ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

VOL. II.
THE

ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

ILLUSTRATED WITH

ESSAYS AND NOTES.

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THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOKS III.—X.
IT has been already assumed without proof, that virtue implies purpose (Eth. II. iv. 3, II. v. 4, II. vi. 15), and therefore of course will and freedom. Before proceeding to the analysis of particular virtues, Aristotle begins by examining the generic conception of the Voluntary, with a view chiefly to the comprehension of its species, Purpose.

The first five Chapters of Book III. are accordingly devoted to this subject, and stand so much apart from what goes before and after, that some have been led to the conclusion that they were written as a separate treatise (see Essay I. p. 10). That several parts of these chapters are unnecessarily repeated in Book V. c. xiii., and that certain points in them do not agree with the psychology of Books VI. and VII., is no argument against the present chapters having formed part of Aristotle's original draft and conception of his Ethics, but only tends to show that Books V. VI. VII. were written later. It is more to the purpose to notice that in Chapter V. § 10, there is an apparent ignoring of the whole discussion upon the formation of moral states which occupies the commencement of Book II., and that no allusion occurs to 'the mean' or to 'happiness.' On the other hand, while we must attribute a sort of completeness in itself and a sort of isolation to the account of the Voluntary, we must also acknowledge that there is at all events great skill shown in the way in which it is worked into the general ethical treatise by §§ 21, 22 of the fifth chapter. And on the whole these chapters bear out the theory which seems most natural with regard to the composition of the Ethics (see Essay I. pp. 42, 43), as they both exhibit to some degree the characteristics of a separate treatise, and also appear to have been written in reference to the preconceived plan of the entire work. The contents of these chapters are as follows:
(1.) The general definition of the Voluntary. Ch. I.

(2.) The special account of Purpose, that it is distinct from desire, wish, opinion; its relation to the process of deliberation. Ch. II.—III.

(3.) Some consideration of the question whether Wish is for the absolute or the apparent good. Ch. IV.

(4.) An attack upon the position that while virtue is free, vice is involuntary. Ch. V.

The remainder of the book is occupied with a discussion of the two first virtues upon Aristotle’s list—courage and temperance. With regard to courage the following heads are treated of:—

(1.) Its proper objects; Ch. VI. (2.) That it is a mean; Ch. VII. (3.) That true courage is to be distinguished from five spurious kinds of courage; Ch. VIII. (4.) That it is particularly related to pain, and implies making great sacrifices for the sake of what is noble; Ch. IX. The objects and the nature of temperance are treated of in Chapters X. and XI. And the book ends with two remarks on intemperance: (1.) that it is more voluntary than cowardice; and, (2.) that its character is shown in its etymology; Ch. XII.
I. 1—2 Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ—κολάσεις

'Virtue then being concerned with feelings and actions; and praise and blame being bestowed on those which are voluntary, while pardon and sometimes even pity are conceded to the involuntary, it is surely necessary for those who treat of virtue to define the voluntary and involuntary; and moreover this will be useful for legislators with a view to their rewards and punishments.' In the Eudemian Ethics, which contain generally speaking a reproduction of these Ethics, for the most part compressed, but also occasionally expanded and supplemented, we find (Eth. Eud., ii. vi.) a more definite and reasoned statement of the voluntariness of virtue and vice, which is by far the best and most ingenious part of the books that certainly belong to Eudemus. His reasoning is briefly as follows:—All oἱοναὶ are ἀρχαῖ, and tend to reproduce themselves; and only those ἀρχαῖ are properly so called (κτισμαῖ) which are primary causes of motion, as is especially the case with regard to immutable motions, whose cause is doubtless God. Mathematical ἀρχαῖ are called so only by analogy, not being causes of motion. We have hitherto only mentioned necessary consequences: but there are many things which may happen or may not, and whose causes therefore must be, like themselves, contingent. All human actions being contingent, it is obvious that man is a contingent cause, and that the reason of the contingency in his actions is his ability to will one way or the other, as is farther manifest from our praise or blame of actions. A deeper ground than that which Aristotle has taken might surely have been found for the position that morality implies freedom. But though philosophy even before Aristotle had dealt to some extent with the ideas of necessity and freedom, it remained for the Stoics to open the question more decisively; and (for reasons elsewhere given) this is one main point in which modern systems may claim an advantage over the ancient ones (see Essay VII.). It is plain that the discussion of free-will in this place is never metaphysical, and rarely even psychological. An appeal to language and common opinions sums up nearly the whole.
The scope of the argument is limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological point of view (άναγκαιον τοῖς περὶ ἄρετῆς ἐνιακαπόσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι).  

3 δοκεῖ δὲ—γινόμενα] 'Now those acts seem to be involuntary which are done under compulsion or through ignorance.' In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of inquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deep-lying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (δοκεῖ) of what constitutes an involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the ἄρχη, or cause of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there really is a superior ἄρχη (Kant's 'heteronomy'), or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense and how the individual is an ἄρχη, is the point where Aristotle stops short in the inquiry.  

βλαίου δὲ—ὁπρετε] 'That is compulsory, whose cause is external to the agent, and is of such a nature that the agent (or patient) contributes nothing towards it; as, for instance, if a wind were to carry you to any place, or men in whose power you are.' ἄρχη seems here equivalent to ἄρχη κινήσεως, the efficient cause. Aristotle attributes spontaneity so decisively to the individual act, that he confines the term compulsion as only applicable to cases of absolute physical force, where a man's limbs are moved or his body transported, as if he were inanimate, by some external power. The compulsion of threats, fear, and such like, he will not call compulsion without qualification, because still the individual acts under it. He has already spoken of the life of money-making as being Βλαίου τις, 'in a sort compulsory.' (Eth. i. v. 8). With ὁ πράττων ή ὁ πάσχων cf. v. viii.  

3: πολλά γὰρ τῶν φύσει ἄρχη κινήσεων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν—οἶον τὸ γηράν ἡ ἀποθέσεως.  

4—9 The cause of the act must be entirely from without, for in some cases men are forced, not to an act, but to an alternative. They may do what is grievous for the fear of what is worse. Such acts, then, are of a mixed character, partaking of the nature both of voluntariness and involuntariness. Relatively to the moment, they come from the choice and will of the individual. Abstractedly and in themselves they
are contrary to the will. But as every act aims at something in reference to the particular moment, and is thus entirely dependent on it, so these must be judged as acts done and chosen voluntarily, and according to circumstances must obtain blame or praise. There seems to be four cases which Aristotle conceives as possible: (1) Praise is deserved where pain or degradation is endured for the sake of some great and noble end; (2) but blame, where what is degrading is endured without a sufficiently great and noble end. (3) Pardon is conceded where human nature succumbs, under great extremities, to do what is not right; (4) except the action be such as no extremities ought to bring a man to consent to, in which case pardon is withheld. In these distinctions we may recognise a practical and political wisdom such as might be found in the speeches of Thucy-
dides, but the discussion does not rise to the level of philosophy.

6 μυκταί—οδύνον] 'Now it may be said that such actions are of a mixed character, but they are more like voluntary actions, for they are chosen at the particular moment when they are done, and the moral character of an action depends on the circumstance of the moment; hence also the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' must be predicated in reference to the moment when a person is acting. Now, in the supposed case (ἐν τοιούταις πράξεις), the individual acts volun-
tarily; for the efficient cause of the movement of the accessory limbs is in himself, and where the cause is in a person, it rests with him to act or not. Therefore such things are voluntary, though abstractedly perhaps, involuntary, for in themselves no one would choose any of such things as these.'

τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως] The phrase is general, not referring only to the cases under dispute, but to action universally. In this sense we may translate τῆς πράξεως 'of an action.'

Τέλος is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the 'moral character of an action.' This sense arises out of a combination of associations, 'final cause,' and 'motive,' being combined with 'end-in-itself,' 'perfection,' 'completeness.' A precisely similar use of the word occurs, Eth. ii. vii.

6: Τέλος δὲ πάσης εὐγενείας—ὁριζέται γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τῷ τέλει (on which see note). The Paraphrast treats the present passage as if the τέλος of an action were different from the voluntariness of an action; and as if the argument were, 'because the character of an action as good or bad is judged in reference to the mind of the actor at the moment of action, so also must the voluntariness of an action be judged.' Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκάστης πράξεως τέλος κατὰ τὸν καρδῆν αὐτῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καρδὸς ἡ ἁγαθὸν ἡ πονηρὴ γίνεται ὡστε καὶ τὸ ἐκάσεως, ἢ τὸ ἀκόσιον, κατὰ τὸν καρδῆν ὑπὲρ πράττεται, ζητητέον. Of course the interpretation of Muretus is wrong which attri-
butes a merely popular and un-Aristotelian sense to τέλος 'actio—terminatur eo ipso tempore quo agimus.'

[Note: prættei] The omission of τις, especially after conjunctions like ei, δε, &c., is common in Aristotle, though not peculiar to him. Cf. Eth. n. i. 6: "ψευδής είσιν ὑποτελέσχει καὶ πράξεις σάματος φυσικων ὑνάρχει ϑάνη ἑχώστων. τοιοῦτο δέ, εί δι ϑὰ ὤργανον. De Part. An. n. i. 41: "σάμας καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἐνεκά τινος γὰρ ἐκατόπτων τῶν μορφών, ὁμοία καὶ τὸ δῶλον), ἀνάστηκε ὡρα ὁμοίως καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτοι εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτοi εἴ ἐκείνο ἔστι.

8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἐυριπίδου—μητροποτόνεια] 'For the things which compelled the Alemreon of Euripides to kill his mother appear absurd,' i. e. the curses threatened by Amphiaras, who, when departing for Thebes, enjoined his son to put Eriphyle to death. Aspasius preserves the lines:—

Μάλαστα μὲν μὲν ἐνεργοίς ἐπισκήψας πατήρ, ὅθεν Έρματι εἰς Θῆβας ἔδω.
I.]

IIOKWN NIKOMAXEIOWN III.

10 poiα δ᾿ ἄντι πολῶν αἰρετῶν, οὐ βίαδιον ἀποδοῦναι] There is something careless about the composition here, as these words repeat what has been already said in the preceding section. "Εστι δὲ χαλεπῶν ἐνιότερ διακρίναι ποιῶν ἄντι πολῶν αἰρετῶν.

11—12 In these sections Aristotle guards his definition against a possible misconception. Having defined the compulsory to be that whose cause is external, he disallows the supposition that the two great inducements to all action, the pleasant and the noble, because external to us, make the actions they induce compulsory. His arguments against this supposition are:

(1) It would make all action compulsory, and thus imply more than any one would wish to support. (2) Compulsory actions are painful; those done for the pleasant or the noble are pleasurable. (3) It leaves out of account the internal susceptibility of the agent (αὐτῶν εὐθύρατον ὑπάντη). His own definition, then, is sufficiently qualified by the addition of the words, 'the person under compulsion in no-wise consenting' (μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος).

tà ἱδέα καὶ tà καλά] Aspasius reads tà ἱδέα καὶ tà λυπηρά. The commentators Victorius, Muretus, Giphanius, and Zell, get over the difficulty by taking tà καλά to mean 'non honesta, sed formosa, pulchra.' It is plain, however, that the same classification of inducements is here referred to as that given Eth. n. iii. 7, the συμφέρων being a means either to the ἱδέων or the καλῶν. The καλῶν is in short 'the noble,' or 'the good, viewed as morally beautiful.' A concise definition of it is given in Ethet. 1. ix. 3: καλῶν μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὃ ἐστιν αὐτῶν αἰρετῶν ὑπὸ ἐπανειπότων ἡ, ἡ δὲ ἐν ἀγαθῶν ὑπὸ ἱδέων, οὕτω ἡ ἀγαθία. It is used in the present passage not at all emphatically, but simply to denote that form of inducement which con-
13 Τὸ δὲ δι’ ἀγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκποιον μὲν ἀπαν ἐστὶν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυσιν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι’ ἀγνοιαν πράξαις ὄτι οὐν, μὴ δὲν ὃς ὑπαρκῆν ἔπὶ τῷ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπισκεν, ὁ γε μη ὡσεῖ, οὐδ’ αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυτομένος γε. τοῦ δὴ δι’ ἀγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελομένος, ἐπειδ’ ἐτερος, ὡστὶ οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ 14 γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ἄνομα ἔχειν ὅδοιν. ἐτερον δ’ ἐδικε καὶ τὸ δι’ ἀγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοούντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἡ ἀργίζομενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι’ ἀγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ

sists in our wishing to do a thing because it is right. A little examination shows that the writing here is vague, for presently it is said to be absurd to assign the cause of the good things to oneself, and of the bad things to pleasure (αἰτίαθαῖ—τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτών, τῶν δ’ αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἠθέα); whereas consistently the ‘good things’ would have been assigned to the ‘good’ as an external cause by those who maintained the position, ei δέ τις τὰ ἠθέα κ.τ.λ. Also would Aristotle say that what is done διὰ τὸ καλὸν, is always done μεθ’ ἠθέας? This goes strangely against Eth. m. ix. 4—5, where the higher satisfaction of the καλὸν is represented as purchased by great pain. There is a vagueness also in the use of βίαια, which first stands for that which compels, and secondly for that which is compelled. The principle, however, is well brought out, that the objective inducement to an action cannot be separated from the subjective apprehension of this in the will.

13 τὸ δὲ δι’ ἀγνοιαν—ἐχειν ὅδοιν] ‘Now that which is done through ignorance is always non-voluntary, but it is involuntary only when followed by pain, and when it is a matter of regret. For he who has done something through ignorance, but without feeling any dislike at the action, has not, it is true, acted voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not know he was doing it, but, on the other hand, not involuntarily, since he is not sorry. With regard, therefore, to actions done through ignorance we may say that he who repents has been an involuntary agent, while he who does not repent we may distinguish as having been a non-voluntary one; for where there is a real difference, it is proper to have a distinctive name.’ Aristotle begins the discussion of ignorance as modifying volition by this refined distinction, that an action may be done through ignorance, and yet not against the will. It may in short be neither with the will nor against it. He then goes on to consider the precise meaning of δι’ ἀγνοιαν.

14—16 ἐτερον δ’ ἐδικε—ἀκοουων πράττει] ‘There seems to be a further difference between acting through ignorance and doing a thing in ignorance. Common opinion pronounces that the drunken or the angry man acts not through ignorance, but in consequence of drunkenness or anger, and yet that he does not act wittingly, but in ignorance. Without doubt every depraved man is in ignorance of what he ought to do, and of that from which he ought to refrain, and it is
in consequence of this error that men become unjust, or bad generally. But the term involuntary is not meant to cover ignorance of man's true interest. Ignorance which affects moral choice, and ignorance of the universal, are the causes, not of involuntary action, but of wickedness, and it is precisely for this ignorance that wicked men are blamed. The ignorance which causes involuntary action is ignorance of particulars, which are the circumstances and the objects of actions. With regard to these particulars, pity and pardon may be proper, for the man who acts in ignorance of some particular is an involuntary agent. The connexion of this somewhat compressed passage is as follows.

An act is involuntary when caused by ignorance. But ignorance cannot be said to be the cause of an act if the individual be himself the cause of the ignorance. In that case ignorance rather accompanies the act ("ἀγνωστὰ πράττειν") than causes it ("δὴ ἄγνωστον πράττειν"). We see this (1) in instances of temporary oblivion, as from anger, or wine; (2) in those of a standing moral ignorance or oblivion (ἐὰν τις ἄγνωστον τὸ συμφέρον—ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνωστον—ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωστον). The only ignorance, then, which is purely external to the agent, so as to take away from him the responsibility of the act, is some chance mistake with regard to the particular facts of the case. A great deal of trouble has been expended upon the endeavour to distinguish and explain the various terms, ἄγνωστα πράττειν—ἀγνωστὸν τὸ συμφέρον—ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνωστον—ἡ καθόλου ἄγνωστον. But a closer examination shows that these different terms are not opposed to each other, but rather are all different ways for expressing the same thing, being opposed to the ἡ καθ’ ἔκαστα, ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξεις. This is the way in which the Paraphrast understands the passage, for he renders it: Αἱ δὴ τουαται πράξεις οὐκ ἐκιν ἄκοινοιον ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνωστον, ἢτις ἔστιν αἰτία τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτία τοῦ ἄκοινοιον, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀκρασίας. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλου περὶ τῆς μὲν ἄγνωστον ὦτι πονηρόν, αἰτίου γίνεται τοῦ ἄκοινοιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄγνωστον μερικῶς τίνηδε τὴν μεθοδοῦν ὄνομ, φέρε ἐπί τις οὐκ εἰσίτω μὴχρί πόσων πόνων ἔνικεθείν. Aristotle strictly confines ignorance, as a cause of involuntary action, to mistakes about particulars. Before proceeding to this particular ignorance, he separates from it that kind of ignorance which is faulty, because caused by the agent himself. Of this there are two kinds, the temporary, as for instance that caused by intoxication, and the permanent, such as that caused by any vicious habit. 'Ignorance of the universal' is not different from 'ignorance of our real interest,' but serves to point the antithesis of 'ignorance of the particular': nor is it opposed to ignorance as shown in wrong moral choice, but to ignorance of external facts. It goes to constitute ignorance in the purpose, for in every moral act there is a universal conception, as well as a particular application of this. But Aristotle does not here enter upon the psychology of the subject, as is afterwards done, Eth. vii. iii. The word συμφέρον is used, Politics, 1. ii. 11, to include and denote all kinds of good, διὰ λόγου ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν, ὥστε καὶ τῷ δίκαιον καὶ τῷ διόκειν.

14 διὰ τὶ τῶν εἰρημένων] Some refer
15 τὸ δ’ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι ὡς εἴ τις ἁγνοὶ τὸ συμφέρον; οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἁγνοία αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μορφῆς, οὐδ’ ἡ καθολοῦ (ὑέχονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταῦτῃ) ἀλλ’ ἡ καθ’ ἐκκατα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἡ πρᾶξις·

16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· οὐ γὰρ τούτων τι ἁγνοῦ ἀκουσίως πράττει. ὦσος οὖν οὐχ ἀεί ὑδροίσει αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστὶ, τίς τε ὃς καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἂν ἐν τίνι πράττῃ, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, ὃν ὤγαγνα, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, ὃν σωτηρίας, καὶ πός, οὖν ἑρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.

17 ἀπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἁγνοῦσει μὴ μανικέμενος, ὁμιλῶν ὃς οὖν τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἐαυτόν γε; ὃ δὲ πράττει, ἁγνοῦτει ἃν τις, οὖν λέγουσι ταπεινός ἡ ἁγνοῦσιν αὐτούς, ὃς οὐκ εἰδεῖ να ἀπόρρητα ἤ ὁσπερ Ἀσχύλος τὰ μυστικὰ, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλημένος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τῶν καταπέλτῃν. ἀφεῖσθαι ὅ τιν τε καὶ τὸν οὗν πολέμιον εἶναι ὁσπερ ἡ Μέροπη, καὶ ἐφαινόσθαι τὸ λευχοχυμένον δόρυ, ἢ τῶν λύθον κίσσην εἰναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρία πάσας ἀποκτείναι ἀν· καὶ δεῖξαι βουλημένος, ὁσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι,

this to § 11, τὰ ὑδα καὶ τὰ καλά, but it appears simply to mean 'not from ignorance, but from one of the things now specified,' (i.e. drunkenness or anger). Cf. iii. iii. 11, τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, which refers to the passage immediately preceding.

16—17 The particulars connected with an action are as follows. (1) The person doing it, about which ignorance is impossible to the doer. (2) The thing done, which may not be known, e.g., Ἀσχύλος did not know he was revealing the mysteries. (3) The thing or person made the object of the action (περὶ τί ἂν τίνι), e.g., Μερόπη did not know it was her son. (4) The instrument, e.g., one might fancy one’s spear had a button on it. (5) The purpose, or tendency of the act (ἴεκα τίνος), e.g., one wishing to preserve might kill.

(6) The manner (πῶς), e.g. one might strike harder than one wished.

ὁσπερ Ἀσχύλος τὰ μυστικὰ] Referring to the well-known story that Ἀσχύλος was summoned before the Areopagus on the charge of having revealed the mysteries, against which charge he pleaded that he had never himself been initiated.

ὁσπερ ἡ Μέροπη] This same incident is alluded to by Aristotle in the Poetics, c. xiv. 19: Κράτιστον δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον, (i.e. τὸν μέλαντα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνήκεστον δὲ ἁγνοῖαν, ἀναγκαιότατον πρὶν ποιῆσαι), λέγω δὲ οὖν ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μέροπη μελετεῖ τῶν οὖν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτεῖνει δὲ οὐ, ἂλλ’ ἀνεγκυρώσειν.

καὶ δεῖξαι βουλημένος, ὁσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειν ἀν] 'And wishing to show the way, as those do who box with the open hand, a man might give another a blow.' Aspasius
I.]

ΘΟΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ III.

13

πατάξειν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἁγιομασίας οὕσης ἐν 18 οἷς ἡ πράξεις, ὁ τούτων τί ἁγιομασίας ἀκαν δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μᾶλλα ἐν τις κυριωτάτοις· κυριωτάτα δ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξεις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. τοῦ δὴ κατὰ 19 τὴν τοιαύτην ἁγιομασίαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν πράξειν λυπηρῶν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείαι. ὁυτός δ᾽ 20 ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίου καὶ οἱ ἁγιοι, τὸ ἐκούσιον δοξέειν ἄν εἶναι οὐ η ἁρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδοτι τὰ καὶ ἐκαστὰ ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξεις. ἵππας γὰρ οὐ καλίσις λέγεται ἀκοῦσια εἶναι 21 τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δὶ εἰπόμεναι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐτὶ 22 τῶν ἀλλων ἔκων ἀκούσιος πράξεις, οὔθε παίδες ἐτὶ 23 πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκούσιως πράττομεν τῶν δὶ εἰπόμεναι καὶ θυμῶν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκούσιος τὰ ὅ αἰσχρὰ ἀκοῦσιος; ἢ γελοῦν ἔνος γε αἰτίου ὁυτός; ἄτοπον δὲ ἄτομος οὐ τὸ ἀκοῦσια 24 φάναι οὖν δὲ ὁρέγεσθαι. δὲι δὲ καὶ ὁργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισὶ καὶ ἐπισκέπτειν τινῷν, οἷον ὑμιέας καὶ μακῆσεως. δοκεῖ δὲ 25 τὰ μὲν ἀκοῦσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἐπισκέπτειν ἦρεα. ἐτὶ δὲ τὶ διαφέρει τῷ ἀκοῦσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ 26

explains ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι thus: ἐστι το πετανεβεν ἡ παγκρατιάζειν πρὸς ἔτερον ἄνευ σωματοκύρης ἡ ὅλως ἀκαίρας ταῖς χεραῖς μετ᾽ ἀλλότρων γνωμάξεσθαι, ἢ. it is what we call 'sparring.' This same phrase δεῖξει βουλόμενος was applied before to 'the man who was showing the catapult,' and was given as an instance of one being ignorant of the nature of his act. Here it is an instance of ignorance of the tendency of an act. The different kinds of ignorance are not very distinct from one another.

18 περὶ πάντα δὴ — ἐνεκα] 'Ignorance, then being concerned with all these circumstances of the action, he that was ignorant of some one of these is held (dokéi) to have acted involuntarily, and especially (if ignorant) with regard to the most important; and the most important seem to be the objects of the action and the tendency of it.' The words ἐν οἷς are used at the beginning of the section in a general sense, as before (§ 15); afterwards they correspond with περὶ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι (§ 16). There is an awkwardness about ὃ ἔνεκα. A person knows with what end or view he is acting (and this is what ὃ ἔνεκα legitimately expresses). But he is mistaken about the means which he uses. Hence wishing to produce one result he produces another. But what he mistakes, is not the end (ὁ ἔνεκα) but the means (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος). The phrase here would imply that an action had an end, or aim of its own (ὁ ἔνεκα) independent of the doer,—in other words a tendency, of which therefore the doer might be ignorant.

20 – 27 Having separated off the involuntary in its two forms of compulsion and mistake, there remains to us the conception of the voluntary, as that whose cause is in an agent knowing the circumstances of the action.
This definition requires justification, owing to a false notion (οὖ καλὸς λέγεται) that acts done from anger or desire (which are 'in the agent') are involuntary. This notion is refuted by the following arguments: (1) It would prove too much, and would make all the actions of brutes and of children involuntary. (2) Some acts prompted by desire or anger are right and good. We must either call these involuntary, or say that, while these are voluntary, bad acts similarly prompted are involuntary. Either supposition is absurd. (3) There is a feeling of obligation (δεὶ), attaching sometimes to these emotions; we ought to desire these things and be angry at some. This feeling of 'ought' implies freedom. (4) Acts prompted by desire are pleasant; involuntary acts, painful. (5) We have as strong a feeling about errors of passion, as about errors of reason, that they are to be eschewed (φειντα). The passions are as much part of the man as the reason, therefore acts prompted by them are acts of the man.

The polemic in these arguments does not seem to be directed against any philosophical school, but rather against a popular error. Aristotle does not deal with the maintainers of the doctrine of necessity as a whole, but only with those who, allowing that half our actions are free, would argue that the other half are not free. Such reasoners are comparatively easy to answer. The most important argument adduced by Aristotle is the third, where he implies that the idea of freedom is contained in that of duty. He does not draw out this principle, nor could he have done so without anticipating the philosophy of later times. The last argument seems to come to this, that you cannot separate a man from his passions, or say the reason is the man's self and the passions not. Elsewhere Aristotle says δο νοῦς αὐτὸς ἐκαστος. And in truth the relation of a man's desires to his individuality might be more deeply investigated than is here done.

φειντα μὲν γὰρ ἀμφοτεροί This seems, a counterpart to the former argument, ἄτοπον λοις τό ἀκοῦσια φαίνει ἐν δεῖ ἀρέσεσθαι. The passions are proved to be voluntary on account of the feeling of reprehension we have for errors of passion. On the emphatic opposition between φειντα and αἰρέτον, cf. Eth. x. ii. 5.

II. Having given a generic account of the voluntary, Aristotle proceeds to examine the special form of it which he calls προαίρεσις. This does not mean the will as a whole (for which indeed, Aristotle has no one name), but a particular exhibition of it, namely, a conscious, determinate act of the will. 'Purpose' or 'determination' is perhaps the nearest word in our language, but in fact no word exactly corresponds. The contrasts and distinctions made in this chapter might at first seem unnecessary, until we observe that Aristotle is himself founding a new psychology. The
word προαιρέσεως only once occurs in Plato, and then not in its present psychological sense, but merely denoting ‘selection’ or ‘choice.’ Parmenides, p. 143 b: τί οὖν; ἐνὶ προελάβαι αὐτὸν εἶτε Βούλει τὴν οὐδίαν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον εἶτε τὴν οὐδίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἶτε τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἡ' οὖν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρομέθα τινε ὧν ὡρθός ἔχει καλείσθαι ἀμφότερον; It is true that the verb προαιρέσθαι is of frequent occurrence in Plato, but generally in the sense of ‘selecting’ or ‘preferring,’ and not ‘purposing’ or ‘determining.’ As in other cases, then, Aristotle takes up a floating term from common language, and gives it scientific definiteness, so that it becomes henceforth a psychological formula. His account of προαιρέσεως in the present chapter is, that it is a species of the voluntary (ἐκουσίων μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταύτων δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκουσίων), and that it differs from anger, desire, wish, and any form of opinion. (1) It differs from desire or anger as not being shared by irrational creatures, as being often opposed to desire, &e. (2) It is still less like anger than like desire, anger excluding the notion of purpose or deliberate choice (ἡμιστὰ γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαιρέσις εἶναι δοκεῖ). (3) It is not wish, because we often wish for what is impossible, or beyond our control, and because, speaking generally, wish is of the end, whereas purpose is of the means, and restricts itself to what is in our power. (4) Nor is it opinion, which may be about anything, the eternal or the impossible, and which is characterised as true or false, not, like purpose, as good or bad. Nor is it opinion on matters of action. For opinion on good and evil does not constitute the moral character in the way that purpose does; again, the use of these terms in common language points out a difference between purpose and opinion.

Purpose then, being a species of the voluntary, implies also intellect (μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας) and deliberation. It is a deliberate desire of what is within our own power (Βουλευτικὴ ὑφεσὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Eth. iii. iii. 19).

1 οἰκειότατον γὰρ—πραξεσὶν] ‘For it seems most closely bound up with virtue, and to be a better criterion of moral character than even actions.’

Cf. Eth. x. viii. 5: ἄμισθηθετιται δὲ πότερον κυριωτέρον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαιρεσὶς οἳ αἱ πράξεις, ὅς ἐν ἀμφότερον οὕσης. The importance of this position as a ground-work for the whole doctrine of morality must be estimated by the advance which is made in it beyond what Plato had arrived at.

3 οἳ δὲ λέγοντες] There is a tendency in Plato to merge the distinctions of will and reason: whether some of his school are here alluded
to, or whether it is a merely popular confusion of terms that Aristotle attacks, is not clear.

It might be said that desires are really contrary to each other, and contradict each other as much as purpose contradicts any desire, e.g., the desire for money is thwarted by that for pleasure. But the psychology is not very explicit here, and Aristotle seems to imply, without definitely expressing it, that in the moral will there is an element contradicting the desires in a manner different from that in which one desire interferes with another.

7 Βουλησις δ' ἐστι τῶν ἄδιαντών, οἷν ἄθανασίας] 'But wish is for impossibilities, as, for instance, immortality.' This is not a passage that can be cited as an indication of Aristotle's opinion with regard to a future life. 'Ἀθανασία here means 'exemption from death,' and does not touch the question as to the imperishability of the soul. It seems to have been a stock instance of an impossible wish. Dr. Cardwell quotes Xenophon's Symposium (1. § 15): οὗτε γὰρ ἐγὼ σπουδάσαι ἐν δυνάμει μᾶλλον, ἦτερ ἄθανατος γενέσθαι. 11–13 ὅλως μὲν οὖν ὅδε ταύτων ἵσως οὔδε λέγει οὖδεις.
For in purposing what is good or bad our moral character consists,—not in opining it. And we purpose to take or avoid, or something of the kind, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is good, or how; but we do not exactly opine to take or avoid. And while purpose is praised rather by the epithets, "of the right object," or "rightly," opinion is praised by the epithet "truly." And we purpose on the one hand things that we know for certain to be good, but we opine what we do not exactly know for certain. 

οἱδὲ τινὶ́ ῥᾳδὶ́ ὑπὸ τοῦ́ ῥᾳδὸς ["II is of course not connected with μᾶλλον. It simply means 'or.' Ὀρθὸς, which should properly go with a verb, seems used because the verb προαίρεσθαι was much commoner before Aristotle than the abstract form προαίρεσις. Ὀρθή is applied to ὦρθος (the element of desire in προαίρεσις), Eth. vi. ii. 2.

III. Since Purpose implies deliberation, this latter is now analysed, and an account is given, first of its object, secondly of its mode of operation. The object of deliberation is determined by an exhaustive process. All things are either eternal, or mutable; we do not deliberate about things

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eternal. Of things mutable, we do not deliberate about those things which are regulated by necessity, by nature, or by chance. Hence it remains that we deliberate about mutable things within the power of man, and not about all such, but about those within our own power, and not about ends, but about means, and where there is room for question. The mode of operation in deliberating is a kind of analysis. Assuming as desirable some end, we first ask what means will immediately produce this end, what again will produce that means, and so on till we have brought the last link of the chain of causation to ourselves, when we commence acting at once, the last step in the analysis being the first in the productive process. If any step occurs which is on the one hand necessary for the given end, and on the other hand unattainable by us, the chain cannot be completed; the deliberation is relinquished. But if all the steps are feasible, that which was indefinite before at once becomes definite, and purpose succeeds deliberation. A discussion of the nature of ἔνθεους as related to φρόνησις occurs Eth. vi. ix., but is evidently written quite independently of the present chapter, on which it improves by employing the formula of the moral syllogism, and by inquiring after the faculty which perceives ends. We might have expected Aristotle to say that in the deliberation which precedes an action some account should always be taken of the right or wrong of the action. But here the only question is represented to be, how a given end is to be obtained? What action will serve as a means to it? Hence while the present discussion must be considered a subtle piece of elementary psychology, and of great merit in the infancy of the science, on the other hand it seems incomplete as regards the theory of morals.

3—5 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄδιδων—ἐφέξεσαι

'No man deliberates about eternal things, such as the universe, or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side in a square; nor indeed about things in motion, if the motion takes place invariably in the same way, whether of necessity, or by nature, or from any other cause, as in the instance of the solstices and the risings of the sun: nor about things entirely variable, like droughts and rains: nor about matter of chance, like the finding of a treasure.' The opposition to τὰ ἄδιδα is τὰ ἐν κυψεῖ. The more exhaustive division of objects would have been that which is given Eth. vi. i. 6, into τὰ ἐνδεξαμένα ἀλλὰς ἔχειν and τὰ μὴ ἐνδεξαμένα. But there is an absence of logical formula in the present book which is observable. The instances here given
of the eternal are (1) the universe, (2) a particular mathematical truth—that the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its side. That the universe is eternal, being uncreated, indestructible, and, as a whole, immovable, was part of Aristotle's physical philosophy. Cf. de Caelo 1. x. 10.

The above mathematical truth is called 'eternal', De Gen. An. ii. vii. 15: ἡ ἀπὸ τὸ θλόον σάμα αὐσείξις ὅπλη μὲν όντως ότε β' ἐκεῖνος διατίθεται καὶ διακεκόμηται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ διθοῦ σύστασις ἐστὶ λόγος καὶ ὁρισμός, ὡς ἄν ὁ λόγος γίγνεται καὶ φθέρεται, ἀλλὰ αἱ διαδέσεις αὐτοῦ. The relation of necessity and chance, as causes, to nature, forms the subject of Aristotle's Physics, Book II. Chapters iv.—ix. See Essay V. pp. 221—5.

8 ἐκ τῶν περὶ γραμμάτων] And on the one hand there is no deliberation about sciences that are fixed and complete in themselves, as for instance about writing—for we do not doubt how we ought to write.' The ἀκριβεία ἐπιστήμης here meant are not the 'exact sciences,' as we may judge from the instance given. Ἀκριβεία seems equivalent to 'fixed' (cf. the note on Eth. i. viii. 18), and ἐπιστήμη is used in a waving sense, almost equivalent to τέχνη, though the words are immediately afterwards distinguished.
The physician does not deliberate whether he is to cure, nor the orator whether he is to persuade, nor the statesman whether he is to produce a good constitution. The end is not the subject of deliberation in any science. An end being assumed, we consider how and by what means it can be brought about; if it appear that there are more ways than one, we inquire which is the easiest and best; if it can be accomplished by one means alone, we inquire how this produces the end, and by what it is itself produced, until we come to that which as a cause is first, but is the last thing to be discovered; for such deliberation as we describe is like seeking the solution of a geometrical problem by analysis of the diagram. The process of deliberation is analytical, proceeding backwards επί τὴν ἀρχὴν. It ends with the πρῶτον αἴτιον, i.e. the individual will. 'Will,' says Kant, 'is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason, and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign determining causes.' That each man is, as regards his own acts, an originating cause not determined by other causes, is Aristotle's view throughout. Kant's definition throws light upon this.

