot have cold fire or even three. But soul—vital principle—is soul by virtue of the idea of life inherent; therefore she can never admit the opposite to life, which is death; else we should have dead soul, which is no less impossible and irrational than even three. Soul therefore has in her inmost essence a source of life that can never fail her.

A very moderate familiarity with Plato's ways of working will now enable us to see where we are to look for the very heart of the dialogue. The assertion of the Ideas as the causes of existence and the objects of cognition; the affirmation that they constitute the ultimate reality
upon which all sound reasoning must be based—this is the most significant metaphysical result of the *Phaedo*, and this beyond doubt was Plato's dearest purpose in composing it. And yet, so far as form goes, this is only subsidiary to the establishment of a doctrine which has turned out to be necessary to the maintenance of the primary proposition. We saw however in the *Sophist* that the chief formal motive is by no means necessarily Plato's principal end; and again we have to seek the chief end in what is technically but a means.

Such being the three strands intertwined in the thread of which the fabric of the *Phaedo* is woven, let us examine their relations a little more narrowly.

The question of immortality is interesting and important just so far as it is connected with the cognition of the ideas. True knowledge, says Plato, is concerned with the ideas alone, because they are simple, changeless, and abiding: concerning the complex, changeful, and fleeting objects of sense there can be nothing better than opinion. Soul alone, acting by processes of pure thought, can apprehend the ideas, because of her likeness to them; she too is simple and self-identical; and like is known by like. But during her association with the body she never has free play for her own activity: the body with its passions and appetites, its pleasures and pains, its maladies and weaknesses, is ever hampering and hindering the movements of the soul to such a degree that even the wisest of mankind can only in part rise superior to these influences. Consequently the joy of pure and untroubled contemplation can never be tasted by the soul while her union with the body continues; only by release from its harassing companionship can she hope for the full fruition of knowledge. So if her existence is terminated at the dissolution of soul and body, she never can attain true knowledge at all: immortality then is an inevitable condition of the free cognition of the ideas. For this immortality she is justified in hoping by the very affinity to the ideas which enables her to apprehend them; nay she is assured of it by the indwelling idea of life itself which informs her very essence. Thus are immortality and knowledge mutually interdependent. Schleiermacher, who has some excellent remarks on this subject, sums up as follows: 'so ist denn die Ewigkeit der Seele die Bedingung der Möglichkeit alles wahren Erkennens für den Menschen, und wiederum die Wirklichkeit des Erkennens ist der Grund, aus welchem am sichersten und leichtesten die Ewigkeit der Seele eingesesehen wird.' In the words of Simmias, εἰς καλὸν γε κατασκεύασάτι ο λόγος εἰς τὸ ὄμοιόν εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχήν ἡμῶν πρὸς γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἢν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.
Such then is the value of immortality, as promising us an existence under conditions more favourable to intellectual activity. I think however Plato intends to turn it to another not unimportant, though minor, use. In the true Platonic system of ethics immortality plays no part. Plato's morality is founded in the very depths of his ontology; for the principle of good and the principle of being are one and the same. It matters nothing whether we live or die: that alone is good which is like the idea of good. But to deduce ethical science from the αὐτῷ ἀγαθῶν calls for a most consummate philosopher: for the great mass of mankind it is simply out of the question. So then, since they cannot frame a moral code for themselves because they do not know the idea of the good, the best they can do is to accept one from the philosopher who does know it, as Plato insists in the Republic. But the philosopher must hold out some inducement for the people to receive his teaching; and this inducement may be derived from immortality. Sokrates himself says 'if the soul is immortal, she needs our care not only during the period to which we give the name of life, but for all time; and now it is that we see how grave is the danger of neglecting her.' The philosopher will persuade the people to follow his precepts by showing that a life of intelligent virtue is the forerunner of free intellectual enjoyment in the invisible world, but a life of vice can only lead after death to helpless cravings for bodily pleasures which are out of reach. So by deducing immortality from the ideal theory, Plato uses that theory to provide a working code of morals for those who are incapable of rising to the only true and rational virtue.

But while we affirm that the chief result of the Phaedo is the establishment of the ideas as the true principles of causation and objects of knowledge, in place of the superficial physical laws and incogitable phenomena which did duty for causes and realities with the Ionian philosophers; and while we recognise that the proof of immortality derives its sole value from its bearing on the cognition of the ideas, we must not leave out of sight the original proposition, that the wise man will cheerfully meet death. This, though overshadowed by the superior interest of the metaphysical issues to which it gives rise, is yet far from unimportant in Plato's sight; and this is what gives artistic unity to the dialogue. As a framework in which to set his vindication of the dignity of the ideas Plato could have chosen nothing better than a description of the cheerful fortitude displayed by a man whose life has been devoted to intellectual research. The lesson which Sokrates inculcates by his precepts and arguments he enforces still more vividly by his living example. From his first pleasant moralising on his own fetter-cramped
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limbs to the last half-conscious injunction to fulfil a pious duty; he shows us the very ideal of that character at which he would have us aim. Never was the Platonic Sokrates more genial and gentle, more ready and subtle in argument, more patient of opposition and skilful in encountering it, never more rich in poetry and imagination, than on that last day of his life. It seems as if Plato had determined to use all the resources at his command in bringing home to us the lesson that in philosophy lies the sovereign charm against the terror of death: he appeals to the intellect by the subtlety of his arguments, to the imagination by his fanciful and beautiful myth, and to the emotions by that death-scene which stands alone in all literature. It is in this way that we may recognise the connexion of the myth and the last scene with the main body of the dialogue. The myth is no mere poetical embellishment, nor does the death-scene share only the unity which belongs to the various stages of one coherent narrative. Both are linked by a deeper unity to the remainder of the work, being by different methods subservient to the same purpose. We see then in the Phaedo an affirmation of the ideas as causative and intelligible existences, from which, through the inference of immortality, the ethical deduction is drawn that the philosopher, secure of his well-being in the region of the departed, will meet death with calmness and confidence; and the impression thus conveyed is rendered more vivid by a description of the earth and the underworld and an account of the adventures of the disembodied soul; and finally it is yet more earnestly enforced by a picture of philosophic fortitude taken from actual history. All these elements, argumentative, imaginative, and narrative, are harmonised by Plato in one consummate work of art and jointly directed to one common end.

§ 2. The relation of the several arguments for immortality.

How the several arguments are mutually related, and how many proofs of immortality are contained in the Phaedo, is a question on which most diverse opinions have been entertained: on one estimate all the proofs are reduced to one, while another reckons as many as seven. I do not propose to criticise these various enumerations, which have been ably treated by Bonitz in his admirable 'Platonische Studien': I shall simply examine the relation of the several arguments, and then from the results thus obtained consider whether they are to be regarded as constituting one or more demonstrations. With
the views of Bonitz in the main I thoroughly agree; but I think it is possible to give a somewhat preciser statement than he has done.

First then as concerning the argument of ἀνταπόδοσις 70 C—72 E. This seeks to deduce the soul's immortality from a universal law of nature, or rather from two laws. The first is γένεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων, which is simply an application of a principle with which we are already familiar—in preplatonic philosophy, e.g. the ὁδὸς ἄνω καὶ κάτω of Herakleitos. A γένεσις is a process between opposite states; whatever we see at one pole, as the result of a γένεσις, has passed over from the other pole. The two poles with which our argument is concerned are ζων and τεθνηκός: ζων we define as a state of union between soul and body, τεθνηκός as a state of separation. We know that the soul passes to the state τεθνηκός from the state ζων, and we deduce from the law of alternations that she passes to the state ζων from the state τεθνηκός. Therefore the soul must have existence in the state τεθνηκός, in virtue of our second law, which is that the sum of all things is constant; in Aristotle's words οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ μὴ ὀντος, πᾶν δ' ἐξ ὀντος. This principle, which the physicists, as Aristotle goes on to observe, agreed in affirming of matter, is here affirmed of thought by Plato, for whom matter is but a phase of thought. It is this which is the most important element in the present argument, and to which we shall hereafter have occasion to recur. The result we obtain then is that our soul in passing from ζων to τεθνηκός is not annihilated in the process, but retains her existence in the state τεθνηκός: in popular language ἔστιν ἐν Λίδου.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις 72 E—77 A, in supplementing the former, introduces us to the ideal theory. By an ingenious process of reasoning Plato shows that our soul must have had cognition of the ideas, and that this cognition must have been attained before our present life: our soul then must have been in existence before she was incarcerated in human form and born into this life. The result then is the antenatal existence of the soul.

But, it might be asked, what more do we gain by this argument of ἀνάμνησις? For though the only result which Plato expressly draws from ἀνταπόδοσις is that the soul exists after death, it would also be a perfectly fair inference that she existed before birth: for the soul that became ζων at a human birth must previously have been τεθνηκός, that is, existent in a state of separation; else we should have γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὀντος. This is true; but ἀνάμνησις makes two important contributions: (1) what we have to prove is ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχῇ ἐν Λίδου καὶ δύναμιν
\(\kappa\iota\varphi\rho\omicron\acute{o}\iota\nu\ \acute{\varepsilon}\chi\epsilon: \) of this only the first half can be deduced from \(\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\pi\omicron\acute{o}\delta\omicron\sigma\iota\iota\), the latter is supplied by \(\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{m}n\iota\sigma\iota\), which shows that the soul had cognition of the ideas: \(\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\pi\omicron\acute{o}\delta\omicron\sigma\iota\iota\) shows that \(\tau\epsilon\vartheta\nu\kappa\omicron\iota\sigma\) is a mode of existence, \(\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{m}n\iota\sigma\iota\) that it is a state of intelligence: (2) \(\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{m}n\iota\sigma\iota\) attaches the demonstration of immortality to the theory of ideas, upon which it is finally to be based. Thus we see that the two arguments are mutually complementary.

In fact there is no more surprising feature in the literature to which the \textit{Phaedo} has given occasion than the fact that many scholars, not only in the face of Plato's explicit declaration (77 c), but in the face of plain reason, have accounted these two arguments as two distinct proofs. For if we allow that \(\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\pi\omicron\acute{o}\delta\omicron\sigma\iota\iota\) furnishes a proof \(\acute{\omega}\iota\varepsilon\iota\tau\nu\ \acute{\eta} \ \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \Lambda\acute{\iota}\acute{\delta}o\nu\), and \(\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{m}n\iota\sigma\iota\) a proof \(\acute{\omega}\iota\ \dot{\delta}\acute{\nu}\acute{\acute{a}}\mu\iota\nu\ \kappa\ai\ \varphi\omicron\acute{o}\omicron\acute{n}\iota\sigma\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\) \(\pi\acute{\iota}\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\acute{\nu}\acute{\acute{e}}\sigma\theta\acute{\iota} \ \acute{\eta}\acute{m}\acute{\omega}\acute{s}\), it is self-evident that the two must be combined in order to constitute a proof \(\acute{\omega}\iota\varepsilon\iota\tau\nu\ \tau\acute{\eta} \ \acute{\eta} \ \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \Lambda\acute{\iota}\acute{\delta}o\nu\ \kappa\ai\ \dot{\delta}\acute{\nu}\acute{\acute{a}}\mu\iota\nu\ \kai\ \varphi\omicron\acute{o}\omicron\acute{n}\iota\sigma\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\). We derive from \(\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\pi\omicron\acute{o}\delta\omicron\sigma\iota\iota\) evidence that the soul exists in the same state (\(\tau\epsilon\vartheta\nu\kappa\omicron\iota\sigma\)) before birth and after death; from \(\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{m}n\iota\sigma\iota\) we have evidence that this is a conscious and intelligent state.

So then, whatever number of proofs we may finally decide to exist in the \textit{Phaedo}, it is clear that the two foregoing arguments do not amount to more than one. But even before any objections have been urged, Sokrates proposes to offer further evidence, as though what he has already brought forward were inadequate. Let us see then in what particulars the demonstration seems to be incomplete, in order that we may know what we should expect to be supplied in the sequel.

A severer scrutiny will detect a weakness in each member of the proof. In the first the soul's continued existence is a simple deduction from a natural law, which is assumed to work with invariable uniformity. But we must recollect that the operation of any cause depends upon the conditions under which it acts: by the same law lead falls earthward and vapour streams upward; and it is conceivable that somewhere in the universe there might exist a set of conditions under which the same law might produce exactly the opposite results. Now if in addition to our knowledge of the law we had a perfect and exhaustive acquaintance with the conditions under which it acts in every conceivable instance, we might be certain of its operation in all cases. But as a matter of fact we have not and never can have such an acquaintance with the conditions. An astronomer, from the data before him, calculates that a planet ought to revolve in an orbit of
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a certain shape in a certain time: observation, however, shows that the facts do not correspond to the calculation. Then comes another astronomer with a larger telescope and discovers that the irregularity is due to the proximity of another body which was invisible to his predecessor. And if his discovery exhausts the number of influences at work on the planet, he will be able to calculate its orbit with accuracy, but not otherwise. Similarly although the law of alternation may afford a strong presumption that our souls return from the dead, this does not amount to certainty, since we cannot tell that our knowledge of the conditions is complete. The very fact that in this case we are unable to perceive one of the twin processes, which elsewhere are both visible, is enough to awaken our suspicion: we do not know the conditions to which soul is subject after our dissolution, and they may be such as to nullify our calculations. We cannot then be satisfied with simply inferring this immortality of the soul from the uniformity of nature, we must prove that imperishability is a necessary and inseparable attribute of her being.

Such I conceive to be the cause of the dissatisfaction felt with the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις. I have dwelt upon it at some length, because, though by no means obvious, it has hitherto, I believe, failed of being noticed. I now pass on to ἀνάμνησις.

We have already seen that ἀνάμνησις does not by itself prove the imperishability of the soul; and now since ἀνταπόδοσις has proved insufficient to accomplish this satisfactorily, the original defect remains unsupplied. We may have enjoyed apprehension of the ideas before our birth, but it does not follow that we shall exist to apprehend them again after our death. But the point to which I would draw attention is that we have so far failed to make the proper use of the soul's cognition of the ideas: the only conclusion we have drawn is that the soul must have existed to apprehend them; this is far short of the inference which on Platonic principles is not only justified but peremptorily required. What this is, we shall presently see.

1 That such is the defect of the argument is indicated by Plato himself at 77 D in the words μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὃ ἀνεμος αὐτῷ ἐκβαίνουσαι εἰ τοῖς σώματοι διαφύσι καὶ διασκεδάσασαι, ἄλλω τε καὶ ὅταν τίχων τις μὴ ἐν ἰναμίζῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ των πνεύματι ἀποθησάκων. That is to say, our law may be perfectly sound, but there may yet be disturbing forces, on which we have not calculated, which interfere with its operation: the accident of a tempest at the time of the soul's egress may produce conditions which render the law null and void in the case of that particular soul.
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We now perceive what we are to look for in the ensuing argument: (1) the establishment of the soul's immortality upon a necessity of her own nature and no mere external cause, (2) the deduction of the required inference from her cognition of the ideas.

In the argument extending from 78 b to 85 d we have the universe divided into the visible and invisible worlds: the former includes all sensible objects, which are composite, and therefore subject to dissolution and change; the latter contains the ideas, which are incomposite, and therefore changeless and indissoluble. Now the body is visible, and obviously belongs to the class of things which suffer change and dissolution; the soul, being invisible, should naturally seem to belong to the world of real existences, incomposite and indissoluble. This belief is confirmed if we consider the soul's attitude in regard to the sensible and intelligible worlds respectively. When dealing with sensible objects she is filled with bewilderment and strays giddily through the ever-fleeting stream of inconstant phantasms, where she can find no rest for the sole of her foot; but when she turns to the ideal world she feels herself at home; the ideas she can contemplate in serene repose, seeing that she herself is akin to them; and she then shares the constancy of the objects of her meditations. Additional confirmation is supplied by the observation that soul commands and body obeys; the former is the function of the divine, the latter of the mortal; therefore we infer that the soul most resembles this divine, deathless, simple, indissoluble, changeless, self-identical essence. Furthermore we know that parts of the body, inferior as it is, or the whole body when embalmed, may last for a practically unlimited time; af fortiori then the soul must be still more abiding.

With reference to this argument it is to be observed (1) that it is professedly a sequel to the preceding, οθεν δέ ἀπέλιτομεν ἐπανέλθωμεν 78 b: (2) that the requisite inference from cognition of the ideas is now expressed in the words I have italicised: (3) that the proof now rests upon the essential nature of the soul. Like knows like: therefore since the soul knows the ideas, she must be like the ideas. But the attributes of the ideas are simplicity, unchangeableness, and imperishability; the soul then must resemble them in these attributes. We are no longer dependent upon an external law, with whose workings we are imperfectly acquainted, to establish the soul's immortality; for we are able to class her with an order of substances to whose essence belongs eternity; and this we are enabled to do by realising that the soul's antenatal cognition of the ideas involves not merely her existence before our birth, but her likeness and affinity to the ideas themselves. Thus by
following to its logical conclusion the train of thought suggested by ἀνάμνησις, Plato has raised the theory of immortality from the dim and doubtful twilight of physical speculation to the clear sunshine of metaphysical certainty. This present argument is in fact intended both as a correction and a development of the previous reasoning. We no longer put our trust in the physical law of γένεσις ἐκ ἐναντίων, which, although it may be perfectly sound and may afford a strong presumption of the soul’s immortality, yet is incapable of offering us the assurance we require; and we have legitimately deduced from ἀνάμνησις a result which may serve as a secure ontological basis for our proposition.

But now we are suddenly brought to a stand. The whole edifice which we have been at such pains to erect collapses in a moment before the criticism of Kebes: we have been building it upon sand. There can be no mistake about this: the objection raised by Kebes is utterly destructive of the theory in its present form. Let us put it to the test.

Surveying the demonstration which has last been summarised, we see at the first glance that it is purely tentative and approximate; it does not even pretend to be more than an argument from probability.

In the first place the eternal objects of intelligence are invisible, while the perishable objects of sense are visible; the soul is invisible, and therefore we have assumed that she belongs to the rank of intelligible and eternal existences. But this assumption is unwarrantable. All that is eternal is invisible; but it does not follow that all which is invisible is eternal. We may say that the soul’s invisibility affords a certain presumption in favour of her eternity, but nothing more. Secondly, the soul apprehends the ideas, therefore she is like the ideas. True; but we are not justified in concluding that this likeness necessarily includes the attribute of eternity: she may, for aught we know, be sufficiently like the ideas to apprehend them and yet not possess all their properties. Thirdly, the plea that she is like the divine because she rules over the body is still less satisfactory: she may possess many divine qualities without sharing the divine attribute of eternity. Fourthly, when we argue that, since body may last a very long time and since soul is far more potent and permanent than body, soul must last a yet longer time, the conclusion is most inadequate of all. In fact the argument, considered as a proof, breaks down at every point: the most that can be obtained from it is in fact the very inference that Plato draws: προσηκέπα ψιχῆ τὸ παράπαν ἄδιαλυτῶ ἐναι ἡ ἔγγυς τι τούτου. But this is very different from the certainty we were seeking. Moreover
since, as we saw, this argument corrected, summed up, and developed the previous reasoning, retaining all that was cogent in it and confirming it by fresh evidence, it follows that in losing this we lose all: our whole case utterly collapses. As Kebes justly says, we have shown that the soul must have existed before her present incarnation; we have made out a case of strong probability that she is very durable and may survive many incarnations and dissolutions; but we are no whit the nearer to proving that she is imperishable: we are in fact just where we were. The whole demonstration must be begun over again ὤτπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

Is then all the discussion up to this point utterly fruitless? Most assuredly not. The case stands, as I conceive, thus. The objection of Kebes divides the debate on immortality into two distinct portions, the former of which is purely preparatory to the latter. It would have been impossible to proceed at once to the actual demonstration, which on Platonic principles is conclusive, without clearing the way and preparing the ground for it by these preliminary investigations. In them we gradually feel our way to the right standpoint from which to attack the question. Starting from the notion of immortality as a consequence of a natural law, we soon make an advance so far as to connect it with the cognition of the idea—ἀναμνήσις gives us the germ of the principle which ultimately grows to reasoned certainty; and this nascent conception assumes form and substance in the psychological argument that immediately follows: thus, though we fail to gain the assurance of eternity which we seek, we now see pretty well in what direction to look for it. We do not flee all empty-handed from the ruins of our fallen theory; we carry with us two priceless possessions, first the principle that the sum of existence is constant, next the consciousness that the proof of the soul’s immortality must stand or fall with the existence of the ideas. Still what I desire specially to emphasise is that not one of the arguments in the first half of the dialogue is a proof of immortality, and not one of them is intended by Plato to be so. Plato never wastes his words. Had he believed that any of these arguments in the first part demonstrated the soul’s immortality, he would have stopped there; the addition of the final argument shews that the former were not conclusive. On the other hand Plato would not have introduced the preliminary arguments, had they not been necessary: they do not indeed directly demonstrate immortality, but they enable us to rise to that stand-point from which the demonstration is possible: they are a necessary propaedeutic for the proof which is based directly on the theory of ideas. The long interval which inter-
venes between the arguments I have been discussing and the ultimate proof serves to mark very clearly that they are to be taken by themselves as forming one division, while the final demonstration itself constitutes the other. Plato generally gives some tolerably plain external mark of his divisions: take, for instance, the criticism of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*. The earlier objections urged against that philosopher's dogma are highly inconclusive, not to say frivolous; so much so, that Protagoras is at last provoked to put up his head from the shades below and to expostulate with Sokrates for condescending to such a method of controversy. After this the debate assumes quite a different character: the arguments put forward are all of a solid and substantial nature. Now there can in my judgment be no doubt that in that part of the criticism which precedes the remonstrance of Protagoras Plato is expressing merely popular objections, which might be urged, and perhaps had been urged, against the μέτρον ἄνθρωπος from the standpoint of ordinary common sense: these he was unwilling to leave unnoticed, although he was conscious that they did not really invalidate the theory of Protagoras. But in the subsequent portion he is arguing from his own point of view and defining what he considers to be the limitations of the doctrine: while, to mark the distinction, he adopts the artistic device of bidding Protagoras emerge from the shades in order to make his own defence. The case of the *Phaedo* is not an exact parallel: for in the earlier part Plato is not bringing forward arguments which are not his own; the reasoning is sound so far as it goes; and though it does not amount to proof of immortality, it materially expedites the discovery of such a proof. But there is a similar reason for marking off the arguments into two separate divisions; and Plato has taken pains to make a broad and conspicuous line of demarcation.¹

¹ The extent of this interlude and its varied character will be at once made obvious by a brief summary of its contents. After five chapters of ethical comment, 81 B—84 B, we have a narrative passage, describing how, amid the reverent silence that fell on the company when Sokrates had ceased, Simmias and Kebes were heard conversing apart. Interrogated by Sokrates they confess that they are not satisfied, but do not like to press their objections in his present situation. Sokrates replies with his famous simile of the swans, and exhorts them to speak out boldly, 84 C—85 D. Then Simmias states his objection, and Kebes follows with his, 85 E—88 B. After this a short conversation between Echekrates and Phaedo is introduced, and the latter, resuming his narrative, describes the effect of these objections on the audience and upon Sokrates; after which follows the philosopher's warning against μυσολογία, 88 C—91 C. The refutation of Simmias occupies three chapters more, 91 C—95 A; next Sokrates restates the objection of Kebes, and not till 95 E does he begin the critique of physical speculation which
It remains to say a few words concerning the final proof. This depends directly upon the existence of the ideas as ἀρχαὶ, or principles of causation. Physical causes explain nothing: at best they are facts, not reasons. For a real cause we must pierce through the phantasmagoria of matter to that invisible essence, of which the sensible universe is the outward expression: we must look for the explanation of each thing in its idea. The whole existence of a particular thing is derived from the inheritance of its idea; and so long as the thing exists it can never be severed from its idea, nor admit anything inconsistent with that idea: should it admit such an inconsistent idea, it ceases to be that which it is. Now in most cases this may occur: snow may melt, fire may be quenched; for their indwelling ideas do not involve indestructibility. But with soul this cannot be: informed by the idea of life she can only perish by admitting death; but this would be to admit the opposite of her inherent idea, which is impossible: her extinction would involve a direct contradiction in terms, namely dead vital principle¹.

This demonstration, which is worked out with a completeness, clearness, and subtlety peculiarly Plato’s own, is on Platonic principles perfectly incontrovertible: given the eternal ideas as causes of existence, the eternity of soul is an inevitable inference. But though complete in itself it utilises some of the materials of former arguments: the principle that the eternity of soul is inseparably bound up with the existence of the eternal ideas has been the chief feature of ἀνάμνησις and the psychological argument: in this last proof it is precisely formulated, handled in a new manner, and pushed to its logical conclusion. Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premiss the constancy of the sum total of existence: σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχεται, εἰ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἄδιον ὅν φθορὰν δὲξεται. And this we saw to be the fundamental proposition laid down in the argument of ἀνταπόδοσις. Moreover ἀνάμνησις is still valid to prove the existence of the ideas and the soul’s intelligent activity apart from the body.

I conceive then that there are in the Phaedo three arguments, culminating in a single proof: but that a continuous connexion can be traced through all. The first, consisting of two portions, bases immortality partly on a natural law, partly on the soul’s connexion with the ideas: the second, being a development of the first, drops the natural law and lays

¹ A detailed analysis of this demonstration is reserved for the commentary upon the passage in question.
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stress solely on the connexion with the ideas, but does not attempt to do more than make out a case of probability: the last takes up the same principle and treats it so as to evolve not a mere probability but a positive demonstration, which ultimately rests upon the law of conservation of energy as laid down in the first argument. So the dialogue proceeds like an advancing tide, each successive wave sweeping higher than the preceding. We must not regard any of the arguments as put forward and then discarded for a stronger; rather the argument is first offered in a tentative form, afterwards developed and corrected, and finally remoulded and brought to its consummation.

In conclusion I must briefly advert to two views which are in my opinion gravely erroneous and misleading. Steinhart treats the ethical passages, founded on the doctrine of immortality, as intended to furnish additional proof of that doctrine. The direct proofs, according to him, are in themselves inadequate, and require a surer foundation in ethics. This is a vicious circle so obvious that criticism is superfluous: we are establishing the soul's immortality in order to justify certain ethical principles, and then we employ these very principles as evidence for the theory whence they are deduced. Moreover this view involves a radical misconception of the purpose and structure of the dialogue.

The second opinion against which I feel bound to protest is that the refutation of the objection raised by Simmias constitutes an argument for immortality. This is propounded by Ueberweg, with whom I am sorry to find Prof. Geddes agreeing. Surely nothing can be more untenable than such a proposition. Simmias suggests that all the facts established by Sokrates concerning soul—viz. that she is invisible, incorporeal, divine, &c.—are compatible with the theory that she is a harmony. Now if soul is a harmony, it is clear that she cannot be immortal: therefore it is absolutely necessary that Sokrates should show that this theory is inconsistent with the conclusions on which they are already agreed. But in disproving this proposition Sokrates does not prove the soul's immortality, nor is he one inch the nearer to proving it. If I wished to ascertain that a certain crystal was not soluble in water, I should gain very little by a chemical analysis which assured me simply that the substance was not saltpetre: and similarly it is no evidence for soul's immortality that she is not identical with one particular thing of which immortality can never be predicated. Even could we make an exhaustive list of all things known to be mortal, and could we prove that soul was not identical with any one of these, we should still not have established her immortality: she might yet be an additional kind of mortal existence, different from the rest. It is therefore illogical to
regard the refutation of the harmonic theory as in any sense an argument for immortality. The proposition of Simmias is one which has some *prima facie* plausibility, and which would be absolutely fatal to the notion of immortality: its confutation is therefore imperative, but contributes nothing, even incidentally, to the main argument: this is in precisely the same position after the overthrow of Simmias as it was before his objection was propounded. The whole episode of harmony, though necessary, is in fact parenthetical. The criticism of Kebes, on the other hand, touches the most vital issue and tends directly to the reconstruction of the argument in that shape wherein alone, as I have tried to show, Plato regards it as a complete and final demonstration that soul is immortal.

§ 3. *Plato's attitude regarding immortality.*

(i) The form in which Plato upholds the soul's immortality next demands our attention: it is of all the most scientific and most philosophical: it is that for which there is the most to be said, and against it the least. His theory predicates eternity of universal soul, and of particular souls metempsychosis. 'The Metempsychosis', says Hume, 'is the only system of this kind that Philosophy can hearken to': and so too thought Plato, who does not deem any other theory worthy of consideration. Universal spirit neither has been nor shall be, but is eternally: particular souls have been without a beginning and shall be for ever. In the infinite lapse of their existence they have passed, it may be, through manifold and diverse incarnations, rising and falling now to higher now to lower spheres of intelligence: but the substance, the conscious personality, is unchanged and unimpaired by all these mutations; and though the shock of each successive embodiment destroys more or less the recollection of what has passed, still each life is haunted by memories of a former existence, ready to be awakened by the sights and sounds that fill our present consciousness.¹

¹ *Essay on the immortality of the Soul.*

² In treating of this view which I have termed metempsychosis, it is to be observed that the actual transmigration is only an accident of it. All that is essential is the limitless duration of the soul's existence: her perpetual reembodiment in various forms is not necessarily involved. If an individual soul can find some permanent and final mode of existence, the theory would be satisfied as well as by a succession of incarnations. And in fact both in the *Phaedo* and in the *Phaedrus* Plato seems to hold out the hope that a soul that has successfully passed all her probationary trials will attain to a permanent state of the highest intellectual fruition possible for a finite existence.
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Thus Plato will have no one-sided immortality: the everlasting life of our soul extends backwards into the infinite past as well as forwards into the endless future. It is just herein that the strength of his position lies: thus he escapes the inextricable perplexities which beset the defenders of other views of immortality. The creational theory perhaps never presented itself to his mind; certainly, if it did, he dismissed it as unworthy to be seriously entertained: it is in fact repugnant to the first principles of his argument. On this view the soul of every being that is newly born into the world is a fresh creation out of nothing; and as all souls previously created exist for ever, the aggregate number of souls is for ever multiplying; that is to say, the quantity of spirit in the universe is continually and ceaselessly on the increase. This is of course directly opposed to the great principles that the sum of force is constant and that generation out of nothing is impossible, which form the groundwork of Plato’s arguments for immortality. Once allow that a soul has a beginning, and we lose our only guarantee that it shall not have an end: nay it must have an end, for only that which is without beginning is without end; only the uncreate is imperishable. It is in fact impossible to bring forward any sound arguments for the future existence of the soul which do not also involve its previous existence, its everlasting duration. The creational theory is matter of dogmatic assertion, not of philosophical discussion.

Not only on metaphysical grounds has Plato’s conception so great an advantage; but from the standpoint of practical ethics its superiority is equally decided. The fundamental law of Platonic morals is ἀπαθεῖν πάθειν. There is indeed no such thing as vengeance in his scheme, but there is an immutable and inexorable sequence of cause and effect. No impurity exists for vice: every act of indulgence is another bar in the soul’s prison-house; it drags her from the pure intellectual sphere which is rightfully hers down to the gross and pestilent atmosphere of sensual delight. From this doom none may escape; the consequences of every action are as inevitable as the laws of the universe. If a man sin, he shall pay for his sin in spiritual degradation; repentance avails nothing, reformation alone can slowly recover the lost position. Now within the span of a single life we know that a man often suffers in his latter days for the vices of his youth: how infinitely wider then is the application of this principle, if we regard that single life as but one out of an endless series. As Plato himself says, we have to consider the effects of our actions not only for this life but for all time: our present state is conditioned by causes stretching we know not how far back into the remotest past, and what we do now will influ-
ence our destiny throughout unknown cycles to come. The indestructibility of force comes terribly home to us here. Now it will be observed that in this reference metempsychosis supplies the Platonist with a ready explanation of the apparent injustice which prevails in the ordering of things—an answer to the question, if the gods are good and care for the affairs of men, why is virtue so often afflicted and vice triumphant? An advocate of the creational theory is forced to reply that the balance will be rectified in another life: suffering virtue will be rewarded, and the insolence of vice will be brought low. But such an answer is idle. No future recompense can undo injustice that has once been done: wrong may be redressed but never cancelled—τῶν τεπραγμένων ἐν δίκα τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαιον ἀποτέλοι, ὁ τῶν χρόνων ὁ πάντων πατήρ δύνατο θέμεν ἐργον τέλος. To the Platonist however the solution is easy. No injustice has to be atoned, for none exists. The conditions obtaining at any given time are the inevitable, and therefore perfectly just, result of an infinite series of causes: we must look for the antecedents not in this life only, but in a limitless cycle of prior existences; and what might be unjust relatively to a man’s conduct in his present life may be the irresistible effect of his action in some bygone period. It is true that the answer is not complete without reference to ontological and physical principles, which however cannot here be entered upon.

Thus the theory of metempsychosis supplies not only an explanation of this inequality in human affairs but also a most powerful incentive to virtuous action. A man shall be what his deeds and thoughts make him: if he degrade himself by vice, his restoration must be effected, not by some deathbed repentance or compulsory purgation, but by his own laborious endeavour, by living according to the best of his lights in the inferior state to which he has fallen. For Plato never leaves him without hope. The fanciful description of the soul’s migrations at the close of the Timaeus (92 a) represents a definite ethical doctrine. The soul that has swerved from the course of pure intellectual virtue may inhabit forms of bird or beast, or even fish and mollusc, ‘when it is defiled with all manner of iniquity and therefore in place of inhaling the fine and clear element of air is condemned to the turbid and gross respiration of water’. Yet even in this most degraded state there is a chance of retrieval: for these vicissitudes are determined νοτ καὶ ἀνοίας ἀποβολῆ καὶ κτήσει. A life well spent according to the conditions of even the lowest rank may enable the soul to rise a step in the next incarnation; and the recovery of the whole intellectual inheritance is always possible. The hopeless reprobation of the incurable criminals described in the myth of the Phaedo belongs simply to the pictorial presentation:
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we find it only when Plato is pressing popular legend into his service; not when he is presenting his own views undisguised by this veil of tradition. I have said that a permanent mode of existence for the soul is not excluded by the Platonic theory. But such permanent mode is only possible when the soul has attained the highest perfection of which she is capable: good may be stable, but evil never.

Among theories then which maintain the personal immortality of particular souls it would seem that Plato's is metaphysically the most defensible and ethically the most fruitful; and while it attaches the heaviest penalties to immorality, it offers the strongest encouragement to any endeavour after improvement. It is not of course contended that this view is exempt from objections and difficulties; merely that these apply with greater force to any other method of defending individual immortality.

(ii) But how far do Plato's arguments tend to prove the immortality of particular souls, as distinct from the eternity of the universal soul? It must, I think, be replied that they go but a very short way indeed. If we examine the several demonstrations, we shall find that what they amount to is that vital principle is indestructible, not that its manifestation in this or that personality is permanent. The result of the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις is that, if all things are not to be brought to nought, the sum of vital essence can suffer no abatement; but it offers no shadow of proof that this constant amount of vitality will continue to be distributed into the same conscious personalities: we know by experience that separate conscious personalities continue to be produced in the world, and therefore we conclude that the vital force which constitutes them cannot perish at the dissolution of soul and body; but we have no right to conclude that these personalities retain their individual consciousness after death. Indeed from this argument we cannot infer that vital force will always continue to exist in the form of particular intelligences: that belongs to another aspect of Plato's metaphysics. Proceeding to ἀνάμνησις, although on a bare literal interpretation Plato's language may imply that the soul existed individually before birth, yet this is not at all involved in the principle of the theory: the particular soul retains the knowledge of truths which are the possession of soul at large, not necessarily of this soul in a former personal existence. A similar examination of the remaining arguments of the Phaedo will show that individual immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies to the brief but pregnant demonstration in Phaedrus 245 c foll. There the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and clearness; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be
deduced from it regarding the permanence of particular souls. The strikingly subtle argument beginning Republic 608 e contains a remarkable expression (611 a), ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἄν ἐνε ἄν αὐταί, sc. αἱ ψυχαί. This seems at first sight like an assertion of the continued existence of the same personalities. A closer examination however shows that this is not the case. Plato simply means that if the whole vital force of the universe is distributed into a certain number of souls, no addition to this number is possible, else the sum total of vitality would be increased, which is inadmissible. We cannot draw from that argument the conclusion that this universal vitality must needs be for ever manifested in a given number of souls; and even if it must, that would not necessarily involve continuity of personality. The whole strength of Plato's reasoning is expended in demonstrating the eternity of soul as such: there is nothing to prove that particular souls on their departure from the body are not reabsorbed in the universal spirit, merging their proper consciousness in that common force of nature which is ever manifesting itself anew in the forms of individual life.

(iii) Such being the case, it is not irrelevant to raise the question, did Plato really and literally maintain the personal immortality of particular souls? This certainly would seem to be the teaching of the Phaedo, and this is the view of the vast majority of Platonic students: but the contrary opinion is supported by the great authority of Hegel and has recently been defended with much ingenuity by Teichmüller; it is not therefore to be dismissed without ceremony. I will discuss the statements of the two critics separately.

First however I must point out a difficulty under which an editor of the Phaedo labours in approaching this question: it does not belong to the treatment of the Phaedo at all, but to that of the Timaeus; and we can hope to attain a satisfactory solution only after a minute investigation of the profound and difficult metaphysics of the latter dialogue. Such an investigation is obviously out of place here, since ὁ λόγος πάρεργος ὑν πλέων ἀν ἔργον ὑν ἑνεκα λέγεται παράλοχο. At the same time it does not seem desirable to leave the subject altogether unnoticed, and I shall therefore treat it as briefly as I am able.

In his statement of the Platonic philosophy Hegel expressly assigns the permanence of particular souls to the region of the mythical. We think of the soul, he says1, as a physical thing possessing divergent attributes, one of which is thinking—thinking determined as a thing that can pass away and cease. But with Plato the immortality of the soul is

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inseparably bound up with the fact that the soul is that which thinks—thought is not a mere attribute of it. We are addicted to thinking of the soul as if it were a thing that could exist without imagination or thought. To Plato, on the other hand, the significance of immortality consists in this, that thought is not an attribute of the soul but its substance—soul is just thought. Thought is the substance of soul as gravity is the substance, not an attribute, of body. Take away gravity, and body is no more; take away thought and soul is no more. Thought is the activity of the universal, which reflects itself into itself and is identified with itself: this self-identity is the unalterable and abiding. Alteration is when one thing becomes another and does not hold fast by itself in the other. Soul on the other hand consists in the retaining itself in the other—in the process of apprehension the soul has to do with external matter, which is other, and yet it retains its self-identity. Immortality has not for Plato the interest it has for us in a religious aspect; it depends upon the nature of thought and its inner freedom. With reference to the Phaedo Hegel observes that we have hardly any line of demarcation between the outward representation and the inward idea, but this is far from sinking to the crudity of conception (Rohheit), that represents the soul as a thing, and inquires about its duration and existence, as concerning a thing.

Now it appears to me that the foregoing criticism amounts to something like this. Hegel, analysing the conception of immortality, seizes at once upon that which he regards as essential to the Platonic philosophy: this kernel he instantly drags to light, rejecting the husk of 'Vorstellung'. Whether an individual consciousness shall continue to exist as such is to Platonism of no metaphysical importance whatever: what is of importance is to grasp the true nature of eternity. The soul's real immortality lies in the operation of thought: eternity is in the nature of thought and has nothing to do with duration. Such, I conceive, is Hegel's point. Now that the duration of the individual is of no metaphysical importance I am willing to admit: Plato's philosophy in no way involves it. I do not however see that it is thereby excluded; provided the really essential point is maintained, it seems to me that the question of individual duration is an open one for Plato; whether a particular consciousness continues for one life, or for a score, or for an unlimited time, does not appear to affect the question.

Teichmüller however goes further, and declares that Plato could not maintain individual immortality without grave inconsistency; from which premiss he most justly draws the conclusion that Plato did
not maintain it. For I cordially agree with him that any interpretation of Plato which attributes inconsistency to him stands self-condemned. It may be very well for writers of Cicero’s philosophical calibre to talk of Plato as ‘inconstans’; but when modern historians of philosophy impute to this greatest of philosophers self-contradictions of which the merest novice would be ashamed, one cannot but suspect them of seeking to lighten their own labours at Plato’s expense: it is easier to accuse him of inconsistency than to work out his meaning.

Teichmüller’s criticism seems to resolve itself mainly into two points: (1) Plato’s reasoning applies only to universal, not to particular soul, (2) the admission of individual immortality makes Plato’s philosophy into a system of monadism, not monism. The first point has been already conceded; but it is no proof that Plato did not believe in the permanence of individual souls. The second objection, if sustained, I should regard as fatal, holding as I do that Platonism is essentially a monistic system. But I doubt whether it has been proved. The contention is that, if particular souls are eternal, we have as the ontological basis of the system not one universal thought, but a number of distinct and independent substances or forces, resembling the monads of Leibnitz. But in the first place it must be remarked that eternity is not claimed for particular souls: the individual, qua individual, cannot possibly be eternal: all that is claimed is the indefinite prolongation of their existence in both directions; but no extent of prolongation is one step nearer eternity. Severance from what we term our body can make no difference; if a particular soul continues her separate existence at all, the conditions of her limitation oblige her to remain in the sphere of γένεσις: did she pass to the νοητόν she would necessarily be merged in the universal.

1 The works of Teichmüller which I have consulted on this subject are ‘die platonische Frage’ and ‘Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe.’

2 As I shall presently have occasion to remark, Plato’s dialogues indubitably show a development in his system. But this development involves no inconsistency, even though the expression of some thoughts needs modification; rather it brings to light the hidden connexion between ideas hitherto unharmonised.

3 Plato most explicitly recognises this, Timaeus 37 E. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέρη χρόνου, καὶ τὸ τ’ ἦν τὸ τ’ ἐστι χρόνου γεγονότα εἰσὶ, ἃ δὴ φέροντες λαυθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν αἰδιον οἰςαν οὐκ ὀρθώσι. Λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ως ἦν ἐστὶ τε καὶ ἐσται, τῇ δὲ τὸ ἑστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἄληθεν λόγον προσῆκει. And again 38 B τὸ μὲν γὰρ παραδείγμα πάντα αἰώνα ἐστὶν δὲν, ὁ δ’ αὐτὰ διὰ τέλος τὸν ἀπαντά χρόνον γεγονότας τε καὶ ὃν καὶ ἐστάμενος.

4 Teichmüller’s objection seemed directed against the existence of a plurality of souls in the intelligible world: cf. die platonische Frage p. 23 ‘Vielleicht aber in das intelligible Gebiet zu versetzen, heisst Atomismus, nicht Platonismus.’ Very true;
Finite intelligences are for Plato simply manifestations of the universal υγίς: they are not self-existent monads, but evolved from the universal, a mode of whose existence they are. Now if, as we may gather from the Timaeus, the universal υγίς has this mode of existence in perpetuity, can it matter to Plato's doctrine whether each finite intelligence preserves the same thread of consciousness throughout, or is merged in the universal on the conclusion of a given term of existence? One view may be more probable than the other, but neither seems to me to involve monadism. If souls are to be monads they must be as individuals eternal and self-existing; prolongation of their existence, even in perpetuity, will not suffice.

Moreover, although I am convinced as firmly as any one of Plato's consistency, I hold it for certain that we have represented in the dialogues a regular development of Plato's thought, whereof the Phaedo does not belong to the latest stage. We cannot therefore bring everything in the Phaedo into severe conformity with the matured pantheism of the Timaeus. In the latter it is probable that personal immortality does more or less recede into the region of the mythical: it enters only in an extremely allegorical guise. But while in the matured Platonism all is coherent and consequent, in the still maturing Platonism of the Phaedo there are to be found views, as we shall see, which Plato afterwards considerably modified: and even were it shown that personal immortality is inadmissible in the Timaeus, it does not follow that it is so in the Phaedo.

In the interpretation of a writer so much addicted to figurative speech as Plato there must needs be here and there difference of opinion as to where the line is to be drawn between symbolism and substance: and in this case I cannot but think that Teichmüller has drawn the line too high. And I cannot acquiesce in his naive assumption that the mere fact that a doubt exists is decisive in favour of a non-literal interpretation. The onus probandi, I take it, lies with those who do not interpret literally; and in general the proof is not hard to find. We have no hesitation in regarding the creation of the universe by the δήμωμένος as purely mythical, because a literal acceptation would reduce Platonism to a chaos of nonsense: we pass a similar verdict on the endless punishment of criminals in the νέχων of the Phaedo, Republic, and Gorgias, because it is incongruous with the just and benevolent spirit that pervades Plato's ethics, and because it only appears when Plato is clothing his thoughts in a legendary form. In the

but the individual soul, as such, whether its continuance be perpetual or not, does not belong to the 'intelligibles Gebiet' at all.
present case however I do not think the incongruity is made out. Moreover the direct and circumstantial seriousness with which the doctrine of immortality is put forward is totally unlike any of the mythical or figurative representations of Plato’s thought elsewhere: Hegel himself observes ‘wir treffen hier am wenigsten geschieden die Weise des Vorstellens und des Begriffes;’ and certainly if Plato is not here in earnest with individual immortality, he may fairly be charged with having passed from mysticism to mystification.

I have made this defence of the literal interpretation not because I consider that the continued existence of the individual is of any real importance in the Platonic system—I should not go so far as to affirm that it was retained to the last—but because, in order that we may follow historically the development of Plato’s thought, it is important for us to determine precisely what he means to set forth in each dialogue. And the conclusion which seems to me the soundest is that, although Plato knew very well that neither he nor any one else could demonstrate the immortality of individual souls, yet he was strongly disposed to believe, at least at the time the Phaedo was written, that every soul on its separation from the body will not be reabsorbed in the universal, but will survive as a conscious personality, even as it existed before its present incarnation.


Adopting the view defended in the preceding section, we have next to deal with a question arising from a comparison between the psychology of the Phaedo and that of some other Platonic dialogues. Such a comparison will bring to light two points wherein Plato’s teaching is at first sight inconsistent and is regarded by Grote and others as distinctly self-contradictory. The object of the present section is to show that no such inconsistency exists.

In the Phaedo (a) the soul is essentially simple and incomposite; and this simplicity is urged as an argument for her imperishability (compare § 8 b with 78 c foll.): (β) ἔρωτες ἐπιθυμίαι φόβοι and the like are referred to the body as their origin, whence arising they intrude upon the soul and trouble her contemplations, (66 c). On the other hand (a) in certain passages of the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus

1 The substance of this section appeared in a paper printed in the Journal of Philology, vol. x, p. 120, to which I may refer the reader for a more detailed statement.
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the soul is represented not as a simple but as a triple nature, \textit{(Phaedrus 246 a, Republic 439 d, Timaeus 69 c)}: \((\beta)\) in the \textit{Philebus} it is expressly declared that all passions have their origin in the soul, body being in itself incapable of giving rise to any sensation; and this position is also consistently maintained in the \textit{Timaeus}, \textit{(Philebus 35 c, Timaeus 64 b, c)}. The problems we have to solve then are \((i)\) how can we reconcile the simplicity of soul in the \textit{Phaedo} with her tripartite nature in the other three dialogues, and how does the argument for immortality affect the three parts severally? \((ii)\) how can we reconcile the assignment of passions to body in the \textit{Phaedo} with their assignment to soul in the \textit{Philebus}?

\((i)\) Of the first problem only two solutions seem possible, \((a)\) that two distinct views were entertained by Plato at different periods, \((\beta)\) that the tripartition of the soul is purely metaphorical.

The first alternative cannot be accepted. For reasons which will be discussed hereafter it is impossible to regard the \textit{Phaedo} as belonging to a different period from the \textit{Republic}; and there are good grounds for assigning the \textit{Phaedrus} to the same group. We are bound therefore to expect that these dialogues will agree in all important doctrines.

Moreover there is a remarkable fact to be noticed. The simplicity of \(\psi\nu\chi\eta\), so far from being a theory peculiar to the \textit{Phaedo}, is one which pervades the whole series of the Platonic dialogues from beginning to end, not even excepting those in which the triform nature appears. This is not only conclusive evidence that we are not dealing with doctrines held at successive periods, but it affords strong presumption that the tripartition of \(\psi\nu\chi\eta\) is a figurative expression.

Let us examine the nature of this tripartition. In the myth of the \textit{Phaedrus} the soul is likened to a car driven by a charioteer and drawn by two winged steeds. Of this pair one is vicious and unruly, the other generous and docile, aiding the charioteer in subduing his refractory companion. This parable is thus explained in the \textit{Republic}. In every soul there are two \(\epsilon\iota\delta\gamma\) or \(\mu\epsilon\rho\gamma\), \(\lambda\omega\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\) and \(\alpha\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu\), the latter being subdivided into \(\theta\upsilon\mu\omicron\omega\omicron\epsilon\delta\varepsilon\) and \(\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\nu\mu\mu\nu\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\). So we have the soul distinguished into three parts or kinds, rational, emotional, appetitive. We see however that the main division is dual not triple; the three parts are not coordinate but made out by the subdivision of the \(\alpha\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu\): this it will be well to bear in mind.

But if this analysis is to be understood as literally signifying that the soul is composed of three distinct parts, the results are truly bewildering. The entire argument of the \textit{Phaedo} is not merely demolished root and branch, but is shown utterly unmeaning and irrelevant. For
when we dreaded lest the soul on quitting the body should be scattered to the winds and dissolved, we were comforted by the assurance that as she had no parts she could not be divided; simplicity cannot admit dissolution. But now she has three distinct parts, therefore into those parts she can be resolved: and what is to become of them? do they continue to exist separately? or does one of them, or two, or all perish? And what becomes of the soul's likeness to the ideas, in virtue of which she claimed to apprehend them and to belong to the region of the invisible and eternal? All this is swept away at one stroke. If we answer that it is the λογιστικόν alone with which the argument of the Phaedo is concerned, we are shutting our eyes to the fact that there is not a single passage in Plato where the term ψυχή is applied to the highest εἶδος as distinguished from the two lower: nor have we a right so to apply it here. And if the three εἶδη all are classed as ψυχή, it must be in virtue of some common principle: what then is this principle? what is the bond of union, what the differentiation of the three? The fact that we are led into so helpless a maze of perplexity is ample cause for deciding that the literal interpretation is entirely inadmissible.

But the case is still further strengthened by the statement in the Timaeus. The created gods are described as implanting in a body the human soul, imitating the manner of their own creation by the δημιουργός. The divine element, θεόν, which they received from the hands of the creator, they placed in the head: this is the λογιστικόν of the Republic. Then, Plato proceeds to tell us, they fashioned another kind of soul, to which he applies the remarkable term θυτήν. This is the abode of vehement passions, pleasure and pain, confidence and fear, wrath and hope and love, and all unreasoning sensations. And lest they should sully the divine principle, they placed this mortal soul in another region of the body: and since it was twofold, they divided the two kinds by a partition, setting the spirited portion in the heart, that it might readily hear and obey the commands of the reason; while the appetitive they set in the belly, that it might care for the nourishment of the body. Here the θυτήν εἶδος corresponds to the ἄλογον of the Republic and includes the θυμοειδές and ἔπιθυμητικόν.

If this too is to be understood literally, confusion is tenfold worse confounded. For to the three parts are assigned different habitations in the body; all three therefore have extension in space: yet we know very well that for Plato ψυχή is unextended and immaterial. Again the lower εἶδη are mortal; that is, vital principle can admit destruction: a declaration not only subversive of all the reasoning in the Phaedo, but
flatly opposed to the whole of Plato's convictions concerning soul: nay it extinguishes once for all his hope of discovering a sure basis of knowledge; for if the principle of life and thought can under any conditions cease to be, what is there that shall abide? θυτή ψυχή, understood literally, is indeed the most absolute contradiction in terms that his vocabulary could furnish. And, as if to bring out this contradiction in the most glaring light, Plato declares (Phaedrus 245 d) πάσα ψυχή ἀδάνατος, all soul, without reservation, is immortal; and presently we have an elaborate statement of the tripartite nature, that is of a mortal and an immortal soul conjoined.

All this constitutes not merely justification but positive necessity for treating the tripartition of soul as wholly metaphorical; and the interpretation of the metaphor is simple enough. The three εἴδη of the soul are not different parts or kinds, but only different modes of the soul's activity under different conditions. The two lower εἴδη are consequent upon the conjunction of soul with matter, and their operation ceases at the separation of soul from matter. Soul, as such, is simple, she is pure thought; and her action, which is thinking, is simple. But soul immanent in matter has a complex action; she does not lose, at least in the higher organisms, all the faculty of pure thought; but she has another action consequent on her implication with matter: this action we call perception or sensation. The main division is, as we have seen, dual: λογιστικόν expressing the action of soul by herself, ἀλογον has action through the body. The πάθη belonging to ἀλογον Plato classifies under the heads of θυμοειδες and ἐπιθυμητικόν. We see too that the terms of the Timaeus, θεῖον and θυττόν, are abundantly justified. Soul is altogether imperishable: but when she enters into relation with body she assumes certain functions which are terminable and which cease when the relation comes to an end. θυττόν then is the name given to soul acting under certain material conditions; and soul may in that sense admit the appellation, not because she ever ceases to exist quia soul, but because she ceases to operate quia emotional and appetitive soul. Soul exists in her own essence eternally, in her material relations but for a time.

1 This is indubitable. In the myth of the Phaedrus the gods have the three εἴδη, but the gods are corporeal (246 d). That they are so is interesting: it shows how fully Plato recognised that the limitations of individual consciousness preclude a purely immaterial existence. The conditions of individual existence are not necessarily identical with ours; e.g. the gods and superior spirits have σώμα, but not σώμα γῆνος; but such an existence involves in some sense materiality: the individual belongs to γένεσις.
Soul then is simple and uniform, the one and only principle of life. All forms of life are manifestations of her, from the highest to the lowest; from the activity of the noblest intellect to the faintest vestiges of vegetable growth. The degree of intelligence varies inversely according to the degree of implication with matter. In the highest forms of individual existence thought has free scope for its activity, and the lower modes of consciousness are in due subordination; but as the material bonds grow tighter, the supremacy of thought wanes, and the dominion of sensation and appetite strengthens; finally reason and thought, even the higher modes of sensation, vanish, and nutrition and growth alone remain. But all these organisms are vitalised by one sole principle of life.

We now have reached a standpoint whence it is easy to solve the difficulties which we encountered at the outset. Once recognise that Plato knew of but one kind of soul, and all is smooth. The essential nature of soul is simple, as much in the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus as in the Phaedo. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the three parts is immortal: Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual. The vital principle which manifests itself in these modes is imperishable, but the modes themselves are temporary and transient.

(ii) The answer to the second question is to be found with no less ease. The whole argument of the Phaedo, as we have seen, deals with soul qua soul. With this of course bodily appetites have nothing to do: accordingly Plato assigns them to the body, because they only belong to soul in her bodily relation and through this affect her. Nothing would be gained by pursuing the analysis further; rather the course of the discussion would be hampered by the introduction of matter which had no bearing on the question at issue. In the Philebus it is different; there it is Plato's business to give a psychological analysis of the passions in question: accordingly they are assigned to soul, which is the only seat of consciousness. Each dialogue is justified from its own standpoint: the Phaedo in attributing passions to the body, because they arise from the corporeal relation of soul; the Philebus in giving them to the soul, because body, as such, has no consciousness. There only appears to be a discrepancy, because the analysis of the Phaedo is in the Philebus carried out more thoroughly: these passions belong to body, because without the bodily environment they could not arise; to soul, because it is by soul alone that they can be felt.

1 See Timaeus 77 A foll.
Thus it appears that if we insist upon treating Plato's allegorical language as plain prose, we are lost in helpless perplexity; while by a reasonable interpretation of the metaphor we are released from all difficulty and show Plato's teaching to be perfectly consistent and philosophical. There cannot, I think, be much doubt which method to choose. As Hegel observes, 'wenn er [sc. Plato] von der Seele des Menschen sagt, dass sie einen vernünftigen und unvernünftigen Theil habe: so ist dies ebenso im Allgemeinen zu nehmen: aber Plato behauptet damit nicht, dass die Seele aus zweierlei Substanzen, zweierlei Dingen zusammengesetzt sey.'

I conclude this section with a brief summary borrowed from the paper to which I have already referred.

In *Timaeus* 69 C—72 D we have a θείον εἶδος and a θνητὸν εἶδος of ψυχή: of which θείον = λογιστικόν, θνητὸν = θυμοειδὲς + ἐπιθυμητικόν. Now ψυχή, as such, is ἀθάνατον: therefore the word θνητὸν can only refer to a particular relation of ψυχή and σώμα, or operation of ψυχή through σώμα. θυμοειδὲς therefore and ἐπιθυμητικόν are not different parts of ψυχή, but only names for different modes of its action through σώμα: thus θυμοειδὲς and ἐπιθυμητικόν are θνητά, because, when the conjunction between ψυχή and σώμα ceases, they cease also.

Thus the apparent discrepancy between the *Phaedo* and *Philebus* is reconciled. In the one ἐπιθυμώμαι are ascribed to σώμα, as arising from conjunction of ψυχή and σώμα: in the other they are more accurately ascribed to ψυχή, because they are an affection of ψυχή through σώμα. Also the argument of the *Phaedo* is entirely unaffected by the threefold division. All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in connexion with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and only exist in relation to body. Thus though the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδὲς, as such, are not immortal, because they depend for their continuance upon body, which is mortal; yet the vital principle, which under such conditions assumes these forms, is immortal and continues to exist, though not necessarily in the same mode. For the modes in which vital force acts under temporary conditions are transitory, but the acting force itself is changeless and eternal.

§ 5. *Position of the Phaedo in the Platonic System.*

The whole philosophy of Plato is, as I am fully convinced, set forth in his extant dialogues. It is a system which in its final development forms a harmonious and consistent whole, worked out with unfailing
logical precision from its fundamental principles. But we can hardly suppose that this system sprang all at once in its mature completeness, like a new Athene, from its creator's brain. Plato is not indeed wont to write down his ideas before they are well thought out: but when we reflect where he took philosophy up and where he left it, it would seem wonderful indeed if a series of compositions extending over a long life belonged to one and the same stage of thought. Of philosophy, properly so called, Plato is the originator and creator. The earlier Greek thinkers in their struggles up to the light had struck upon divers principles of profound and vital importance: the names of Herakleitos, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras are associated with truths which form the very framework of philosophy. But each of the earlier philosophers dwelt exclusively on his own peculiar principle, till in its isolation a truth became a falsehood; they advanced one aspect of the truth as if it were the whole: those on one side of the shield declared that all is convex; those on the other, all is concave. Philosophy first became possible when there arose a συνοπτικὸς ἄνθρωπος, who saw that these truths are complementary, that each is realised in the others. And here I cannot forbear once more to quote a remark of Hegel's: 'We are not to look upon Plato's dialogues as if it were his concern to give expression to sundry philosophies, nor must we suppose that his philosophy was an eclectic system constructed out of the former: it rather forms the knot in which these one-sided abstract principles are truly unified in concrete form... In the Platonic philosophy we see manifold philosophemes of earlier times, but taken up into Plato's principles and therein unified.' Platonism in fact realises by conciliation principles which in their separation were null and void.

From this point of view we should expect to find in Plato's exposition of his system (1) a phase wherein the necessity of such a conciliation is recognised and its accomplishment more or less effected, while at the same time imperfections and gaps yet remain, (2) a phase in which Plato's severe self-criticism has revealed to him the weak points in his earlier theory, and his unparalleled metaphysical insight has suggested to him the remedy. To leap at once from the one-sided crudeness of preplatonic thought to so profound and comprehensive a philosophy as the later Platonism would seem beyond the power even of such a genius as Plato's: there are few indeed who could have reached the intermediate stage. We may expect to see, and I believe we do see in the dialogues evidence of development in Plato's thought, which passes through definite stages, enabling us to distribute the Platonic writings into three distinct
periods, which I shall term the Sokratic, the middle, and the later.

Upon the precise nature of this development an entirely new and most important light has been thrown by Mr Jackson in a masterly series of essays recently published in the *Journal of Philology*, vols. x and xi. His results, so far as he has yet proceeded, I cordially accept in the main; and it is from the standpoint which his researches have empowered us to reach that I now propose to indicate a classification of the Platonic dialogues. I am only concerned to give such a general outline as will enable me to define the period to which I conceive the *Phaedo* to belong; a full analysis would not serve the present purpose.

At the time he first met Sokrates, the unsatisfactory result of previous speculation had in all probability inclined the young Plato, like most of his contemporaries, towards philosophic scepticism. Sokrates gave a new impetus to his thought; it was from him that Plato derived, along with the interrogatory method, the principle which afterwards bore such abundant fruit—the principle that knowledge is of universals. This is the great contribution of the unmetaphysical Sokrates to metaphysics; but it is in the hands of Plato, not of Sokrates, that it attained its true significance. And even with Plato it at first remained barren. In his earlier dialogues Plato exercises the exuberant strength of his growing thought in the Sokratic method of definition: we find abundant promise of the matchless artistic power that is to come, but little or no advance on the position of Sokrates. Such dialogues are the *Euthyphron*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, and others, mostly of small compass and of slight philosophical importance. They culminate in the *Protagoras*, the longest and most brilliant of the series. These dialogues constitute the Sokratic period; in them we do not yet find Plato.

But Plato was a true scholar of Herakleitos: he saw that in things which abide not, but ever fluctuate and fleet away, there can be no stable truth nor basis of knowledge. Knowledge is of that which abides firm and changes not, if there exists such in the universe. And now Plato despairs no longer of finding this existence, he sees it in the principle of universals. But not in the universals as he received them from Sokrates; a change must pass upon them before they will serve his end. Sokrates had said, if we would know a thing we must clear our conception of it from all accidental attributes which may be peculiar to particular specimens of the class: if we would know what is a tree, we must obtain from the completest comparison that

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our experience enables us to make an exhaustive catalogue of those attributes which are not peculiar to any particular tree but which are common to all, and lacking any one of which a thing would not be a tree. Thus we shall have framed in our mind the definition or concept of a tree, and now we have such knowledge of it as is attainable. But this concept is simply a thought in our own mind, it has no existence of its own: it is, as Protagoras might tell us, doubly unsubstantial; for it is formed from the impressions produced by an ever-changing object upon a subject that is never constant: the image of a flitting insect in running water is not more shadowy than the perceptions from which our definition is formed. Knowledge demands for its object a constant self-existent verity. This led Plato to the hypostasisation of the universal. In place of a mental concept derived from particulars he gives us an essential idea prior to the particulars, whereof it is the cause. These ideas, being veritatively existent, can be objects of true knowledge; and they served Plato as a δεισμος wherewith to mediate between the immovable unity of Parmenides and the limitless plurality of Herakleitos. We cannot, says Plato, clear at one bound the gulf between ἰν and ἀπερα, between the primal unity and the infinite multitude of particulars; we need, as intermediates, πολλα, i.e. a definite number of classes, proceeding by gradually widening generalisations from the infima species to the all-embracing unity: and each of these classes represents an idea.

This is the stage of the middle Platonism: as yet the ideas are simply hypostasisations of every logical concept. Consequently we find in the Republic an idea of every group of objects denoted by a class-name. We have at the top of the scale the ἀδήτο ἀγαθόν, we have ideas of καλὸν δἰκαίον, &c., ideas of natural objects, ideas of σκευαστά, beds, tables, &c., ideas of relations, great, small, equal, &c., and ideas of κακὸν ἀδίκον and the like. The particulars in every group derive their nature and existence from the immanence, παρονσία, of the idea. The Republic is the chief exponent of this phase of Plato's metaphysics: it is also represented by the Phaedrus, Symposium, and others: its main distinguishing characteristics are the assumption of an idea for every group of particulars, and the inheritance of the idea in the particulars, also expressed as the participation, μέθεχις, of the particular in the idea.

But Plato presently finds reason to be dissatisfied with this expression of his theory: the difficulties and deficiencies he sees therein are stated with overwhelming force in the earlier part of the Parmenides. The points which chiefly demanded correction were the contents of the
ideal world and the relation between ideas and particulars. The list of ideas is largely reduced, though it is not easy to say precisely to what extent: instead of an idea corresponding to every group of particulars we now have only an idea for every group which is naturally and not artificially determined; thus all ideas of ἀκεφαλάτα are abolished. Next relations are reduced from the rank of ideas to that of universal predicates, or, as Aristotle would say, categories; so that we no longer have ideas of great and small, equal and double, and so forth. Finally ideas of negations are abolished, such as evil, unjust, &c. Therefore one great criterion of the stage to which a dialogue belongs will be the nature of the ideas that are assumed in it.

The second point is no less important, the relation between the ideal and the material world. In the middle period the idea exists (α) transcendentally, ἐν τῷ φύσει, (β) immanent in the particulars. In the period to which we have now come, the transcendental existence of the idea alone is allowed: the particulars no longer participate in the idea, but are regarded as copies, μίμημα, of the ideal type, παράδειγμα. In this way the objections formulated in the Parmenides against the earlier account of the relation between idea and particular are avoided. Other characteristics of the later Platonism, as the analysis of ὁντα into πέρας and ἀπειρον in the Philebus, and the still subtler analysis of the Timaeus, need not detain us here; since the object of the foregoing statement is merely to indicate the development of Plato's system so far as is necessary for fixing the position of the Phaedo. The later metaphysic is unfolded in the Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus, and consummated in the Timaeus.

Guided by these landmarks we shall find it no hard matter to determine the bearings of the Phaedo. In this dialogue we have an idea of ἵσον (74 Α), μέγα (100 Β), σμικρότερα. Also we have the idea described as ἐν ἡμιν as well as ἐν τῷ φύσει (102 Δ). That is to say, in the Phaedo (1) we see ideas of relations, though ideas of ἀκεφαλάτα do not occur, and (2) the ideas are immanent in particulars. These are two unmistakable marks that the dialogue belongs to the Platonism of the Republic.

The metaphysical doctrine of the Phaedo is in fact identical with that of the Republic, although it is less precisely formulated. The cardinal point in each dialogue is the existence of the ideas as the sole principle of causation and the one object of true knowledge. In the Phaedo indeed Plato does not bring out in definite language the subordination of the other ideas to the αὑτὸ ἄγαθον as the supreme source of all existence. But this is not due to any discordance of theory, but only to
a difference in the immediate object. The supremacy of the αυτὸ ἀγαθὸν in the Phaedo is plainly indicated in the fact that τὸ βέλτιστον is postulated as the ultimate αἰτία, to which all other causes are merely subsidiary. Moreover a synthesis of these two dialogues will show us that Plato is working on precisely the same lines which he afterwards follows in the Philebus and Timaeus. In the Phaedo he declares that all things are ordered by νοῦς working ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. But what is the 'best'? by what standard are we to determine it? The answer is indicated in the Republic: the efficient and final causes are indistinguishably blended in the αυτὸ ἀγαθὸν. This identification is pregnant with a significance which is not fully brought to light until we come to the Timaeus; where, behind the veil of poetical embroidery, we behold the universe as the self-evolution of absolute νοῦς, according to the immutable laws of its own nature. The standard of τὸ βέλτιστον then lies in the nature of νοῦς: and νοῦς in operating ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον is working out its own being. This is why the philosopher must seek to base his morality upon cognition of the ἀγαθὸν itself; for there is no other standard of excellence than the laws of true Being.

The thoroughly Herakleitean conception of the phenomenal world is also quite in keeping with the Republic. In the shadowy realm of the sensible the soul goes astray bewildered and befogged in the whirling eddy of unsubstantial phantoms—ἀμένηνα κάρηνα—that throng around her. In this doubtful region, midway between being and not-being, she can only grope her way under the treacherous guidance of opinion. And here we may note another characteristic of the middle period, in the absence of any really serious attempt to account for the existence or apparent existence of phenomena. Plato does not flatly deny the existence of the visible world, as the Eleatics did; he assigns it a sort of ignominious half-existence: but he gives us no explanation of it beyond such vaguely metaphorical phrases as 'participation in the ideas'. It is not until his latest dialogues that he sets himself resolutely to deal with this problem. He never recedes from his Herakleitean view of phenomena; but he recognises that their appearance is a fact requiring the most thorough investigation.

The position of the Phaedo with respect to the vexed question of predication is very interesting. In the earlier days of philosophy, for fault of adequate logical analysis, the perplexity surrounding this subject was so great that thinkers of most opposite tendencies had been forced to deny the possibility of predication altogether—at most identical propositions could be admitted. From the first Plato perceived that there could be no sound logical or metaphysical basis for a dogma which
would render reason useless and language impossible. In Phaedo 102 B, we have his earlier view on the subject. Whatever we predicate of an object is predicable of such object by virtue of the immanence of the idea therein; we call it by a name denoting the attribute of the idea: τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τῆν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχεν. In fact when we say 'Simmias is small', this is merely a convenient expression for 'Simmias partakes of the idea of smallness'. Accordingly the two statements 'Simmias is small', 'Simmias is great', though contradictory ὃς τοῖς ἰδίων λέγεται, are not contradictory in fact; for they only signify that Simmias participates in both ideas: in comparing him to Sokrates we designate him by the ἐπωνυμία of μέγεθος, to Phaedo by that of σμικρότης. Moreover the expression 'Simmias is smaller than Phaedo' is only a conventional phrase signifying that the σμικρότης in Simmias is smaller than the μέγεθος in Phaedo.

Now however superior this conception may be to that of Antisthenes and others who denied predication, it is plain that it does not really touch the vital point. The whole puzzle arose from erroneous notions about ὅν and μὴ ὅν; the copula ἐστί was conceived to denote identity and veritable existence, while οὐκ ἐστί implied absolute negation—abstract non-existence. This is the problem which is handled with such consummate skill in Sophist 240 B onwards. But in the Phaedo Plato is so far from approaching this question that he does not even betray the slightest consciousness that just herein lies the difficulty; he has in fact evaded, not solved, the ἀπορία. Here again the Phaedo ranks itself with the Republic. In the latter (477 A foll.) we have the division into ὅν, μὴ ὅν, and τὸ μεταξὺ, being respectively the objects of γνώσεως, ἀγνώσεια, and δόξα. In this classification ὅν signifies absolute existence, μὴ ὅν absolute non-existence, while τὸ μεταξὺ comprehends all phenomena. Now although a sensible object is declared to be ἀμα ὅν τε καὶ μὴ ὅν (478 D), this is simply because it lies μεταξὺ τοῦ ἐιλικρινῶς ἄντος καὶ τοῦ πάντος μὴ ὅντος—it is an ambiguous semi-reality: but there is no glimmer of the significance in which Plato afterwards declares (Sophist 259 B) that it πολλαχῇ μὲν ἐστὶ, πολλαχῇ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ. When the Sophist was written, he did not shrink from affirming that τὸ ὅν, ὀσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἐστιν. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὅν ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστιν, ἀπέραπτα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰλλα οὐκ ἐστιν αὖ (257 A). But in the Republic and Phaedo there is not the slightest evidence either that Plato had made the logical analysis which led him to this conclusion or that he was alive to the necessity of making it.

1 A confusion of course arises from the assumption of ideas of relation: but with this we are not at present concerned.
2 The difference between Plato's earlier
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On this ground also then the *Phaedo* must be classed along with the *Republic* in the middle period. Which of these two dialogues was prior in order of composition is a question which I think is hardly possible to determine. Plato's voice in the *Republic* is clearer, fuller, and more confident. The ontological theory which is somewhat vaguely sketched in the *Phaedo* is in the *Republic* very precisely formulated. But this admits of a double interpretation. We may either suppose that the *Phaedo* contains as it were the first draft of a scheme which is afterwards fully matured; or else that Plato is briefly adverting to a theory which he has already thoroughly expounded. We might point to the more confident tone of the *Republic* with regard to the attainment of knowledge as arguing an advance upon the *Phaedo*: but, it must be remembered, Plato recognises in the *Timaeus* that an approximation to knowledge is all for which the human intellect can hope: albeit the *Phaedo* does not strike one as intermediate between the *Republic* and *Timaeus* in this respect.

The doctrine of *ἀνίμωτος*, though it does not occur in the *Republic*, is conspicuous in two other dialogues of the middle period, to wit the *Meno* and *Phaedrus*. It is remarkable that this thought, dormant through nearly all the later period, finally reappears, under an altered form, but still easily recognisable, in the *Timaeus*.

So much for the metaphysical relations of the *Phaedo*, which enable us with perfect certainty, if we accept the theory of development which I have indicated, to assign it to the middle Platonism; in fact it constitutes, along with the *Republic*, our chief source of information upon the fundamental principles of that period. Its ethical relations are discussed in appendix I, and therefore need not here be dwelt upon: moreover they are of very slight comparative importance for our present purpose. It is absolutely impossible to fix the position of any Platonic dialogue by its ethical contents: the metaphysical significance alone constitutes the very soul of Plato's works; and this is the guide we must follow, if we would determine the order of their development.

§ 6. Persons of the dialogue.

(i) *Echekrates* the Phliasian is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (viii 46), along with his countrymen Phanton Diokles and Polynnastos and the Chalkidian Xenophilos, as the last of the Pythagoreans. These and later views on predication is very clearly brought out by Mr Jackson in his paper on the *Parmenides*, *Journal of Philology*, vol. xi p. 287 foll.
men, according to the same authority, were scholars of Philolaos and Eurytos, and were still alive in the time of Aristoxenos, the musician and Peripatetic, who was a contemporary of Theophrastos. An Echekrates, the son of Phrynion, is mentioned in the 9th Platonic epistle, 358 b, but there is nothing to show whether he is identical with the Echekrates of the Phaedo: there was, according to the catalogue given by Iamblichos, a Tarentine Pythagorean of that name; Prof. Geddes suggests that Echekrates may have been an Italian by birth who settled at Phlius; but the Phliasian occurs as a distinct person in Iamblichos’ list of Pythagoreans.

Plato’s choice of Echekrates as the auditor of Phaedo’s narrative is judicious. A hearer was required who should be in sympathy not only with the character and fate of Sokrates, but also with his teaching. The theory of ideas plays the most important part in the arguments ascribed to Sokrates, and none would be so likely as a Pythagorean philosopher to turn a friendly ear to this theory. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, as Aristotle tells us, bore a considerable resemblance to Plato’s ideal theory: and we may well suppose that a due amount of σκέψις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις would render an intelligent Pythagorean a ready recipient of Platonism.

(ii) Phaedo was a man of much greater note. A native of Elis, he was taken prisoner in the war waged by Sparta and Athens upon his country, B.C. 401. He is said to have been brought as a slave to Athens; but his servitude cannot have been of long duration, since in 399 we find him a member of the Sokratic circle: according to Aulus Gellius (II 18) he was ransomed by Kebes, and, in the words of Diogenes, τούντεύθεν ἑλευθερώς ἐφιλοσόφει. He seems to have possessed genuine philosophic ability; and after the death of Sokrates he returned to his own country, where he founded the Elean school; the same which, after its transplantation by Menedemos, became better known as the Eretrian. Nothing definite seems to have been recorded regarding the views of Phaedo; but probably they bore a considerable resemblance to those of Eukleides, with whom he is classed by the satirist Timon in a passage quoted in Diog. Laert. II 107:

 allot One moi tois philoïon melēv oide γαρ allot oidevos, oú Philōnous, ois ge men, oide évridantew Eukleidou, Megareusin de emba leusvan erismou. 

1 Echekrates, a Lokrian Pythagorean, occurs in Cicero de finibus v § 87: if Cicero is correct in saying that he was one of Plato’s teachers, he is obviously a different man.
A tendency to ἐρυσμὸς certainly characterised his Eretrian successor Menedemos. Phaedo composed dialogues, whereof the names of several are given by Diogenes Laertius ii. 105: of these however only two are said by Diogenes to be undoubtedly genuine, Ζωπυρος and Σιμων. A fragment from one of his works is thus translated by Seneca epist. xcv. 41: minuta quaedam animalia, cum mordent, non sentiuntur: adeo tenuis illis et fallens in periculum vis est: tumor indicat morsum, et in ipso tumore nullum volnus apparat. idem tibi in conversatione virorum sapientium eveniet: non deprehendes, quemadmodum aut quando tibi prosit, profuisses deprehendes. The neatness of this simile would lead us to suppose that Gellius was justified in the epithet 'admodum elegantes', which he applies to Phaedo's writings.

Phaedo was evidently a special favourite with Sokrates and seems to have been highly esteemed by the other Sokratikës: of whom Aischines is said to have composed a dialogue called by his name. The chronology of his life is unknown; at the death of Sokrates however he appears to have been little more than a youth.

(iii) Concerning Apollodorus of Phaleron we know little beyond what Plato has told us. He was a man of impulsive and passionate temperament, which had gained him the name of ὁ μανικὸς (cf. Symposium 173 d), fervently attached to Sokrates, but frequently, it would seem, not very good company to others (Symp. i. 1. σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλους ἁγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους). Xenophon refers to him twice: once in memorabilia iii. xi. 17, where he is said to be inseparable from Sokrates; and again in the apology § 28, where Xenophon again testifies to his strong affection for his master, but stigmatises him as ἄλλως εἴσθης. He is of no philosophical importance.

(iv) Simmias was a native of Thebes, where he attended the lectures of the Pythagorean Philolaos. How long he had been a companion of Sokrates is unknown, but both he and his friend Kebes were at the time of their residence in Athens very young men (νεανίσκων, 89 λ): afterwards he seems to have acquired a considerable reputation. He is mentioned in the Phaedrus 242 b: Sokrates vows that no one has caused the production of more λόγου, whether composed by himself or by others, than Phaedrus; always excepting Simmias—Συμμιὰν γὰρ ἔγαιρό λόγου. In Crito 45 b Simmias is said to have brought to Athens a sufficient sum to effect the release of Sokrates. The meagre notice of him in Diogenes Laertius ii. 124 is merely a catalogue of twenty-three dialogues of which he was said to be the author. In Plutarch de genio Socratis § 7 Simmias is made to say that he studied philosophy at Memphis in company with Plato and Ellipsoid of Peparethos.
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This is pretty nearly the sum total of our information concerning him.

(v) Of Kebees equally little is known, beyond what we learn from the Phaedo. Diogenes says merely Κέβης ὁ Ῥηβαιος. καὶ τούτου φέρονται διάλογοι τρεῖς: Πίναξ, Ἐβδομη, Φρύνχος. A composition purporting to be the Πίναξ of Kebees is still extant; but there can be no doubt that it is spurious. Xenophon mentions him twice (mem. i ii 48, iii xi 17), but adds nothing to our knowledge. He, like Simmias, offered to furnish funds to secure the release of Sokrates (Crito 45 b). And this is all there is to tell of him.

Yet this Theban pair, little as is known of their lives, will always be full of interest in our eyes, because of the important part they play in this dialogue. They are both alike painted as ardent lovers of philosophy, keen and eager searchers after truth. Both evidently enjoyed the esteem of Plato in a high degree; but the philosopher has succeeded with a few light and subtle touches in thoroughly individualising the two men: we cannot read the Phaedo without being conscious of a marked difference in their temperament. Simmias is somewhat dreamy and prone to mysticism; he is intelligent and sympathetic, but not free from vagueness; he is apt to be misled by superficial likenesses, e.g. on the subject of harmony; and he sometimes λανθάνει ἐαυτῶν οἴδην εἴκών, as in 76 D. But the intellect of Kebees is bright and keen as a sword: he has an admirable faculty of seeing the point and making straight towards it; all his criticisms are definite and precise and aimed at the heart of the matter; he possesses the invaluable quality of always knowing exactly what he himself means, and he will not put up with any haziness of thought in others. He is notable for his πραγματεία, for tenaciously clinging to the question until it is sifted to the very bottom: he is the hardest of all mortals to convince, yet perfectly open to conviction when once a satisfactory argument has been found. It is always Kebees who at every important point influences the course of the dialogue: he gives the message from Euenos which starts the whole discussion (60 D); he insists on being told why suicide should be unlawful (61 D), and how Sokrates can welcome death without contradicting his own principles (62 C); he points out that the question of the soul's immortality must be raised (70 A); he suggests the theory of ἀνάμυησις (72 E); and finally he brings forward the objection in 87 A, which shows that he has fully grasped the previous argument in all its bearings and perceives exactly what is required for its completion. Thus every important issue turns upon some pertinent remark of Kebees. The chief contribution of Simmias is the discussion
on harmony; which is indeed a theory that must needs be debated, but
which, as I have shown, does not affect the position of the demonstra-
tion; nor does it show that he has mastered the argument like his
clearer-headed companion. Yet, as Sokrates says of him, οὗ φαίλως
ἔωκεν ἀπτομένω τοῦ λόγου: he is a sincere and zealous lover of truth,
and not unworthy to share the immortality which Plato has bestowed
at least upon the fame of these two Theban friends.

(vi) Of a personage so well known as Kriton it is needless for me
to say much: a few words concerning him will complete this account of
the interlocutors. He was the oldest and dearest friend of Sokrates, a
man of wealth and position and of high character. His sympathy
with Sokrates was probably much more personal than intellectual;
Plato's picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world,
looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentle-
man, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote
in Euthydemus 304 ν foll. has any foundation on fact, he may sometimes
have remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities.
Diogenes Laertius however (n 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues
attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as περὶ τοῦ
γνώναι, τὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι: we can hardly suppose that they contributed
much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true
interest of the man when he says οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοσοφοργότατα διετέθη
πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ οὗτος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτοῦ, ὡστε μηδέποτε λείπειν τι τῶν
πρὸς τὴν χρήσαν.

(vii) The other companions of Sokrates who were with him at the
last, but who do not speak, are Kritobulos, the son of Kriton; Hermo-
genues, son of Hipponikos, a speaker in the Cratylus; Epigenes, son of
Antiphon; Aischines, son of Charinos a sausage-seller, or, by another
account, of Lysanias; he was a noted Sokratic and the author of eight
dialogues (Diog. Laert. n 64); Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics;
Ktesippos, a youth introduced in the Euthydemus; Menexenos, son of
Demophon, who gives his name to a dialogue; Phaidondes, of whom
we know only that he was a Theban; Eukleides, founder of the Me-
garian school; and his friend Terpsion, also a Megarian. Of these all
but the last three are Athenians.
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I append a list of editions of the *Phaedo* and other works of which I have made use.

Platonis *Phaedo* ed. Wytenbach

" " " Heindorf

" " " Ast

" " " Geddes

" " " W. Wagner

" " Stallbaum's edition as remodelled by Wohlrab. This is really a variorum edition, containing notes by most previous editors and by Wohlrab himself.

Platon's *Phaedon* für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von Martin Wohlrab.

Schanz's critical edition of the *Phaedo*.

Hirschig's " " "

Schleiermacher's introduction translation and notes.

Plato's *Phaedo* literally translated by E. M. Cope.

Olympiodori Scholia in Phaedonem.

Hermann Schmidt. *Kritischer Commentar zu Plato's Phaedon*.

Bonitz. *Platonische Studien*.

Ast. *Plato's Leben und Schriften*.

Hegel. *Geschichte der Philosophie, Plato*.

Zeller. *Philosophie der Griechen*.

Teichmüller. *Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, and Die platonische Frage*.

Schanz's critical writings on Plato's text.

Since this in no wise pretends to be a critical edition I have thought it needless to give the mss. readings in full; this would have been merely a reproduction of other men's work. For all who are interested in the text of Plato the edition of Schanz is indispensable; and the readings of other mss. are given by Stallbaum and Bekker. Remembering nevertheless how much it is to the reader's convenience that he should know exactly how far he can trust the text before him, I have drawn attention in the notes to every case in which my reading materially differs from the mss. I have also marked all noteworthy points of difference from two of the editions which are in most common use,
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viz. those of Stallbaum and of the Zürich editors. Also, seeing that my text is based upon that of Schanz, I have noted all my departures from his readings. Wherever I have had occasion to refer to the four mss. quoted by him, I have adopted the symbols which he has employed to denote them; these are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
B &= \text{Clarkianus sive Oxoniensis sive Bodleianus.} \\
c &= \text{Crusianus sive Tubingensis.} \\
d &= \text{Venetus 185.} \\
e &= \text{Bessarionis liber sive Venetus 184.}
\end{align*}
\]

Stallbaum and the Zürich edition are denoted by St. and Z. respectively. Where I have deserted Schanz, it has usually been in the direction of a return to the mss. The chief blemish in the text of the Phaedo is interpolation, which is not wonderful, considering that few products of Greek philosophy have been read more widely and less intelligently. There are no small number of instances in which words or sentences have indubitably been inserted by some copyist or annotator out of sheer inability to grasp the connexion. But this cannot justify the reckless handling of Hirschig, who cancels or rewrites passages wholesale, for no apparent reason but that they are not such Greek as he would have written himself. The result in many such cases is a deep thankfulness in the reader's soul that Plato, not Hirschig, was the author of the dialogues. Schanz, though a far sounder critic, has, I think, in several cases unduly deferred to Hirschig; and in others has himself bracketed passages without having in my opinion sufficient cause. In matters of orthography I have for the most part followed his guidance. And I cannot conclude without an expression of gratitude for the invaluable work he has given us: indeed only those who have engaged in the task of editing any of the dialogues can fully appreciate the boon which has been bestowed on Platonic students by Martin Schanz.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ
Prologue.

Echekrates, the Phliasian, begs for information respecting the last moments of Sokrates. Phaedo assents, and, after explaining the circumstances which delayed the execution, gives a list of the friends who were present at that last meeting, where sorrow and gladness were so strangely mingled.

1. Αὐτός, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἦ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπειεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἦ Ἀλλοι τοῦ ἰκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες.

EX. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστιν ἄττα εἰπεν ὁ ἄνηρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἢν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν 5 πολιτῶν Φλιασῶν οὗτος πάνι τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ μὲν Ἀθήναξε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκεται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκείθεν, ὃστις ἢν ἡμῖν σαφές

gethether needless; the article is continually omitted before national names by all Attic writers. Stallbaum compares Apology 32 B, Meno 70 B.

7. ὃστις ἄν] ‘who would have been able to tell us’. In a phrase of this sort I conceive that no definite protasis is in the mind of the writer. I cannot see what is gained by supplying ‘si venisset’ with Rückert, or ‘wenn er gefragt worden wäre’ with Wohlrab. The words which follow show that communication between Athens and Phlius did exist, for some Athenian visitor brought the news of Sokrates’ death. It seems needless therefore to speculate whether intercourse was suspended by the war with Elis (Stallbaum), which ended in the year Sokrates died; or by the Corinthian war (C. F. Hermann), which began five years
τι ἀγγείλαι ὦ ὦ τῇ ἑν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δή ὅτι φάρμακον πιὸν ἀποθάνοι τὸν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἴχεν φράξειν.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρὰ ἐπίθεσθε ὃν τρόπον 58 ἐγένετο;

5 EX. Καί, ταῦτα μὲν ἢ μὲν ἢγγείλε πιὸ καὶ θαναμάξομεν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὑστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανόν. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὁ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχῃ τις αὐτῶ, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη ἐτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρῶμα ἐστεμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὦ εἰς Δήλον

10 Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπτοιν.

EX. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τούτ' ἐστι τὸ πλοίον, ὅσ φασιν Ἀθηναίοι, εὐ ὁ Ὁσσθέν ποτὲ εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὲ ἐπτὰ ἑκεῖνους ἄχετο ἄγων καὶ ἐσωτερικὸς ἔσωθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνος εὐξάμωτο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ 15 σωθείει, ἐκάστου ἑτούς θεωρίαν ἀπάσεωι εἰς Δήλον· ἢ δὴ δέει καὶ νῦν ἐτί ἑξ ἑκεῖνος καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ τῇ θεῷ πέμπτοιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἑστίν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεῖν τῷ πόλει καὶ δημοσίᾳ μιθέοι ἀποκτινώναι, πρὶν ἄν εἰς Δήλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοίον καὶ πάλιν δεδορ' τοῦτο δ' ἐνιοτέ 20 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τρυχοσιν ἀνέμοι ἀπολαβέσθεντες αὐτοῖς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἰερεύς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τῷ πρῶμαν τοῦ πλοίου τοῦτο δ' ἐτυχε, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλὸς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης 25 τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

Π. EX. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θάνατον, ὁ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεγέντα καὶ πραγματεύτηκεν, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγεγομενοί τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὔκ εἰσόν οἱ ἀρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτατα φιλον;

30 ΦΑΙΔ. Ὀυδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τινὲς, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

EX. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητε ὡς σαφέστατα ἢ μὲν ἀπαγγείλατε, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀπώλεια τυχόχανεν οὖσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάξω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ἢ μὲν διηγήσασθαι

afterwards. The events of the last day in prison were of course known but to a small circle.


13. τοὺς δὲς ἐπτὰ] the seven maidens and seven youths, according to the legend, who were delivered every nine years to the Minotaur.

18. μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι] So Xenophon II.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ άλλου ἀκούοντα ἐμούνε ἄει πάντων ἥδιστον.

Ε. "Αλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσμένους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις; ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὃς ἀν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξέλθειν πάντα.

Ε. Φαίδων. Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ θανάσια ἐπαθῶν παραγενόμενος, οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσήγη; εὐδαίμον γὰρ μοι ἄνηρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐξέκρατε, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεώς καὶ γενναίος ἐτελεύτα, ὡστε μοι ἑκείνουν παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς "Αἰδον ἱόντα ἀνευ θειᾶς μοίρας ἱέναι, ἀλλὰ 10

59 καὶ ἐκέισθαι ἀφικόμενον εὔ πρᾶξεν, εἴπερ τις πῶτοτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνι μοι ἑλεεινον εἰσήγη, ὡς εἰκὸς ἄν δόξειν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὐ ἥδονη ὃς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰδώθειμεν καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινες ἤσαν· ἄλλα ἀτεχνὸς ἀτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀίδης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε 15 τῆς ἥδους συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμούμενον ὅτι αὐτικὰ ἑκείνους ἐμελλε τελευτάν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχέδον τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὥστε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύνοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος οὖθα γὰρ ποῦ τὸν 20

Β ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

Ε. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Φαίδων. "Εκείνος τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἐτεταράγην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Ε. "Ετυχόν δὲ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

Φαίδων. Οὔτος δε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχειρίων παρῆν καὶ 25 ὁ Κριτοβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτε Ἐρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Λίσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης ὑν δὲ καὶ Κτησιππος ὁ Παιανίεως

3. τοιούτοις ἑτέροις] i.e. they take equal pleasure in the recollection of Sokrates: compare below 59 A καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιαύτω τινες ἤσαν, referring to ὑς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων; and 79 C καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ἰδοῦσα ὥσπερ μεθύσασα, ἄτε τοιοῦτον ἐφαπτομένη.

8. εὐδαίμον γὰρ] Here the key-note of the dialogue is struck. Its express object is to show ὑς εἰκότως ἄνηρ τῷ δύνῃ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατηρῶν τὸν ἀνθρώπη μέλλων ἀποθανέσθαι: and at the very outset we are introduced to Sokrates as a living illustration of his own belief.

13. παρόντι πένθει] ‘as would seem natural for one who was present at a scene of mourning’. For the two datives compare Phaedrus 234 C τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι, ‘to one who takes a rational view’.

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] The nearest parallel in Plato to this remarkable phrase seems to be Protagoras 317 C καλὸν τὸν λόγον ἐπηκείν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ: cf. ibid. 319 C, Phaedo 84 A, Republic 581 E. But in all these passages the phrase expresses devotion to some particular pursuit; not, as here, the occupation of a certain time.

25. Ἀπολλόδωρος] Compare 117 D.
καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων Πλάτων ἔδε οἴμαι ἧσθένει.

EX. Ἐνοῦ δέ τινες παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναὶ, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ ᘠφβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαι-δώνης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

EX. Τί δέ; Ἀριστιππὸς καὶ Κλεόμβροτος <οὐ> παρεγέ-
vνοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα: ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ γὰρ ἑλέγοντο εἶναι.

EX. Ἀλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδὸν τι οἴμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

EX. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες φής ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

III. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἡγὼ σοι εξ ἅρχης πάντα πειράσομαι διηγη-
σαθαί. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθεμεν φοιτάν ἔ καὶ ἐγώ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἐσθέν 15 εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν οἷ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένουν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἔως ἀνοίχθη τὸ δεσ-
μωτηρίον, διατρίβοντες μετ’ ἄλληλον ἀνεφέτο γὰρ οὐ προῖ ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοίχθη, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διη-
μερεύομεν μετ’ αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε προιαίτερον συνελέγημεν. 20 τῇ γὰρ προτεραλα [ἡμέρᾳ] ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐστέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῦτον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφγίμενον ἔχει, ἐ
παρηγγείλαμεν οὐν ἄλληλοις ἥκεν ὁς πρωιαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἴωθος, καὶ ἥκουσαι καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει υπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρείναι, ἔως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ'

1. Πλάτων δὲ] There is but one other passage in which Plato mentions himself, Ἀριστοκρατία 38 b; Πλάτων ἔδε 6δε, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτίδουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδορος κελέουσι μὲ τράκοντα μὴν τιμήσασθαί, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσθαί. Forster suggests that the present language im-
plies that Plato's sickness was due to excessive grief. I see nothing however to justify the inference: but doubtless Plato was anxious to explain his absence.

4. Φαιδούνδης] I have retained this form on the analogy of other Theban names and on the authority of Xenophon mem. i ii 48: perhaps too the Theban termination as should be restored.

6. <οὐ> παρεγένοντο] οὐ is not in the best mss. but is inserted by Schanz after Cobet. St. and Z. omit it.

8. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ] This has usually been considered to convey a reproach: see Diog. Laert. iii 36, cf. ii 65.

59 c—60 c, e. iii. On the morning after the return of the sacred vessel from Delos the friends meet earlier than usual at the court-house near the prison. After some delay they are admitted and find Sokrates relieved of his fetters and in company with his wife and child. Xan-
thippé, unable to control her grief, is led out; and Sokrates chafing his cramped leg falls to moralising on the intimate union of pain and pleasure, which he says would have made a good subject for Aesop.

24. περιμένειν] This reading seems
to me certainly right. Bonitz, quoted by Wohlrab, accurately distinguishes between the usages of περιμένων and ἐπιμένων in Plato: the former means ‘to await’, the latter ‘to remain’ in a given condition. Cf. below 80 c, and Theaetetus 179 E. So far as I am aware, the nearest approach of ἐπιμένων to the meaning of περιμένων is in Republic 361 D ὅπων δὲ τοιούτων οὖδὲν ἐτι, ὥσ ἐγγὺς, χαλεπῶς ἐπέχειδεν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. If ἐπιμένειν be read with Hermann, we should translate: ‘he bade us stay where we were and not come in until he summoned us’.

1. παραγγέλλοντι I agree with Prof. Geddes in taking these words: ‘are giving directions that he may be put to death to-day’; the directions being given to the officers of the prison. If, as is usually done, we take Sokrates to be the object of παραγγέλλοντι, the clause ἄπω δὲ...τελευτήσῃ becomes nonsence. Wohlrab (in his Latin edition) has a note which is utterly beyond my comprehension.

5. τὸ παιδίον] no doubt his youngest son Menexenos.

15. τὸ ἁμα μὲν] The usual reading is τῷ, and this is confirmed by Stobaeus, who cites this passage, ecl. 1 1104. This would = ‘by refusing’. But τῷ is found in the Bodleian and two other mss. and is abundantly justified by Riddell, digest of idiom 85. I have therefore followed Schanz in retaining it. ‘How wondrous is the relation between pleasure and its seeming contrary, pain; that the pair will never come to a man together’.

18. Αἶσωτος] It is worth while here to notice the consummate skill with which Plato allows the dialogue to unfold itself as in the natural course of conversation. By this simple reference to Aesop Kebes is reminded that Euenos was anxious to know what was the object of Sokrates in versifying the fables of Aesop. In answering the question Sokrates sends a kindly message to Euenos and bids him follow to Hades as soon as he may. The surprise of Simmias at this message draws
from Sokrates an expression of his belief that the true philosopher will meet death gladly in the hope of being happier in Hades than on earth; and in support of this opinion, as we shall see, the whole argument that occupies the remainder of the dialogue is evolved.

3.  ἐπακολουθεὶ ὑπέρτερον] In these observations of Sokrates we may find the germ of the Platonic theory of pleasure as a καθάστασις. See for instance Timaeus 64 C ἥ το μὲν παρά φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γεγομένον ἄθροι ὑπ’ ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ’ εἰς φύσιν ἀπιόν πάλιν ἄθροι ἡδόν. Cf. Philebus 31 D &c. The καθάραι ἰδιοναι are exceptions, Philebus 51 B; but, so far as concerns physical pleasures, only apparent exceptions, Timaeus 65 A.

60 D—61 C, cc. iv, v. Ἰκεῖς: This reminds me that Euenos and others desire to know what led you to compose verses during your confinement in prison? So-krates: It was not with any thought of rivalling Euenos as a poet, but because I have been frequently warned in a dream to practise ‘music’. This I always understood as an encouragement to persevere with philosophy; but in case music in the popular sense might be meant, I thought it well to be on the safe side. So I took the fables of Aesop, because I knew them best, and turned them into verse. Tell this to Euenos and bid him farewell and follow me as soon as he can.

8. ἐντείνασ] ‘putting into verse’. The term is used of setting words to music, Protagoras 326 B; of putting thought into words, Philebus 38 E. The last example seems to me conclusive that the notion of the word is not, as Prof. Geldes considers, derived from stretching a string, but implies fixing in a certain form or position. Cf. Leno 87 A, where it is used of inscribing a triangle in a circle.

9. προοίμιον] This word is applied by Thucydides, III 104, to the Homeric hymn to Apollo: such προοίμια were strictly speaking preludes either to a longer poem (ὅτι) or to a religious celebration. Specimens of verses attributed to Sokrates are to be found in Diog. Laert. II 42.

10. Εὐήνος] Euenos of Paros was a sophist and poet. From Apology 20 B we learn that he taught ἀπεργή for five minas; from Phaedrus 267 A that he was the inventor of new rhetorical figures: τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάρων Εὐήνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἀγομεν, ὥστε ὑπόθηκαν τιν πρώτως εἰρή καὶ παρεπαλίνους; ὃ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ παράργοντος φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν, μνήμης χάριν σφῦδος γὰρ ἄνθρομος οὗτος, where see Dr Thompson’s note. From both passages we may infer that Plato did not think much of him. The few fragments that remain of his elegiac poems are given in Bergk’s poetae lyrici. Bergk however remarks ‘quae hic unius Eueni nomine comprehendi, rectius dubius attribui videntur’; and the other epigrams, chiefly erotic, given in the Anthology under the name Euenos,
are undoubtedly the work of different authors.

5. ὃς οὐ βάδουν] After ὃς BD give ὅτι, which Schanz brackets and I omit.

7. εἰ πολλάκις] ‘if perchance’; as in 61 Α.

12. παρακελεύονται τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν] ‘to urge and cheer me on’. Each of the three compounds used by Plato in this passage has its distinct shade of meaning, παρακελεύονται, which is the term frequently applied by Thucydides to a general’s address to his soldiers, means ‘urge to make an effort’; ἐπικελεύειν, which is a much rarer word and occurs nowhere else in Plato, ‘encourage while the effort is being made’; as in Euripides Electra 1224. In διακελεύομενοι the preposition has a distributive force: ‘as the partisans of different runners cheer on their favourites’. Cf. Herodotus IX 5 διακελευσάμενος δὲ γνωτίζειν.

14. ὃς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὖσης τής με-


\[ \text{\textbf{ΠΑ\textup{-}ΛΑ\textup{-}Ω\textup{-}ΝΟ\textup{-}Σ}} \]

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\[ \text{ἐποίησα, όδ} \ ήν \ ή παρούσα \ θυσία: \ μετά \ δὲ \ τῶν \ θεῶν, \ ἐννοήσας \ ὅτι \ τῶν \ ποιητὴν \ δέοι, \ εἴπερ \ μέλλοι \ ποιητής \ εἶναι, \ ποιεῖν \ μύθους, \ ἀλλ' \ οὐ \ λόγους, \ καὶ \ αὐτὸς \ οὐκ \ ή \ μυθολογικός, \ διὰ \ ταῦτα \ δὴ \ οὐς \ προχειρου \ εἶχον \ μύθους \ καὶ \ ἡπιστάμην \ τοὺς \ Λίσσωπον, \ τούτους \ ἐποίησα, \ δὲ \ οἱ \ πρώτοις \ ἐνέτυχον. \ ]

5. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Κέβης, Εὐνύμων φράξε, καὶ ἐφρώσθαι καὶ, ἀν 
σοφρονῦ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα. ἀπειμὶ δὲ, ὡς ἐοικε, τήμερον 
κελέουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι. καὶ ὁ Συμμίας, Οἶον παρακελέει, ἕφη, 
tούτῳ, ὁ Σώκρατες, Εὐνύμων; πολλὰ γὰρ ἡδὴ ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἄνδρὶ 
ἰο σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ὑσθῆμαι οὖν' ὀποστιοῦν σοὶ ἐκὼν εἶναι

Geddes has some interesting remarks on the special connexion between Sokrates and Apollo, cf. 85 a. I cannot however agree with his suggestion that the προσόμοιν was a thanksgiving for the thirty days' reprise; which would be totally inconsistent with the attitude of Sokrates in the face of death: cf. 116 e.

2. μύθους ἄλλοι οὐ λόγους] 'fiction and not fact'. This distinction is established by Gorgias 523 a, ἢκον δή, φασί, μάλα καλὸν λόγον, ὃν ὡς ἕγγος μῦθον, ὥς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον. ὥς ἀληθὴ γὰρ ὡς σοι λέει ὁ μέλλω λέγειν; then follows the myth about the judgment of souls; cf. Laws 572 D. μύθος is defined by Aphthonios, quoted by Wytenbach, as λόγος φεύγη εἰκονίζων ἀληθεύον. Plutarch, de gloria Atheniensium § 4, says that Πινδαρ was rebuked by Κορίννα, ὃς ἐμοῦσιν ὁντα καὶ μὴ παιοῦντα μύθους, ὁ θύσι ποιητικῆς ἔργον εἶναι συμβέβηκε; further on he says ὁ δὲ μύθος εἶναι βουλεύσαι λόγος φεύγη ἐοικῶς ἀληθώς. Compare Aristotle's distinction between ἱστορία and ποιήσα, poetics 1451 b, τοῦτο διαφέρει τῷ τόν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν τῶν δὲ ὀτα ἀν γενόστο. Of course λόγος in its wider sense includes μύθος, as we have in 60 D τοῦ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου λόγους.

3. οὓς προχειρούσε εἶχον] i.e. in his memory; there is no evidence that the fables of Aesop had been published in writing up to this time. Aesop is said to have been a contemporary of Solon; and the story of his death is told by Plutarch, de seru numinis vindicta § 12: there is also an allusion to it in Herodotus Π 134.

7. ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα] This injunction must be considered as modified by the proviso added below, οὖν μέντοι γ' ἐκοι βιάται αὐτῶν. Schmidt finds a 'dilologia' in the words, and Prof. Geddes takes the same view. But it appears to me that such a premature reference to the μελέτη βανάτου is thoroughly unplatonic. It is futile to omit the words ὡς τάχιστα with Heindorf; in any case they must be implied, else we make Sokrates give Euenos the superfluous advice to die some time or other.

61 c—62 c, cc. v, vi. Simmins: Euenos is not likely to take such advice as that. Sokrates: Yes he is, if he is a real philosopher; not that he ought to take his own life. Κέβης: This seems inconsistent; you first say that the philosopher will be glad to die, and then that he may not kill himself: why may he not? Sokrates: I only know what I have been told. According to one account we are in custody here and may not make our escape. This is a hard saying; but there is a more obvious reason, that we are the property of the gods, who are as justly indignant if we destroy ourselves as you would be, should of your slaves do so.
4. οὗ γὰρ φασὶ] It is worthy of note that the whole of this rather superficial reasoning against suicide, which is quite outside the main argument of the dialogue, is carefully and repeatedly marked as secondhand. It seems as if Plato wished to avoid any prejudice and misrepresentation which his panegyric of death might bring upon him; while his slight and rapid treatment of this subject would show that he did not feel strongly upon it. That he did not in all cases disapprove suicide is certain: cf. Latus 854 c καὶ ἐὰν μὲν οὐδ᾿ ἔρχᾳται ταύτα λοιφά τι τὸ νόσημα—εἰ δὲ μὴ, καλλὸν θάνατον σκέφτεσθαι καὶ ἀπαλάττον τοῦ βίου. Also 873 c δὲ ἐὰν ἐαυτὸν κτείνῃ, μὴτέ τόλεως ταξάσῃς δίκη, μὴτέ περιωδίων ἀφύτῳ προσπεσοῦσα τιχῶ ἀναγκασθῆς, μὴδὲ αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀτόμον καὶ ἁβίον μεταλαχών, ἀργία δὲ καὶ ἀνανδρίας δειλία ἀνατὸν δίκην ἁδικῶν ἐπιθῇ.
9. Φιλολάω] From this it is evident that Philolaos spent some time at Thebes, where Keubes and Simmias attended his lectures. We have absolutely no authentic information about the life of this eminent Pythagorean; and the genuineness of the fragments ascribed to him has, I think, been once for all disposed of by Mr Bywater, Journal of Philology vol. 1 p. 21 foll.