κάπετο] Refers to εἰσὶ and διὰ τούτου.

ἀστέρ διάγραμμα] Aristotle compares deliberation with the analysis of mathematical problems. Given a problem in geometry, e.g., to find the method of constructing some figure, Assume it as constructed, and draw it

[Chap.
accordingly. See what condition is immediately necessary, and what again will produce this, &c.

14 [ηπείται δ'—διὰ τίνος] 'The question is sometimes what instruments are necessary, sometimes how they are to be used; and, speaking generally, we have to find sometimes the means by which, sometimes the manner or the person by whom.' Michelet makes a difficulty about ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς, explaining it 'in reliquis categoriis;' but the Paraphrast renders it simply ὡς ἀπλῶς.

15 ἐσικε δή—ἐνεκα] 'It seems, therefore, that man is, as we have said, the cause of his actions: that deliberation is about the things to be done by ourselves, and that actions are means to something else.' In one sense, and so far as deliberation is concerned, action must be regarded as a means. Cf. Rhetoric, i. vi. 1: πρὸκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπός τὸ συμφέρον, Βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρῶς τὸ τέλος,
18 προαιρομένον. δήλον δὲ τούτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαῖων πολιτείων, ὡς ὁμήρος ἐμιρεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἀ προ-
19 ἐ λοιπὸν ἀνήγγέλλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὅτι δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ
βουλευτοῦ ὅρεκτο τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαιρεσὶς ἀν ἐν ἐβολευτικῇ ὑφεξίς τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι γὰρ
20 κρίναντες ὄργανα κατὰ τὴν βουλευσίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
προαιρεσίς τόπων εἰρήσθῳ, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἐστιν οBeginInit τῶν
πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

4 Ἡ δὲ βουλήσις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν, εἰρήται,

18 δήλον δὲ—δήμῳ] 'Now this is exemplified from the old polities which Homer depicted; for the kings used to announce to the people the course they had selected.' Cf. the conduct of Agamemnon, Νεαδ p. 53, sqq. A modern illustration is furnished by the French Parliaments, which used to register the edicts presented to them by the king as a matter of course. The Paraphrast explains the comparison by making the people represent the ἱποαίρεσις.—Εἰσάγει γὰρ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετὰ τὴν βουλὴν τὸ προ-
κριθήν ἀπαγεγέλλων τῷ δήμῳ ώσπερ τῇ προαιρέσει, ὡστε πρακτικαί. The people were required to acquiesce in and carry out the decisions of the kings, which else would have remained unratified. So the reason announces its decisions to the will or purpose, i.e. the active powers in the mind. Metaphors of this sort never accurately represent mental distinctions. The present comparison has many flaws. For the προαιρεσις is here called τὸ ἑγούμενον, which does not answer to the people, distinguished from the king. Again, it is the individual (ἐκαστὸς), not the reason, that announces his deliberations to the leading part in himself. What constitutes the individual as separate from the will or purpose? And, is not reason part of purpose, how then can it be distinguished from it?

19 ὅτι δὲ—βουλευσι] 'If the object of purpose is that, which, being in our power, we desire after deliberation, purpose will be a deliberate desire of things in our power. After deliberating we decide, and form a desire in accordance with our deliberation.' The Paraphrast here reads κατὰ τὴν βουλήσιν at the end of this passage. There might seem to be something plausible in the change, because βουλευσις is represented as confining itself to means; hence how can we be said to desire κατὰ τὴν βουλευσίν? Consistently, our desires must depend on something else, namely, βουλήσις—deliberation is the faculty for attaining them. On the other hand, the phrases βουλευτοῦ ὅρεκτο, and βουλευτική ὑφεξίς, run the consideration of means and ends together.

IV. Hitherto every act has been regarded as a means, and has been accounted voluntary because origi-

nating in the individual. Delib- 

eration and purpose have been restricted in their function to the mere choice and taking of means. A great question therefore remains to be mooted, whence do we get our conception of ends? What is the nature of the faculty called βουλήσις, which has been assumed to be the faculty of 

ends? Are we as free in the choice
of these, as we are in that of the means? Aristotle contents himself with mentioning in the present chapter that there are two extreme opinions, the one (that of Plato) that wish is always for the good; the other (that of the sophists) that it is for the apparent good. He rejects both of these, the first as contradicting facts, the second as ignoring any true object of wish. He takes a position between them, that, abstractedly and ideally, as appealing to the universal reason (άπλως μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν) the good is the object of wish, while to the individual mind only what appears good can seem desirable; hence, although the wise man, who is in accordance with the universal reason, and is its exponent in particular cases (τάληθες ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾷ, ἀτοπερ καὶ πὼς καὶ μέτρων αὐτῶν ἄν), wishes for the good alone, others are deceived by false appearances and by pleasure, and choose what is not truly good. Aristotle for the present passes over the important question, which is discussed in the next chapter, Does our knowledge of what is good depend upon our natural character? And if so, how can vice and virtue be called free? The statement in § 4, ἐκάστῳ ἀπό τὸ φαινόμενον (Βουλητῶν) is inconsistent with his usage of the word Βουλησις elsewhere; see the passages quoted in next note.

1 δοκεῖ δέ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι] This doctrine is found stated at length in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 466, sqq. Polus having argued that the position of a tyrant or orator is enviable, because ‘he can do what he wishes,’ Socrates answers that ‘the tyrant or orator does nothing that he wishes:’ φησὶ γὰρ, ὥς Πάλη, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς βήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἁμικρότατον—οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ἦν βούλομαι, ἡ μὲν ἔσος εἰπεῖν τοὺς ποιεῖν μὴν τι τι ἦν αὐτοῖς δόξη βελτιστοῦ εἶνα. Then follows an account of Βουλησις, that it is of ends not means. Πότερον οὖν σοι δικοῦσαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτο βούλεσθαι, δὲ ἐν πράττωσι ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἢ ἕνεκα πράττωσι τούθ' ἢ πράττωσιν; By which it can be demonstrated that Βουλησις is of the absolute good.

The difference between Plato’s account and the one above is, that Plato distinguishes Βουλησις from ἐπιθυμία, while Aristotle does not. The Βουλησις of Plato is the higher will or desire of the Universal. In this higher sense of the word wish, no one wishes except for what is good, that is, in his best moments, in the deepest recesses of his nature, if the true bearings of his wish be pointed out to him. In this sense the wish of the individual is in accordance with universal reason, and is an expression of it. In a lower sense, we wish with different parts of our nature, and thus wish for all sorts of things, bad as well as good. But to this latter kind of wish the name ‘desire’ is appropriate. The tenet δὴ ἀγαθοῦ Βουλησις ἐστιν is of great importance for morals. It implies much that modern systems would convey in other terms, such as the ‘supremacy of conscience,’ the ‘autonomy of the will,’ &c. Elsewhere Aristotle distinctly maintains it. Cf. Metaphys. xi. vii. 2: τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ κυνομένα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά (transcendentally the objects of reason and of longing are identical). Ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλὸν, βουλητῶν ἀπὸ τῶν, ἐπιπλών τὸν καλὸν. In
De Anim., iii. x. 4, he makes the wish (or will) side with reason, in opposition to desire. 'H γὰρ βουλήσεις ὑρεξίς· ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κυή-
ται, καὶ κατὰ βουλήσιν κυήται. η δ’ ὑρεξίς κυνεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν· η γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὑρεξίς τίς ἐστιν. In other parts of the Ethics also (which may hence be concluded to have been com-
piled at a different period from this chapter) this distinction between βο-
λήσεις, the general wish, and any par-
ticular desire or determination, is ob-
served. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 6: οὐδέσθι γάρ βουλεύεται, οὐδ’ ἀκρατῆς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βουλήσιν πράττει, οὕτω γάρ βουλεύ-
εται οὐδέσθι δὴ μὴ οὕτω εἶναι εἰπωνδαῖον. vni. xiii. 8: τούτῳ δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλευσθαι μὲν πάντας ή τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, προφθέγχα δὲ τὰ ἀφελίμα. τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἄγαθοι] This is a corollary of the doctrine of Prota-
goras. If the individual could only

know what ‘seemed’ to him, he could only wish for what seemed good. Thus the objective distinction between good and evil is done away with (συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι φόσι βουλη-

4. ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἐκάστα κρίνει ὁρθῶν]. The good man is made here again, as above (π. vi. 15), that standard of right and wrong, that exponent of the universal reason, by which Aristotle escapes being forced into an utterly relative system of morals.

5 οὗ γὰρ οὕσα ἄγαθον φαίνεται] The ‘pleasant’ is often characterised
in Aristotle as 'the seeming good.' Cf. De Motu Animal. vi. 5: δει δε τιθέναι καί το φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν χόραν ἤχειν, καί το ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν.

V. Aristotle winds up his account of the voluntary, by arguing that virtue and vice are free (ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄρετή, ὑμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία). As before remarked, this must not be taken as a metaphysical discussion of the question of free-will. Partly, the question had never yet been fully started; partly, Aristotle would have thought it foreign to an ethical treatise; partly, we find in the present chapter that same elementary and tentative character which marks the previous discussions in this book. In dealing with one of the real difficulties of the question at the end of the chapter, Aristotle contents himself with a very qualified and moderate assertion of freedom, which contrasts with the dogmatic statements on the same subject in the Ethics of Eudemus. The discussion here is evidently suggested by, and directed against, the doctrine of the Platonists, that 'vice is involuntary,' since it consists in ignorance. The arguments are as follows: (1) All action implies the possibility of its contrary, hence if to act rightly be in our power, to act wrongly must be in our power also. (2) That an individual is the originating cause of his actions, is a conception which it is difficult to get rid of. This implies freedom. (3) We all act as if vice were free as well as virtue. It is punished by the state. Even for ignorance and carelessness producing vice, men are held to be responsible. (4) Men must not charge their acts upon their natural character—rather their character is produced by their acts. (5) The analogy of bodily infirmities shows us that if some vices are congenital, some, at all events, are self-produced. (6) The great difficulty of the question is as follows: if, as was said above (Chapter IV.), we each of us desire what seems good; if our conception of the end, that is, our idea of good, depends not on our own will, but on nature, or our character and tendency from birth; and if all our acts are determined by this conception of the end, how can they be called free? Aristotle answers by putting various alternatives: (a) you may either accept this position in its full extent. It will then apply to virtue as well as vice. Both will be equally under a law of nature. Neither will be voluntary. But this the mind seems to revolt against. (b) Or, you may say that while the end is absolutely determined, the means to it are all free as springing from the will of the individual. Thus, virtue and vice are free, because all their parts are free. (7) Or, you may modify the doctrine by admitting that there is something self-produced and self-determined in the character as a whole, and therefore in the idea of good, which is to determine our actions.
while the means are the objects of deliberation and purpose, the actions that are concerned with the means must depend on purpose and must be voluntary. But every calling out of the virtues into play is concerned with the means; virtue accordingly is in our power, and in like manner so is vice.

ai peri taîta prâges] The words peri taîta are ambiguous. The Paraphrast confines them to 'the means,' which rendering is supported by kata prôlresin wv elew. Actions were above said to be means (ii. iii. 15).

ai de tâwv árgetov enpérgwai] This is an unusual expression. We find it again, Eth. x. iii. 1: oûde gar ai tâs árgethîs enpérgwai poûstptes estin. Aristotle's usual formula is enérgwia koi árgethîn, i.e. the evocation of the internal nature into consciousness or action, under the regulation of the moral law. He seems averse to considering árgethî as a doûsmos, or latent quality that might be so evoked. The psychology of this passage is different from that of Eth. vi. xii. 8-10. Here it is said that boûlêsos gives us the idea of the end, and that virtue consists in prôlresin and boûleunos taking the means; there that virtue gives the end, and an intellectual faculty (h prôsos) the means.

2 ev oûs gar' h'mi v to prâtein kai to mî prâtein] Elsewhere (Meto-

phys. viii. ii. 2) Aristotle states in more philosophical form this first step in the doctrine of free-will, namely, that every psychical doûsmos is a capacity of contraries, see Essay IV, p. 187.

3 toûto de ën to ágathos kai kakos einai] 'And this is, according to our hypothesis,—being good and bad.' ën = 'is as we have said,' referring to the preceding section. Trendelenburg in his paper on to to ën einai (Rheinisches Museum, 1828) tells us that ágathos in the present passage is by attraction to h'mi w. It is therefore to be distinguished from the logical expression to ágathî einai, 'the essential idea of goodness.'

to de lêgein òs—alêtheî] 'But to say that 'No man prefers a crime or spurns a bliss' seems half false and half true.' The line here quoted, on which the discussion in this chapter turns, is of uncertain authorship. It is quoted in the dialogue which bears Plato's name, peri Dalxwv. This fragmentary dialogue is, in all probability, not Plato's, but of the Platonic school (though Victorius ascribes it to Plutarch). It stands pretty much on a level with the ninth book of the Laws (see Essay III, p. 166), and one
can hardly doubt that it is referred to here. Cf. p. 374 L: Πότερον δὲ ἐκώντας οἷς ἦχειν τοῦτο τὸ ἄδικον τὸν ἀνθρώπον ή ἄκοντας; διὸ δὲ λέγω, ἐκώντας οἷς ἄδικοι καὶ ἄδικοι εἶναι ή ἄκοντας; Ἐκώντας ἔγγον, & Σάκρατες: πωνηρός γὰρ εἰσίν. 'Ἐκώντας ἅρμα οὐ οἷς πωνηροὶ εἶναι καὶ ἄδικοι ἄνθρωποι; Ἐγγον: οὐδὲ δ' οὖ; Οὐκ, εὖ γέ τι δεῖ τῷ ποιητῇ πείσθαι. Ποίῳ ποιητῇ; 'Οστίς εἶπεν

οὐδεὶς ἐκών πωνηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ.

'Αλλά τοι, & Σάκρατες, εὖ ή παλαιά παραμοία ἔχει, ὅτι παλαῖς πεύδονται ἄδικοι. The answer to this is, an argument to show that injustice is δι' ἀμάδαν, and therefore involuntary. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐφεύσατο τοῦτο γε ἀδίκοι. The original saying was probably a mere truism, πωνηρὸς meaning not 'wicked,' but 'wretched.' This play on the word rendered the line peculiarly suitable for the Platonic argument.

5 γεννηθῆν τῶν πράξεων ὡσπέρ καὶ τέκνων. The analogy here given, when looked at closely, does not imply any very strong assertion of free-will (though Aristotle meant it to be so). For the father inherits, or receives by nature, qualities that he transmits to his children. Analogously the will might be regarded as an effect, as well as a cause, of circumstances.

7 τοῦτοι δ' ἔοικε—νομοθέτων] 'This seems to be supported by the testimony both of individuals and of legislators themselves.' The argument drawn from the constitution of society, from the fact of rewards and punishments, goes so far as this. It proves that the mind is of a nature to be acted on by inducements. It, of course, does not touch the metaphysical difficulty as to the whole world being bound by a law of necessity. But it proves an instinctive belief existing in society, exactly coincident with the position of Aristotle, that the individual is the cause of particular acts. There is no natural tendency in criminals to disclaim responsibility for their crimes. If they do so, it is not from an instinctive feeling, but rather from a sophisticated mind. As before said, this fact is not sufficient to disprove a metaphysical system which would represent legislature, judge, criminal, and the whole world, as forced to do what they do by an irresistible succession of cause and effect. But ethically and politically it is sufficient to justify a practical assumption of freedom. And in any system it must at all events be taken account of.
τρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὖδεν πρὸ ἔργου ὅτι τὸ πειθόμαι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεὶν ἢ πεινῶν ἢ ἄλλᾳ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. 8 οὖδεν γὰρ ξινὸν πειθομέθα αὐτά, καὶ γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τοῖς ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δικῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, αἰῶν τοῖς μεθύοσι διπλὰ τὰ ἐπιτίμια. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθύσθαι, τοῦτο δ’ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας τὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἀ δὲ ἐπίστα- σθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. ἁμικῶς δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥστα δὶ ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δικαίως, ὡς ὑπ’ αὐ- τίος ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ’ ἱσος τοιοῦτος ἐστὶν ὡστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνεμίμενοι, καὶ τοῦ ἀδικοῦς ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακομυγέωντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτους διάγνωστε. αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἓκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μελετῶντων πρὸς ἡμινοῦν ἀγνοιάς ἢ πρᾶξιν διατελοῦσι 11 γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργείαν 12 περὶ ἓκαστα αἱ ἑξεις γίνονται, κυρίως ἀναστηθότου. ἐτι δ’ ἁλογοῦν τῶν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικοῦν εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. ἐi δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει

8 διπλὰ τὰ ἐπιτίμια] Cf. Politics, π. xii. 13: Ἐσθάντο δὲ καὶ Πιττάκος νόμοι δημοφυρὸν ἄλλ’ οὐ πολιτείαν νόμοι δ’ ἦδος αὐτοῦ τοῦ τοις μεθύονται, ἀν τυπθῆσοι, πλεῖω χρηματὶ ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφώντων. διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλεῖόν ὑδρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφωντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέθελεν, ὦτι δεὶ μεθύοντος ἐχεῖν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. Drunkenness is self-caused ignorance of right and wrong. (Cf. Eth. iii. i. 14). The law of Pittacus is given in the Rhetoric to illustrate an ἐνστασις depending on an appeal to authority. (π. xxxv. 7) ἐτι τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὦτι τοὺς μεθύοσι δεὶ συγγνώμῃ ἐχεῖν, ἄγνοοντες γὰρ ἀμαρτάνοντες, ἐνστασις δι’ ὁκὼν οἱ Πιττάκος αἰτεῖτο. οὐ γὰρ ἐν μεθύοις χρηματὶ ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐὰν τις μεθύον ἀμαρτάνῃ.

10—12 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἓκαστα—ἀναστηθότου] ‘For the particular developments of the mind in each case give people their character. This may be illustrated by the case of those who are practising for some contest or action,—for they keep on exercising their powers. Now not to know that the several states of mind arise from particular developments of the powers is absolute idiocy.’ This passage contains exactly the same theory of the formation of moral states as that given at the beginning of Book II. But it is written independently of the former passage—in that separate way, which must be called a marked peculiarity of Aristotle’s writings.

13 ἐτι δ’ ἁλογον—ἀκόλαστον] ‘Again it is absurd to say that he who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or he who acts intemperately
to be intemperate.' Aristotle would not say himself that any one 'wished to be intemperate,' that is, wished it in the general, in the abstract, for its own sake. But here he points out that those who do not wish to be intemperate yet take the steps that lead inevitably to this. He argues that the means make the end free; the outset, the conclusion; the parts, the whole. Afterwards (§ 22) he allows that the general state is not so entirely in our power as the particular act. With regard to the former it is rather true to say that we are responsible for it, than that we choose it. A paradox then still remains, that men produce by voluntary acts that which they do not wish. The resolution of this is to be found in Eth. vi. iii., where it is shown that right moral acting consists in allowing the act of the moment to be sufficiently in-

fluenceed by universal considerations. Error and vice, on the contrary, consist in suffering the universal idea, the general conception of what is good and desirable, to stand in abeyance.

14 προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι] 'But after he has thrown his health away, he has no longer a choice.' To 'give away' is the only sense in which προέθεσα is used in the Ethics. Cf. iv. i. 9, ix. i. 7, &c.

17—20 This complex argument will be perhaps made most clear, if divided into the following separate members. (1) Εἰ δὲ τις λέγω—ἄντις is the general protasis. Suppose it to be said that all aim at what appears to them good, but that their ideas and impressions are beyond their control, being dependent in each case on the character of the individual. (2) Οn this an alternative follows: either (ε)
μὲν ὁδοὶ—αἴτους) the individual is the cause of his own character, and so accordingly of his ideas, or (3) let us see what the consequences will be if we allow that the individual is not the cause of his own character (ἐὶ δὲ μὴ—ἐδύφαι). In this case no one will be responsible for doing wrong: wrong will reduce itself to mere ignorance, the knowledge of the good to a happy gift of nature. (4) But these extreme deductions are overthrown (ἐὶ δὲ ταῖς ἐστὶν—ὦναξιόσιον) by its being shown that they will equally disprove the voluntariness of virtue, as well as that of vice. (5) The argument is summed up by summing up the results of the previous discussions (ἔτε δὴ—ὑμοίως γὰρ). In whatever sense virtue is said to be free, whether as implying that the idea of the end is in our power, or only that there is something free and individual in the taking of means,—in exactly the same sense will vice be free, for these two opposite terms stand on exactly the same footing.

17 τὸς δὲ φαντασίας ὁδὸς κύριοι]

′But are not masters of their impression.′—Φαντασία is a special word, denoting something of sense and intellect (φαντασία γὰρ ἔστερον καὶ αἰσθητικεῖον καὶ διανοίας: αὐτὴ τε ὡς γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ πάντως ὡς ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. De An. iii. iii. 5). It denotes, in short, the sensual impression of an object. Aristotle says that we may have a false φαντασία even where we have true opinions, as, for instance, our φαντασία of the sun makes it a foot in diameter, while our belief is that the sun surpasses in magnitude the habitable world (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ φευγῇ, περὶ δὲ ἂν ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, ὧν φαίνεται μὲν δὲ ἥλιος ποιεῖσθαι, πεπιστευεῖ δὲ εἶναι μείζων τῆς ὁικομενίκης, De An. iii. iii. 15). Φαντασία is closely allied with μνήμη, it belongs to the same part of the mind (De Mem. i. 9). Memory and φαντασία are something short of intellect—Aristotle attributed them to the lower animals. Cf. Metaphys. i. i. 3: τὰ μὲν ὁδοὶ ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ἔνει καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπείριας δὲ μετέχει μικρῶν. Cf. also Eth. vii. iii. ii. Brutes and the incontinent are said to follow their φαντασίαι, De An. iii. iii. 21: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὑμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ἐκεῖ, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, ὦν τὰ ἡράλδα, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλούσθειν τὸν νοῦν ἐννοεῖ τάδει ἡ νόσος ἡ ὑπνός, ὦν οἱ ἀνθρώποι. Cf. Eth. vii. viii. 8. We find the word φαντασία not as yet settled into a psychological formula in Plato's Theaetetus, p. 152 b, where the doctrine of Protagoras is shown to imply that everything is as it appears, and that this appearing is identical with sensation. Σ. τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθητικεῖαι ἐστίν; Θ. Ἐστὶ γὰρ, Σ. Φαντασία ἡ ἡτα καὶ αἰσθήσεως ταύτην ἐν τε βερμοίς καὶ πάσης τοῖς τοιούτοις, οἱ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἐκάστοτι, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κυκλωνεῖ εἶναι. Aristotle, giving a scientific account of it in the De Anima, separates it, as we have seen, from sensation on the one hand, and reason on the other. The term does not correspond with any of our regular psychological terms. In relation to the fancy and the imagination, it represents the material for these, the brain-images out of which the creations of fancy (as well as the phantasmagoria of dreams) are con-
structured. Aristotle, not entering at all into the philosophy of the imaginative faculties, merely speaks of φαντασία as furnishing a necessary element to thought (νοεῖν ὅπως ἔστω ἐκείνῳ φαντάσματος, De Mem. i. 5). From what has been said it is easy to see the special appropriateness of the word in the above passage to denote an impression or idea of the good received passively, and in itself erroneous.

19 ἐστι δὴ—τέλει] 'Whether, then, the conception of the end, of whatever kind, comes not to each individual by nature, but something also is contributed by himself (τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστὶν), or whether the end indeed is fixed by nature, but it is through the good man's voluntarily taking the means that virtue is voluntary; in either case, I say, vice will be not a whit less voluntary (than virtue), for the bad man, exactly as the good, has individuality (τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν) in the particular actions, if not in the conception of the end.'

20 καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συνάτιοι πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν] 'For we are ourselves joint causes, in a way, of our own states of mind.' The word συνάτιος, meaning not the primary, but a concomitant cause, is of not unfrequent occurrence in Plato. Cf. Timæus, p. 46 ν, where it is said of fire, &c., δοξάζεται δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ’ αὕτη ἐστὶν τῶν πάντων. On the general bearing of Aristotle's
towards the question of free will, see Essay VII, pp. 316–18.

21-22 These sections form the junction between the somewhat isolated treatise on the Voluntary and Aristotle's discussion of the separate virtues. They bear marks of having been added for the express purpose of forming a junction. For after a general statement of the theory of virtue in section 21 there is a resumé of some points with regard to the voluntariness of actions and habits, which is just what a man might have been likely to add after reading over his own treatise, and thinking that it required a word or two of elucidation.

22 ὁμοιός ὁμοιὸς δὴ — ἀρρωστιῶν] But actions and habits are not equally voluntary, for we are masters of our actions from the beginning to the end because we know all the particulars, but we can only control the beginning of our habits, while the gradual addition made by each particular step is unperceived, as is the case also with illnesses.'

23 ἀναλαβόντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης —ἐκσίν] 'Let us therefore resume our discussion of the separate virtues, stating what they are, with what actions they are concerned, and in what manner. It will at the same time appear how many there are.' On the assumed completeness of Aristotle's list of the virtues, see note on Eth. ii. vii. 1, and the plan of Book IV; cf. also Eth. iii. x. 1, note.

καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας] Aristotle's admirable account of courage is to some extent indebted to the observations of Plato, while in some points again it is a protest against the Platonic theory. In the Protagoras (pp. 349—351, 359—361) courage is identified with the science of the truly safe and the truly dangerous. In the Laches (pp. 198—201) a refinement is made upon this, and it is argued that, if danger be 'future evil,' courage cannot be the science of this, for a science excludes all consideration of time, so, if courage be a science at all, it must be the science of good and evil universally. Thus Plato merges courage in that universal wise consciousness, which he considered the true ground of morality. In the Republic (p. 430 b), courage is said to be the maintenance of
right principles in spite of the distractions of danger. By Aristotle, courage is more definitely fixed as a condition of the moral side of man's nature, and as implying not only a consciousness, but a conscious choice of the highest moral good. Its sphere is limited to war, and thus a rather special and restricted character is given to the virtue. At the same time a reverence is shown for the nobleness of courage beyond what we find in Plato. And deep human observations are made which are in the best style of Aristotle's moral writing.

VI. 1-2 peri φόβους καὶ θάρρης—
taìta 8' έστιν ως ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά
di καὶ τὸν φόβον ὄριζονται προσδοκίαις κακῶς\]

These points are accepted from Plato, cf. Protag. p. 358 B: προσδοκίαι των λέγων κακῶς τοῦτο, εἰτε φόβον εἶτε δέος καλεῖτε. Laches, p. 158 B: ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινά μὲν εἶναι καὶ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλεία δὲ καὶ μὴ δέος παρέχει: δέος δὲ παρέχειν οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκόμενα: δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκικά μέλλωντος κακοῦ. . . . τοῦτον δὲ γε τὴν ἑπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις; κομίδῃ γε. The subject of the present chapter is the proper sphere of courage. ἢδη καὶ πρότερον, Eth. ii. vii. 2.

3-8 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν—κινδύνον[\]

These sections contain a protest against the doctrine represented in the Laches, p. 191 B, e, where courage is extended to all those objects which are here expressly excluded from it—dangers by sea, illness, political conflicts, even the encountering of temptation. Βουλάδεμον γὰρ σου πυθέσαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀπιστικῷ ἀνδρείως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱστηκῷ καὶ ἐν ἐντοπισμῷ τῷ πολεμικῷ εἰδε, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν βαλασταν κινδύνους ἀνδρείας ὁτας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρείας εἰσὶ, καὶ ἔτι αὐτῇ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρείας εἰσὶν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἤ ἡδονὰς δεινὰ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφουντες . . . . εἰσὶ γάρ ποι τοῖς τινές, ὅ γάρ τοι πρὸς τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀνδρείας. Aristotle treats all such applications of the word ἀνδρείας as merely metaphorical (λέγεται β' ὧν τινων ἀνδρείας κατὰ μεταφοράν), to these he opposes the proper use of the word (κυρίοις δὲ λέγοντ' ἐν, § 10) as belonging peculiarly to war.

Εἰνα γάρ δὲ φοβείσθαι καὶ καλὸν[\]

Cf. Eth. iii. i. 24: δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὄργεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὄγειας καὶ μαθῆσεως. It admits of discussion how much, independently of a merely permissive attitude in the will and reason, the instincts of fear, anger, and desire, may be positively called out and even created by considerations and suggestions of the reason, or how far their place may be supplied by the reason itself.
μὲν γὰρ Φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ αἰσθήματι, ὁ δὲ μὴ Φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ’ ὅτῳ τιμῶν ἀνδρείος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γὰρ τι ὁμοίων τῷ ἄνδρειῳ. ἀφοβὸς 4 γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἄνδρειος. πενίαις ὁ ἱστος οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπιστρέφειν, οὐδ’ ἕλεος διὰ τὰ πεπάλαμα καὶ θύμια μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι’ αὐτῶν. ἀλλ’ ὁ περὶ ταύτα ἀφοβὸς ἄνδρειος. λέγεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ’ ὁμοίωτητα· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δείκει ὅντες ἐλευθερίαν εἰς καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων 5 ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσίας ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἰ τὶς ζῆσιν περὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικᾶς φοβεῖται ἡ φύσις ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δεῖλος ἐστὶν· οὐδ’ εἰ φοβεῖσθαι μέλλουσιν μαστιγώσθαι, ἄνδρειος. 6 περὶ ποιὰ οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἄνδρειος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐδὲις γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν θείων. Φοβερῶτατον δ’ ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γὰρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τῶν 7 τεθνεύσεως δοκεῖ οὔτ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν εἶναι. δόξεις εἰ δὴ ἀν’ οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἄνδρειος εἶναι, οὖν εἰ 8 ἐν βαλάντῃ ἢ ἐν νόσιμω. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιούτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ ἐν μεγάλῳ γὰρ 9 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ, ὑμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαί αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάχοις. 10 κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ’ ἂν ἄνδρειος δὲ περὶ τῶν καλῶν θάνατον ἀδέης, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγνωσα ὑντα· τοιαύτα 11 δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ ἐν βαλάντῃ καὶ ἐν νόσιμω ἀδέης ὁ ἄνδρειος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὅσι ὧν βαλάντται· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασαν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιούτον ὑσχεραινοῦσαν, οἱ δὲ εὐθείας εἰσὶ 12 παρὰ τὴν ἐμπείριαν. ἁμα δὲ καὶ ἄνδρερίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλὴκτὴ καὶ χαλῶ τὸ ἀποθάνειν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ Φθοραῖς οὐβέτερον ὑπάρχει.
their experience. Besides, men put forth their courage on occasions where to die is helpful or glorious; but in death at sea or from sickness neither of these qualities is to be found. This passage is a curious exemplification of Athenian feeling. In spite of the glorious traditions of Salamis, the Athenians had never attained these instincts which are inherited by the descendants of the Norsemen—the feeling that 'the deck' is their proper 'field of fame.'

VII. This chapter discusses courage as being a mean state with regard to daring and fearing. Setting aside terrors which are too great for human nature to bear, the brave man is calm (ἀνέκπληκτος), and endures or fears all things in their due measure according to the true standard, his aim being to attain the noble. Thus he is distinguished from the extremes by whom these proportions are violated. The extremes, by a refinement which Aristotle does not extend to the other virtues (cf. note on Eth. ii. vii. 2), are fourfold. (1) Deficiency of fear, producing a character which has no name. (2) Excess of fear = cowardice. (3) Deficiency of daring = cowardice. (4) Excess of daring = rashness. Two of these terms are identical, and one is nameless, so that the extremes really reduce themselves to cowardice and rashness (§ 12). Some excellent remarks are introduced on the characters of the boastful man and the rash man.

1 το ὅποιον—θαρραλέα] Having said where fear and courage are to be looked for, we next observe that fear admits of degrees, so that courage is proportionate. 'Now the Fearful is different to different persons, independent of our calling some things fearful beyond human endurance. These latter are fearful to every man in his senses, but dangers that are not beyond human endurance differ both in magnitude and in degree, a difference found also in the things that give courage.'

6 τέλος ὅποιον—ἀνδρείαν] This difficult section must be taken in connexion with what has gone before. Aristotle is determining the charac-
teristics of a brave act. He here says that ‘the End-in-itself, or perfection, of a particular moral act will be identical with that which belongs to the formed moral character. The End-in-itself for courage, as a whole, is the idea of the noble. The idea of the noble, therefore, must be that End-in-itself which a man proposes to himself in each separate act of bravery in order to constitute it brave.’ In short, the meaning comes to this, ‘what makes an act truly brave, is that, like the perfect state of bravery, it aims at the noble.’ The term τέλος is used in a sense between that of ‘perfection’ and ‘motive,’ or rather as implying both (see Essay IV. p. 176, and cf. Eth. iii. 1. 6, note). 'Ενέργεια, in πάσης ενέργειας, is opposed to ἔξος as ‘act’ to ‘state.’ The phrase τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν τέλος occurs again iii. ix. 3: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειν ἐν ἔξιν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἄνδρείαν τέλος ἤδη. The whole notion that a moral act can only be considered good when it exhibits the qualities of the formed moral character has been already brought forward, τ. iv. 3. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ—ἀνδρείαν] ‘Now to the brave man courage is something ideally noble (καλὸν). Of this nature, then, must be the end of courage, for it is the end of a thing which in each case determines its character. Therefore the noble is the end for the sake of which the brave man endures and does whatever is brave.’ The argument is as follows: Nobleness is what characterizes bravery, therefore it is the end of bravery (because final and formal causes coincide), therefore it should be the end of each brave act. The above explanation agrees with that given by the Paraphrast, except that he does not appear to supply τέλος with τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. His words are, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης ενέργειας τῆς κατ' ἄρετὴν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξεως γίνεσθαι· οἶον καὶ κατὰ δικαιοσύνην πράξεις τέλος ἔχουσι τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξεως τῆς δικαιοσύνης πράστεσθαι· καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἄνδριαν
VII.—VIII. [ ΗΟΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ ΙΙΙ. ]

πάντα τα τοιαύτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ. ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλουν μᾶλλον κατα-φανῆς ἔστιν. δύσεπις ηὲ τις ὁ δειλὸς; πάντα γὰρ φο-11 βείται. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείας ἐναντίως; τὸ γὰρ ἀνδρείαν εὐελπισθεὶς.

περὶ ταύτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐ τε δείλος καὶ ὁ βρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείας, διαφόρος δ’ ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσας ἥξει καὶ ως ἰεῖ καὶ οἱ μὲν βρασεῖς προτετείς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀφίσταται, οἱ δ’ ἀνδρείας ἐν τοῖς ἐργάζοντες, πρότερον δ’ ἕσυχοι. ἑκατέρων οὖν ἔρηται, 13 ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσοτής ἐστὶ περὶ ταρραλεά καὶ Φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἰρήται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρέσειται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. τὸ δ’ ἀποβήσεκέναι Φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρόν οὐχ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ μαλακία γὰρ τὸ Φεῦγει τὰ ἐπίτονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ Φεύγων κακῶν.

"Εστὶ μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτον τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ 8 ἐτεραὶ κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική;"

κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξως τῆς ἀνδρείας.

κ.τ.λ.

13 Aristotle denounces suicide committed on account of poverty, or love, or anything grievous, as the act rather of a coward than of a brave man. Taking a broad human view of life, he does not sympathise with or discuss the sentimental deaths of the Cynic philosophers (see Essay II. p. 130). Suicide was afterwards dignified by the Stoics with the name of ἔξοχος, 'ushering oneself out of the world.'

VIII. This chapter discusses the spurious kinds of courage, classified under five heads. Of this classification we find the germ in Plato's Protagoras, p. 351 a: θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρείας ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος καὶ ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὅταν τιμήτως νυνίσκει, ἀνδρείας δὲ ἀνθρώπος καὶ ἀνθρώπος τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται. The five shades (τρόποι) mentioned by Aristotle are (1) apparent courage produced from a regard to the opinions of society, (2) from experience of the particular danger, (3) from anger, (4) from a sanguine mind, (5) from ignorance.

1 πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική[ This phrase is to be found in Plato's Republic, p. 430 c, where it probably originates, but it is there used in a different sense from the present. Plato meant by the term 'civil courage' to distinguish the true courage of a civilized man from all merely brutal instincts. Δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτον ἀνεόν παθεῖν εἰς εἰρήνην, τὴν τε θηριάδθη καὶ ἀνθρωποδίνῃ, οὔτω πάνω νόμον ἤγεισθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἦν ἀνθρείαν καλέων. Αλλ’ ἂν οὐκ ἦν ὁ ἀνθρείας ἐναέων, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις. Ἀποδεχόμαι τοῖνος τοῦτο ἀνθρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδεχοῦμαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, πολιτικῆς γε, καὶ ὀρθάς
HDIKWN NIKOMAXEION III. [Chap.

μάλιστα γὰρ ἑοικεν' δοκούσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους
οἱ πολίται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμησι καὶ τὰ ὑπειθή καὶ
diὰ τὰς τιμὰς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκούσιν εἶναι
παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐντιμοι. των
τοιούτων δὲ καὶ "Ομήρος ποιεῖ, οὖν τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν
"Εκτορα.

Πολυνάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει'
καὶ Διομήδης,

"Εκτορ γὰρ ποτε φῆσει ἐν τρώειν ἄγορεών,
Τυκεῖθ' ὑπ' ἐμείο.

2 ἀμοιωταί δ' ἀυτὴ μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, οτι δι
ἀρετήν γίνεται. δι' αἰῶν γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ῥεξίν (τιμῆς

ἀποδείξει. Aristotle meant by 'civil courage' that daring which is
prompted, not by an independent desire for the noble, but by a regard
to reputation, and to the fame or disgrace, and even punishment, awarded
by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively.

διὰ τὰ ἐκ νόμων ἐπιτίμησι] The laws
relating to cowardice are alluded to,
Elh. ν. i. 14.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο—ἐντιμαὶ 'And for
this cause men appear to be more
brave in communities where cowards
are held in dishonour, and the brave
in honour.' Aristotle does not actually
assert that real courage is capable
of cultivation by the influence of society.
But if we do not put too fine a mean-
ing on the word courage, there is no
doubt that it flourishes most in
warlike ages and communities. And,
in short, with all but the very few,
individual virtue generally springs
out of the feelings of society; what is
first outward, afterwards takes root in
the mind.

2 τοιούτωσι δὲ—ἐμείο] 'Now just
such men does Homer depict, as, for
instance, Diomed and Hector, (when
he says,) "Polydamas will be the first
to cast a reproach at me," and so
Diomed, "Hector will some day,
haranguing among the Trojans, de-
clare, Tydides, by me terrified, fled
to the ships."' Cf. Iliad xxii. 100, viii.
148, sq., where the line ends φοβεύ-
μένος ίκετο νῆσ.

3 ἀμοιωταὶ δ'—ὑποτο] 'But this
courage is most like the kind which
we have described, for it originates
in virtue, namely, in a sense of
honour (αιῶν), in a desire for the
noble (since it aims at reputation),
and in a fear of dishonour as of some-
thing base.' On the nature of aἰῶν, see
Elh. iv. ix. and the note on II.
vii. 14. Most admirably does Ari-
stotle touch off here in a few words
the spirit of honour which is the
nearest approach to, and, at all
events in many of the relations of
life, the best substitute for, a genuine
morality. In reading his words, we
can hardly fail to be reminded of
Burke's magnificent lament over the
loss of the age of chivalry. 'The
unbought grace of life, the cheap
defence of nations, the nurse of manly
sentiment and heroic enterprise, is
gone! It is gone, that sensibility of
principle, that chastity of honour,
which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness' (Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 149). Just as Plato placed the philosopher above the man of honour (θυμοειδής, cf. Repub. p. 547-9), so Aristotle conceives of a courage higher and purer than that which emanates from the spirit of honour.

4 'Civil courage' is of two kinds (1) which depends on honour, (2) that which depends on fear. The latter may remind us of the description given by Plato (Phaedo, p. 68 b), where he speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice. There is a vast falling off between the first class and the second. To the second belongs the spirit of Asiatic slavery, which Burke contrasted with the spirit of chivalry (l.c.). The instances here given are the compulsory measures used by the princes in the Trojan war to make the people fight, and similar devices used by the Persians, &c.

δ "Εκτωρ] This is a misquotation, the words are those of Agamemnon (Iliad, ii. 391), and stand thus in the original: "Ου δὲ κ’ εγών ἀπάνευε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοῦσω, οὐ δ’ ἄρκᾳ έσσεϊται φυγείν κύνας."

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, καὶ ἀναχωρίσας τῷ πόλεμῳ τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δὲι δ’ οὐ δ’ ἀνάγκην ἀνδρείων εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καλῶν. δοκεὶ δ’ καὶ ἦν
εμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἔκαστα ἀνδρεία τῆς εἶναι ὃθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὡσῇ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῆν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοὶ ὃς ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ὃ τι στρατιῶται· ὃ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖ ἐστὶν. τοιοῦτοι ὃς ἄνδρεῖοι, ὃτι ὧν ἱσασίν ὁ ἄλλοι ἄν ἐστίν. εἰτα ποιήσαι καὶ μὴ παθέν μάλιστα δύνανται εἰκὸς ἐμπειρίας, οὐνάμενοι χρήσθαι τοῖς ὀπλοῖς καὶ τοιῶντα ἐχοντες ὑποῖα ἀν εἰν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ

ὄθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης] Cf. Memorab. iii. ix. 2, and Plato, Protag. p. 359, where it is agreed that those who dive most boldly are the professional divers, those who fight most boldly the professional soldiers, &c. This empirical view of courage forms one side, it is true, of the Socratic doctrine, but by no means the whole (see Essay II. p. 123), and the statement about Socrates in the text is accordingly unfair. The statement is corrected by Eudemos in his Ethics (iii. i. 13), where he well sums up the present part of the subject: "Εστὶ δὲ εἰδὴ ἀνδρείας πάντες λεγόμενα καθ' ὰμοιώτητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ. Μία μὲν πολιτική· αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ δὲ αἰῶν ὁδός. Δευτέρα δὲ ἡ στρατιωτική· αὐτὴ δὲ δὲ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰσέναι, οἷς ἄστερ Σωκράτης ἐφι, τὰ δεινὰ, ἀλλὰ ὅτι (ἰσασὶ τὰς βοθειὰς τῶν δεινῶν.

πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου) This is the reading of Bekker, supported by a majority of the MSS., the Scholiast, the Paraphrast, Casaubon, &c. It is illustrated by Cicero, Epist. ad Att. v. 20: 'Seis enim dici quaedam pavan, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου,' where the idilio princeps (Romana) has κοινα, another instance of similar confusion. Another reading, supported by six MSS., is τὰ καυκα τοῦ πολέμου, which would mean 'the surprises of war.' The phrase occurs in Diodorus Siculus, xx. 30: ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὃτι πολλὰ τὰ καυκα τοῦ πολέμου. Cf. Thucyd. iii. 30: καὶ μή ἀποκρίσασθαι τῶν κινδυνῶν, νομίσαιτε οὐκ ἄλλῳ τι εἶναι τὸ καυκὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δ' εἰ τις στρατηγὸς ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ φυλάσσοντα καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἑνορῶν ἑπιχειροῖται, πλείστ' ἀν ὑπόθετο: where also the MSS. vary between καυκὸν and κενα. It would seem, then, that τὰ κενα τοῦ πολέμου, and τὰ καυκα τοῦ πολέμου, were both received formulæ, only with different senses. In the text above, either phrase might have been substituted for the other, according as it was more familiar to the transcriber. But τὰ κενα alone makes good sense, for while the soldiers would get accustomed to the empty show, the noise and pageantry of war, it is not true to say that they would get accustomed to the surprises of war, these being exactly what not even the experienced could calculate upon. Perhaps there is no better setting forth of the κενα τοῦ πολέμου than in the speech of Brasidas, Thucyd. iv. 126, 4: οὕτω δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχοντες τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβέραι· καὶ γὰρ πληθὺς ὑμεῖς δεινοί καὶ βαθι περίκελτο ἄφορότητον, η ἡ διὰ κενής ἐπανάληψις τῶν ὁπλῶν ἐξει τινὰ δηλασίν ἀπειλής· προσμείζετε δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οἷς ὁμοίοι.

συνεφράκασιν] The συν here seems to mean not 'together,' or 'at a glance,' but as in συννυσίκειο, σύνωσις, &c., 'intimately,' 'privily,' 'familiarly.'
regular troops lose heart when the danger is overpowering, and when they are inferior in numbers and equipment. In such cases they are the first to run away, while citizen troops remain and die, as actually happened at the Hermacum.

10 καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ’—δρμήν] The spirit of anger, too, men reckon as courage, and they who act through anger (like brutes turning on those who have wounded them), get the character of being brave, because the converse is true, and brave men are spirited. The spirit of anger is most keen for the encountering dangers, and hence Homer wrote:

“(Apollo) put strength into his spirit.”
"He roused up his strength and spirit."
"Fierce strength in his nostrils."
"His blood boiled."

For all such things appear to signify the awakening and outbreak of anger. These quotations are obviously made from memory, and none of them are quite accurate. The first seems to be compounded of II. xiv. 151, μένα ὑπόσ εὐθυμεῖ ἐκάστῳ Καρδίη, and xvi. 529, μένου δὲ ὁ ἐμβαλε ὕμφα. The second appears to be meant for II. v. 470, ἄστρων μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔκατον. The third is Oid. xxi. 318, ἀλα βους δὲ ὁ ἦθη Δρυμό μένος προετύχε. The last is not in Homer at all. This passage illustrates the progress of psychology towards distinctness, for it is impossible to translate it simply into English; θυμὸς means more than anger, or than any one modern word, for even with Aristotle it includes what we should call 'spirit.' But with Homer it meant (1) life, (2) spirit, (3) wrath, (4) heart, (5) mind. Aristotle in quoting Homer fails to remember this great indefiniteness, though there is no doubt that in Homer a simple and physical account is given of the manifestations of courage.

12. Φυσικατάτη ο ὠεικος—einas] 'Yet the sort that springs from anger appears most natural, and with purpose and motive added, it becomes genuine courage.' Taking this sentence in its context, it must be an apology for the ἀνδρεία διὰ τῶν ὕμων. Aristotle had said that anger makes a man brave only in the sense that a hungry ass is brave, obeying the goads of a blind instinct. He adds that the instinct of anger is part of our nature (cf. Eth. iii. 10, note, and vii. vi. 2), and that, rightly directed and brought under the control of the will and reason, it can be elevated into a moral state. It is remarkable on what a high level Aristotle places courage. It must be entirely, he says, prompted by a desire for what is morally beautiful (οὶ μὲν ὁμοι ἀνδρεία δ. τὸ καλὸν πράσσοντας); mere physical courage is only an assistance in realising this (ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς), and the prompting of anger, &c., will make men pugnacious, but not brave (οὶ δὲ δ. διὰ ταύτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεία δ.). Perhaps Aristotle makes almost too great a separation between true courage and this 'spirited element,' which must be its physical basis. This is to be attributed (1) to
his high moral tone, (2) to his analytical mode of treatment. In Shakespeare, as in Homer, courage is attributed to physical causes. It is made sometimes to depend on the action of the spleen, or it is connected with the gall. Cf. King John, Act II. Sc. 1:

'Rash, inconsiderate, fiery voluntary,
With ladies’ faces and fierce dragons’ spleens.'

And Hamlet, Act II. Sc. 2, quoted below on Eth. iv. v. 6.

13—15 The fourth kind of spurious courage is that which arises from a sanguine mind. This may be due to previous success, and gives a confidence like courage, but also like intoxication. Such confidence is liable to a collapse.

15 did kai—έξιν] ‘For this reason it seems braver to be fearless and untroubled in sudden perils than in such as may be anticipated. In the former case a man is brave more by habit, or in other words less by premeditation; for in foreseen dangers a man may calculate and reason out the course to be chosen, in sudden ones he must depend upon his habitual character.’ This acute observation puts real courage in opposition to the ease of a man puffed out with a sort of extraneous confidence. Take a man on a sudden, and you will find how brave he is. While Aristotle makes courage a quality of the moral will, he requires that it should be a settled habit, and a second nature of the mind, not prepared consciously to meet a particular emergency.

16 ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ — Σκυλακίσις] ‘In the
last place, men appear brave from not knowing their danger. Such persons are not far removed from the sanguine, but are inferior to them, because they have no self-confidence, as the sanguine have. This confidence makes the sanguine to stand their ground for a time; while those who have blundered into bravery, as soon as it appears that the danger is other than they suppose, take to their heels, as was the case with the Argives, when they fell in with some Lacedaemonians whom they took for men of Sicyon. The last and poorest semblance of courage is when something daring is done unknowingly, and from a mistake. The instance given is mentioned by Xenophon (Hellenics, iv. 10). Some Spartans assumed the shields of some vanquished Sicyoni ans, and were at first contemptuously encountered by the Argives, who, when they discovered their formidable enemies, took to flight.

IX. This interesting chapter is on the connection of courage with pain and loss. The nobleness of courage chiefly depends on the sacrifice which it implies (ἐπίλυτον ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαίος ἐπαινεῖται). The brave man by encountering death consciously makes a sacrifice of the greatest magnitude, since he runs the risk of relinquishing a life which is eminently valuable, and, by reason of his virtue, full of happiness. Courage, then, is not to be called pleasurable, except as attaining to a satisfaction above all pleasure, attaining, in short, to the end of one’s being (οὐ δὴ ἐν ἄπασας ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἱδέαν ἄφεν εἰργᾷ πολλὰ, πλῆν ὑπ’ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται). The conscious heroism of the brave man distinguishes him from the recklessness of the mercenary; it disqualifies him, indeed, from becoming mere rank and file, a mere machine of discipline.

3 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ - ἔχειν] 'Without
doubt the end that belongs to courage
is pleasant in itself, but this pleasant-
ness is neutralised by the attendant
circumstances, as happens likewise in
the contests of the arena. The end at
which the boxers aim, the garland and
the honours, is pleasant; but the
blows, and indeed the whole exertion,
are painful and grievous to flesh and
blood; so that by the multitude of
intervening pains the incentive, which
is small in itself, loses all appearance
of being pleasant.'

4 καὶ ὁσφ—αλησηται] 'And in pro-
portion as a man possesses all ex-
cellence, and the happier he is, so much
the more will he be pained at
death, for to such a one life is es-
cially valuable, and he will con-
sciously be deprived of the greatest
blessings. And this is painful. But
he is not the less brave, nay, perhaps
even more, because he chooses the
noble in war in preference to those
other goods.' These last words may
remind us of the characteristic attri-
buted by Wordsworth to his Happy
Warrior, who is 'more brave for this,
that he hath much to love.' The
whole of Wordsworth's description
may well be compared with that of
Aristotle:

'Who, if he be called upon to
face
Some awful moment to which Heaven
has joined

Great issues, good or bad for human
kind,
Is happy as a lover, and attired
With sudden brightness, like a man
inspired;
And, through the heat of conflict,
keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he
foresaw;
Or if an unexpected call succeed,
Come when it will, is equal to the
need:
He who, though thus ended as with
a sense
And faculty for storm and turbulence,
Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans
To homefelt pleasures and to gentle
scenes;
Sweet images! which wheresoe'er he
be
Are at his heart, and such fidelity
It is his darling passion to approve;
More brave for this, that he hath
much to love.'

The consciousness of the sacrifice to
be made appears rather more promi-
nent in Aristotle's brave man than in
Wordsworth's. In saying this we
must not forget that the word 'sacri-
fice,' in the moral sense of the term,
expresses an idea that has grown
up in the human mind subsequently
to Aristotle. How nearly Aristotle,
by the force of his penetration,
realised it, the present chapter shows
most remarkably.
let us speak of temperance, for these (namely, courage and temperance) seem to be the excellencies of the irrational parts of our nature.' This is almost the only indication which Aristotle gives of the system upon which he has arranged the several virtues in order; he places together, and first treats of, the development of the lower and more instinctive qualities. On the arrangement of the remaining virtues see the plan of Book IV.

With regard to the first two, there is a want of any distinct principle in their arrangement. It if be said that they are based on \( \thetaυμός \) and \( \epsilonπιθυμία \), and that Aristotle begins at the bottom of the scale, why does he not begin with \( \sigmaφφοροσύνη \), since \( \thetaυμός \) is higher than \( \epsilonπιθυμία \) (Eth. vii. vi. 1)? Again, as we have seen (ch. vii. § 12) \( \thetaυμός \) is here considered rather as having an occasional connection with courage than as being the basis of it. But in fact Aristotle's Ethics are very little psychological in their character. In them psychology and morals are both in process of formation; we cannot therefore expect in so tentative and unfinished a work to find systematic arrangement. Aristotle probably began his list of the virtues with courage and temperance because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues, and when he came to temperance, he said 'this comes
γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐτοὶ εἶναι αἱ ἁρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστι περὶ ήδονᾶς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἰρήται ἡμῖν· ἢπτον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὄμοιος ἐστι περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολογία φαίνεται. περὶ πολλὰς οὖν τῶν ήδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διχάσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ ἀἱ σωματικαὶ, ὥσπερ Φιλοτιμία Φιλοράθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ

next, since it also belongs to the irrational part of our nature.

τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν] The instincts, such as those of self-preservation, fear, desire, &c., can only be capable of excellence by being brought under a law (μεσότης, λόγος) of the intellect, having no law in themselves. This law of the intellect becomes the most important part of the conception of virtues, as form is more striking than matter. In Plato the law is put for virtue altogether, and thus, as we saw, he calls courage a science. Similarly in the Charmides, where temperance is discussed, the nearest definition that is given is ‘self-knowledge,’ though it is shown that mere ‘self-knowledge’ has no content, and would be a useless blank; therefore it is implied that knowledge of the good must be added to make the conception complete.

It is the extreme opposite of Plato’s view to speak of temperance as ‘a virtue of the instincts’ (τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν); the word μεσότης however in the next line implies what was omitted, namely, ‘under a law of the intellect.’ The formula of Aristotle attributes a worth to the bodily instincts which would be opposed to asceticism.

μεσότης ἐστι περὶ ήδονᾶς] Σωφροσύνη, which, in spite of the false etymology given in Plato’s Cratylus, 411 e, and Eth. vi. v. 5, meant originally ‘sound-mindedness’ (in German Besonnenheit), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by Plato, cf. Lepid. p. 430 E: κόσμος πού τις—ἡ σωφροσύνη ἵπται καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων ἐγκράτεια. Symposium, p. 196 c: εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων, &c. Aristotle’s procedure in discussing it is first to ascertain definitely its object. Pleasures are either bodily or mental. With mental pleasures temperance and intemperance are not concerned. Nor again with all bodily pleasures—not those of hearing, nor of smell; but only the merely animal pleasures (ὅν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ) of touch and taste. Even taste, as an object of intemperance, reduces itself to touch; and with regard to touch we must exclude the merely and human satisfaction felt in exercise, &c. (chapter xi.) Desires of the kind in question are either common, or special and acquired (τίδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετα); in the former, excess is the only kind of error possible; in the latter all kinds of errors are committed. The only pains with which temperance and intemperance can be concerned are pains arising from the want of certain pleasures; these pains the temperate man feels to excess. While intemperance thus consists in excess, there is no such thing as deficiency in the sense for the above-named pleasures; thus there is no name for the opposite extreme to intemperance. In respect of propriety, health, and fortune, and with a regard to what is noble, the temperate man preserves a balance.

2 διηρήσας—διανοιά] We must take a distinction between the bodily
pleasures and such as are mental, like ambition and the desire of knowledge. The man who has either of these feelings takes pleasure in the object of his desire without the body being at all affected, but only the mind. The writing is loose here, constituting a σχήμα πρὸς τὸ συμμονέμον. Transitions as from φιλοσοφία to φιλότης are common. Cf. below, ch. xi. § 3: διδ λέγονται οὐσὶ γαστρίματος, where there is nothing preceding which answers to γαστρίματος, only a general description of a course of action.

4-5 While Aristotle justly says that the words temperance and intemperance do not apply to the pleasure felt in colours, forms, painting, music, and acting, it is strange that he should have spoken of these at all as bodily pleasures. Such a way of speaking shows an early and immature psychology.

6 Pleasures of smell are not the objects of intemperance, except accidentally, as by association, reminding people of eating, &c. Eudenus quotes a witty remark on the subject. Eth. Eud. iii. 10: ἐμελέτας ἔφη Στρατινόκος τὰς μὲν καλὰς ψεύνει, τὰς δὲ ἐγὼ.

7 Brutes, says Aristotle, have no pleasures of hearing, or smell, or sight, except accidental ones, namely
when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food. It may be questioned whether this is absolutely true, whether, for instance, brutes are not capable of some pleasure from musical sounds. This appears to be the case with lizards and snakes; and horses are fond of bells. It is said that the cat likes the smell of mint. Dogs like the smell of carrion, apparently for its own sake, this being their taste. With brutes the senses are the intellect, and thus by the well-known law that as an organ increases in fineness of perception, it decreases in sensitiveness to pleasure and pain,—we may conceive how it is that the fine perceptive organs of brutes are to them in a less degree the instruments of pleasure.

See Sir W. Hamilton, Reid’s Works, pp. 880 and 886.

efóv χλαφον] This alludes to Homer, II. iii. 23:

ὅστε δέων ἔχαρη μεγάλη ἐπὶ σάματο κώρας,
eφρων ἡ ἐκαφον κεράν ἡ ἀγρίνων αίγα.  

VOL. ii.

10 did καὶ ἐξετάζει τις ὕφοφαγος] The name of this glutton is recorded by Eudemus (iii. ii. 10), who paraphrases the present passage as follows: did οἱ όφοφαγοι οὐκ εὑρονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φαρμαγα γεφανόν, ἅπερ Φιλόζενος ὁ Ἐρώξιδος. Athenæus mentions the same story (viii. 26), quoting the verses—

Φιλόζενος ραθ’, ὅς λέγετο, ὁ Κυθήριος εἴπετο τριμήν ἔχειν λάρναγγα πήχεων.

Aristotle uses the word φαρμαγα here in its loose sense for the ‘throat,’ as λάρναγγ (which properly meant the top of the windpipe) was also loosely employed by the ancients to mean the whole throat. Speaking scientifically Aristotle confined the term φαρμαγα to mean the trachea or windpipe, distinguishing it from the ἀσῳφαγνς or gullet, cf. De Part. An. ut. iii. 1: ὁ μὲν οὖν φάρμαγα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνεκέν πέρικον—ὁ δ’ ὕφοφάγος ἐστὶ δι’ ὅ ἡ τροφή πορεύεται εἰς τὴν κολλα. 

The latter was the term properly required above. Aristotle seems to
have considered that the pleasure of gluttony was not in taste, of which the tongue was the organ, but in the contact of food with the passage of the oesophagus.

XI. 1 καὶ ἐφόνης, φησίν Ἡμέρος
IIiad, xxiv. 129: μεμησμένος οίντε τι σίτου, Οδη ἐφόνης, the remonstrance of Thetis to Achilles. It is plain what ἐφόνης means.

2 διὸ—τυχόντων] 'Hence (this choice of particular foods, &c.) appears merely factitious. In reality, however, it has something natural in it, for different things are pleasant to different people, and all men have their preferences.' Aristotle attributes

the very diversity of tastes to a law of nature, which no doubt exists,—and to a wise purpose, else what a fearful rivalry there would be in the world. Some MSS. for πᾶσι read τῖσιν. It seems common for transcribers, when they do not understand a sentence, to play fast and loose with τις and τίς: see below, Eth. v. vii. 4.

3 γαστρίμαργοι] 'Greedy-bellies' from μάργοι, cf. Homer, Od. xviii. 2, μετὰ δ' ἐπέρει γαστέρι μάργοι— and Euripides, Cyclops 310, πάρες τὸ μάργον σὺς γαστέρας.

πληροῦντες αὐτὴν] sc. τὴν γαστέρα, which is to be supplied from γαστρίμαργοι, according to the Aristotelian mode of writing.
It seems almost certain that the hurt which takes place in internecine disputes is an intemperate, and where it is unjustified is the effect of the evil-mindedness and the good sense of mankind.

Aristotle, from his experience as a citizen, was able to determine the ends of particular things, because they like them more than people in general, of Eudoxus of Cnidus, and that Aristotle wrote more to Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because, to Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because. For Eudoxus of Cnidus, of Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because, to Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because.

What Aristotle wrote were more doubt in ascendancy than to make sense for pleasure more than people in general, of Eudoxus of Cnidus, and that Aristotle wrote more to Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because, to Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because.

Aristotle, from his experience as a citizen, was able to determine the ends of particular things, because they like them more than people in general, of Eudoxus of Cnidus, and that Aristotle wrote more to Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because, to Eudoxus of Cnidus, or because.
8 μὴ πάνι γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σῶφρον μέσως περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκάλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὔτ' ὅλος οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόρα τοιοῦτοι οὖν εἰ, οὔτ' ἀπότομων λυπεῖται οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὔτε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔστι, οὔτ' ὅλος τῶν τοιούτων οὖν· ὁσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὔεξίαν ἴσεα ὑπάντα, τούτων ἀρετεῖσαι μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἴσεα μὴ ἐμποδίων τοιούτων ἴσεα· οὐκ ὑπάρχον, τῷ καλῷ ἢ ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας. οὐκ ὅτι τῶν ἴσων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τιμίας ἴδιον τῆς ἀξίας· οὐδὲ σῶφρον οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ οὐκ ὁμοίος λόγος.

12 Ἰσονύμως δὲ μᾶλλον ἱερεῖς ἢ ἀκολούθως τῆς δειλίας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἄρει ὑδώρη, ἢ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὅσον τὸ μὲν αἰρέτων, τὸ δὲ φεύγατον. καὶ ἢ μὲν λυπή ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχουσας

8 We see how indefinite after all Aristotle has left the standard of temperance, he refers it merely to the blank formula of ὃς δεῖ and τὸ καλὸν. In so leaving it, however, he appeals to a sense in each man's own mind. There is a relative element to be considered, the health or fortune of the individual (πρὸς ὑγίειαν, μὴ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν), and there is also something that appears absolute amidst all that is relative (τὸ καλὸν).

ὁ γὰρ ὡτός ἐχαρ] This is an awkward piece of writing. ὡτός refers to those phrases which have been negativ—παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

XII. Which is most voluntary, cowardice or intemperance? A suitable question to conclude a Book which opened with a theory of the voluntary and proceeded to discuss courage and temperance. Thus far there is method. Courage and temperance are considered very much throughout in relation to each other, and here they are considered in relation to the voluntary. On the other hand the subject of this chapter is closely connected with the theory of the formation of habits (Eth. ii. 1.—ii.), and also with the questions mooted above (Eth. iii. v.) as to the voluntariness of vicious habits. Standing then as it does isolated, it forms an instance of the immaturity of Aristotle’s moral investigations.

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice, inasmuch as it consists in choosing pleasure, while cowardice is under a sort of compulsion, flying from pain. (2) Again it is easier by practice to learn to resist temptation, than it is to learn to withstand danger, for the opportunities are frequent and free from risk. Hence intemperance is the more disgraceful of the two. (3) These vices are in a peculiar way different from each other, for cowardice as a whole is more voluntary than its parts. Intemperance as a whole is less voluntary than its parts.

The chapter ends with some remarks on the nature of ἀκολούθως as connected with its etymology.

2 καὶ ἢ μὲν λυπή—ποιεῖ[π] And while pain distress and overturns the
mental balance of him who experiences it, pleasure does nothing of the kind.' \(\phi\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\sigma\) here denotes the perfect or normal state: see above, \textit{Eth.} ii. i. 3, note.

3 διέξεις δ' ἄν—ἐὐστήσων] 'But cowardice is not equally voluntary with (i.e. \textit{c.} is more voluntary than) its particular acts, for in itself it is painless, while its particulars distract the mind with pain.' It seems curious to speak of cowardice in this abstract way as distinct from all particular acts of cowardice. It is, however, true that cowardice is not, like intemperance, a growing chain upon the mind. Each cowardly act, while it leaves the mind irresolute and so prone to fresh cowardice, on the other hand brings experience and renders the mind more familiar with danger. Thus cowardice, which at first was involuntary, tends to become more and more voluntary and deliberate, the more it is continued in; but in-
temperance, which at first was voluntary, becomes the longer it lasts more and more involuntary and a mere bondage.

5—6 τὸ δ' ἔνομα—ἐρετις] 'Now the name intemperance (or unrestrainedness) we apply also to the faults of children, for these have some resemblance to it. \textit{Which is} called from \textit{which}, matters not for our present purpose; obviously that which is later in conception is called from that which is earlier. And it seems no bad metaphor, for that which hankers after what is base, and which has a mighty capacity for development, requires to be chastened, and this is just the character of desire and of the child. Children live entirely by desire, and have the longing for what is pleasant most strongly.' Eudemus (\textit{Eth. End.} iii. ii. 1) commences his account of intemperance with this etymology. He points out that \(\epsilonκόλαστος\) is capable of two meanings,
7 η τού ἢδεος ὀρεξιν. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθές καὶ ύπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑξει. ἀπληστὸς γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἢδεος ὀρεξιν καὶ πανταχώθεν τῷ ἀνοικτῷ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὐξεῖ τὸ συγγενές, καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὠσί, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκχωροῦσιν. διὸ δὲ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ θλίγας, καὶ τὸ λόγῳ μὴν ἐναντιοῦσαί. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον. ἦσπερ γὰρ τὸν παιδὰ δὲι κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ξῆν, ὦτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸ λόγῳ. διὸ δὲ τοῦ σῶφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σῶφρον ὄν δὲι καὶ ὅσ δὲι καὶ ὅτε·

8 οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταύτ' οὖν ἡμᾶς εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

'exercise of desire increases its native powers, and if the desires grow great and vehement, they expel all reasoning in the end. Wherefore the desires should be moderate and few, and nowise opposed to the law of reason.'

7 η τοῦ ἢδεος ὀρεξιν. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθές καὶ ύπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑξει. ἀπληστὸς γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἢδεος ὀρεξιν καὶ πανταχώθεν τῷ ἀνοικτῷ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὐξεῖ τὸ συγγενές, καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὠσί, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκχωροῦσιν. διὸ δὲ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ θλίγας, καὶ τὸ λόγῳ μὴν ἐναντιοῦσαί. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον. ἦσπερ γὰρ τὸν παιδὰ δὲι κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ξῆν, ὦτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸ λόγῳ. διὸ δὲ τοῦ σῶφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σῶφρον ὄν δὲι καὶ ὅσ δὲι καὶ ὅτε·

7 εἰ οὖν—ἐναντιοῦσαί] 'If then this thing be not obedient and subjected to the governing element, it will develop vastly; for the longing for what is pleasant is insatiable in him that is foolish, and it seeks satisfaction from all quarters; and the exercise of desire increases its native powers, and if the desires grow great and vehement, they expel all reasoning in the end. Wherefore the desires should be moderate and few, and nowise opposed to the law of reason.'

'Εὐπειθές is indefinite; it might refer either to ἡ ἐπιθυμία or ὁ παῖς. Aristotle speaking indistinctly had the idea of ἐπιθυμία most present to his mind. Out of this etymology of 'intemperance' he develops anew the relationship which ought to exist between the passions and the reason. The passions should be to the reason as a child to his tutor. This analogy was already suggested in Eth. i. xiii. 19: διίτὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ἦσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκοοςτικὸν τι.
PLAN OF BOOK IV.

WITH only two exceptions, this Book follows faithfully the programme drawn out in the seventh chapter of Book II. These exceptions are, that it inverts the order of the social virtues—Truth, Wit, and Friendship; and that, being at its close fragmentary or mutilated, it omits to discuss Indignation, and breaks off in the middle of a discussion upon Modesty.

The only question, then, that arises, is—can we find any logical sequence in Aristotle's list of the virtues as given in Book II. and followed out here? There are various principles on which a classification of the virtues might have been made; as, for instance, on a principle of psychological division, it might have been shown how the virtues are the proper development of man's nature in its various parts. Or, again, with a view to education, the virtues might have been arranged according to the most natural order of inculcation. Or, again, in point of excellence, the greater virtues might have taken precedence of the lesser ones. But no one broad principle of this kind is to be found in the arrangement made by Aristotle. It must always be remembered that his Ethics, while tending to advance psychology very greatly, are not composed upon a psychological system. Hence, though he said (Eth. iii. x. 1) that Temperance must succeed Courage, because these both consisted in the regulation of the brute instincts, we do not find elsewhere any reference to a classification of the parts of man's nature. Aristotle, having clearly divided moral from intellectual excellence, does not carry out the same sort of division in discussing moral excellence. He seems to have taken up first the most prominent and striking qualities, according to the common notions in Greece—Courage, Temperance, and Liberality. Liberality suggested to
him Magnificence—Magnificence, High-mindedness; and from this he proceeded to distinguish the more ordinary quality of Ambition. He then added, what had hitherto been omitted, the virtue of regulation of the temper; and pointed out that in social intercourse three excellent qualities are produced by bringing the demeanour under the control of the law of balance. Lastly, even in the instinctive and untrained feelings of Modesty and Indig nation, this same law exhibits itself.
Aristotle's excellent account of liberality represents it as the balance between illiberality and prodigality. On the characters produced by these different qualities the most discriminating and happy remarks are made in the present chapter.

'Now we call "property" all things whose value is measured by money.' In other words 'all things with an exchangeable value.'

'But the term "prodigality" we sometimes apply in a complicated sense, for we call those who are incontinent and who lavish money on intemperance—prodigals.' Exactly the same usage has been confirmed in modern language by the associations of the parable of 'the Prodigal Son.'
'This application of the name is improper; for "prodigal" ought to denote a man who has one fault, the habit of wasting his substance. The word literally means "he who destroys himself," and the wasting of one's substance may well be thought a kind of self-destruction, for life depends upon substance. This accordingly is the sense in which we take the word "prodigality."' Aristotle attributes some weight here to the etymology of ἀσωτός, arguing that the man who destroys his property, destroys himself, and he who destroys himself is beyond salvation (ἄσωτος). Βούλεται εἶναι is exactly analogous to the English word 'means.' Cf. Eth. iii. i. 15. Τὸ δ' ἀνοικόν Βούλεται λέγεσθαι κ.τ.λ. In Eth. v. v. 14, Βούλεται is used in a slightly different sense to denote not the 'meaning' of a word, but a 'tendency' in things, ἄμως δὲ Βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.