οὐδὲν γε σαφῶς] ἔθος ᾦν τοῖς Ἡθαγοροῖς δὲ αἰ νιγμάτων Μηγεόν, says Olympodoros, whom the editors all repeat. I think Plato’s meaning is that the arguments of Philolaos against suicide were not conclusive enough to satisfy the πραγματεία of Keubes.

12. διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν] This is an accurate description of the conversation that is to come: when reason has done all she can, fancy comes to her aid with a myth.

13. τῆς ἐκεί] Schanz brackets these words: Hirschig proposes ἐκεῖνε. 

14. μέχρι ἦλιον δυσμῶν] before which execution was not legal; cf. 116 ν.
10

3. **ei tou toyn mouy** Of this **locus vexatus** I shall first give my own interpretation before mentioning other views that are held upon it. I accept the text precisely as it stands without alteration or omission. The first thing to be done is to fix the meaning of **touto**. It can hardly be doubted that **touto** means here exactly what it does in 62 c, **all' elikos, ephi o Kexhys, touto ge faivetai:** where the context clearly requires that **touto = mu' thematov eivai authon eauton apoktini-nina.** Taking it in that sense here I should translate: 'perhaps you will be surprised if this question alone of all admits a simple answer—if the same thing does not happen to man in this as in all other cases; I mean that to some men at some time death is better than life: and for whom death is better, you will perhaps think it strange that they may not do themselves a good turn but must wait for some other helper.' I conceive the clause **kai oudepoto...qen** to show how it is that the question is not **apalou.** Unless death were sometimes better than life the question whether suicide were sometimes lawful would never be raised, for no one would dream of committing it. **Oupser kai talx, i.e. as in other cases either of two opposites may be better according to circumstances. The whole sentence amounts to this: you will think it strange if in the case of suicide we can lay down an invariable rule; that there are no persons for whom it is better to die than live; and if there are, that they may not release themselves from life.

Mr Jackson, in a paper read before the Cambridge Philological Society Dec. 1, 1881, has a most searching examination of this passage. Understanding **touto** as I do, he is of opinion that the clauses **kai oudepoto touvchanei...qen** and **thetaos...thetao** are interpolations. My interpretation, which differs from all those that he criticises, seems to me to meet many of his objections; and though I am far from affirming that he may not be right in rejecting these words, I am loth to do so when I believe they afford a reasonable sense. As regards certain phrases to which he objects, I think **oudepoto** is simply in antithesis to **estin ote;** and may we not with Mr Cope translate **tou anthetaopo** 'mankind', a universal expression which is afterwards qualified by **estin ois?**

Prof. Geddes has an elaborate note, but I am entirely unable to agree with his view. He seems to regard **kai oudepoto** as beginning an independent sentence. There is no difficulty about **ou** after **thetaos** ei, cf. 97 A.

Schanz places a full stop after **tallla** and inserts **allas before estin.** If the text is to be altered, I should prefer Mr Jackson's plan.

7. **mu' osoi**] Z. and St. add **estin,** which is wanting in B pr. m.

9. **Ippw Zeus**] This little provincialism was doubtless a favourite mode of em-
phasis with Kebes, and well known to his friends as characteristic.

1. ἐν ἀπορρήτοις] The ancient commentators explain that the Orphic traditions are meant. This seems more probable than any reference to the Eleusinian mysteries.

2. ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ] 'in ward'. We might translate 'on a sort of garrison duty', following Cicero, Cato maior 20: vetatque Pythagoras in iussu imperatoris, id est dei, de prae sidio et statione vitae decedere. But the common Pythagorean notion was that the body is the soul's prison, whence she may not come forth until her term is fulfilled: compare Athenaeus 14 xiv 157 C πρὸς ἣν ὁ Καρπείος ἐφη, Εὐδέθεος ὁ πυθαγορικός, ὁ Νίκιος, ὡς φησι Κλεάρχος ὁ περιπατητικός ἐν δευτέρω βίων, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδεσθαί τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ τῇ δὲ βίῳ τὰς ἀπάνων ψυχὰς τιμορίας ἄχριν, καὶ διεσάβα τοῖς θεοίς ὡς, εἰ μὴ μενοῦσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτως ἐκ ἐκάκως αὐτοὺς λόγη, πλέσσαι καὶ μείζονιν ἐμπέσωνται τῷτε ὑμῖν. διὸ πάντας εἰδαμονεύοντι τὴν τῶν κυρίων ἀνάτασιν φοβείται τοῦτο ἕκωστα ἐκβήναι μόνον τοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἕρας διότι ἀνάπασιν προσταθήσεσθαι, πεπουμένους τὴν ἀπόλουσι τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης. Cf. Phaedrus 250 c, with Dr Thompson's note; Crito 400 c, Gorgias 493 λ.

4. οὐ ράδιος διδέων] 'not easy to see through'. Sokratic εἰρωνεία: evidently he does not think this theory worth much. Olympiodorus, with perhaps unconscious sarcasm, observes ἀνάγκη οὐν μέσα τῶν μέλλοντα θέσασθαι αὐτῶν.

6. ἐν τοῖς κτήματοι] Cf. Latus 906 ἀξίμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε άμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαμαίων: also 902 B. Elsewhere man is called the plaything of the gods: Latus 803 C ἀντιτομον δὲ, ὅπερ εἰπομεν ἐμπροσθεν (644 D, E), θεοὶ τι πάλινυς μεμιχανεμένος, τούτο αὐτοῦ τὸ βέλτιστον γεγονέναι.

11. πρὶν ἀνάγκην] Although ἄν may very easily have dropped out before ἀνάγκην, I have not thought proper to insert it against all the mss. I am not satisfied that Plato could not write πρὶν alone with the subjunctive; and in Timæus 57 B it is not easy to account for the loss of ἄν: λυόμενα οὐ πάεται, πρὶν ἡ παντάπαιν συνάκωμαι καὶ διαλύθηται ἐκφύγῃ πρὸς τὸ ξυγγενές, ὢν κυκλήθναι, ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ὁμοίων τῶν κρατήσας γενόμενον, αὐτοῦ ἐξοκοκοι μείγν. Cf. Latus 873 λ.

62 c—63 E, cc. vii, viii. If this be so, replies Kebes, it seems inconsistent to say that the wise man will be glad to die. For only a fool would desire to run away from wise and good masters and guardians, such as the gods are to us.
νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοῦς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἄν ἐθέλειν ἀποθηρήσκειν, ἔικεκν τούτῳ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄτοτῷ, εἰπὲρ δ' νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ὁ ἐχει, τὸ θεὸν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἥμων καὶ ἥμας ἐκείνων κτῆματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμώτατοι ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόυταις, εὖ ἐπιστατούσιν αὐτοῦ ὀἴπερ ἄριστοι εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται θεοῖ, οὐκ ἐχεῖ λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ποιον αὐτὸς γε αὐτοῦ ὀὔτε τὴν ἐπιμηλησθεὶσαν ἑλεύθερος γενόμενοι· ἀλλὰ ἀνήστοις μὲν ἀνθρώπος τάχ' ἀν οἴηθεί ταῦτα, θεοῦτον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοντο ὅτι οὐ δει ἀπὸ γε Ἐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ' ὁ τι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἄν φεύγοι, ὁ δὲ νῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῦν ποιεῖν αὐτὰ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίον. καὶ τοις οὔτως, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν ναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ δ' νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμως ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθηρήσκουται πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἀφρονίς χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀσθοὶν ὁ τῷ κάθετοι τῇ τοῦ Κέβης πραγματεία, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας 63 εἰς ἡμᾶς Ἁ. Αἰτείν τοι, ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης λόγους τυνάς ἄνεφενα, καὶ οὐ πάνω εὐθέως ἐθέλει πειθέσθαι ὁ τι ἐν τις εἰπτμ. Καί ὁ Σιμμίας Ἀλλὰ μην, ἐφ' ὁ Σώκρατες, νῦν τε μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τι γὰρ ἄν βουλόμενον ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττωσιν αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὔτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἥμας ἀπολείπων καὶ ἀρχοῦντας ἁγαθοῖς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀμολογεῖς, θεοὺς. B

To this Simmias agrees, and upbraids Sokrates for being too ready to leave his friends. Well then, answers Sokrates, since I am thus arraigned, I must try to defend myself before you more persuasively than I did before the jury. As he is beginning his defence he is interrupted by Kriton: the attendant, says he, has been warning me that talking is apt to hinder the operation of the poison. Never mind, replies Sokrates; only let him be prepared to repeat the potion as often as may be required.

3. τὸ θεὸν τε εἶναι] Sokrates had used the plural, as he Kebes himself does directly afterwards. Plato, when he uses the word popularly, without any metaphysical significance, seems to employ θεος or θεοι indifferently.

8. φευκτέοι εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου] Schanz brackets these words.

15. πραγματεία] 'insistence'. The word is used in a somewhat unusual manner here. Plato frequently denotes by it a pursuit followed with care and earnestness, generally philosophy, but sometimes the ordinary business of life, as in Republic 500 c. Compare πραγματείαδη παίδαι, Parmenides 137 b.

16. λόγους τυνάς ἄνεφενα] 'he is always hunting for some principle or other'.

19. ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς should be taken together.

21. εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον] Olympiodoros remarks, not without acuteness, ὅτι ἀραφήνεται ἐν τοῖς τελευτάτοις Κέβης Σιμμίαν, because Kebes raises a universal question, while Simmias soothes ἐπὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους.
63] ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

Δίκαια, ἕφη, λέγετε. οἷμαι γὰρ ύμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταύτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἕφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

7 VIII. Φέρε δή, ἦ δ’ ὦς, πειραθῶ πιθανότερον πρὸς ύμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ὅ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἕφη, ὁ Σιμμίας τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ὕμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοῦς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἄγαθοὺς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἁμείνως τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἡδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ τῶν.

C ὃ ἐμεθαυδάτος ἐς ἐρείσσων ἄφθιεσθαι ἄγαθοὺς καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνο λισχρισάσην ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοῦς δεσπότας πάνοι ἄγαθος ἥξειν, εἰ ὕστε ἢτε, εἰπέρ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διασχισάσην ἄν καὶ τοῦτο. ὅστε διὰ ταύτα ὦν ὅπως ἄγανακτῶ, ἅλλ’ εὑλπίζε ἐμί ἐναί τοῖ τοῖς τετελευτηκόντας καὶ ὡσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολύ ἁμείνων τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς ἃ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τι οὖν, ἕφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὁ Ἐκρωτας; αὐτὸς ἐχ’νον τὴν

D διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν ψυ ἠξειν ἄπτεναι, ἢ κᾶν ἡμῖν μεταδόῃς; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἠμοῦνε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἴναι ἄγαθον τοῦτο, καὶ ἁμα σοι ἀπολογία ἔσται, εἰπέρ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείςης. Ἀλλά πειρόσσομαι, ἕφη, πρῶτον δὲ Κρύτωνα τόνδε σκεφώμεθα, τί ἐστιν οὐ βουλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. 'Τι, ὁ Ἐκρωτας, ἔφη ὁ Κρύτων, ἄλλο γε το ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ἡ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρὴ

6. παρὰ θεοῦς ἄλλους] Sokrates follows the popular distinction between the ὄφρανοι and χθόνοι θεοί. Mr Cope translates 'in the company not only of Gods wise and good, but next also of men'. I think however the meaning is settled by Ἰάσων 958 ό τὰ μὲν περὶ τὰ θεὶα νόμιμα τῶν τε ύπὸ γῆς θεῶν καὶ τῶν τῆς: and soon afterwards, 959 β, we have exactly the same phrase as here; παρὰ θεοῦς ἄλλους ἀπίεινι δώσοντα λόγον, where ψοῦς ἄλλους can only mean 'other gods'.

9. παρ’ ἄνδρας τε] The proper apodosis to the ἐς has been displaced by the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο...διασχισάσην, which modifies the form of the succeeding clause. The meaning of the parenthesis seems to be that Sokrates does not feel sure enough as to the exact condition of souls after death to make any positive statement about their association with one another: all he is quite sure of is that, whatever their condition, they are under the care of good and wise gods.

11. ἕξων] We cannot supply ἐπίσω, because Sokrates is confident that he will be in the company of gods, not that he hopes to be. But the infinitive construction is carried on from the previous sentence, although the particular force of the governing verb is no longer appropriate. Perhaps however Schanz is right in bracketing ἕξων.

14. πάλαι λέγεται] in the current traditions of Greek religion.

15. αὐτὸς ἐχ’νον] 'are you minded to depart keeping this persuasion to yourself?'

19. πρῶτον δὲ Κρύτωνα] This little episode serves to mark the conclusion of the introductory matter.
5. ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ is needlessly bracketed by Schanz.

7. [πάλαι] The mss. are uncertain about this word, which Schanz brackets. Z. and St. retain it.

63 ε—64 λ. After the interruption Sokrates restates the thesis which he has to defend: that the philosopher will meet death with good courage, in the confident hope that he will enjoy the greatest blessings in the other world.

8. ὡς μοι φαίνεται] At this point the main business of the dialogue begins: all that precedes has been merely preparatory to this thesis, and all that follows is logically evolved in its defence.

64 λ—67 β, α. ix—xi. The philosopher’s whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death: how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher’s aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the body is for ever thwarting his endeavours; (1) by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all communion with the body: its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her.

15. ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάιναι] ‘dying and being dead’. ἀποθνῄσκειν represents the philosophic training, the gradual emancipation of the soul from bodily passions; τεθνάιναι the perfected philosophic εἶσ, the complete independence of soul, so far as is permitted by the conditions of corporeal life.
6. **touS mn6 par' 6mpwv**] In the mouth of Simmias I think these words must refer to the Thebans: cf. *Sophist* 242 D to dé par' 6mpwv 'Elestik6n 6thnos. 'The majority would think what you say of philosophers excellent—my countrymen would give an especially cordial assent'. Simmias is glancing at the proverbial dulness of the Boeotian mind.

7. **kal s6fáS**] Sc. touS par' 6mpwv.

15. **gegovn6nai...einaI**] Note the significant change of word.

16. **éra mi 6llo tu**] If 6 be right, it can only be a 'deliberative' subjunctive. For in a question we can hardly accept Heindorf's suggestion, 'ante mi7 intelligi potest dedolkate'.

20. **perI tás 6don6S**] Olympiodoros classifies those here mentioned as (1) ἐνεργεῖαι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαίαι, (2) φυσικαὶ καὶ ὁμόν ἀναγκαίαι δὲ, (3) ὀστε φυσικαὶ ὀστε ἀναγκαίαι. This however, as Wytenbach points out, is an Epicurean distinction: cf. Cicero *de finibus* i xiii § 45, and Diog. Laert. x 149: where the examples do not correspond with the present passage.
2. ἄφεστάναι αὐτοῦ] With the whole of these three chapters should be compared Timaeus 87 c—90 b. It would be an error to suppose that Plato, with all his contempt for the body, was a friend of asceticism. In the passage of the Timaeus above mentioned he says that a due balance should be maintained between soul and body; a vigorous soul ought to have a vigorous body for its vehicle. Accordingly the body should be kept in good health and condition for the sake of the soul; for no less emphatically than in the Phaedo he declares that all is to be subordinate to the free exercise of intelligence; see especially 90 A foll.

8. ἐγγύς τι τείνειν] ‘verges pretty closely on the state of death’, Cope. Here Plato marks the vulgar error already referred to in 64 B θληθεν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. The majority have no conception of the philosophic τεθάναι; if one lives without bodily pleasures, they think he may as well be dead. Such is the judgment of Kallikles, Corgias 492 οἱ οἷον γὰρ ἄν οὖν γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονίσταται εἰσεν. Socrates retorts that the life of the pleasure-seeker is a πίθου βίος and afterwards χαράδρου, 494 b. Cf. Philebus 21 c.

9. διὰ τοῦ σώματος] This phrase would indicate that there is no real discrepancy between the doctrine of the Phaedo and of the Philebus on the subject of pleasure. For the preposition διὰ implies ‘those pleasures [which the soul feels] by means of the body’: see introduction § 4.

14. οἱ ποιηταὶ ἢμῖν ἄλλην θρυλοῦσιν] e.g. Empedokles 49—53 (Karsten):

"ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἄθρει παμπαλάμη πῇ δῆλον ἐκάστον,
μήτε τῶν' ὤν έχων πίστει πλέον ή κατ' ἀκούνην,
μήτε ἀκούν έριδουσιν ύπέρ τρανάματα γλώσσης,
μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὕππη πόροι ἔστι νοῆσαι"

γένων πίστιν ἔρικε, νῦν δ' η' δῆλον ἐκάστον.

Cf. 108:

"τήν ον νοῦς δέρκει, μήδ' ἄμμασιν ἐσο τεθητώς,
also the line of Epicharmos:

νοσὶς ὅρη καὶ νοσὶ ἀκούει τάλλα κωφά καὶ τυφλά."
1. **φαυλότεραι**] Sight is distinguished as the noblest of the senses in *Timaeus* 47 A ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν ὄργαν αὐτίκα τῆς μεγάλης ὑφελείας ἐγένετο ἤμι: hearing comes next, 47 C, D. Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 D ὄψις γὰρ ἦμιν ἀντιτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἑρχέται αἰσθήσεως.

7. **παραλυτή**] ‘annoys by its intrusion’: this sense of *παρά* is not uncommon in Plato: cf. below 66 D παραπέταστον; *Timaeus* 50 E παρεμφάνει.

8. **μηδὲ τις ἡδονή**] This is the reading of the Bodleian, and seems to me right. ἀληθῶν μηδὲ τῇ ἡδονῇ all belong to the last μῆτε. Z. has μὴτε τις.

10. **ὁρέγηται**] ‘reaches after’.

15. **καλὸν γε τι καὶ ἄγαδόν**] Here the αὐτὸ ἄγαδον seems placed on the same level as the other ideas. This however is merely because for the present purpose Plato is not concerned to differentiate it: the criticism of Anaxagoras, 98 C foll., shows that in the *Phaedo* the αὐτὸ ἄγαδον must occupy the same position as in the *Republic*. In the *Republic* itself ἄγαδον is several times apparently classed with the inferior ideas, e.g. 476 λ.

18. **μεγέθους πέρι**] Here is the first decisive indication that the *Phaedo* belongs to the middle phase of Platonism, along with the *Republic*. For μέγεθος is τῶν πρὸς τι, ὥς ὅφειν εἰναι καθ’ αὐτὸ γένος. (Arist. *metaph.* I ix.)

22. **διανοηθήναι**] is opposed to αἰσθάνεσθαι: ‘to apprehend intellectually the essence of each object of his investigation’. 
καθαρώτατα, ὅστις δ' ὑπ' ἑντὸς τῆς διανοίας ἵνα ἐφ' ἑκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὅψιν παρατιθέμενον ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφέλκον μηδέμιαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' ἑντὸς καθ' ἑντὸς εἰλικρινές ἑκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύει τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἑφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ὃς ἔτος εἰσίν ἄκμαπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀς παράστοτος καὶ οὐκ ἐδότος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀληθείως τε καὶ φρονήσει, ὅταν κοινωνίᾳ, ἀρ' οὐχ ὦτός ἔστιν, ὁ Σιμίμα, εἴσπερ τις καὶ ἄλλα, ὁ τευχόμενος τῶν ὄντων; 'Τερπνοῦσ, ἐφη ὁ Σιμίμας,

10 ὡς ἀληθὴ λέγεις, ὁ Σάκρατες.

XI. Οὐκόν ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐκ πάντων τοῦτων παρίστασαι ὡς δόξαν τοιάνδε τινα τοὺς γνησίους φιλοσόφους, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλων λόγων τοιαῦτα ἅττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοῦ ὄσπερ ἀτραπός τις

1. ἑντὸς τῆς διανοίας. The distinction of the Republic between νοῦς and διάνοια is not drawn here, since for our present purpose it is unnecessary.

7. ἀληθείας καὶ φρονήσεις] ἀληθεία is objective truth, φρονήσεις the mental πάθημα which apprehends it; cf. Republic 511 B.

13. ὄσπερ ἀτραπός] Olympiodorus insists that this refers to a Pythagorean maxim φεύγει τὰς λεωφόρους, whereby he has largely contributed to the perplexity of this passage. I believe ἀτραπός properly means not so much a byway as a short cut: what then is this short cut? We are here drawing an inference ἐκ πάντων τοῦτων, i.e. from the various considerations which induce the philosopher to withdraw his soul from communion with the body. Now to this state of separation, towards which the philosopher struggles during life by a long and tedious process, there is but one short cut, namely death; which therefore I hold with Schleiermacher is meant by the ἀτραπός. So far then we get a perfectly good sense: 'the inference which genuine philosophers will draw from the foregoing considerations is this: it seems that death is a short cut to the goal of our life's endeavour'. But what of metá τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ οἰκέτει which in the mss. follow ἐκφέρειν? The unmeaning superfluity and intolerable clumsiness of this addition surely ought not to be laid to the charge of Plato. A glance at the notes of the various editors is enough to show the hopelessness of extracting any sense from the phrase as it stands in the texts. Again, as I think, the acuteness of Schleiermacher has solved the difficulty. If, as he proposes, we place the words after ἔχομεν, they are perfectly appropriate and restore the balance of the sentence, which will then run 'it seems that a kind of short cut brings us to our goal; because, so long as we have the body as a partner with the reason in our search for truth, and our soul is mixed up with this plague, we shall never fully attain the object of our desires'. Cf. 65 ἐ μήτε τὴν ὅψιν παρατιθέμενον ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὲς ἄλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφέλκον μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. As evidence of confusion in the mss. it may be noted that the position of ἡμᾶς varies; on which account Hermann brackets it. Possibly we should translate τοῦ λόγου 'our theory', not 'reason', because in the latter sense Plato usually says μετὰ λόγου, not μετὰ τοῦ λόγου: cf. Timaeus 28 A, Protagoras 324 B. But in Timaeus 70 A we have τοῦ λόγου καθήκον. I still feel doubtful whether some words have not fallen out:
65

67]

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

65

έκφερεν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἐξ ἀν τὸ σῶμα ἔχομεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεπεριμένη ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτὲ κτησάμεθα ἵκανος οὐδ' ἐπιθυμοῦμεν φαμέν δὲ τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς ἔτι δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσουσι, 5 ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμᾶς τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρῶτον δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦμι καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπτεσθαι ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι υπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμου καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδέν ἄλλο παρέχει ἡ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἰ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ

67 αὐτή καθ' αὕτην ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσται χωρίς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' ὦ, καὶ ἐν ὑπ' ἀν ἡμῖν, οὐτός, ὡς ἐστε, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδεῖναι, ἐὰν δὲ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνοῦμεν, ὥς τι μὴ πάσα αὐτή, μηδὲ ἀνατιμπλώμεθα τῆς τοῦτον ἀτρὰτος seems to require definition; and possibly the misplaced phrase extruded something like σὺ δάνατος afer ἐκφέρεων. For the use of ἐκφέρεων Heindorf quotes Soph. Αἰ. 7: and somewhat similar is the use of the passive in Cratylus 386 Λ. 5. διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν] Compare Timaeus 43 Β—44 Λ. 9. οὐδὲ φρονήσαι.] This, as indicated by τὸ λεγόμενον, was no doubt a common phrase, to which Plato has given a turn of his own. Wyttenbach observes 'nondum satis cognitum, ὥς ἀληθῶς et item τῷ ὄντι citatis locis addi'. He might have added that Plato uses these words when he is giving the popular phrase a deeper meaning, as here and in Phaedrus 256 Β τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς 'Ολιμπιακῶν. 11. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν] cf. Republic 373 Μ. 20. αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα] 'the realities of things', i.e. the ideas. For this use of πράγματα compare 99 Β βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα.
1. ὁ θεὸς] Z. and St. add αὐτὸς.
3. μετὰ τοιούτων] sc. καθαρῶν. I take this to be neuter; i.e. the contents of the ideal world. Cf. Ἁλεάτης 249 c πρὸς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος αἰεὶστι μνήμη πρὸς οὐσίαν τοῦ ὅθεν ἐστι.
4. [τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἵσως τὸ ἄλληθες] I have bracketed these words, which I believe to be a mere gloss on εἰλαθμεῖν, derived from 66 β φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἄλληθες.
5. μὴ καθαρῶ] 'for I doubt it is not lawful for the impure to reach the pure'.

67 β—68 β, c. xii. So then he will meet death with a good heart who has purified his soul by withdrawing her from contact with the body and accustoming her to dwell apart by herself; for death is the consummation of her release from body. Were it not strange if the wise man shrank from that which all his life long he sought; freedom from his foe the body, and fruition of wisdom his love? Shall a man meet death gladly in hope of reunion with some earthly love, and for the sake of his divine love shall he fear to die?
20. ἐκλαυμένη] notice the present: 'working out her deliverance'.
ὁσπερ δεσμῶν] Z. has ἐκ δεσμῶν.
23. μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι] 'chiefly, nay only, the philosophers'.
σόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἥ οὗ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἰ ᾗ ἀνδρὰ παρασκευάζονθ᾽ ἐκατοντὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὑπὸ ἐγχυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι ὄντως ἥν, καὶ πετός ἁκοντος αὐτῶ τοῦτον ἁγανακτεῖν; [οὐ γελοῖον;] Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ; Τῷ ὄντι ᾗρα, ἐφη, ὁ Σύμμα, οἱ ἀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν μελετώσει, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ᾗκιστα αὐτῶς ἀνθρώπων φοβερῶν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκότει. ἐπὶ γὰρ διαβέβληται μὲν πανταχῷ τῷ σώματί, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμούσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τοῦτον δὴ γνωμομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἁγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἁλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἁσμενοί εἰκείσε ὑοιεν, Ῥ ἀφικομένοι ἔπλις ἑστίν 10 68 οὐ δια βίου ἦρων τυχεῖν—ἠρων ἰ ἐροῦσεως ὤ τε διεβέβλητο, τοῦτον ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτῶς; ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νεῶν ἀποθανόντων πολλοῖ δὴ ἐκοντες ἥθελσαν εἰς" Ἀιδοὺ ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενου τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ἔψε- δαί τε ἐκεῖ δὲν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνεσθαί' φρονίσεως δὲ ἁρα 15 τής τῷ ὄντι ἥρων, καὶ λαβῶν σφόντα τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγῳ ἐν ἂ "Αἶδον, ἀγανακτῆσει τε ἀποθνήσκοι καὶ οὐχ ἄσμενος εἰσών αὐτός; οἰσθαί γε χρῆ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἦ, δέ ἐταίρε, φιλόσοφος' σφόντα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταύτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονίσει ἄλλῳ γε ἦ εἰκεί. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ὄντως ἐχεῖ, ὅπερ ἀρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἁλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τῷ θίανατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλῇ μέντοι νη Δία, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

/ XIII. Οὐκοῦν ἰκανὸν σοι τεκμήριον, ἐφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἂν

I follow Schanz in adopting δὲ, since the vulgate gives a somewhat ill-balanced sentence: thus we may translate, 'if they are at feud with the body on every issue and desire to keep the soul to herself, then, should they fear and fret on the attainment of this object, were it not the height of perversity, not to go thither with gladness, where on their arrival they hope to possess that which they loved all their life long?' Z. and St. retain δὲ.

21. ὅπερ ἀρτι ἔλεγον] referring to οὗ πολλὴ ἂν ἁλογία εἴη.

68 b—69 e, c. xiii. Therefore the philosopher alone is truly brave and temperate. The courage and temperament of the multitude is spurious: for they endure evils only to avoid greater evils, they forego pleasures only that they may enjoy greater pleasures; thus fear is the source of their courage, indulgence the source of their temperance. But the fount of all real virtue is wisdom: this is the only true currency; virtues that arise from balancing pleasure against pleasure and pain against pain, apart from wisdom, are worthless and slavish. Virtue is the purification of the soul; the true philosopher is he whose soul is purified and initiated into the holy mysteries of wisdom, and he it is who shall dwell with the gods in the other world. Such is the defence of Sokrates.
3. philochrēmatos καὶ φιλότιμος] Cf. 82 c: these correspond to the ὁλουργικὸς and πτυκοκρατικὸς anhē of Republican IX.

5. ἡ ὠνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία] The philosopher faces death with calmness and abstains from bodily indulgence; therefore he is courageous and temperate even in the popular sense, although his courage and temperance arise from a widely different source to that of the vulgar. τῶν οὗτω διακεκυμένων, i.e. the character described in the preceding chapter, τὸς τῷ σώματι διαβεβλημένους.

10. ἔθελεις] Z. has ἔθελησεις.

15. τῷ δειδείναι ἄρα καὶ δεῖ] Schanz well compares 78 B τῷ μὲν συνεθέντει τε καὶ συνθετῷ.

24. ἄλλων ἠδονῶν] Schanz brackets ἄλλων, which, he says, is omitted in the citation of this passage by Iamblichos. I think however it is wanted.

26. πρὸς ἀρετὴν] 'in respect to virtue': the preposition is not used in quite the same sense as in the words that follow.
2. "καὶ τοῦτο μὲν], 'and that all that is bought for this and with this—that and that alone is in reality, whether it be fortitude or temperance or justice; and in a word that true virtue only exists when accompanied by wisdom'.

COPE, μετὰ τοῦτον—'along with this': it is the presence of φρόνησις which gives all virtue its value. If we press the metaphor too hard, it breaks down; for money is of value only for the sake of what it can buy. Plato however merely means that φρόνησις is the only true currency; all else is base coin.

4. Ἀληθὴς ἁρέτη ἦν] I have followed Schanz, after Heindorf, in adding ἦν after ἁρέτη, although it is not in B, and is not absolutely required. But the ἦν of CD is in favour of it, and it certainly improves the sentence. St. omits it.

5. μετὰ φρονήσεως] The true nature of the philosophic ἁρέτη can only be understood by studying the latter part of the sixth book of the Republic. φρόνησις is cognition of the truth, that is, of the αὐτὸ ἁγαθόν. Plato found his escape from utilitarianism by identifying the source of morality with the source of existence; his ethics are the outcome of his ontology. All things are good in so far as they are like the idea of the good; therefore to him that would be really good knowledge of the idea is indispensable. With the conception of ἁρέτη in this passage compare the definition in Republic 442 B καὶ ἁρδεῖον δὴ, ὥσπερ τῷ μέρει καλώμενον ἐνα ἔκαστῳ, ὅταν αὐτῶν τὸ θύμοι δὲς διασώ̂γη διὰ τὸ λυπῶν καὶ ἰδονῶν τὸ ὕπο τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθὲν δεινὸν καὶ μη.

7. σκιαγραφία] 'a rough sketch'. σκιαγραφία was a kind of painting meant to produce its effect at a distance and not to be inspected close at hand: see Thales 208 E ἑπείδη ἐγγὺς ὀφθήσεται, ἵνα ἐνθαρρύνῃ τὸν λαόν ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν. Compare Republic 523 b. From Aristotle rhetorics III xii 1414 b 8 it seems to have been a sort of scene-painting, as Mr Cope translates it: ἦν μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἐγκλημα τῆς σκιαγραφίας: ὅσον γὰρ ἄν πλεῖον ἢ ὁ δράκος, πορρωτέρος ἢ θέα, διὰ τὰ ἀκριβή περίπληξα καὶ χεῖρον φαίνεται ἐν ἄμφόσιστοις. Cf. σκιαγραφία, Δ xxix 1024 b 23 τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶ μὲν ὅσα, πέρικες μὲντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οὰ οὰ οὰ ὅσα ἢ μὴ ὅσα, οὖν ἢ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνυπνυμα ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃν ἐμποτες τῆς φαντασίας. The meaning therefore is that on a superficial view the popular virtue seems identical with the philosophic, but on closer examination is found to fall far short of it.

8. ἀνδραπαθοῦς] cf. Republic 430 b δοκεῖς μοι ἂν ὅσον δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονέναι τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ ἀνδραπαθοῦς οὕτε πάνω τόμων ἡγεσιά διὸ τε τι ἡ ἀνδρεία καλεῖ. Olympiodorus saus καλεῖ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων τὰς μὲν φυσικὰς ἁρέτας ἀνδραπαθοῦς, ὡς καὶ ἀν-
οὔδεν ὑγίες οὔθ ἀληθῆς ἔχῃ, τὸ δὲ ἀληθῆς τῷ ὄντι ἢ καθαρὸς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σοφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρῶς τις ἔχῃ. καὶ κινδυνεύονσι καὶ οἱ τίς τελεταί ἥμιν οὔτωι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαίνει εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅσ ἀκόμη καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς "Δίον ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κεῖσεται, δὲ καθαραμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφίκμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκίσθησι. εἰσιν γὰρ δὴ, ὅς φασὶν ὁ περὶ τάς τελεταῖς, παρθένοφόρου μὲν πολλοὶ, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι' οὔτοι δὲ εἰσίν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ή οἱ τοῖς περίκοκτοις ὑπὸ ὑβόμα καὶ ἐν οὕσσαν ὡς ἐφο. ἔφη, ὃ Σμυρνία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὃς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείποντι καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις οὐ χαλεπῶς φέροι οὐδ' ἀγανάκτω, ἤγομενοι καὶ οὔτε οὔτων ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἐν ἄγαθοις ἑντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις [τοὺς δὲ πολλοὶς ἀπιστικᾶν παρέχει] εἰ τοι ὑμῖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερος εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ή τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δικασταῖς, εὖ ἀν ἔχοι.
well, replies Kebes, if we were sure that death did no more than release the soul from her bodily prison. But how do we know that on quitting the body she does not vanish away like a breath? We need some strong assurance that the soul has a conscious and intelligent existence after death. True, says Sokrates, and no more fitting subject of discourse could be found for one so near to death as I am.

Thus we distinctly see that the question of the immortality of the soul turns up, not as the main subject of the dialogue, but as arising out of the principal thesis.

3. **μὴ ἐπειδὴν** Various devices have been resorted to by several editors to avoid the intolerably harsh asyndeton in this sentence. The mildest remedy is that of Heindorf, who puts a comma after τοῦ σώματος, thus joining ἀπαλλαττομένη with the previous clause. But it seems to me that we cannot divorce ἀπαλλαττομένη and ἐκβαίνουσα. Schanz brackets οὐκήτα...οὐδαμοῦ ἦν, the last words closely resembling οὐδαμοῦ ἦν just above and being repeated verbatim at 84 E. But this subsequent repetition seems really in their favour, where Sokrates is expressly referring to the apprehension which is uttered here and which then seems to have been lulled to rest. Moreover if these words are omitted the rhythm of the sentence halts lamentably. I agree with Hirschig in suspecting διαφθείρηται to be the intruders: the words are superfluous and suspiciously like a gloss.

12. **παραμυθίας** 'reassurance'. Cf. 115 D ταῦτ' ὅτι δοκό ἄρτι ἄλλοις λέγειν, παραμυθίαμεν ἰμα μὲν ὑμᾶς ἰμα δ' ἐμαυτῶν. And see Euthydemus 290 A, Laws 730 A, 773 E.

**ὡς ἐστὶν ἢ ἢ ψυχή**] Note that there are two distinct propositions to be proved, (1) that the soul exists in Hades, (2) that she has faculties and intelligence.

18. **κωμῳδιστοῦς** Notwithstanding the friendly treatment of Aristophanes in the Symposium we see in Apology 18 b foll. how deeply Plato resented the attacks
made by the comedians upon Sokrates: cf. especially the reference to the Clouds in 19 c.

1. ἀδολεσχώ] Eupolis, quoted by Olympiodoros, calls Sokrates τῶν πτωχῶν ἀδολέσχων, and no doubt it was a favourite epithet with the comic poets. Plato has adopted the word, apparently in sheer defiance; and wherever ἀδολεσχεῖν, ἀδολέσχης, ἀδολεσχία occur in the dialogues, we may be sure the term is applied to the genuine philosopher. A very notable instance is Sophist 225 D, where in seeking the sophist we stumble upon somebody very like Sokrates: compare too Theaetetus 195 B, C, Phaedrus 269 E (where see Dr Thompson’s admirable note), Cratylus 401 B, Parmenides 135 D, Republic 488 E, Politicus 299 E. The strict meaning of the word is fairly given in ὦ περὶ προσηκόντων τῶν λόγων ποιοῦμαι.

70 C—72 D, cc. xv—xvii. Tradition says that the souls of the dead come back from Hades and live again on earth. That this belief is reasonable we may argue in the following way. All nature shows the generation of opposite from opposite; thus greater arises from less, worse from better, swifter from slower. And between each of such pairs of opposites there are two processes, one in either direction; as between greater and less are increase and decrease, and similar processes between every other pair. Therefore since life and death are such a pair of opposites, we shall expect to find two similar processes between the living and the dead. We see one such process take place before our eyes; the living pass over to the dead: if then nature’s work is not here left incomplete, there must be the other process that we do not see, and the dead pass over to the living. A yet stronger confirmation is this: did all things travel in one direction and were there no return, in the end all living things would die and remain dead, and life would be swallowed up in death. But if it be true that souls return again from the dead, they must be somewhere after their departure from the body; for certainly if they perished utterly, they could return again no more.

We have here one half of the first stage of the argument, which is complemented by the inference from reminiscence that follows. It is true, this argument of ἀνταπόδοσις implies the antenatal existence of the soul, but it is used mainly as evidence of her existence after death. Note also that it proves ὃς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν Ἀιδοῦ, not ὃς ὄνων καὶ φρύνης ἔχει.

4. παλαιὸς μὲν ὦν ἔστι τις λόγος] Herodotus ii 123 states that the Egyptians believed in the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and adds: τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ Ἑλλήνων ἐχθρῶμεν, οὶ μὲν πρῶτεροι οὶ δὲ νῦστεροι, ὡς ἰδίων ἐστὶν ἐν εἰς τῶν εἰσίν τα αὐτὰ πιθεῖν τὰ γράφαμα. He doubtless refers, as Grote says, to the Orphic and Pythagorean sects; to whom may be added Empedolkes.
taut' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὑντὶ φανερῷ γίγνεται ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ λεγόμεναι ἐκ τῶν τεθνεωτῶν' εἰ δὲ μὴ ἂστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν τοις δέοι λόγου. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τούς κατ' αὐθρώπους, ἢ δ' ὃς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βουλεῖ ρᾴν μαθεῖν, ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ σώματα πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην τὸ ὀσπέρ ἠκεί γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων ἰδιωμεν, ἢρ ὀντωσί γίγνεται τὸ πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοι τυχ العراقي ὅν τοιοῦτον τι, οὗ τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀἄδικο, καὶ ἄλλα ὑπὸ μυρία ὀρῶν ἠκεί. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψόμεθα, ἃρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοι ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτῷ γίγνεται ἁπλή ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίον. οἷον οὗ ταῖς μεῖζον τι γίγνεται, ἀνάγκη

5. ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ ἐκ τῶν πάντων καὶ φυτῶν] It is true, as Olympiodoros remarks, that we cannot from this particular sentence infer τὸν Πλάτωνα πάσαν ψυχὴν ἄθαναταίσεως. But since Olympia implies that Plato did not hold all soul to be immortal, it may be as well to point out that he did; cf. Phaedrus 245 c. Moreover a glance at any passage treating of metempsychosis (e.g. Phaedrus 249 b) will show us that Plato was not so irrational as to deny immortality to the souls of beasts, while conceding it to those of men; and Timaeus 77 A foll. proves that he was not so unscientific as to draw a hard and fast line between animal and vegetable life.

In the present passage Plato appeals to the uniformity of nature. If the presence of a given condition in any of the γεγένηται is the result of a γένεσις, it must be a γένεσις from the opposite condition, where such an opposite exists: if a thing has become cold it must have been warm and so forth. We observe moreover that in all instances there exist γένεσεις in both directions, whence we infer that alternation is a law of nature. And since we see that this law is in force in all cases which fall under our experience, it is fair to assume that it is in force in all cases where our experience fails us. Accordingly when between a pair of opposites we observe one γένεσις occurring, while the other γένεσις is from the nature of things beyond our observation, we may infer that the latter also occurs though we cannot perceive it.

II. τούτῳ ἐναντίῳ] I see no necessity to read αὐτῷ with Z. from Baiter's conjecture.

μεῖζον] The use of the comparative throughout denotes that the condition is the result of a γένεσις. We shall presently see the application of this. The positive, in such terms as μέγα—σμικρὸν, παχὺ—βραδύ, though these all express relations, implies no self-regarding relation. We must therefore use the comparative to denote a relation between two successive conditions of the same object. But any positive which necessarily implied a relation of one and the same object to itself in another condition would answer just the same purpose as the comparative. Such a positive we actually find in the word τεθνηκός, which logically implies ἐν ως as a previous condition of the object. Therefore whatever generalisation we establish between μεῖζον—εὐπτων, ὕπαττον—βραδύτερον &c., holds good also of ἐν ως and τεθνηκός. And since we affirm that between every pair of these comparatives two γένεσεις take place, therefore between ἐν ως and τεθνηκός, besides the γένεσις that we see, viz. ἀποθνήσκειν, there must be another γένεσις that we do not see, viz. ἀφαιρεσκεσθαι;
if we are to suppose that the operation of nature is uniform. The comparatives in fact show under what circumstances γενέσεις take place, i.e. between opposite conditions of the same thing. 14. καὶ εἰ μῆ] i.e. the processes exist, even in those cases where we have no names to describe them. The argument is that were there no alternation of processes we should have all things at last stationary on one side or the other.

16. εἰς εἰκατέρου] Schanz brackets these words: they are not indeed necessary but the pleonasm seems to me Platonic, and their omission seriously impairs the rhythm.

22. ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, ἐρῶ] Sokrates pursues the same plan in 105 b foll. καὶ μῆ μου δ ἄν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνον, ἀλλὰ μμούμενος ἔρε.
2. **Εκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων**] It is necessary to remember the exact sense of the two opposites, according to the definition given in 64 c καὶ εἶναι τούτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρίς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀσωμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγέσαιν αὐτὴν καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι. ζωὴ then is applied to soul and body united, τεθνηκός to soul and body asunder. A very similar use of the word ζωὴ is to be found in Soph. Oed. Col. 999, οὐς ἐγὼ οὐδὲ τὴν σαρκίν | ψυχήν δὲ σώμαν ἀντιποικίαν ἔμοι. The soul of Laios is certainly not regarded as extinct, therefore ζωὴν can only mean 'if it returned to bodily life'.

12. **καὶ ταύτῃ**] i.e. by demonstration as well as by tradition; cf. 70 c.

14. **ἐδοκεῖ**] 70 D.

18. **ἦ δὲ τοῖνυν οὕτως**] In this chapter we have a statement of the fundamental principle on which not only the foregoing argument but all Plato’s reasoning in favour of immortality is based; viz. that the sum total of spirit is a constant quantity. Plato has seized upon this principle of 'conservation of energy' as the only rational method of defending the indestructibility of soul: he has applied to spirit the axiom which previous philosophers laid down for matter; as Anaxagoras expresses it, γενούσιν χρησίν πάντα οὐδὲν ελάσσω ἐστιν οὐδὲ πλέον ὦ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλέον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα αἰεὶ. Similarly the πύκνωσις καὶ ἀραβιώσις of Anaximenes, the οὐδὲς αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τῶν Ἀρεκλεώτων, the σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις of Empedokles, all implied that γένεσις was not creation out of nothing but a passing from one form into another. Cf. Aristotle *metaφ.* Κ υ 1062 b 23 τὸ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι πάντα δὲ εἶ δέντο, σχεδὸν πάντων ἐστὶν κοινὸν δόμα τῶν περὶ φύσεως.

19. **εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰεί** 'for if there were not a perpetual correspondence between the two in generation, just as if they re-
volved in a circle'. 

Cope. ἀνταποδοίησις is here intransitive, as in Aristotle πέλαγος. xi 347b 32 ὡς δ' ἐκείνῃ χάλαζα, ἐνατὰθα ὡς ἀνταποδίδωσι τὸ ὁμοῦν. Cf. below 72 B. 

1. εὐθεῖά τις] This of course implies that the straight line is finite, i.e. there is not an indefinite quantity of soul in existence, nor can fresh souls be created out of nothing. Plato has taken his metaphor from the δίαλος δρόμος. 

4. τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα] compare Ῥωμ. 245 D ἢ πάντα τὲ οὐρανοῦ πᾶσῶν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήραι καὶ μῆκος αὐθέν ἐχειν ὅθεν κυνηγήται γεινῆται. 

8. πᾶντ' ἂν] I have followed Schanz and others in supplying ἂν. ἀποδείξειν could hardly stand without it, since the subject of φαίνοιτο is different. Z. omits it. 

10. [καθεύδειν] This seems to be a gloss, and it was condemned by Dobree: the editors however retain it. 

12. ὡς πάντα σχῆματα] The ὤμοιομερῆ of Anaxagoras, infinite in number and infinitely divisible, were mixed in formless confusion until νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν. 

16. ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων] i.e. ἐκ τῶν μὴ τεθνεότων, as Heindorf saw. If ἄρα ἦν ἄνωτερον πάντα ἔκατον, so ἔστιν ἀργύρου αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν. 

This is a transcript of a page from a book written in Greek, discussing various philosophical concepts and theories, including Plato's views on eternity, the nature of soul and body, and the distinction between the finite and the infinite. The text includes references to other works and philosophers, such as Aristotle and Anaxagoras.
After these words the mss. have καὶ τὰς μὲν γ’ (or μὲν) ἀγαθὰς ἀμεινὸν εἶναι τὰς δὲ κακὰς κάκιον. The inconsequence of this stupid interpolation is so glaring that I have ejected the clause bodily from the text: its author, whose memory is sounder than his logic, was doubtless prompted by 63 C πολὺ ἀμεινὸν τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἡ τοῖς κακοῖς. The words are retained by Hermann and the Zürich editors, bracketed by Stallbaum and Schanz.

72 E—76 D, cc. xviii—xxi. Kebes observes that another line of argument tends to show that our souls are immortal, the theory that learning is reminiscence. If questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing that the knowledge sought exists in the mind of the respondent; as we see in the case of geometrical truths. For the satisfaction of Simmias Sokrates adds the following demonstration. Reminiscence we define as recalling to mind something we formerly knew but had forgotten. For instance, a lover on seeing a lyre thinks of his beloved who used the lyre; similarly a picture of a lyre or a horse may remind us of a man, a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes, or finally a picture of Simmias may remind us of Simmias himself: so that we see reminiscence may be effected either directly or indirectly. Now if it is effected directly, that is, if the object we perceive is similar to that which it calls to our minds, we cannot fail to notice how far the resemblance is exact. For example: we affirm that there is an idea of equality, which is called to our minds by our perception of sensibles which are equal. That this idea is something distinct from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea of equality no difference of opinion can exist. Now we are to observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, (2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have been acquired before our birth (75 c). Now this of course applies to all ideas as well as to that of equality. Since then we have obtained this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on this ground: if a man knows a thing he can give an account of it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas: it follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose it, and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our souls certainly did not acquire this knowledge during their human life they must have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it.

The argument from ἀνάμνησις proves the existence of the soul before birth; thus supplementing ἀνταπόδοσις which is chiefly used to show her existence after death. Moreover ἀνάμνησις shows, what ἀνταπόδοσις did not, that the soul δύναμιν καὶ φύσιν ἐξεις apart from the body.

4. δυ σῦ εἰσινας] This must not be
memathkénavi ὀ νῦν ἀναμμηνησκόμεθα· τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἣν ποὺ ἥμων ἡ ψυχή πρὶν ἐν τῶδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἰδεί γενέσθαι. 73 ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀδάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἐσκεῖν εἶναι. Ἀλλα, ὁ Ἐφέσιος, ἡ Σεμινίας ἐπολαβών, ποίαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; 5 ὑπόμνησιν μὲν ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παράγετι μέμνημαι. Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφὶ ὁ Ἐφέσιος, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτάμενοι οἱ ἀνθρωποί, εἰάν τις καλὸς ἐρωτᾶ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἢ ἔχει καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐντύγχανεν αὐτῶς ἐπιστήμη ἐνόσα καὶ ὅρθος λόγος, οὐκ ἂν ὀλοί τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τούτῳ ποιήσαι ἐπεὶ τοι ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἀγαθὸν ἥν ἀλλὰ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἑνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἐφὶ, πείθει, ὁ Σεμινίας, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέφτασι δὴ τῇδε πῇ σοι ἂν σκοτουμένῳ συνδόξῃ, ἀπιστείς γὰρ δῆ, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀναμμηνήσει ἐστίν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν σοὶ ἐγὼ, ἡ δ’ ὃς ὁ Σεμινίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τούτῳ, ἐφὶ, δέομαι παθεῖν 15 περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμμηνήσῃ. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεξερήσει λέγειν ἢδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι οὐδὲν μεταν ἦπτον ἀκούομι νῦν, τῇ σφ ἐπεξερήσεις λέγειν. Τῇδ’ ἔγορα, ἡ δ’ ὅς. θ ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἰ τίς τι ἀναμμηνήσηται, δέν αὐτὸν τούτῳ πρότερον ποτε ἐπιστασθαι. Πάνω τῇ ἐφι. Ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ τόδε 20 ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀναμμηνήσει εἶναι; λέγον δὲ τινὰ τρόπον τούδε ἐάν τίς τι [πρότερον]

regarded as true of the historic Sokrates.

7. ἐάν τις καλὸς ἐρωτᾷ] Olymposodoros’ explanation of καλὸς deserves perpetuation: ὁβῶς καὶ Πλάτωνικὸς καὶ μή Περσιατικῶς καὶ μή βραχωμόλοχως. Plato’s views will be best understood by comparing Theadeutus 149 A—151 D with Republic 518 B—D.

9. ποιῆσαι] I have followed Schanz in adopting Hirschig’s emendation. I cannot believe in such a construction as οἷοι τε ποιήσειν, and not a single instance has been adduced in its defence. The fact that κινδυνεῖν sometimes is followed by the future infinitive is quite irrelevant. Z. and St. have ποιηθεῖν.

ἐπεὶ τοι] So Heindorf for ἐπεὶτα. This seems absolutely required by the sense: surely the geometrical demonstrations are meant to furnish an instance of what Kebes has just been saying, not an additional piece of evidence for ἀναμμηνήσεις.

H. Schmidt has much to say against Heindorf and for the vulgate; but the cogency of his argument is not proportionate to its length. ἐπεὶτα is retained by Z. St. and Schanz.

τὰ διαγράμματα] mathematical diagrams. The interrogation of the slave in Λεων 82 B foll. is of course a case in point.

10. κατηγορεῖ] Subject the same as of ἄγγελον. It has been suggested that κατηγορεῖ is impersonal, but there is not a shadow of authority for such a use.

14. παθεῖν] ms. μαθεῖν, which is retained by Wohlrab and defended by Schmidt. But παθεῖν is so much more pointed and the alteration is so slight, that I have followed Schanz and most of the later editors in adopting it. ‘I desire personal experience of the very thing we are talking about.’

21. ἐάν τις τι [πρότερον] It is possible to defend πρότερον, since the percep-
tion must precede the reminiscence. But there is no point in this, and the word seems to have crept in from προτερόν ποτε ἐπιστάσθαι above.