7 Liberality or 'the virtue connected with property' consists more in right giving and spending than in right receiving. The former is the positive and active side, the latter is the negative and passive side. Giving is the 'use' of money, receiving and keeping is mere 'possession.' And 'use,' as Aristotle tells us in the Rhetoric (i. v. 7), constitutes wealth proper, as being a sort of life and reality (ἐνεργεία), which mere possession is not. "Οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ πλοῦτες ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρήσαμαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτήσαταί· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνεργεία ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρήσις πλοῦτος." 8 οὐκ ἄμως δ'—ἀλοχροπραγεῖν] 'It is not hard to see that giving is an avenue to the doing of good and to noble action, while in taking we only receive a benefit or at most avoid a base position.' Αλοχροπραγεῖν here seems to be on the analogy of εὐπραγεία, and hence to have partly a passive, and at all events an indefinite sense: see above, Eth. 1. iv. 2, note. Δικαιοπραγία is used similarly Eth. v. v. 17.

9 καὶ ἰόν δὲ—ἀλλότριον] 'And it is easier too to abstain from taking
than it is to give; for men are less willing to give away (ἵππον προέταται μᾶλλον) what is their own, than they are to abstain from taking what belongs to others.' Μᾶλλον is redundant, it goes to strengthen the comparative force of ἵππον. — Οἱ λαμβάνοντες corresponds to μὴ λαβεῖν just before, and makes up a positive notion to 'abstain from taking.' Aristotle attributes to men in general a character the reverse of that attributed by Sallust to Catiline, 'alieni appetens, sui profusus.'

11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὗτος ἐπαινοῦνται πᾶνυ] 'But they who receive are not praised at all.' Πᾶνυ means 'quito'; οὐ πᾶν in the sense of 'hardly' is frequent in Aristotle; cf. Eth. iii. ii. 12–13: λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πᾶν δοξάζωμεν—δοξάζωμεν οὐ ὧν πᾶν ἵππον: and οὐδὲ πᾶν appears to mean 'not at all,' the οὗτος being joined with the verb.

16 οὖν ἐν εἴῃ—ἐνεργεῖτειθαί] 'Nor would he be ready to ask favours, for it does not belong to the benefactor to be easily a receiver of benefits.' This is a manifestation of the spirit which runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle—the spirit of manliness and nobility (ἀνδρόδοξος καὶ φιλόκαλος, cf. Eth. iv. iv. 3). It appears most strongly in the character of the high-minded man; see below, ch. iii. § 24. The principle of individuality, a sense of life and free action (ἐνεργεία), are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect. Now, a slight difference in the way in which this truth is stated will make it appear a pure or self-sufficient principle. Christianity says, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' implying that to gratify a feeling of love and kindness is better than any pleasure that the sense of gain could afford.
17 τείσθαι. ὃθεν δὲ δεί, λήψεται, ὄνω ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων κτημάτων, ὁίχ ἀις καλὸν ἀλλ' ἀις ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διόναι. ὧδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἱδίων, βουλόμενος γε διὰ τούτων τισιν ἑπαρχεῖν. οὐδὲ τοὺς τυχόσι δώσει, ὅνα ἔχῃ διόναι ἀις δεῖ
18 καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὦ καλῶν. ἐλευθερίαν ὅ ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ ὀδύσει, ὦστε καταλείπειν ἔκαστῳ ἑλάττων.

19 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἐκατόν ἐλευθερίαν. κατὰ τὴν ὀσών ὃ ἡ ἐλευθερίατης λέγεται: ὃ γὰρ ἐν τῶι πληθεῖς τῶν ὁδόμενοι τὸ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὁδόντος ἐξεί, ἀυτῇ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὀσών ἀδίσκοιν. οὐθὲν ὃ ἂν καλὸς ἐλευθερίατος ἑυμνοῖ τὸν τὰ ἑλάττων ὁδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττώννων ὁδόῃ. ἐλευθερίατοι δὲ ἐγὼ διοκὺσιν ὁ μὴ κτησίμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν ὀσών ἀπειροῖ τε γὰρ τὰς

But at the same time, if we analyse the Christian sentiment of love and charity, we cannot by any means separate it from the development of the personality of him that feels it. For as all knowledge implies a subject as well as an object, so does every moral act or feeling imply the will and individuality of the actor. In the Christian sentiment there is so great a harmony between the object and subject, that the subjective side appears to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again, it is diminished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be 'It is better to give than to receive, because it is more noble.' This has a slight tendency to give too much weight to the subjective side. In Aristotle's whole account we do not find a word about benevolence or love to others as prompting acts of liberality. We find no other motive but the 'splendour' (καλὸν) of the acts themselves. What is said in the present section verges towards the selfish theory, which would ascribe such acts to the love of power inherent in man. In Hobbes (Leviathan, Book i. Chap. xi.) we find a bitter statement of the feelings with which benefits may be received. 'To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom, which is to one's equal, hateful.' Cf. Eth. ix. vii.

17–19 Points in the character of the liberal man: he will take care of his own property in order that he may have means for his liberality. Hence, too, he will be discriminating in the objects of his favours; yet his tendency is to forget himself, to give largely, to leave hardly anything for himself; yet again, liberality does not depend on the largeness of the gift, it is in proportion to the means of the giver, a less gift may be more liberal than a large one.

20 ἐλευθερίατοι δὲ—ποιητα] 'We see that those are the most liberal who
have not themselves acquired their property, but have inherited it; for they have never known what want is, nor are they restrained by that love of what we have ourselves produced, which belongs to all men, and is well exemplified in parents and poets. On the philosophy of this remark, cf. Eth. ix. vii. 2-7. The remark itself comes almost verbatim from Plato's Republic, p. 330 b-c. Socrates asks Cephalus whether he made his money or inherited it, and gives as a reason for the question, "οὐ τοι ἔννοια ἕρμην, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτε μοι ἠδοξας ὑλεῖα, ἀγαπάω τὰ χρήματα. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οὐ ἀν μὴ αὐτὸι κτησάμενοι· οἷοὶ δὲ κτησάμενοι διὰ λίθη ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀπαύγασται αὐτὰ. ἀσπέρ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ ποιήτες τοὺς παιδὸς ἀγαπῶς, ταῦτ' ἐν διὰ καὶ χρηματικάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν, ὡς ἔργον ἄνωτόν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρέαν, ἢ περὶ ἅ ἄλλοι.
to be rich who have hardly any care for money, and this is the characteristic of the liberal.

26—27 καὶ εὐκοινώνιος—ἀρεσκόμενος ἐφ' ὅις δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώνιος ὡς ἡ ἐκτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέρος εἰς χρῆματα. δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖται, καὶ τῶν χρήματα καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχρήμενος ἐὰν ἑνὶ δεῖν ὡς δεῖ ἀνάλλοις ἐὰν μὴ ἑνὶ δεῖν τι ἀνάλλοις.

28 καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίτη ὁ πολλὰς ἀρεσκόμενος. ἢ ἡ ἀστωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει. ὡς γὰρ ἐδεικταὶ ἐστὶν δὲ προϊστάμενον. εὑρέται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαί καὶ ἐλειάπεις εἰσίν ἡ ἀστωτια καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν ὑπερβολαί, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήσει καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ ἐς τὴν ὄσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀστωτια τῷ ὑπερβολαι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνεις ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνεις ἐλλειπείς. ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ ὑπερβολαι μὲν ἐλλειπείς, τῷ λαμβάνεις τὸ ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροίς. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀστωτιας οὐ πάνω συνυπάρχεις. οὐ γὰρ ῥαδίων μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνονται πᾶσι διόνουσιν. ταξέως γὰρ ἐπιλειπείς ἡ ὁσία τοὺς ιδιώτας διόνουται, ὁπερ καὶ ὅσοῦσιν ἀστωτοι εἰναι, ἕπει ὧ γε τοιοῦτος δῴζειν ἄν οὐ μικροὶ βελτίων εἰναι τὸν ἀνελευθέρων. εὐλατὸς

to the solid advantage of riches. Cf. Ar. Rhetoric, ι. xvi. 2: ὅθεν καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδου εὑρέται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τῷ ἱέρωνος ἐρμόμενη πότερον γενόσθαι κρείττον πλούσιων ἵπ τούς πλούσιον εἰπείς· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἐφι ὀρῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θέραις διατριβοῦται. Again, there is quoted from Plutarch a saying that 'the money-chest is always full, and the chest of the graces is always empty, ' and another, that 'avarice is the proper pleasure of old age.' On the philosophy of Simonides, see Essay II. pp. 62—4.

29 τῷ λαμβάνειν—μικροῖς] ἰlliberality exceeds in taking, only it must be in petty matters. Grasping on a large scale gets another name than illiberality; cf. §§ 41—42.

30 τῷ μὲν οὖν —ἀνελευθέρων] 'The two sides of prodigality can hardly exist together; for it is not easy to give to everybody and receive from nobody; private persons, whom alone
we reckon prodigals, soon find their substance failing them. Therefore the prodigal man may well be thought in no small degree superior to the illiberal. The commentators, from not seeing the train of thought in this passage, have made a difficulty about ἐπί, which refers to the beginning of the sentence, the intermediate clauses οὐ γὰρ ἡδίον—being parenthetical. With πρὶς καὶ δοκοῦσιν, cf. § 23.

31-32 Reasons are given why the prodigal is better than the illiberal man, namely, he may be cured by time, or by the failure of his means. His tendency to give is a principle which requires only to be harmonised to become a virtue. Lastly, he does more good than the illiberal man. Aristotle here is speaking of a better sort of prodigality (τούτων τῶν τρόπων ἁσωτος) which is only a slight overstepping of the bounds of liberality; but even with this restriction, it is much to be doubted whether prodigality does more good than illiberalism. From wise acts of liberality much good may arise, but the common sort of prodigality, as Aristotle himself says, § 35, being prompted by folly and vanity, almost invariably goes to enrich the wrong people. If the case be even not so bad as this, the solid benefit which accrues from any tendency to capitalize money may surely be set against the chance good done by money given away indiscriminately or spent unproductively.

33 ἀλλα' οἱ πολλοὶ—ἀνελευθεροὶ. But most prodigals, as we have implied already, take whence they ought not, and in this way are illiberal. This is an instance of a phenomenon often to be observed in Aristotle's virtues and vices, that the 'extremes meet' (cf. iv. vii. 15, ii. viii. 15). The rationale of this phenomenon appears to be that the extremes are both the result of the same principle, they are both different forms of selfishness. Selfishness can equally produce prodigal giving and meanness in receiving. Hence, if a man be selfish, though his tendency is to be prodigal, yet on occasion selfishness, which is his governing principle, will lead him to become illiberal. The fact is noticed by Eudemus, Eth. Eud. iii. vii. 12: "Εστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τῶν ἀκροτο ἑὔσεσθαι τὸ μέσον Ἡ
Again, that men, it, prodigality is and was so widely universal: it, and the insertion keep prodigality, that men, and other. Aristotle has, as the spirit, justice, Kant, and many other. times, the world, and among the Irish, with giving, often utter heartlessness, he does not sufficiently notice, nor does he observe that lavish giving often proceeds from the want of a faculty—from an incapacity for estimating the worth of objects. Thus if illiberality be incompatible with a magnanimous spirit, prodigality is incompatible with absolute truth and justice.

38 Illiberality is widely spread, and has many forms; it contains two elements—excess of taking and defect of giving; but it does not always manifest itself in its entirety (οὐ πάσιν ἀλλόκληρον παραγίγγεται), sometimes one element exists separately from the other. 

Perhaps too favourable a view of the vice of prodigality. Its connexion with vanity, selfishness, and often utter heartlessness, he does not sufficiently notice, nor does he observe that lavish giving often proceeds from the want of a faculty—from an incapacity for estimating the worth of objects. Thus if illiberality be incompatible with a magnanimous spirit, prodigality is incompatible with absolute truth and justice.
bolgi tis lyseous, ou pasin olkalhros parexwetai, allan euistote xarizetai, kai oi men tis lypsei uperbasalousei, oi de tis horisei expleitouin. Oi men gar en tais toimatais prospachoriais oion feiwoi goloxhrei kymhikes, pantes tis horisei expleitouin, ton de allotropion ouk efineTai oude boRolontai logambanein, ois men dia tina epieixeian kai euolabeian ton aiSxrow. DOxoOsi gar enoi ymatai ge dia touto fualitein, yna my pot anagkasiowin aisyrou ti praxeii. touoous de kai o kyminopristhis kai pas o toimatoi adolmastei de apo tis uperbolhis tou mouven an doumai. Oi de ou diado fobon apxeontai ton allotropion ais 40 ou basdon to auton men ta eterow lammbanein, ta de autou eterous myi aerisei ouw autous to myte lammbanein myte didouai. Oi de ai kata ton lypsei uperbasalousei tois pantodevei lammbanein kai pin, ois ois tas angeleuthereois ergasiais er-gyaziouosi, poromhosei kai pantes ois toiooOai, kai toXistai kata micron epil polllow. Pantes gar ouoi othen ou dei lammbanontai, kai optonou ou dei. koinon de ep autous h aisyxo-41 keredia fainetai. Pantes gar eneka keredous, kai touo mikerou, onecoi upomenein. Touy gar ta megala my h othen 42 de dei lammbanontas, myde a dei, ou legomen angeleutheres, oon touo turannoous poleis porboOonta kai eirh suwonta,

39-40 ois men gar—ou de] 'Men of one class, those who go by such names as "stingy," "closefisted," "curmudgeons," all fall short in what they give away, but they neither covet their neighbours' goods, nor wish to take them. With some of them this arises from a certain sense of equity and shrinking from what is base: for their motive, either supposed or professed, in being careful of their means, is to prevent the possibility of their being compelled by want to do base actions. To this set belong the "skinflint," and all his like, a name derived from superlative unwillingness to give to anybody. But others again abstain from their neighbours' goods through fear, since it is not easy to take what belongs to others, and not have others take what belongs to oneself—they are content, therefore, neither to take nor give. A second class are excessive in taking everything and from all quarters, as for instance, those who ply illiberal trades, brothel-keepers, and all such like, and leaders of small sums at high interest. For all these take whence they ought not, and more than they ought.' This passage falls into two parts, oi de a kata ton lypsei corresponding to oi men gar en tais toimatais. There are two subordinate divisions of the first part, namely, oi men dia tina epieixeian, and oi de a diad phobon.
II. Magnificence, the virtue next discussed, is a higher kind of liberality. It consists in spending money on a great scale with propriety (ἐν μεγαλοπρεπεῖς θαυμαστών). Great and solemn occasions will be its proper sphere, the services of religion, the entertaining of foreigners, public works, gifts, and return-gifts. The well-born and illustrious will be the proper persons to exercise it. The house of the magnificent man will be of suitable splendour, everything he does will show taste and propriety: even in a gift to a child he will exhibit the idea of magnificence. The vulgar man, missing this happy nicety, will jar on our taste with his excessive splendour (λαμπρόντει παρὰ μέλος), his object being evidently mere ostentation. The petty man, on the other hand,
from timidity and constant fear of expense, will be always below the mark, and even after considerable expense will mar the whole effect by meanness in some point of detail.

"Now the great ness is relative, for there is not the same expense for a trierarch as for the head of a sacred legislation." This latter office would of course demand peculiar splendour. The leitour giai at Athens were exactly fitted to exercise the magnificence of the citizens.

'Propriety accordingly must be relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object.' We have here nearly the same categories as were given, Eth. iii. i. 16, where the points connected with an action are enumerated, τίς τε δή καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἐν τίνι πράττει. On the suitableness of the person see below §§ 12-14. The circumstances are touched upon §§ 11, 15. The object (which cannot be definitely separated from the circumstances) §§ 16-18.

πολλάκις ὅσκον ἀλήτη] Homer Odysse. xvi. 420.

'bad taste,' and the like.' Bάνανος is said to be derived from βαῖνος 'a forge' and αὐθ. Thus it means a metal-worker, or artisan. From the contempt felt by the Athenians for this kind of craft, Bάνανος came to imply 'mean,' 'vulgar,' analogously to φορτικός. In Aristotle's Politics there is a definition of what kind of work is strictly to be considered Bάνανος (viii. ii. 4). Bάνανος δ' ἐργον ἐστὶ τούτῳ νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθειν, δοσά πρῶς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τός τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄρχοντον ἀπεργοῦνται τὸ σώμα τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. The word Bάνανος is excellently applied here to denote vulgarity in expenditure.
5 ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς—ἀμελῶσι  
The magnificent man is a kind of artist, because he has an eye for the becoming, and can spend great sums tastefully.' The word ἐπιστήμων here conveys the association of those qualities which were said to belong to a perfect work of art, Eth. ii. vi. 9: Ἐὰς δὲ πάσα ἐπιστήμη ὅτι τὸ ἔργον εὐ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπονως, κ.τ.λ.

6 ὅσπερ γὰρ—τῷ ἔργῳ  'For as we said at the outset, a moral state is determined by its acts and its objects. Therefore the outlays of the magnificent man will be great and suitable. And the works on which he employs them will be of the same character, for only thus it will be possible to have a great outlay suitable to the work.'

ἐν ἄρρηθ] The allusion seems to be generally to the beginning of Book II.; perhaps Eth. ii. ii. 8 is the nearest reference that can be given. But in the present place Aristotle is not speaking of the formation of habits out of acts, but rather of moral habits or states having a definite existence and reality only in acts and in the objective circumstances (ἐν ἑστίν) to which they (the moral states) refer. This view regards a moral state as a mere potentiality, which only attains definite and conscious reality by emerging into an act. The remark is apparently made to account for a concrete treatment of the virtue of magnificence. We have above noticed (Eth. iii. xii. 3 note) a separation made between the habit and the act, which looks much less philosophical.

10 ἀναγκαῖον δὴ—ἐν μεγάλει] 'It
follows therefore that the magnificent man must also be liberal, for the liberal man spends what he ought and in the way he ought. But it is in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality, that the element of greatness which there is in the magnificent man appears, as for example in vastness of proportions, and with the same expense he will make the result more splendid. For a work is not to be esteemed for the same qualities as a possession. That possession is most prized which is worth most, as for instance gold, but that work which is great and noble. When we contemplate such a work, we admire; but the magnificent is always admirable; and the highest excellence of a work, as far as scale is concerned, is magnificence.' The words οἶον μέγεθος have vexed the commentators. One device that has been adopted is to omit the stop after μέγεθος and to translate the passage, 'Sed in his magnum est magnifici, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa haec (reading ταίτα) versantis' (Michelot). Or, without altering the punctuation, we might construe, taking οἶον μέγεθος as epexegete of τὸ μέγα,

'But the greatness of the magnificent man, as it were a certain grandeur of scale, appears in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality.' But the point Aristotle insists on is that magnificence differs from liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result. He gives as an instance of the means employed, 'vastness of size.' Τὸ μέγα is the moral greatness of the magnificent man, this takes as its exponent μέγεθος or physical bulk. The Paraphrast carries out the comparison in the text rather neatly. Οἶον, φέρε εἰτέν, θεραπεύεται τὸ θεῖον δεῖσαι, ὃ μὲν ἔλευθεροι χρυσόν τι σκεῦος ποιήσας, καὶ λίθους τιμίους ἔγκολλησε τῷ σκεῦει; ἐν μέγα-πρεπῇ νυνί μέγαν καὶ καλὸν οἰκοδομέσει ἢ ἀνδριαντας ἀναστήσει ἢ γεφέρας οἰκοδομήσει ἢ ἄλλα τι μέγα καὶ θαυμαστὸν διὰ τῆς ἰσος διαπάνω ἐργάσεται. καὶ τὸ μὲν τοῦ μεγαλαργοῦ ἔργου κυρίως ἔργον ἔσται, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου κτήμα μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργον.

1 Εὐφροσύνης 'favourite objects of rivalry.' Dr. Cardwell (upon § 2 above) quotes Lycurgus Orat. contra Locr. p. 167: ὃ γὰρ εἶ τις ἰπποτερόχικην ἢ κιχοργύηκην λαμπρῶς —δείδος ἦστι παρ᾿ ἵμας τιαστὴς χάριτος —ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τις τετραφόρχικην λαμπρῶς ἢ τείχῃ τῇ πατρίδι περιβάλει, ἢ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων συνεσπορήσε.
The undertaking of such expenses is proper for persons already distinguished by magnificence, either in themselves, or their ancestors, or their connections, and for the noble, the illustrious, and such like persons: for in all those cases greatness and dignity are present.

The use of προσάρχειν here to denote that which exists already as an achievement in one's family is not unlike its use, Eth. i. xi. 4, to denote those events which in a play are supposed to have been done before the commencement of the action.

And the "greatness," which is exhibited in the work, differs from the "greatness" of the expense; for the most beautiful of balls or of bottles is magnificent as a present to a child, though its price be small and paltry. Hence the magnificent man, whatever kind of thing he be producing, will
produce it magnificently; for the character of such work is that it cannot be easily outdone, its magnificence being always in proportion to the outlay. The first part of this passage is almost a repetition of what was said § 10, on the difference between 'greatness' and 'costliness' in a work of art. The 'ball' and the 'bottle' seem to have been common toys. Dr. Fitzgerald compares the description of Cupid's toy in Apollonius Rhodius, Arg. iii. 135, and Plato, Phaedo, p. 110 b, ἥσπερ αἱ διδακτικοὶ σφαίραι, ποικίλη, χρώμαι διαλίμπις ἡμήν. Also Theophrastus' Characters, Peri ἄρεισκειας, where the ἄρεισκος is said to purchase θυριακά τῶν στρωγγυλῶν λυρίδων—καὶ σφαιρισθῆριον. 20 τοιοῦτος—πολλά] Such now is the magnificent man, but he who exceeds and is vulgar exceeds because, as was said before, he spends more than is necessary. He spends much upon trifles, and preserves no harmony in his splendour; he entertains his club-fellows with a wedding-feast, and when he has charge of a comic chorus, he makes them appear in purple, as the Megarians do. In all this extravagance he never aims at a noble end, but only seeks to parade his riches, in the hope of being stared at; where he should spend much, he draws his purse-strings, where he should spend little, he squanders.' The last sentence shows that in vulgarity extremes meet, selfishness prompting both too much expense and too little, see above, chap. i. § 33 note. With παρὰ μέλος we may compare Shakspeare, Merry Wives, Act i. sc. 3. 'His filching was like an unskilful singer: he kept not time.'

οὗν ἐρανιστᾶς] ἐρανος being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour. ἐν τῇ παράδοσῃ] The parode was the first song of the chorus sung at its entry. Naturally the comic chorus would not require rich purple dresses. The expense of a comic chorus at Athens appears to have been sixteen minae (48l.), that of a tragic chorus thirty minae (90l.); see Bentley on Phalaris,
The Megarians were noted among the Greeks for stupidity. Now these (i.e. vulgarity and pettiness) are vices, but they do not entail disgrace, because they are neither hurtful to one's neighbour, nor are they very unseemly.

III. Aristotle's famous description of the virtue of high-mindedness (which he places as a mean between vanity and want of spirit) throws great light upon the whole bearing of his moral system.

We must notice in it rather an admiring picture of what is than an investigation into what ought to be. High-mindedness is nothing else than a certain loftiness of spirit possessed by great men. It can only (in its fullest sense) belong to great men, for unless accompanied by qualities superior to those of the rest of the world, it would be simply ridiculous.

Aristotle takes this loftiness of spirit, and, considering it fine and admirable, points out the various traits in which it exhibits itself. And nothing can be more subtle or felicitous than many of his observations on this head. But it is plain that high-mindedness, as here represented, is not something which is prompted by duty, rather it stands quite beside the idea of duty. Greatness and the sense of moral obligation are essentially distinct, however much they may accidentally coincide.

The high-minded man has all virtues, says Aristotle (§§ 14—15). But we find on nearer inspection that this means that the high-minded man is above all those minor interests which might induce to vice; he does not care about money, so he will never cheat, he does not value even life very high, so he will not be a coward. Here then there is no self-subjection to a law. The high-minded man does not avoid vice because it is 'wrong' (in the modern sense), but simply because it is unworthy of him. Thus he is most essentially a law to himself and above all other law. Aristotle spoke of high-mindedness as being a sort of culmination of the virtues (§ 16), and justly so, for it is the culmination of his moral system. As we before remarked (ch. i. § 16, note), his system is based on the idea of self-respect. Loftiness of spirit is the highest form of self-respect (μεγάλων εαυτόν αξιώ, αξιος &c.). This principle goes a long way in elevating the character and purifying the conduct, but its natural development is also a dislike (§§ 24—26) of all limitations of the individuality; in short, its natural development is a sort of noble pride.

High-mindedness, however fine may be the qualities that go to make it up, is essentially not a human attitude. As we have observed already, it is something exceptional, and in Aristotle's account of it we have a psychological portrait of a great man. Yet still this account shows Aristotle not to have been familiar with that conception of 'moral goodness' which has arisen out of later associations.
2 διαφέρει δ’ οὖθεν—σκοπεῖν] 'Now it does not make the least difference whether we consider the state of mind, or the character that is produced by the state of mind.' The procedure adopted by Aristotle throughout is that of describing virtues in the concrete, though in no other case does he give so complete a personality as in describing the highminded man. This procedure, while it gives graphic liveliness to his discussions, tends to make us forget that these virtues are not so much different kinds of character as different elements in the same character. A later development of Aristotle's ethical system calls attention to this point (cf. Eth. vi. xiii. 6). It has been said that the picture of a highminded man here given to us must have been taken from life. Probably Aristotle traced different manifestations of the highminded element in different people, and has here combined them.

5 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ—οὗ] 'For highmindedness implies greatness, just as beauty implies a large body; little people may be pretty and elegant, but not beautiful.' This was the Greek idea, cf. Politics, vii. iv. 8: ὁ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶσθαι γίνεσθαι. Politics, vii. 8: τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστὶ. Cf. also the story of Phye in Herodotus, i. c. 60. Against such critics of beauty as the Greeks, nothing is to be said.

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τοιοῦτον ὃν ἡ τιμὴ τῶν ἄγαθων. ἀνεύ δὲ λόγου Φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλοπύχων ἐστίν ἡ τιμὴ τῶν ἐκτός ἄγαθων. Περὶ τιμῆς γὰρ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλοπύχως ἔστιν εἰναι τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστ' οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιόσων ἐστιν κατ' ἀξίαν. ὁ δὲ μικρούς ἐπιλείπει καὶ τρις ἐστιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοπύχου αἴσθημα. ὁ δὲ χάριν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν ὑπερβάλλει, καὶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλοπύχων ἢ ἄγαθον εἶναι. καὶ ἀξίαν ὃν ἐνεῖν ἐμαχόμενοι μεγαλοπύχοι τὸ ἐν ἐκάσθη ἄρετής μέγα. οὐδεμιᾶς τὰς ἀμφότερας μεγαλοπύχων Φθύγειν παρασεισάντω, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν τίνος γὰρ ἐνέκα πρᾶξει αἰτία, ὃ ὑδένε μέγα; καί ἐκάσθη ἐπισκοποῦντι πάρτιαν γελούσιος Φαινοῖτ' ἀν ὁ μεγαλοπύχως μή ἄγαθος ὁν. ὡς εἰν' ὃ ἀν ὑπερβάλλει αἴσθησις φαύλος ὁν' τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄλοχον τῇ τιμῆ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἄγαθοις. ἐφέξει μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοπύχα πὼς ἀκόμη τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν μείζονος γὰρ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλέπτων τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλοπύχων

10—11 toioonton de—kai aixioi de] 'Such a prize is honour, which is the greatest of all outward goods. Therefore the highminded man bears himself as he ought with regard to honour and dishonour. But why should we prove what is obvious, that the study of magnanimous minds is honour? And great men lay especial claim to honour, yet according to their desert.' Aristotle here fixes external honour as the object with which highmindedness deals. Afterwards he sets it above all external honour (§ 17), ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελῶς ὡς ἐν γένοις ἄλια τιμή. Honour is not good enough, but the world has nothing better to give.

15 ouxiamos—paraesieonta] 'It would never suit the highminded man to fly in ungraceful haste.' Γαμα-σελεύ (i.e. τὰς χείρας) meant 'to work the hands in running.' Cf. De Jucens. Animal. iii. 4, where the principle of the lover is shown to be involved in this motion. Διὸ καὶ οἱ πέντε του ἀλλοι πλεῖον ἔχοντες τοῖς ἀλλήρας ἢ μὴ ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ θέωτες θαῦταν θέωσι παρασεισάντω τὰς χείρας γίνεται γὰρ τίς ἀπόφεις ἐν τῇ διαστασὶ πρὸς τὰς χείρας καὶ τὰς καρποὺς.

16(e)ouke min odn—kalokagathias] 'Now highmindedness appears to be, as it were, a sort of crown of the virtues; it enhances them, and it cannot come into existence without them. Hence it is hard to be highminded in the true sense of the term, for this is impossible without accomplished excellence.' The word 'magnanimity' is the conventional
representative of μεγαλοψυχία, but it does not really answer to it. 'Magnanimity' often implies rather generosity, and what Aristotle calls ἵπτερετα, than that loftiness of spirit which he attributes to the μεγαλοψυχίς.

The difficulty of finding English words to answer to the terms of Aristotle has given rise to a practice, not to be commended, of constantly using Greek terms while speaking of the system of Aristotle. It is better to paraphrase if we cannot translate.

καλοκάγαθος] This abstract noun does not occur in Plato, who fre-
22 ὁ δὲ μεγαλύφυχος — τυχόντως

"But the highminded man despises justly (for his estimate is true), but most people do so at haphazard." Throughout, the great man is justified in the high position he assumes by reason of the correctness of his estimate. Modern ideas of delicacy, to say the least, would proscribe this accuracy of self-appreciation, and the claims founded upon it.

24—26 He is glad to do a benefit and ashamed to receive one; he will wipe out a favour by doing a greater one in return; he will remember those whom he has benefited, but not those by 'whom he has been benefited; he will be in want of no one; he will serve any readily; he will be proud to the great, and easy with the lowly, &c. On the principle of independence, which appears here in an extreme form, see above, note on ch. i. § 16.

οὔτω] Homer, Iliad 1. 503—4. She only says—

"Νῦν ή ἐποτε ἕστατο θυγατέρις ἡμῶν ἡ ἐπει̣ ἐκείνη ἔργων.

οὖν οἱ Λάκωνες] This is said to have been on the occasion of a Theban invasion into Laconia. Aspasius quotes from Callisthenes a mention of the circumstance. Xenophon is thought to allude to the same event (Hill. vi. v. 33), where, however, he makes the Spartans enumerate their services.
27—34 A list of characteristics follows, completing the picture of the lofty-minded man. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition (τά ἐντιμα); he will only attempt great and important matters, he will seem otherwise inactive; he will be open in friendship and hatred; really straightforward and deeply truthful, but reserved and ironical in manner to common people. Will live for his friend alone, will wonder at nothing, will bear no malice, will be no gossip (οὐκ ἀθωροσολόγος), will not be anxious about triles, and will care more to possess that which is fine, than that which is productive. His movements are slow, his voice is deep, and his diction stately.

28 εἰρωνεῖα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς] Bekker has introduced this reading on the authority of one MS. alone; all the rest read εἰρωνεῖα. Εἰρωνεῖα is not strictly grammatical, but it is in accordance with the Aristotelian mode of writing; it comes in despite the nominative ἀληθευτικός, as a carrying on of the accusatives before used, καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι—καὶ ὀλίγων πρακτικῶν, &c.
οὐ κακοὶ—ἡμαρτημένοι δὲ] ‘Now it is true that these again are not bad, for they do no harm, but are only in error.’ Oōde refers to ch. ii. § 22. Vanity and want of spirit are, like pettiness and vulgarity, not very serious vices. Of the latter pair, speaking of the qualities and not the persons possessing them, he said they are κακαί, but not disgraceful.

ο μὲν γὰρ—ἀγαθῶν] ‘For the mean-spirited man, though worthy of good things, deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to be harmed by not appreciating his claims, and by ignorance of himself; else he would have aimed at the good things he had a claim to. Such characters, however, are not to be called foolish, but it is rather their energy that is deficient. Still this way of thinking seems to have a bad effect upon the character: for men’s aims are regulated by their opinions of their merits, but these men draw back from noble actions and pursuits, thinking themselves unworthy; and in the same way they cut themselves off from external advantages.’ From these considerations, and from the whole tendency of his system, Aristotle decides that want of spirit is worse than vanity (§ 37), and he also asserts that it is more common. Want of elevated aims, want of effort, of will, of individuality, these are indeed fatal deficiencies as regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character. The conception of ‘humility’ is of course quite beside the system of Aristotle, but we may observe that it does not come into necessary collision with a condemnation of μικροφαχία. For this latter implies a want of moral aspiration. Now it is desirable to combine with humility the greatest amount of moral aspiration.

"And another reading, supported by several MSS., is νοεροί, which the Scholiast explains by δραμεῖ καὶ ἐπιμονηκόι. The Paraphrast, however, gives νοθροί, which supports the present reading. Νοθροί makes good sense, since it is true that want of spirit often accompanies an intellectual turn of mind, men’s native hue of resolution’ being
This sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. Yet, on the other hand, it is possible that καθάπερ has come to supplant δείκτης from a mistake arising from a fancied antithesis to ἡλίθιον.

IV. Descending now from what is extraordinary to the common level, Aristotle discusses another virtue which bears the same relation to high-mindedness as liberality does to magnificence, namely, the virtue of a laudable ambition. This is concerned with the desire for honour as it exists in ordinary men. There is no name for this virtue, but language testifies to the existence of extremes, hence we may infer a mean. There are two words, ambitious and unambitious; both these are made terms of reproach, thus implying that there must be a middle quality, in relation to which they are each extremes. Again, both are used as terms of praise, which shows that each in turn lays claim to the mean place, as setting itself off against its opposite.

1 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις] Cf. Eth. ii. vii. 8. This expression might seem to suggest that the present passage was written after an interval; it is repeated in § 4.

4 ἐστι δ' ὅτε—μέτον] 'But sometimes we praise the ambitious man as
manly and noble-spirited, and sometimes we praise the unambitious man as moderate and soberminded, as mentioned in our first remarks. Now it is plain that as the term "lover of anything" is used in more senses than one, we do not always apply the term "lover of honour" to express the same thing, but when we praise, we praise that ambition which is more than most men's, and when we blame, we blame that which is greater than it should be. The mean state having no name, the extremes contend, as it were, for this unoccupied ground; but still it exists: for where there is excess and defect there must also be a mean.'


V. The regulation of the temper (κεσοτῆς περὶ ὀργᾶς) is the next subject for discussion. Aristotle con-
3-6 Boiiletai yap—Aivrapodw'des]

"For the term "mild man" means one that should be dispassionate and not carried away by his feeling, but should be angry in the way, at the things, and for so long a time, as the mental standard may have appointed. Yet this character seems rather to incline to error on the side of deficiency, for the mild man is more apt to pardon than to resent. But the deficiency is a moral fault (ψέγεται), whether it be called perhaps (τίς) want of anger, or whatever else. For men seem fools who do not feel anger at things at which they ought to feel it, or in the manner they ought, or at the time they ought, or with the persons they ought. Such a man seems to be devoid of feeling and of the sense of pain, and since nothing provokes him, he seems not to know how to defend himself: but to suffer insult or to stand by and see one's friends insulted is servile."

Boiiletai yap o prados] Boiiletai appears to be used here in a doubtful sense, something between 'the word mild means,' &c. and 'the mild man has a tendency to,' &c.; cf. ch. 1. § 5, note. 

To de prpopiikanzoumen] Had the Ethics been composed on a psychological plan, what is said here might have been arranged under the head of θυμος, and would have been connected with the relation of θυμος to courage, which is discussed above, Eth. iii. viii. 10-12. The present passage is admirably illustrated by Shakespeare's Hamlet, Act II. Scene 2:

'Am I a coward?
Who calls me villain? breaks my pate across?
Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face?
Tweaks me by the nose? gives me the lie i'the throat.
As deep as to the lungs? Who does me this?

Ha! why I should take it: for it cannot be

But I am pigeon-liver'd, and lack gall

To make oppression bitter.'

7 ἡ δ' ὑπερβολή—γίνεται] 'Now the excess is possible under all heads, the wrong people, the wrong things, more, quicker, longer, than is right. However, these excesses cannot all coexist in the same man. This would be impossible. For evil destroys even itself, and if it exist in its entirety, it becomes unbearable.' Psychologi-
cal reasons might be assigned why the same person cannot be passionate, peevish, and sulky. But Aristotle here gives an abstract generalization —that the different forms of evil are mutually destructive, and that it is only by tempering evil with a certain admixture of good that its existence can be borne.

8 συμβαίνει δ'—ἀποσανώνται] 'This happens because they do not keep in their anger, but make immediate reprisals, so that their anger is betrayed by their hastiness, and then they are done.' The words ἡ φανερὸς εἰσὶ can have nothing to do with the principle given in the Rhetoric, p. ii. 1, that anger desires to make itself manifestly felt, else we must have had ἡ φανερὸς ἐν εἴσοι. The Para-
phrast simply renders ὡς κατέχουσι τὴν ὄργην, ὡς δὲ κρύπτουσι, ἄλλα ἐξά-
gονται καὶ ἀμίνονται εἰδοὺς.

9 οἱ ἀκρόχολοι] 'The hasty.' The older form of this word is ἀκράχολοι. The etymology appears to be ἄκρος and χολή, as if 'on the point' or 'extreme verge of anger.' On the same analogy we find the word ἀκροσφαλῆς, 'on the verge of being overturned,' 'rickety,' cf. Plato, Repub. p. 404 n. Plato speaks of passionate and peevish people as having become so through the ener-
vating of an originally noble and spirited temperamente. Cf. Repub. p. 411 b—413: ἐὰν δὲ θυμοεῦθα (ἡ ἀρχὴς λάβῃ), ἀσθενὴ ποίησας τὸν θυμὸν ἐξουροντα ἀπειράσατο, ἀπὸ σμικρῶν ταχύς ἐφεξιομένους τε καὶ κατασθενο- 
μενον. ἀκρόχολοι οὖν καὶ ὄργηλα ἀνί τι θυμοεῦθα γεγένηται, δοξολοίς ἐπι-
πλεοῦ κ.τ.λ.

10 οἱ δὲ πικροὶ—φίλοις] 'But the sulky are hard to bring round, and are angry a long time, for they keep in their wrath. Now there is a
natural termination, when one has wreaked one's resentment, since revenge stops anger by substituting a feeling of pleasure for that of pain. But if this does not take place, these people continue to feel their burden. Their feeling is not manifest, and so no one reasons them out of it, while to digest it internally requires time. Therefore such persons are exceedingly vexatious both to themselves and to their best friends. 

An admirable account of sulkiness, on which nothing more need be said.

13 ὑπὲρ βραχομοιώτερον εἰρηταὶ

This refers to Eth. n. ix. 7–9, which passage is with some amplification almost exactly repeated here. This part of the Ethics is written with a constant reference to Book II., and yet as if the subject had been taken up again to be worked out after an interval.
VI. The next subject is the regulation of one's deportment in society, with regard especially to complacency or the reverse. This also is a balance between extremes, avoiding on the one side surliness (τὸ δίσκωλον), and on the other side the conduct both of the weak assenter (ἀρέσκος), and of the interested flatterer (κόλας). The balance has no name, it is most like friendship, but differs from it in being devoid of affection, and being extended to all in proper degrees. There is a slight departure here from Book II. vii. 11-13, and it may be said that the present treatment is an improvement. Before (l.c.) it was said, there are three virtues connected with speech and action in society: the first is about what is true, the others about what is pleasant. But here the quality which concerns the deport-
general expression, implying as much care to please, as care for the welfare of the persons in question.

6-7 καθόλου — δυσχεραίναι. We have said generally that (the good man) will associate with people as he ought, but we may add (ὅτε) that, with a constant reference to what is noble and good, he will aim at not giving pain, or at contributing pleasure. The province of his virtue lies among the pleasures and pains that arise out of social intercourse, and wherever in giving pleasure he would dishonour or injure himself, he will make a difficulty, and rather choose to give pain than such gratification. And if there be something which will bring, to any considerable degree, disgrace or harm on the doer, while opposition will give him slight pain, he will not approve it, but will show his repugnance. (1) It may be derogatory to oneself to show complacency. (2) It may be hurtful to some member of the company. These cautions show the moral and thoughtful spirit by which Aristotle would have conduct in society regulated. The following section prescribes the bearing of a finished gentleman, giving to all their due. It must not be forgotten that Aristotle himself had played the part, not only of a philosopher, but also of a courtier.

9 δύσκολοι] Eudemus uses the word αἰθάδης to denote this character (Eth. Eud. iii. vii. 4), in which he is followed by Theophrastus (Characters, e. 15) and the author of the Magna Moralia (i. xxix.). Eudemus makes the mean state σεμαντική, which is a departure from the present treatment.
VII. There follows another nameless excellence closely connected with the former, having still to do with demeanour in society; this, by a curious formula, is termed the regulation of boastfulness (ἡ τῆς ἀλογονείας μεσότης). The boastful man lays claim to honourable qualities which he does not possess, or to a greater degree than he possesses them (δοκεὶ προσανατολισμὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι κ.τ.λ.), while the ironical man denies or understates his own merits. The balance between these two is found in the straightforward character (ἀδέκαστος τις), who in word and deed neither diminishes nor exaggerates his own good qualities. In Eth. ii. vii. 12, the provisional name ἀληθεία was given to this virtue, but here Aristotle points out that it is to be distinguished from 'truth,' in the more serious sense of the word, that 'truth' which makes the difference between justice and injustice. What he is at present concerned with is merely a truthfulness of manner, though he confesses (§ 8) that this has a moral worth (ἐτεικής), and that the man who is truthful in little things will also be truthful in more important affairs.

3 ἐφών] This is an excessively difficult word to express in English. 'Ironical' has acquired an association of bitterness and taunting,—'Dissembler' of craft. If we render it by 'over-modest' we trench upon the qualities of the μικρόφως, and imply too much that is connected with the whole character. Ἐπωνεία as here spoken of is simply an affair of the manner; there appear to be two forms of it, one that refined species exhibited by Socrates, the other an affectation of humility which is really contemptible. There is perhaps no one English word to express these two forms, the only resource appears to be to use the word 'Ironical' in a restricted sense. Ἐφών in Theophrastus (Char. 1.) is already used in a worse sense than in Aristotle, to denote one who dissembles for selfish motives, and whose whole life is artificial and deceitful.

ἀδέκαστος] probably from αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν 'everything exactly as it is,'
and hence a 'matter-of-fact' or 'straightforward' man.

5—6 ἄτε—ἄλαξαν] 'Now it is possible to practise both irony and boastfulness either with or without a particular motive. But in general a man speaks, acts, and lives, in accordance with his character, unless he have a particular motive. Falsehood is in itself base and reprehensible, and truth is noble and praiseworthy. And thus the truthful man, who occupies the mean, is praiseworthy, while those who strive to give a false impression of themselves are both reprehensible, and especially the boaster.' Aristotle first appears to assert that both irony and boastfulness are prompted generally by a particular motive, for, if it were not so, men would be simple and natural. Afterwards we are told that boastfulness is a condition of the will (ἐν τῇ προσφέρετε), that it aims at either gain or reputation,—that irony may spring from a motive of refinement, or again from vanity itself. These things however may aim at reputation and yet be instinctive, the desire for reputation forming part of men's natural impulses.

8 δόξει δ' ἄτε—ἐπαινετός] 'But this character appears to possess a moral excellence. For the lover of truth, who adheres to what is true even in things where it does not matter, will be still more truthful in affairs of importance, for he will surely avoid a lie when it appears as something base, when he avoided it before merely for its own sake.' The writing here is a little careless, since above, all lies were declared to be essentially base, but here a contrast seems to be drawn between the 'white lie' in society, and the base lie in affairs of importance. It throws great light upon the nature of Aristotle's table of the so-called 'virtues'.
to observe that he excludes from them truth proper, and admits truthfulness of manner.

10—12 ὁ δὲ μείζων—κέρδος] 'But the man who pretends to better qualities than he really possesses, if he has no motive, shows like a mean man, for else he would not have delighted in the falsehood, though he seems foolish rather than bad. Supposing there is a motive, if it be reputation or honour, the boaster is not to be severely blamed, but if it be money, directly or indirectly, his conduct is more discreditable. The boaster is not constituted by a given faculty, but by a particular condition of the will; for it is in accordance with his moral state, and by reason of his character, that he is a boaster, just as a man is a liar,—though the latter takes pleasure in falsehood itself, while the former aims at either reputation or gain.'

†ὁς δὲ ἀλαζόν] This makes no sense. The Paraphrast omits ὁς altogether, rendering the passage, εἰ δὲ τινος ἐνεκα προσποιεῖται, εἰ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λιθὰν ψεκτός, ἂν ὁ ἀλαζόν, ἤ δὲ ἀρχιρύου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀρχιρύου, ἀρχικεύστερος. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ὁ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζόν, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ προσποιέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἔξω γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιότῳ εἶναι ἄλαζόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ καὶ ἴστατις ὁ μὲν τῷ ἴστατι αὐτῷ χάριν, ὁ δὲ ὁ δόξης ὄργων ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἄλαζονεύμονες τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιεῦται ἐν ὅς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονίαμος, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ἂν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς τέλαι καὶ ἄ διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ιατρόν. Διὰ τούτῳ οἱ πλείστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἄλαζονεύμονται· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρήνηα. οἱ δὲ ἐφρανὲς ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαρίστεροι μὲν τὰ ἡγή φαινοῦνται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἐνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ...
Ironical persons, in depreciating themselves, exhibit it is true a certain refinement of character, for they do not appear to speak in that way for the sake of gain, but to avoid pomposity. These persons are especially given to disclaiming the possession of honourable qualities, just as Socrates used to do. But they who make a pretence about things petty and obvious are called “affected fops,” and are despised by every one. Sometimes this kind of conduct appears to be really pretension, as in the case of the Lacedaemonian dress; for both the excess and the extreme of deficiency are of the nature of boasting.

§ 9: ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαινεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι.

Such as wisdom and the like, cf. § 2, where ἐνδοξάζω is used in the same sense, an unusual one in Aristotle. Cf. Eth. vii. i. 5, and note.


It is impossible to understand this in the sense of ‘disclaiming’ which the context requires. The Pamphlist supplies μὴ δύνασθαι, and explains it very clearly, as follows, διδεὖσιν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ἐνδοξάζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἀπαντᾶται, καὶ ἰδίος ἐστὶ δυσάμενος ταῦτα προσποιούμεται μὴ δύνασθαι. But προσποιούμενον can never have been consciously meant to stand for this. There must have been some slip about the writing. Two of the MSS. read μὴ προσποιούμενον. This sort of variation in MSS. does not show what was the original reading, but only that the transcribers felt a difficulty.

VIII. i Ὅσης δὲ—τοιοῦτων ἀκούειν] Rest also being a part of human life, and an element of this being playful diversion, we find here likewise the sphere for a certain harmonious manner of intercourse, and the possibility of both speaking and hearing the right sort of things in the right way; though there will be a difference as to whether one is the speaker in such matters or listens to what is said.

Aristotle considers the virtue of wit or tacit (εἰτ’ ἐπιδείξεις εἰτ’ εὐπράξεις λέγεται) to be concerned with the amusing and sportive element in society, and to be a balance between buffoonishness that sacrifices all propriety to the ludicrous, and dulness that is incapable of either making or appreciating a joke. Aristotle does not here enter into the philosophy of the ludicrous, or inquire what is a
joke and why it please. Nor does he lay down any canons for the regulation of wit, except such general ones as that 'nothing should be said which is unworthy of a gentleman' (πότερον οὖν τῶν εὐκόπτου ὄριστέων τῷ λέγειν ἀν πρέπει ἐλέεθερεῖ), that the hearer must not be shocked, &c. On the whole he leaves it indefinite, saying that tastes differ, and the educated man will be a law to himself. His account of wit then is negative and abstract, though perfectly just as far as it goes.

διαγωγής μετὰ παιδίας] διαγωγή is the passing of time, hence 'diversion.' Cf. Metaphys. 1. i. 15: πλείων δ' εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τάνακαίὰ τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ϑεοῦν. Eth. x. vi. 3: καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιοῦτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιομένων οἱ πολλοὶ.

Βαμμολόχοι] This name seems originally to have belonged to the vile creatures who lay in wait at the altars to purloin the offerings, and hence to have been applied to those who thought nothing too low for them, buffoons who would descend to anything.

3 οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς—τὰ ἡπά] 'But they whose jocularity is in good taste are called men of elegant wit, as if it were nimble, by a name that signifies nimble-witted; for such motions of wit seem to belong to the moral character, and characters, like bodies, are judged by their movements.' Aristotle here calls attention to the etymology of ἐυτραπέλος, as he did before to that of ἀσώτως. Ch. i. § 3.

4 ἐπισολάζοντος—χαρινεῖτε] 'But as the ludicrous meets us at every turn (ἐπισολάζοντος, cf. Eth. i. iv. 4), and most people take pleasure in sport and jesting more than they ought, even buffoons get the name of witty just as though they were fine wits.'
This may be seen from a comparison of the old and the new comedy. In the former it is coarse language that provokes laughter, in the latter it is rather innuendo; which makes no small difference with respect to decorum. This interesting remark is in accordance with what we know from other sources, of the comparative tameness of the new comedy in relation to the license of the old. Cf. Horace, A.P. 281 sqq.

9 ὅ ὁ δὴ πῶν—σκάπτειν] 'Therefore he will not give utterance to every jest, for the jest is a sort of reviling, and the lawgivers forbid certain kinds of reviling—they ought doubtless to have forbidden (certain) jests.' 'Iena must be understood as carried on from λαυδορεῖοι σκάπτειν. Aristotle could never have wished that jesting altogether should be forbidden by the law.'

10-12 These sections are an
almost verbal repetition of what was said, Eth. ii. vii. 11—13. They appear like an afterthought as compared with Eth. iv. vi. 1.

We perhaps ought hardly to quit the present subject without alluding to the remarks which Aristotle has elsewhere thrown out on the nature of wit and of the ludicrous. The most striking are Rhet. ii. xii. 16, where he defines wit as 'chastened insolence,' ἢ γὰρ εὐτραπελία παπαθεμένη ἔδρας ἐστιν, and his account of the ludicrous, that it consists in a thing being out of place, anomalous, ugly and faulty, though not in such a way as to cause any sense of apprehension or pain. Poet. v. 2: Τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμαρτημα τι καὶ αἰσχός ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτέαν, οἷον εὗρεν τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἀνευ ὀδύνης. This definition, which is to the highest degree penetrating, has been made by Coleridge the text for his admirable dissertations on wit and humour. See Literary Remains, Vol. I.

IX. 1—2 Peri δὲ αἰδώς—ἐλειν] 'Modesty we can scarcely with propriety describe as a virtue; for it has more of the feeling than of the state. It may, however, be defined as a kind of fear of evil report; and in its effects it greatly resembles the fear of danger, for persons who are ashamed blush, and those who are in terror of death grow pale. Both therefore appear to be in a manner corporeal, which again approximates them to feelings rather than states.' Aristotle, following out the programme given, Eth. ii. vii. 14—15, arrives now at the place for discussing two instances of the law of the balance existing in the instinctive feelings of the mind (ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι μεσοτήτες), namely modesty and indignation. But from some cause his work is interrupted here; indignation (Νέμεσις) is not treated of at all, and the discussion on modesty is left unfinished. There is no mention of the extremes, shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) and shamefacedness (κατάπληξις), which are specified in Book II. (l. c.) and in Eth. Eud. iii. vii. 2. After stating that only to certain ages is 'modesty' suitable, and that only in a certain provisional sense (ἐξ ὁποθέσεως) can it be called a virtue, the chapter abruptly ends, a sentence having been added by some later hand which gives an appearance of finish to the book and awkwardly connects it with the opening of Book V.
3—5 aíðos is the apprehension of shame, joined of course with a capacity for strongly feeling it; neither modesty nor any other English word seems adequately to convey the force of aíðos. Aristotle speaks of it as a desirable quality in tender age, before the character is formed. But in mature life the necessity for it, and therefore its merit, ceases to exist. It might be said that sensibility to shame ought to be preserved with regard to acts that are conventionally (κατὰ δόξαν) and not really (κατ’ ἀλήθειαν) disgraceful; but Aristotle says that any possibility of feeling shame must be avoided altogether, so that the former acts must not be done. 7—8 'Modesty can only be good hypothetically: if a person were to do so and so, he would be ashamed. But this is not the way with the virtues. Though shamelessness and the having no sensibility about base acts is bad, it does not follow that to do such things and feel shame is good. Just so continence is not a virtue, but a sort of mixed quality.' 'Εξ ύποθέσεως 'conditionally' is opposed to ἀπίκες 'absolutely.' While the virtues are absolutely good, modesty is only conditionally so.
The same formula occurs before, Eth. i. vii. 20: ἵκανην ἐν τοιῷ θῷ δειχθήναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄρχας.

Aristotle's MS. of the fourth book having ended abruptly at the word μικτή, Nicomachus or the editor, whoever he was, in all probability added these clauses in order to give the book a seeming union with the three Eudemian books which were now to be grafted on.
PLAN OF BOOK V.

HITHERTO all has been perfectly coherent and regular in the Ethics of Aristotle. Down to the ninth Chapter of Book IV., though all the parts may not have been composed at the same time, yet all belong to the same plan, and bear every mark of being the work of the same author. But the MS. of Book IV. seems suddenly to have broken off in the middle of a subject. Whether this was owing to mutilation, or to original incompleteness, there is now no means of saying. What is clear to us from internal evidence is, that the editor has at this point commenced supplying a lacuna; and accordingly three whole books are now introduced, which, though bearing a close resemblance to the style of Aristotle, and probably conveying, with only slight modifications, his actual system, yet belong to the Ethics of Eudemus, Aristotle's disciple, and thus have only an imperfect coherence with the present work. The chief arguments by which it is demonstrated that Books V., VI., VII., are only 'copies' from Aristotle by one of his school have been given, Essay I., pp. 33-43. These arguments may be briefly recapitulated as follows.

(1.) It is established both by probability and by internal evidence, that the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia, are not works of Aristotle, but expositions of his system by his disciple Eudemus and by some later Peripatetic.

(2.) The three books in question form part of the Eudemian, as well as of the Nicomachean Ethics.

(3.) They belong naturally to the Eudemian Ethics and fit into them without causing the slightest irregularity.

(4.) In the Nicomachean Ethics they are the cause of extreme irregularity, and of collisions and discrepancies which would be a disgrace to Aristotle as an author, if it could be supposed that he
had allowed them to remain in a work written by himself as a whole.

(5.) In style they possess all the peculiarities of Eudemus as far as his writing can be distinguished from that of Aristotle. These peculiarities are a sort of confusion of expression, as if philosophical thoughts were slurred in the repeating—a want of method and a frequent tautology—a fondness for logical formulæ—and an abundance of quotations from different kinds of literature.

(6.) In various philosophical questions, especially in psychology, these books contain an advance beyond the point arrived at in other parts of Aristotle's works, the Politics, the Nicomachean Ethics, &c., but they are consistent with the views in the Eudemian Ethics. This last argument is the most important, but also the most subtle, and it can only be followed up in detail by a careful examination of different passages as they occur.

(7.) Lastly, it may be said that there is no really strong argument in favour of attributing these books to the direct authorship of Aristotle, beyond a habit of belief which has depended on the question never being mooted. All arguments drawn from apparent quotations in the Politics, &c., on examination come to nothing.

The present Eudemian book on Justice bears probably the same relation to Aristotle's theory of Justice now lost, as the Eudemian theory of Pleasure in Book VII. bears to Aristotle's theory of Pleasure given in Book X. The Eudemian books have all a peculiar indistinctness which taxes the reader's thought to divine their exact bearing. But on consideration, the outlines of a method appear to show themselves through the mist. And accordingly, the following parts may perhaps be discerned in Book V.

(1.) Justice having been defined to be 'a state of mind that wills to do what is just,' the first part of the book is concerned with determining, what is the just? (τὸ ἔθικον as distinguished from ἔθικον ὁμοσί). The abstract principle of 'the just' may either be identified with all law and therefore with all morality; or it may be restricted to its proper sense, fair dealing with regard to possessions, &c. (τὸ ἴσον). In this restricted sense 'the just' finds its sphere either in distributions of the state, or in correcting the wrongs done in dealings between man and man. Though justice is not retaliation, yet in all commerce, &c., there is a sort of retaliation. Ch. I.—V. § 16.
(2.) Having settled the nature of 'the just,' it follows to discuss 'justice,' or this same principle manifested in the mind of the individual. This part of the subject is very imperfectly carried out. We miss the graphic impersonations of the virtues with which the fourth book of Aristotle's Ethics is filled. We find nothing but a few barren remarks on voluntariness as necessary to make an act unjust, and deliberate purpose to constitute an unjust character. There is a large digression here on the proper sense of the word 'justice.' Justice, it is said, can only properly exist between citizens; it is a mere metaphor to talk of justice in families, &c. Ch. V. § 17.—Ch. VIII.

(3.) A set of questions are added, the answers to which go to supply deficiencies in the definition hitherto given of justice. The leading question is, Can one be injured voluntarily? and the answer to this shows that justice implies a relation between two distinct wills and interests. It is again repeated that justice must be a settled state of the character; thus the just man could not at will be unjust. The subject is concluded by an assertion that justice is essentially a human quality. Ch. IX.

(4.) An appendix follows on the nature of Equity, which is a higher and finer justice, dealing with exceptional cases and acting in the spirit not in the letter of the law. Ch. X.

(5.) Ch. XI. is evidently superfluous and out of place. It touches on the already settled question, Can a man injure himself? The Eudemian Ethics were probably never finished, and this is the only account that can be given of the irregularity.

This book, imperfect as it is if we look at it as a whole, is yet full of interesting suggestions, especially those in the fifth chapter on subjects which belong to political economy. It disappoints the reader, however, by seeming to approach questions, without absolutely dealing with them. Thus in Ch. III., there is very nearly a theory of the division of property; in Ch. IV., there is nearly a theory of punishment; and in Ch. V. nearly a theory of value and price. No one can say, however, that these questions are really met. There is considerable confusion in the treatment of cases of 'voluntary contracts,' and it is left entirely uncertain to what head of justice these belong. But even were the political questions more satisfactorily treated in this book, it must be said that the moral view of justice as an individual virtue is left strangely deficient.
This chapter proposes and opens the discussion upon the nature of justice and injustice. The chief points which it contains are as follows. (1) Justice and injustice must stand opposed to each other, as being two contrary states of mind. From the nature of one, we may infer its contrary the nature of the other, and if the one term be used in a variety of senses, the other term will be used in a corresponding variety of senses. (2) The term 'unjust man' is used in two senses, to denote one who is lawless, and one who is unfair. Therefore the term 'just' must denote both lawful and fair. (3) The lawful (το νόμιμον) is simply all that the state has enacted for the welfare of its citizens. Therefore, in one sense, 'justice' means fulfilling all the requirements of law. Thus it is nothing else than perfect and consummate virtue. In this general sense justice is different from virtue only in the point of view which one would take in defining it.

Aristotle proposed the question about the two kinds of justice, 'in what sense are they mean states?' This probably refers to the way in which the moral virtues have been treated in the preceding Book of the Eudemian Ethics. There is nothing distinctive about this method, or different from the procedure of Aristotle. What is most specially alluded to at present must be the fixing of the meaning of terms, which is now resorted to with regard to justice, and which was more or less employed before. Cf. Eth. End. iii. v. 1—3, where the general method and the style of the writing has great affinity to the present opening.
legeth dikaiosynei, αφ’ ἓς πρακτικοί τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ
ἀφ’ ἓς δικαιοπραγοῦται καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια: τὸν αὐτὸν
δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδίκιας, αφ’ ἓς ἀδικώσθη καὶ βούλονται
τὰ ἀδίκα. διό καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τῷ οὐσκεῖνῳ
ταύτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τὸν ἑπτά
στημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἕξεουν. ὁμοίως μὲν
γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἑναντίων ἡ ἄνωτε ἐ(stats,
ἐξίς ὡς ἡ ἑναντία τῶν ἑναντίων οὐ, οἷον ἄπο τῆς ὁμοίας οὐ
pρᾶττεται τὰ ἑναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὁμοίως μόνον· λέγομεν
γὰρ ὁμοίως μοιθὲν, ὅταν βαθίζῃ ως ἄν ὁ ὁμοίως.
pολλάκις μὲν οὐν ὁμοίως ἐστιν ἡ ἑναντία ἐξίς ἀπὸ τῆς ἕναν-5
tías, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἐξίς ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσκειμένων· εἰν τε
gὰρ ἡ ἐυεξία ἡ Φανερά, καὶ ἡ καχεξία Φανερά γίνεται, καὶ
ἐκ τῶν ἑυσεκτικῶν ἡ ἐυεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης ἡ ἑυσεκτικά. εἰ
gὰρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐυεξία πυκνότητος σαρκὸς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχε-
ξίαν ἐστὶν μακραίτερα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ ἑυσεκτικὸ τὸ ποιητικὸν
πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκὶ. ἀκολουθεῖ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν
βάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ βάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγε-

4 οὖθε γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν—μόνον
(And I have specified them thus)
for it is not the same with developed
states as it is with sciences and
faculties. A faculty or a science
appears to be the same of contraries,
but a contrary state does not include
its contraries, as, for instance, from
health only healthful things and not
the contraries of health are produced.'
Γὰρ refers to the mention of both
justice and injustice separately, and
as opposed to each other. The writer
accounts for this by saying that a
δύναμις admits of contraries, but a
137, 190). The style above is some-
what careless, for we first have ἐπιστήμη
τῶν ἑναντίων ἡ ἄνωτε, and then, to
answer to it, ἐξίς ἡ ἑναντία τῶν
ἑναντίων οὐ.

5—6 Though a state does not in-
clude its contrary, yet its contrary
may be inferred from it; and the
state itself may be known by its par-
ticular manifestations (ἃπ τῶν ὑπο-
κειμένων), just as a bodily condition is
known from the symptoms. If the
name of a state be used in more
senses than one (πλεοναχῶς), it follows
usually that the name of its contrary
will be used in more senses than one.

Ἁπ τῶν ὑποκειμένων] As we might
say, ‘from its facts,’ the ὑποκειμένα
being the singular instances in which
a general notion is manifested. The
meaning is, that τὰ δίκαια are to
dikaiosynei as good symptoms are to
good health. Τῶν ὑποκειμένων is an
instance of the logical formula with
which the writing of Eudemus abounds.
7 σήμε, οὖν εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. έκεῖ δὲ πλεονα-
χώς λέγεται ἡ δικαιοτύνη καὶ ἡ ἄδικια, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ
συνέγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμονομασίαν αὐτῶν λανθανεὶ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ὁσ-
περ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρων ὤνη μᾶλλον. ή γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλή
ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἴδεαν, οὖν ὅτι καλεῖται κλεῖς ὁμονομασίας ἡ
τε ὑπὸ τῶν αὐξένα τῶν ἐρώτημα καὶ ἡ τὰς ὑβράς κλείσιν.

8 εἰλήφθη δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσακχῶς λέγεται. έκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε
παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλεονεκτής καὶ ὁ ἄνισος,
οὕστε δήλου ὅτι καὶ τὸ δίκαιος ἐσται ὁ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ
ίσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ ὅ

Cf. Ar. Met. i. ii. 4 (ὁ ἐχθρὸν τὴν
καδόκου ἐπιστήμην) οἶδε πὼς πάντα τὰ
ἐποιεῖται.

7 έκεῖ δὲ—κλείσινιν] 'Now the
term "justice" appears to be used in
more senses than one, and so does the
term injustice, but, because there is
a close resemblance between the
ambiguous senses, the ambiguity
escapes notice, and the case is not the
same as with things widely differing,
where the ambiguity is comparatively
plain (δήλη μᾶλλον). A physical
difference appealing to the eye (κατὰ
τὴν ἴδεαν) is widest, as for instance
the word 'key' is used ambiguously
to denote the clavicular bone of
animals, and that with which men
lock doors.' While the general
upshot of this passage is clear enough,
the writing is in itself very indistinct.
Hence in translation it has been
necessary to use expansion. To say
that 'their equivocation escapes notice
because it is close' goes beyond the
legitimate bounds of compression.
Cf. the obscure and probably corrupt
passage above cited from Eth. Euth.
iii. τ. i: ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ
τὴν γενικάσεων καὶ ἱματικήτη μεχρὶ τῶν
λανθανέων πόρων πρῶτων.

κατὰ τὴν ἴδεαν] This seems to mean
'in external form.' Cf. Eth. i. viii.
16: ὁ τὴν ἴδεαν παναλαγχης.

κλείσις] There is a pun attributed to
Philip of Macedon—cf. Plutarch, Reg.
et Imp. Apophth. Philippi i.x.—which
it has been thought that Aristotle here
alludes to: τῆς κλείσις αὐτῶν κατε-
αγελθής εν πολεμῷ καὶ τῶν δεσποτῶν
λατρεύω πάντας τι καὶ ἑκάσταν αὐτῶν,
λάμβανε, ἐφη, ὅσα βοῦλει, τὴν γὰρ
κλεῖν ἴδεις.

8—11 The word 'unjust' is used
in three different senses to denote the
lawless man, the greedy man, and the
unfair man. The word 'just' may
mean either the lawful man or the
fair man. In this statement there is
something illogical, for we notice at
once that there are only two senses of
the word 'just' to match the three
senses of 'unjust.' We find in § 10,
that unfairness (τὸ ἄνισον) is a generic
term, including both greediness (πλεο-
νεία) and also the collateral notion of
selfishly avoiding evil. In short, to
divide 'unjust' into lawless, greedy,
and unfair, is a cross division.
Evidently there are on each side
two terms: (1) justice is divided
into lawfulness or universal justice,
and (2) fairness about property, or
particular justice. Injustice is divided
into (1) lawlessness or universal in-
justice, and (2) unfairness about
property, or particular injustice.
In the unjust man is greedy, he will be concerned with things good, not all, but the "goods of fortune," which abstractedly are always goods, but which are not so always to the individual. (Men pray for these and follow after them, but they ought not to do so; they ought to pray that what are abstractedly goods may be so to them, and they ought to choose the things which are good for them.) The goods of fortune are those which all men desire, though it is not certain that they will prove goods to them. The phrase "good of fortune" becomes a set formula in this book, cf. ch. vi. § 4; ch. ix. § 17. The difficulties connected with prayer, arising out of human ignorance, form the subject of Plato's Second Alcibiades. They are also alluded to, Laws, iii. p. 687. At the end of the Phaedrus is given the prayer of Socrates (279 b): "Ω φίλε Πάν τε και ἄλλοι δοὺς τῆς θεοῦ, δοῦτέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τάνδοθεν ἔξωθεν ὃν ὄσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἰναι μοι φίλὼν. πλούσιον δὲ νομισμάτων σοφὸν τὸ δὲ χρυσὸν πλῆθος εἰς μοι ὑστόν μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἀγεῖν δύνατ' ἄλλος ἢ τὸ σώφρων.

12—15 In one sense all that is lawful is just; the law aiming at the good of all, or of a part, of the citizens, speaks on all subjects, and more or less rightly enjoins the practice of all the virtues. Justice, then, in this sense, may be said to be the practice of entire virtue towards one's neighbour.

13 στοιχαζομένοι ἦ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέροντος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Ap. Pol. iii. vii. 5: ή μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἔστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ τούτῳ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δὲ δικαίωσις πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ τῶν ἀπόρων. The term νομοθετική (§ 12) occurs again in the Eudemian book, Eth. vi. viii. 2. The view given here of law, which is expressed still more strongly below, ch. xi. § 1, is quite different from modern views. Law is here represented as a positive system
κατ' ἄρετην ἣ κατ' ἄλλου τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον ὡστε ἐνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τά ποιητικά καὶ Фυλακτικά τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.

14 προστάτευε δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, ὦςον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ βίπτειν τὰ ὀπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, ὦςον μὴ μοιχεύει μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράσων, ὦςον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἄρετὰς καὶ μοιχηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύουν τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύουν, ὃρθως μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὅρθως,

15 κείρον ὃ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαίωσύνη ἄρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλὰ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον. καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῦτο πολλάχις κρατίστη τῶν ἄρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ

(though the instances quoted of its formula are all negative, μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν, &c.), aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias of class-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (ἀπεσχεδιασμένος). This educational and dogmatic character of the law was really exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institutions. Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.

14 τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου] Cf. Eth. iii. viii. 1—2. Enactments of the kind here mentioned form part of the system given in Plato’s Laws, pp. 943—4. Modern statutes of military discipline against desertion, &c., furnish an exact parallel to these ancient laws, if we only consider that in the Greek cities the whole state was more or less regarded as an army.

15 αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν—ἔτερον] ‘Now this justice is complete virtue, not absolutely, however, but in relation to one’s neighbour.’ There is a careless transition here from τὰ νόμματα and τὰ δίκαια to ἡ δικαίωσυνη. Correct writing would have required ἡ κατὰ ταῦτα δικαίωσυνη or a similar phrase. Generally speaking, this first part of the Book is about τὰ δίκαια as distinguished from ἡ δικαίωσυνη (see Plan of Book V.). Τελεία is here used apparently with no trace of the Aristotelian or philosophic sense, but simply as denoting ‘complete.’