2. ἅλλα καὶ ἑτερον ἐννοήσει[.] This is probably the earliest mention of what has been known since Locke as ‘association of ideas’. Compare Aristotle περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως II 451b 16, where he refines upon the simple classification of Plato (ἄφ' ὄμοιον καὶ ἄνομοιον) by starting the sequence ἄφ' ὄμοιον καὶ ἄνομοιον καὶ τοῦ σώματος: he deals too with the process as an act of volition.

13. ἑπελάθησο] Compare the definition in Lassoς 732 β ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστιν ἑτερον ὑφηγήσεως ἀπολειπόνσης.

16. οὐκόν καί Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα] The order in which these illustrations are arranged seems at first sight strange. For instead of working up from the simpler and more direct cases of association to the more complex, we have, as it were, a descending scale: it is surely more remarkable that the picture of a lyre should remind us of some particular human being than that a picture of Simmias should remind us of the living Simmias. But the explanation is simple, if we remember how Plato intends to apply his analogy. The particulars, by which we are reminded of the ideas, stand in much the same relation to the ideas as the painted Simmias to the real Simmias: hence by this arrangement of his examples Plato emphasises exactly the right form of the analogy. This is one of ten thousand proofs of the astonishing carefulness of Plato’s writing. Also it is worth noticing that although the relation between ideas and particulars is in the Phaedo, as in the Republic, still undefined (see 100 D), this passage distinctly foreshadows the doctrine of ἀληθης, which is evolved in the Philebus and Timaeus.

19. εἶναι μὲν ἄφ' ὄμοιον] as in the
last example of the previous chapter. Reminiscence of the ideas by means of the particulars is ἀνάμνησις ἃφ’ ὄροις.

7. λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην] This does not mean that the knowledge of the idea is derived from the particulars, which is in itself impossible and is contradictory to 75 B: but the knowledge that we possess of the idea is awakened by the perception of the particulars. ἐπιστήμης is the more accurate word used later on. Cf. 74 C τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννοητικὰς τε καὶ εἰληφας. The simile of the aviary in Theaetetus 197 D would not be unapt here: knowledge of the idea is our possession, but it is not actually in our grasp until awakened by ἀνάμνησις.

10. οὐκότει δὲ καὶ τῇδε] The following sentences furnish proof of the independent existence of the idea; in 74 D begins the proof that our knowledge of it must have been prior to our observation of the particulars.

11. τῷ μὲν] So Schanz with B. The ordinary reading is τοτέ μὲν...τοτέ δέ, which Schleiermacher approves on the ground that the defective equality of the particulars appears in their seeming to the same observer now equal now unequal. Prof. Geddes takes the same view: ‘Plato is not reasoning from the variety of judgments among men generally: his argumentation proceeds as if there was but one soul in the universe to hold converse with the outer world’. Surely this is quite unnecessary. The existence of a conflict of opinion is sufficient to establish the difference between the particulars and the idea: in the case of the latter no such conflict does or can exist. τοτέ has inferior ms. support and is clumsy after ἐνιοῦρε.

12. αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα] This very strange phrase has a parallel in Parmenides 129 B εὶ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια τις ἀπέφανεν ἄνωμον γεγυρόμενα ἡ τὰ ἁνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρασάν, ὅμαι, ἢν. In the present passage various explanations have been given: (1) that of Olympiodorus, that the plural represents the idea as thought by several minds; this is adopted by most commentators: (2) that it represents the idea as exemplified in several sets of equal particulars; to this approximates the view of Schneider, that αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα means the separate ideas of equal logs, equal stones &c. But who ever heard of the idea of an equal log? (3) Doedelein supposes that αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα means perfectly equal objects, such as can be conceived but do not exist in nature. But this makes Sokrates ask ‘do things, which ex hypothesi seem to you equal, seem to you unequal?’ besides there is no point in the introduction of these imaginary equals. (4) Heindorf seems to me to come much nearer the
truth. After quoting the Parmenides he adds 'multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatis vel similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe referetur'. When Plato asks 'does the idea of equality seem equal or unequal?' the implied comparison compels him perforce to use the plural; not that he thinks there are more ideas of equality than one, but because to ask whether one thing is equal or unequal is sheer nonsense. He immediately explains the unusual phrase in the following words, 'I mean, does equality ever appear to you inequality?' By the time Plato wrote the Parmenides he had got rid of these unfortunate ideas of relations: for in the passage quoted Sokrates is stating the earlier form of the ideal theory: and probably he there used the plural not without the intention of pointing to the contradiction which such ideas involve. Schleiermacher takes αυτά τα ἰσα to be the particulars; but his explanation is in itself very unsatisfactory and requires an alteration of the text.

2. ταυτά τε τα ἰσα] i.e. the equal particulars.

5. ἐνενοθήκας τε καὶ εἴληφας] 'you have recalled and gained'; see on 73 c.

6. [όυκον ἡ ὁμολογ ὀντος] From the passage enclosed in brackets I have utterly failed to extract any meaning. Plato has just completed his proof that equal particulars carry back our minds to an idea of equality which is distinct from the particulars: next he is about to show that our knowledge of the idea must have been prior to our observation of the particulars. But between these two necessary links in his argument we find interpolated an irrelevant remark to the effect that the process is called ἀνάμνησις whether the object of perception is like or unlike the object of reminiscence. In the present context the repeated definition of ἀνάμνησις is surely pointless; and worse than pointless is the re-introduction of the ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον: for the reminiscence of the idea by means of the particulars is necessarily ἀφ’ ὁμοιον. I am therefore compelled to treat the words down to πάνυ μὲν ὁνιν as an interpolation: a conclusion at which I find Susemihl and Schmidt have also arrived. Stallbaum has an elaborate defence of the words, which might possibly have been more successful had he understood the difficulty. Prof. Geddes (not however on this passage) suggests that particulars may remind us of other ideas besides that to which they belong. But the whole force of the argument comes from the fact that this kind of reminiscence is ἀφ’ ὁμοιον, for in this case alone are we conscious of a defect in the resemblance (74 α); and our consciousness of this defect is our sole warrant for inferring that we must have known the ideas before we perceived the particulars (74 ε).
...words the not, evoteo-Tepw? but as This Oura)9.

TOLOVTOV Mr 10 words the evoteo-Tepw? evoteo-Tepw? etc co TOOV olov rjuas rrepi t<?ov, UTJV 17 etc evoteo-Tepw? Kat 82 is close quality sense, impute elvai, retains it within brackets. 

to to short d/coveiv ISovTes evvorjay, Kat 82 is close quality sense, impute elvai, retains it within brackets. 

1. ὧσπερ αὐτὸ ὧς ἔστιν] St. adds ἵνα, which Z. has within brackets; but the word is absent in the best mss.

2. ἢ ἐνδει τι ἐκεῖνο] 'or does it fall short of the idea, that is of being similar to it'. This is the reading of Schanz, which seems quite satisfactory and is very close to the mss. The common reading is τῷ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, which is excellent sense, but μὴ is almost destitute of authority. Madvig would read ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, 'does there lack anything to that quality of being like': a specimen of Greek composition which one would not rashly impute to Plato.

5. τοιοῦτον εἶναι] The mss. add ἵνα, which is clearly a gloss. Schanz retains it within brackets.

15. ταύτων δὲ πάντα ταύτα λέγω] 'I count all these sensations as the same thing': as is shown by the following sentence; not, as Wagner says, 'I say the same of all these'.

17. πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν] Since all sensuous perceptions do not remind us of equality, Madvig would insert ἵνα after αἰσθήσεσιν, Schanz brackets ἵνα. Against bracketing ἵνα I would urge that it is premature to apply the present argument to all ideas: that is first done in 75 c: while the notion of equals so exclusively engrosses our attention throughout the present chapter that Madvig's insertion seems needless.

22. [ὅτι προθυμεῖται ... φαυλότερα] Schanz following Hirschig brackets these words: Mr Jackson independently takes the same view. The objections to them are
(1) that they are irrelevant and inapposite,
(2) that the use of προθεμείται is most strange. I fully acquiesce in the judgment of these scholars that the clause is an unintelligent gloss upon ἔκεισε.

3. πρὸ τοῦτων] i.e. before our perceptions of sight, hearing, &c.

5. οὐκ ὕπατε χρώματε] ‘if then, having received this knowledge before birth, we were born in possession of it’. As yet Plato is merely putting the case, without expressing an opinion about it: presently we shall find that we were not born possessing it, except in a dormant state. We now go on to apply the results gained for ὑπὸν to all the other ideas.

10. ὃπερ λέγω] just above, ἔμμαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα] ‘on which we stamp the character of essence’. ὃ ἔστι is Plato’s technical term to denote the essentiality of the ideas. Plato never descends to forms like αὐτοκριτρωτός, which are common in Aristotle: he would say αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος.

11. ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ... ἀποκρινόμενοι] i.e. in our dialectical discussions. The conversational method was as distinctive a peculiarity of the form as the ideal theory was of the substance of Plato’s philosophy; and so intimately are the two connected that διαλεκτικῇ, properly ‘the science of dialogue’, means nothing less than ‘the science of ideas’. The Sokratic method of examination was distinctly aimed at obtaining a definition or λόγος of the object in question; and this definition was peculiarly the outcome of the method. Plato, in developing the logical concept into a metaphysical essence, scrupulously preserved the method by which the former was attained.

12. ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῶν] Z. adds εἶναι with some mss.

14. ἐκάστοτε] i.e. ‘and if after receiving it we have not, in every instance of our doing so, forgotten it, we are always born in possession of this knowledge and retain it through life’. I do not think it necessary to insert γεγράμενοι after ἐκάστοτε with Heindorf, although I fully agree with his interpretation. Prof. Geddes’ rendering can hardly stand, and he, rather than Heindorf, seems to have mistaken the argument. ‘If we have’, he says, ‘in all the crises of our history, retained this knowledge’. But Plato does not say ‘if we have retained’, but ‘if we have not forgotten’: and though it is
sense to say ‘if we have retained it in all the crises’, it is not sense to say ‘if we have not forgotten it in all the crises’; since we have forgotten it once for all, and that, as Heindorf says, at our birth. I think in fact that ἐκάστοτε is to be taken in close connexion with λαβόντα: ‘in every instance of our receiving it, we have not forgotten’. (Prof. Geddes is also scarcely accurate in saying that ἐπιστήμη is ἀνάμνησις: Plato says μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις, which is another thing.) The perfect ἐπιλεξεμέθα, as Wohlrab rightly observes, shows that Plato still expresses no opinion.

5. περὶ ταύτα] This reading seems necessary, although αὐτά has stronger ms. authority. ταύτα means the objects of sense, in antithesis to ἔκεινας. Wohlrab retains αὐτά but does not inform us how he proposes to make sense of it.

7. οἰκεῖαν] ‘a knowledge that is already ours’.

9. ἐφάνη] in 73 C.

10. ἔτερον τι ἀπὸ τοῦτον] ‘to derive from this a conception of something different that he had forgotten, with which this was associated, whether unlike or like’. COPE. ὁ refers to ἕτερον τι ὃ ἐπεδέληστο, τοῦτο τοῦ τούτου. I see no sufficient reason for bracketing the second ὁ with Schanz. Here there is nothing amiss in the introduction of the ὅμως and ἀνάμνησις, for Plato is expressly repeating the statement in 73 C.

20. δούναι λόγον] ‘to give an account’; that is an accurate description of the thing defined, marking its logical differentia. A passage quoted by Wohlrab, Republic 534 B, explains the phrase very well: ἐὰν καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ’ ὅσον ἠ μὴ ἔχει λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόμας, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τοῦτον οὖ ἰδέας ἔχει; where we may translate λόγον τῆς οὐσίας ‘the
principle of its being'. Compare alsoRepublic 621 A, where the souls that are on the point of returning to earth must drink of the river Ameles. In comparing this passage, as Prof. Geddes does, with Wordsworth's famous ode, it ought not to be left out of sight that there is a fundamental opposition between them. According to Wordsworth we are born with the antenatal radiance clinging about us and spend our lives in gradually losing it; according to Plato we lose the vision at birth and spend our lives in gradually recovering it.

76 D—77 B, c. xxii. The outcome of the preceding argument is this: the pre-existence of our souls is inseparably bound up with the existence of ideas and the former stands or falls with the latter. Simmias heartily assents to this and affirms his unshaken conviction that the ideas do exist and consequently that our souls existed before our birth.

19. [υπάρχουσαν πρότερον] Mr Jack-
son, in the paper before mentioned, maintains that the words from ὑπάρχονσαν to ἀναγκαῖον ὠντος are spurious. In this opinion I concur for the following reasons: (1) the clause ὑπάρχονσαν πρῶτον ἀνευ-ρισκόντες ἡμετέραν ὠδαν would seem just the same kind of clumsy misapplication of Plato's phraseology of which we have already seen too much: Plato says (75 e) that the knowledge of the ideas is our own; but where does he say that the ideas themselves are our own, and what is the sense of saying so? (2) ταῦτα ἐκεῖνη ἀπεικάζομεν is a pointless repetition of ἐπὶ ταῦτην ἀναφέρομεν: (3) ταῦτα there means sensibles; presently ταῦτα three times refers to the ideas. Wytenbach, on this very ground, proposes to read αὐτὴ ἔστιν: (4) though the repetition of ὠντος may be defended, it certainly sounds very awkward here. Accordingly I have bracketed the words. With this omission the sentence will stand: 'if these ideas exist which are for ever on our lips, absolute beauty and goodness and all other absolute essence, and if it is to this essence that we refer all our sense-perceptions, as this surely exists, so surely did our soul exist before our birth'. εἶναι will then depend upon ὠντος ἔχει.

2. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα] 'if these ideas do not exist'; not as some take it, 'if this is not so'. Cf. below ἵνα ἀνάγκη ταῦτα τε ἐστιν.

5. εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε] i.e. if the ideas do not exist, neither did our souls exist before birth.

6. εἰς καλόν γε] 'And our argument has found an excellent refuge in the position that the pre-existence of our soul rests on the same assurance as the existence of the ideas'. Wagner should not have supplied καῦρον with καλόν, which is explained by the sentence in apposition, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίον εἶναι.

8. ἤν σὺ νῦν λέγεις] νῦν is omitted in some mss. and Schanz brackets it.

11. καὶ, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ικανοὶ ἀποδέδεικται] This reading has the best authority, and Schanz defends the parenthetical use of ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ by citing 108 b, Protagoras 314 c, Menexenus 236 b. Z. and St. give ἐμοὶ ικανῶς ἀποδεδεικται.

77 B—D, c. xxiii. But, continues Simmias, reminiscence only proves that our soul existed before entering into a human body: it does not prove that the soul
XXIII. *Ei μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδῶν ἄποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ
αὐτῶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄποδεδειξθαί, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνεσθηκεν
ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὡς ποῖ ἄποθνήσκοιτος
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδασμέναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτὴ τοῦ εἶναι τούτῳ
tέλος γ', τι γὰρ κωλύει γένισθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ἐξυπόστασθαι 5
ἀμόθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σώμα ἄφικέσθαι,
ἐπειδῶν δὲ ἄφικηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτῳ, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν
καὶ τελευτάν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; Ἐδ' λέγεις, ἐφι, ὁ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης.
φαίνεται γὰρ ὡσπερ ἦμισυ ἄποδεδειξθαί οὐ δει, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι
ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή δὲ δὲ προσποδειξία ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδῶν 10
ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἢττον ἔσται ὅ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ
ἀπάδειξις ἔχειν. 'Αποδέδεικται μὲν, ἐφι, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης,
ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθείναι τούτων τε τῶν λόγων εἰς
ταυτόν καὶ δώ πρὸ τούτων ὀμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν
ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστων μὲν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη 15
δ' δὲ αὐτὴ εἰς τὸ ξῆν ιούστη τε καὶ γιγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ
θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ
ἐπειδῶν ἄποθάνη εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δει αὐθίς αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἄπο-
δεδεικται μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.

on leaving the body may not be dissipated and perish. Kebes agrees that
immortality is only half proved. Sokrates replies that the other half is sup-
plied by the argument from alternation of opposites, which proved that the soul
must exist after death.

4. διασκεδασμέναι] The indicative
can hardly be right here because we have
γ' in the next clause, and the change of
mood would be meaningless. A parallel
form is the optative πηγυνότο in 118 A. I
do not see on what ground the accentua-
tion διασκεδασμέναι (as subjunctive) and
πηγυνότο can be defended, since the forms
are clearly contractions. Z. and St. have
dιασκεδάνυμαι.

5. τὶ γὰρ κωλύει] 'What reason is
there why she should not come into being
and union from somewhere or other and
exist before she enters a human frame, but
when she has entered one and is in act of
leaving it, she should not at that moment
herself come to an end and perish?'

6. ἀμόθεν ποθὲν] This is Bekker's
correction of ἄλλοθεν, which is retained
by Z. and St.

13. εἰ θέλετε συνθείναι] I do not un-
derstand how, in the face of this express
statement of Plato's, some have regarded
ἀνταπόδοσις and ἀνάμνησις as two distinct
demonstrations of immortality. As he
says, they are two halves of a demonstra-
tion; one showing the pre-existence, the
other the after-existence of the soul.

77 D—78 B, c. xxiv. Yet, says Sok-
krates, you and Siminas seem still to
have a lurking fear lest the soul on leaving
the body be scattered to the winds. Per-
haps, replies Kebes, there is a child
within us that still needs to be soothed;
and soon there will be no man living who
can soothe it. Do not despair, says Sok-
krates; wide is Hellas and wider is the
world; you must spare neither pains nor
riches to find such a man, not omitting to
search among yourselves.
XXIV. "Ομως δε μοι δοκεις συ τε και Σιμμιας ήδεως αν και τοπου διαπραγματευσασθαι τον λόγον έτι μάλλον, καὶ δεδειναι το των παίδων, μη ος ἀληθῶς ο άνεμος αυτην éκβαινοσαι ἐκ του σώματος διαφυς και διασκεδάζωνωσι, ἀλλωσ τε και οταν τύχῃ τις E μη εν νηνεμια ἀλλ' εν μεγάλῳ τινι πνευματι ἀποθησκων, και ο Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας 'Ως δεδιότων, ἐφη, ο Σώκρατες, πειρῳ ἀναπειθεῖν μάλλον δὲ μη ὡς ήμως δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ίασω εν τις και ἐν ήμως παϊς, ὅστις τα τοιαύτα φοβεῖται τοπου οὐν πειρώμεθα πειθεῖν μη δεδειναι τον βάιατων ὁμστε τα μορμολύκεια. Ἀλλα τοιοῦτον ἐκδική, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αυτω ἐκάστης ἁμέας, ἔως ἃν ἐξεπάσητε. Πόθεν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατος, των τοιουτων ἁγαθων 78 ἐπιδόν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδῆ σὺ, ἐφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλη μὲν ἡ Ἔλλας, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, εν ἡ ἐνεισι που ἁγαθοι νηρες, πολλα δὲ και τα των βαρβάρων γένη, οὐς πάντας χρη διερευνᾶσθαι ξητοῦντας τοιουτον ἐπιγρον, μήτε χρηματων φειδυμένους μήτε πόιων, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι <ἀν> ἀναγκαιότερον ἀναλισκοίται χρήματα. Ζητεὶν

2. διαπραγματεύσασθαι τον λόγον ἐτι μάλλον] I think the misgivings of Simmias and Kebs arise thus. We have indeed seen that the recurrence of soul is a law of nature; but we are not sufficiently acquainted with the laws of nature and the conditions of their interaction to be perfectly sure how they will work in every particular case. So we are still haunted by the doubt that a soul may, under certain circumstances, be dissipated and destroyed; this doubt can only be satisfied by proving that the eternity of soul can be deduced not only from a universal law but from her own inherent nature. Next ἀνάμνησις has placed the eternity of soul on the same footing of assurance as the existence of the ideas: but this is done indirectly; we desire to be convinced that soul not only has had cognition of the ideas, but that she possesses such an affinity with their nature as will justify us in believing that she shares their attribute of eternity; see introduction § 2.

4. διασκεδάζωνωσιν] Hirschig would read διασκεδαζών. But here the indicative is clearly right. What we fear is, not lest the wind should blow the soul away, but lest it is a fact that it does so.

8. εν ἡμῖν παῖς] 'there is a child within us'; not of course 'among us'.

11. ἐξεπάσητε] 'until you have charmed him out of you'. This reading is due to Heindorf; the old editions and the best mss. have ἔξασθα. Heindorf's admirable emendation is confirmed by one ms.

12. ἐπειδῆ σὺ, ἐφη] For the repetition of ἐφη Wohlrab compares 89 C, 103 C, 118 A.

14. τα των βαρβάρων γένη] Plato's travels had caused him to form a more liberal estimate of barbarian possibilities than was usual in his time. Compare Κόριμμικα 499 C ει τοιν άναρα εις φιλοσοφίαν πόλεις τις ἀνάγκηπεμέλθησα ή γέγονεν εν τῳ ἀπελφῳ τῳ παρελησθεῖ χρόνῳ ή και μνι ἔστιν εν τινι βαρβαρικῶς τότε, πόρρω πον ἐκδον ἐντι της ἡμετέρας ἐτόσως, ή και ἐπείνα γενήσεται, περι τούτον ἐτοιμοι τῳ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, οὐ γέγονεν ή εἰρήμενη πολτεία και ἐστι και γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὕτη ή Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς γένησαι. Cf. Ὥνσιμοσιμ 209 E.

16. ἀν ἀναγκαιότερον] So Schanz with
dé χρῆ καὶ αὐτοῦς μετ' ἀλλήλων ἵσως γὰρ ἀν οὐδεί ῥαδίως εὑροῖτε 
μᾶλλον ὰμῶν δυναμένους τούτῳ ποιεῖν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἐφη,
β ὑπάρξει, ο Κέβης' ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν ἐπανέλθομεν, εἰ σοι ῥόδο-
μένως ἔστιν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥόδομένῳ γε' τῶν γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; 
Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις.

XXV. Οὐκοῦν τοιὸνδε τι, ἢ δ', ὅ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς 
ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτοὺς, τὸ ποίῳ τινι ἁρα προσήκει τούτῳ τὸ πάθος 
πάσχειν τοῦ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδέναι 
μὴ πάθη αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινι <οὐ>· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐ ἐπι-
σκέψασθαι, πότερον ἡ ψυχῆ ἔστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ ιο 
δεδέναι ὑπὲρ τῆσ ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. Ἀρ' 
C οὖν τὸ μὲν συντεθεῖτι τε καὶ συνθέτω ὅντε φύσει-προσήκει τοῦτο 
πάσχειν, διαρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ἢπερ συνετέθη: εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ὅν 
adψυθεῖν, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει ἡμὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῷ

C: ed omit ἄν. Z. and St. give ἄν εὐ-
καριστεὶν with ἐ.

78 B—80 E, cc. xxv—xxix. The question is then, what kind of things are 
liable to dissolution and what are not? and to which class does soul belong? 
That which is composite and consists of 
parts may doubtless be resolved again 
into parts; but if we can discover some-
thing which is composite and without 
parts we may safely affirm that this, if 
anything, is indissoluble. To the class of 
incomposites we should assign whatever 
is constant and changeless; to that of 
composites all that is ever-changing. Now 
this is precisely what constitutes the 
difference between the contents of the 
ideal and of the phenomenal world re-
spectively: the ideas are changeless, 
simple, apprehensible by pure intelli-
gence; phenomena are ever-changing, 
manifest, apprehensible by mere sen-
sation. Let us term the former the in-
visible, the latter the visible world: to 
which sphere shall we assign soul and 
body respectively? (1) the body is visible, 
the soul is invisible: (2) when the soul 
apprehends by means of the bodily 
senses, she deals with the ever-changing 
and is herself filled with confusion and 
uncertainty; when she apprehends by 
herself, she deals with the changeless, 
and her own reflections are constant and 
sure: (3) when soul and body are to-
gether, the soul is mistress, the body is 
servant; and to command is the function 
of the divine, to obey is that of the mortal. 
For these three reasons we decide that 
the affinity of soul is to the divine and 
changeless and indissoluble, the world of 
ideas; that of body to the mortal and 
changeful and dissoluble, the world of 
phenomena. Hence we should infer that 
while the body quickly decays the soul 
is nearly if not quite indissoluble. And 
as even a body that is embalmed lasts 
for an indefinite time, how much more 
enduring then should we expect the soul 
to be?

9. τῷ πολῷ τινι οὐ] οὐ is not in the 
mss. but was supplied by Heindorf. It is 
certainly necessary.

12. καὶ συνθέτω] As Prof. Geddes 
remarks, συνθέτω denotes the state which 
is the result of the process expressed by 
συντεθεῖτι. Wagner wrongly takes φύσει 
with συνθέτω: it belongs to προσήκει.

14. εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ] It is to be noticed 
that the present line of argument aims at 
nothing more than establishing a proba-
āllō; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἑφι, οὔτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Ὁ οὐκον ἄπερ ἂεὶ κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὁσαυτῶς ἔχει, ταύτα μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξίωθετα, ὃ δὲ ἀλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα; 'Εμούη δὲ, ἑφη, ἐπὶ ταύτα ἑφ' ἄπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἢς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ ὃ εἶναι καὶ ἑρωτάτης καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὁσαυτῶς ἂεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταύτα ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ὃ ἐστιν, τὸ ὑπὲρ, μὴ ποτε μεταβολήν καὶ ἴμηνίνων ἐνδέχεται; ἢ ἂεὶ αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ὃ ἐστι, μονοειδές ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὁσαυτῶς κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὖναμη οὐναμῶς ἄλλοισιν οὔθεμιν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἑφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν, ὃ Σώκρατες. Τὴ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν], οἶδον αὐθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἰματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὄντωνοι τοιούτων, ἢ ἵσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνων ὀμοιόμοιων; ἄρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ πάν τούναντίον ἐκείνων οὖτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλληλοις οὐδέποτε, ὃς ἔτος εἴπειν, οὖναμῶς κατὰ ταύτα; Οὔτως, ἑφη ὁ Κέβης οὐδέποτε ὁσαυτῶς

bility that soul is immortal; and as Kebes afterwards points out, it merely shows that soul should be much more durable than body, not that she is inherently eternal. I consider the chief importance of this part of the dialogue to consist in the opening it gives for the objections of Simmias and Kebes. The former brings in a theory of soul which would be fatal to Plato's view, were it not refuted; the latter necessitates the final investigation, to which I conceive the present argument is merely preliminary. At the same time we are here first endeavouring to establish a direct connexion between the soul's nature and that of the ideas.

1. οὐκον ἄπερ ἂεὶ κατὰ ταύτα] Change in any object is the result of transposition, compression, or separation of its parts, or of increase or decrease in their number. Consequently that which has no parts cannot suffer change. All material things have parts, therefore the immaterial objects of reason are alone changeless.

5. ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ] 75 D. ἢς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι 'as whose principle we assign being'. λόγον = its definition, notion. τοῦ εἶναι is descriptive genitive after λόγον. Madvig proposes τοῦ εἶναι, which Schanz adopts: but ms. authority is entirely against him, and there is no real difficulty in the genitive. Here again we have a marked association of the ideal theory with the conversational method.

12. τῶν πολλῶν [καλῶν] καλῶν is an obvious interpolation: we are not concerned merely with beautiful particulars; and presently we have ἢ ἵσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὀμοιόμοιων, 'all the particulars which share the name of the ideas'. The particulars are ὀμοιόμοια as being copies of the ideas: see Sophist 234 B μιμήματα καὶ ὀμοιόμοια τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενοι τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ. Cf. Timaeus 41 C.

15. οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς] 'they hardly ever preserve any constant relation either to themselves or to each other'. This is one of many passages which show that Plato thoroughly accepted the doctrines of Herakleitos and Protagoras so far as regards the material world.

16. οὔτως, ἑφη ὁ Κέβης] Z. and St. have οὔτως αὐ, ἑφη, ταύτα, ὁ Κέβης.
79 ἔχει. Ὥποκοιν τοῦτον μὲν κἀν ἄφαιο κἀν ἰδιοὶ κἀν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν ἀισθούν, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἐχόντων οὐκ ἐστὶν ὅτι ἀν ἄλλω ἐπιλάβοι τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ἄειδὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὀράτα; Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, ἀλήθη λέγεις.

XXVI. Θάμειν οὖν βούλει, ἐφη, δύο εἶδο τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὀρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἄειδὲς; Θάμειν, ἐφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄειδές ἄεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὀρατὸν μιᾶς κατα ταύτα; Καὶ τούτῳ, ἐφη, θάμειν. Φέρε δὴ, ἦ δ’ ὡς, ἄλλο τοῖ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σωμάτι ἔστιν, ἢ τὸ ἄφυ θυκῆ; Οὐδέν ἄλλο, ἐφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὦμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαίμεν ἂν εἴην καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντί, ἐφη, τοῦτο γε ἠπὶ ἰδίλλον, ὧτι τῷ ὀρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχῆ; ὀρατῶν ἢ ἄειδές; Οὐχ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων γε, ὧν ὧν Σώκρατες, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὀρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ οἴει; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὀρατῶν ἢ ἀόρατον εἰναι; Οὐχ ὀρατῶν. 'Αειδές ἄρα; Ναὶ. Ὠμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχῆ σώματος ἔστιν τῷ ἄειδει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὀρατῷ. Πάσα ἀνάγκη, ὧν Σώκρατες.

XXVII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἑλέγομεν, ὧτι ἡ ψυχῆ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρήτηται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τῇ ἀπ’ τοῦ ὄραν ἔτι τῷ σιών αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστίν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σῶματος, τὸ δ’ αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τοῦ—, τότε μὲν ἐλκεται ὑπὸ 20

3. τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ] Cf. Phaedrus 247 c ἄχρωματος τε καὶ ἄσχηματος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία, ὄντως οὐσία, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνῳ θεατή νῦ. See also Timaeus 28 a.

5. θάμειν οὖν βούλει] Z. and St. have εἰ βούλει.

τὸ μὲν ὀρατὸν τὸ δὲ ἄειδές] Compare the division of the universe into ὀρατοῦ and νοητοῦ in Republic 509 D.

8. ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν] 'of ourselves is not one part body, the other soul?' I agree with Heindorf and Stallbaum in taking ἡμῶν αὐτῶν with τὸ μὲν...τὸ δέ. Ast would join it with ἄλλο τι, on account of the reply, οὐδὲν ἄλλο. But why should special emphasis be laid on the exhaustiveness of the division?

15. οὐχ ὀρατῶν] No distinction is intended between οὐχ ὀρατῶν and ἄειδες. Plato has made his division into ὀρατῶν and ἄειδες, and since soul is not ὀρατόν, it is ἄειδές. No doubt the motive which led Plato to choose ἄειδες instead of the direct verbal opposite ὀρατὸν was the etymological connexion of the former with"Αἰδῆς: as if he would say that"Αἰδῆς, far from being the abode of death and nothingness, is the region of true existence alone. That he did connect the words is clear from 80 D, 81 C, in spite of Cratylus 404 B.

17. πάλαι ἑλέγομεν] 65 B foll.

20. τότε μὲν ἐλκεται] 'then she is dragged by the body among things that are never constant, and she herself loses her way and is filled with confusion and dizziness, like one that is drunk; for of such nature are the things that she grasps'. τοιοῦτον = πλανωμένου &c., cf. 58 D. Plato means that when the soul makes her investigations by the aid of the body, she necessarily is concerned with sensible pheriomena; and since these
of stable or sure in them, there is a like want of stability and certainty in her perceptions.

6. "καὶ πέπαυται τ’ εἰς τ’ πλάνον" [she has rest from her wandering, and in dwelling with them is ever constant, since the things that she grasps are constant].

So in Republic 500C it is said of philosophers, εἰς τεταγμένα ἀττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἀπ’ ἑνώτα ὥρμεναι καὶ ἑινόμενοι ὅντ’ ἀδικούντα ὅντ’ ἄδικουμεν ὅπτ’ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἑνώτα, πάντα μικρῶλα τε καὶ ὅ τι μικρίστα ἄρομουνθάλα. For πλάνον compare Parmenides 135E ὅπ’ εἰς ἐν τοῖς ὥρμενοιο ὅπέρ περὶ πάντα τ’ ἐν πλάνῃ ἐπισκοπέων.

8. "τοῦτο αὐτής τὸ πάθημα" [this condition of hers is called wisdom]. Olympiodoros is much exercised as to how φρόνησις can be a πάθημα, how an activity of the soul can be denoted by a passive term. But Aristotle, for whom cognition was emphatically an ἐνέργεια, says, ἀνομία πεντά 429b 13, ἐν δ” ἐστί τὸ νοεῖν ὡσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡ πάσχειν τ’ ἐν εἴῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἡ τι τοιοῦτον ἑτερον. I think however that πάθημα here means nothing more than condition: compare Republic 511D, where the term παθήματα is applied to the four mental states corresponding to the four segments of the line.

12. "ἐκ ταυτής τῆς μεθόδου" [from this way of approaching the question]. μέθοδος is frequently used by Plato for scientific method, especially dialectic: cf. Republic 510B, Politics 286B.

13. ὅλω καὶ παντὶ [Prof. Geddes explains ‘both in the general and in the particular’; which I think is a needless refinement. It is only a strong expression for ‘altogether’ and is not uncommon: see Republic 469C, 527C (with the article), Laws 779B, Cratylus 434A. In Laws 734E we have the reverse order τ’ παντὶ καὶ ὅλω, and in 944C we find ὅλων καὶ τὸ πάν in precisely the same sense. In Lysis 213C is the remarkable phrase ὁρᾶ ἐκ ὅλω τιν ἐξαιτηθείηα;]

16. ὁρᾶ δὲ καὶ τῇς [After showing that the soul resembles the ideas (1) in her invisibility (2) in her affinity to the changeless, we now come to the last piece of evidence: that she is mistress over the body and uses it as a slave. Cf. Timaeus
80 ψυχή καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαί ἢ φύσις προστάτευτε, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ διεσπόζειν’ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸ τὸ πότερον σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοίως τῷ θείῳ εἰναι, καὶ πότερον τῷ θυντῷ; ἢ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θείῳ οὗν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἕγερνονεῖν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θυντῷ ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἑμοίνε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἢ ψυχή έοικεν; ἡ δὲ ἢ σῶμα τῷ θυντῷ. Σκόπει δ’ ἐφί, ὁ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἦμιν εὐμβάλειν, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ αἱδιαλυτῷ καὶ ἄει ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχουσιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοίοτατον εἰναι ψυχήν, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θυντῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ 10 καὶ ἀνοίτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχουσιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοίοτατον αὐτὸν εἰναι σῶμα. ἔχομεν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Ὅνι τί ἔχομεν.

XXIX. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντων ἀρ’ οὖχι σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχή δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν αἵδιαλυτὸ καὶ τοπίστατο. 3 εἰσαὶ ἡ ἐγγύς οἱ τοῦτον; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἔννοεῖς οὖν, ἐφί, ἐπειδάν ἀποθανόν ὁ ἀνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὀρατόν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὀρατῷ κείμενον, δ’ ἢ κεκροῖν καλοῦμεν, δ’ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διάπιπτει, οὐκ εἰσθαὶ τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπεικος συγχων οτιμένει χρόνον, εὖν μὲν τις καὶ χαριστώς ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευ—

34 C γενέοις δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴ προσέρχεα καὶ πρεσβυτέραις ψυχῆς σώματος ὡς δεσπότων καὶ ἀφοῦσαν ἑαυτῶν εὐνεστήσατο.

3. θεῷ...θυντῷ] Below, 80 b, we have the contrast θεῖοι—ἀνθρωπίνωσ: but the antithesis θεοὶ—θυντῶν occurs Timaeus 69 c and d.

10. ὁμοιότατον εἰσαὶ ψυχήν] I have adopted this reading notwithstanding that there is much stronger ms. authority for ψυχήν, which Schanz Z. and St. retain. ψυχή can only be construed by supplying εὐμβάλειν again, which is intolerably harsh. Such instances as Thuleus 55 A and ἀπολλή τις ἀλογία εὐμβάλειν γλυκεσθαι are nothing to the point: such a construction is common enough, but here we have τάδε as the subject of εὐμβαλείν.

11. αὐνότητα] i. e. ‘not the object of intelligence’: a sense which, I believe, αὐνότοσ bears nowhere else; it is however placed beyond doubt by νοητῷ in the opposite catalogue, by which Olympiodoros absurdly understands ‘intelligent’.

16. ἦν οὕτως τοῖς τούτοις] Here is a distinct confession that the foregoing is only an approximate demonstration: we have made out a case of probability, and that is all.

18. καὶ διαπίπτειν] Z. and St. add καὶ διαπνεύσθαι which is found in the citations of Stobaeus and Eusebius, but not in the best mss. Hermann justly says ‘imperie ab anima ad corpus translata esse apparat’.

20. ἔναν μὲν τις] It seems to me that needless difficulty has been raised over this sentence. χαριστῶς ἔχων simply
means 'having his body in a good state', and to this τοιαύτη refers. If the body were in a healthy condition at death and at a healthy age, it would hold out longer, says Plato, against decomposition. Mr Cope, I think, is quite correct in translating: 'if a man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of his life, a very considerable time indeed'. The following sentence συμπεσον ... χρόνον is bracketed by Schanz after Ast. I see no sufficient reason for doing so; the γρο is certainly not very obvious, but may be explained thus, 'nor is this the strongest case,) for if a body is embalmed, it remains nearly whole for an incredible time'. Hirschig brackets ὡσπερ ... ταριχευθέντες: very superfluous. Plato says (1) the body of a healthy man who dies in the prime of life lasts a good while, (2) an Egyptian mummy lasts an indefinite time, (3) even without this some parts of the human frame are almost indestructible.

3. καὶ ἄν σαπήν] i.e. τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα.
7. εἰς "Αἰδών ὡς ἄλθόσω] To Hades rightly named, the abode of the unseen. Cf. Gorgias 493 B.

80 E—81 E, cc. xxix, xxx. We cannot then believe that the soul when she leaves the body is scattered and dispersed; nay, if she departs pure and untainted of the body, because she has never willingly held communion with it during life, she is freed from its follies and passions and reaches the abode of the invisible, where she dwells with the gods for ever. But if she has been the companion of the body, sharing its pleasures and desires and thinking that alone to be real which she can apprehend by it, then she departs tainted and clogged with the material; and in fear of the viewless region, weighed down by her earthly load, she flits about the visible world. Hence it is that ghosts are seen about places of burial; they are such gross spirits as cannot rise from earth, but wander about it, until for their love of the material they once more enter a bodily form.

14. καὶ συνηθροισμενή] Schanz brackets these words, but they are in the best mss., and I see nothing against them. He omits αὐτή εἰς αὐτήν, which words have much slighter ms. support. I have thought it sufficient to bracket them.
81 φούσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνώνει μελετώσα [ῥαδίως]: ἢ οὗ τοῦτο ἄν εἰσὶ μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασι γε. Ούκειον οὔτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὄμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδές ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οὐ τὰ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχας αὐτῇ εὐθαλάμου εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἑρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν 5 ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὡσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὁς ἀληθῶς τῶν λοιπῶν χρόνων μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγοῦσι; οὔτω φῶμεν, ὁ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

B XXX. Οὔτω νῦν Δία, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης. 'Εαν δὲ γε οἷμαι μεμυημένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάσσεται, ἢτε τὸ σώματι 10 ἀεὶ ἔξωσάκα καὶ τούτῳ θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐφόρασα καὶ γεγονημένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ καὶ ἔδοκε, ὡς καὶ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄλλης ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ σωματειδεῖς, οὐ τις ἄν ἄφαιτο καὶ ἴδιοι καὶ πλοῦ καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τα ἀφροδίσια χρῆσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὑμμασι σκότωδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητον δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφὸν καὶ ἀμέτον, 15 τούτῳ δὲ εἰδθεμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὔτω δὴ ἐχοσάνος οἰεὶ τῇ μορφῇ αὐτῆς καθ’ αὐτὴν εἰλικρνή ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐ’ ὀποστιοῦν, ἐφη. 'Αλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε οἷμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματειδοῦς, ὅ αὐτή ἡ ὤμιλα τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἄεὶ ἕξωσάκαι καὶ διὰ τῆς πολλῆς μελετής ἐνεποίησεν ἕξωσάθων; 20

1. ῥαδίως savours of the margin, and I have followed Schanz and Hirschig in bracketing it.
3. διαγοῦσα] I have ventured to follow Heindorf and Hirschig in reading thus. The ms. all have δίαγονον, which most editors retain, but which I cannot believe that Plato wrote. It is idle to quote Thucydides vii 42 § 2: for in the first place it is rash to argue that a construction found in Thucydides is therefore possible in Plato; secondly, it is not a parallel case. When Thucydides says Σιρακοσιοῦ κατάληψις ἐγένετο, and after a subordinate clause resumes with ἔρωτες, the shock is not very great; but that after the regular datives εὐθαλάμου, ἀπηλλαγμένη Plato should end with this ungrammatical διαγοῦσα is quite a different thing. More to the purpose is Prof. Geddes' citation of Phaedrus 241 D, where however Schanz reads λέγων' for λέγων. Not one of the constructions given in Riddell, digest of idioms § 271 foll., at all justifies this, which is not an anacoluthon but a solecism. It has been suggested to connect διαγοῦσα with ἀπέρχεται, but I think this is hardly possible.
5. διειλημμένη] 'interpenetrated'. The notion of this word is the mixture of two substances so that the particles of one are held apart by those of the other. The soul's substance is as it were adulterated by a material alloy. Z. and St. omit καὶ, which is however in the best mss.
6. ἕξωσάτων] 'ingrained'. The soul's perpetual communion with the body has so inseparably blended the material and
the spiritual that they become virtually one nature; hence even when separated from the body she is not yet freed from matter.


5. περὶ ἀ δὴ καὶ ὡφθη] This is an interesting illustration of the manner in which Plato will take some popular belief, as he often takes some popular expression, and fill it with a deeper meaning of his own. In Laws 865 D we find another current opinion about ghosts, here however without any special Platonic turn: that if one man killed another the spirit of the slain wandered about his accustomed haunts, terrifying and tormenting the homicide so long as he remained there.

11. τροφῆς] ‘mode of life’. ἐως ἀν] ‘until by craving after that bodily nature which is their companion they are again confined in a body’. The presence of this material alloy is sufficient to inspire the soul with bodily desires but cannot afford means to gratify them: so that the longing grows more and more intense until the soul is once more confined in her earthly prison.

81 E—82 B, c. xxxi. These souls pass into the bodies of animals whose habits are likest to their former way of life; the sensual into asses, the cruel into wolves and hawks; while they that have lacked philosophy but led humane and harmless lives pass into bees and wasps and ants, or even into the human form again.

With this chapter should be compared the remarkable passage Timaeus 91 D foll. The other principal statements of Plato on metempsychosis are in Timaeus 41 E—42 D, Republic 618 A—620 C, Phaedrus 249 B. Wytenbach has a long and learned note on the subject, dealing chiefly with neoplatonist views.

17. μὴ διευλαβητείνους] ‘who have not taken heed to their ways’.
2. **φαίμην**] So Schanz with the best miss., joining ἄν with ἐναι. Z. and St. φαίμεν.

4. **κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας**] 'according to the peculiar affinities of their pursuits'. Cf. *Timaeus* 42 C κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τῶν τρόπων γενέσεως.

6. **δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν**] As to this popular and social virtue see on 69 B and appendix I. In *Republic* 619 C we find that this class of people are in great danger of making a bad choice at the ἀρέσις ὑπὸ. One who chose a tyrant's life was τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὄφραν ἱκανῶν, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ πρωτέρῳ βίῳ βεβαιωτά, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφθά. ὥστε δέ καὶ εἰπεῖ νῦν ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ὀπισθοῖς ἀλεικομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ὄφραν ἱκανῶς, ἄτε πόρων ἀγμαστώς.

9. **τῇ; ὁ τούτους**] So Schanz: B has ὅτε οὖ. St. and Z. give ὅτι τούτους.

**εἰς τούτουν**] 'to another social and gentle race like themselves'. In *Timaeus* 91 D we have another class of harmless but unphilosophic men with a different destination: τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ὄφραν φόλων μετερρυθμίζετο, ἀντὶ τριχῶν πτερά φόνον, ἐκ τῶν αἰκιῶν ἀνδρῶν κούφων δὲ, καὶ μετεπιλογικῶν μέν, ἐγιουμένων δὲ ὃδε φέρει τὰς περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις ἑβαιαστάτας εἶναι

**P.**

82 [ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.]

καὶ ἀρταγάς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνου γένη ς τοῦ ἀλλοσφαίρας τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; 'Αμέλει, ἐφι σῆς ἴνα, καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον, ἐφι ποτις δ’ οὐ; Ὀγικά οὐδενότατοι, ἐφι, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν 5 καὶ εἰς βελτιστὸν τόπον ἵνα τίνι δημοτικήν καὶ πολιτικήν ἀρετήν ἐπιτετηδεύκει την ἑν καὶ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἐθνος τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονόνταν ἰένει φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πη δ’ οὐτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Τί; οὐ τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τούτων πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικῶν τε καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ή τοιο υπὸ μελετῶν ἀμφήκων ἔμμηρκων, ή καὶ εἰς ταύτων γε ἐκ τάξιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι εἰς αὐτῶν ἀνδρῶν μετρίους. Εἰκός.

***XXXII.*** Ἑις δ’ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσατι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶ απιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαί ἄλλ’ ἄ’ φιλομαθεί. ἄλλα

13. **ἄνδρας μετρίους**] 'worthy citizens'; men who practise δημοτική καὶ πολιτική ἀρετὴν and discharge their social and domestic duties creditably. They belong to a decidedly higher grade than the character described in *Republic* 554.

82 C, D, c. xxxii. But to the company of the gods only the true philosopher can come. For this cause he keeps himself pure from vice, not from the worldly motives that govern the vulgar, but because he will not resist philosophy when she offers freedom and purification to his soul.

13. **εἰς δ’ γε θεῶν γένος**] 'but to the company of the gods none may approach who has not sought wisdom and departed in perfect purity; none but the lover of learning'. The words ἄλλα τὸ φιλομαθεῖ are appended as though μὴ φιλοσοφήσατι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπιόντι had not preceded: they are certainly pleonastic, but perfectly natural and intelligible. I see no cause to insert ἄλλα, far less to adopt such a violent transposition as Wyttenbach suggests. φιλομαθής
and Φιλόσοφος are frequently identified by Plato, especially in the passage quoted by Heindorf, *Republiec* 376 B τό γε φιλο-

mathèς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταύτων. St. gives ἀλλο ἦ.

9. σώμα τι πλάττοντες] Literally 'moulding a body', i.e. spending all their care on tending the body. Cf. Τι-

μαςις 88 C τόν τε αὐ σώμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα τάς τής ψυχής ἀνταποδοτέων κινήσεις. Also *Republic* 377 C καὶ πλάτ-

τεων τάς ψυχάς τοῖς μίθοις πολὺ μάλλον ἢ τά σώματα ταῖς χερσίν. The usage of the word in the present context easily arises from that in the two passages quoted, where it signifies the development of the body by nourishment and training and in each case is opposed to the culture of the soul. The reading of ECD is σώματι, whence Fischer sug-

gested σώμα τί, which with the Zürich editors I have adopted: the τί seems to add a touch of contempt. E has σώματα, retained by Stallbaum. Ast's σώματι πράττοντες, 'working for the body', is a very strange expression, by no means justified by the use of πράσσειν in Thucy-

dides. Schanz adopts Heindorf's bold alteration λατρεύοντες, which I cannot approve; far less Madvig's coinage πέλα-

tεύοντες.

82 D—84 B, cc. xxxiii, xxxiv. Philoso-

phy, finding the soul a prisoner in her bodily abode, strives by persuasive admo-

nation to set her free; telling her that she is deluded by the body and its sen-

sations: from such she should withdraw herself and trust to herself alone; for she alone can behold the invisible and apprehend the true. And the soul that is discreet listens to the voice of philosophy, for she sees that indulgence of bodily pas-

sions has this fatal result. Whateover awakes in us the strongest pleasure or pain, fear or desire, this we think to be most surely true. So if she share the body's pleasures and pains, she will also share its beliefs concerning truth; and being the body's close companion through life will leave it at death contaminated by its nature: therefore she will never reach her home in the invisible but must enter again into another body. For this reason the philosopher is virtuous; not from any common motive; but because, when philosophy is delivering his soul, he will not undo her work by indulging the body's appetites. So his soul has peace from its troubling and lives apart from it; and at death she returns to her divine abode, fearing not at all lest as she departs she be scattered by the winds and exist no more.
XXXIII. Πῶς, ὦ Σωκράτης; Ἐγώ ἐρώ, ἐφη. γυμνόσκουσιν γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅσ, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν φυχὴν ἡ Φιλοσοφία ἀτέχνως διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένη, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὅσπερ διὰ εἰργμοῦ διὰ τοῦτον σκοπεῖσαι τὰ ὅντα ἄλλα μὴ αὐτὴν δὲ αὐτής, καὶ εὖ πάση ἀμαθία κυλιν-δουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστὶν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ἦλθηττορ εἰς τὸ 83 δεδεσθαί,—ὅσπερ οὖν λέγω, γυμνόσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὔτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἐχοῦσαν αὐτῶν τὴν φυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἔπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν 10 μεστή ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεως, πείθουσα δὲ καὶ τοῦτον μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῦ χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ἥλιστεσθαι καὶ ἄθροίζεσθαι παρακελευσμένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλη ἡ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, δὲ τὰ ἄν νοσῆ ἄντι καθ' ἄντι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν 15 Β οὕτων. ο τι δ' ἄν δι' ἄλλων σκοπη ἐν ἄλλοις ὦν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἥγεσθαι ἄληθες· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ὀρατὸν,

4. διὰ εἰργμοῦ] 'through the bars of her prison'. She can indeed see ὅστα, but only in the material symbols by which alone they reveal themselves to the senses.

5. κυλινδουμένην] 'wallowing in utter ignorance'. Stallbaum compares Politicus 309 A, Theaetetus 172 C.

6. ὅτι δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν] I take the literal translation of this sentence to be as follows: 'that it (the prison) exists by means of lust; just the way in which the captive is most apt to aid and abet his own incarceration'; in other words, the prison is the dungeon of lust, wherein the prisoners are accomplices in their own imprisonment—ὡς I understand as a simple relative, 'in which way'. The phrase δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν is understood by Stallbaum as a periphrasis for ἐπιθυμεῖ, by Heindorf for ἐπιθυμεῖται. The former makes the clause ὡς ἀν μάλιστα express the object of the ἐπιθυμία, which comes to this: the prison (i.e. the body) desires to find out how the soul may most aid her own imprisonment. But this is downright nonsense. Heindorf rightly interprets the ὡς ἀν μάλιστα clause, except that he makes ὡς = ὅστε. But δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν = ἐπιθυμεῖται is surely very questionable; moreover it is not the body but bodily pleasures which the embodied soul desires. The interpretation I have suggested precisely agrees with 83 ὅ: the prison of lust is just that very one of which the soul shuts the doors upon herself: for each act of indulgence is the shooting of a fresh bolt. The translator in the Engelmann series alone takes the same view: 'weil er auf der Sinnenlust beruht, auf welche Weise der Gefangene selbst hauptsächlich Helfer seiner Gefangenschaft sein muss'.

7. τῷ δεδεσθαί] So all the mss. Schanz and Z. after Heindorf's conjecture read τοῦ. But since συλλαμβάνειν continually takes a dative there is no reason why the verbal συλληπτωρ should not be followed by the same case: the alteration seems gratuitous.

8. οὕτω goes with ἔχουσαν.

16. δι' ἄλλων] i.e. τῶν διὰ σώματος αἰσθήσεων. ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, 'varying with varying conditions'.

7—2
4. *loγιξομένη*] The soul reflects that vehement passions of pleasure, pain, fear, or desire so absorb the attention that nothing seems so real as the object inspiring them. Therefore if she is strongly excited by bodily affections of this kind she will be forced to think nothing so real as these material things: so that instead of seeking truth in the changeless verities of the intelligible she will look for it in the everchanging flux of phenomena.