15—20 Hence justice is often thought the best of the virtues, brighter than the evening or the morning star, the sum of all other excellence. It is the use of virtue, and not in relation to oneself alone, but also towards others. Hence it has been defined ‘others’ profit.’ As he is the worst man who is bad both to himself and others, so he is the best who is good to himself and to others. This kind of justice is not a part of virtue, but the whole; it can only be distinguished from virtue when you come to define it, and discover that you must take a different point of view for each.
δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐσπερος οὐδὲ ἔφος ὀὕτω δειμαστὸς· καὶ παρομοιαζόμενοι φαμεν
ἐν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ συλληβδήν πᾶσ' ἄρετῇ ἐνι.
καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἄρετῆ, ὅτι τῇς τελείαις ἄρετῆς χρήσις ἐστιν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἐχθιν αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἔτερον ὑναται τῇ ἄρετῇ χρήσθαι, ἀλλὰ οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτῶν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἄρετῇ δύναται χρήσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἔτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῦτο 16 οὐ δοκεῖ ἐχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἄρχη ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἔτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἡγημ Ο ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ 17 αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον δοκεῖ εἰναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνο τῶν ἄρετῶν, ὁτι πρὸς ἔτερον ἐστίν· ἀλλιώς γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πρᾶττει, ἡ ἄρχουσιν ἡ κοινωνικ. ἀκαίος μὲν 18 οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρήσιν τῷ μοχύρια, ἀκαίος ὁ οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἄρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον τοῦτο γὰρ ἐγγὸν καλεστόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν 19 ἡ δικαιοσύνῃ οὐ μέρος ἄρετῆς ἀλλὰ ὧλη ἄρετῆ ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ ἑναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὀλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέ-20 ῥεί ἡ ἄρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέσων.

οὐθ' ἐσπερος κ.π.λ.] This may have allusion to something in literature, now lost. At all events it is a fine saying.

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ] Given among the verses of Theognis (147 sq.) in the following complet:

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλῆβδην πᾶσ' ἄρετῆς ἐστίν, πᾶς δὲ τ' ἀνήρ ἄγαθός, Κόρνη, δίκαιος ἐλών.

πρὸς ἔτερον] Fritzsche quotes Eurip. Herod. c.: ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τοῖς πέλας πέρον' ἀνήρ. ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ κέρδος λῆμ' ἐχων ἀνεμένον, τόλει τ' ἄχρηστος καὶ συσαλλάσσειν βαρύς, αὐτῷ δ' ἅρμος.

Ἀρδ. Πολ. iii. xiii. 3: κοινωνίκην γ' ἄρετήν εἶναι φαμεν τῇν δικαιοσύνῃ, ὥ πάσας ἀναγκαίων ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας.

16 ἄρχη ἄνδρα] The same sentiment is expressed by Sophocles, Antig. 175 sq.


20 τί δὲ διαφεῖ—ἀρετή] 'But what the difference is between virtue and this kind of justice is clear from what we have said already. They are the same, only conceived diffe-
rently; viewed as a relation to others the state is justice, viewed as a state of the mind simply, it is virtue.'

\( \text{τὸ \varepsilon \iota \epsilon \iota \nu 
\text{i \iota \varepsilon \nu 
\text{a \nu \tau \omicron} \delta \omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \iota \omicron \nu \omicron \iota \nu} \) This logical formula occurs again Eth. vi. viii. 1, where it is said that wisdom and politics are the same state of mind, only their essence is differently conceived (\( \text{τὸ \\mu\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu \epsilon\iota\nu \nu \tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu \alpha\upsilon\omicron\omicron\alpha\omicron\omicron \)). On the force of \( \epsilon\iota\nu \), see Eth. ii. vi. 17, note. In both of these Endemian passages, where it is said of two things that \( \text{they are the same, only their \epsilon\iota\nu is different,' we must understand that the results are the same, but the essential nature, the causes, and what the Germans would call the Grund-begriff, or fundamental conception, are different. Thus the first idea about justice (in the widest sense) is, that it is a relation to others. The first idea about virtue is, that it is a regulation of the mind. There is a slightly different application of the formula, Arist. De Animâ, iii. ii. 4: \( \iota \delta \varepsilon \tau\omicron \iota \alpha\omicron\upsilon\theta\omicron\upsilon \tau\omicron \nu \ vari\gamma\epsilon\nu \alpha\omicron \kappa \tau \tau\upsilon \alpha\omicron \kappa \tau \iota \upsilon \mu\epsilon\tau \omicron \nu \eta \nu \epsilon \upsilon \tau \omicron \nu \epsilon \omicron \iota \nu \mu \nu \iota \nu \kappa \alpha \mu \alpha \iota \nu ; \) \( \text{τὸ \\delta \iota \epsilon \iota \nu \nu \tau \alpha \tau \omicron \nu \alpha \upsilon \omicron \omicron \alpha \omicron \omicron \nu} \). \( \text{‘Now the consciousness of an object is identical with and inseparable from the consciousness of the sensation of it, but yet in conception these differ from each other fundamentally.' Here we have two distinct sides or ‘moments’ represented as, though logically distinct, yet inseparable.}

Plato in discussing justice had first to clear the subject of sophistical notions, and to prove that justice did not depend alone upon human insti-
tutions, but far more on the nature of the human soul. Thus he concluded by defining it to be a just balance in the mind itself. The Aristotelian starting-point is different. It is assumed that justice proceeds from the development of man’s nature as a ‘political creature.’ Also it is assumed that in political institutions there is something which is absolute and not merely conventional (Eth. v. vii. 1—5). Then the only question is, what are the exact limits of justice itself? To which the answer is, that we may either regard it in the broadest sense as including the whole of right dealing with others, or, more restrictedly, as right dealing in respect of property and advantages of all kinds.

II. This chapter consists of three parts. (1) It brings arguments to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice, relating chiefly to property, from which the existence of a particular kind of justice might also be inferred, §§ 1—6. (2) It sets aside universal justice as not being the object of discussion to the present book, §§ 7—11. (3) It divides particular justice into two kinds, distributive and corrective, §§ 12—13.

1—6 The arguments brought to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice reduce themselves apparently to an appeal to language.

(1) We speak of the coward as ‘doing wrongly’ (διακυων); also we speak of the man who takes more than his share, as ‘doing wrongly;’
the latter use of the terms is evidently different from the former.

(2) A crime committed for the sake of gain is called a ‘wrong’ distinctively, rather than by the name it would have had, were this motive of gain not present.

(3) While all other wrongs (ἀδικήματα) are referred each to some evil principle, such as cowardice, intemperance, and the like; acts of unjust gain are referred to no other principle except ‘injustice,’ which accordingly must be used in a special sense and denote a special vice in the mind.

The statement of the first of these arguments in the text is extremely confused. It is put in such a way that it would as well prove any other vice as πλεονεξία to be particular injustice. Suppose we substituted ‘idleness’ in the text for ‘grasping’; it would then be true to say, ‘When a man is idle, he often errs in none of the other vices, certainly not in all, but yet he acts with a certain faultiness (for we blame him) and wrongly (κατ’ ἀδικίαν). Hence there is a kind of wrong separate from universal injustice,’ &c. However this is only a matter of statement; there is no doubt that ἀδικία with regard to property means something special, and different from ἀδίκως in the sense of wrong-doing in general. In English ‘injustice’ is not used to mean vice generally; though its opposite ‘just’ is occasionally used in the translation of the Bible as equivalent to ‘righteous,’ and in a sense answering pretty nearly to that of νόμος.

4. ἐτί εἰ δὲ μὲν—κερδαίνειν] ‘Again if one man commits an adultery for the sake of gain, making a profit by it, and another man does the same for lust, lavishing money (προστιβής) and incurring loss; the latter would rather be deemed intemperate than covetous, the former would be called unjust, but not intemperate; evidently because of his gaining by it.' Fritzsche (upon i. 14) quotes Aeschines Socra'ticus, p. 14: δοκεῖ δέ ὁ σοι ἀνθρωπός εἰ μοιχεῖει τὰς τῶν πέλας
ἐκείνων, ἔτε οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐτ' ἀδικίαν.
6 ὥστε Φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶ τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὀλυν ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνάψωμος, ὅτι οἱ ἄρσιμοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει: ἀμφὶ χάρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄτερον ἐχουσί τὴν ὀμυαν, ἀλλ' ἐκ ἐν περὶ τιμὴν ἡ χρήστα ἡ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἰ τινὶ ἐχομεν ἐνι ὁμόματι περιλαβέων ταύτα πάντα, καὶ οἱ ἱδονὴς τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ οὐ περὶ ἀπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαίος.

7 "Οτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλειοῦσα, καὶ ὁτι ἐστὶ τις καὶ ἄτερα παρὰ τὴν ὀλυν ἄρετις, ἢγαν; τις δὲ καὶ ὅποια ὑπώεια, ἥμαρτον. διώρισται δὴ το ἄτικον τὸ τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ὥστε ἄτικον τὸ τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἱερον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον ἔισημένη ἁδικία
9 ἐστίν. ἔπει δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταῦτα ἄλλα ἄτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἄταν ἄνισον, τὸ οὖν ἅνισον οὐ πάν πλέον), καὶ τὸ ἄτικον καὶ ή ἁδικία οὐ ταῦτα ἄλλα ἄτερα ἐκεῖνον, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ οὖν ὅλα; μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ή ἁδικία τῆς ὅλης ἁδικίας, ὁμοίως ὑπώεια καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν

γνώσις ὡς ἀργυρίῳ, ἀδικεῖν ἂν ἢ οὖ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ λατρειῶν;
6 ὥστε——σπουδαίος] 'So that it is plain that there is a particular kind of injustice distinct from the universal kind, having the same name by reason of a kindred nature (συνάψωμος), because its definition falls under the same genus. For both have their whole force consisting in a relation to others, but the one is concerned with honour, property, or safety (or by whatever one name one might sum up all such things), and is prompted by the pleasure of gain, but the other has to do with the whole sphere of virtue.'

συνάψωμοσ] What logic calls 'analogous.' We before had the word ὅμωμα to denote 'equivocation' (c. i. § 7), see Eth. 1. vi. 12, and note; and cf. Ar. Categor. i. 3: Συνάψωμα δὲ λέγεται ἂν τὸ τε ὅμωμα κοινὸν καὶ δ' κατὰ τοῦ οὕσιν τῆς ὅμωμα ὁ αὐτός. 9 ἔπει δὲ—δικαιοσύνης] 'But—un-

(ἐπεί) 'unequal,' and 'more' are not the same, but stand related to each other as part to whole (for 'more' is a species of 'unequal'), so (καὶ) the unjust principle and habit belonging respectively to the two kinds we have mentioned are not the same but different, this from that, the one being as part, the other as whole. For this injustice (about property) is a part of universal injustice, and the correspondent justice is a part of universal justice.' The only way to give any meaning to this indistinct passage is to consider what is said about 'more' and 'unequal' to have nothing to do with πλεονεξία, but simply to be an illustration of a part included by a whole. Particular justice includes all the generic qualities of universal justice,
no less than as a particular virtue it includes all the generic qualities of universal virtue. Some MSS. read ἐπέλ δὲ τὸ ἄνοικον καὶ τὸ παράνοιαν, from not understanding the force of the illustration applied in ἐπέλ. It is no wonder that confusion should have been caused when the writer was at so little pains to avoid it.

10—11 We may set aside justice in the wider sense as being identical with the exercise of virtue, and also the principle on which it depends (καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ), this being simply the inculcation of virtue by the state.

(The question as to whether private education is the same as public, whether the good man is the same as the good citizen, may be discussed hereafter.)—This seems to be the train of thought, the whole of § 11. being parenthetical. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ κ.τ.λ. is a mere repetition of ch. i. § 14.

τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ—παντ[|] "Now the enactments productive of entire virtue are those which have been made with regard to education for public life. With regard to individual education, according to which one is not a good citizen, but simply a good man, we must afterwards determine whether it belongs to politics or some other province. For perhaps the idea of the good man is not the same as that of the citizen in every case."

[ὑστερον διοριστέων] This is an unfilled promise in the Eudemon Ethics as they stand. Nor can this exact question be said to be touched upon in the Nicom. Eth. In the Politics Aristotle very decisively pronounces that education should be all public, i.e., under the control of government and reduced to one standard, cf. Pol. viii. i. 3: 'Επεὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάρη, φανερῶν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄναγκαιον εἶναι πάντων καὶ τάξεως τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινῆν καὶ μὴ κατ' ιδίαν, διὸ τρόπον νῦν ἔκαστον ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μᾶθημα ἰδίᾳ, ἂν οὖν δὴς, διδάσκων. He also after a discussion pronounces that on the whole the virtue of the man and of the citizen is the same, cf. Pol. iii. iv. and iii. xviii. Eudeme's then in the present place appears to depart to some extent from the views of Aristotle.
12 ἄνδρι τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτη παντὶ. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκούσισιν καὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀντὶν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν ἑιδὸς τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἡ χρημάτων ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστᾷ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτωι γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνίσον ἑκεῖν καὶ ὡς οὖν ἔτερον ἔτερον), ἐν δὲ τὸ
13 ἐν τοῖς συναλλαγμασί ἀνθρωπικοῖς. τούτων ὡς μέρη ὅποι τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκουσία ἐστὶ τὰ δ ἀκούσια, ἐκουσία μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον τράσις ἰνὴ διανομὴς ἐγγὺς χρῆσις παρακαταθῆκη μίσθωσις ἐκουσία ὑπελεγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἁρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκουσίως. τῶν ὡς ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαβραία, οἷον κλοπῆ μοιχεία Φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δούλατακτία δολοφονία ψευδομαστηρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία ἀσμής βάνατος ἀρπαγὴ πύρωσις κακηγορία προπληκανσίως.

3 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὡς τ' ἀνίσος ἀνίσος καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον ἀνίσον,

ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι] 'The essential idea of a good man.' On this formula, see Eth. u. vi. 17, note.

12—13 Particular justice is now divided into distributive and corrective justice. For all details connected with these two forms, see the following chapters. It must be observed at present that there is some confusion in the account at its outset, for 'voluntary transactions' (τὰ ἐκούσιαςυναλλαγμάτα) 'such as buying, selling, lending, pledging, using, depositing, and hiring,' are said to come under the head of corrective justice, as well as 'involuntary transactions.' But this is not entirely the case; we find that in all bargains the principle of geometrical proportion comes in (which does not belong to corrective justice), and we find in fact that voluntary transactions are not touched upon in the chapter which treats of corrective justice. They are discussed to some extent in chapter v., but not assigned to any particular head.

III. This chapter, without for-
Plato in the great idea of a harmony and proportion ruling in the world, cf. Gorgias, p. 507 E: φασι δ’ οἱ σοφοὶ, ὃ Καλλικλῆς, καὶ διάφανον καὶ γῆν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄνθρωπος τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχει καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμίωτητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ διόν τούτο διὰ ταύτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὃ ἐταύρης, οὐκ ἀκομμαῖα, οὐδὲ ἀκολούθαι, ὅπερ γὰρ πρέπει τὸν νόμον τούτου, καὶ ταύτα σοφὸς ἦν, ἀλλὰ λέληθε σε ὅτι ἡ ἴσότητα ἡ γεωμετρική καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἄνθρωποις μέγα δύναται οὐ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἷον δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖται. There is a still nearer approach to the present doctrine in the Laws, p. 757 B, where it is said that there are two kinds of equality; one is a mere equality of number and measure, the other is the ‘award of Zeus,’ the equality of proportion. Τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ δόγμα τῆς ἴσοτητας οὐκέτι βάδιον παντὶ ιδείν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἀεὶ συμφαρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ· πῶς δὲ ὄνων ἐν ἐπαρκείᾳ πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἱδίωσι, πάντ’ ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργαζέται, τῷ μὲν γὰρ κυρίων πλεῖον, τῷ δὲ ἐλάττων συμμορφότερα νῦνε, μέτρη τὸ δοξοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκατέρωθ’ καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμᾶς μείζον μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζον’ τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρόσων ἐκατέρωθ’ ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.

It is remarkable that the terms ‘distributive and corrective justice’ are not found in the Politics of Aristotle, though this distinction and the various points connected with it in reality belong much more to political theory than to ethical science. However, though the name of distributive justice does not occur, yet the idea of it is fully developed in Politics, iii. c. ix.—a passage from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly taken, though an interpolated reference (καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡδίκοις) gives the passage in the Politics a fallacious appearance of having been written later, and of having accepted conclusions from the present book. Far rather it is likely that the conception of ‘distributive justice,’ having been received as a conception from Plato, and further worked out by Aristotle in his Politics, only became stereotyped into a phrase in the after-growth of his system, at the end of his own life, or in the exposition of his views made by Eudemus. It is in speaking of the ‘oligarchical and democratical principles of justice’ that Aristotle says: (§ 1) πάντες γὰρ ἀποτιθέμεν δικαίων τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τῶν προφήτων, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πάντων τοῦ κυρίου δικαίων. Οἶνον δοκεῖ ἵνα τὸ δικαίων εἶναι, καὶ ἐστὶ, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντων ἀλλὰ τοῖς λόγοις. καὶ τὸ ἄνευν δοκεῖ δικαίων εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάνω, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἂν. οἴ μείζων, οἷον τῷ ἄνευ, καὶ κρίνοις κακῶς, τῷ δ’ ἄτιτον οτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις: σχεδὸν δ’ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαίνουσιν κρατεῖν τῶν οἰκείων. Ὁποτ’ ἐπεῖ τὸ δικαίων τοιόν, καὶ διδόμεθα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πράγματος καὶ οἶ, τ’ καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡδίκοις, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἴσοτητα ἄμφοτεροι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφότεροι. The conclusion is (Vol. iii. ix. 15) that they who contribute most to the joint-stock of virtue and good deeds in the state are entitled to a larger share in the control of affairs than those who base their claims upon any other kind of superiority.
These sections are full of confused writing. It is said 'since the unjust is unequal, there must be a mean, which is equal; justice must be equal; the equal is a mean, therefore justice must be a mean. As being equal justice implies two terms, as being a mean two extremes, as being just two persons, therefore it must be in four terms, &c.' The general meaning is clear, but the statement, especially in § 4, is very faulty. A confusion is made by the introduction of the idea of μέσον with regard to justice, which at the present part of the argument was not required.

6 εἰ γὰρ μὴ Ἰσος, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Ar. Pol. iii. ix. 1 sq. l. c.

7 ἐτὶ εκ τοῦ—ἀρέτην] 'Again this is clear from the principle of equality according to standard; for all agree that justice in distributions must be according to standard, but men are not unanimous in declaring the same standard. While the democrats declare liberty, those who are for an oligarchy declare wealth or birth, and those who are for an aristocracy (in the highest sense) declare virtue.' This is apparently taken from the saying in Aristotle's Pol. iii. ix. 4: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἦσοι ζωῆν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τι μέσον τήν ἴσων 

8 εὐγένειαν, οἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρέτην. ἔστιν ἂρα το τί 

14 ἔστιν ἑρα—ἀγάθος] 'The just then is something proportionate. The proportionate is not restricted to pure number alone, but applies to everything that admits the idea of number. Proportion is an equality of ratios, and implies four terms at the least. Now
it is plain that “discrete proportion” is in four terms; but so also is “continuous proportion,” for it uses the one of its terms as two, and names it twice over, thus,—as A is to B, so is B to C. B then is twice named, and if it be set down twice over, the proportionate terms will be four. But justice also implies four terms at least, and an equality of ratios: for the two persons and the two things are divided in similar proportion. (The formula) then will be, “as the term A is to B, so is C to D;” and *alternando*, “as A is to C, so is B to D,” and so too the whole to the whole, which the distribution couples, and if the terms be thus united, it couples them justly. The joining therefore of A to C and of B to D in distribution is just, and this justice is a mean between violations of proportion. For proportion is a mean, and the just is proportionate. Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical, for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as each separate term is to each. This proportion is not “continuous,” for it has no one term standing in a double relationship.

Now this justice is the proportionate, and injustice is a violation of proportion, which takes place either on the side of more or less. And this is actually the case, for he that does an injury has more than his share, while he that is injured has less than his share of what is good.” This passage gives a formula for distributive justice in mathematical language, which comes in short to this, that in all awards of the state the result should be proportionate to the separate worth of the citizens.

8 _µοναδικῷ ἀριθμῷ_ ‘number expressed in ciphers,’ *abstract number,* in German, *unbenannte Zahl.* Fritzsche refers to Euclid *El.* vii. def. 1.

9 _ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β_ ἡ is ind-finite and probably meant to be so. It may stand for _στιγμῆ_, _γραμμῆ_, or the like.

IV. This chapter is on corrective justice, which is said to apply to the transactions between men whether voluntary or involuntary. Corrective justice goes on a principle, not of geometrical, but of arithmetical proportion; in other words it takes no account of persons, but treats the cases with which it is concerned as cases of unjust loss and gain, which have to be reduced to the middle point of equality between the parties. Justice is a mean, and the judge a sort of impersonation of justice, a mediator, or equal divider. The operation of justice, bringing plaintiff and defendant to an equality, may be illustrated by the equalizing of two unequal lines. The names, 'loss,' and 'gain,' are however often a mere metaphor borrowed from commerce.

The term 'corrective justice' (τὸ διορθωτικὸν or, as it is afterwards called, § 6, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον) is itself an unfortunate name, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution, and therefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to confine the view to 'involuntary transactions,' instead of stating what must be the principle of the just in all the dealings between man and man. In the present chapter, it is remarkable that although we are told at first that 'voluntary transactions' belong to corrective justice, yet all that is said applies only to the 'involuntary transactions;' and at last we are told that the terms used are 'a metaphor from voluntary transactions'—as if these were something quite distinct. It may be said indeed that bargains, and voluntary dealings in general, have no respect of persons (κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμὴν ἰδιότητα), and thus have something in common with civil and criminal law. Also that the next chapter supplies some of the principles for the regulation of commerce. In short we might deduce some sort of a theory from various suggestions in the text. But the statement in the text itself is undeniably confused.

This excludes all possibility of the writer having conceived another kind of justice, to be called 'catalectic' or some such name, as it has been sometimes fancied. Τὸ διορθωτικὸν ἰδικ. implies not merely 'regulative,' but strictly 'remedial'
justice; διόρθωμα is used to signify a remedy in Arist. Pol. iii. xiii. 23, where it is said of ostracism, βέλτιστον μὲν ἢν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συντηρήσῃ τὴν πολιτείαν ὅτε μὴ δείξαι τοιαύτην ἴσαραίαν· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἄν συμβῇ, πείρασθαι τοιοῦτον τινὶ διορθώματι διορθώσῃ.

2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ—εἰσενεχθεῖται] ‘For distributive justice deals always with the goods of the state according to the proportion we have described; for if the distribution be of common goods, it will be according to the proportion which the different contributions bear to one another.’ Τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα is thus explained by the Paraphrast, ἀναλόγως ἐκάστῳ δίδωσι κατὰ τὴν ἒκταν κάστου καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ὥς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν συνείσδεσθαι· ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντες ἰσομείοι, οὐδὲ πάντες ἰσομείοι εἰσφέρομεν. Probably the remark in the text was taken from Aristotle, Pol. iii. ix. 15: διόπερ ὅσι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτως τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον.

3 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν] This term occurs Eth. ii. vi. 7. ‘Arithmetical proportion’ denotes a middle term, or point of equality, equidistant from two extreme terms, thus, 6 is the mean, according to arithmetical proportion, between 4 and 3. In Eth. ii. (l.c.) it is called μέσον τοῦ πράγματος, which implies that it has no respect of persons. So corrective justice is here said to regard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and between these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of persons that is ignored (εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαίλον κ. τ. Λ.), for we find afterwards, eh. v. §§ 3—4, that a consideration of the position and circumstances of persons does come in to modify the estimate of the loss sustained from an indignity, &c.
5 τοῦ χέρδος. λέγεται γὰρ ὅσις ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ εἰ μὴ τῶν ὁμών όνομα εἶναι, τό χέρδος,
6 οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθώντι· ἀλλὰ ὃταν
gειρισθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ χέρδος.
ώστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος τὸ ὑστὸν μέσον, τὸ δὲ
χέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἐλαττὸν ἐναντίως,
tο μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλαττὸν κέρδος, τὸ
ὁ ἐναντίον ζημία: ὃν ἦν μέσον τὸ ὕστερον, ὁ λέγομεν εἰναί
dίκαιον· οὕστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μέσον
7 ζημίας καὶ χέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὃταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, εἶπε
生产总 δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἱέραι
ἵναι ἔστιν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὃ γὰρ δικαστής βούλεται εἰναί
οἶνον δίκαιον ἐμφυχὸν καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ
καλοῦσιν ἑνὸν μεσιδίως, ὡς ἐὰν τὸν μέσον τύχωσι, τὸ
8 δίκαιον τευχόμενον· μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, ἐπερ καὶ ὁ
dικαστὴς. ὃ δὲ δικαστής ἐπανιστοῖ, καὶ ὀσπερ γραμμῆς
eἰς ἀνίσα τετειμένης, ὃ το μείζον τρήμα τῆς ἡμίσειας
ὑπερέχει, τούτῳ ἀφείλε καὶ τὸ ἐλάττον τρήματι προσεῖ
θηκεν. οὕτο π διὰ διαρείθη τὸ ὑστὸν, τότε μείζον ἔχειν
9 τὰ αὐτῶν, ὃταν λάβοισι τὸ ὕστερον. τὸ δ' ὑστὸν μέσον ἔστι
τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀρίθμητην ἀνα-
λογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὄνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίκαια ἔστιν,
ἀσπέρ ἂν εἰ τῇ ἐποίη δίκαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς δίκαστης.
επαν γὰρ δύο ᾦσον ἀφαρέθη ἀπὸ βατέρου, πρὸς βατέρον δὲ τὸ προστεθῇ, ὡστὶ τούτωι ὑπερέχει βατέρον: εἰ γὰρ ἀφαρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ δὲ, ἐνι ἀν μόνον ὑπερέχειν. τοῦ μέσου ἀρα ἐνι, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἂφ' οὕτω ἀφαρέθη, ἐνι. τούτω ἀρα γνωρίσθημεν τι τε ἀφελείν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεοῦ ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προστεθηκαί τῳ ἐλαττον ἔχοντι: ὦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προστεθηκαί δεὶ τῳ ἐλαττον ἔχοντι, ὦ δ' ὑπερέχεσται, ἀφελείν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ᾧστι αἱ ἐφ' ἀν 12 ἈΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ἀφαρέθη τὸ ΒΕ, καὶ προστεθῇ τῇ ΓΓ τῷ ἐφ' ἀν ΓΔ, ὡστε δὴ η ἩΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ. τῆς ἀρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. θέστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τεχνῶν τούτω· ἀνγρούντο γὰρ ἀν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅλων, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐπαχεῖ τούτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον. ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἦ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, 13 ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἡ τὰ

10—12 ἐπαν γὰρ—ΓΔ] 'For, of two equal lines, if a part be taken from the one and added to the other, that other will exceed the first by twice this part; for if it had been subtracted only from the one and not added to the other, that other would have exceeded the first by only once this part. Therefore the line which is added to exceeds the mean by once the part added, and the mean exceeds the line subtracted from by once the part added. By this we learn what we must take from the term which has more, and what we must add to that which has less. We must add to that which has less the amount by which the mean exceeds it, and we must take from the largest term the amount by which the mean is exceeded. Let ΑΑ, ΒΒ, and CC be equal to one another; from ΑΑ take AE, and add CD to CC; then the whole DCC exceeds EA by CD and CZ; and therefore it exceeds BB by CD.' The figure required is as follows:

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13—14 ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ—ὑπερεχο] 'Now these names, "loss and gain," have
come from voluntary exchange. For having more than one's own is called "gaining," and having less than at the commencement is called "losing," as, for instance, in buying and selling, and all the other things in which the law gives one immunity. But when the things are neither more nor less, but on a level (αὐτὰ δ' αὐτῶν), then men say they have their own, and neither lose nor gain. Thus justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in involuntary things, it is the having the same afterwards as before.

ἐν δυνα τούτων] In commerce of all kinds, the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions, the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade.

ἄλλα αὐτὰ δ' αὐτῶν γένηται] This has puzzled the commentators. Felicianus interprets it "sed sua cuique per se ipsa everserint;" Argyropolus, "sed sua per se ipsa suant facta;" Laminus, "sed paria paribus respondent." What the phrase must mean is plain, whether grammatically it can mean this is another question. It must mean 'neither more, nor less, but equal to itself.' Perhaps it may be construed 'but remain themselves by means of reciprocity,' i.e. by mutual giving and taking, ἀυτῶν being equivalent to ἄλληλων.

V. This chapter, commencing with a critical notice of the Pythagorean definition of justice, that 'justice is retaliation,' shows it to be inadequate, and then goes off into an interesting discussion upon the law of retaliation as it exists in the state. Proportionate retaliation, or an interchange of services, is said to be the bond of society. The law of proportion regulates exchange, and settles the value of the most diverse products. Money measures and expresses value, and turns mere barter into commerce. The chapter concludes with some general remarks on the relation of justice as a quality to the just as a principle.

1 δοκεῖ δὲ—ἄλλω] 'Now some think that retaliation without further qualifying (ἀπλῶς) is justice, as the Pythagoreans said, for they defined justice simply as retaliation on one's neighbour.' On the rude and inadequate attempts at definition made by the Pythagoreans, cf. Ar. Metaph. 1. v. 16: ἄριστωτε τῷ γὰρ ἐπιστολαίος, καί δὲ πιστῶν ὑπάρξειν ὁ λεγεῖσι υρος, τούτ' εἶναι τὴν ὑσίαν τοῦ πράγματος
IV.—V.] ΠΟΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] V. 117

ε' ηραφώττει οὖτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὖτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικὸν: καίτοι βούλουνται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸς Ῥωδαμάνθους δίκαιον·

ἐι κε πάθοι τά κ' ἔρεξε, ἐκη κ' ἱθεία γένοιο.

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ: οἶνον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἠπάταζεν, ὡσ' ὃς ἢ ἀντιπληγημένας, καὶ εἰ ἔρχοντα ἠπάταζεν, ὥσ' πληγή γίναι μόνον ἢ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθήσαι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολὺ, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινονίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνεχεί τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπονθό, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἵστοτητα: τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πολίς. ἦ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ἐκτότινι· εἰ δὲ μὴν ὀυκελεῖα δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄντιποιητεί· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μὴν, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ

ἐνόμιζον, ἀπερεὶ τὶς οὕνετο παῖδων εἴναι διπλασίου καὶ τὴν διάδα, διότι πρῶτον ἐπάρχει τοῖς δυσὶ τὸ διπλάσιον. Their inadequate account of justice was doubtless owing not only to an imperfect logical method, but also to the immature political and social ideas of the day. Demosthenes mentions a law of retaliation given by Zaleucus to the Locrians (Timocr. p. 744): ἰντος γὰρ αὐτοθή νόμον, εάν τις ὀρθελμόν ἔκασσι, ἀντικυκλάξαι παρασχεῖν τὸν ἱκανοῦ. In the Mosaic code the same rude principle appears, Exod. xxi. 24. Levit. xxiv. 20, Deuteron. xix. 21.

2 It is obvious that simple retaliation cannot be the principle of distributive justice; the state does not win battles for its generals, &c. Nor is it that of corrective justice; (1) because the same treatment is different to different individuals; (2) because an involuntary harm must not be required like a voluntary one.

3 τὸ Ῥωδαμάνθους] Necessarily a primitive idea of justice.

ἐι κε πάθοι] Of uncertain authorship, attributed to Hesiod.

note. Rank is here looked at as a kind of property. It is not a question of individual goodness or badness, but an officer being struck loses more than a common soldier being struck in return, so that retaliation is in that case not justice.

6 ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν—συμμένοιν] 'But in commercial intercourse, at all events, this kind of justice, namely, retaliation, is the bond of union—on principles, not of equality, but proportion, for by proportionate requital the state is held together. Men seek to requite either evil or good; to omit the one were slavery, to omit the second were to fail in that mutual interchange by which men are held together.' On mutual need as the basis for civil society, cf. Plato, Ρεπο. p. 369 B: γίνεται τοῖς πόλεις, ἵπτειν τυχχάνει ἡμῶν ἐκάστος ὁμίκροι, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἕνεκες. A recognition of this principle might be called the first dawning of political economy; from it several deductions are made in the text above as to the nature of value, price, and money. These, though rudimentary, are able.
and interesting, but the relation of the law of value (τὸ δικαίων ἐν ταῖς καὶ τὴς ἀλλ.) to the other kinds of justice is not stated.

7 διὸ—χαρίζομεν] 'Hence, too, it is that men build a temple of the Graces in their streets, that there may be reciprocity. For this is the property of grace, one must serve in return one who has done a favour, and again be in the first to confer favours.' Pausanias (ix. 35) says that the Athenians originally worshipped two Graces, Auxo and Hegemone; afterwards, from Eteocles the Boeotian, they learned to worship three, and called them Enphrosyne, Aglaia, and Thalia. There was a statue of the three Graces (clothed), the work of Socrates, which stood before the entrance of the Acropolis. Seneca (Benef. i. 3) mentions with some disdain the various symbolical meanings which were supposed to be expressed by the figures of the Graces, and on which Chrysippus appears to have written an elaborate treatise. Of course no English word will exactly answer to χάρις.

8 ποιεῖ δὲ—συγευσίς] 'Now the joining of the diagonal of a square gives us proportionate return.' The diagram supposed to be drawn is as follows:

Architect.  Shoemaker.

House.  Shoes.

The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and thus an exchange is made, but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange. What, then, is the law of value? It is enunciated a little later (§ 10). διὸ τοῖνυν—τροφῆν. 'As an architect (or a farmer it may be) is to a shoemaker, so many shoes must there be to a house or to corn.' That is, the value of the product is determined by the quality of the labour spent upon it. The sort of comparison here made between the quality of farmer and shoemaker seems connected with a Greek notion of personal dignity and a dislike of ἑπαναλάβει. Such feelings are opposed to the impartial views of political economy, and are
quite superseded by the law of supply and demand. If it be asked what is
to determine the quality of labour, it
will soon be seen that quality resolves itself into quantity, that the excellence of
labour must be measured also by supply and demand. We cannot be sure that we have above the full
statement of Aristotle's ideas upon
't value,' but if we have, they are imperfect.

9 ἢ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο—ἰσασθῆναι] Cf.
ch. iv. § 12, note. 'Now this is the case with the other arts also (i.e.
beside those of the architect and shoemaker), for they would have been
destroyed if there had not been the producer producing so much, and of a
certain kind, and the consumer (τὸ πᾶσχον) consuming just the same
quantity and quality. For out of two
physicians no commerce arises, but
out of a physician and a farmer it
does, and, in short, out of persons
who are different from one another,
and not equal; these, then, require
to be brought to an equality.' The
division of labour, the mutual depen-
dence of the arts, and the correspond-
dence of supply and demand, are here
well stated. It is a pity that these
principles were not further carried
out. The terms ποιοῦν and πᾶσχον
may probably have some reference to the
ἀντιπεποιηθὸς, which is the subject of the chapter.

11 οὗν δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας
tὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην]
'Now money is a sort of representative
to demand conventionally es-
tablished.' This excellent definition
was not altogether new; Plato had
already said (Republic. p. 371 n):
ἀγορὰ δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ νόμισμα ἐξουθελοῦν
tῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἑνεκα γενήθηται εἰ τοῦτον.
The present chapter is disfigured by
repetitions. Thus cf. § 15: τοῦτο δ'
ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται.
The saying (§ 10) τὸ νόμισμα ἐλὴκῳθε
cαι γίνεται πας μέσον, is repeated
The law of value is given twice, § 10 and § 12, &c.

12 ἔσται δὴ ἀντιποσθεὶς—γίνεσθαι] 'Retaliation, then, will take place when the terms have been equalized, and the production of the shoemaker has been made to bear the same relation to that of the farmer, as that of the farmer himself does to a shoemaker. We must not, however, bring the parties to a diagram of proportion after the exchange has taken place, else one of the terms will have both superiorities assigned to it. When the parties have got their fair share (ὅταν ἔχοισι τὰ αὐτῶν), then are they on an equal and mutual footing, it having been possible to establish this kind of equality between them.'

This vexed passage appears to describe the steps in a commercial transaction. There being a mutual need between producers of a different kind, their products require to be equalized. This is done by reducing the goods to a standard of inverse proportion. As a farmer to a shoemaker, so shoes to corn; thus, if a farmer's labour be 5 times better than a shoemaker's, then 5 pair of shoes = a quarter of corn; or if a pair of shoes = 10 shillings, then a quarter of corn = 50 shillings. When this process of equalization has been effected (ὅταν ἔσται), then simple retaliation, or 'tit for tat,' begins. After an exchange has been made, or, in short, after the price of an article has once been expressed in money, it is no longer the time to talk of 'the quality of labour,' or for either side to claim an advantage on this account. If he did he would have 'both superiorities,' or his superiority reckoned twice over. Having enjoyed the superiority of price already, in which the quality of labour was an element, he would now proceed to claim the superiority of labour by itself, which would thus be reckoned to him twice over. 'Ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται can mean nothing else than 'when they have exchanged,' ὅταν with the aorist implying a completed act. It seems unnecessary to say that the value of a thing is not to be settled after it is sold. Rather it is after the goods have come to market, and had a market price put upon them, that considerations of their production must cease. The expression, therefore, is not clear, but the above interpretation seems the most natural that can be given of the passage. The commentators, driven to extremity, have resorted to violent measures, (1) omitting οὗ with no authority of MSS.; (2) interpreting ἀμφότερας τὰς
B, τὸ ἔργον αὐτῷ τὸ ἵσαμενον Δ. ἐί δὲ ὤτω μὴ ἴν ἀντιπεπολύναι, οὐχ ἂν ἦν κοινω-νία. ὅτι δὲ ἡ χρεία σω-νε-κεί ὁσσέρ ἐν τί ὄν, ἰδοὺ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὁσσιν ἄλλης, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἄτερος, ὃσσι σύναξανται, ὁσσέρ ὅταν οὐ ἔχει αὐτῶς ἄγεται τις, οὐκ οἴνοι, οὐδὲς σίτου ἐξαγωγής. δεδα ἡμείς τότῳ ίσασθήναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελ-λούσης ἄλλης ἐξαγωγής, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν οἴεται, ὃτι ἐσται ἐὰν δεῖ, τὸ νόμισμα ὁδὸν ἐγγυτής ἔσθι ἡμῖν· δεὶ γὰρ τούτῳ φέροντι εἶναι λαβέναι. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸ αὐτῷ ὦν γὰρ ἄει ἴσον ὑμναται: ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μὲνειν μᾶλλον. οἵον δὲ πάντα τετιμησθαι· οὔτω γὰρ ἄει ἴσται ἄλλης, εἰ δὲ τότῳ, κοινω-νία. τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὁσσέρ μετρον σύμ-μετρα ποίησαν ἵσαξ-εί: ὅστε γὰρ ἐν μῆ νούσης ἄλλης κοινω-νία ἢν, οὐτ' ἄλλης ἱσότητος μὴ οὐτης, οὐτ' ἱσότης μη' οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῷ μὲν οὖν ἄληθεία αὐτον τὰ 15 τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς: ἐν ὧ δὴ δεὶ εἶναι, τούτῳ δὲ ἐς οὐσίος· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. τούτῳ γὰρ πάντα

ὑπεροχαῖς, 'both extremes,' i.e. excess and deficiency; (3) asserting that the principle enunciated is one not of commerce, but of friendship, &c. Fritzsche understands it as if ἄλλ' ἵσαν ἔχωσιν were in opposition to ἓν ἄλλωντα— but we learn from ch. iv. § 8 what the former phrase must mean, τὰς φιλεῖν ἄθικεν τὰ αὐτῶν, ἓν ἄλλων τὸ ἰσαν. Cf. also ch. iv. § 14.

13 ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία—ἱσασθήναι] 'And that mutual want like a principle of unity binds men together, this fact demonstrates, namely, that when men are not in want of each other, whether both parties or one be thus independent, they do not exchange; whereas, when some one else wants the commodity that a man has (they effect an exchange), one party wanting, for instance, wine, and the other being willing to give it for an export of corn: and then an equality has to be brought about.' Some MSS., and the Para-phrase, read ἐξαγωγήν, which would invert the relation of the parties. Διόδοναι ἐξαγωγήν, 'to grant an exportation,' occurs in Theophrast. Char. xx.: διδοµένης καυτὸν ἐξαγωγῆς ἐξόλον ἀνελευθ. 14 ὅπερ δι—μᾶλλον] 'But with a view to future exchange, supposing one does not want an article at present, money is a security that one will be able to get the article when one wants it, for with money in his hand a man must be entitled to take whatever he wishes. It is true that money is under the same law as other commodities; for its value fluctuates, but still its tendency is to remain more fixed than other things.' On these excellent remarks nothing farther need be said. The term ἐγγυτής is quoted from the sophist Lyceophon by Aristotle, Pol. iii. ix. 8, in application to the law.

15 τοῦτο δ' ἐς ὑποθέσεως] 'Conven-
IIOTF

The different divisional' opposed to ἀπλῶς, cf. Eth. iv. ix. 7. The merely conventional character of money is strongly stated by Aristotle, Pol. i. ix. 11: 'Οτε δὲ τὰν ἄρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμος καὶ νόμων παντάπασιν, φῶςι δ' οὖθεν, ὅτι μεταβεμένων τε τῶν χρωμάνων οὐδένος ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιον, κ. τ. λ.

16 δοί δὲ οὖτως ἢ ἀλλαγῇ] The origin of commerce seems taken from this place by Paulus, cf. Digest. i. De Contr. Empt.: 'Origo emendi vende
dique a permutationibus coepti; omim enim non ita erat manusus, neque aliud merx aliud pretium vocabatur, sed unusquisque secundum necessitatem rerum ac temporum utilibus inutilia permutatabat, quando plerumque evenit ut quod alteri superest alteri desit; sed quia non semper nec facile concurrebat ut, quum tu haberes que ego desiderarem, invicem ego habarem quod tu accipere velles, electa materia est cujus publica ac perpetua est im
tatio difficultatibus permutationum nequalitate quantitatis subveniret.'

17 τι μὲν οὖν—εὑρηται] 'We have now stated what is the nature of the unjust and the just abstractedly.' A fresh division of the book commences here; after discussing the various kinds of justice objectively, that is, as principles which manifest themselves in society, the writer proceeds to consider justice subjectively, that is, as manifested in the character of individuals.

ἡ δικαιοπραγία—ἀδικεῖσθαι] 'Just treatment is plainly a mean between injuring and being injured.' Δικαιοπραγία is formed on the analogy of εὔπραγία (cf. also αἰσχροπραγεῖν Eth. iv. i. 8), and as εὖ πράττειν is used ambiguously to denote both 'doing' and 'faring well' (cf. Eth. i. iv. 2), so δικαιοπραγία includes both the doing and the receiving justice.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης κ.τ.λ.] Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of ἐπίλειξις in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.
ΕΤΣΤΙΝ ἡ δ ἄδικια τῶν ἁκρῶν. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἦν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικός κατὰ προαιρέσειν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διαμεταγιγμένος καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλου καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἑτέρον, ὥς ὁμοιὸς ὡστε τοῦ μὲν ἁφετοῦ πλέον αὐτῶν ἐλαττων δὲ τοῦ πλησίου, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ ὃ ἀνάταλκον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἰσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοιῶς δὲ καὶ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλου. ἡ δ' ἄδικια τοῦνατιων τοῦ ἄδικου. τοῦτο τ' ἐστίν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις τοῦ ἁφετοῦ ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις ἡ ἄδικια, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁφετοῦ ἢ δικαίου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ μὲν ὀλον ὁμοιῶς, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁπότερας ἐτυχεῖν. τοῦ δὲ ἄδικήματος τοῦ μὲν ἐλαττοῦ τοῦ ἄδικεστα τοῦ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μείζου τὸ ἄδικειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἄδικιας, τίς ἐκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσιον τοῦτο τῶν τρόπων, ὁμοιῶς δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἄδικου καθόλου.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστιν ἄδικοντα μὴν ἄδικον ἔως, ὁ ποία ἄδικήματα ἄδικων ἢδ' ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἄδικων, οἷον κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λυστής; ἡ οὖν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως; καὶ Ευδημος, apparently has for its object to restrict the term justice yet more definitely than has hitherto been done. We are now entering on the second division of the book, and the question is, what will constitute an individual unjust? This question tends to elucidate the nature of justice and injustice as individual qualities. But before answering it, there is a digression. It must be remembered, says the writer, that we are treating of justice in the plain sense of the word, that is, civil justice, not that metaphorical justice which might be spoken of as existing in families. On the nature of this justice, proper or civil justice, and on the metaphorical kinds, some remarks are given.

VI. This chapter, which is written confusedly after the manner of
γὰρ ἄν συγγένειοι γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ γ', ἀλλ' ὧν διὰ προσιτότερας ἀφελήν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν ὃν, ἀδίκοις δ' οὖν ἔστιν, οἷον οὔδε κλέπτης, ἐκλέψε ὦ, οὔδὲ μοιχῷς, ἀρετοίς ἐπεσταλεῖ ὁ πλῆθος ἔξει τὸ ἀντιπεπόντιον πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εὑρήσῃ πρῶτερον. ἀνεί ὃς μη λανθάνειν ὧτι τὸ θετομένον ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τούτῳ δὲ ἔστι ἐπὶ κοινωνίας ὁ πλῆθος τὸ ἐξαι αὐτάρκειαν, ἔλευθερων καὶ ὦτων ἦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἦ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὢστε ὤσις μὴ ἔστι τούτῳ, οὐκ ἔστι τούτως πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ καὶ ἀριθμῶς τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ὀίς καὶ νόμοσ πρὸς αὐτοὺς· νόμοσ δ', ἐν ὦς ἀδικία. ' ἡ γὰρ

3 πῶς μὲν οὖν—πρῶτερον] The allusion is to ch. v. § 4—6, and the meaning appears to be simply, in the variety of cases that may occur, punishment by simple retaliation will not do. The sentence however appears irrelevant.

4 δὲ δὲ μὴ—κατ' ἀριθμὸν] 'Now we must not forget that the object of our inquiry is at once justice in the plain sense of the word (ἄπλως) and justice as existing in the state. But this exists amongst those who live in common, with a view to the supply of their mutual wants, free and equal, either proportionately or literally.'

Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is opposed to κατ' ἀριθμὸν. It is not meant here to separate τὸ ἀπ. δίκ. from τὸ πολ. δίκ., rather it is implied that they are both the same. The only justice that can be called so without a figure of speech is that between fellow-citizens, who have mutual rights and some sort of equality. Proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments, numerical or exact equality to democracies. Cf. Ar. Pol. vi. ii. 2: καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικόν τὸ ἄνω ἐχειν ἐστι κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀλίαν, τούτου δ' ὁπτος τοῦ δικαιού τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον.

4—5 ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον—τῆς ἔτσι δικαιοσύνης] 'For what is just exists among those who live under a common law, and law is where there is injustice, (for legal judgment is a decision between the just and the unjust). Now wherever there is injustice there is wrong dealing, but it does not follow that where there is wrong dealing there is injustice. Wrong dealing consists in allotting oneself too much absolute good and too little absolute evil; and hence it is that we do not suffer a man to rule, but the impersonal reason, for a man does this for himself (i.e. rules, cf. ἐστὸν ποιῆσαι below), and becomes a tyrant.' This passage does not give the origin of justice, but the signs by which you may know it. Justice could not be said to depend on law (especially as law is said to depend on injustice, for we should then argue in a circle), but where law exists you may know that justice exists. The argument then is that justice exists between citizens who have a law with each other, and not between father and children between whom there is no law. Law implies justice because it springs out of cases where a sense of wrong has been felt.
en ois δ' ἀδικία κ.τ.λ. | This seems to mean that law has not arisen merely from the fact of unequal dealings (ἀδικεῖσ), but from a sense of the violation of a principle (ἀδικία). Thus the principle of justice is prior to all law and not created out of it. 

To ὕππο δ', ὑπὸ τὸ ἀδικεῖσ. Following up this conception of the a priori character of justice, the writer says we must be governed not by a man, who may act selfishly, but by an impersonal standard of the right. That selfish rule is tyranny, Aristotle asserts in Pol. III. vii. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ταρανίς ἄστη μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τὸ μοναρχοῦντος. Cf. also Pol. III. xvi. 3: τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν ἀρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἑν τινὰ.—ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύει ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν ἔθνον καὶ τὸν νόμον, ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπων κελεύειν προστίθησαι καὶ ὥριον. η τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ δ' θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀριστούς ἄνδρας. Διότερ ἂνεν ὁρίζεσιν νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἑστιν.

6 ἐπεὶ δ' οὗτοι—γέρας] The apo-
dosis to ἐπεὶ is μισθὸς ἄρα. From ὁ γὰρ το πρότερον is parenthetical. 'But since he does not seem to gain at all, if he is a just man (for he does not allot to himself more of the absolutely good than to others, unless it be proportional to his own merits, and hence he acts for others, and justice thus is said to be the good of others), we must give him some reward, and this comes in the shape of honour and reverence.'

καθάπερ ἑλέσθη τὸ πρότερον] The reference is to ch. i. § 17.

8 ὁ δὲ—διόμοιον. 'Now the justice of masters and parents is not identical with what we have gone through (τῶν τοιοῦτοι ἢ ἐπ. καὶ πολιτ. δικ.), but is only analogous to it.'

9 διὸ—ἀρχεσθαί] 'Hence a man cannot have a spirit of wrong towards
himself; nor civil justice or injustice; for this is, as we have said (ἢν), according to law and among those who can naturally have law; namely, those, as we said (ὅσαν), who have an equality of ruling and being ruled.

VII. Continues the discussion as to the nature of civil justice, in which there are two elements, the natural (φυσικόν) and the conventional (νομικόν). They are distinguished, and arguments are brought against the sophistically position that all justice is merely conventional. The chapter as above is not conveniently divided. We need not have had a fresh commencement with § 1, τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν, which is a carrying on of the same digression before made; and we might well have had the end of a chapter at § 5, κατὰ φόρου ἡ ἁριστία, after which there is a return to the main question as to justice and injustice in the acts and the characters of individuals. In his later edition Bekker makes one undivided chapter including Chaps. VI., VII., VIII., of the present edition.

1 τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν—διαφέρει | 'Now in civil justice there is a natural element and a conventional element; that is natural which has the same force everywhere, and does not depend on being adopted or not adopted (τὸ δοκεῖν ἡ μή); while that is conventional which at the outset does not matter whether it be so or differently, but when men have instituted it, then matters.' The distinction here drawn is like that between ἕθος and κοινὸς νόμος in Aristotle’s Rhetoric i. xiii., and also that between moral and positive laws in modern treatises. Natural justice is law because it is right, conventional justice is right because it is law. Τὸ νομικὸν is not to be confused with τὸ νόμον (cf. ch. i. § 8), which is justice expressed in the law, and which is nearly equivalent to πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, containing therefore both the natural and conventional elements. In the early stages of society all law is regarded with equal reverence. Afterwards, in the sceptical period, the merely conventional character of many institutions is felt, and doubt is thrown on the validity of the whole fabric. Afterwards the proper distinction is made, and the existence of something above all mere convention is recognised. The idea of 'nature' as forming the basis of law, which was started in the school of Aristotle, was afterwards developed by the Stoics, and still further drawn out by Cicero and the Roman jurists. It became a leading formula in the Roman law, and hence has influenced the modern school of continental jurists, until a reaction was made against it by Bentham.
VI.—VII.]

ΗΟΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] V. 127

μμάς λυτροφθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αἰγὸν θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρῶβατα,
ῄσκει ἐπὶ τῶν καὶ ἐκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν
Βρασίδα, καὶ τὰ ἡγεμονικαὶ. διόκει δὲ εὖ υἱὸς εἶναι
πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φῶτον ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ
τὴν αὐτῆν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὡσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνδόθε καὶ ἐν
Πέραις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινοῦμεν ὁρῶσιν. τούτο δὲ

τὸ μμάς λυτροφθαι] Herod. (v. 79)
speaks of των minae as the ransom, ἀποικά ὡς: Πελοποννησίους δύο μνίαι
tetagmēnai kath' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἐκτίνηται.

τὸ αἰγὸν θύειν Cf. Herod. II. 42:
ὑπὸι μὲν δὴ Δῶς Θηβαῖος ἱδρυται ἱρὸν ἢ τοιοῦ Ὀθῆλου εἰς, οὗτοι μὲν

καὶ πάντες ὄντα ἀπεχθέμενοι αἰγας

τὸ θείους Βρασίδα] i.e. in Amphipolis,
cf. Thucyd. v. x.: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὦν Ἀμφιπολίται περίπτεραι αὐτοῦ τὸ
μυθημένων, ἃς ἤρωι τὰ ἐντέρισον καὶ τιμᾶς δεδώκασιν ἀγώνας καὶ ἐντερίσωσ

τοῖς νομίσμασιν τῶν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρα
σφάλ γεγενήσθαι.

2 δοκεῖ δὲ—ὁρῶσιν] 'Now some

think that all institutions are of this

character, because, while the natural

is fixed and has everywhere the same

force (as fire burns equally here and

in Persia), they see the rules of jus-

tice altered.' Καὶ ἐνδόθε καὶ ἐν τοῖς

Πέραις. This appears to have been

a common formula, cf. Plato, Μινώος,
p. 315 ε.: ἐγὼ μὲν (νομίζω) τὰ τὸ δίκαια

δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκα ἀδίκα, ὡσκόν καὶ

παρὰ πάσιν ἀδίκως ἂν ἐνδόθα νομίσκεται —

καὶ —οὐκόν καὶ ἐν Πέραις; —καὶ ἐν

Πέραις. In the same dialogue, p.

315, are given specimens of the diffe-

rent laws and customs in different
times and places (ν): Μωρία δὲ ἄν τις

ἐχοί τοιαῦτα εἶπεν. πολλὰ γὰρ ἑπρε-

χωρία τὰ ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ὄστε ἤμεις

ἡμῶν αὐτοῦς ἢ ἔκατα ταῦτα νομίζουμεν

όστε ἄλλοις οἱ ἀνθρώποι. The variety
customs and ideas is brought for-

ward by Locke and Paley to disprove
the existence of an innate 'moral

sense.' This variety is generally over-

stated, and the list of aberrations is

mainly obtained from the usages of

barbarous tribes. On the origin of
the opposition between 'nature' and
'convention,' and on the use made of
this by the Sophists, see Vol. I.

3 τοῦτο δ'—οὐ φῶσει] 'But this

is not the case (i.e. that justice is

mutable), though it is so to a certain

extent. Μay be among the gods

justice is immutable; but with us,

although there is somewhat that exists

by nature, yet all is mutable. Though

does this not do away with the dis-

tinction between what is by nature

and what is not by nature.' The

writing here is very compressed, ἀλλ' 

ἐστιν ἃς, i.e. τὰ δίκαια κινοῦται,
to which also ὀθοδόμοι afterwards must
be referred. The answer given to the

sophistical argument against justice

consists in denying the premise that

'what is by nature is immutable.'

This might be the case, it is answered,
in an ideal world (παρὰ γε τοῖς θεοῖς),
but in our world laws are interrupted,
and the manifestation of them is less

perfect (μικτῶν μὲντοι πάνω). Again

'nature' must be taken to mean not

only a law but a tendency (see note

on Eth. ii. 3), as, for instance, the

right hand is 'naturally,' but not

always, stronger than the left, while

merely conventional institutions exhi-

bit no natural law (οὐ φῶσει ἀλλὰ
σωμάτων), and are like weights and measures, which entirely depend on the convenience of men.

παρά γε τοῖς θεοίς] Of course there is nothing theological in this allusion. In Eth. x. viii. 7, the notion of attributing justice to the gods is ridiculed. The present mention of the gods is not meant to convey anything about their nature, it merely contrasts a divine or ideal state with the human and actual. An exactly similar mention of the gods is made below, ch. ix. § 17.

4 ενδέχεται τινας] Bekker reads τινας, Neil and Cardwell πάντας, all without mentioning any variation in their MSS. The latter of the two readings is supported by the Paraphrast and also by the author of the Magna Moralia (i. xxxiv. 21): λέγει δὴ οἶνον εἰ 
τῇ ὀριστερᾷ μελετῶμεν πάντες δὲ 
βάθαμεν, γεμίσαμεν ἐν ἀμφιδίσιοι. In either case, the sense is nearly the same, πάντας implying 'any one out of all,' as above, κινητῶν μέντοι 
πάν.

5 ὦμοιοι τοῖς μέτροις] The meaning appears to be, that measures differ in size in the producing (οὗ μὲν ἀνοώνται) and the consuming (οὗ δὲ παλάθσών) countries.

6 τῶν δὲ δικαίων—καθόλου γὰρ] 'Now every just and lawful rule stands like the universal in relation to the particulars, for while actions are manifold, the rule is one, being universal.'
We have a transition of subject now, a return from the digression on civil justice, to inquire into individual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying that the principles of justice and injustice (τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἄδικον) are universals and differ from just and unjust acts. At first the writer makes δικαίωμα stand to δίκαιον, as ἄδικημα to ἄδικον. Afterwards he substitutes δικαιοπράγμα as a more correct word, inasmuch as δικαίωμα had another special meaning to denote the setting right of injustice—legal satisfaction. It is not improbable that Eudemus here is correcting the phraseology of Aristotle, who at all events in his Rhetoric, i. xiii. 1, uses δικαίωμα as the opposite of ἄδικημα, merely to denote a just action. Ἄτι δ’ ἄδικημα οὖσα καὶ τὰ δικαίαμα διέλαμεν, κ. τ. λ.

VIII. The general principles of justice having now been defined, the question is what constitutes justice and injustice in the individual? In one word the will. This chapter adds some needless remarks on the nature of the voluntary, and distinguishes between the different stages of a wrong done, according to the amount of purpose which accompanied it. The same act externally might be a misfortune, if happening beyond calculation; a mistake, if through carelessness; a wrong, if through temptation; the act of an unjust man, if through deliberate villany (§§ 6—8). This distinction is illustrated by the legal view with regard to acts done in anger (§§ 9—10). All voluntary just acts are just. Some involuntary acts are still unpardonable.

3 λέγω δ’ ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὦσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηταί. The reference is to the Eudemian Ethics ii. ix. 1, where voluntariness is defined to depend on knowledge. 'Επει δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔχει τέλος, καὶ ὦστε τῇ ἄρει ὄστε τῇ προαὶ ἐστι τὸ ἐκούσιον ἀρετᾶ, λοιπὸν δὴ ὀφεῖσαι τὰ κατὰ δικύσιον. δικεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἄκουσιν, καὶ τὸ
ei̱do̱ta ἡ ὦν ἡ ὢ ἢ ὥ ὅ ἦ ἐνεκα—τῷ δ' ἀγνοούσιν καὶ ὡν καὶ δ' καὶ δ', δι' ἀγνοιαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.  

6 ὀπέρ εἶ τις λαβὼν τὴν χείρα κ.π.λ. ] The same illustration is given on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 1. ch. xiii. The present discussion is promised in Eth. Eud. ii. x. 19: ἀμα
arising on the appearance of injustice. It is not as in contracts, where men dispute about the thing having been done, and where (if the thing has been done) one of the parties must be a villain, unless they have done it in forgetfulness. But (in the present case) agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which side justice is. Now he that has attacked another cannot plead ignorance, so that (the issue lies on this) one party thinks he has been injured, the other denies it. But if a man has harmed another on purpose, he is guilty of injustice.' Owing to the obscurity of expression,
this passage has given great trouble to the commentators. The context is a carrying on of the distinction between ἀμάρτημα, ἁδίκημα, and ἁδικον. What distinguishes these is the amount of purpose they contain. This, says the writer, is illustrated by the way in which acts of anger are treated legally. Such acts are not denied, but the plea is that they were caused by an injustice, that they did not proceed from purpose, but were caused by an injury which gave rise to them. Thus the question is moved off from the acts themselves, and is entirely concerned with their antecedents. Was it a real injustice that gave rise to them? Whereas with regard to harmful acts done on purpose (ἐν δ' ἐκ προαρ. βλάψ) there is no doubt that in themselves they constitute a wrong. The chief difficulty is about the words ὁ ἁτραβοθέουσα ὁν ἁγνεῖον ὡστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδίκεσθαι, ὁ δ' ὁδ. Who is ὁ ἁτραβοθέουσα and who are ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' ὁδ. Apparently ὁν ἁγνεῖον is merely in reference to διὰ λήθην. Cases of anger differ from other civil cases (ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι), (1) because the acts of anger are not denied; (2) because ignorance is not pleaded to justify them. Ὁ ἁτραβοθέουσα, accordingly, must mean 'he that made the attack,' though the word is not very appropriate to denote an attack made in anger. Ὁ μὲν refers to the same person, namely, to him who, having done a violent act in anger, now pleads that he was injured before, which plea the one who has suffered from his violence denies. The sentence ἐν δ' ἐκ προαρ. is in contrast to the whole of the preceding passage—to all that is said about deeds of anger. If it appears to any impossible that ὁ ἁτραβόνυθως can refer to the angry man, there are several other meanings that can be assigned to it. (1) It may mean the person who by an injury provoked the attack, and then the second clause would mean, 'so that the angry man thinks he has suffered a wrong, the unjust man does not.' (2) The first clause may be parenthetical, the 'plotter' being contrasted with the angry man, and the second clause may be taken to mean 'so that the sufferer thinks he is wronged, and the angry man thinks he is not.' The first clause would then have been inserted to show that where, in cases of this kind, intentional provocation has been given, the parties are in the same relation as in cases ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν, i.e. one of them knows upon which side justice is, because he is conscious of his own wrong.

12 τοῖς δ' ἁκουστίων] The word is used less sternly here than it is by Aristotle in Eth. iii. i. 21, &c., where acts of passion are excluded from the class of the involuntary. On the difference between ἁγνειούντες and ὁδ' ἁγνεῖον, see Eth. iii. i. 14, and note. The view here given of physical temptation as constituting an excuse for wrong acts is similar to that in the later Eudemian Book, vii. xiv. 6.
IX. This chapter, by means of mooting and answering certain difficulties and objections with regard to the nature of justice and injustice, completes and deepens the conception of them that has hitherto been given. These questions are as follows: (1) Can one be injured voluntarily? §§ 1—2. (2) Is the recipient of an injury always injured? §§ 3—8. The latter question is first generally answered, and then, §§ 9—13, it is re-stated in the form of two other questions, namely, Is the distributor of an unjust distribution, or he that gains by it, unjust? and, Can a man injure himself? By mooting these points it is at once shown that justice implies a relationship of two wills, and that an act of injustice implies a collision of two wills: a loss on one side and a gain on the other. The chapter ends with some remarks correcting popular errors, and deepening the conception of justice. (1) Justice is no easy thing consisting in an external act. It consists in an internal spirit, § 14. (2) To know it is not like knowing a set of facts. It implies a knowledge of principles, § 15. (3) The just man could not at will act unjustly. The character of the act depends on the state of mind, § 16. (4) Justice is limited to a human sphere, § 17.

I ἀπορίσαει δ’ ἂν—ἐκόντες Ἡν one might doubt whether we have adequately defined being injured and injuring; in the first place, whether it be as Euripides says, in his strange language, A. "I killed my mother, and there's an end of it." B. "Was it with the will of both, or was she willing while you were unwilling?" In short, is it as a matter of fact possible that one should be voluntarily injured, or, on the contrary, is that always involuntary, just as all injuring is voluntary? And is all injustice, like all injuring, to be summed up under the one category or the other, or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary? The same may be said about being justly treated, for all just doing is voluntary, so that it might be supposed that being injured and being justly treated would be opposed to each other as to being voluntary or involuntary correspondingly to the two active terms (ἄντικ. ὑμόλος καθ’ ἐκάτερον). But it would be absurd to say of being justly treated that it is always voluntary, for some are treated justly against their will.'

ei ἑκανός διάφωσσα | This shows the purpose of the chapter, to complete the definition of justice and injustice by looking at them on the passive side.

Ωςπερ Εὐριπίδης] Wagner (Eur. Fraga. p. 40) says the lines come from the Alceste of Euripides. The Scholiast refers them to the
Bellerophon. Wagner writes them as a dialogue, supposing the persons to be Alcmene and Phegeus. He conjectures κατέκται, which appears more probable than the usual reading κατέκτα, and which accordingly has been adopted in the above translation.

2. The passive terms are not opposed to each other in respect of voluntariness in the way that might be expected from the opposition between the active terms under which they stand.

ἀδικεῖν—δικαίοπραγεῖν
ἀδικεῖσθαι—δικαίοσθαι.

For ἀδικεῖσθαι is always involuntary, but δικαίοσθαι is not always voluntary. A man may be 'treated justly' by being hanged.

3. Not every one who suffers what is unjust is injured, for injury implies intention on the part of the injurer. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. i. xiii. 5: ἐστὶ δὴ ἐκ τὸ θυτὸ ἔκοντος τὰ δικά πάσχειν.

4—6: οὐκ ἔστιν—πράττει] 'Now if to injure is simply defined "to hurt any one willingly," and "willingly" means "knowing the person, and the instrument, and the manner," and the incontinent man hurts himself willingly, then it follows that one can be willingly injured, and it will be possible to injure oneself. But this was one of the points in question, whether it is possible to injure oneself. Again, one might from incontinence be hurt willingly by another who was acting willingly, so that in that way it would be possible to be injured willingly. But shall we not rather say that the definition is not correct, but that we must add to the formula "hurt any one willingly, knowing person, instrument, and manner," the terms "against that person's wish?" It is true one is hurt and one suffers injustice willingly, but no
one is injured willingly. For no one wishes (harm), nor does the incontinent man, but he acts against his wish. For no one wishes for what he does not think to be good, and the incontinent man does not what he thinks to be good.'

4 ἀπλῶς is opposed to κατὰ πρόσθεσιν as implied in προσβεβεβοῦν. Cf. vii. iv. 2—3.

τὸ βλάπτειν] Harm does not constitute injustice without a violation of the will. Cf. Ar. Rhet. i. xiii. 6: ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀδικομένην βλάπτεσθαι, καὶ ἀνοιχτάς βλάπτεσθαι.

ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς] The incontinent man may harm himself, or be led into ruin by others. The phenomena of incontinence appear to have constantly occupied the attention of Eudemus. They not only form the main subject of Eth. Book vii. (Eth. Eud. vi.), but they are also mixed up with the discussion on the voluntary, Eth. Eud. ii. viii.

6 οὕτω γὰρ βούλεται κ. τ. λ. ] In his inmost self every one wishes for what he thinks good. Thus the incontinent man, following his desire, acts against his own real wish. This is the same point of view as is taken in the Gorgias of Plato (p. 466 sqq.). It is rather different from that in Eth. iii. ch. iv. (on which see notes), though the word οὕτω prevents an absolute collision. The terms παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν are rather awkwardly introduced in the text, for it is said they are necessary to turn mere harm into injustice, but with regard to the incontinent man, while acting voluntarily he receives 'harm—against his wish.' Yet he is not injured voluntarily, because the terms 'against his wish' constitute him an involuntary agent. In short, in this case παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν is made to qualify, not the harm, but the voluntariness of the recipient. There is a slight confusion in the expression, but on the whole the tendency here is to attribute a less degree of voluntariness to weak and foolish acts than was done by Aristotle in his discussions on the voluntary; Eth. iii. i. 14. &c.
οὐκ ἀδίκειται. ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ’ ἀδίκεισθαι οὐκ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδίκοιντα δεὶ ὑπάρχειν.

8 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδίκεσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἔκοψαν, ὁδηλον.

'Ετι δ’ ἂν προσεἰλομέθα δι’ ἔστιν εἰπέναι, πότερον ποτ’ ἀδίκει ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεῖον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἐστιν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἀδίκειν: εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεγόντες καὶ διανέμον τὸν ἀδίκης ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἰ τις πλέον ἔτερον ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδαν καὶ ἐκών, οὕτως αὐτὸς αὐτῶν ἀδίκει. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν: ὃ γὰρ ἐπιείκης ἐλαττωτικὸς ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἀπλούν; ἔτερον γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἐπιπερέεστε, οἶνον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλώς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδίκειν: οὗθεν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶς πᾶσχε θυσίας, ὡστε οὐκ ἀδίκειται διὰ γε τούτῳ, ἀλλ’ εἰπέρ, βλάπτεται μόνον.

9 φανερον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδίκει, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων δεί: οὐ γὰρ οὗ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδίκει, ἀλλ’ οὗ τὸ ἐκοντα τὸτε ποιεῖν: τούτῳ δ’ ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ἐστιν ἐν τοῦ διανέμοντι αλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμπάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλάκιος τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἐστιν ὡς τὰ ἁγιακα κτείνει καὶ ἢ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκείτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδίκει ἐμὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἁδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἁγιοὶν ἐκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδίκει κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὕτ’ ἁδικος ἢ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἐστι δ’ ὡς ἁδικος· ἐτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον: εἰ δὲ γινόσκον ἐκρινεν ἁδικας, πλεονεκτεί καὶ

8—13 ἔτι δ’ ἂν προσεἰλομέθα δι’ ἔστιν εἰπέναι] 'But of the questions which we determined on there remain two to discuss;' namely, (1) whether the distributor of an unjust distribution does the wrong, or he who gains by it? (2) Can a man injure himself, as for instance by taking less than his share? These questions are as good as answered already; it is already clear that no one can injure himself. Again the act belongs to the distributor and not to the receiver. If the distributor acts from corrupt motives he is unjust, if unconsciously and by accident he is not unjust, though justice may have been violated by his decision.

11—12 ἔτι ἐπεὶ—πρῶτον] 'Again, as the word doing is used in more senses than one, and there is a sense in which inanimate things kill—or one’s hand—or the slave who does his master’s bidding—so the distributor may be the instrument of doing injustice, without himself injuring. Again, if he decided in ignorance, in the eye of the law he is not guilty of injuring, nor is his decision unjust, though from another point of view it is unjust, for justice according to law is distinct from abstract justice.'
first case supposes the distributor to act as the instrument of others, the second that he makes a mistake through ignorance. In the latter case abstract justice (τὸ πρῶτον δίκαιον) is violated, and yet legally (κατὰ τὸ νομικῶ) no injustice can be complained of. πρῶτον here appears used analogously to πρῶτη φιλοσοφία, πρῶτη ὁλη, &c., to denote that which is most real and necessary, and also most abstract as being most removed from individual modifications. The Paraphrast and many of the commentators understand § 11 to refer to the receiver, not to the distributor. It might also be taken in a quite general sense, as applying to all such subservient acts. But it seems simplest to refer it to the distributor.