*ήσθι* ἢ *φοβθη*] Z. and St. add ἢ *λυτθη*; but these words are not in BCD, and the other mss. are not agreed as to their position.

5. *οὖν τοσοῦτον*] 'not on the scale that one might suppose'. For *τοσοῦτον* virtually = 'so little' compare Ἀριστότ. 608 b μέγας γάρ, ἐφην, ὦ ἄγων, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ. Schanz, against the mss., writes ἃν' αὐτῶν: but ἂν may equally well be said; 'arising from them'.

6. *οὖν ἢ νοσήσας*] the considerations on which the δημοτική ἀρετή is based.

8. *ὅτι ψυχή*] 'that the soul of every man in the act of feeling some vehement pleasure or pain is at the same time constrained to believe that whatsoever most strongly excites such feelings, this is most vivid and true: whereas it is not so'.

12. τά ὅρατα] Heindorf supplied τά, which is missing in the mss.


17. ὁμότροπος τε καὶ ὁμότροφος] 'like it in her ways and nurture'.
XXXIV. Τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὥς Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλο-
μαθεῖς κόσμιοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ἑνεκά φασιν ἢ
84 σὺ οἷεί; Οὐ δὴ τά ἐγγορε. Οὐ γάρ ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσατ' ἀν ψυχῇ
ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἃν οἰηθεὶ τήν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρήναι
ἐαυτῆς λινό, λυνύσῃ δὲ έκείνης αὐτῆς παραδίδονα ταῖς ἱδοναῖς 5
καὶ λύπαις ἐαυτῆς πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδείκνυ τοῖς πράτ-
τεν, Πηνελόπης τινα ἐναντίων ἵστον μεταχειριζομένην ἀλλὰ γα-
λήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένῃ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν
τούτῳ ωὔσα, το ἀληθές καὶ τὸ θείον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ
τὸν ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζην τε οἴεται οὕτω δειν, έώς ἃν ζητ, καὶ το
ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ἐνυγγενές καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον αφικομένη
απηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ θῇ τής τοιαύτης τροφῆς
οὐδὲν δεινον μὴ φοβηθῇ, ταύτα γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὥ συμμία τε καὶ

2. οὐχ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ἑνεκά φασιν] ‘not for the reasons which the many as-
sign for being so’. Schanz brackets φασίν, and Heindorf proposes φαίνοτα, both,
as I think, needlessly. Stallbaum rightly supplies κόσμιοι εἰσί καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι.

3. οὐ γάρ ἀλλ' οὕτω] This punctuation is clearly right here as in Phaedrus
276 D. οὐ γάρ ἀλλὰ gives just the wrong
sense.

5. λυνύσῃς δ' ἐκείνης] ‘and while
philosophy is loosing her to give herself
up to pleasures and pains that they may
bind her fast’. The appended infinitive
ἐγκαταδείκνυ is a very common idiom, and
why Madvig should wish to expunge
παραδίδονα I cannot see. Schanz how-
ever brackets it.

7. μεταχειριζομένην] This is doubtless
the right reading, although the ms. are
stronger in favour of μεταχειριζομένην:
the genitive is however, as Prof. Geddes
says, easily accounted for by the proximity
of Πηνελόπης. The soul works at a kind
of Penelope’s web, only in the opposite
way. Penelope, to preserve her virtue,
undid at night the work she wove by
day; the soul weaves again the web of
lusts which philosophy has been unravel-
ing to set her free. Prof. Geddes would
govern Πηνελόπης by ἐναντίως: but I
believe Plato never uses the genitive with
this adverb; for in 112 E, to which Prof.
Geddes refers, τοιοῦτον is governed by
catastrophic. St. has μεταχειριζομένης.

8. τοιοῦτων] See on 59 A.

10. ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη] Compare
Phaedrus 248 B οὐδ' ἐνεχ' ἣ πολλ' ἀποδύ-
to ἀληθείας ἵδεις πεδίων ὡς ἐστίν, ἢ τε ἢ
προσήκουσα ψυχῇ τῷ ἀράστῳ νομή ἐκ τὸ
ἐκεί λειμώνοι τυχάναι ωὔσα, ἢ τε τοῦ
πτεροῦ φῶς, ὃ ψυχῇ κούφισται, τοιοῦ-
τερατεί. The souls which cannot reach
the plain of truth τροφῆς δοξαστῆ χρωται.
Compare the still more striking meta-
phor in Timaeus 90 A ἐκείθεν γὰρ, ὅθεν
ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς γένεσις ἔφη, τῷ θείον
τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ βίαν ἡμῶν ἀνακρεμαννῶν
ἀρθοί πάν τὸ σώμα.

11. τοιοῦτων] Sc. ἀληθές καὶ θείον καὶ
ἀδόξαστον.

13. οidUser δεινον μὴ φοβηθῇ] For this
unusual phrase compare Republic 465 B,
Apology 28 B, Gorgias 530 D. Also Aris-
tophanes Ecclesiazusae 650 οὐδ' ἰδον μὴ σε
φιλήσῃ.

ταύτα γ' ἐπιτηθεύσασα] mss. ταύτα δ'.
Many editors, beginning with Forster,
have regarded these words as a gloss
upon ἐκ τοιαύτης τροφῆς, and Schanz
brackets them. This view may be right;
but I think there is hardly sufficient evi-
dence for bracketing. If the words are
Kébhs, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπομένη οἷχῇται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ.

XXXV. Συγῆ ὅν τὸ ἐγένετο τάστα εἰπόντος τοῦ Ὥκρατους ἐπὶ τὶν πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Ὥκρατης, ὥς ἰδεῖν ἐφανετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεύσθην καὶ ὁ Ὥκρατης ἰδὼν αὐτῷ ἢρετο: Τί; ἐφῆ, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεδοκέρεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἐτί ἐχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξεῖναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖςθον, οὐδὲν λέγω. εἰ δὲ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκυνήσητε καὶ αὐτόλ ἐπείν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἰ τῇ ὑμίν φαίνεται βέλτιον <ἄν> λεχθῆναι, δ καὶ αὐ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ τι μᾶλλον οὖσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἐφη: Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ὥκρατες, τάληθῃ
genuine, δὲ needs correction. Wytenbach has ταῦτα τ'.

At first sight the concluding words of the chapter seem to imply that a soul that is pure is less likely to perish than the impure. But since this is not the case, we must understand Plato to mean that the pure soul alone is exempt from fear. The impure soul, having cast in her lot with the body and having no conception of existence apart from it, may well suppose that corporeal life is a condition of her being: but the pure soul, who has lived apart from the body so far as she may and feels her own independent power, has no misgivings lest the company of her slave be necessary to her existence: the body may dread dissolution, but she is secure.

84 c—85 d, ε. xxxv. Silence ensues as Sokrates ceases: but presently Simmias and Kebed are heard conversing apart. Are you discussing any doubtful matters in the argument? asks Sokrates, for there must be many remaining. Simmias: There are points on which we should like further satisfaction; but we shrink from troubling you at so sad a time. Sokrates: If I cannot convince you that I do not consider my present situation sad, I shall find it hard indeed to persuade the rest of mankind. You think I am more foolish than the swans: for they sing sweetest just before they die; not, as men say, that they are lamenting their approaching death, but because they are Apollo’s birds and know the good things that are in Hades: wherefore they sing in gladness of heart. I too am the servant of Apollo, and I depart this life no less cheerfully than they: speak then, if you have anything to ask. Simmias: I will speak: the truth of the matters we have been discussing is hard to discover, nevertheless it were fainthearted to abandon the search. So in default of some divine word we must strive by all means to find the surest theory that human reason can furnish, as it were a raft to bear us over the sea of life. Therefore, I tell you, Sokrates, that the foregoing proof does not seem to me complete.

5. πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ] ' was absorbed in the foregoing discourse'.

12. βέλτιον ἄν λεχθῆναι] The insertion of ἄν, which could easily drop out after βέλτιον, seems to me necessary. Prof. Geddes observes that verbs of thinking often take a bare infinitive, to express duty. This is true: but φαίνεσθαι is not a verb of thinking.
σοι έρω. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν έτερον προσθείκα καὶ κελεύει ἐρεσθαί διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὁκείν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μῆ σοι ἀνδὲς ἥ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν. καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασεν τε ἥρεμά καὶ φησιν, Βαβαί, ὁ Σιμμία ἂ πον ἐχαλπώσω ἄν τοὐς ἀνθρώπους πείσαμι ὡς ὦ συμφοράν 5 ἡγούμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γὰρ μηδὲ ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβείσθη, μὴ δυσκολώτερον τὸν διάκειμαι ἦ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίω καὶ, ὡς ἐσώκε, τῶν κύκων δοκῶ φαντάσων οὐκ εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οὕτως ἐπείδαι ἀισθοῦνται ὅτι δεὶ αὐτοὺς ἁποθανεῖν, άδοντες 85 καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μᾶλλον ἄδοσιν, 10 γεγοθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεόν ἀπιέναι, οὔτε εἰς θεράποντες. οἶ δ’ ἀνθρώποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκων καταφεύγονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς θρησκύνειν τὸν θάνατον υπὸ λύπης ἐξαίρεσιν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρενον ἀδεί, ὅταν πεινη ἢ ριγοῦ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπηταί, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἢ τε ἀνέδων 15 καὶ χειλίδων καὶ ὃ ἐποψ, ἤ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρησκύνειν ἀδεῖν ἀλλ’ οὕτε ταῦτα μοι φαίνεται οὐπούμενα ἀδεῖν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλὰ ἐὰν οἴμαι τοῦ 'Απόλλωνος ὅτες μαντικοὶ τὸ εἰς καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν 'Αδιδον ἀγαθὰ ἄδοσιν καὶ τέρπουνται ἐκείνῃ τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόμενος ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ποι οἴμαι 20 ὑμόδουλος τε εἶναι τῶν κύκων καὶ ἱρός τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χείρον ἐκείνῳ τῇ μαντικῇ ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὔτε δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἦ ἐνεκά λέγεις τε χρὴ καὶ ἔρωταν ὃ τι ἐν βούλησθε ἐως Ἀθηναίων ἐόσιν ἄνδρες ἐνδέκα. Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἔρω 25 σ’ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ οὖδ’ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τα εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ

7. διάκειμαι] Heindorf takes this for a subjunctive, and Hirschig reads διακέωμαι: but, even if διάκειμαι could be a subjunctive, that mood would be positively wrong here. Sokrates says 'you are afraid (not least I should be, but) lest I am more peevish than heretofore'. Contrast this with the words of Simmias, μὴ σοί ἀνδές ἥ, where the subjunctive has its proper reference to the future.

10. καὶ μᾶλλον] Schanz reads καὶ-λίσσαι, after Blomfield's conjecture. I have reverted to the reading of the mss.

23. τοῦτον γε ἐνεκά] 'so far as this is concerned'.

24. ἐως Ἀθηναίων] Cobet proposes ἐως ἂν oi ἐνδέκα ἐώςαν. I do not conceive that any person who has ears to hear will prefer Cobet's sentence to Plato's: nor, apart from this, would one willingly sacrifice the grave courtesy of Sokrates' language. I regret that Schanz determines to bracket the clause; still omission is preferable to mutilation. Prof. Geddes justly says ἄνδρες ἐνδέκα is to be regarded as one expression, and compares ἐν τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς. The common reading is ἐως ἂν oi, but ἂν oi are wanting in the best mss.
dokèi, ὁ Σωκράτης, peri τῶν τοιούτων ὅσος ὦσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἡ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἡ παραχάλατον τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχὼσκοτότων ἀπείτης τις, 5 πάνυ μαθηκόν εἶναι άνδρός· δει̂ν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γῇ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἡ μαθεῖν ὡς ἥκει ἡ εὐρεῖα, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τῶν γοῦν βελτιστῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δύσεξ- καὶ λεγκτότατον, ἑπὶ τούτοις ὄραμαν εἴσπερ ἑπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλέσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατον ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκίν- 10 δυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου όχίματος, λόγων θείου τινὸς, διαπορευ- θῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγγον οὐκ ἐπαίσχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑπότροχχρόνῳ ὥτι νῦν οὐκ εἴπον ἃ ἐμοὶ δοκέι. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τῷ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται 15 ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

XXXVI. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἰσως γάρ, ἐφή, ὁ ἑταίρη, ἀληθῆ Ε

4. καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι] Hirschig wrongly brackets μή. The words παντὶ προαφίστασθαι are all qualified by μὴ οὐχὶ: or as Heindorf puts it, we may regard καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι as equivalent to μὴ προαφίστασθαι. We have here a very strong case of μὴ οὐ after a word which only implies negation: cf. Symposium 210 β πολλὴ ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἐν τε καὶ ταύτων ἥγεισθαι.

6. μαθεῖν] i. e. either to learn from another or to discover by our own researches: cf. 99 c. Hesiod says, Works and Days 291, οὕτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὅσ αὐτὸς πάντα νόησῃ, ἐσθῆλός δ' αὖ κάκεινος, ὡς εἰς ἐπιτόμη πιθήκαι.

10. λόγων θείου] 'a divine doctrine'; such as the Orphic traditions. The Pythagorean Simmias, whose mystical tendencies are well contrasted with the clear and acute intellect of Kebes, naturally gives a θεῖος λόγος the preference over dialectical demonstration. Cf. 107 a. Olympiodoros explains it, αὐτοπτικὸν νοῦς ὁ θεῦ τῷ ὡτὶ συννά. But the other interpretation is more natural and more dramatically appropriate. The mss. have ἕ λόγου, Schanz brackets ἕ: I have followed Heindorf in omitting it. That ἕ is ever explanatory I do not believe: it certainly is not so in the passages cited by Prof. Geddes. Plato would have used καὶ. St. retains ἕ.

85 Ε—86 D, c. xxxvi. Simmias states his objection. All the terms that have been applied to soul and body may be transferred to harmony and the lyre. The harmony is invisible, immaterial, beautiful, divine; the lyre is material, composite, earthly, perishable. Might we not then on the same principle maintain that the harmony must survive the destruction of the lyre? yet we know it does not. Now suppose the doctrine to be true, that the soul is a harmony of the body, arising from the due proportion and temperament of its parts; will she not, let her be ever so divine, vanish away if these bodily conditions cease? will she not, like other harmonies, cease to be, long before the body itself suffers dissolution?

As I have pointed out in the introduction, the refutation of this theory does not constitute an argument for immortality. To refute a doctrine which would
be fatal to immortality is not the same as to prove immortality. Plato justly considered that a view so widely entertained and so hostile to his own, must be disposed of; but its overthrow leaves the argument precisely where it was at 81 A.

2. ἢ δὴ] So Forster for ἦ δὴ.

7. διατ[φυ] Schanz brackets this word: needlessly, I think.

eἰ τις διασχιρ[ζοτο] The apodosis never comes. Prof. Geddes finds it in ὥρα ὅν, 86 D. This is not strictly accurate; for the subject of διασχιρ[ζοτο] is supposed to maintain that the harmony survives the lyre, while the subject of ἐὰν τις ἀξιός maintains that the soul is the first to perish. In fact the protasis ἐὰν τις ἀξιός is substituted for the original protasis.

10. διερρωμιῶν τῶν χορδῶν is bracketed by Hirschig, whom Schanz follows: again I see no reason.

16. ὑπολαμβάνομεν] The use of the first person by Simmias would seem to imply that this doctrine was Pythagorean. But there is little or no evidence to that effect, and it is irreconcilable with the Pythagorean dogma of transmigration.

Aristotle de anima 1 iv 407b27 mentions the theory as πέπαντα πολλάς, but without assigning it to any particular school or thinker. Macrobious ascribes it to Pythagoras and Philolaos; but the testimony of so late a writer is worthless. Prof. Geddes remarks that it seems more Eleatic than Pythagorean: and there certainly is some resemblance between this ἄρμονια and the conception of ψυχή as a κράμα attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius ix 29. The view of Parmenides is expounded by Theophrastos de sensu §§ 3, 4: it is however merely a theory of perception. The opinion that soul is a harmony was certainly held by Aristoxenos the musician, as we learn from Cicero Tusc. 1 10: and Lucretius in countering the theory (iii 94 foll.) evidently had him chiefly in his mind; cf. iii 131 reddre harmoniai Nomen ad organisicos alto delatum Heliconi. But Aristoxenos was a pupil of Aristotle, not a Pythagorean. On the whole then it seems probable that Simmias is not speaking as a Pythagorean, but making himself the exponent of a widely received opinion. Kebes, who is equally a Py-
the doctrine, 87 A; but on the other hand it is a favourite theory with Echekrates, 88 D.

2. κράσιν] 'a temperament'. Compare the lines of Parmenides quoted by Theophrastos l. l. (Karsten 145 foll.)

ως γὰρ ἐκάστῳ ἔχει κράσις μελέων ποιν-πλάγκτων, τῶν νόσω ἀνθρώποις παρέστηκεν· το γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ὀπερ φρούνει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώ-ποισι
καὶ πάλιν καὶ παντὶ· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

That is to say, the character of the perception is dominated by the preponderating elements of the percipient. As Theophr. remarks, Parmenides does not distinguish between φρονεῖν and αἰσθᾶ-νεσθαι.

The word ἁρμανία is generally used to denote a succession of musical tones, not their simultaneous accord, for which συμφωνία is the ordinary term. The former meaning is however here clearly unsuitable; and in fact ἁρμανία is a general term expressing the relation between musical sounds, in itself signifying neither succession nor accord.


10. παραμένεν] 'remain with us'. Cf. 62 E. The word occurs again and again in this sense; yet Hirschig must needs alter it to ἐπιμένεν.

86 D—88 B, c. xxxvii. Sokrates defers his reply to Simmias until he has heard the objection of Kebes, which the latter states as follows. I think our argument is no further on than it was: I admit that the antenatal existence of the soul has been fairly proved, but the evidence of her existence after death seems still insufficient. Not that I agree with the objection of Simmias; but all that has yet been proved is that the soul is more lasting than the body. Suppose a weaver were in the habit of making his own coats; in the course of his life he would wear out many coats; but when his time came to die, the last coat would exist after him; yet we do not deny that the weaver is more durable than the coat. Similarly the soul in the course of a man's life may wear out many bodies: that is, so fast as the body wastes, she may renew it like a garment that needs mending; but when the time of her dissolution comes, she perishes and the body as last renewed by her exists after her.
XXXVII. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀσπέρ τὰ πολλὰ εἰσῄει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἐφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἔμοι, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἤθικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρὴν πρὸ τῆς ἐποκρίσεως ἐτί πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι, τί αὖ ὀδὲ ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ 5 λόγῳ, ἦνα χρόνων ἐγγενομένου βουλευσόμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἐπειτὰ δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἐὰν τὸ δικώσι προσδείνει, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, ὦτος ἣδη ὑπερδικεῖ τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ’ ἀγε, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ὁ Κέβης, λέγει, τί ἦν τὸ ὑ ἀὐθράττων [ἀπιστίαιν παρέχει]. Λέγω δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὦς οὖν Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐτί ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, 10 87 ὁπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ελέγομεν, ταῦτον ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὥν ἵνον ἤ ψυχή καὶ πρὶν εἰς τὸδε τὸ εἶδος ἔλθείν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων χαριέντως καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθὲς ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνω ἰκανῶς ἀποδεδείξατι ὦς δὲ καὶ ἀποδιονότων ἵμων ἐτί που ἔσται, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τὴδε. ὥς μὲν οὖν ἴσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώ—

Or to grant you even more: let us suppose that she wears out many bodies, not only in the span of one life, but in many lives; and that at the separation she continues to exist in Hades; yet we have no assurance that this goes on for ever; after repeated incarnations she may gradually be wearied out, and some one of them will be her last. Therefore it is not enough to show that the soul is ever so much stronger and more lasting than the body: you must show that in her own nature she is altogether indissoluble and eternal; else our hope of immortality is but foolishness.

1. διαβλέψας ‘with a piercing glance’. This rare word well describes the penetrating gaze of Sokrates’ prominent eyes (Theaetetus 143 E) from under the gathered eyebrows: much the same is expressed by ταυρηθὸν ὑποβλέψας in 117 B. The preposition seems to have the same force as in one usage of διαβλέψω—i.e. with eyelids far apart: cf. Aristotle de insomniis 462*3 ἐνιάο γὰρ τῶν νευτέρων καὶ πάμπαν διαβλέποντι (with eyes wide open). ἐὰν ὑ σκότος, φαίνονται έξιδόλα πολλά κινούμενα, ὡστ’ ἐγκαλπτέσθαι πολλάκις φοβομένους. Compare Xenophon Symp-
teron ψυχή σώματος, οὗ ἔγχωρῷ τῇ Σίμμιον αὐτηλήφει. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πάσι τούτοις πάνω πολὺ διαφέρειν. τι οὖν ἂν φαίη δ λόγος ἐτί ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὅρας ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε αὐθεντέστερον ἐτί ὑ; τὸ δὲ πολυχρωνώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαίον. B 5 εἶναι ἐτί σφιξθαί εἰς τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δή τούτο τόδε ἐπισκέψαι, εἰ τι λέγων εἰκόνος γὰρ τινος, ἀς ἐσθεικ, καὶ γὰρ ὡς πρὸς Σίμμιος δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γάρ δοκεῖ ὡμοίος λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥστε ἄν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπον υφάιτο πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τούτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλολεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλ' ἐστι ποι σώς, τεκ- 10 μήριον δὲ παρέχοντο θοιμάτιον ὁ ἤμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλολεν, καὶ εἰ τις ἀπιστοίχ αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτήθη πότερον πολυχρωνώτερον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου τῇ ἰματίῳ ἐν 0 χρεία τε ὄντος καὶ φορομένου, ἀποκριμαμένου δὲ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὔτοτι ἀποδειχθάτι ποτὲ παντὸς ἀρά μᾶλλον ὁ γε 15 ἀνθρώπος σώς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ γε ὑλοχρωνώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλολεν. τὸ δ' οἴμαι, ὡς Σίμμιοι, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει σκόπει γάρ καὶ σὺ ἂν λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὕπολαβοι ὅτι εὐθές λέγει ὁ τούτῳ λέγων ὁ γὰρ υφάιτης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίξας τοιαῦτα ἰματία καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ύστερος ἀπόλολεν πολλῶν οὐτων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταῖον D 20 οἴμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὔδεν τι μᾶλλον τούτον ἕνεκα ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἰματίον φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσβενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἴμαι εἰκόνα δέξατο ἃν ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγοι αὐτὰ ταύτα περὶ αὐτῶν

1. οὗ ἔγχωρῷ] Again we may observe the superior acuteness of Kebes. The objection of Simmias is ingenious and plausible, but somewhat flimsy: it crumbles away at the first touch of the elenchus: moreover its refutation adds nothing to the argument. That of Kebes goes straight to the root of the matter, and obliges Sokrates to put forth his whole argumentative strength; while its disproof constitutes the crowning argument of the dialogue.

δοκεῖ γάρ] 'for I think soul is far superior in all these respects'.

7. ὡμοίως λέγεσθαι] 'for I think your argument is exactly parallel to the assertion one might make about a weaver who died at an advanced age'. Heindorf would insert ei, but this is not necessary.

9. ἐστὶ ποι σῶς] I adopt without hesitation Forster's admirable emendation, which by a very slight change materially improves the sense. ἐσος seems to me quite inappropriate, notwithstanding Heindorf's defence of it and its retention by Z. and St.

10. αὐτὸς υφηνάμενος] The weaver is chosen as the closest parallel to the soul, who is perpetually renewing the body that is her vesture.

11. ἀπιστοτιχ] mss. ἀπιστῶν which cannot stand, since the question would be pointless in the mouth of an opponent. The ἂν which belongs to λέγω also does duty for παρέχοντα, ἀνερωτήθη, and ὧδατο.

16. τὸ δὲ 'but in fact this is not the case'. Cf. Theaetetus 157 B, Sophist 244 A, Laws 642 A.
3. Πολλά σώματα κατατρίβειν] i.e. within the limits of a single human life. Kebes puts his case in two forms: the superior durability of the soul is consistent with the supposition (1) that during the ordinary span of human life she wears out many bodies, perpetually restoring them as they suffer waste; (2) that after separation from one body she may survive and enter into another and another. Yet in the first case she may become extinct on separating from the body; in the second she may after several incarnations be worn out by her labours and at some one separation perish utterly. Therefore we cannot argue that because the soul outlasts the body she is necessarily immortal.

9. ἐπιδεικνύον] Prof. Geddes is not, I think, right in referring this optative to indirect speech, though Soph. Phil. 617 would justify it (not the other passage he cites). As Stallbaum points out ἦ is easily carried on from above, ἀναγκαῖον μεντάν.

11. ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν] Schanz adopts ἦσται from Hirschig, for which I see no sufficient reason, since ἦστιν is general. Note that Kebes treats the whole of chapters 25—29 as intended to supplement ἀνάμνησις by showing the after-existence of the soul: he recurs to the objection he made at 77 c, against which Sokrates appeals to ἀνταπόδοσις, but nevertheless proceeds to bring fresh evidence.

τῷ λέγοντι [ἡ] Madvig proposed to strike out ἦ, and Schanz seems right in bracketing it. For (1) τῷ λέγοντι wants an object, (2) Kebes offers to grant not more than what Sokrates says, but more than he has himself just said. He will grant not only that the soul may have existed before birth and may wear out many bodies in this life before perishing, but also that she may survive the severance once or many times before she herself succumbs.

15. οὔτω γὰρ αὐτῷ] αὐτῷ, referring to ψυχήν, seems to be attracted into the gender of ἵππουρόν. Prof. Geddes compares 109 Λ πάμμεγάν, τι εἶναί αὐτό, sc. τῇ γῇν.
2. τούτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον] Since no one knows how often his soul has already been incarnate, he cannot tell whether or not she may survive the termination of his present life.

4. εἰ δὲ τούτο οὕτως ἔχει] 'if the hypothesis I suggest be true'. Few who have read through this forcibly stated argument will agree with Wagner that 'it gives the reader the impression that Kebs is represented as an awkward speaker, because he is not a clear thinker'.

88 c—89 c, e. XXXVIII. Phaedo pauses to describe the effect of these objections upon the audience: how their confidence is shattered in the argument and in their own judgment. Echekrates sympathises, adding that the conception of soul as a harmony has always had a strong attraction for him. He desires to know how Sokrates behaved. Never, replies Phaedo, did Sokrates appear to greater advantage: he showed neither irritation nor dismay; he cheered and encouraged us, as a general rallies his broken forces. In illustration thereof Phaedo narrates a little by-play which passed between Sokrates and himself.

By interposing this interlude Plato desires to mark in the most emphatic manner that an acute crisis has arrived in the discussion. The whole position has to be reconsidered, and the argument, as Echekrates says, started again almost from the beginning. The exact situation of the argument at this point is dealt with in the introduction § 2, where I have tried to show as clearly as possible the relation between the earlier and the later part of the demonstration. A short dialogue between Phaedo and Echekrates is similarly introduced at 102 A to mark the completion of an important step.

13. τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις] governed by ἀπειρίαν.

15. ἀπειρίας] Schanz, following Heindorf, reads ἐν against the mss. But the change of mood is nothing remarkable, as the instances cited by Stallbaum will show. The subjunctive represents a more vivid conception of the contingency: see Prof. Goodwin’s excellent article in the Journal of Philology, vol. viii p. 18. For ἐμεν BCD corruptly give ἤμεν.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

2. ὃς γὰρ σφόδρα[1] 'for how strongly persuasive was that theory which Sokrates maintained, and yet it has now fallen into discredit'.

4. ἀντιλαμβάνεται[2] 'has a wonderfully firm grasp of me'. It never seems to have occurred to Echekrates that his favourite theory was fatal to the soul's immortality and to metempsychosis.


15. ὃ τ᾽ λέγοι ἑκένοι[4] The subject is placed in the relative instead of the main clause.

17. ὃς ἐξέτο ἠσθετο[5] as is shown by his admonition against 'misology' in the next chapter.


29. ἀναβιώσασθαι[7] This transitive use of the word occurs again Crito 48 c.
biōsasθαι. καὶ ἐγὼν ἃν, εἰ σὺ εἶσθι καὶ μὲ διαφεῖνοι ὁ λόγος, ὁ ἐνορκὼν ἃν ποιησάμην ὁσπερ Ἀργείωι, μὴ πρότερον κομῆσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμιμίον τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ’, ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷς τε εἶναι. 5 Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἔφη, τῶν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἐνοῦσαι φῶς ἑστίν. Παρακαλῶ τοῖς, ἔφη, οὖχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ’ ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη.

XXXIX. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὔλαβθωμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποίον; ἂν δ’ ἐγώ. Μὴ γενομέθα, ἂν δ’ ὡς, μισολογούς, ὁσπερ ὀϊὸν 10 μισανθρωποὶ γυνόμενοι’ ὡς οὐκ ἑστίν, ἔφη, ὁ τι ἂν τις μείζον τούτῳ κακῶν πάθοι ὁ λόγος μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἡ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐφύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεύσαι ἁνεῦ τέχνης, καὶ γηγήσασθαι παντάπασι ἵνα ἀληθή εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστῶν τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἐπειτα ὀλίγον ὁσπερν εὑρείν τούτῳ ποιηρόν τε καὶ ἀπιστὸν καὶ ἀθυίς ἐπεροῦν καὶ ὡταν τοῦτο πολλάκης πάθη τις, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάληστα οὖς ἂν γηγήσατο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἐταιροτάτους, τελευ- 15 ἔ τῶν δὴ θαμα προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἤγειται οὐδενὸς

2. ὁσπερ Ἀργείωι] referring to the story told by Herodotus i 82. The Argives, foiled in their attempt to recover Thyreai from the Spartans, vowed not to let their hair grow till they reconquered it. Prof. Geddes remarks that the Romans on the contrary showed grief by letting their hair grow long.

3. ἀναμαχόμενος] ‘renewing the battle’.

4. οΪδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς] We find the legend in Euthydemus 297 c. Herakles, while fighting the hydra, was assailed by a big crab, against which he called in the aid of Iolaos. Cf. Laws 919 b. Presently Schanz after Cobet brackets τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.

5. ἐνοῦσαι φῶς ἑστίν] because at sunset he must drink the poison.

89 D—90 D, c. xxxix. Sokrates continues: we must beware lest we become haters of arguments as some become haters of mankind. For when one has been repeatedly deceived in others, whom he believed to be good and true men, he falls sometimes into distrust and dislike of the whole human race. But this is owing to his ignorance of human nature: he does not reflect that extremes are rare, and that the very good and very bad are equally few in number. It is the same with arguments: if we have come rightly or wrongly to distrust one argument after another, we must not hastily conclude that no valid argument is to be found; it is our own want of skill that we should rather blame. We ought to take warning by those contentious disputants, who assert that there is no stable truth in anything, and fancy themselves prodigiously clever to have found this out. Yet it were sad indeed, supposing there is such a thing as truth, and that we might discover it, if, instead of laying the fault where it is really due, we quarrelled with philosophy and thus deprived ourselves of all chance of attaining truth.

11. ὁ λόγος μισήσας] ‘than by conceiving a hatred for arguments’; explanatory of τούτων.
oûδεν ὑμεῖς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦν οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὑπὸ τοῦτο γεγυμόμενον; Πάνω γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅσει, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δὴλον ὅτι ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ ταῦθροτεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοὺς ἀθρόποτοις; εἴ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ἦσπερ ἤχει, ὦτως ἦν ἤγισσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ ποιηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγοις εἶναι ἕκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἤφην ἐγώ. Ὁσπερ, ἦ δ' ὅσει, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων οὐεί τι σπανίωτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα μικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἀθροποτῇ ἢ κύνᾳ ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁπισθῷ; ἢ αὐ ταχύν ἢ βραδύν, ἢ αἰσχρόν ἢ καλόν, ἢ λευκόν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοι- ὦτων τὰ μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἁβοῦνα καὶ πολλά. Πάνω γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οὐεί, ἤφη, εἰ ἐν πονηρίας ἀγών προτειεῖ, πάνω ἦν ὀλίγως καὶ ἐνταθά τους πρῶτους φανήναι; Εἰκός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκός γάρ, ἤφη ἀλλὰ ταυτή μὲν ὦ χ' ὁμοίοι οἱ λόγοι τοὺς ἀθρόποτοις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ πράογοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσάλμῃ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ, ἦ, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινί ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἀνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπεται ὀλίγον ὑπέρον αὐτῷ δόχῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὄν, ἐνίοτε δ' ὦτι δν, καὶ ἀδίκης ἐτέρος καὶ ἐτερος καὶ μᾶλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς

οὺς ἄν ἤγισσατο] 'whom he would naturally think'. ἄν of course belongs to ἤγισσατο.

1. ἤσθησαι σὺ τοῦτο] Z. has οὐτω τοῦτο. St. οὐτω πῶς τοῦτο.
2. αἰσχρόν is bracketed by Schanze.
3. ἀνευ τέχνης] i.e. without a knowledge of mankind.
4. τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ ποιηροὺς σφόδρα] Although the order of the words inclines us to take σφόδρα with ὀλίγοις, I think the sense requires that it should be joined with χρηστοὺς καὶ ποιηροὺς. Heindorf would double σφόδρα; but it is not really wanted with ὀλίγοις.
5. τὰ μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων] 'the extremes in both directions'. The ἐσχάτα are the two opposite qualities, ἀκρα the extremes of these. Thus if we conceive λευκὸν and μέλαν to be represented by a straight line, the central portion is occupied by shades of grey; the ἐσχάτα, or parts remote from the centre, by white and black; and the ἀκρα or ends of the line by the highest degree of each.

14. ἀλλὰ ταυτή μὲν] Sokrates has been led by the question of Phaedo into a digression upon the nature of the ἄτεχνια shown by misanthropes, which consists in their forgetting that extremes are seldom met with. But this does not constitute the analogy between μισανθρωπία and μισολογία. The real analogy is that when we have been several times disappointed in a λόγος we jump to the conclusion that all λόγοι are worthless, without stopping to consider whether the fault may not lie in our unscientific treatment.

16. ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύσῃ] The apodosis never comes: Plato finishes the sentence as if he had not written ἤ, which Schanz, at Madvig's suggestion, omits.

19. οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους] Plato may refer to the Ephesian school, ὁι ἰδιώταις of the Thracetetus: perhaps also to sophists of the type of Dionysodoros and Euthydemus, such as he seems to have in view at ιοι ε; and to the Cynics.
...object was to make a sensation, must be classed apart from disputants of the Cynic and Megarian schools, whose paradoxes rested upon logical and metaphysical errors which were genuine difficulties at the time; which in fact required all Plato's genius to clear away.

90 d—91 c, c. xl. Let us beware then, says Sokrates, lest we rashly charge our argument with being faulty, when the fault is our own. The question is of deep interest to us all, and to me especially: indeed I feel less like a philosopher than like those who argue not for truth's sake but merely that their opinion may prevail; only I am more anxious to persuade myself than you. However, if my belief is true, it is well; if not, it will at least make me better company for you while I am with you. For your part, you must think more of the truth than of Sokrates; and you must not accept my reasoning...
until you have fully tested it; lest I depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.


6. *εἰ μὴ εἶναι πάρεργον*] 'unless it were merely by the way'. It is surprising that Prof. Geddes has adopted against all the mss. Hermann's most infelicitous conjecture εἰ μή εἰ πάρεργον. Had εἰ been found in the texts, one would have felt strongly inclined to alter it to εἴη.

8. *λογίζομαι γάρ*] 'for I am reasoning, my dear companion — see how selfishly'. All this is Sokratic elprwela: Sokrates and Plato were the last men to persuade themselves that a belief was true, because it was pleasant.

11. *Ἦπτον τοῖς παρούσι*] 'I shall be less likely to annoy the company with lamentation'. *Ἦπτον* of course qualifies all the words that follow: it will less be the case that I shall annoy them by lamenting. The passage would not have required a note but for the strange misconception of Wagner, who seems to think that μὴ is wanted before οὖν ἀμοινοσ.

12. *ἡ δὲ ἡ ἀγνοια*] Sokrates means that one way or another his doubts will be cleared away; he will not go on existing in doubt whether his existence will continue. For at death he will either find assurance of immortality or he will cease to be, and in neither case is he subject to ἀγνοια. ἀλόγον ὑπεροτεροι means shortly after the present moment, not after death. δὴ ἀγνοια is Fischer's suggestion for διάνοια, which is the reading of the best mss.: the rest have ἀνοια.


17. *ὅπως μὴ*] The editions generally have εἰλαβομένοι ὅπως: but the participle is absent in *BCD* and omitted by Schanz.
The commentator think this is borrowed from the line of Eupolis concerning Perikles, to κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοὺς ἀκρωμάνους. The expression seems likely to have been proverbial.

With a harmony and the doctrine that learning is reminiscence. The theory of reminiscence presupposes that the soul existed before the body; but a harmony comes into existence after that which produces it: either therefore soul is not a harmony or she has had no precognition of the ideas. Simmias admits this and declares without hesitation in favour of reminiscence, which he affirms to be a rational hypothesis, while the other is merely a plausible analogy.

The first refutation is addressed to believers in ἀνάμνησις and pre-existence of the soul; it appeals therefore only to Platonists or Pythagoreans.

They take πολλά to refer to the exhaustion of many bodies during our human life, and πολλάκις to the repeated incarnations of the soul; the two cases put by Kebes. But the following words καὶ ἦ...παθεῖα seem to show that Sokrates had the first case only in view; and for the purposes of his argument there is no difference between them.

So Stallbaum and Schanz; Z. has δοξάσα with the mss.
major, earnestly 1'de the object, for the arguments given to support the view that the soul is an unchanging, eternal being.

6. taivta soi sumpaivnei] this is what your statement amounts to'. Schmidt proposes oF tauta, i.e. you make contradictory statements. This would do well enough, had it ms. authority; but the ms. reading is equally good sense. tauta = proteron...sunthevatai.

9. o apieikazes] 'harmony is not what you represent it', i.e. it is not such a thing as soul. This is the reading of the best mss. and gives a simpler construction than the ordinary F.

10. o'i philologoi] i.e. the tones of the several strings before they are combined into harmony.

18. meto eikotoi tinoj] 'through a certain analogy and plausibility'.

tois pollois] Another indication that this was a widely spread popular opinion, not distinctively Pythagorean.

23. erepitha yap tou] 'for we said, I think, that the existence of our soul before she entered the body rested on the same assurance as that of the very substance that has the title of absolute essence'. I have followed Schanz in adopting the emendation of Mudge, aVth for aVthi. Retaining aVthi we make Plato affirm that the pre-existence of the soul is assured inasmuch as her substance is absolute existence. But Plato never said anything of the sort: he merely said, as surely as the ideas exist, so surely did the soul, 76 E. Heindorf in an acute note defends the vulgate, taking aVthi as possessive; 'as surely as absolute existence belongs to her', i.e. was cognised by her; referring to the words in 76 E
 HLII. Τι δε, ἢ δ’ ὡς, ὃ Συμμία, τῇ; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἡ ἀλλЋ τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἀλλως πῶς ἐχειν ἢ ὡς ἀν ἐκείνα ἔχει 93 εξ ὑν ἂν συγκέντρα; Ὀνδαμώς, ὁδε μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὃς ἐγκυμν, ὁνδὲ τι πάσχειν ἀλλο παρ’ ᾗ ἄν ἐκείνα ἡ ποιή ἡ πάσχῃ; Συνέφη. 10 Οὐκ ἂρα ἱγεῖσθαι γε προσήκεικαι ἀρμονίαι τούτων ἐξ ὑν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἀλλ’ ἐπεσθαί. Συνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἂρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἁρμονία

υπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρλακοτες ἀμετέ-

ραν οὐσ. Βυτ (1) this interpretation

supposes a very awkward ellipse of ἐστιν

in a relative clause, (2) the sense of αὐτῆς

is severely strained: could Plato say

‘absolute existence is hers’, meaning

‘absolute existence is cognised by her’? (3) we have already seen reason to doubt

the genuineness of the words in 76 E.

Hirschig also adopts αὐτῆς.

3. ἰκανῶς] ‘on adequate proof’.

92 E—94 B, c. xlii. Again a harmony

must conform to the conditions of the

materials which produce it; consequently

the completeness of the harmony is in

exact proportion to the completeness

with which these are brought into tune.

It follows then that there are degrees in harmony, corresponding with the conditions of the materials. But in soul

there are no degrees; each soul is just as

completely soul as every other. Furthermore we say some souls are virtuous, others vicious; and we define virtue to be a harmony, vice a discord of the soul.

Now supposing that souls are harmonies, they are harmonies which admit of no difference in degree, since we have admitted that there are no degrees of soul.

But a virtuous soul, being a harmony, has

in her another harmony, while a vicious

soul has a discord; therefore the virtuous

soul is more of a harmony, that is, more

of a soul, than the vicious. But this being

contrary to our premisses, we are forced

to conclude that no soul is more virtuous

or vicious than another; or rather that all

souls, being complete harmonies, are com-

pletely virtuous: a reductio ad absurdum.

The second argument will reach those

who accept neither ἄμμησις nor the ideal

theory, but who do accept the view that

virtue is a harmonious state of the soul.

It is to be observed (1) that the premiss

in 93 A πολλοῦ ἂρα δεῖ κ.π.λ., of which a

different use is made in the next chapter,

here is simply brought in to show that

the perfection of the harmony depends

upon the tuning of the strings &c., and

consequently that as these may be more

or less in tune, the harmony admits cor-

responding degrees of completeness: (2) the argument might seem to be complete

in 93 B, where it is allowed that, while

harmony admits degrees, soul does not.

But we should regard all the earlier part

of the chapter as collecting the materials

for the refutation which proceeds consecu-

tively from 93 D: moreover Plato had to

guard against the rejoinder that, although

harmony, as such, admits of degrees,

there may yet be particular kinds of har-

mony, whereof soul is one, which do not

admit of degrees.

11. ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία[ ἐναντία is of course accusative plural. Plato means

that the harmony is entirely the outcome

of its constituents and is conditioned by
kynethnai & phlégxastei & ti állo énaptiethnai tois autês mé-
resteiv. Polllou méntoiv, efph. Ti ðe; oûx oûtos ármovía têfiekiv
eînai ékástê armovía, ós ãn ármovsth; Øv maðhânoiv, efph. Øvchi,
ðe ðe, ãn mèn màllou ármovsth kai èpî plêon, eîper èndéxeitai
touto ñýngesetai, màllou te ãn ármovía eîn kai plêonv, èi ðe ñttou 5
tè kaï èp' èllâtv, ñttou te kai èllâtvv; Pánv ge. 'H oûn èsti
touto perî psuvxhî, ñôste kai katà touto smikrôttatou màllou ëtérav
ètérav psuvxhî èpî plêon kai màllou & èp' èllâtvv kai ñttou  tôutó
eînai, psuvxhî; Øû'd' ópovstioiv, efph. Fère ðh, efph, pròs
C Dîos' légetai psuvxhî & mèn noîn te ëkheiv kai ãrèthn kai ènìa
anagthî, ñè de ánoïav te kai moçhthîrav kai ènìa kakh; kai taûta
alhthôs légetai; 'Alhthôs mèntov. Tòv oûn thêménon psuvxhî áp-
them, having no independent existence: as you tighten the string the tone rises. On this ground it would be impossible
for a soul to be in a harmonious state, i.e. virtue, independently of the physical conditions
of which she herself is the result.

4. màllou ármovsth kai èpî plêon] There
must be some distinction between màllou
and èpî plêon. I think màllou may apply
to the degree of completeness in which
the sôvthes is accomplished, and èpî
plêon to the character of the sôvthes
itself. To take an illustration from
music (1) the two notes forming an octave
may be more or less in tune; (2) the
to tâ  tôutó ñìa toûn álìmôtôv ós Kate
ármovian katákórestâtyn de tîn ñi ña pñwv
às màłsta. As to the màllou kai ñttou he
remarks èxei ñar ékástê armovía plástos ti
taka tîn anôthn, oû mîn katà tòn ármovíkôn
lågòv: that is to say, although one pre-
cise ratio alone constitutes a true octave,
there is a certain margin of variation
within which the ear will accept the
interval as an octave.

7. màllou ëtérav ëtérav] I have re-
tained màllou with all the mss. It is
bracketed by Schanz and expunged by
the Zürich editors. màllou however is
not seldom used by Plato to strengthen
another comparative: cf. Tîmæus 87 c
dikaîöteron ñar tòn ágâbhn perî màllou
& tòn kakwv ëxaçhn ëlgon. Politeias 259 c
tîs de ñrastîkî màllou & ñî tîs xeraùteknì-
kês kai ñlôos pràaktikês bòdlev tîn
båsilêa fòwmên oikeîöterov ènìa; Gôxîas 487 b
aîxhûtùteîrô màllouv tîn ñentov. The
present case is, it is true, a stronger one,
since the word màllou is actually re-
pealed; but this is softened by the in-
terposition of èpî plêon, and the pleonasm
seems to me not unnatural. Some editors
would insert psuvxhî before psuvxhî: but, as
Schmidt observes, this is superfluous on
account of the preceding words ñ oûn
èsti touto perî psuvxhî.
μονιαν εἶναι τὶ τῆς φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαις, την τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὐτὶ τινα ἀλλην καὶ ἀναμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἥρμοσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἐξειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὐσία ἀλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀναμοστὸν αὐτὴν τὲ 5 εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐξειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλην; _OCκ ἐξω ἐγων’, ἐφε ο Σίμμιας, εἴπειν. δῆλον δ’ ὅτι τοιαῦτ’ ἀπ’ ἀν λέγοι ο ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. Ὁ Ἀλλὰ πρωμολόγηται, ἐφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἤττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυγής εἶναι τοῦτο δ’ ἐστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ’ ἤττον μηδ’ ἐπ’ ἑπαττὸν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν 10 ἁρμονίας εἶναι’ ἡ γάρ; Πάνω γε. Τὴν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἤττον ἁρμονίαν οὐσίαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἤττον ἁρμόσθαι: ἔστιν οὕτως; ’Ἑστιν. Ὅ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἤττον ἁρμόσμενη ἑστίν δ’ τι πλέον ἢ ἑπαττὸν ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἱσον; Τὸ ἱσον. Ὁ υἱοῦ 15 ψυχῆς, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ’ ἤττον ἀλλή ἀλλης αὐτῷ τούτῳ Ε ἑτέρας ἑτέρας οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἤττον ἁρμόστατι; Οὕτω. Τοῦτο δὲ γε πεπονθοῦσα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι ἀν’; Οὐ γὰρ οὐσιν. Τοῦτο δ’ αὐτ’ οὐδ’ οὐδενός ἀρ’ ἀν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἰπέρ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναμοστία, ἢ δὲ ἁρµήνευσα ἐν; Οὐδὲν πλέον. Μᾶλλον δὲ γέ πον, ὧ Σίμμια, 20 κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχῆς μεθέξει, εἰπέρ ἁρμονία 94 ἐστίν’ ἁρμονία γάρ δὴπον παντελῶς αὐτῷ τούτῳ οὐσα, ἁρμονία, 2. ἁρµονίαν αὐ τινα ἀλλην[ The conception of virtue as a harmonious condition of the soul is peculiarly Platon- ic. Compare the description of δικαιοσύνη in Republic 443 D μὴ ἐλάσσατα τὰ λειτουργία πράττειν ἐκαστὸν εἰν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονέων πρὸς ἀλληλα τα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπ᾽ αὐτὴ τὰ οἰκεῖα εἰθθέμενον καὶ ἄρεταν αὐτῶν αὐτὸν καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλων γενόμενον ἐσκυμὸν καὶ εξαναµο- στάντα τρία δύτα, ὥσπερ θρόνοι πρεῖς ἁρµονίας ἀγέννως, νεάτας τε καὶ υπάτας καὶ μένης. And in Sophist 228 b we hear that vice is a στάσις of the soul. 8. τούτο δ’ ἐστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα] the admission amounts to this, that (in saying one soul is not more soul than another) you affirm that one harmony is not more a harmony than another’. Schanz, following Madvig and Schmidt, brackets ἁρµονίας, so that we must understand ψυχῆς ψυχῆς in agreement with ἑτέραν ἑτέρας. But this prematurely anticipates the conclusion in Ε οὐκοίν ψυχῆς ἢμοστατι. The train of reasoning is thus. We agree that one soul is as much soul as any other. Assuming soul to be a har- mony, this amounts to saying that all these harmonies, which we call souls, are equally harmonies. Now equal harmonies are equally harmonised and have an equal portion of harmony. Therefore souls, being harmonies, are equally har- monised. In other words, if souls are harmonies, they are equal harmonies; but equal harmonies cannot be more or less harmonised one than another; neither therefore can souls. There is no difficulty about ἁρµονίας, if we under- stand that particular harmony which is soul’. 21. παντελῶς] Soul is complete and
perfect soul, as such; therefore complete and perfect harmony: no discord then, and consequently no vice, can exist in her.

4. ψυχὴ πεφυκασίν] Schanz brackets ψυχή, following Heindorf. But the clause is of general application: 'seeing that it is the nature of souls to be this precise thing, namely souls, in the same degree'.

5. ἡ καὶ καλὸς] 'do you think this is a worthy conclusion? or that our theory would have been in such a predicament, had our premiss been correct, that soul is a harmony?'

6. πάσχειν ἄν] The mss. omit ἄν, which however occurs in the citation of Stobaeus. It is certainly necessary, since εἰ... ἢ ἐν ὑπόθεσιν ἢν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδὲ ὀπωστιόυν, ἔφη. //

XLIII. Τῇ δὲ; ἡ δὲ ὃς τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπων πάντων ἔσθ' ὁ τι ἀλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἡ ψυχὴν, ἄλλος τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὔκ ἔγονε. 10 Πότερον συγχρονοῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σώμα παθήμασιν ἡ καὶ ἐναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο, ὡς καύματος ἐνόστος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοιναντίον ἐλκεῖν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ views on the subject will be found in de anima 1 iv §§ 2—9. In the lost dialogue Eudemos he argued against harmony, (1) that harmony has an opposite, viz. ἀναρμοστία, but soul has no opposite—an obvious petitio principii; (2) that the opposite of ἄρμονία σώματος is ἀναρμοστία σώματος: the ἀναρμοστία is disease, weakness, and deformity, therefore the ἄρμονία is health, strength, and beauty; none of which is soul. See Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles p. 26.

11. πότερον συγχρονοῦσαν] The mss. are in confusion here. Schanz gives πότερον [συγχρονοῦσαν] τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σώμα πάθεσιν ἐναντιομένην [παθήμασι], which, omitting the brackets, is the reading of BCD. Schanz considers that the confusion arose because the copist was puzzled by the use of πότερον with a single interrogative. The sentence, as he reads it, seems to me however somewhat bare; and I have reverted to the text of Z. and St. In the next sentence ὡς εἰ is found in B, ὥσιν in CD. ὥσιν is in Stobaeus and many inferior mss. ὡς is in the margin of B, and was approved by Schanz N. C. p. 150, though he now prints [ὁσιν]. St. and Z. give ὅσιν.

έσθελεν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ποὺ δρόμον ἐναντιομένην τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ζ. κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὐ ὀμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μὴ ποτε ἁν αὐτὴν, ἄρμονίαν ἐν οὕτως, ἐναντία ἄδειοι ν ἐπιτεύνοιτο καὶ χαλότο καὶ πάλλουτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος 5 πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν πυγχάνει οὐσα, ἀλλὰ ἐπέσταθαι ἐκεῖνοι καὶ οὔποτε ἁν ἰγμενεύειν; Ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἐφὲ πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τὶ οὖν; νῦν οὐ πάν τοῦπαντίν ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζόμενη, ἰγμενεύουσα τε ἐκεῖνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησὶ τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιομένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζοντα πάντας Δ 10 τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάξουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλγηδῶνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν ἀκουστικὴν, τὰ γὰρ πραδεροῦν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετουσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅργαις καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὕσα ἀλλὰ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οὔτω ποιεῖ ὁμηρός ἐν Ὅδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὅδυσσεά

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίνην ἡνίπταπε μῦθον. τέτλαθά δή, κραδίνη καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτην. 

3. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] 93 A. St. and Z. give ἐμπροσθεν.
4. οἷς ἐπιτεύνοιτο] i.e. ἐκεῖνοι ἂ. cognate accusative, ‘it can never give a sound contrary to the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and all the other conditions of the materials from which it arises’.
12. ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις] The construction is usually regarded as following ἀπειλοῦσα rather than νουθετοῦσα. Heindorf compares Isokrates Argor. 149 c (§ 48) and Lysias against Andokides § 33. But it is surely evident that ἐπιθυμίαις κ.τ.λ. depends on διαλεγομένη, as Schleiermacher takes it.
15. στῆθος δὲ πλήξας] Odyssey xx 17. The passage is quoted also in Republic 390 D, 441 B. 
22. Ὅμηρος] In the same half-serious manner Plato professes to trace the doctrine πάντα μεί back to Homer: Theaetetus 152 E εἰσόν ἅρ ὦκεανῶν τε βεβόν γένεσιν καὶ μυστέρα Θηβῶν, πάντα εὑρηκεν ἐκγέννη τε καὶ κινήσεως. Cf. 153 c.

95 A—E, c. xlv. Having thus disposed of the theory of harmony, Sokrates proceeds to deal with the objection of Kebes, which he first recapitulates. If the philosopher is to feel any reasonable confidence that his life in Hades will be the happier for his devotion to philosophy on earth, we must prove that the soul is absolutely indestructible. It is not enough that she is strong and godlike, nor that for ages before our birth she enjoyed an
XLIV. Eilev δη, ἡ δ' ὤς ὁ Σωκράτης, τα μὲν Ἄρμονίας ἡμῶν τῆς Θηβαίκης ἢλεά πως, ὡς έοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἐφι, ὁ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφι ο Κέβης, ἐξευρήσεις τούτοιρ γοῦν τῶν λόγων τὸν πρός την Ἄρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπτε ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γάρ 5 Β λέγοντος ὦ τί ἦπορει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον, εἰ τι ἐξει τις χρῆσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἐδοξέω εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἐφόδον οὐ δέξατοι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἦν βαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ἡ γαθέ, ἐφι ο Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῶν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν 10

going intelligent existence. This does not prove her immortality: the very incarnation in a human body may be the first symptom of her coming dissolution; it matters not whether she undergo one or many such incarnations; if we cannot, show that she is actually imperishable, our hope of a future life is vanity.

1. τα μεν Ἄρμονίας] Sokrates playfully personifies the theory of his Theban friend as Harmonia the Theban heroine. She had threatened the argument with destruction, but the persuasive tongue of Sokrates has propitiated her. Harmonia naturally suggests Cadmus, who is made to personify the objection of Kebes. Many and marvellous are the interpretations which various commentators have forced upon this simple piece of pleasantry, which ill deserves such treatment. But even the laboured absurdity of Olympiodoros compares favourably with such trifling as Stallbaum’s 'Simmiae ratio facilitor, Cebetis difficilior ad refellendum fuit. quam-obrem facile illa uxori haec marito tribuitur'. Supposing the ‘ratio’ of Simmias had been ten times more difficult than that of Kebes, to whom but Harmonia could it have been assigned? Heindorf sensibly says ‘hinc ad alteram illam Cebetis itidem Thebani transituro sponte se Cadmi offerebat mentio’. Mr Jackson has suggested to me that άνεια conveys the notion of ‘bidding farewell’, άναθε having the same sense addressed to a deity as χαίρε addressed to a mortal: this view he supports by Cicero de natura deorum i § 124 deinde si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam 'propitius sit'? This seems to me very probable: άναθε certainly is a form of farewell in Theokr. ΧV 143, where the lady ends her song with άναθε νῦν φιλ' 'Αδωνι, καὶ εἰ νέος' εἰθυμήσας. Compare Apollonius Rhodius iv 1773 άναθε όριστήν μακάρων γένος: the poet is taking leave of his heroes.

6. δ' ο τι ἦπορε] So Schanz after Forster. I have adopted δ' τι mainly because λέγοντος seems to want an object. If δε be retained we must translate: 'while Simmias was speaking, at the time he was stating his difficulty'. Kebes did not agree with the theory of Simmias, but apparently did not see his way to refute it.

10. βασκανία] 'lost some malign influence should put to confusion our discourse that is to come'. βασκανία expresses the prevalent superstition that over-confidence on the part of man drew down on him the resentment of superhuman powers. Cf. Verg. Ecl. vii 27 aut, si ultra placitum laudarit, bacchare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro. The ‘mala lingua’ of Codrus vents its malice, not in abuse, but in extravagent praise exciting supernatural wrath. This feeling has found its
most perfect expression in Caliban upon Setebos, e.g. 'Meanwhile the best way to escape His ire Is, not to seem too happy. 'Sees, himself, Yonder two flies, with purple films and pink, Bask on the pompon-ball above: kills both'. Plato however, when speaking seriously, is careful to repudiate the popular notion of being φθόνοι: cf. Timaeus 29 ε ἀγαθὸς ἤν [sc. δέ τοῦ τῶν ξυναστάς], ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ ουδένος οὐδέποτε ἐγγίζεται φθόνος. See too Phaedrus 247 η φθόνος γὰρ ἐξω θέου χρόνου ἴσταται. Aristotle also denies it, *metaph.* I ii 9832. ἠμῶν is Heindorf's correction for ἠμῶν, which seems too far removed from τὸν λόγον.

1. ἔσεσθαι seems suspicious, and is bracketed by Schanz. As it has strong ms. support however I have retained it. λέγεσθαι has hardly any authority.

2. Ὀμηρικῶς Prof. Geddes rightly translates, 'as Homer's heroes do': not, as Wagner, 'in Homeric phrase'.

4. εἰ φιλόσοφος αὔτη[.] Note that Plato once more carefully marks the proof of immortality as merely subordinate to this main thesis.

6. ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ] i.e. ἐν βίῳ μὴ φιλοσόφῳ.

7. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν] 'but as for proving that the soul is a strong and godlike thing and that she existed even before we were born as men—there is nothing, you say, to prevent all this from showing, not indeed her immortality, but that she is long-lived, &c.' That is to say, Kebes does not object to the reasoning of Sokrates, so far as it merely shows that the soul is very durable; but it is none the nearer to showing that she is immortal.

13. ἀρχὴ ἣν αὐτῆς ὀλέθρου] Kebes did not put it quite in this way; Sokrates amplifies his expression in 88 Λ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαίς γενέσεις.

14. ἥλιος] The change of mood is readily understood if we transfer the words from reported to direct speech. The two imperfects would naturally be used by Kebes in making his statement: 'for all your reasoning, she was none the more immortal' (ἡν = ἦν ἀρα); 'the incarnation was the beginning of her dissolution': while the two optatives would in his mouth be present indicative; ἥλιος and ἀπόλλυται. As Ast says, the construction follows ὅτι: cf. 96 b, where ὅτι is never actually expressed.
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4. πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω] This extreme care in preparing the indictment serves to remind us of the vital importance of the coming struggle. All that precedes has been, so to speak, mere skirmishing: from this point the main battle begins; the whole strength of the ideal theory must be put forth to secure the victory.

95 Ε—97 Ψ, c. xliv. This demands an investigation into the causes of generation and decay, on which subject Sokrates proposes to relate his own experiences. In his youth he was strongly fascinated by the old physical philosophy; he inquired whether heat and cold were the universal generative forces; whether the blood were the source of intelligence, or fire, or air, or the brain. But finally he came to the conclusion that he had no aptitude for such speculations, and even lost his faith in the knowledge he before supposed himself to possess.Formerly he rested comfortably in the belief that eating and drinking were the cause of growth; nor did he shrink from saying that one man was taller than another by the head, and that ten are more than eight because of the addition of two. But now he cannot satisfy himself that the mere juxtaposition of separate units is a sufficient cause for their being two; all the less because the same result is produced by the precisely opposite process of division; nor can he even tell why one is one; but he is forced to reject the physical method as affording no real explanation of anything.

10. ὅλως γὰρ] The ἀπορία of Kebes necessarily raises the question propounded in Τίνακες 27 Ε τί τὸ ὅν ἄει γένεσιν ἢ ὁικ ἐχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ὅν ἢ ὅν ὃδεποτε; The immortality of the soul can only be proved by means of the theory of ideas; and in order that we may fully understand the bearing of that theory, it is put in sharp contrast with the ἀδιάσεως of previous philosophies.

11. τά γε ἐμά πάθη] It has been maintained that we have here a piece of actual history; that the mental development of the real Sokrates is here described. This is however highly improbable. We know from Xenophon (mem. i i 11—15) that Sokrates had the utmost distaste for physical speculation; nor does Xenophon say one word which leads us to suppose this was the result of fruitless study. Such inquiries must have been always alien to the strongly practical genius of Sokrates. Plato may be merely describing in its supposed effect on an individual mind the development of philosophy to the theory of ideas; but it is not impossible that he is recounting his own experience. Nothing can be more probable than that a mind so insatiably thirsting for knowledge should have
already sought it from every existing source, and that when he met Sokrates his disappointment in all should fast be leading him to philosophic scepticism. But in the lack of direct evidence it would be rash to speak positively.

2. ὃν ἄν λέγῃς i.e. whatever you may have to say after hearing my reply. ὃν λέγεις would refer to the statement already made by Kebes; but this has less ms. authority.

8. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν] This was held by several philosophers, first perhaps by Anaximandros, of whose ἄπειρον, according to Plutarch and Stobaeus, the first determinations were these. Simplicius assigns to him other ἐναντιώτιτρα among the first determinations, such as ἐξωρὸν and ὑγρὸν. To Anaxagoras this classification is attributed by Theophrastos de sensu 59; and to Archelaos by Diogenes Laertius ii 16. Compare Aristotlde gen. et corr. ii ii 320b24 θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ύγρὸν καὶ ἐξωρὸν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικῷ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ παθητικῷ λέγεται. Schanz gives τὸ θερμὸν [καὶ ψυχρὸν].


10. τὸ αἷμα] See Empedokles 315 (Karsten):

αἷματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀμ-φύρωτοις,

τῇ τε νόημα μᾶλλον κυκλίστεται ἄμ-

θρόπωσιν;

αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώπος περικάρδιον ἐστὶ

νόημα.

ὁ ἀήρ] This too was the view of more than one philosopher. Air was the ἄρχη of Anaximenes. Diogenes of Apollonia said the soul was dry hot air; as in a passage quoted by Simplicius, καὶ πάντων τῶν ᾧῶν δὲ ἡ ψυχή τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀέρ ἄθερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἐξ, ἐν ὡ εἰμέν, τοῦ μὲντοι παρὰ τοῦ ἑλῶν πολλῶν ψυ-

χρότεροις; and again ἄθρωπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἥξα ἀνατηρώντα ἄξιος τῷ ἀέρι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτότις καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ νόης. Cf. Theophrastos de sensu 39—45.

τὸ πῦρ] This was held by Heracleitos, who considered the soul as a ἕξα ἀναθημ-μασις. Cf. Arist. de anima i ii.

11. ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλος] It is very doubtful to whom this doctrine must be assigned. Possibly it was merely a popular opinion, as Wytenbach thinks. It has been ascribed to the Pythagoreans; but this rests only on a statement of Diogenes Laertius (viii 30), which has a suspiciously post-platonic appearance. R. Hirzel (Hieros, vol. xi p. 240) endeavours to trace it to Alkmaion of Krotona; but his evidence
hardly amounts to proof. Theophrastos de sensu ῥεῖ does indeed say of him that he affirmed ἀπάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις συνηρτήσας ποιόν ἐν ῥήγεφαλον, but this is not very definite. It may be observed, that the brain is not ὅ φρονοιμέν, but ὅ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων: and the view of Hippokrates is not far off this. In a passage quoted by Heindorf, ὁς ὅρον ἐπιτύχεμ, he says of the brain, οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡρέος γενομένων ἁρμήνευς, ὡς ὑγιαίνου τυχάνην τὴν ὑπὸ φρόνησιν ἀυτῷ ὁ ἄρε παρέχεται. Thus Hippokrates may be said to have held that air is ὅ φρονοιμέν and the brain is ὅ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων. Still as the brain is introduced as an alternative to air, not as supplementary, probably no special reference to Hippokrates is intended. Plato's own view is that the brain and spinal marrow form the medium through which the soul acts on the body: Timaeus 73 C, D.

5. ἀφυῆς εἶναι] ‘nothing in the world could be more stupid in such studies than myself’. Core.

6. ἀ καὶ πρῶτον] There are three stages to be discriminated in the ἀπίθη of Sokrates: (1) the period when he was content with the ordinary beliefs of the unreflecting many concerning γένεσις καὶ φθορά: (2) when he sought some more scientific theory in the speculations of the physicists: (3) when, disappointed in this and failing in his search for the ultimate aitia itself, he fell back upon his system of λόγοι.

11. ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες] This is commonly understood as alluding to the theory of Anaxagoras. But I cannot imagine that any such reference is meant. Sokrates says that his physical studies
γένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστέοις ὀστά, καὶ οὗτοι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ
toῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν
ὁλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ύστερον πολύν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὗτοι γέγνεσθαι
τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν οὕτως τότε ὃμων οὐ δοκῶ σοι
μετρίως. Ἔμοιγε, ἐφθι ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἐτί. ὃμων
γὰρ ἰκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε ταῖς φαίνομεν ἄνθρωπος παραστάς
μέγας σμικρῷ, μείζων εἶναι αὐτοῦ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππουν καὶ
ἔτι γε τούτων ἑναργεστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὁκτὼ πλέονα Ε
εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσθέναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχανιν
10 μείζων εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἐφθι ὁ
Κέβης, τὶ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω ποι, ἐφθι, νῦ Ἔδα ἐμὲ
εἶναι τοῦ οἴσθαι περὶ τούτων τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὃς γε οὐκ
ἀποδέχομαι ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἐνὶ τις προσθῇ ἐν, ἡ τὸ ἐὰν οὐ
προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἡ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ ὁ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν
15 πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτεροῦ τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετος θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ, ὅτε
μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἄλλῃς ἡν, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἥν καὶ οὐκ
ἡσθην τὸτε δύο, ἔπει δ' ἐπιλήψασαν ἄλλῃς, αὐτὴ ἄρα αἰτία
αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενεθαί, ἢ ἕνωδος τοῦ πλησίον ἄλλῃς
τεθήμας. οὐδὲ γε ὡς, ἐὰν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πειθέσθαι
20 ὡς αὐτὴ αὐ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἑναυτία γὰρ
not only brought him no fresh knowledge
but made him sceptical of that which he
fancied he already possessed. This belief
therefore is one that he held, not only
before he made acquaintance with the
works of Anaxagoras, but before he en-
tered upon any physical speculations
whatsoever. It is probably the view of
popular common sense, that the human
frame is composed of the food consumed,
without any reference to the ὄμοιομερη.

7. μείζων εἶναι αὐτοῦ] The mss. have
αὐτῆ. I have accepted Wytenbach's
correction (i) because the following words,
kαὶ ἵππος ἵππου, seem to require that the
object of comparison should be expressed
here also, (2) because αὐτῆ seems super-
fluous with τῇ κεφαλῇ. If we retain αὐτῆ,
we must translate 'just by the head'. Cf.
101 Λ.

14. ἢ τὸ προστεθέν] Wytenbach
writes these words twice over, arguing
that the question should be put thus; if
B be added to A, has A become two, or
B, or are A+B two because of their
juxtaposition? Schanz follows him. I
cannot see that Plato is bound to express
this in full, and therefore I have reverted
to the ms. reading.

18. ἢ ἕνωδος] 'the juxtaposition caused
by their approximation'. τοῦ πλησίον
ἄλλῃς τεθήμας is explanatory genitive
after ἕνωδος: compare Timaeus 58 B ἡ
δὴ τῆς πιλάσσεως ἕνωδος. The right ex-
planation, according to Plato, is not
juxtaposition but participation in the idea
of duality: it is irrational to speak as if
the mere approximation of two objects
one to the other had anything to do with
the question.

20. ἑναυτία γὰρ γέγονεν] The fact that
two opposite processes produce the same
result shows that neither of them can
really be the explanation of the result;
they are συνάλλατα, not αἱρέω.
5. Kata to touton touton tropou] i.e. the method of physical speculation.

6. Autos eikē phrōw] 'I mix up everything at random according to another method of my own'. Such is the literal translation of this difficult phrase, but the meaning is not so easily fixed. Wytenbach, saying that the ideal theory cannot possibly be meant, takes phrōw as virtually a past tense, and explains 'alium modum ex male intellecto Anaxagora suscipientem commentus sum'. Prof. Geddes translates 'it so chances that I form to myself another method'. He says phrōw is 'I work up', like dough, and quotes Aristoph. Birds 482 προσπεφιραται λόγος εἰς μοι: and so Heindorf takes it. But phrōw is not the same as phrāw: Plato always uses the former word in the sense of 'confusing', see below 101 D, Gorgias 465 D &c. For 'kneading' he uses the proper word phrāw, cf. Timaeus 73 E, Theaetetus 147 C. The exact phrase occurs in Aeschylus Prometheus 450 ἐφιντον eikē pánta. Wytenbach's explanation will not do; we have the present tense running through the whole passage. Nor does Sokrates represent his view as arising from that of Anaxagoras. I believe Sokrates is speaking half ironically, half in earnest. We must remember that the Platonic Sokrates took refuge, not in the theory of ideas, which he failed to reach, but in the method of λόγος, cf. 99 E. This method is then what he means by τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον. In 101 C he advises Kebes to leave divisions and additions and such subtleties to those who are cleverer than he. There the irony is obvious; and here with the same irony he says that being unable to follow any of the infallible methods of the physicists he was forced to blunder on after a fashion of his own. And although he does not seriously mean to disparage his own method in comparison with theirs, perhaps he does hint some dissatisfaction that he is still unable to work on the more perfect principle.

97 B—98 B, c. xlvi. Afterwards Sokrates hears a passage of Anaxagoras, wherein that philosopher declares that mind is the universal cause. His hopes are thereby raised to the highest pitch; a system which takes mind for its principle cannot, he thinks, be otherwise than teleological. Anaxagoras will surely point out that mind must order all things for the best, and he will seek no other cause why each thing is as it is, but that it is best so. He will first inform us of the shape and position of the earth and then explain how that shape and position were the best; and similarly with all other natural phenomena, assigning as the cause the best for each and all. So he read the book with eager anticipation.

8. ἀλλ' ἄκοινασ] 'but once when I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras.'
1. τρόπον τινά] 'in a certain way', but not, as we presently see, in the way of Anaxagoras.

2. πάντα [κοσμεῖν]. Hermann is probably right in bracketing κοσμεῖν. Translate: 'if mind orders all things, it places each thing severely as is best', i.e. we must not, as Anaxagoras did, assign ἄφες and ἀλθὲς as causes of various phenomena, if we assign νοῦς as the cause of the whole.

7. περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου] So the best mss. Schanz brackets αὐτοῦ, Z. and St. give αὐτοῦ, omitting ἐκείνου. I think the ms. reading will stand: it refers to the ἐκάστου above; 'he will seek this cause both for the particular object of his inquiry and for everything else'.

10. αὐτήν γάρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὑρήκεναι φήμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὤντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσει πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεία ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγυλὴ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειν, ἐπεκδηθήσεται τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἁμεινὸν Εκατοντακτικά.

15. καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἁμεινὸν ἢν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίνη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδηθήσεται ὡς ἁμεινὸν ἢν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ ἐὰν μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνω, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος.

19. τῆς ποτὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἁμεινὸν ἐστὶν ἐκάστου καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ αὐτὸν φήμην, φάσκοντα ἐν ύπό νοῦν αὐτά

21. πῇ ποτὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἄμεινον] The final cause of the movements of the heavenly bodies is declared in the Timaeus, see especially 39 β foli.
intelligent cause ordered the universe, it is inconceivable that it should not design the best in all things: and this is our proper object of investigation, not the mere physical agencies which immediately produce the phenomena. Plato’s own system is perfectly consistent with this principle: by making the αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸν the ultimate cause he keeps his ontology strictly teleological; and again his teleology is strictly ontological. The cause of each thing is its indwelling idea; this idea is a form of the ἀγαθὸν, therefore the ἀγαθὸν is the cause why each thing is as it is. The βέλτιστον is not merely the design of a creative intelligence; it is the very idea which is symbolized in the particular. In the Timaeus Plato teaches that the entire universe is the self-evolution of absolute intelligence, which is the same as absolute good. This is differentiated into finite intelligences, subject, through their limitation, to the conditions of space and time. Sensible perceptions are the finite intellect’s apprehension, within these conditions, of the idea as existing in absolute intelligence. Thus the perception is the idea, as existing under the form of space. Therefore the idea, which is a form of the good, is the cause of the perception’s existence: that is, as was said above, the ἀγαθὸν is the ultimate αὑτὰ of each thing. But only the first-beginnings of this theory are to be found in the Phædo.

98 B–99 D, c. xlvii. Bitter was his disappointment when he found that Anaxagoras did not really use mind as a cause, but accounted for phenomena by the agency of merely physical forces. Exactly similar would be the conduct of one who, after saying that Sokrates acted by intelligence, should maintain that he sat there in prison because he had muscles and sinews and joints which enabled him to do so; instead of assigning the real cause, that he thought it right to submit to the judgment of the Athenian people. So far as his bones and muscles are concerned, he might have been at Megara by this time; only he thought it his duty to remain. To call such things causes is folly; although they may be termed instruments without which the cause would not produce its effect. But just this confusion of cause and instrument is made by those who suppose a vortex or some other physical force is what keeps the earth in the centre, instead of the true cause, that it is best for it to be there. About this supreme cause, the good, Sokrates would gladly have learnt, could he have found a teacher: as it is he was obliged to content himself with the second best method.

8. ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστὴς ἐπίδος [from what a height of hope was I hurled down, when I went on with my reading and saw a man that made no use of mind]. Heindorf takes ἄνδρα = τὸν ἄνδρα: but the above rendering seems preferable. The metaphor in φύσιν φερόμενον is surely falling from a height; not, as Wagner has it, ‘starting from great hope, I was sailing along’: a most feeble saying. The same charge is brought against Anaxagoras by Aristotle, metaph. i iv 985a 18. ‘Αναξα-
μενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊόν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὄρος ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν ύψῳ οὐδὲν χρώμενον [οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὑδάτα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἐδοξέα ρημαίοταν πεποιθέναι ὡσπερ 5 ἃν εἰ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει υψὸς πράττει, κάπετα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράπτω, λέγοι πρότον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταύτα υὲν ἐνθάδε κἀθημαί, ὅτι σύγκειται μον τὸ σώμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅστα ἐςτιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυμά ἔχει χωρίς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οία ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ θ 10 ἀνίσεσθαι, περιαμpelέσθαι τὰ ὅστα ἐὰν τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτ’ αἰωρουμένων οὐν τῶν ὑστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἰννο-βολαῖς χαλώτας καὶ συνεῖσονται καὶ συνεῖσονται τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεῖ οἶνον τ’ εἴναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμψθεὶς ἐνθάδε κἀθημαί καὶ αὐτ’ περί τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι υμῖν ἐτέρας 15 τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνᾶς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἄκουσ καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν ἐ 6ι 1 , ἐπειδῆ Ἀθηναῖως ἐδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὸν καταγγείσασθαι, διὰ ταύτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐτ’ ἐδοκεῖται ἐνθάδε κἀθημαί, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένουτα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἡν ἄν κελεύωσων ἐπεὶ 1ο νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πάλαι ἄν ταύτα τὰ νεῦρα τε καὶ τὰ ὅστα ἂ 99

γόρας τε γάρ μηχανή χρῆται τῷ νῦ τρός τὴν κοσμοποιεῖν, καὶ ὅταν ἐπορήσῃ διὰ τὸν αἰτίαν εἰς ἀνάγκης ἐστίν, τότε παρέλκει αὐτον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοις πάντα μάλλον αἰτίαται τῶν χωμομένων ἄθροι: compare Latus 1507 b, c. Schanz brackets καὶ before ἀναγιγνώσκων, but this causes a harsh collision between the two participles.

2. οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον] I concur with Mr Jackson in regarding these words as an unmeaning interpolation. The sole complaint Plato has against Anaxagoras is that he made no use of νοῦς: what then are these αἰτίαι that he ought to have introduced? We cannot understand it as explanatory of τῷ μὲν νῦ ὁδὲν χρῶμενον, ‘making no use of mind, that is alleging no real (primary) causes’, (1) because the distinction between primary and secondary causes has not yet been made, so that a reference to it would be unintelligible, (2) the plural is fatal to such a rendering; there is but one real cause, that is νοῦς.

9. διαφυμά ἔχει χωρίς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων] ‘joints to separate them one from another’, and so render the limbs flexible. διαφυμά and ἄρθρων regard the joints from opposite points of view; the former as breaking the continuity of the bones, the latter as knitting the frame together.

νεῦρα here, as always in Plato, mean sinews or muscles, not nerves. Of the nerves he had no knowledge. Cf. Timaeus 74 D.

19. οὐν ἄν κελεύσωσιν] Hirschig most unnecessarily brackets these words. It is true there is now no doubt what the sentence is; but Sokrates expresses in general terms that he deems it best to submit to whatever may be the judgment of the Athenians: compare οὐν ἄν τάττῃ below.

20. πάλαι ἄν ταύτα] The bones and muscles cannot be the cause; for they
The page contains a portion of the Greek text from Plato's dialogue, translated into English. The text is a dialogue between Socrates and Meno, discussing the nature of knowledge and inquiry. The page includes a section where Socrates introduces the concept of recollection, or anamnesis, as a way to acquire knowledge. The translation is followed by a modern English commentary by a contemporary scholar, discussing the implications of Socrates' arguments and the importance of recollection in the context of Plato's dialogues.

The commentary discusses the significance of Socrates' method of inquiry, known as the Socratic method, which involves asking questions to elicit knowledge from the interlocutors. The scholar notes that Socrates' approach is aimed at demonstrating the interlocutors' lack of true knowledge and the necessity of philosophers to unveil the ignorance that is present in their subjects. The commentary also touches on the ethical implications of Socrates' method, emphasizing the importance of education and the pursuit of wisdom.

Overall, the page provides a window into Socrates' philosophical method and the ethical implications of his approach, as interpreted and elaborated by the commentator. The text is an excerpt from a broader narrative, illustrating Socrates' engagement with the community and his efforts to educate them on the nature of true knowledge.
The image contains a page from a document written in Greek. However, the content appears to be a mixture of Greek and partially translated text, making it challenging to extract meaningful information. The text seems to be discussing philosophical concepts, possibly related to Anaxagoras and his theories. For a precise understanding, a proficient translation is necessary to comprehend the context and meaning accurately.
XLVIII. "Εδοξε τοῖνυν μοι, ἡ δ' ὃς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῦν εὐλαβηθῆναι, μὴ πάθουμι ὑπὲρ οἱ τῶν 5 ἥλιων ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι διαφθείρονται γάρ του ἐνιοῦ τὰ ὄμματα, ἐάν μὴ ἐν ὑδατὶ ἡ τινὶ τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται Ε τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτον τι καὶ ἐγώ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα, μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχήν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοὺς ὑμασίν· καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειροῦν ἀπτεθαι αὐτῶν. ἦδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνως τυχῶν τις ὀφροῦ κάποιος πλήγ κατὰ Πανσανίαν. Plato uses it again, Politicus 300c, Philebus 19c. Compare Aristotle Nic. Eth. II ix 4 ἐπεὶ ὅντα τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρας χαλεπῶν, κατὰ τῶν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. Also politics III viii 6 (Susemihl) 128419.

99 D—100 A, c. xlviii. Since then, continues Sokrates, I have been forced to abandon the search for the true cause, and fearing lest, as those who rashly take observations by gazing on the sun himself, instead of his reflection in the water, are bereft of their bodily vision, my soul should be blinded in the endeavour to behold truth herself, I betook myself to contemplating her image, by which I mean definitions or notions. And yet this comparison is scarcely fair: for he that investigates truth in notions certainly does not see her in a similitude more than he who observes sensible objects. Anyhow this was the course I took: assuming the best definition I could form, I regard whatever agrees with that as true, and whatever does not I reject as false. I will presently explain my method more clearly.

From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that my interpretation of this extremely difficult passage differs widely from that of other editors. My objections to their views and defence of my own will be found in appendix II, as requiring too much space for a note.

5. τὰ ὄντα] 'realties'; i.e. from Plato's point of view the true causes, τὰ γαθόν καὶ δῶν.

8. τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ] Cf. Republic 516 Α.

9. τὴν ψυχήν τυφλωθεῖν] Compare the metaphor in Republic 527 D τὸ δ' ἐστιν τὸν πάνω φαίλον, ἄλλα χαλεπῶν πιστεύσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου ὄργανον τι ψυχής ἐκκαθαριστάτε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενοι καὶ τυφλοῦσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρείττον ὅν σωθήται μιρρόν ὀμμάτων· ἑνὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὀράται. πρὸς τὰ πράγματα] i.e. the ideas themselves. Cf. 66 D αὐτή τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτά τὰ πράγματα. The idea is called πράγμα in virtue of the antithesis between 'thing' and 'shadow'.

10. ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων] This is of course metaphorical, like βλέπων, with all the powers of the soul. But with respect to this clause see appendix II sub fin.

11. εἰς τοὺς λόγους] The meaning of this can be fully understood only after a very careful study of Republic 506—518. Briefly however it is this. The Sokratic method of definition was, by comparison of a number of particulars which we designate by the same name, to ascertain what attributes were merely accidental in various particulars, and what were es-
skepetin tov outon ton ultheian. 'Isws mven ouv o eikai-zero totopon tina ouk eiokev ou gar panu sunvhowo ton en tois logous sko-100 poiymenon ta ousta en ekisai malloan skepetin h ton en tois eigrhous. all' ouv de taute ge 'ormhsa, kai upothemenos ekastote logon ou 5 an krino erfrowenastaton einai, o me an moi dokh touto symb-phonain, tithmi wos alithi ousta, kai peri ai'tias kai peri tov allwn aptantw ton oustw, de 2 an m, wos ouk alithi. bovloimai de soi safesteron eiphein o legw: hmaia gar se vno ou mauthanein. Ouv ma ton Dia, efhi o Kebh, ou sfodora.'

10. XLIX. 'Alall' h de ose oude legw, ou'deven kaiwv, all' uper awei B

tential to the class: thus in defining a horse we must distinguish between those qualities which some horses possess and others do not, and those without which the animal would not be a horse. The definition thus formed is the logos, the concept or general notion. Now in the earlier stage of the ideal theory, wherever there is such a logos, there is also an idea, corresponding to every group of particulars called by the same name (Kepulic 506 A). The principal difference between the logos and the ideia is (1) the logos is a mental concept, having no existence but in our thought; the ideia is a self-existing essence, independent of our thought: (2) the logos includes all that we can discover about the class by observation; the ideia includes all that there is to be known about it. Therefore from the Platonic point of view the logos is our conception of the ideia, the reflection of it in our mind; which reflection only imperfectly represents it, inasmuch as it is derived from an imperfect apprehension of particulars, which themselves are only imperfect likenesses of the idea. In this sense it is that Plato regards the logos as eikwv tou oustos. This matter has been admirably cleared up by Mr Jackson, Journal of Philology vol. x p. 132 foll. See introduction § 5. There is an interesting use of logos in Laws 895 D, where the Athenian says de' ouk en ethlebais peri ekaston tria noeiv;...en mev ton oustian, en de tis oustias ton logos, en de to onoma.

The approximation of ousta to the Aristotelian sense is also notable.

1. [Isws mven ouv] Sokrates stops to guard himself against conceding too much. The logos are indeed only eikones, but so also are the sensible particulars; and the latter are the less trustworthy. He then who seeks truth en tois logos does not deal with images any more than the physicist who investigates natural phenomena. For φ εδε give οσ, which perhaps should be retained.

3. ton en tois eigrhous [erfa] here= the particulars. The word is used because of the familiar antithesis with logos: not, I think, with a view of denoting the particulars as works or products of the ideas whence they derive their existence.

4. allou dven de] 'however that may be'. Sokrates does not propose here to debate the issue raised in the preceding sentence. [upothemenos] The method is more fully explained in the next chapter. For example, Sokrates by examining a number of instances of dikaios forms his upotheias as to the nature of dikaiosth. This upotheias is his conception of the autod dikaios. Then he compares with this upotheias particular dikai, or whatever professes to be such, and admits or rejects each in so far as it agrees or disagrees with the upotheias.

100 B—102 A, c. xlix. My method is nothing new, he proceeds: it starts from the ideal theory which is familiar to us;
and by means of this theory I hope to prove the soul's immortality. Starting from the assumption that there are ideas of beautiful and just and great &c., I simply affirm that all particulars possessing these qualities possess them through the idea, whether by participation, presence, or communion, or however you may define the connexion. All other causes are beyond my comprehension; I cling simply to my safe reply, that the idea of the beautiful is the cause of beauty. If you accept this, you will never consent to say that one man is greater or less than another by a head, but by greatness or smallness; nor that ten are more than eight by two, but by multitude. Similarly when one is added to one, or divided, the cause why the two are two is not addition or division, but the idea of duality: all other causes you would leave to wiser heads than yours. Again if you were forced to give an account of your hypothesis, you would proceed to a higher generalisation, and again to another; ascending till you reached one that was adequate: and you would beware of falling into the confusions of thought, of which sham philosophers are guilty. Here Echekrates interrupts to express his admiration of Sokrates' clear exposition.

The upshot of this chapter is that universals alone can be known. For the present however these universals are in the form of λόγοι or υποθέσεις, which are not objects of νοῦς proper. When dialectic is made perfect λόγοι will be exchanged for ἱδεῖα, υποθέσεις for ἀρχαί.

2. έρχομαι γαρ δή ἐπιχειρῶν] As Heindorf observes ἐπιχειρῶν ἐπιδελεξασθαι has virtually a future force, whence it takes the place of ἐπιδελεξόμενον, which would be the ordinary construction. Cf. Theaetetus 180 c ὅπερ ἦν ἔρων.


13. τὰς σοφὰς παῦτας] i.e. the causes of the physicists.

17. ὅτι οὐκ ἀλλο τι ποιεῖ] This is the passage referred to by Aristotle de gen. et corr. II ix 332 b 9 ἄλλ' οἱ μὲν ἱκανὴν
καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία εἶτε ὅπως [προσγενομένη]: οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ καλὸν τὸ καλὸν γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαντῶ ἀποκρίνοσθαι καὶ ἀλλῳ, καὶ τοῦτον ἐχόμενον ἤγονθαι οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλές εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐκ τοῦ καλὸν καὶ ἀλλῳ ἀποκρίνοσθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλα' ἡ οὖ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἅρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζων μείζων, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττων ἐλάττων; Ναὶ. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἂρα ἂν ἀποδέχοιτο, εἰ τίς τινα φαίνετε ἐπέρον ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ

φήσθαι αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι τῇ τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὥσπερ ὑ ἐν τῷ Παλαιων Σωκράτης: καὶ γάρ ἐκείνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ὑδέθεν εἰρηκόσιον, ὑποτίθεται ὡς ἐστὶ τῶν ἄντων τὰ μὲν εἶδον δὲ μεθεπτικά τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν εἰκόνι εἶναι μὲν ἐκαστὸν λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἴδος, γίγνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάλλησην καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολὴν· ὡς' εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἶδον οἴεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰτίαν εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φύσεως. Αὐτὴν ἀριθ. 1 ix 991b. 3.

1. εἰτε ὅπη δη καὶ ὅπως [προσγενομένη] Τοῦτο παρεγέμισιν ἔχεις. Τοῦτο εἰτε ὅπη δη καὶ ὅπως [προσγενομένη] has given much trouble to the editors. Wyttenbach proposes προσαγενομένη, which, though accepted by the Zürich editors, is hardly satisfactory. Schanz and other recent editors bracket εἰτε, which is precisely the word I should most wish to keep. For surely Plato is suggesting some alternative to παρουσία and κοινωνία, not merely some mode of their existence: moreover προσγενομένη is not properly applied to those two nouns. Ueberweg's προσγενομένου is much better, and I should be content to adopt it, but that Mr Jackson's suggestion to omit προσγενομένη seems to offer a better solution of the problem. προσγενομένῃ is a familiar word as applied to the connexion of ideas and phenomena; cf. Hippias maior 289 d, 292 d, Parmenides 133 ε, and is especially common in later writers; we may therefore easily suppose it to be a marginal note upon ὅπη καὶ ὅπως. On the other hand, had Plato written προσγενομένου, there seems no obvious reason for its corruption into -η. A very similar use of ὅπη καὶ ὅπως is found in Laws 899b θεός αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσωμεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἔνοικας, ἵνα ἄρα, κοσμοῦν πάντα οἰκανόν, εἴτε ὅπη τε καὶ ὅπως. I should add that Olympiodoros in quoting this passage omits προσγενομένη.

2. οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο 'for I do not proceed to insist upon that point', i.e. all he insists upon is that the idea is the cause; he does not specify the mode of its operation. This phrase is an indication that Plato at this period did not entertain a view of the relation between ideas and particulars definitely distinct from that expounded in his later writings; but that he had not as yet applied himself to working out the question. In the later dialogues he does not so much alter his view as define it; the definition however necessarily leads to important modifications in the theory of ideas, and to the decisive rejection of the doctrine of παρουσία, towards which he had hitherto chiefly inclined: see on 73ε: compare Parmenides 133 τά παρ' ἡμῖν εἶτε ἡμών· ματα εἰτε ὅπη δη τις αὐτὰ τίτεσαι. 7. μεγέθει ἅρα] The words μεγέθος and σμικρότης are synonymous with μείζων and ἐλάττων in 75 c.

9. τῇ κεφαλῇ] Plato here clears up a logical confusion. The fact that the dative is used to express both cause and manner gives the ἄντιλογο καίς his opportunity. If Α is said to be taller by a head than Β, he insists upon understand-
ing 'by the head' as denoting the cause, just as in the phrase 'Sokrates acts by intelligence', νῦν πράττει.

6. ἐναυτὸς λόγος] Inasmuch as (1), if A is taller by a head than B, B is shorter than A by the same head, namely A's; which is therefore the cause of both tallness and shortness; (2) the head is small compared with the rest of the body, therefore it is absurd to say A is large through a small part of himself.

25. τοῦ ἄσφαλοις τῆς ὑπόθεσεως] 'clinging to the safeguard of your hypothesis'. The ὑπόθεσις is the notion or definition, λόγος, under which the object to be explained falls. If we are asked, why is a rose beautiful? we shall not attribute its beauty to the colour, shape, disposition of the petals, and such κομψεία, for all these are merely ἐναυτα: we shall say it is because the rose partakes of the beautiful. Now it is of course the idea which is the cause of the rose's beauty; the λόγος is not the cause, but it is the conception of the cause which, for fault of direct apprehension of the idea, we have formed by generalisation from particulars. Only when we know the ideas shall we have a true insight into causation; until then λόγοι are the best substitute. The term ὑπόθεσις, as well as the method, may be traced to Sokrates:
The difficulty of retaining ἐχοίτο in the sense of 'attack' has been perceived by most editors, and Madvig proposes to read ἐφοίτο, which Schanz adopts. But the objections to the passage are by no means thus exhausted. A discussion of them will be found in the article of Mr Jackson's before mentioned, Journal of Philology vol. x p. 148. I shall state them as follows: (1) ἐχοίτο in a sense entirely unparalleled following immediately upon the ordinary use. Wagner indeed finds 'a certain acumen' in this; but wherein it consists he fails to inform us. (2) If we acquiesce in ἐχοίτο or accept ἐφοίτο, the words εἴ δὲ τίς...ἐχοίτο are a clumsy and tautological anticipation of ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνης αὐτῆς δεός σε διδάσκει λόγον. Ast, seeing this, most ingeniously suggests εἴ δὲ τίς ἀλλὰς ὑποθέσεως ἐχοίτο. But, as Mr Jackson observes, there is grave difficulty in applying the term ὑπόθεσις, which is throughout reserved for the Socratic method, to the principle of an opponent, who would doubtless term it αἵρεια. Moreover the introduction of a rival method is here irrelevant. Finally Ast's emendation does not meet the most serious objection of all, which is (3) that the words ἐὼς ἀν...διαφωνεῖ are inconsis-
tent with the method indicated in ὡσαύτως ἀν διδάσκει κ.τ.λ. and are in themselves sheer nonsense. If a hypothesis is proposed to account for a given set of facts, we proceed to observe, not whether the facts are consistent with one another, but whether they are consistent with the hypothesis; and this is precisely what Sokrates professes to do in 100 α μὲν ἄν δοκῇ τούτῳ ἔξωφρων, τίθημι ὡς ἄληθή ὑπ' ὅτα, where he is supposing the truth of his hypothesis established. And presently we see that the validity of a doubtful hypothesis is tested, not by examination of particulars, but by the ascent to a more general hypothesis. The word ὑμηθεῖσα too strikes me as betraying a writer who had no sense of the difference between aorist and perfect participles: below we have ὑμηθεῖσαν. On these grounds I fully agree with Mr Jackson in regarding the passage εἴ δὲ τίς...διαφωνεῖ as an interpolation; probably, as he suggests, by the same hand that inserted ταῖς μὲν γ' ἀγαθαῖς κ.τ.λ. in 72 α. 

4. ὡσαύτως ἀν διδάσκει] i.e. as when we are asked to explain a group of particulars we form by generalisation a concept or definition, ὑπόθεσις, which includes them all, so if we have to explain our ὑπόθεσις we form a wider generalisation which includes that and other ὑπόθεσεις corresponding to other groups of particulars. We proceed from particulars to species, from species to genus, from genus to a more comprehensive genus, and so ascend step by step until we arrive at one that will satisfy our needs.

5. ἂν τοὺς ἄνωθεν] 'whichever of the higher generalisations seems most adequate'. τοὺς ἄνωθεν means the more comprehensive ὑπόθεσεις, farther removed

1. έως ἐπὶ τὶ ικανὸν ἑλθοίς] I agree with Prof. Geddes, though for very different reasons, in holding that ικανὸν does not mean the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. In this passage Socrates is avowedly setting forth his δεύτερος πλοῦς: he has declared his inability (99 D) to attain to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Now if ικανὸν means the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, we have here described no δεύτερος πλοῦς, but the perfect dialectic of which Socrates at present despairs; and we ought to exchange the term ὑπόθεσις for ἀρχή. By the superior method we use our ὑπόθεσεις merely as steps to the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν: having reached this we are enabled to descend step by step, verifying every one of the ὑπόθεσεις by which we ascended: so that the knowledge of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν is essential to the real knowledge of all our generalisations from the highest to the lowest. But since the inferior method only is attempted here, ικανὸν must merely mean a ὑπόθεσις comprehensive enough to satisfy the antagonist or our own doubts. Olympiodorus, though his phraseology is sadly confused, means rightly when he says άμειν αὐτὸ, τὸ ἀναλογομομένον φάσαι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοπιστοὺς ὑπόθεσεις τε καὶ ἀρχάς.

έως ἐπὶ τὶ ικανὸν ἑλθοίς i.e. you would not make a confusion between arguments intended to prove your ὑπόθεσις and arguments applicable to deductions therefrom: e.g. in the case that follows, you would not confuse a demonstration of the ideal theory with a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, which is a corollary from the former. In other words the processes which are not to be confounded are (1) the establishment of the ὑπόθεσεις, (2) the comparison of the ὀρμημένα with the ὑπόθεσις, cf. 100 Α. As Grote says, ‘during this debate [on the ὀρμημένα] Plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself’. In the sarcastic remarks that follow Plato indicates the difference between the aim of the φιλόσοφοι and that of the ἀντιλογικοί: the former seek τῶν ὄντων τί εὑρέθη, the latter αὐτοὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρέσκειν. This spirit of self-satisfaction is exorcised by dialectic; cf. Theaetetus 177 B. φύρως is Madvig’s correction for φύρω, which is retained by Z. and St. οὐκ ἄν φύρως means ‘you would not get muddled’, but the active gives a preciser sense.

102 Α. Plato brings in this brief interlude with his usual skill. The emphatic approval expressed by Echekrates of the principles just laid down serves to impress on us that by them we must stand or fall. We have staked all upon this last effort; we have chosen our own
EX. Νή Δία, ὁ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε' θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὁς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ συμκρόν νυν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκείνος ταύτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὥς Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παρούσις ἔδοξεν.

5 EX. Καὶ γάρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀπούσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούοντος. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεξθέντα;

L. ΦΑΙΔ. Ῥως μὲν ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ἐπεί αὐτῷ ταύτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὑμολογεῖτο εἰναί τι ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων την ἐπωνυμίαν ἰσχεῖν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἱρώτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγει, ἢρ' οὖν, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φήμη μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγει τότ' εἴναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμία ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἐγώγε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὑμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν

battle-ground, on which alone we can hope for victory. Nothing could better mark the gravity of the crisis than this momentary pause in the narrative.

102 Λ—103 Α, c. 1. Assuming then that ideas exist corresponding to the hypotheses, and that by participation in them particulars possess their attributes, Sokrates proceeds thus. When we say Simmias is bigger than Sokrates and less than Phaedo, we are speaking loosely: in reality Simmias partakes of the ideas of great and small; and it is greatness in him which is bigger than smallness in Sokrates, and smallness in him that is less than greatness in Phaedo. For it has nothing to do with the personality of Simmias Sokrates and Phaedo, as such, that one is greater or less than another. We observe then that (1) two opposite ideas can coexist in the same subject, although (2) such opposite ideas cannot combine with each other, either (3) as they exist absolutely in nature, or (4) as they are manifested in concrete particulars.

And this incapacity of one opposite idea to take upon it the nature of the other is true of all pairs of opposite ideas as well as great and small.

Setting aside the metaphysical objections to the doctrine of ideas of relation, which we have here in its most pronounced form, it conveniently serves Plato's purpose to show that in particulars contradictory ideas may coexist. In 103 b we pass on to the next stage. We are here dealing with the participation by particulars in ideas which are not essential to their nature. Greatness and smallness are not essential to a man as heat is essential to fire and cold to snow. With this chapter it is well to contrast Parmenides 150 a foll.

7. ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη] Sokrates now assumes the existence of the ideas, though at present he is unable to attain cognition of them: that is, he assumes that his ὑποθέσεις more or less faithfully represent the substantial realities. Taking then the ideas as the true αἰτία περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φύσεως, it remains to examine whether the immortality of the soul is a legitimate deduction from this theory.

8. τάλλα] i.e. concrete existence. τάλλα is constantly used thus in the Parmenides.

11. λέγεις τότ' εἴναι] The ideas are the cause of comparison, as of everything else. It is through partaking of the ideas of great and small that Simmias is comparable in point of size with other men.

13. τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν] 'as to Simmias being bigger than Sokrates, you
admit the truth is not as expressed in the words'. Strictly speaking Simmias is not bigger than Sokrates, for the personality of two men cannot be compared in respect of size. The only things that can be so compared are great and small: therefore it is the greatness in Simmias which we compare with the smallness that is in Sokrates. But to say that Simmias qua Simmias is greater or less than Sokrates qua Sokrates, would be nonsense.

8. ἐπονυμιάν ἔχει] because he participates in the two opposite ideas. This predication of opposite attributes exhibits particulars in sharp contrast to the ideas, of which no such contrary predication is, to the Sokrates of the Phaedo, possible: cf. Parmenides 129 β εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὕτα τὰ διόμαι τις ἀπέφαυνεν ἀνόμως γιγάντεα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμως δύναι, τέρας ἂν, ὅμοιον, ἢ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφότεροι ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὔδὲν ἐρωτεύεται, ὃ Ἰῆρων, ἀτομον δοκεῖ εἶναι. The whole passage 129 Α—130 Α should be compared, where Sokrates is stating the earlier Platonic doctrine, which in the latter part of the dialogue Plato criticises with a view to its modification.

9. τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων] This reading is due to Madvig, who thus renders the sentence: 'alterius magnitudinis exiguitatem suam superandum subminis-

trans, alteri magnitudinem exiguitatem superantem praebens'; i.e. Simmias submits his smallness to be exceeded by the greatness of Phaedo and presents his greatness to exceed the smallness of Sokrates. On the whole this seems the best attempt to disentangle this troublesome sentence that has yet been made. The ordinary reading is ὑπερέχων, which is thus translated by Mr Cope: 'exceeding the shortness of the one by excess of height, and lending to the other by comparison a size exceeding his own shortness'. The grave objection to this reading and interpretation is that in the first clause ὑπερέχων is followed by the accusative, in the second ὑπερέχων by the genitive. The verb may, it is true, take either case; but surely Plato would not use both constructions in the same breath. Wytenbach, Heindorf, and Ast reconstruct the passage each in his own way; Madvig's remedy is however the simplest.
1. οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος] According to the earlier Platonism, the idea exists (1) absolutely apart from the sensible world, χωριστῇ, (2) inherent in phenomena, to which it imparts their attributes. Not only are opposite ideas incapable of communion, as existing apart by themselves, but also as informing particulars. The importance of this point becomes manifest when the argument is applied to ψυχῇ.

4. ἡ φεύγει καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν] If any object that was great becomes small, the idea of greatness either withdraws from it and goes elsewhere or is extinguished; and the idea of smallness takes its place. But under no circumstances can the idea of greatness remain in the object and accept the attribute of smallness, thus contradicting its own nature.

6. ύπομένον] Schanz has adopted Hirschig’s ὑπομείναν, against all authority. The change of tense is however perfectly proper. Awaiting the approach of the other idea is a prolonged process, accepting it is an act performed once for all. In the next sentence ὑπομεῖνας denotes the actual completion of the process in a specified instance.

οὐκ ἑθέλειν] ‘it will not consent to abide and accept smallness and thus become different from what it was, in the way that I accept and abide smallness and still remaining the man I am, without losing my identity am small; whereas it has never submitted, while remaining great, to be small’. That is to say, if Sokrates δέχεται σμικρότητα, we have a small Sokrates, which involves no incongruity nor loss of identity; but if greatness δέχεται σμικρότητα, we have small greatness, which is incongruous and impossible. Schmidt (krit. Comm. II p. 41) discusses this passage at great length: he would read οὐκ ἑθέλειν εἶναι ἄτι ὑπὲρ ἥν, comparing 103 Ε δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἄτι εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἥν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. There is much to be said for this; but I think the vulgate may be defended, as indicating that in the one case a change of identity is involved but not in the other: the incongruity in fact lies in the supposed retention of its identity by the idea under circumstances which render its retention impossible. σμικρὸν μέγεθος would remain μέγεθος but yet be ἐτερον. Moreover Schmidt’s reading anticipates the point made in μέγα ὀν σμικρὸν εἶναι. On the whole therefore it is better to make no change.

8. οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἷμι] ‘I, this same Sokrates, am small’.

9. τετὸμηκε] as in 103 θολμήσεων. The perfect expresses the fixed constitution of the idea: it has been ordained by nature not to endure smallness.
1. έν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι | i.e. έν τῷ προϊόμενῳ αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον.

103 L—C, c. li. One of the company suggests that this doctrine is inconsistent with our former theory of generation from opposites (7ο c foll.). Sokrates replies that then we were speaking of particulars possessing the attributes of such opposites, but now we deal with the absolute opposites themselves. The former can pass from one to the other of the two opposite conditions; but the opposite itself can never put on the nature of its opposite.

8. παραβαλῶν τὴν κεφαλήν] 'bending his head to listen'. As Heindorf suggests, the objector probably spoke in a low voice through diffidence.

9. ἄνδρικως] Sokrates is never without a word of praise for any mark of interest or intelligence in his listeners. Plato is fond of the word ἄνδρικως and its cognates to express staunchness in argument: cf. Thaetetus 204 E, Phaedrus 265 A, Republic 454 B, Laws 752 B: in the last two instances ironically.

10. οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον] The distinction is clear enough. The concrete particular is not in itself opposed to either of the opposites, therefore it can admit either of such opposites without contradicting itself; but the opposites themselves are so mutually exclusive that neither can admit the other without self-contradiction. Hot water can become cold, because water is not itself opposite to hot or cold, nor is any attribute essential to it which is opposed to either. But hot cannot become cold without manifest contradiction of its own nature. Similarly, when we generated ζῷον from τεθνηκός, we did not mean that death became life, but simply that things that live have passed over from a state of death into a state of life. In the next chapter however we shall see that a further refinement must be made.

13. οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν] Simmias can be small and great by participation in the ideas of small and great; but the idea of greatness in him can never have the quality of smallness, so that Simmias should be small by virtue of its immensity. For ἐν τῇ φύσει compare Parmenides 132 D τὰ μὲν εἶδόν ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδελματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει.

15. τῇ ἑκείνῳ ἐπωνυμίᾳ] Here Plato propounds a theory of predication. When we say that Sokrates is small, we do not
mean that Sokrates and small are the same thing, but we call Sokrates after the name of the idea whose attribute he possesses. To mark this point was necessary because of the confusion into which Antisthenes and others had fallen in the matter of predication. The difference between Plato’s treatment of the subject in the Phaedo and in the Sophist has been dealt with in the introduction § 5.

4. οὐκ ἄλθι ‘no, not this time’. The mss. are corrupt here: I have adopted the text of Schanz, except that he brackets ὁ Κέβης. Z. and St. have οὐκ ἄλθ, ἐφὶ ὁ Κέβης.

103 C—104 C, c. iii. The mutually exclusive opposites, hot and cold, are not identical with fire and snow; yet we see that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. Whence we infer that there may be an idea which is not one of a pair of opposites, but which may exclude one of such opposites. For instance, the idea of odd is opposite to that of even, and exclusive of it. Also the idea of three, though not opposite to even, excludes it, because the idea of three necessarily carries with it the idea of odd. Similarly the idea of even and the idea of two exclude the idea of odd. Thus it appears that there are (1) opposite ideas which are mutually exclusive, (2) other ideas, not identical with any such opposite but necessarily partaking of it, which, equally with that opposite, exclude the other opposite.

After establishing in the fiftieth chapter that opposite ideas cannot enter into communication, Plato’s next task is to show that this incommunicability extends to other ideas, which, though not themselves opposite to anything, are inseparably combined with one of such opposites and therefore necessarily exclude the other.

9. ὀπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ] Plato at first speaks of hot, cold, fire, snow, without distinctly specifying whether he means ideas or particulars: presently however he gives a precise statement: we have in 104 A (1) περιτῶν, the idea of odd, (2) τριάς, the idea of three, (3) τρία, the three particulars informed by the τριάς.

12. χιόνα οὖσαν] Schanz writes χιώνα twice, which is far from euphonic and surely unnecessary, the subject being readily supplied from the preceding sentence.

ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν] 102 E.

13. χιώνα καὶ θερμῶν] ‘at once snow and hot’. The sense is perfectly right, and I cannot understand why Schanz should bracket καὶ θερμῶν, as he does καὶ ψυχρῶν in E. For the phrase χιώνα καὶ
θερμῶν is explanatory of the whole clause deξαμένην το θερμῶν ἑτι ἔσεσθαι ὑπερ ἦν, the result of which process would be precisely what Plato says, not snow. Schanz seems to refer it to the ὑπερ ἦν alone. Hirschig goes so far as to bracket all three words; also πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν below. I cannot see that the shadow of suspicion attaches to them.

1. ἀπολείπον[.] That which ἀπολ- λυται is of course not the idea, which is as imperishable existing ἐν τῇ χιώνῃ as existing ἐν τῇ φώσῃ: what perishes is the quality of snow which the particular possesses by the immanence of the idea of snow—the sensible form of snow, such as those described in Tūmaeus 50 c as εἰκόνα καὶ εἴγενα: this however is to explain Plato's words by means of an analysis which he had not yet made.

4. ἔστιν ἅρα, ἣ δ’ ὅσ] ‘it is the case then with some ideas of this kind that not only do we recognise the right of this idea itself to the same name in perpetuity, but also that of some other idea, not being identical with it, which, whenever it exists, always possesses the form of the other.’ For the construction ἔστιν ὡστε cf. 93 b.

6. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅνοματος] So Schanz: rightly, it would seem; cf. below, τὸ γὰρ περίττον ἄεὶ πον δεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ὅνοματος τυγχάνειν. In support of ἐαντοῦ Prof. Geddes refers to 104 A μετὰ τοῦ ἐαντοῦ ὅνοματος. But there, as well as in τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὅνοματι below, a comparison is involved which is absent here. Z. and St. give ἐαντοῦ.

7. τῆν ἐκείνου μορφήν] On this Wyttenbach observes ‘notatur alius verborum usus: quo eidos ut universalis habetur, μορφή minus universale et quasi communio τοῦ eidos: veluti numerus incomparabilis dicitur, ut autem illius morphi habe’. But this distinction cannot be maintained; for, as Wyttenbach himself points out, in 104 D Plato says ἡ ἐναντία ἑδα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἀν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεται, where μορφή = τῷ περιττῷ. In fact μορφή, eidos, and ἑδα are in the present passage interchangeable words. ‘The species has the morphi of the genus present, with whatever else that morphi may be combined’, says Prof. Geddes, rightly.

ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς] No fresh point is introduced here: Plato is merely illustrating his proposition more fully. From his second example he again draws the inference stated in 103 ε, which he gives in a more complete form in 104 β.

ἐκ. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔρωτα] ‘for this is the point of my question’. These words direct the attention of the hearer to the proposition on which most stress is laid: viz. that there are ideas which are not logically opposite to anything, but which nevertheless contain the principle of some opposite and therefore refuse to combine with the rival opposite. The vital importance of this we shall presently see.
7. O ëhmus ërûmûc ðapœa] 'the entire half of the set of numbers' COPE. For the construction cf. Thucydides viii 8τâs ëhmusiais tîwv ðeouv. polûs is similarly used, Thuc. i 5 tîwv ðelostov toû ðiûtou; and other like idioms are given in Wagner's note.
12. Oû ùuûzov ëkeîa tâ ëvanûlia] 'not only those original opposites refuse to admit each other, but also those, which, though not opposite one to another, always contain the opposites, seem no more likely to admit the idea which is opposite to the idea they contain, but on its approach they either perish or withdraw'. That is to say ðràs is not opposite to ðuâs, but it contains an opposite, perittûn, to the idea, ðrûvov, contained in ðuâs. Therefore ðràs equally with perittûn excludes ðrûvov and ðuâs excludes perittûn.
16. Apollûmeva ñ ñækêçëgowiûnta] As Ast says, the construction is as though ñaîvelau had been written instead of õîke.

It might be thought that in the last chapter we had already a sufficient account of these ideas. But in the present chapter one important addition is made. Now we not only say of the ñal' ñâttâ that they ëkxetv tâ ëvanûlia, but also that they ëpipôreme tâ ëvanûlia eis ð tîwv ða-k-âççxv. This is a necessary corollary to the foregoing; but Plato desires to bring it out as prominently as possible, because this is the point at which the whole argument is aimed. Thus the gist of this
chapter lies in its application of the principle to concretes.

8. ἄ ο τι ἰ ἐ ν κατάσχη] 'which, whatever they occupy, compel that to have not only its own idea, but always that of some opposite as well'. The word κατάσχη marks the fresh point: what the idea occupies or informs can be nothing else but particulars.

9. τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν] i.e. ἐκείνου ὁ τι ἰ ἐ ν κατάσχη. Wohlrab strangely remarks 'αὐτὸν bezüglich auf den Plural ἰ'. To say nothing of the grammar, this makes sheer nonsense, representing the idea as the idea of itself. Plato's meaning is plain enough. The ideal triad, for instance, occupying the concrete three, forces the latter to receive not only the special idea, τρίας, but also the idea of a certain opposite, περιττῶν.

10. ἐναντίου ἰ ἐ ν τινος] There is so much confusion in the mss. that it would be rash to assert confidently what is the true reading. This however gives precisely the sense required and differs from the best mss. only in the omission of αὐτῷ.

Notwithstanding that αὐτῷ has overwhelming ms. authority I cannot believe it genuine. The only plan for making sense of it is to read ἰ ἐ τι with Schmidt for ἰ ἐ τί. But the phraseology 'but it also has need of some opposite' is so glaringly inappropriate that it is incredible that Plato wrote it. I have therefore with the Zürich editors ejected αὐτῷ, which Schanz retains within brackets. Ast's ἰ ἐ τι ἰ ἐ ν τινος is not bad, possibly accounting for the corruption ἰ ἐ τινος.

13. ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ] see on 103 E.

14. εἰργάζετο δὲ ἦ περιττότης] The ms. reading ἦ περιττῇ is surely indefensible. Plato never uses such a phrase as ἦ περιττῇ ἰδέα, which would indeed be something very like nonsense. Probably he wrote either ἦ τοῦ περιττοῦ or ἦ περιττώτης: the latter, which was suggested to me by Mr Jackson, I have ventured to adopt, as the mildest remedy I can find for an evident corruption. Compare 105 E οὐκ ἐρῶ ὃ ἰ περιττότης.

15. ἐπὶ τὰ τρία] i.e. three particulars.

17. ἀνάρτιος ἀρὰ ἦ τριάς] The word
'Ο τόινων ἐλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποία οὐκ ἑναντία τινὶ ὑπά οἷος οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἑναντίον, οἷον νῦν ἡ τριὰς τῷ ἁρτίῳ οὐκ ὑπά ἑναντία οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἑναντίον ἄεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυᾶς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα ἑναντία τινὶ ὑπά τὸ ἑναντίον μη δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἃ ἐν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἑναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἔφ᾽ ο̣ τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἢ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἑναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέχεσθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμήσκοιν οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἄκοινεν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἁρτίου οὖν δέχεται, 10 οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα την τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἑναντίον, οἷος δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὖν δέχεται. οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμισίου οὐδὲ τᾶλα τὰ τοιαύτα, τὸ ἡμισὺν, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, Β

ἀνάρτιος is used instead of περιττὴ to denote the opposition to ἀρτίον involved in the number three: the full significance of this mode of expression will be clear when we come to take the case of ψυχή.

1. Ἐλεγον ὀρίσασθαι] Heindorf says 'Ἐλεγον in his, ut saepè, idem fere est quod ἐκέλευον'. Cf. Aeschylus Agamemnon 955 ἕλεγον κατ' ἄνδρα, ἡ μὴ θεόν, σέξειν ἐμὲ.

2. οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἑναντίον] There seems no reason for omitting τὸ ἑναντίον. 'The opposite itself' is distinguished from the idea which is not, but implies, an opposite; and this is all that is meant by the word αὐτὸ. Cf. 103 B. This seems to be the view of H. Schmidt (krit. Comm. ii p. 58), who understands αὐτὸ 'nicht in dem streng philosophischen Sinne an sich'. Stallbaum's plan of taking τὸ ἑναντίον in apposition to αὐτὸ is clumsy.

5. ὅρα δὴ ἐλ οὐτως ὄριζει] resumes the sentence begun at ὁ τοίνων Ἐλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, the construction of which is left imperfect.

μη μόνον τὸ ἑναντίον] 'that not only does the opposite refuse to admit its opposite, but whatever imports an opposite into that to which itself comes—that very importing idea can never admit the opposite of that which is imported'. Sokrates here speaks highly ἄγωγαφικῶς.

Not only will odd refuse to admit even, but the triad, which imports the idea of odd (ἐκείνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἑναντίον) into whatsoever it enters, will itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον) never admit even, the opposite of oddness which is imported by it (τῆν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἑναντιότητα). ἐκείνος is to be joined with ἐπιφέρης. The present definition differs from that in 104 B in the introduction of the word ἐπιφέρων, which denotes that the principle is now being applied to concretes which are informed by the ideas.

10. τῷ τοῖς μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἄλλῳ <οὐκ> ἑναντίον] The insertion of οὐκ is absolutely necessary: there is no sense in which the number ten can be said to be contrary to anything else. Cf. 104 C ἀλλὰ καὶ δῶ αἰχ ὅντα ἄλληλοι ἑναντία ἐξεϊ ἄεὶ τάνατα: and 104 E. Stallbaum's defence of the vulgate apparently fails to satisfy even himself.

12. οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμίλιον] 'nor will τὸ ½ and the rest of the fractions whose denominator is 2 accept the idea of whole; nor yet will ¾ and the fractions whose denominator is 3'. These last examples do not seem very felicitous, since we have no such definite contrast of opposites as in the case of odd and even. We must however take it thus: ½ and ¾ are not opposites to anything; they contain how-
ever the idea of fractionality, which is opposite to that of integrity, therefore they will never admit the latter.

tò ἤμισυν. Schanz brackets this as a gloss.

105 π—δ, c. liv. We are now enabled to advance beyond our first simple and safe hypothesis. When we are asked what by its immanence makes a thing hot, we shall no longer answer heat, but fire: similarly we shall assign fever as the cause of sickness, not disease; the monad as the cause of numerical imparity, not oddness. Applying this rule, when asked what is the cause of life in the body, Kebes answers soul; for soul contains in her the principle of life which is opposite to death; whence soul can never combine with death.

We now see the significance of Plato's insistence on his point that some ideas which are not opposites yet refuse to combine with certain opposites. Soul is not opposite to anything; but she stands in the same relation to the idea of life as fire does to that of heat and the triad to that of oddness.

It is to be noted that a fourth term is added in this chapter. Hitherto we have had three, e.g. περιττότης, τριάς, τριά: the general idea, the special idea and the particular informed by the latter: now in addition to these three we have σώμα in which the particular resides; the fever that seizes on us is not the idea of fever, but a particular fever, which corresponds to τριά, while the idea of fever corresponds to τριάς. Similarly the soul that quickens a particular body corresponds to τριά. Now since this fourth term is itself in no wise material to the argument,—it matters nothing to the immortality of soul whether or not she resides in a body—I conceive the point of it is to emphasise the fact that these particulars too, πυρετός and ψυχή, carry with them the ideas of νόσος and ἀθάνατος, and consequently refuse to admit their opposites. Hitherto it has only been the special idea which ἐπιφέρει the general idea.

3. καὶ μὴ μοι ὅ ἂν ἄρωτῳ] 'and do not answer in the terms of the questions I put, but following the examples I shall give you' i.e. to the question, what makes a thing θερμόν? the answer must be, not θερμότης, but πῦρ. The reading in the text has the best ms. authority and gives the best sense.

5. τὴν ἄσφαλῆ ἐκείνην] Cf. 100 ε ἄσφαλῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐμι καὶ ὁμοίως ἄλλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίνεται καλά. For the use of ἄσφαλῆς cf. Timaicus 50 ο. μακρῷ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄσφαλέστερον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρυσός.

6. εἰ γὰρ ἔρωτο με] 'were you to ask me what must be inherent in a body to make it hot'. Stallbaum seems right in bracketing ἐν τῷ: we thus have the same phrase three times over, with a slight variation in the order of the words. Schanz and others include σώματι in the bracket; but it seems quite as much in place here as in the two passages below.
1. θ ἀν πυρετός] i.e. he will specify the particular kind of sickness as the cause of the term. He will explain that the general term: as Prof. Geddes puts it, the species is substituted for the genus.

2. θ ἀν μονάς] Similarly, instead of assigning περιττότης as the cause of oddness in a number, he will assign the idea of that particular odd number, whatever it may be: monās, like πυρετός, is merely given as an example.

6. θ τι ἀν αὐτῆ κατάσχη] It is to be noted that the usage of κατάσχη here is different from that in 104 b. The soul does not occupy the body in the sense in which τριά occupies τρία: the triad is the cause why the three are three, the soul is not the cause why body is body, but the cause why it is alive. The difference lies in this: the triad is the idea of three; the soul which quickens the body is not the idea of soul, but a particular soul, just as the fever is a particular fever. Thus we have the following terms: (1) the idea of life; (2) the idea of soul, which carries the idea of life to particular souls; (3) the particular soul, which vivifies the body; (4) the body in which is displayed this vivifying power. It is true that an idea of soul is a metaphysical monstrosity; but we cannot escape it here, first because otherwise Plato's elaborate parallel breaks down, secondly because in the earlier Platonism an idea of soul is inevitable. Wherever there is a group of particulars called by the same name, we are told in the Republic, there is an idea corresponding: therefore since there are particular ἐνεργαί, there must be αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι ἐνεργαί. This is one of the errors which Plato rectifies in his later dialogues; for the present we must bear with it. The whole point of this sentence is that not only the idea of soul but also a particular soul ἐπιφέρει ἡμᾶς, and accordingly τὸ ἑναντίον θ ἀν ἰτή ἐπιφέρει αἰώνιον μή τοι δέχεται.

105 d—106 a, c, iv. As then that which will not admit even is uneven, so that which will not admit death, namely soul, is deathless. Now if the negation of even or of heat or of cold necessarily implied indestructibility, then three and snow and fire would not perish at the approach of the opposite to the idea contained in them, but would merely withdraw from it. This however is not the case: these negations do not imply indestructibility; therefore three and snow and fire can cease to exist at the approach of the opposite. But the negation of death does imply indestructibility: soul therefore, on the approach of death, not only refuses to admit it, but also refuses to perish: soul is thus not only deathless but indestructible. Indeed if the eternal principle of life could perish, there is nothing in existence that should not perish.

We have seen that πῦρ and τρία, on the approach of cold or evenness, had two alternatives open to them, either ὑπεκχωρεῖν or ἀπόλλυσθαι: what is not open to them is δέχεσθαι τὸ ἑναντίον. Therefore if in any case ἀπόλλυσθαι were identified with δέχεσθαι τὸ ἑναντίον, it would necessarily be precluded. In the foregoing instances this is not so: ἀπόλλυσθαι is not identical with δέχεσθαι ἐντολῶν nor with δέχεσθαι ἐρημίων. Consequently both alternatives are open to πῦρ and τρία. But in the case of ἐνεργαί this identification actually occurs: δέχεσθαι τὸ ἑναντίον is for the principle of life
106] ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

αὐτή κατάσχη, ἀεὶ ἤκει ἐπ’ ἐκείνῳ φέρονσα ζωήν; "Ἡκεὶ μέντοι, ἐφη. Πότερον οὐ ἐστὶ τι ζωῆ ἐναντίον η̣ οὐδέν; "Ἑστιν, ἐφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει αἰεὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε δεξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὠμολογηται; Καὶ μᾶλα σφόδρα, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.

LV. Τί οὖν τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἄρτιον ἴδεαν; τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀναρτίον, ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον Ε καὶ οὐ ἂν μονοσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; Ἀμουσον, ἐφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἰπον, οὐ δὲ τάφαν τοῦ μὴ δέχηται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. Ἀθάνατον ἀρα ἡ ψυχὴ; Ἀθά- 10
νατον. Εἰπον, ἐφη τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδειξθαι φῶμεν ἡ τῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μᾶλα γε ἰκανὸς, ὁ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἥ δ’ θ’; ὁ Κέβης; εἰ δὲ ἄναρτίον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρον εἰναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἦ ἀνω- λεθρὰ ἂν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρον εἰναι, ὅποτε τὸς ἑπὶ χιόνα θερμῶν ἐπαγάγων, υπεξῆξε 15 ἄν ἡ χιών υούσα σὸς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετο γε, οὐδ’

δέχονται θάνατον: ἀπόλυσθαι is the same as δέχονται θάνατον: therefore, since δέ- χονται θάνατον is precluded, so also is ἀπόλυσθαι; else we should find soul doing what we have agreed is impossible, viz. admitting the opposite idea to the idea contained in it.

6. τί νῦν δὴ ταύτα] ταύτα is in bcd, omitted by Z. and St. Schanz cites Alcid. Ι 109 c πρὸς ταύτ’ ἀρα, τὸ δικαίον, τῶν λόγων πουίσει.

10. ἄθάνατον ἀρα ἡ ψυχή;] It is necessary to distinguish very carefully the meaning of ἄθάνατον. All it denotes here is δ’ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται: it is that which contains the opposite idea to θάνατος, as ἁνάρτιον contains the opposite idea to ἁρτιον. It signifies in fact not what soul is but what she is not; and for the pre- sent we must dissociate the word from the positive notion of imperishability. We are now merely expressing the particular ἐναντίον which soul will not admit; that the exclusion of this ἐναντίον involves indestructibility is an inference we do not reach until we declare that ἄθανατον = ἀνωλέθρον. Wytenbach accurately says ἄθανατον hic dicitur δ’ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται: ἀνωλέθρον, quod superveniente contrario oik ἀπόλυσθαι. For a somewhat similar subtlety compare Aristotle topica vi vi 148b21 foll. where ἄθανατον is regarded as logically distinguishable, though not actually separable, from ἀφθαρτον.

11. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδείξθαι φῶμεν] What has been demonstrated is, not the eternal existence of soul, which is a sub- sequent inference, but that soul contains the opposite idea to death. Dead soul would be analogous to cold fire or even three. It must be borne in mind that ψυχή means the principle of life: a dead vital principle is a contradiction in terms. That this is only a preliminary step to the final induction is marked by the τοῦτο μὲν.

14. εἰ τὸ ἄθερμον] If τὸ ἄθερμον were necessarily indestructible — that is, if ἄθερμον were the opposite idea to ἄθερμον, then snow, as containing ἄθερμον, would not have the alternative of persisting on the approach of its opposite; it must withdraw whole and unmelted. χιῶν ἀπολομένη would then be as impossible as χιῶν θερμὴ is now.
The correction ἄψιχρον, suggested by Wytenbach, seems to me certain. In order to formulate his antitheses with the utmost precision, Plato has coined the words ἀνάρτιον and ἄθερμον, to express the direct opposites of ἀρτιόν and θερμῶν: it seems hardly doubtful that he also coined the word ἄψιχρον to express the direct opposite of ψιχρόν. ἄψιχρον, as Wytenbach says, is the counterpart of ἀθέρματον, not of ἄθερμον: and in a passage where Plato is choosing his terms with such extreme nicety the slightest failure in fitness is not to be tolerated. It is surprising that Wytenbach's admirable correction has been so completely ignored by subsequent editors. Mr Jackson, independently of Wytenbach, made the same emendation. ἄψιχρον is confirmed by the corrupt reading ψιχρόν in Stobaeus εἰ. 1 814.

The inference that soul is immortal is not yet definitely drawn, but is based upon the two statements made in this sentence, (1) soul is ἀδάνατον, i.e. she cannot combine with death and so become dead soul; (2) therefore if ἀδάνατον involves ἀνώλεθρον, soul is ἀνώλεθρον, i.e. she cannot perish. When these two propositions are put side by side, it becomes obvious that the refusal of the soul to admit death implies her indestructibility, since we know that ἀδάνατον does involve ἀνώλεθρον.

It is noteworthy that τεθνηκώα has a different sense here from that of τεθνηκός in the discussion at 71 c: there it implied merely the state of separation of soul and body, but here denotes the actual destruction of the soul.

At last we have the inference definitely stated. Since soul will not admit the opposite of its imma-
nent idea, and since that opposite is death, soul, being deathless, must be imperishable.

2. σχολή γάρ ἂν] Here we have the fundamental postulate on which the whole argument rests: viz. that energy cannot be annihilated. All other things being but forms of energy, may make way for their opposites, since their conversion into the opposite state involves not destruction but simply modification of energy. But vital principle is energy itself, therefore its conversion into the opposite state would mean conversion into non-energy, i.e. annihilation of energy. Plato is simply applying to spirit the principle which the older physicists laid down for matter, and which Lucretius formulates in the words 'ex nihilò nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti'. Similarly we have in 72 D ei γάρ εκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ δὲ σῶμα γίγνετο, τὰ δὲ σῶμα θνησκοῦ, τίς μηχανὴ μη οὐχὶ πάντα κατακαλοῦθηναι εἰς τὸ τεθῆναι; Compare Phædrus 245 D τοῦτο δὲ οὗτ' ἀποκλείονθαι εὑτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἡ πάντα τα ὀφθαλμῶν πάσαν τὰ γένεσιν συμπεσόνται στίχως καὶ μῆποτε οὖσιν ἔχειν ὒδεν κυκλήθηται γενήσεται.

μὴ δέχομαι] It is easier to feel the correctness of μή than to explain it grammatically. The meaning is 'hardly could there be anything else incapable of admitting destruction, if the immortal, being eternal, will admit it'. μὴ δέχομαι φθοράν is in fact equivalent to εἰς τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον φθοράν. Wohlrab compares Cratylus 429 D πῶς γάρ ἂν, ὥς Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο, δέ λέγει, μὴ τὸ δὲ λέγοι; Add Gorgias 510 D τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγώ μέγα δυνατήν καὶ μηδές με ἀδικοίη.

3. el...δεξεται = el ἐθέλει οἱ μέλλει δεξεῖσθαι. The distinction between el with future indicative and ἔδω with subjunctive is apt to be overlooked. The former is constantly used as an equivalent to ei μέλλει, or even ei χρῄ, with infinitive; and the substitution of ἔδω would be, as here, impossible. It were easy to multiply instances, but one may suffice: Aristophanes Fros 1460 εὑρίσκειν τὸ Δτ, εἴπερ ἀναδώσει πάλιν, 'you must find something, if you mean to go on earth again'. Cf. Timæus 31 ε. This usage is recognised by Prof. Goodwin, moods and tenses § 49, note 3: he however regards a number of cases as falling into the class of ordinary future conditions equivalent to ἔδω with subjunctive (§ 50). I cannot but think that such cases are very rare: nearly if not quite all of the instances he quotes might be taken the other way: especially Isokrates Archidamos § 107, where el δὲ φοβησόμεθα is, I conceive, precisely parallel to ἂν ἐθέλωσει ἀποδώσεις: 'if we mean to be cowards'.

Here it may be convenient to give concisely a synopsis of the reasoning in chapters I—lv. After agreeing that the truth of immortality will be best established if we can show that it is a legitimate deduction from the theory of ideas, we set forth thus: (1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary ideas, but the idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes; and this applies both to ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (2) there is a second set of ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite ideas; no such idea can admit the opposite of the idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; e.g. the triad contains the idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained idea; e.g. three things can never be even: (4) if
LVI. 'O δὲ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ἔσχης εἴδος καὶ εἰ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀδάνατον ἔστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἄν ὄμολογηθεὶς μηδέποτε ἀπολλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μὲντοι νῦν Δί' ἐφη ἀνθρώπων τε γε καὶ ἐτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγὼμαί, παρὰ θεῶν. 'Οπότε δὴ 5 τὸ ἀδάνατον καὶ αἰμαφθορὸν ἔστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἦ, εἰ ἀδάνατος εἰ τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ ἀνωλεθρὸς ἄν εἰ; Πολλὴν ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιόντος ἃρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν θυτήν, ὡς ἐοικεῖ, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀδάνατον σῶν καὶ αἰμαφθορὸν οἴχεται ἅπτων, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἃρα, ἐφη, ὁ 10 Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀδάνατον καὶ ἀνωλεθρόν, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσσωσαι ἡμῶν 107 αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν "Δίδου. Ὅμως ἐγὼγε, ὁ Σωκράτες, ἐφή, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδὲ πη ἀπίστευν τῶν λόγων. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Συμμίας ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εῦ ἔχει μὴ καταστηγησαί ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντινα τις ἄλλον καίρων ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα,

in any such instance refusal to admit the opposite necessarily involved indestructibility, we could predicate immortality of that which refused to admit it; e.g. if refusal to admit evenness involved indestructibility, three would be imperishable; but since this is not so, three may perish at the approach of evenness: (5) but in the case of soul refusal to admit the opposite of its contained idea does involve indestructibility, since the contained idea is life, whose opposite is death; and that which will not admit death is imperishable: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, but must adopt the other alternative, ὑπεκχωρεῖν. Else, if the principle of life perished, nothing could be found to resist destruction.

106 D—107 B, c. lvi. Thus from the general principle that all things which refuse to admit death are indestructible we infer that soul can never perish: when death comes upon a man, his mortal part perishes, but his soul withdraws, making way for death, while she herself is saved alive. It must be then that our souls live in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning of Sokrates but still feels misgivings; whereupon Sokrates encourages him to sift the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied.

1. ὁ δὲ γε θεός] We must identify θεός with absolute universal mind, the νοῦς βασιλεύς of the Philoebus, the mythical δημοργός of the Timaeus. Eternity cannot be ascribed either to the deities of popular worship or to those of Plato's cosmology: see Timaeus 41 A, where they are thus addressed by the creator: δι' α' καὶ ἐπισεπερ γεγένησε, ἀδάνατον μὲν οὐκ ἐστε οἴδα ἀληθινόν τὸ πάμπημα, οὐ τι μὲν δὴ λυθήσετη γε οὐδὲ τεῦξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς εἰμῆς βουλήσαντο μελίζως ἐτί δεσμοῦ καὶ κινωτέρων λοχίντων ἐκείνων, οἷς ὅτι ἐγλύγασθε εὔνεδεσθε. In the final development of Plato's system we find that God, the idea of life, and universal soul are identical: ψυχὴ alone of all things is αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀδάνατον. This identification however is not to be found in the Phaedo: it belongs to the consummated idealism of the Philoebus and Timaeus.

8. ἀποθνήσκει] Here again the word denotes annihilation; not as in 71 C.

καὶ ἀδιάφθορον] The distinction made in the last chapter between ἀδάνατον and ἀνωλεθρόν must be carefully borne in mind.

14. εἰς ὄντινα...ἀναβάλλοιτο] It is
needless, as I think, to insert ἄν: this use of the optative both in direct and indirect questions is established by a number of indubitable instances, and probably ought to be retained in some other cases where the editors introduce ἄν. It seems rash to assume in the face of much strong ms. evidence that the old use of the optative had entirely died out in Attic Greek. With the present example Wohlrab compares *Euthydemus* 296 E οὐκ ἔχω ἤμιν πῶς ἀμφορβυσθήνη. A case in direct interrogation is *Gorgias* 492 B τί τῇ ἄλλῃθε αὐχίῳ καὶ κάκιον ἐλή; In both these passages some would insert ἄν; but it is not so easy to dispose of cases like Aeschylus *Choephoroe* 172 and several other passages in tragedy. In Soph. *Oed. Col.* 170 the Laurentian has ποῖ τὶς φροντίδος ἔλθοι; The force is very much the same as that of the ‘deliberative’ subjunctive; but there is a distinction closely analogous to that drawn by Prof. Goodwin between ἄν γενήται and εἰ γένοτο: the optative expresses a conception less vivid and more vague. The following words ἦ τῶν νῦν παρώντα are very needlessly bracketed by Hirschig.

3. τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων] ‘through distrust of human fallibility’. Cf. 85 D. The contrast between the clear-headed logician Kebes and the somewhat vague-minded Simmias is well brought out here. Kebes, sceptical as he is, has found an argument that in his judgment is free from flaw; he therefore freely accepts its consequences: Simmias still hesitates, not because he can find any defect in the reasoning, but rather because the ‘child in him’ cannot be soothed by reason. A good piece of dialectic does not come home to him as to his friend. Sokrates, it may be noticed, while commending his caution, points out what it ought to lead to: not to sighing over human weakness, but to a vigorous examination of the ὑποθέσεις.

5. οὗ μόνον γε] ‘yes, Simmias, and not only so, but, besides what you have just so rightly suggested, you should also, however secure they may seem to you, nevertheless reexamine our first premises’. COPE. There seems no sufficient reason for ejecting ταῦτα τε εὖ λέγεις as Hirschig would do: nor can Ast’s ταῦτα γε εἰ λέγεις be commended.

7. οἵμως ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον] I have followed Schanz in accepting this correction: the vulgate ἐπισκεπτέα involves an anacoluthon so harsh as to amount to bad writing.

καὶ ἐὰν αὐτάς] ‘and if you succeed in analysing them satisfactorily, you will follow up the reasoning, so far as it is possible for man to follow; and only when the result becomes perfectly plain will you cease to prosecute your search’. κἂν τούτ’ αὐτῷ σαφές γένηται, i.e. if the security of the ὑποθέσεις and the validity of the deductions from them become plain, then only you will be justified in relaxing your efforts.
upon that will depend her happiness and misery for all time. The ways of Hades are many and intricate; but the soul that has studied death will find herself at home there, and guided by her attendant genius to the place of judgment will pass her appointed sojourn in the companionship of gods: but the impure will be without friend or companion. To realise what regions the soul enters after death, we must understand the true form of the earth. It is a sphere in equilibrium at the centre of the heavens: the part we inhabit is but a small cavity on its surface, filled with the coarser sediment of air which gathers in it. We have no idea that we dwell in such a hollow, but fancy we are on the surface and that our atmosphere is the true air: but could we mount to the surface, we should see how murky and impure is our dwelling compared with that bright region. We should see the earth's surface splendid with zones of the most brilliant colours, of which ours are a faint image, glowing with flowers and trees and precious stones, all bathed in purest aether, untouched by decay: and the dwellers thereon are free from age and sickness, and the gods come to dwell among them. There are many other hollows on the earth besides ours, greater and less, having subterranean communication; but the greatest of all is called Tartaros, which is pierced right through the earth from side to side. From this all rivers issue forth and into it they all return: and a great pulse sways up and down Tartaros, carrying with it all the air and liquid that are therein, and it replenishes now the rivers that are on one side the earth, now those on the other. All the rivers fall again into Tartaros at a lower point than they flowed out; but not lower than the centre, from which in all directions it is an ascent. Of these rivers the four greatest are Okeanos, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Styx, which flow in many tortuous windings, some beneath the earth and some on its surface. So when the souls of the departed come to judgment, they whose lives have been moderately good proceed to Acheron and dwell there till they are cleansed of any guilt that clings to them; but they whose wickedness is past cure are hurled into Tartaros, whence they come forth no more. All whose guilt is heinous but not yet beyond remedy dwell in Tartaros for a year, and then are cast forth by one of the rivers, on whose banks they meet those they have wronged. Then if they can win the pardon of these, they come forth and are purified; but if not, they return to Tartaros for another period; and this they continue to do until they have gained their pardon. But all that have lived in perfect holiness ascend to the earth's true surface, where they dwell henceforth in bliss and purity.

6. ἐν θαλάσσῃ τῷ ἥλιῳ [a short expression for ἐν ὃ ἐστιν θαλάσσῃ] The editors quote several similar phrases: Wyttenbach says he could fill a book with them.

7. εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει] 'if we mean to neglect her'.

αὐτῶς ἰκανῶς διέλθετε, ὡς ἐγνώμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ’ ἵκον δυνατῶν μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπω ἐπακολουθήσαι καί τοῦτο αὐτό σαφῆς γένηται, οὐδὲν ξητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις.

LVII. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ’ ἐφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιοι διανοηθήναι ὅτι, εἰ εἰπέρ ἡ ἐφύλαξσι ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐ̣χ ὑπέρ τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτον μόνον, ἐν θαλάσσῃ μέν τῷ θυγάτερῳ, ἀλλ’ ὑπέρ τοῦ παντός, καί ὁ κύριος θρόνος ὑψὸς δὴ καὶ δόξειαν ἀν δεινός εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ήν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἐρραιούν ἄν ἂν τοῖς
I. ἀπηλλάξθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας A vicious soul would be well rid of her vice even at the cost of her existence. But in Laws 958 Α death is regarded as a remedy for those whom milder measures will not serve: οἰς δὲ ὄντως ἐπικεκλωσμέναι [αἰ δίδοι], βάνατον ἱαμα ταῖς οὖσι διατεθέσαι ψυχαῖς διανέμοντες. And in 854 C suicide is recommended to the incurable sinner as his only relief: καὶ ἐὰν μὲν σοὶ δροῦντι ταῦτα λοφᾶ τι τὸ νόσημα—εἰ δὲ μή, καλλὶον βάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλάστου τοῦ βίου. We may perhaps regard death as offering a chance of turning over a new leaf.


8. ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμονας] Olympiodoros denies that each soul has a distinct δαίμων for sundry reasons, one of which is ὅτι τοῦ βίου λυθέστωσ ἄργησεν ὁ λαχῶν ἐκεῖνς διουκεῖν τῶν βίων. But there can be no doubt that he is wrong: cf. Republic 630 D ἐκεῖνην τ' ἐκάστην δ' ἐλεύθερον ἔφη δαίμω, τοῦτον φύλακα ἐνυπερέσκειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἄπο-πληρωθῆν ὑπὸ ἄρεθέντων. We have a different sort of daemonic supervision in

10. μετὰ ἡγεμόνοις] The two ἡγεμόνες are evidently distinct from the δαίμων, whose duties seem to cease when he has conveyed the soul to the place of judgment. In οiêu above, the form of the adverb is determined by τοῦς ἐνυπερέσκειτο, though in sense it belongs quite as much to διαδικασαμένοις.

13. ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνοις καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις] Plato does not here specify the number and length of these periods.
but in *Phaedrus* 248 E foll., we learn that each soul must fulfil ten millennial periods, except that of the philosopher, who is let off with three. Cf. Pindar *Olymp.* 11 68 ὅσοι δὲ ἐντόλμασαν ἐστρίφη ἐκατέρωθι μεῖναι ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἄδικους ἔχειν | ψυχὰν, ἐπεὶ λὰ ὅδε παρὰ Κρόνου πύρσοι. In *Republic* 615 A we have also a *χιλιάτης* πορεία, and the reason for this number is assigned. Every man must be required tenfold for his good and evil deeds; and calculating human life on the liberal estimate of 100 years, Plato devotes 1000 to his reward and punishment. The Egyptians made the period 3000 years (Herod. 11 123); Empedokles goes as far as 30000 for a murderer, ἐστὶ τέσσαρας πλῆθος φίλα γυνὰ μῆνη | τρίς μὲν μυρία ἀράσα ἀπὸ μακάρων ἄλλαισθαι | γενόμενον παντὸδα διὰ χρῶν εἰδέα θυσίων.

1. ἀπλὴν ὀμοί[ν] This expression seems to have been proverbial. The verse of Aeschylus has not been preserved.

5. ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων] 'judging by the funeral offerings and ordinances on earth'. ὅσια καὶ νόμιμα are the offerings made in honour of the departed. As these were made on the shrines of Hekate at the τρίδων, Plato seems to infer by analogy that the road to Hades is also forked. Cf. *Gorgias* 524 A οὕτω ὁμί, ἐπεὶ δὲν τελευτήσωσι, διακόσιοι ἐν τῷ λευμῷ, ἐν τῷ τρίδῳ ἔξ ἐς ἵς φέρετον τῷ ὀδῷ, ἢ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νῖσος, ἢ δ’ εἰς τάρταρον. The old reading ἔνθανον is now universally discarded.

7. οὐκ ἄγνοες τὰ παρόντα] Wytenbach well observes 'agnoscit eam sibiiam antea meditatione mortis et philosophia cognitam'.

8. ὄπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπιπο] 81 c ἔλεγεν ταύτα εἰς τὸν ὁράμα τόπον, φύσι τοῦ ἄνθρωπος καὶ γὰρ ἡ Λιθου, ὡσπέρ λέγεται, περὶ τῶν μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς πάροικους κυλινδοιμένην. Plutarch de genio Socrates § 22 in a curious myth expands the notion of the present passage: his imagery is however chiefly borrowed from the *Phaedrus*.

11. ὃπερ αἱ ἄλλαι] so the mss. Schanz adopts Cobet's ὅπερ.

15. αὐτὴ δὲ πλανάται] 'she strays by herself'.
of the lift)? cf. as me.

4. οὕτε ὅση δοξάζεται] i.e. not so small as is supposed: cf. 83 B οὐδέν τούτου κακόν ἔπαθεν, and Sophist 217 E.

5. ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι] Some think that Anaximandros is meant, because he first made a map of the world. But there is no evidence that his description of it had anything in common with Plato’s: and it seems very doubtful whether a reference to any definite person is intended. Plato is fond of giving an air of antiquity to his fables by referring them to some supposititious author; e.g. the Αἰγύπτιος λόγος in Phaedrus 274 C, and the legendary war between Athens and Atlantis, Timaeus 24. Wagner strangely takes τυός to be neuter.

8. οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη] The origin of this proverb is obscure. Wohlrab supposes that the sea-god Glaukos is meant, the patron of sailors. None of the ancient authorities however take this view, but oscillate between various artificers bearing this name; the most distinguished of whom seems to have been Glaukos of Chios, mentioned by Herodotus (1 25), who invented the art of soldering metal. The diverse theories will be found in Heindorf’s note.

12. μοι δοκεῖ] see on 77 A.

18. τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ] Plato’s assumption is that the earth has no natural tendency to move in any one direction; and the substance of the universe, being homogeneous, offers it no inducement to move this way or that: were the surrounding mass of various density in different parts, the earth might move in the direction where the least resistance was offered; as it is, it remains poised in the centre of a uniform mass. It must be observed that Plato is putting this forward, not to show that the earth must necessarily abide in the centre, but that there is no reason why it should not.

A similar theory is attributed to Anaximandros by Aristotle de cælo II xiii 293b 11 els τινες οί διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα φασίν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὡστερ τῶν ἄρχαίων ὁ ‘Ἀραξίμανδρος’ μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω.
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who, from atmosphere, small conceived the theory of the earth's dimensions was immense.

11. αὐτήν δὲ τὴν γῆν] i.e. the real surface of the earth, as distinguished from the hollows.

13. οὐ δὲ ύποστάθμην] i.e. our atmosphere is the sediment of aether, which collects in the depressions on the earth's surface. ταύτα = ὕδωρ καὶ ὄμιχλη καὶ ἄερα.

24. τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανόν καλεῖν] We are in the same plight as the supposed dwellers at the bottom of the sea; who, looking up through the water at the stars, would fancy that the sea above them was the heaven: so we, looking up through
the air, fancy it is that wherein the stars move, and that the air is heaven.

1. το δὲ [ἐναίται]  

No satisfactory defence of the words ἐναίται has been made: nor is Heindorf’s το δ’ ἐναίται τοιοῦτον attractive. Hermann, after Baiter, reads το δὲ διαφύσατον: but there is no special aptness in this. Hirschig suggests ταῖτον, but I think Schanz, following Rückert, is right in bracketing ἐναίται ταῖτον and retaining το δὲ, which is exactly the connecting link we want: ‘but the truth is that’. το δὲ occurs in this sense Θεάκτεος 157 Α, Σοφίστι 244 Α, Λαως 642 Α, 967 Α, Μενος 97 Ε, &c. ἐναίται ταῖτον might be the insertion of a copyist who did not understand the idiom.

3. εἰ τις αὐτοῦ] i.e. if we could either climb the sides of the hollow in which we dwell, or fly up through the air to its surface and peep up, as fishes do out of the sea.

4. κατιδεῖν ἀνακύψαται] Most editors have ἄν ἀνακύψαται, but ἄν is wanting in the mss. It could, it is true, easily have fallen out in that position; but since κατιδεῖν is presently repeated with ἄν, it seems to me hardly necessary to insert the particle here.

12. ὅποιον ἄν καὶ γῆ γῆ] Schanz retains ἵκη with the best mss. But the meaning is, whenever any earth is present in the sea, the result is βόρβορος.

15. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μύθου λέγειν, ἑξιον ἀκούσαι, ὁ Σιμίμα, οία τυγχάνει  

This some mss. and editions have the pointless addition καλῶν: the word however is absent in the Bodleian and other mss. and is certainly to be omitted.

19. ὅποτε ἄπει δωδεκάκτους οὐφαίραι] The number twelve refers to the twelve signs of the zodiac, as is clear from Τιμακύς 55 Ε ἄν δὲ ὁ βοῦς ἐξοργάζεται μᾶς πέµπτης, ἐπὶ τὸ πάν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῆς κατεχρήσατο ἐκείνο διάγραφον: ‘and whereas there remained yet a fifth figure, God used it as a model for the universe in describing its signs’. The πέµπτη ἐξόστασις was the dodecahedron: cf. Τιμακύς
Locrius 98 ε. τ. δε διδακάσκης τοις παντοίς ἐστάσατο, ἐγγίστα σφαίρας ἐν. The last words, ἐγγίστα σφαίρας ἐν, are a foolish addition by the compiler of the Timaeus Locrius: for the dodecahedron has nothing to do with the shape of the universe, which is a perfect sphere modelled after the image of the αὐτός ἐσεὼν: it merely affords the type for the duodenary division of the zodiac. In the present passage the διδακάσκυτος σφαίρα, a ball covered with patches of leather variously coloured, is used to represent not only the twelve signs, but also the variegated surface of the earth. A great store of erudition on the virtues of the number twelve is to be found in Wyttenbach’s note.

8. καὶ γὰρ αὕτα ταῦτα] ‘even these very hollows, being full of water and of air, display a kind of colour that gleams amid the dazzling diversity of the rest; so that the earth’s form appears as one unbroken surface of varied hues’. To an observer viewing the earth from above even such hollows as that wherein we dwell would appear as patches of colour, iridescent we may suppose; so that the many-coloured surface would not be marred by any blots of obscurity. συνεχῆς is regarded by Heindorf and others as adverbal: perhaps however we might treat εἶδος συνεχῆς as practically one word, which is qualified by ποικίλον.

15. ταῦτα τὰ ἄγαπώμενα] ‘the stones that here are so much prized’. For this sense of ἄγαπῶν compare Politics 286 β. δεύτερον ἀλλ’ οὐ πρῶτον ὁ λόγος ἄγαπῶν παραγγέλλει.

19. υπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἁλμῆ] If the common reading is genuine, we must translate: ‘marred by the corruption and brine produced by the sediment that has gathered here’. But the repetition of υπὸ before τῶν δεύτερον ἐνυφερηκότων is rather awkward. Schanz brackets υπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἁλμῆ as a gloss upon υπὸ τῶν δεύτερον ἐνυφερηκότων. Heindorf inserts
whereas πολλα πληθείς καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἵδειν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεστῶν. Ξύρα ὑ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἅλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκούντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἁέρα, ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νῆσοις ἅς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἁέρα πρὸς τῇ ἑπείρῳ οὕσας καὶ εἰνὶ λόγῳ, οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ τῇ θάλασσῇ ἐστὶ πρὸς τῇ ἤμετέρᾳ χρείᾳ, τὸ τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἁέρα, δ' ἐν ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἴθερα. τὰς δὲ ὀρας αὐτῆς κράτιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἄνοσοι εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε τὴν πολύ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἄκοη καὶ φρονίσει καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ὑπερ ἁέρ τε ὑδατος ἀφεστήκεν καὶ αἴθηρ ἁέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἁλση τε καὶ ἑρὰ αὐτῶς εἶναι, ἐν te after the second ὑπό, and Stallbaum substitutes ἀπὸ. I have followed the suggestion of Wyttenbach in bracketing the second ὑπό only.

4. ἐκφανή γὰρ they are exposed to view on the surface, not, as with us, hidden in mines.

7. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἁέρα] i.e. round the edges of the hollows, which are filled with air. Others again dwell on islands amid the aerial ocean, their bases plunged beneath the air but their surfaces encompassed with aether.

11. ἀήρ] The article is wanting in the mss. and supplied by Bekker. I have, on the suggestion of Schanz, written it as a crasis.

12. κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην] Compare the description of the climate of the ancient Attica, Timaeus 24 c, where Athenæ chooses the site of her city τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὦρων ἐν αὐτῇ κατιδώσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας ὤσι.

13. ὄψει καὶ ἄκοη καὶ φρονίσει] This reading has the all but unanimous support of the mss. Heindorf with one ms. reads ὀσφρήσει for φρονίσει, saying 'ingenii praestantiam non sane tam obiter uno verbo memorasset Plato, nec post φρονίσεως mentionem addidisset haec καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις'. These arguments do not seem very cogent; and it is hardly credible that Plato should have omitted to ascribe superior φρόνησις to his dwellers in aether. Schanz justly compares Κέρυπ- λίς 367 c οἷον ὄραν ἀκούειν φρονεῖν. In fact ὄψει καὶ ἄκοη stand for αἴσθησις. 'In sight, hearing, and intelligence [i.e. both in bodily and mental power] they excel us in the same proportion as air excels water and aether air in purity'. Z. adopts ὀσφρήσει.

16. ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκήτας θεοὺς εἶναι] I.e. in these temples is the very presence of the gods themselves; whereas we have but their statues. 'And they had groves and temples of the gods, wherein the gods in very truth were dwellers, and voices and prophecies and visions of them, and of this kind was their communion with them, face to face'. τοιαύτας = personal communion. αὐτῶς πρὸς αὐτός should be taken in the most emphatic sense, literally 'the people themselves with the gods themselves'.

11] ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.
9. τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν] There is a slight anacoluthon; the regular construction would be ἔχοντας. For αὐτῶν B D E give αὐτοίσις, which Wytenbach illustrates by Xen. Cyrop. I iii 13 περάσομαι ἄγαθων ἵππεων κράτιστος ὄν ἵππεις συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ. There is no lack of instances of a redundant pronoun, but the effect here is harsh. Schanz reads τὸ αὐτῶν χάσμα, Heindorf τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν, which latter I have adopted, as being nearly identical with the reading of C, τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν.

19. ὃν δὴ καὶ ἕκαστος τοὺς τόπους] 'wherewith each of the places is filled in turn as the stream in its course round chances each time to reach it.' Cope.

The stream, when replenished by the αἰώρα presently to be mentioned, makes a circuit of these hollows through the subterranean channels. ὃς ἄν is Stallbaum's correction for ὃν ἄν, which Z. retains.

21. ὁσπερ ἄλοραν] 'all these are moved backwards and forwards by a kind of oscillation which exists in the earth'. αἰώρα properly signifies a seesaw movement, like that of a pair of scales equally balanced. It is the name given to a kind of gymnastic machine like a swing. By the force of this αἰώρα the volume of air and fluid in Tartaros is perpetually swaying to and fro like a pendulum. When the mass which is ἄνω surges towards the centre, the mass that is κάρω is necessarily driven towards the extremity: then the latter in its turn recoils towards the centre and forces the former towards the opposite extremity.
1. **Diapmeres tetrphemwn** Tartaros differs from all the other Eiykoia, not only in its far greater magnitude, but in being pierced right through the earth from end to end; whereas the rest are merely depressions more or less deep. The physical theory of the present passage is simple enough. Let us suppose for the sake of clearness that Tartaros is a chasm pierced from the north to the south pole; and let us concede so much to popular usage as to call one hemisphere, say the northern, ἀνω and the other κάτω. For each of these hemispheres the centre of the earth is the lowest point, towards which all things gravitate. Out of Tartaros ramify a number of channels in all directions through the earth, some reaching to the surface, some subterranean throughout their whole length. Now the alôpa pulsing up and down Tartaros carries with it all the fluid that is therein; and when it rushes northwards, it forces the liquid into the channels of the northern hemisphere; then returning southward it fills those in the southern. Thus the stream is violently impelled through the channel by the force of the alôpa: but when this force is spent, it obeys the law of gravitation and makes its way back to Tartaros at a lower level than that whence it started. It can however never pass beyond the centre, since that is the absolutely lowest point from whatever direction it is approached, and an ascent from it would be contrary to the force of gravitation.

2. **Omeros eite** Iliad viii 14: cf. viii 481.

8. **Oti tvmiena ovk exi** The cause of the alôpa is that there is no bottom or foundation on which the liquid mass can rest. Were there a solid platform at the centre of the earth, the fluid on either side would settle there and remain stationary. Of this passage a doubtfully accurate statement and a certainly unfair criticism is made by Aristotle meteorologica ii ii 355b 32 foll., cf. i 349b 28. Plato's doctrine of gravitation, which is incomparably more scientific than anything to be found in Aristotle on that subject, is very clearly expounded in Timaeus 62 c—63 e.

15. **Otav te ouv upoxwrfisi** Many editions, including Z. and St., have ὑρμή-σαν after ouv: but since it is absent from the best mss. I have omitted it.
1. τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον] Plato considers the expression incorrect, as is indicated by δὴ. Cf. Timaeus 62 c φῶς εἰς τὸν τόπον δύναται διὰ τὴν ἀνάπλατην, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς τὸν φέρεται πάντως θύει τὸν δὲ ἄνω, πρὸς τὸν αἰωνίου ἐφεξῆς πάντα, οὐκ ὡμοίως νομίζειν. For some very curious reasoning on the other see Aristotle de caelo ii 11 28 1b 6 foll.

[tois] κατ’ ἑκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα] If the text is sound we must translate ‘it (τὸ ὕδωρ) flows into the parts about those streams’; unless with Prof. Geddes we take τοῖς as an instrumental dative, which is hardly probable. But either way the phrase is a singularly awkward one and can scarcely, I think, have been written by Plato; though H. Schmidt defends it, translating ‘das zu jenen Strömen Gehörende’. Madvig’s εἰσφέρει, which Schanz adopts, leaves the sentence as clumsy as before. Wytenbach reads τὸ τοῖς, which may be right: Ast brackets τοῖς. Mr Cope translates ‘it flows through the earth to the neighbourhood of those streams and fills them, as it were by a pump’. But surely δὲ τῇ γῆς describes the progress of the water after it has entered the channels: it would be a strange expression to apply to its surging up and down Tartaros.

3. τὰ ἑνθάδε] i.e. the rivers in our hemisphere. We are regarded as living in the ‘upper’ hemisphere: and so said the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle de caelo 283b 21. Aristotle himself said our hemisphere was the lower: to Plato of course the distinction is meaningless.

9. ἑπνυτλέιτο] i.e. were pumped into the channels: it is needless to read ἑπνυτλείτο with Heindorf.

11. καταντικρῡ ἡ ἐσπερί] i.e. καταντικρύ̄ τῆς χώρας ἡ ἐσπερί. This seems to mean that a stream which issued forth from Tartaros, say in an easterly direction, may, by a circuit of the earth, re-enter it on the western side. Aristotle’s version of this (meteorologica 326b 9) is τὰ δὲ καταντικρῡ τῆς θάλασσας ἐσπερί, ὡς εἰ μὲν ἦργαντο κατῶθεν, ἀνωθεν ἐκβάλλειν. This is usually regarded as a misstatement on Aristotle’s part: but H. Schmidt (krit. Comm. ii 107 foll.) ingeniously endeavours to reconcile it with Plato’s words. He lays stress on the fact that Aristotle says, not ἀνω and κάτω, but ἀνωθεν and κάτωθεν; and he explains it thus. A river may issue from Tartaros in the southern hemisphere and in the course of its wanderings pass into the northern, finally discharging itself into the very centre of Tartaros. Thus after rising in the southern hemisphere (κάτωθεν) it enters Tartaros from the side of the northern (ἀνωθεν); but since it discharges itself at the centre, it has not violated the law μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθένας, πέρα δ’ οὗ. The weak point in the expla-
nation seems to me this. When the stream has once reached the northern hemisphere, it is subject to precisely the same laws of gravitation as the rivers of that hemisphere; and there is no reason why it should be compelled to descend to the very centre any more than a stream which has risen in the northern hemisphere: yet, if it does not, it has passed beyond the centre, relatively to its source. Schmidt's theory in fact breaks down, unless we can understand the words μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, πέρα δ' οὗ relatively to the direction of the stream after it has once begun its downward course, irrespective of its point of issue. Perhaps however Plato had not thought of the case of a river passing from one hemisphere to another while on the surface of the earth: or, as exact science is hardly to be expected in a myth, the rivers may be prohibited from crossing the plane which divides the two hemispheres. Aristotle's paraphrase sounds like a reproduction of the Platonic passage based on an imperfect recollection of it. The notion, entertained by some, that καταντικρὸν ὑ εἰσερέι means that the stream on discharging itself crosses Tartaros and emerges on the opposite side is assuredly untenable. Schanz, against all mss., has ἐξέπεσεν εἰσερέι.
1. ἐκβάλλει] ‘issues forth’. In the passage of Aristotle already quoted ἐκβάλλει has the opposite sense, ‘discharges itself’; it is in fact equivalent to ἐμβάλλει in Plato’s account. Aristotle follows the ordinary usage, whereas Plato has formed his compounds to fit his present descriptions.

3. ζέουσαν ὑδατος καὶ πηλοῦ] ‘boiling with water and mud’. The genitive is joined with the verb as describing the material: cf. Anthol. Planud. iv 39 καὶ πεδία ζεύκτα πολυσπερῶν Ἀγαρνῶν.

4. περιελιττόμενος δὲ [τῇ γῇ] Of the three writers who quote this passage, Stobæus Theodoret and Eusebius, τῇ γῇ is found in the first alone: the words are however in all the mss. The objection to them is that they seem to make Pyrophlegethon flow on the surface of the earth, which, Schmidt notwithstanding, cannot be allowed. Stallbaum retains τῇ γῇ, and explains that Pyrophlegethon encircles the earth beneath its surface. But this seems scarcely a natural interpretation; and I have thought it better to bracket the words, which the Zürich editors expunge.

7. κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου] ‘into a lower depth of Tartaros’.

12. ἢν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμός] ἢν is absent from most mss. but is rightly added from Theodoret and certain mss. by Heindorf, who compares Latoς 683 A. The construction is indeed familiar enough.

Στύγα] Plato’s conception of Styx as a lake differs from that of the older authorities: cf. Hesiod Theogonia 786 foll. where Styx is a river, a branch (κέρας) of Okeanos: and Homer l.l. makes Kokytos a branch of Styx.

14. ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιαδίκλιμῃ] The convolutions of these four rivers are a little perplexing. They issue from Tartaros on four different sides: Okeanos emerges to the surface and encompasses the whole earth; of its return to Tartaros we are told nothing. Acheron, issuing from the opposite side, flows in the contrary direction, partly on the surface, partly beneath the earth; and before re-entering Tartaros forms the Acherusian lake. Pyrophlegethon, rising half-way between the two former, not far from its source forms the boiling lake, and after many windings skirts one end of the Acherusian lake before plunging into the profoundest deeps of Tartaros. Its course is entirely subterranean. Kokytos, flowing in the opposite
direction, ascends to the surface, where it spreads into the Stygian lake; then diving into the earth, it reaches the Acherusian lake from the contrary side to Pyriphegethon; and making another circuit enters Tartaros opposite to that river. Styx, it will be noticed, is on the earth’s surface, whereas the other two lakes are subterranean.

6. ὁ δαίμων] Cf. 107 D.

9. ἀνάβαντες] ‘going on board vessels which, it is said (ὅτι), are provided for them’.

12. ἀνώτατος ἔχειν] These incurables were cast into Tartaros, not in retribution for their crimes, but as warnings to others; since to Plato punishment is always either remedial or exemplary. So Gorgias 525 C ὃ ὁ ἄνω θέσια ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίσατο γένωσιν, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὑδαταί ὅτι ἄνωτα ἄνωτες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσιοι οὐσίας διὰ τὰ ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὄδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερότατα πάθη πάσχοντας τῶν ἄνω χρόνων, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνθρωπίνου εἰκῆ ἐν Ἀδεὶν ἐν τῷ δεσμῷ θηρίῳ, τοῖς ἔνω ἀδικῶν ἀφικνομένοις θέαματα καὶ νοῦθηματα. Cf. Republic 616 A.

13. ἑρωσυλλας] This was a peculiarly heinous offence: cf. Laws 854 A, where the law thus addresses the sacrilegious, ὃ δαιμόνιος, οὗ ἀνθρώπων ἐν κακοὶ οὐδὲ θεοὶ καὶ τὸν νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑρωσυλλας προτέρων λέναι, ὅστρος δὲ σὲ τὰς ἑμφόνωνοις ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενοι ἀβηρεύδητος.

16. ὃδεν οὔποτε ἐκβάινοντο] In the νέκυαι of the Republic and Gorgias also incurable criminals are doomed to eternal punishment: and this is natural where Plato is weaving up popular tradition with his own phantasy. But in Timaeus 42 c it is evident that the degenerate soul at any period of her transmigrations has the chance of reformation and final restoration to her original purity; nor is this possibility excluded in Phaedrus 248 c foll.

18. καὶ μεταμέλειον αὐτοῖς] ‘and who
have lived the rest of their days in a state of repentance. The participle metamélos is used absolutely.

1. τοιούτω τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ i.e. their offence is similar to that of the patrálóias, in that it was committed in sudden passion and followed by repentance, and different to that of the φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἔξεργασμένοι. These terms apply not only to parricides and matricides, but to any one who strikes a father or mother.

2. κατὰ τὴν λίμνην] It will be remembered that both these rivers enter the Achærusian lake.

12. πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὐς ἢδίκησαν] This was no doubt suggested by the Athenian law which enacted that a person guilty of involuntary homicide must appease the family of the deceased before he could return from exile: cf. Demosth. Aristocr. p. 644 τοῖς ἄλλως ἐπὶ ἀκονισθεὶς φῶς ἐν ταῖς εἰρημένοις χρώσις ἀπελεύθη τακτὴν ὄνομα καὶ φείδησιν, ἐώς ἂν αἰδέστησα τιμα [κ. τ. κ.] τοῖς ἁγίαις τοῦ πεποιθότος. It would appear that the injured family could not insist upon more than a year’s exile, which was called ἀπεναιασμὸς. Plato adopts this period in Laws 869 E. ὃς ἀκονισθεὶς γεγονότος τοῦ φόνου οἱ οἱ καθαροὶ γεγένθεσαν τῷ δράσασθαι καὶ ἐναυτὸς ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκδήλας ἐν νόμῳ, cf. 865 E. In Laws 872 E we are told that in another life it shall be done to the wilful homicide as he did to his victim: τοῦ γὰρ κοινοὶ μιακτένοις αἰματος οὐκ εἶναι καθαροὶ ἄλλοι οὐδ’ ἐκπληκτὸν ἑθέλεις γίγνεσθαι τῷ μιανθὲν, πρὶν φῶς φῶς ἰδιῶς ἰδιῶς ἡ ἰδρασατ ζυζη ζήσῃ καὶ πάσης τῆς εὐνωνειάς τοῦ θυμὸν ἀφιλασιαμένη κοιμῆσθ. cf. 870 E.

13. δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὅσιος βιώσαι] The text is certainly corrupt. Stallbaum’s attempt to make βιῶσαι do double duty is futile, and his quotations are transparently irrelevant. Schanz, following Heindorf, inserts from Theodoret προκεκληθαι after βιώσαι. This has some support from Clement of Alexandria, who reads προκεκληθαι; but it is not satisfactory. For while it is sense to say ‘who are deemed to have lived holly’, it is not sense to say ‘who are deemed to have been judged to have lived holly.’ I suspect that Theodoret’s προκεκληθαι is merely a clumsy attempt to supply a deficiency which existed in his copy; and that Plato’s real word has been lost: possibly ἐσχεν after διαφερόντως, unless we should read πρὸς τὸ ὅσιον.
3. ἐπὶ γῆς] so all mss. Eusebius, Theodoret, and Stobaeus have ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: but the article is not required. ‘Upon the earth’ means of course on the true surface, distinguished from the hollow wherein we dwell.

4. καθηράμενοι] a genuine reflexive middle: ‘who have purified themselves’. ἄνευ τε σωμάτων] I conceive this to mean ‘without earthly bodies’: for the most exalted of finite spirits, even the gods, must have body of some sort; that is, they are subject to the conditions of space and time. Cf. Phaedrus 246 c. ἄνευ σωμάτων to Plato signifies freedom from bodily appetites.

114 D—115 A, c. lxiii. To insist that all these details are strictly accurate were folly; yet something like this is the fate of the soul and her habitation after death. Wherefore it is well worth while for a man to bestow all care upon his soul during this life, that she may be free from bodily passions and adorned with true virtue. And now, continues Sokrates, my hour is at hand; and I will go to bathe my body for my burial.

10. τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διασχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς] Plato lays no stress upon the exact details of his description: indeed he is never at any pains to make his various accounts of ‘die letzten Dinge’ precisely correspond: all he is really concerned about is that the virtuous soul is better off in the other world than the vicious.

15. ἐπάθειν ἐαυτῷ] cf. 77 E ἄλλα χρῆ ἐπάθειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἐὼς ἄν ἐξεπάθητε. διὸ δὴ ἐγώ οὖν καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μύθον] This phrase would seem to bear out the view of the myth given in the introduction, p. 8.

19. πλέον βάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζομαι] ‘thinking that they do more harm than good’. For this use of βάτερον cf. Euthydemus 280 ε, 297 δ. Also Pindar Pythia III 34 δαίμων δ᾽ ἔτερος.
3. ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία] 'with freedom and truth'. These terms practically correspond to φρόνησις or σοφία. ἐλευθερία is that state of liberation from the body which enables the soul to grasp ἀληθεία.

5. ἐκαστοι πορεύεσθε] so nearly all mss. Schanz writes ἐκαστος after Stallbaum.

6. φαίη ἢν ἀνήρ τραγικός] 'to speak like a hero of tragedy'. The good taste of this parenthesis is admirable. ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλεῖ is in perfect keeping with the eloquent passage which is its context: but in applying the phrase to himself Sokrates instinctively feels the risk that it may sound high-flown. And so with these words he passes simply and naturally from his lofty flight of moralizing to the homely, but eminently characteristic, ὡρα τραπέζια πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν.

8. καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶν παρέχειν] 'and not to give the women the trouble of washing my corpse'. This piece of thoughtfulness for others is admirable evidence of the perfect serenity with which Sokrates awaits his doom.

115 A—116 A, c. lxiv. Kriton now inquires of Sokrates what are his last injunctions. Only that you will take good heed to yourselves, he replies, and put into practice the principles affirmed in our late discourse. But how are we to bury you?' asks Kriton. Sokrates answers with a smile, As you please, provided you can catch me. It would seem that all my words have been thrown away, and I fail to persuade you that this Sokrates who now speaks to you will presently take flight to the company of the gods, and that all you will bury is his forsaken body. So, my friends, be surety for me to Kriton, not this time that I shall stay, but that I shall verily depart. But seriously such incorrect language is mischievous; say then that it is my body which you bury, and bury it as seems to you best.

11. ἐπιστέλλεις] 'proprium de extrema morientium voluntate'. HEINDORF. Cf. 116 B ἐπιστελάς ἀπ' ἐβούλετο."
επιμελοῦμενοι ύμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ύμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅπτε ἀν ποιήσετε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· εὰν δὲ ύμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἄμελητε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε, ὥσπερ κατ᾿ ἵχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρήμενα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπρόσθεν χρόνῳ ἥγη, οὐδὲ ἔδω πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε· εὖ τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. 5 Ταῦτα μὲν ταῦτα προθυμηθήσομεθα, ἐφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν θάπτομεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ἡ Οἶμος ἄν, ἐφη, βουλησθε, ἕαντερ γε λάβητε με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ύμᾶς· γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ἔνυχθη καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας ἔπευ, Οὐ πείθο, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὦς ἔγο εἰμι ύοτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ διατάττων ἐκαστὸν τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ ὑπεταί με ἐκείνου ἐναι, οὐ ὑπεται ὄλγον ὑστερον ὃ νεκρῶν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δή, πῶς με θάπτη; ὅτι δὲ ἔγο πάλαι πολλὸν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὅς, ἐπειδὰν πῶ τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ύμῖν παραμενό, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσομαι ἀπίων εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταύτα [μοι] δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἀμα μὲν ύμᾶς, ἀμα δ’ ἐμαυτὸν· ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἐφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἡ ἢ νῦ ὄντος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυατό, οὕτος μὲν γὰρ ἡ μὴ παραμενέω ύμεῖς δὲ ἡ μὴ ὑμὶ παραμενεῖν ἐγγύη· Ε σασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπίοντα, ἦν Κρίτων ῥὰν φήρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὅρων μοι τὸ σῶμα ἢ καίμουν ἢ κατορτιτῶμεν ἐγνώς· αὐτῷ ἔγον φήρη, καὶ μὴ ὅρων μοι τὸ σῶμα ἢ καίμουν ἢ κατορτιτῶμεν ἐγνώς.
names, by obtaining a precise definition of each thing. That which we speak of as Sokrates is his soul, not his body; although, since the body is all we see, popular usage applies the name to the body even when the soul has quitted it. But, says Sokrates, not only is this in itself a slovenly mode of speech, but it may habituate us to thinking that the body is all that exists of a man.

3. \(\text{θάπτειν οὕτως}\) Most of the recent editors make \(\text{θάπτειν}\) depend upon \(\text{φάναι}\). There seems to me no valid reason for doing so; and it makes better sense to take it with \(\text{χρη}\).

116 Α—117 Α, c. lxv. Sokrates retires to the bath, and on his return takes leave of his children and household. After a little farther conversation with his friends he is warned by the servant of the Eleven that the hour of his death is at hand. The man warmly testifies to the noble character of Sokrates and departs in tears. Sokrates, after a few kind words concerning him, bids the poison be brought. Nay, remonstrates Kriton, the sun is yet on the mountains; many prisoners have put off drinking the hemlock till far on into the evening: there is no haste. They acted after their kind, answers Sokrates; but I were false to myself, were I so covetous of the little remnant of my life: therefore bring the poison.

11. \(\text{δῶ ἡνдрων αὐτῷ}\) cf. \textit{Apology} 34 Ο \(\text{oikeioi μοι ελαὶ καὶ νεῖς, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίου, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἔδω, δῶ δὲ παίδια.}\) In Diog. Laert. ii 26 we are told that the name of the eldest was Lamprokles and those of the two younger Sophroniskos and Menexenos.

12. \(\text{αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες}\) i.e. the women of his family. Probably his wife was not among them, else Plato would have mentioned her. Some suppose that this expression gave rise to the absurd fable that Sokrates had two wives living at the same time; of whom the second, Myrto, daughter or grand-daughter of the famous Aristeides, was the mother of his two younger children: see Diog. Laert. i. i.

\([\text{ἐκείναις} \text{ ἐναντίον}]\) The mss. vary between \(\text{ἐκείναις}\) and \(\text{ἐκείναι}\), and also in the position of the word, which in many follows \(\text{ἐναντίον}\). Since \(\text{ἐκείναι}\) and the position after \(\text{ἐναντίον}\) are alike impossible, I read as above; bracketing however \(\text{ἐκείναις}\) as highly suspicious.

15. \(\text{ἐνδον}\) sc. \(\text{ἐν τῷ εἰκήματι}.\)
Therefor this g. a7ro5a-condemns 12. 177 Dill-will have the accustomed make a less is dramatic are angry, XaXeTraveis, the Tavra av Kal Trdvv /cal

3. οὐ καταγγέλουσαί] 'I shall not have the complaint to make of you that I make of others'.

8. οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαίνεις] Some read χαλεπαίνεις, but the present is found in the best ms. and gives the best sense. 'I know it is not with me that you are angry, but with them; for you know who are to blame for it.' There is a subtle dramatic propriety in these words which is one of the finer touches of this matchless narrative. This man must have had a large experience of criminals and been accustomed to look on the baser side of humanity. He could however appreciate the nobility of Sokrates, so far as it is directly brought before his eyes; but he never thought of Sokrates as bearing no ill-will even against those who were really the cause of his death: this is something outside his experience.

9. ἀ ἡλθον ἄγγελλων] So the best ms. Schanz needlessly reads ἄγγελων: but ἄγγελλων is equivalent to ἄγγελιαν φέρων which we have in Crito 43 c.

12. ὡς ἀστείος] 'how courteous the good fellow is; throughout all this time he used to come and talk to me now and then, and was the best of men: and now how honestly he mourns for me'. ἀποδικρέει με as below 117τα ἀπέλκαιον ἐμαυτόν.

21. ἐτί γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ] 'for there is still time to spare'.

24. ταύτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω] Hirschig condemns εἰκότως, for no reason that I can see, though Schanz brackets it. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἴμαι κερδανείν] The ms. authority is stronger for κερδανείν, but
here I think Schanz is right in accepting the future. Prof. Geddes defends the present by a reference to Herodotus IX 106; but there Abicht reads ἐμμενεῖν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι: besides which the construction is different. Plato could very well say ούδὲν ομοι κερδαίνων ἄλλα ὑφλήσεως, but οὐδὲν ἄλλο κερδαίνων η ὑφλήσεως seems very doubtful Greek.

2. φειδόμενος οὐδενός ἐτι ἐνότος] ‘being chary when the vessel is empty’; a proverbial expression which we find in Hesiod works and days 367 μεσόθι φεῖδοσθαι, δειλὴ δ’ ἐνι πυθμένει φειδω. 117 A—118 A, cc. lxvi, lxvii. The last moments of Sokrates.

10. αὐτὸ ποιήσει] ‘the poison will act of itself’. ποιεῖν is used in this technical sense by medical writers: Heindorf cites Dioscorides 1 95 ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, ‘is efficacious against poison’. The lexicons also give Strabo 234 λοίφρα κάλλιστα ποιοῦντα πρὸς νόσους.

11. καὶ ὅσ λαβὼν] ‘and he took it right cheerfully, Echekrates, without a shudder or any change of complexion or countenance; but looking on the man with bent brows, as his manner was, he asked, What say you of this potion as to pouring a libation to some deity? is it permitted or not?’ Notice the earnest emphasis thrown on the words μάλα γενεῖς by the following ὡ Ἐξέκρατες. διαφθείρας = changing for the worse, as Prof. Geddes says: the partitive genitives strengthen the force of the negation. ταυρήδων ὑποβλέψεις describes the fixed piercing gaze habitual to Sokrates, cf. 86 D. For the use of πρὸς Stallbaum compares Sympos. 174 B, 176 B. The man’s matter-of-fact reply and his conduct throughout serve to heighten the pathos: he does not mean to be unfeeling, but familiarity with such scenes has produced a certain professional indifference; he seems not to have been personally influenced by Sokrates like the servant of the eleven.

19. ἐπισυχέομενος] ‘putting it to his lips’. The active ἐπισυχέων is used of giving a draught to another.
1. katēchein] 'we were able to refrain from tears'. This usage of katēchein is rare: cf. Soph. Oed. Τυν. 781 κάγω βαρύνθει τήν μὲν υόμαν ἤμεραν μόνος κατέχειν. Below we have the common use, katēchei tā δάκρυα.

2. ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ] 'but in spite of myself my tears began to flow in torrents'. Cope.

7. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος] 'then above all bursting into loud sobs, by his weeping and lamenting he utterly broke down every one of the company, save Sokrates himself'. Hirschig would omit κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, Schanz brackets κλαίων καὶ: but can any one read the sentence without feeling that its rhythm is hopelessly ruined by either of these needless and mischievous omissions? With katēklase Heindorf compares the Homeric katēκλάθη fίλων ἤτορ: and Stallbaum quotes two passages of Plutarch, Perikles 37, Dem. ἡμ. 118, where the word is used as here. The old editions had katēklase: Stephanus conjectured katēklase, which was afterwards discovered in certain mss.

11. αἰκίκοια ὦτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή τελευτάν] According to Olympiodoros it was a Pythagorean precept.

15. ὀὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευσαι] i.e. ὀὕτω κατακλῆθηναι.

16. ὀὕτως ὁ δοῦς τὸ φάρμακον] Schanz brackets these words, but I think they are justly defended and retained by Heindorf.

20. τηγυνύτο contracted from τηγυνύστο, cf. 77 b.

καὶ αὐτός ἤπετη] Sokrates himself did the same as the man. This seems to be mentioned simply as evidence of his perfect calmness. Forster proposes αὐδῆς, supposing that the subject of ἤπετη is ὁ δοῦς τὸ φάρμακον, and Schanz reads αὐ, presumably on the same hypothesis. Neither alteration is to be commended.
2. τῷ Ἀσκληπίῳ ὁφείλομεν ἀλεκτρουόνα] It might have been supposed that the conception of life as a ‘fitful fever’ was familiar enough to spare us all the unprofitable ingenuity that has been expended on this passage. The last words of Sokrates are in perfect harmony with the whole tenor of his foregoing discourse. His soul is on the point of being liberated from the body and all its attendant infirmities and will presently be restored to her primal purity and health. Corporeal existence is in fact a morbid condition of the soul, for which death is the remedy; wherefore Sokrates vows to Asklepios the sacrifice customary on recovery from sickness. Prof. Geddes aptly quotes Timon of Athens 1 1 ‘my long sickness of health and living now begins to mend’. So Olympiodoros: ἱνα τὰ νέονηκτά τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει ταῦτα ἐξισάτησαι: he speaks too of an oracle which declares τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναγομενὰς τὸν παύνα γάδενν.

6. ἐκνήθη: ‘he stirred’: probably some slight spasm or shudder at the moment of dissolution. ἐκνήθη is far too mild a word to signify convulsions, as some would have it.

8. ἢδε ἡ τελευτὴ] The last three lines of the dialogue have been variously assailed by different critics on divers grounds. First Wytenbach, offended by τότε, proposes τῶν πώτερος. Heindorf would have πάντων, τότε ὡς ἐπειράθημεν. Schanz brackets ἄλλως. Hirschig is usually prepared to cancel all after ἐγένετο.

I believe that every word stands exactly as Plato wrote it, and that not one could be altered or omitted without marring the sad music of this solemn close. Wytenbach supports his τῶν πῶτος from Plutarch, but the Platonic passages he quotes have γενομένων, ἀφικομένων &c, which makes all the difference. Moreover he introduces a tone of panegyric, which, though not perhaps exaggerated, is quite discordant with the subdued simplicity which is the chief charm of this wonderful scene, and with the studiously modest ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἃν: this has been remarked by Prof. Geddes. τῶν τότε, as Stallbaum says, ‘solemnis est formula in ciusmodi praeconii’, meaning ‘of all his contemporaries’; and for the reference of τότε to a recent period he cites Politicus 263 ε. But probably, as Grote suggests, Plato used the word rather from his own point of view at the time he wrote than from that of the supposed speaker. ἄλλως has reference not to τῶν τότε, as Heindorf thinks, but to ἀριστο: ‘in other respects’ is practically equivalent to ‘moreover’, or ‘besides’: it merely serves to mark the transition from the vaguer to the more definite expressions of praise. Preserving the sentence intact I should translate: ‘such was the end, O Echekrates, of our companion—a man, as we should say, among all then living whom we knew the noblest, ay and the wisest and most just’. 
Appendix I.

Δημοτική καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή.

To the student of Plato's ethics it is obviously important to determine exactly what is to be understood by the popular, as contrasted with the philosophic, ἀρετή, and should there prove to be more than one variety of the former, to distinguish between them. With a view to this, I propose to examine briefly Plato's principal statements on the subject. Besides the passages in the Phaedo, 68 d foll. and 82 a, the following extracts seem to me to contain a complete exposition of Plato's views.

i. Republic 554 c. ἀρ ὅν τοῦτο ἱλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνμπολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐπὶ οἷς εἴδοκει διὸκον δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ τιν ἐαυτοῦ βία κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας, οὐ πείθων οὐκ ἁμείνουν, οὐδὲ ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγχη καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Καὶ νὴ Δία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὑρίσκεις, ὅταν δὲ ταλλότρια αναλίσκεις, τὰς τοῦ κηφήνου ἐνυγγενεῖς ἐνοίχας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ μάλα, ἥ δ' ὡς, σφόδρα. Οὐκ ἀρ ἄν εἰ ἀστασιάστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἰς, ἀλλὰ διπλοῖς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυμίων ὡς τὸ πολὺ κραταύςας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίων χειρόνων. *Εστιν οὕτωσι. Διὰ τάτα δὴ, οἴμαι, ἐνσχημονεύτερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εὖ, ὁμονομακορυχής δὲ καὶ ἐμμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆς πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι αὖ αὐτῶν.

ii. Republic 506 a. οἴμαι γοῦν, εἴπον, δικαία τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνωσμενα, ὅτι τοτε ἁγαθὰ ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτήσθαι ἄν ἑαυτῶν τῦν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦνταμ. μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὕτα πρὸτερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.

iii. Republic 500 δ. ἂν ὅν τις, εἴπον, αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ φιλοσόφῳ] ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἁθη καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημοσιογράφων αὐτῶν οἷς γενῆσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ συμπάθεις τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; Ἡκιστά γε, ἥ δ' ὡς. 501 a. ἐπειτα, οἴμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκάτεροι ἀποβλέποιν πρός τε τὸ φύτει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σωφρόν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἑκεῖνο αὖ, ἃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῦσιν, ἐνμ-
muηύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ὁ δὴ καὶ ὁ ὸμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγυγομένον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοεικελον.

iv. Λατινὸν 710 Α. ΚΛ. Σωφροσύνη μοι δοκεὶ φράζειν, ὡς Μέγγαλε, δειν εἶναι τὴν ἐξουσιομένην ὁ κέιτος· ἢ γὰρ; ΛΘ. Τὴν δημαίδῃ γε, ὡς Κλεινία, καὶ οὐχ ἦν τις σεμνών ᾗν λέγοι, ἀλλὰ ὅπερ εὐθὺς πασί καὶ θηρίοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἤδονας, ἔξωφτον ἐπανθεῖ, τούς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς· ὃ καὶ μονοούμενον ἔφαμεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἔξιον εἶναι λόγῳ.

v. Μενο 99 Ε. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐξητήσαμεν τε καὶ ἐλεγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοίρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἄν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μὴ τις εἰ θείοιτο τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἀλλος ποίησαι πολιτικῶν. εἰ δὲ εἰη, σχεδοῦ ἂν τι οὔτος λέγοι τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ξύσιν, οἶον ἐφη Ὁμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνέωσι Τερεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡτι οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Λίδου, αἴ δὲ σκιαί αὐσονοι. ταῦτόν ἂν καὶ εὐθὺς τοιοῦτος, ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιας ἀλήθες ἄν πράγμα, εἴη πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

vi. Λατινὸν 642 Κ. μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυώς θεία μοίρα ἀληθῶς καὶ οὖ τι πλαστῶς εἰσίν ἁγαθῶ.

vii. Ρεπόρτικ 619 Κ. εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν [sc. τὸν τὴν μεγάλην τυραννίδα ἐλέμενον] τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Ἥκων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς ἀληθικομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας, ἀπὸ πόνων ἁγμανάστους.

viii. Ρεπόρτικ 401 Ε. τῶν παραπομπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημουργηθέντων ἡ μὴ καλῶς φύσεων ἀξίατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεῖς ὡς ἐδει, καὶ ὅρθως δὴ χαίρων καὶ δισχεραίνων τα μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῦ καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχῆν τρέφουτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τὸ κάγαθος, τα δ' ἀισχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἄν ὄρθως καὶ μισοῦ ἐτι νέος ὦν, πρὸν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' ὀμοιότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεῖς.

Other passages might be quoted more or less bearing on the subject, e.g. Ρεπόρτικ 409 Α, 430 Β, Φαιαδρός 256 Ε, Προταγόρας 355 Κ foll., but none, so far as I am aware, which throw any additional light upon it.

In the extract first quoted we have, it is clear, precisely the same conception of the vulgar sort of virtue as in Φαιαδο 68 Ν. Plato has been describing, in one of the most scathing passages he ever penned, the character of the ὀλυμπρικὸς ἀνὴρ. Such a man sets lucre above all things, he scrapes and hoards and denies himself, subduing all other ap-

1 I have followed the text of the Züriχ editors.
petites beneath the master-passion of amassing wealth. And since such habits tend in the main to outward orderliness of conduct, he acquires the reputation of being a worthy respectable man. Yet he is filled with a swarm of ‘drone lusts’, which are commonly held down by the strong hand of avarice, but are suffered to riot unchecked, if this may be done at another’s expense. And all this happens because he has paid no heed to his education. Here we have a perfect picture of a man δι’ ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένος: in that he controls his sensual appetites he is so far σώφρων, but he controls them only because he is ἀκολαστός in the indulgence of unbounded avarice. In ii again Plato insists upon the point which is so strongly emphasised in the Phaedo; that no real knowledge of things just and beautiful can exist which is not based on knowledge of the good. We see then in these passages that the δημοτικὴ ἀρετή is a morality formed by the mass of mankind for themselves on strictly utilitarian principles, by balancing pains and pleasures, and without knowledge of the good. We observe also that for this Plato has nothing but scorn and sarcasm: he would not indeed deny that a temperance which is the effect of intemperance is better than no temperance at all; but it is at best a base and sordid counterfeit of true virtue.

But in iii we have quite a different picture. Here we see the philosopher himself, as prophet and teacher, creating the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ in the souls of his fellow men, by moulding their characters after the image of that justice and beauty whereof he beholds the eternal ideas. As the painter’s glance passes to and fro between his model and his canvas, so is the gaze of the philosopher turned now to his ideal archetype, now to the human image of the divine that he is fashioning. Now it is evident that this virtue can no longer be a contemptible thing, since it is worth the philosopher’s while to pause in his study of the truth, that he may implant it in the hearts of men: it is indeed the highest that the great mass of mankind can hope to attain, who live and die in the darkness of the cave. Again this is no longer an ethical code which the multitude frame for themselves; it is one which the philosopher frames for them: nor does he construct it on any utilitarian basis, but out of his knowledge of ideal truth. Yet as held by them it is still utilitarian, for they accept it on utilitarian grounds: they receive it, not because they know why it is good, for they are without knowledge of the good, but because the philosopher convinces them that it is for their advantage to do so; that by submitting to its restrictions they avoid great evils. As they hold it therefore, it is utilitarian; as he conceives it, not so: thus they are still, though in a far more refined sense, δι’ ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρο-
APPENDIX I.

νυσμένοι. Plato acknowledges that the morality of the multitude must be utilitarian, since none other is attainable save by the highly trained metaphysician. Therefore, however superior the morality of those who obey this code may be to that of the oligarchical man, it is sundered from that of the philosopher by a fathomless gulf—it is ἀνευ φρονήσεως.

In the next three quotations Plato is speaking of an innate virtue, not springing from reason or any system, but from natural instinct. The most interesting and important of these passages is that from the Μένος, which with its context gives a pretty full statement of Plato’s view. This instinctive virtue is due to no effort of its possessor but to the dispensation of heaven; θεία μοίραν παραγεγορείν— a phrase which is explained in vi by αὐτοφυός. Some men are so happily endowed by divine favour that without consciously striving after virtue they lead virtuous lives; they do right without knowing the difference between right and wrong. Now this natural virtue seems at first sight difficult to classify along with either form of δημοτική ἀρετή before described. But a closer examination will show that, however much more attractive it may be, it does not in principle differ from the first. For we observe (1) that the virtue which these θείων follow by the impulse of their own hearts is the ordinary utilitarian virtue, (2) they are just, temperate, &c, simply because these virtues are more natural and therefore more easy and pleasant to them than the opposite vices, not because they choose them as being better: their virtue, when analysed, is an amiable form of selfishness. Therefore they must, harsh as it seems, be classed with οἱ ἀκολασίαν σεσωφρονισμένοι, and with the first variety, since their virtue is of themselves, not from the philosopher.

The whole discussion in the Μένος brings out two points very clearly: (1) the fundamental difference between popular and philosophic ἀρετή is the same as that between true opinion and knowledge; (2) true opinion, where it is present, leads in the same path as knowledge: the ἰδιώτης who has a true opinion about what is right will act in the same way as the φιλόσοφος who knows what is right.

1 A careful investigation into the meaning of the phrase θεία μοίρα will be found in Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen ii i p. 497 note (3rd ed.). See also Dr Thompson’s note on Gorgias 506 ε ὧς οὕτως ἐκή κάλλιστα παραγιγρεται.

2 This seems at first sight to conflict with the opposition of θεία μοίρα with φόροι in the Μένος. But I think that while in the Λαύνος Plato is contrasting the αὐτο-

ϕυής ἀρετή with that which is the result of ἐπιστήμη, in the Μένος he merely notes that ἀρετή is no inbred attribute of human nature, but where it occurs without ἐπιστήμη, it is bestowed by special favour of the gods. Cf. S9 b.

3 The ἰδιώτης and the φιλόσοφος are aiming at precisely the same thing, viz. the good: only the φιλόσοφος seeks it as it really is, the ἰδιώτης as it is adumbrated.
popular virtue in its highest conceivable form leads to the same conduct as the philosophic virtue. The difference is that we can trust the latter and not the former: we cannot ensure that a man will always have right opinions; they may at any moment slip away from him like the statues of Daidalos. But the knowledge of the philosopher can never fail him: thence it is that he must come forward as the instructor of mankind; they must not be left to their good instincts, which may betray them, or to their utilitarian codes, which must lower them: they must accept a morality founded on the philosopher's sure and abiding knowledge of the good

In vii we have a slight distinction. Here is one who is virtuous by habit and convention. There is however no specific difference between him and the θεϊος of the Meno: his conduct is equally influenced by unreflecting impulse, and we must conceive him as naturally well disposed. Plato notes however that this unthinking obedience to custom and tradition may lead to the most disastrous consequences, when a man is placed in a situation where custom and tradition are of no avail. How little value Plato set on this conventional virtue may be gathered from Phaedo 82 b, where those who have lived virtuously ξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ pass at death into the form of some social and peaceable animal, bee, wasp or ant, or at best live again as decent and orderly citizens.

In viii we have the description of a child who is receiving a true education. He is to be surrounded from infancy with an atmosphere of the purest morality, ὡσπερ αὕρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγείαν, till he insensibly glides into harmony with fair reason; music is to sink into his soul, filling it with a love of concord and order: and thus being habituated to all that is noble and beautiful, while still too young to understand the reason why it is so, when in maturer years he at last attains knowledge of the reason, he welcomes it with joy, because all his previous training has fitted him to receive it. Thus we see that the δημοτική ἀρετή in its highest form serves as a propaedeutic for ἀρετή μετὰ φρονήσεως. That is to the philosophic child but an early stage which to the unphilosophic many is their journey's end; the highest level their maturity attains is for his youth a starting-point to the knowledge of the good.

The result then of our investigation is this. While all δημοτική

in his own mind: the demotic good is, as Plato says, the shadow of the philosophic.


APPENDIX I.

\( \dot{a}peta \) is radically distinguished from philosophical morality by the fact that it is \( \dot{a}nev \ \phi rovn\dot{a}steos \), we may I think discern two well-marked varieties of it, represented by extracts i and iii; regarding that of vi and vii as not specifically distinct from i. The first is an ethical code formed (1) by the multitude for themselves, (2) on utilitarian principles, (3) without knowledge of the good; the second is (1) formed by the philosopher for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian principles and without knowledge of the good. The first Plato regards with unmixed contempt; the second he recognises as the best which the great majority of mankind can attain, and by it he hopes to supersede the other: nay, so much importance does he attach to this, that his philosophers must take it in turns to desist from their own meditations and give their minds to instructing their fellow citizens. We must beware of regarding these two varieties as two successive conceptions by Plato of the \( \delta \eta m\sigma t\eta k\dot{i} \ \dot{a}peta \): they are two distinct kinds, of which one is utterly condemned, the other positively enforced upon the masses.

Finally it may be noted that the perfection of philosophic virtue is only to be found in the perfect philosopher in whom all knowledge and wisdom are consummated, \( \dot{a}s \ \phi ilo\sigma f\dot{i}as \ \dot{e}n \ \dot{a}kr\dot{e}n \ \dot{a}p\dot{a}s\dot{e}s \ \dot{e}l\dot{i}l\dot{a}v\dot{e} \). Plato did not pretend that he or any one else had reached such knowledge; therefore he would admit that his moral code was necessarily incomplete and tentative. But this is only to say that no ethical system based on metaphysical research can be perfect until the object of that research has been fully attained; until, that is, absolute knowledge has been won. And though such knowledge may be unattainable, Plato has still consolation: if philosophy's advance in cognition of the truth be endless, endless also must be her progress in virtue.
The ordinary interpretation of chapter xlvi represents Sokrates, after failing to unravel the secrets of nature by the methods of the physicists, as betaking himself to the contemplation of nature through the medium of λόγοι. This view has been set forth with such clearness and precision by Prof. Geddes that I cannot do better than give it in his words. 'Having failed in his first voyage, under the guidance of the physicists, Socrates says that he set out by himself on a second voyage of discovery in search of a solid basis of Being, not by gazing on the outward world of matter, but by meditating on the inner world of thought'... 'Socrates had stated that the study of the external world by the senses simply would not conduct to knowledge of causation, and that the effect of such study would be like looking at an eclipse of the sun with the naked eye; viz. dizziness under the dazzling maze of phenomena (cf. ἰλαγγα in 79 C, ταράττομαι in 100 D). Therefore, he goes on to say, as one uses a medium in looking at an eclipse, such as the reflection in water, or the like, so we must proceed regarding the external world, by studying phenomena through media or images, which images can be nothing else than of λόγοι, i.e. principles or reasons intellectually apprehended. This simile however has the disadvantage of representing the intellectual world as the shadow, and not the reality; and therefore Socrates at once anticipates and corrects a misimpression that might arise from the use of such a simile. Perhaps however the process I refer to (viz. το ἐν λόγοις σκοπεῖν) is in a certain respect not parallel with that to which I compare it. For I do not at all admit that the man who looks at things in their principles sees things a whit more by images than one who looks at them in their external effects. "Although it is true," says Socrates, "that those who look at the sun's reflection in water see a reflection and nothing more, I do not admit that those who study to obtain a knowledge of Being through

1 The italics are Prof. Geddes's own.
the medium of the principles in the intellect (οἱ λόγοι) perceive mere reflections of things, and not realities. Therefore the simile I have used is simply an illustration indicating that transition in which I turned from the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists, to the less remote, but not less real, world of οἱ λόγοι, or the intellectual principles of things ".

Now the first remark I have to offer upon the above exposition is that the representation of δεύτερος πλοῦς as a 'second voyage of discovery' is not consistent with the perfectly correct explanation of that proverb given by Prof. Geddes himself a little earlier; 'it signifies a "second resource in default of a better", and is applied, not to what is absolutely, but to what is relatively, best'. Ast indeed denies this: but that such is the meaning is conclusively determined, not only by the origin of the proverb, but by its use in every one of the passages where it occurs. Sokrates means that having failed in the highest object of his endeavour he betakes himself to this method of λόγοι as the closest feasible approximation to it.

But what is this highest object, the πρῶτος πλοῦς? Certainly not the investigation of phenomena by means of physical science. On the study of phenomena Plato is perpetually heaping the most contumelious epithets, especially in the period to which the Phaedo belongs: even in the Timaeus, great part of which is occupied with physical speculations, the most Plato will say for such pursuits is that they are a sober and harmless recreation in the intervals of more serious studies (59 c). Neither in matter nor in our opinions about it is there any certainty, stability or truth: matter therefore cannot be meant when Sokrates says ἀπειρήμα τὰ ὀντα σκοπῶν. It is true that he guards himself by the provision οὗ γάρ πάνυ ἔνθαρσίῳ κ.τ.λ., but this very fact is inconsistent with the theory that phenomena are the ὀντα which Sokrates failed to reach: the λόγοι must in some sense be ἐἰκόνες of something, else what is the point of the comparison? Apart from this, Sokrates has in the previous chapter given us two perfectly precise statements: (1) that he had actually tested and discredited the methods of the physicists, (2) that his hope was to discover τὰ γαθόν καὶ δέον as the ultimate αἰτία; in other words, to construct a teleological theory of the universe. This then is the 'great and wondrous hope', which the physicists could not gratify, and which he himself failed to fulfil; and this it is for which the method of λόγοι offers a substitute.

I conceive then that Prof. Geddes has fallen into error as to the nature of the πρῶτος πλοῦς by failing to keep a firm hold upon the meaning of δεύτερος πλοῦς: for I cannot imagine he would maintain
that Plato even for a moment could speak of the study of λόγοι as inferior to the study of phenomena. But I have another very grave objection to his interpretation. He speaks of the ‘dazzling maze of phenomena’, ‘the blinding spectacle of τὰ ἔργα, as studied by the physicists’; and in his exposition the sun symbolises material particulars. But where shall we find such language in Plato? If we turn to a part of the Republic with which our present passage is intimately connected, we shall see something very different. In 508 c we read ὀφθαλμοὶ οίσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτ' ἐπ' ἐκείνα τις αὐτῷς τρέπῃ ὡν ἂν τὰς χρώας τὸ ἕμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὃν υνοτερινα φέγγη, ἄμβλυνωτονοτι τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ύστερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὑψως καί μᾶλα, ἔφη. ὅταν δὲ γ', οἶμαι, ὃν ὁ ἠλίους καταλάμπῃ, σαφῶς ὀρῶτι, καί τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὀμμασιν ἔνουσα φαίνεται. τί μήν; οὕτω τούτων καί τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὥδε νόει: ὅταν μὲν οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθεια τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τούτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησε τε καὶ ἐγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται. ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν σκότων κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνώμενον τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἄμβλυνωττεί ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὐ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι. Again if we turn to 516 a we find the very same metaphor: the sun moon and stars represent the ideas, and their reflections in water represent these very λόγοι with which we are dealing in the present passage. It is to me absolutely incredible that Plato should have inverted his metaphor, should have reversed the relation of thought and matter. Thought is always to him the region of truth and light, matter of dimness and uncertainty: and that he should even for a moment represent thought as a medium to temper the blinding glare of material existence is in my judgment unnatural and inconsistent with the whole tenor of his language on this subject. Prof. Geddes appeals to the use of λαγγα and ταράττομαι, but Plato tells us (Republic 518 a) ὅτι δισταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διστῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὁμμασιν, ἐκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότως μεθυσαμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότως εἰς φῶς. Moreover in the interpretation I am criticising λόγοι are used as helps to the contemplation of phenomena, whereas Plato always treats them as helps to the contemplation of the ideas.

The passage, as I read it, has the following significance. I attempted, says Sokrates, to discover τὸ ἀγαθὲν as the ultimate cause working in nature. But when, after long endeavour, I failed in the struggle, I began to fear that by fixing my gaze too intently on realities I might be blinded in soul, as men are bereft of their bodily vision by gazing on the sun. So I bethought me of framing in my own mind images or concepts of those realities which I desired to study, and in them safely to examine the nature of their types. But though I admit these concepts
are but images of the realities, mind I don't allow that they are so in any greater degree than material phenomena: both in fact are images; but whereas phenomena are the images presented to us by our senses, concepts are the images deliberately formed by our understanding; concepts therefore are more real than phenomena in proportion as understanding is more sure than sense. Be that as it may, I did form these concepts and used them as a standard to estimate the truth or falsehood of particulars.

Sokrates in fact, since he despairs of actually grasping the eternal ideas, of which all natural phenomena are symbols, endeavours to form from those symbols, mental concepts or universals, which shall represent the ideas to him: they are the ideas as reflected in his intelligence. The verity of these concepts cannot be thoroughly ascertained, as the Republic tells us, until the ideas have been actually apprehended and compared with them: meanwhile they afford the best working hypothesis that can be obtained. No prospect of this verification is held out in the Phaedo; in the Republic however Plato speaks more hopefully.

This interpretation, as it appears to me, establishes the right relation between the δεύτερος πλοῦς and the πρώτος πλοῦς, gives to Plato's illustration its natural and customary significance, and brings the passage into complete harmony with the Republic. The objections which I conceive are most likely to be felt to it would no doubt be based upon the sentence βλέπων πρός τὰ πράγματα κ.τ.λ. The difficulty of the passage arises, I think, partly from the ambiguity of the term τὰ ὃντα, partly from a fusion of the symbol with the thing symbolised, and from a general lack of that precision of language which our familiarity with the sixth book of the Republic induces us to expect. But we must remember that Plato is not here professing to give a systematic exposition of his theory, such as we find in the Republic; we have only a general outline of the method which is copiously explained in the other dialogue. Accordingly Plato, while setting up an antithesis between realities and images, does not stop at this point to explain what realities are opposed to the images; hence the uncertainty attaching to τὰ ὃντα, which the physicists would refer to sensible, Plato to supersensual existences. The meaning he assigns to it is only parenthetically conveyed to us by his saving clause later on. My reference of τὰ πράγματα to the ideas I should defend by the use of αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα in 66 e; and we are in no wise bound to assign the same meaning to πράγματα and to ἐργοὺς. The words ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων are, I consider, to be regarded as purely metaphorical. In the passage ἵσως μὲν ὃν κ.τ.λ., Plato seems to betray
a consciousness that the absence of precision in his previous statement is likely to lead to misconceptions: he therefore inserts a parenthesis warning us against supposing that the realities of which he speaks are particulars; these, he says, are *eikônes* just as much as the λόγοι. But he does not dwell on this point; and his immediate resumption of his narrative with ἀλλ′ ὤν δῆ, 'be that as it may', shows that it is not his present purpose to emphasise it.

The views of other editors agree in the main with that of Prof. Geddes, but show some minor points of difference. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, regards both λόγοι and ἔργα as *eikônes*, and translates ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις 'ex effectis alicuius rei'. Ast and H. Schmidt understanding ἔργοις of material objects, deny that λόγοι are *eikônes*; and the former expressly, the latter by implication, denies that δεύτερος πλοῦς signifies an inferior method. I think the two latter are right about ἔργοις, but in respect of the λόγοι and the δεύτερος πλοῦς Fischer and Stallbaum are unquestionably nearer the truth. But all these views are in my judgment radically vitiated by failure to recognise that a theory of final causes is that which Sokrates had hitherto vainly attempted to reach by apprehension of the ultimate *aitia* itself, and to which he now hoped to make an approximation by the aid of his logical method.

The foregoing exposition assumes the genuineness of every word in the passage. Mr Jackson however has suggested to me that one sentence is open to grave suspicion of interpolation. The whole trouble arises from the words βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπεσθαί αὐτῶν. Had these words been absent, there would not, I think, have been two opinions as to the interpretation of the passage, which would then run thus. 'Exhausted by the effort to grasp realities', says Sokrates, 'I felt I must beware lest I suffered the fate of those who observe an eclipse of the sun directly and are blinded for their pains. I feared my soul might be blinded by direct vision of the truth; and so I thought it prudent to content myself with the consideration of λόγοι, which are the reflections of the truth in my thoughts. Yet for all that, these thought-images are just as real as the material images of nature: so I am in at least as good a position as the physicist who occupies himself with the symbols of sense'. Nothing can be more plain and simple than the sense thus obtained. Now if we examine the obnoxious sentence, we shall see that it is in itself confused and inaccurate. After τῆν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν, which gives us the thing symbolised, we have a sudden and perplexing transition to the symbol in βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι: the mind's eye and the body's eye are jumbled most incoherently together; for the depri-
vation of mental vision is given as the result of action on the part of the bodily organ. And in the next breath we have ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν, which is not even germane to the metaphor. Surely these are two serious defects. And since we find that the very sentence which hampers the interpretation of the entire passage is in itself, quite apart from the general context, open to damaging criticism, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the whole clause from βλέπων to αὐτῶν is from the hand of the same hazy-minded interpolator who has on some other occasions foisted his own ineptitudes upon Plato. The sentence is precisely what we should expect him to introduce, imagining (as he was quite certain to do) that the πρῶτος πλοὺς was the observation of particulars ¹.

But although I think there are strong reasons for supposing these words to be spurious, I do not in the least rest my interpretation of the chapter on their rejection. The omission renders the passage a much better piece of exposition; but in any case it seems clear to me that the meaning is the same. On this ground I have refrained from bracketing the words in question, since I do not wish it to appear as if my explanation in any degree depended upon expunging them.

¹ It is possible that the bracket ought to begin with ἐδεισα. The words μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν are not indeed open to the objections which apply to the following, but they are not necessary since the same meaning is conveyed in μὴ πάθομι κ.τ.λ. Our interpolator may have borrowed from ὅσον ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, where, it may be noted, the blindness is not said to arise from excess of light. The omission of these words gives a satisfactory sentence: τοιούτων τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοῆθην, καὶ ἐδοξε δὴ μοι χρήμα. I do not feel however that the clause ἐδεισα...τυφλωθεῖν is at all on the same footing as the concluding words of the sentence.
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