14—17 These sections contain remarks concluding the subject of justice. As they correct popular errors regarding its nature, they may be considered a continuation of the ἀπορία, with which the chapter commenced. The views which are here combatted are (1) a shallow and external notion about justice and injustice as if they merely consisted in outward acts; (2) a sophistical opinion that to know justice merely consists in knowing the details of the laws, cf. Eth. x. ix. 20; (3) an opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art (δέναμα); see above ch. i. § 4. This opinion would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, Repub. p. 334 a, Hipp. Min. pp. 375–6. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (ἐξε) set the difficulty at rest.
... and property of the goods, gives them a more advantageous situation, and that they receive much, too, from the society. Hence justice is human. Two ideal states, one of the absolutely good, the other of the absolutely bad, are here depicted in contrast to the condition of human society. The idea of property cannot of course be connected with God (cf. Eth. x. viii. 7), who has and is all good (cf. Eth. i. vi. 3, ix. iv. 4); nor again with those who are so degraded that they could not receive any benefit at all from what are called goods (cf. ch. i. § 9). The passage is a curious one, and may remind us of the position assigned by Aristotle (cf. Pol. i. ii. 14) to man in his social condition, as something between the beast and the god.

X. Some account of equity (epieikeia) forms a suitable complement to the theory of justice, and we find the subject so treated in Aristotle's Rhetoric, i. xiii., from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly borrowed. Professor Spengel is mistaken in saying that this chapter is out of place, being introduced into the midst of the ἀτορια on justice. Evidently it is chapter xi., and not chapter x., that is out of place. Spengel thinks that the words περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἢ μὲν ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δίκαιοσύνην τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
lectic qualities, and is coupled with what he calls εὐγνώμοσύνη, Magna Moralia, ii. i. 1, sqq.

To us the contents of this chapter appear natural and easy to apprehend. The idea of equity as the complement of law and justice is to us perfectly familiar, but the writer saw a difficulty in saying how logically (τῇ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι) equity could be praised if it contradicted justice. The answer is well given above, that equity is a higher and finer kind of justice coming in where the law was too coarse and general. The best illustration of this conception is to be found in the beautiful description given in Rhet. i. xiii. 'It is equity to pardon human failings, and to look to the lawgiver and not to the law; to the spirit and not to the letter; to the intention and not to the action; to the whole and not to the part; to the character of the actor in the long run and not in the present moment; to remember good rather than evil, and good that one has received, rather than good that one has done; to bear being injured (τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι άδικου-μένον); to wish to settle a matter by words rather than by deeds; lastly, to prefer arbitration to judgement, for the arbitrator sees what is equitable, but the judge only the law, and for this an arbitrator was first appointed, in order that equity might flourish.'

1 οτὲ μὲν—ἄγαθοὗ] 'Sometimes we praise what is equitable and the equitable character in such a way, that we transfer the term and use it instead of the term good in praising people for all other qualities besides.' The word ἐπιεικῆς is constantly used merely in the sense of 'good,' cf. Eth. iv. ix. 7, εὖ σπουδαίους ἐπιεικὲς, and above, ch. iv. § 3, &c., but it is a mistake to consider this the later sense of the word, as if 'equitable' were the primary sense. 'Ἐπιεικῆς (from ἐκδος) first means 'customary,' as in Homer; then 'seemly,' then 'good' in general; afterwards it is probable than an association of ἐκδος, 'to yield,' became connected with the word, and hence the notion of moderation and of waiving one's rights arose, and τὸ ἐπιεικὲς was constantly contrasted with τὸ δίκαιον. Thus in Herod. iii. 53: πολλὰ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἐπιεικέστερα προτίθεσα. Cf. Plato, Laws, p. 757 b: τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ψυγγραμμὸν τοῦ τελεόν καὶ ἀκριβῶς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὁδὴν ἐστὶ παρατεθραυσμένον, &c. Out of this contrast the idea of equity was developed.
There are some cases for which it is impossible to legislate, you require a special decree to meet them.' The ψήφισμα, like the exercise of equity, was a remedy to make up the insufficiency of laws. On its special character, cf. ch. viii. § 1, and Eth. vi. viii. 2, see also Arnold on Thucyd. iii. 36.

'For the rule for what is indefinite must be itself indefinite, like the leaden rule in the Lesbian architecture—the rule is not fixed, but shifts itself according to the shape of the stone, and so does
the decree according to the nature of the case. ‘Lesbian architecture’ appears to have been a kind of Cyclopian masonry, which may have remained in Lesbos from the early Pelasgian occupiers of the island. Polygon stones were used in it, which could not be measured by a straight rule, cf. Aesch. Fragm. 70,

"ἀλλὰ ὁ μὲν τὶς Δέσμιον κὺμα ἐν τριγώνῳ ἐκπεραίωτο πρὸς ἀυτὸν," where κὺμα means a waved moulding where.

XI. This chapter, which is evidently superfluous (cf. Vol. I., Essay I., page 41), discusses an already settled question. Can a man injure himself? There is no merit in the present discussion. Amidst the feeble reasonings and the repetitions which it presents, the only points the least interesting are the view that is taken of suicide, §§ 2, 3, and the saying that it is a mere metaphor to speak of justice between the higher and lower parts of a man.

1 ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων] i.e. ch. i. §§ 12 —20. The question is complicated by introducing a mention of universal justice (τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν), and the extraordinary assertion is made that 'whatever the law does not command it forbids!' We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c.? 2—3 The suicide sins against the state, not against himself. This is proved by the fact that the state affixes infamy to the deed. In Aeschines, Ctesiph. p. 636, § 64, it is mentioned that the hand of a suicide was buried apart from himself. And in Plato's Laws, ix. p. 875 c, sqq., regulations are laid down for the burial of suicides. In the words ἀδεικὴ δρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; there is a change of meaning from the intransitive ἀδεικύων, to 'do wrong,' to the transitive verb to 'injure.'
individual, qualifies to lose its real value.

This is the case in the example given earlier, where Plato, in his dialogue, speaks of the value of a certain goods in the context of a trade transaction.

For it would be possible to consider the same thing to be of greater or lesser value, but this is not possible, justice and injustice must always take place between more persons than one, as shown by Plato and his followers.

The chapter ends by touching upon two points which have an apparent reference to Plato, (1) the assertion that to injure is worse than to be injured, which the writer here qualifies with a consideration; (2) the conception of justice existing between the different parts of the mind of an individual, which is here pronounced to be a metaphor.

This sentence is parenthetical and elliptical. The train of thought appears to be: 

'Injuring and being injured are both bad, they are both departures from the mean, and it is (with justice) as with health in medicine and good condition in training,' namely, it is a state of balance between excess and defect, cf. Eth. p. ii. 6.

This is exactly the point which is urged by Socrates in the Gorgias of Plato, (p. 473 A, 509 C), and seems to be his hearers a paradox. It is qualified above by the admission that being injured might be in its consequences (κατά συμβεβηκός) a worse evil than injuring; just as a stumble might cause a man's death, and so be accidentally worse than a pleurisy. Is it then worse to be ruined by the cheating of others, or to cheat some one of a sixpence? The writer above acknowledges that moral science will maintain the severity of its verdict, and say cheating is the worse (ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ κ. τ. λ.). Of
course being depraved in mind is the worst of all evils. It is not this (άδικος εἶναι), but a single act of wrong (τὸ ἄδικεσθαι), that will bear comparison with the evil of being injured.

9 κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ — τοῦτοι] Now metaphorically and by analogy one is capable of justice, not towards one’s own self, but towards certain parts of oneself, not every kind of justice, but despotic or household justice. For in the theories alluded to there is a separation made between the reasonable and unreasonable part of man’s nature. Regarding this, people consider that one can have injustice towards oneself, because these separate parts may be made to suffer something contrary to one’s proper tendencies; so then, like ruler and ruled, they have a sort of justice with each other.’

ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς ἁγγοις] It can hardly be doubted that there is a reference here to Plato, Ῥεπόδ. p. 441 λ, 443 δ, 432 λ, &c. However, the reference may be second hand, having been first made by Aristotle. To deny the appropriateness of the term ‘justice’ to express a harmony between the different parts of man’s nature is unlike the point of view taken Eth. ικ. e. iv., where the friendship which the good man has with himself is described at length. Eudemus, however, was much busied with problems as to the unity of the will, and probably advanced to some extent the Peripatetic psychology.
PLAN OF BOOK VI.

TURNING to the contents of this Sixth Book, we see at once that it includes two subjects, and that the intermixture of these two has given rise to some little confusion. The questions are (1) What is the moral standard? (2) What are the intellectual ἀρετοί?

Commencing with the former question, the writer goes off into the latter. And thus Wisdom (φρονησις) is treated of at some length as a perfection of the moral intellect, but is hardly touched upon with regard to its operation as the moral standard.

After the two above-mentioned questions have been proposed, without any statement of their connexion, the discussion of the intellectual ἀρετοί commences by a division of the reason into scientific and calculative. Ch. I.

Truth is the object of both, but truth is divided into practical and speculative. The former enters into and becomes an element in the decisions of the will. Ch. II.

Truth of whatever kind is attained by only five organs of the mind—Science, Art, Wisdom, Reason, and Philosophy. These then are severally discussed; and Philosophy, after being treated independently, has Wisdom brought in again in contrast to itself. Ch. III.—VII.

The relation of Wisdom to Economy and Politics is then discussed. Ch. VIII.

Prudence (εὐδοκία), Apprehension (σώεσις), and Considerateness (γνώμη), as being component elements of Wisdom, are severally treated of, and some remarks are added on the natural and intuitive character of these practical qualities. Ch. IX.—XI.

The book ends by the statement and solution of difficulties with
regard to Wisdom and Philosophy, their respective use, and their relation to each other in point of superiority.

With regard to the use of Wisdom some important though not very clear remarks are made on its inseparable connexion with Virtue. Though inseparable, it is not, however, identical with Virtue, as Socrates wrongly asserted. In relation to Philosophy, Wisdom is the means, while Philosophy is the end. Ch. XII.—XIII.

The upshot of the book, then, is, that it treats of the intellectual ἀρεταί. These are two—not five, as some would say, reckoning as such the five organs of truth, nor again an indefinite number, as Aristotle would seem to say, admitting 'Apprehension,' &c. (Eth. I. xiii. 20); but two essentially, Philosophy and Wisdom. These are contrasted with each other, but in such a way that Wisdom, though the least excellent, is brought into prominence, and is the real theme of the book. With all the discrepancies of statement which we have already alluded to (Vol. I. Essay I. p. 40), Wisdom comes out in its general outlines as the perfection of the practical reason combined with the will; as inseparable, if distinguishable, from Virtue itself. The picture of this quality and of its growth in the mind is made the occasion of many interesting remarks; but the question how the mind acts in determining the mean, and what is the nature of the moral standard, is left still unanswered.
This chapter states, though somewhat indefinitely, the question which is to be answered in the ensuing book. Referring back to a previous mention of ‘the mean,’ it proposes now to discuss ‘the right law’ by which the mean is determined. For only to know that action must be ‘in the mean, and according to the right law,’ is a mere blank formula which requires filling up (ἐν τοῖς μέσοις δὲ πράττειν εἰρημένοις ὑπὸ ἀρίθμωσιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ἄρητος λέγεται, τοῦτο διέλαμβαν. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἐξεσεῖ, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοιον, ἐστὶ τις σχοινᾶς πρὸς ὁν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τῶν λόγων ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίψειν, καὶ τις ἐπαυτίκων πράττειν εἰρημένοις). The reference is to Eth. End. II. v. 1: ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπάκουειν ἀρετὴν ἐναὶ ἡ ταινία ἐξίς ἀριθνῃς ἦς πρακτικος τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἤν ἄριστα διάκειται περὶ τοῦ βελτίστου, βελτίστου δὲ καὶ ἄριστου τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ἀπεριβαλόντος καὶ ἐλλεῖψεως τῆς πρὸς ὁμοίως αἰ. τ. ι. 

For in all the states of mind which we have described, as also in all others, there is a certain mark to which he who is in possession of ‘the law’ (δ' τῶν λόγων ἔχων) looks, and tightens or relaxes (the strings) accordingly, and there is a certain standard of those mean states which we say are between
excess and deficiency, being in accordance with the right law.' "Epitēnei kal anēsheia is a metaphor from tuning the strings of a lyre. Cf. Plato, *Lysis*, p. 209 b: kai ἐπειδὴ ἂν ἄγγαμα, τὴν ἅλφαν λάβῃ, οὐ διακω-

νοῦσαι σε οὐ δ' ὁ πατήρ οὐθ' ἡ μήτηρ ἐπιστευνεῖ τα καὶ ἀνίκανία ἂν τὸν βουλή τῶν χρόνων. *Phaedo*, p. 98 c: καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅπιο ἐστὶ στερεὰ, καὶ διαφὰς ἔχει χαρὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ μέρα ὕπα ἐπιστευνεῖσθαι καὶ ἀνέσθαι. This metaphor is not quite in accordance with that other metaphor of 'looking to the mark,' but in fact the term ἕκοσι seems to have become so regular a formula with Eudemus as to have lost its metaphorical association. By Aristotle ἕκοσι was used as a pure metaphor, the application of which was borrowed from Plato (cf. *Eth. i. ii. 2*, note). But in the writing of Eudemus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος; cf. *Eth. i. ii. 20*: ἐπεὶ δὲ βούλευεται δὲ οἱ βουλευομένοι ἐνέκα τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπὸς τὸ νὲ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ἤν σκοπεῖ τῇ συμ-

φέροιν, περὶ μὲν τὸ τέλος οὐδέστε βούλευεται. *ib. i. xi. 2*: λέγομεν δὲ προαπορρήσαντες. "Ἐστὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν σκοπῶν ὅρθον εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαματάνειν ἦστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτήσαται, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὅρθος ἔχει, καὶ μηδέτερον. In like manner the use of ὅρος by Eudemus is quite different from anything that we find in Aristotle, and is no doubt an innovation. Cf. *Eth. Eud. ii. v. 8* (which is especially referred to in the present passage), τίς δὲ ὁ ὅρθος λόγος καὶ πρὸς τίνα δὲ βορὸν ἀποβλέποντος λέγεται τὸ μέσον, ὄστερον ἐπισκεπτόν. *ib. viii. iii. 12*: δὲ τινὰ εἶναι βορὸν καὶ τῆς ἔξεως καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυσικῆς χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ἀλγόστης καὶ τῶν εὐτυχίμων. *ib. viii. iii. 15* (quoted Vol. i. p. 23).

2 ἐστὶ δὲ—σαφὲς] 'Now to say this is to say what is true enough, but not explicit.' This same expression, with the same illustration of the medical art, is repeated *Eth. Eud. viii. iii. 13*: ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρῶτον ἐλέηθη τὸ ὃς ὁ λόγος τούτῳ. ὃς ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν προφή-

τειν ἐστειλέα τῇ ἐμφάσει ἃς ἡ ἑαυτή καὶ ὁ λόγος ταῦτας τούτῳ δὲ ἀληθεῖς μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δὲ. *Ib. i. vi. 2*: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφώς δὲ προφήτευεν ἐσται καὶ τὸ σαφώς. Throughout the *Eudemian Ethics* one can trace an inclination to make small corrections and improvements upon Aristotle. Cf. the notes on *Eth. iii. viii. 6* and *v. vii. 7*. In the present place there is an apparent protest against the indefiniteness and relativity of Aristotle's moral theory of 'the mean' and 'the law.' Eudemus does not seem (according to the statement here) content to give greater explicitness to the idea of the 'law' by the develop-
ment of the idea of the wise man who is its impersonation. But he asks
(separating skopos and opos from the logos) ‘What is the mark to
which one possessing the law must look?’ What is the standard of the
law? In reality these questions get no answer. They only cloud the subject
by introducing a confusion of formulae.

4 τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ήδου ἐφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοιας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
ηδικῶν διελεγμένας, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ὑψηλῶν
πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγομεν οὕτως. πρῶτερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέγχῃ
οὐ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον
νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαρέστων.
καὶ υποκείσθω οὐδὲ τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν οὖν ἑσπερώμεν
τὰ τοιαύτα τῶν ὀντῶν ὅσοι αἱ ἀρχαι μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως

Eth. t. ch. xiii. But here he speaks as
if he had repeated verbatim the popular division into rational and irrational
which was provisionally accepted by Aristotle. Thus, by a slip of the
memory, he confuses his own state-
ment with Aristotle’s.

καὶ υποκείσθω—αὐτοῖς] ‘And let
us suppose that the parts possessing
reason are two, one by which we
apprehend such existences as depend
on necessary principles, and one by
which we apprehend contingent
matter, for to objects differing in
genus there must be different mem-
bers of the mind severally adapted,
if it be true that these members
obtain their knowledge by reason of a
certain resemblance to and affinity
with the object of knowledge.’

We have here a division of the mind in
accordance with a division of the ob-
jects of which the mind is cognizant.
And as a justification of this we have
the assumption that knowledge implies
a resemblance and affinity between
object and subject. With regard to
this, Aristotle (De Anima, t. ii. 10)
says that ‘those philosophers who
wished to account for knowledge and
perception identified the ψυχή with
the principles of things, because like is known by like, 'Osoi ά' eπ\i το γνώσκειν καὶ το 
aisθανείται των ὑπτων (ἀποβλέπουσιν), οὖν δε λέγουσιν την 
ψυχην τας ἄρχας, οι μὲν πλείους ποιούν 
tes, οι δε μιαν ταυτην, άναπε 
δεκλήσι μεν εκ των στοιχειων πάντων, 
ειναι δε κα εκαστον ψυχην τοστων, 
λεγων οιτων 
γαλ μεν γαρ γαϊν υπόπαμεν, άδαι δε 
νωαρ, 
αλθερ δαι άλθερ διαν, άταρ πυρ πυρ 
διαθλοιν, 
στοργη δε στοργην, νεικος δε τε νεικε 
λυγρη.

των αυτων δε τροπων και Πλατων εν το 
Τιμαι την ψυχην εκ των στοιχειων 
ποιηι γνωσκεθαι γαρ της ὁμοιω το 
διμων, τα δε πράγματα εκ των ἄρχων 
εισαι. Sir W. Hamilton says (Dis 
cussions on Philosophy, p. 60): 'Some 
philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Hera 
clitus, Alcmaeon) maintained that 
knowledge implied even a contrari 
ty of subject and object. But since the 
time of Empedocles, no opinion has 
been more universally admitted than 
that the relation of knowledge intr 
ced the analogy of existence. This analogy 
may be supposed in two potencies. 
What knows and what is known are 
either, first, similar, or second, the 
same; and if the general principle 
be true, the latter is the more philo 
sophical.' The fact is, that every act 
of knowledge is a unity of contra 
dictions. It would be absurd to deny 
that the subject is contrary to the 
object, and it would be equally 
as absurd to deny that the subject is the 
same as the object. As Empedocles 
says, the mind only knows fire by 
being fire, but, on the other hand, if, 
in knowing fire, the mind only were 
fire, and were not contrary to fire, 
then to know fire would only be to 
add fire to fire. But it is quâ 'know 
ing' that the mind is contrary to its 
object, not quâ knowing any par 
ticular object. Thus from the diver 
sity of objects we are justified in con 
ccluding a diversity in the mind. But 
we must be sure that objects are 
really different from one another in 
genus (το γενει ετερα), before we con 
clude the existence of different parts, 
faculties, or elements corresponding to 
them, else we may attribute to diffe 
rent principles in the mind phenomen 
ae that were only modifications of each 
other, and not by any means implying 
a diversity of principle.

6 λεγατον δε — έχουνος] Of these 
let one be called the 'scientific,' the 
other the 'calculative' part, for deli 
berating and calculating are the same, 
and no one deliberates about neces 
sary matter. The calenative part, 
then, is one division of the rational.' 
The psychology here is an advance in 
dogmatic clearness of statement be 
yond what we find in the writings of 
Aristotle. The terms το επιστημο 
nikov and το λογιστυκον are not opposed 
to each other in the De Anima. Λογι 
stυκον has not there taken the definite 
meaning which it wears in the present 
book. Rather it is used in a general
sense to denote 'rational.' Thus in asking how the ψυχή is to be divided, Aristotle says (De An. iii. ix. 2): 'χείν ὁ ἰδιοίκαν εὐθὺς πᾶς τε δὲι μόρα λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πᾶσα. Τόπον γὰρ τινα ἄτειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἄ τινες λέγουσι διορίζουσ ὁ λογιστικὸς καὶ θυμικὸς καὶ ἐνθυμικὸς (i.e. Plato, Republic, pp. 436—441), οἷο δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἔχουν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. Cf. 10. iii. ix. 5: ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται. 10. iii. x. 10: φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ αληθινή. Cf. Topics, v. v. 4, where in stating the various ways in which the logical property may be predicated of a substance, it is said, ἡ ἀπόλως καθάπερ ζέουν τὸ ζήν, ἡ κατ’ ἄλλο, καθάπερ ψυχής τὸ φύσμα, ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον, καθάπερ λογιστικῶς τὸ φύσμαν (φύσμαν) and λογιστικῶς being here both used most probably in a general sense for 'wisdom' and 'reason'). Again, τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν is used, not as here opposed to τὸ λογιστ., but generally. De Anim. iii. xi. 3: τὸ ὃ ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινετά ἀλλὰ μένει. However, the distinction here given is already prepared in the De Animā, and is even stated (though less dogmatically) in a place which was probably borrowed by the present writer. 10. iii. x. 2: νῦν δὲ ὁ ἐνεκά τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. Eth. Eud. 10. ii. 9: περὶ ᾗν οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδὲ ἐγχειρήσει βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἄργον. Περὶ ᾗν δὲ ἐγχειρήσεσθαι μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύ- σασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. We before observed (cf. Eth. iii. iii. 3, note) that Aristotle, in the parallel passage, did not use the terms ὑ ἐνδεχόμενα and τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα. To combine logical with psychological formulae is the characteristic of Eudemus.

II. The last chapter having divided the reason into scientific and calculative, the present chapter proceeds to bridge over the interval between the intellect and moral action. This is done by assuming three principles in man—sensation, reason, and desire. Sensation merges into the other two, and then it is shown that in purpose, the cause of action, there is the meeting point of desire and reason, not of the pure or speculative reason (answering to the 'scientific part' of the last chapter), but the practical reason aiming at an end (which answers to the 'calculative part' in the former division). Thus there are two kinds of truth, one pure, the other having a relation to the will, and 'agreeing with right desire.' This distinction is a great step towards answering the question with which the present book is concerned. Truth having been divided into pure and practical, it only remains to see the forms under which the mind deals with these two kinds, and the highest developments of the mind will be disclosed, arranged under a twofold head.

I τρία δὲ ἐστίν] Cf. Ar. De Animā, iii. x. 1: φαίνεται δὲ γε δυο ταῦτα κινοῦτα, ἡ ὕπεξις ἡ νοῦς, εἰ τις τὴν
After en дианови k.t.L. All this is a compressed result of Aristotle's discussions, De Anima, iii. x.—xi.


τὸν τὲ λόγον ἄλληθεν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀρέξιν ὀρόθην] 'The decision of the reason must be true, and the desire must be right.' The terminology here used is rather more accurate than that of Aristotle, De An. iii. x. 4: νοῦς μὲν ὁνὸς πᾶς ὀρθός: ὀρέξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθή καὶ ὁνὸς ὀρθή. Cf. Eth. iii. ii. 13, where it is said that ὀρθός is the proper epithet for purpose (i.e. as a function of the will), ἄλληθεν for the functions of the intellect.

4—5 πράξεως μὲν ὁνὸς—ἀνθρωπος] 'Now of moral action purpose is the cause (I mean the efficient cause, not the final), and the efficient cause of purpose is desire, and that reason

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I.—II.

ΠΟΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΩΝ] VI.
which takes cognisance of an end. Hence purpose can neither be separated from intellect and thought, nor from a particular state of the moral nature. Well-doing and its contrary imply thought and moral character. Now thought by itself moves nothing, only thought aiming at an end, that is, practical thought. This controls the productive thought as well, since he that produces, produces for the sake of some end, and the thing produced is not an end in and for itself, but is only an end relatively and belongs to something. But the thing done is an End-in-itself, since well-doing is an end, and this is what we desire. Hence purpose may be defined as desiring reason, or as rational desire, and such a principle as this is man. We have here a resumé of Aristotle’s views in *De Anima*, i.e. Another division of the intellect, however, is introduced, that into practical, productive, and speculative, which is to be found implied in Eth. i. i. 1, and is stated Metaphys. v. i. 5: ὅστε εἰ πάσα διάνοια ἡ πρακτικὴ ἡ ποιητικὴ ἡ θεωρητικὴ κ. τ. λ. It is here shown that the productive faculties of man are subordinate to the practical thought, since no artist produces anything purely and solely for its own sake; however much he may seem to do so, still his art as a part of his life falls under the control of his will and reason.

*diaνοία δ’ αὐτή οὖθεν κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐνεκα του* | There is a slight confusion here. Aristotle had said (De An. iii. ix. 10, iii. x. 2, iii. x. 4), that the reason dealing with ends differed from the speculative reason, that reason neither speculative nor practical was the moving cause of action (iii. ix. 10: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖθε τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλοδίκαιος νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κτιστὴν ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὖθεν νοεῖ πρακτικὸν—οὖθεν θεωρῇ τι ποιότον κ. τ. λ., and that intellect could not move anything without desire conjoined (iii. x. 4: μὴν δὲ τὸ μὲν νοῦς ὁ φαίνεται καὶ προαριστεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως, but Eudemus mixes up these points. He said that ‘thought by itself moves nothing,’ and then as if in opposition to thought by itself he puts ‘but practical thought does.’ He should have said ‘practical thought plus desire.’


οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ προαιρέτων οὐθὲν γεγονός] | ‘Now nothing that is past is over the object of purpose.’ This
assertion, with the quotation from Agathon to illustrate it, appears certainly to be a digression. The nature of purpose had been quite sufficiently explained already, especially in reference to the present context. However, to exclude the past, and circumstances which though contingent have become historical, from the sphere of deliberation, is an addition to Aristotle’s list of exclusions (Eth. ii. iii. 1—10), and on this account probably Eudemus was glad to introduce the above remarks.

III. This chapter proposes to consider the two parts of the reason (scientific and calculative) from a fresh point of view (άρξάμενοι—πάλιν). It accordingly gives a list of five modes under which the mind attains truth; namely, art, science, wisdom, philosophy, and reason. It then proceeds to give some account of science. This account will be found to be a mere centro of remarks from the logical writings of Aristotle. The chief points specified are as follows. Science deals only with necessary matter. It is demonstrative, starting from truths already known, and proceeding by means of induction or syllogism. Its premises are obtained by induction, but they must be more certain than the conclusion, else the knowledge of the conclusion will be not scientific, but merely accidental.

1 πέντε τῶν ἀρκόμενων] It seems in the highest degree probable that this list was suggested by a passage in Aristotle’s Post. Analytics (i. xxxiii. 8), where, after a discussion on the difference between science and opinion, it is said: ὅτα δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δει διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καί ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας, τὰ μὲν φυσικά τὰ δὲ θεικά θεωρίας μᾶλλον ἐστίν. It will be observed that Aristotle in this passage does not propose six terms to be distinguished from each other, but three pairs of terms which are to be separately discussed, part of them (i.e. probably the two first pairs) by psychology (φυσικῆς θεωρίας), and part of them (i.e. σοφία and φρόνησις) by ethics. Eudemus, taking up the whole list, has omitted διάνοια, which he does not distinguish from νοῦς, and has given the rest as an exhaustive division of the modes by which the mind apprehends truth. By so doing
he has made a cross division, for 

sofía does not stand apart from nous and ἐπιστήμη, but includes them, and surely so complex an idea as ‘philosophy’ ought not to be placed on the same level with the intuitions of the reason, the simplest and deepest forms of the mind. In ch. vi. § 2, however, the logical exhaustiveness of the division is made the only ground for proving that the principles of science are apprehended by reason.

υπολήψεις γάρ—διαφεύγεσθαι] 'For conception and opinion may be false.' This is suggested probably by Ar. Post. Anal. ii. xix. 7: 'Επει δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάωσιν ἔξω, αὐτὰ ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἄλλα ἀλήθεια εὑρίσκομεν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιβάλλονται τὸ φευδόν, οὐν δόξα καὶ λογίσμος, ἀλήθει δὲ ἄλλα ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, κ.τ.λ. In Ar. De. An. iii. iii. 7, ὑπάλλης is used in so general a sense for the apprehensions of the mind as to include ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις. If opposed (as here) to scientific certainty, it comes to very much the same as δόξα.

2 ἐπιστήμη μὲν—ἐπιστητήν] 'Now what science is, will be clear from the following considerations, if we wish to speak exactly and not be misled by resemblances. We all conceive that what we know is necessarily what it is—if it be so only contingently, as soon as it is out of our ken, we cannot tell whether it be so or not. Therefore the object of science is necessary matter.'

ταῖς διαφόροισιν] i.e., the various analogical and inaccurate uses of the word 'knowledge.' Ἐπιστήμη is to be defined ἀπλῶς and not καθ' ἰδιότητα, cf. Eth. vi. 4. The present passage is taken from Post. Anal. i. ii. 1: 'Επει δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάωσιν ἔξω, αὐτὰ ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἄλλα ἀλήθεια εὑρίσκομεν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιβάλλονται τὸ φευδόν, οὐν δόξα καὶ λογίσμος, ἀλήθει δὲ ἄλλα ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, κ.τ.λ. In Ar. De. An. iii. iii. 7, ὑπάλλης is used in so general a sense for the apprehensions of the mind as to include ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις. If opposed (as here) to scientific certainty, it comes to very much the same as δόξα.

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being so apprehended. But all demonstration depends on pre-existing knowledge (as we say in analytics also), for it proceeds either by induction or syllogism.

“ώσπερ λέγομεν” This is a general mode of expression, not a particular reference; some MSS. however read ἐλέγομεν. Eudemus, as we know, wrote a book on analytics (cf. Vol. I., Essay I. p. 21). In his Ethics, ii. vi. 5, he speaks, as here, generally of analytics, δῆλον δ’ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὑπὲρ ἀναγκαίων, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν. In the present passage he is borrowing, not quoting, from the opening of Aristotle’s Post. Anal. Πῶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προβο-παρχοῦσης γίνεται γνώσεως. It is the first proof of knowing a thing, to be able to impart it, cf. Metaphys. 11. i. 12: δῶς τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος τὸ δόναι δίδασκεν ἐστὶν. Hence, by association with the idea of science, διδασκαλία comes to be almost identical with demonstration, cf. Sophist. Elench. ii. 1: Ἐστὶ δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλεγόμεθα λόγων τέταρτα γένη, διδασκαλικός καὶ διδακτικός καὶ περιστατικός καὶ ἐρευνικός, διδασκαλικός μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἕκαστον μαθήματος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρυμμένου δόξων συνελαγμένοις, δὲν γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μαθηματικόν. Cf. ib. x. 11.

ή μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἐπαγγελμῖ[κ. τ. λ.] This is taken from Post. Anal. 1. i. 2: where Aristotle, having said that all demonstration depends on previous knowledge, adds that this is true with regard to the mathematices, and also in dialectical arguments, ὁµῶς δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λόγων οὔ τε διὰ συν-λογισμῶν καὶ οὐ δι’ ἐπαγγελμῖν ἀμφότερον γὰρ διὰ προγνωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνετε ὡς παρὰ ὑμιντῶν, οἱ δὲ διεικνύσα τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δήλου εἶναι τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν. What Aristotle had said of dialectical arguments, Eudemus applies to science, which he accordingly asserts to be sometimes inductive. His further assertion that the principles of deductive science are obtained by induction is inconsistent with the conclusion of ch. vi., though it agrees with Ar. Post. Anal. II. xix. 6. In fact ἐπαγγελμῖ seems to be used by Aristotle in the Post. Anal. as equivalent to that amount of experience which is the condition, not the cause, of necessary truths. Cf. ib. 1. i. 4.

4. η μὲν—ἀναλυτικὸς] ‘Science, then, is a demonstrative state of mind, with all the other qualifications which we add in analytics.’ Cf. Ar. Post. Anal. i. ii. 2: Ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικ-τικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἅμισυ καὶ γνωρι-μωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος. Aristotle, in his account of science, represents it from its objective side as a deduction of ideas rather than as a state of mind.

ὁταν γὰρ—ἐπιστήμην] ‘For a man knows when he is convinced, and is
sure of the premises; since if he is not more sure of them than of the conclusion, the knowledge which he has will be only accidental.' Taken from Post. Anal. i. ii. 1: "Επιστασθαι δὲ οίνομεθ’ ἕκαστον ἀπάλλω, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν σωματικῶν πρῶτον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κ.τ.λ. To know results without the proofs Aristotle called 'accidental' knowledge, and this mode of knowledge he attributed to the Sophists; cf. Metaphys. v. ii., &c.


Infra, ch. viii. § 6: τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν ὁ νέον, ἀλλὰ λέγονσιν.

IV. Eudemus altered the list of mental operations given by Aristotle (Post. Anal. l.c.) only by the position of νοῦς, which in first stating his list Eudemus places at the end, probably because, having separated it from διάνοια, he was uncertain about its admission; afterwards he discusses it before σοφία, as being prior to it in order of time. The list then appears in Aristotle, διάνοια νοῶς, ἑπιστήμη τέχνην, φρονήσις σοφία; in Eudemus, ἑπιστήμη, τέχνην, φρονήσις, σοφία, νοῦς (afterwards νοῦς, σοφία). This chapter, in treating of art, gives but a scanty account, apparently borrowed from different passages in the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Art, like action, belongs to the sphere of the contingent, but its difference from action is universally recognised (πιστεύομεν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ λόγως). As shown by an instance, it consists in 'a productive state of mind in harmony with a true law.' It has to do with producing and contriving the production of things that fall neither under the law of nature nor necessity. Rather art deals with the same objects as chance, by which it is often assisted.

1—2 τοῦ δ’ ἐνδεχομένου—λόγως

'Now contingent matter includes the objects both of production and action, but production and action are different. On this point even popular notions sufficiently bear us out.' With regard to ἐξωτερικόλ λόγων, cf. Eth. i. xiii. 9, and see Vol. I. Essays, Appendix b, pp. 328–332.

3 ἐπεὶ δ’—πιστεύῃ] 'But since architecture is an art, and may be defined as (δημορ) a certain state of mind rationally (μετὰ λόγου) productive, and there is no art which is not a rationally productive state of
mind, nor again any such state which is not an art: art must be the same as "productive state of mind rightly directed." The procedure here is to take a species of art, and, abstracting what is peculiar, to leave the generic conception remaining, which thus is taken as the definition of the genus.


 οὔτε ποιατί ἡ οὐ τέχνη ] This is a slight discrepancy from Aristotle, who speaks of three modes of production, art, faculty, and thought, without, however, specifying the difference between them, Metaphys. vi. vii. 3: πάσας δ' εἰδίν αἱ ποιήσεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ διανόησις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοιαῖς. Ib. x. vii. 3: ποιητικὴς μὲν γάρ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιομένῳ τῆς κινήσεως ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ τούτ' ἑστιν εἶναι τεχνῆς τις εἰς ἄλλα τις δόματι.

 4 ἐστὶ δὲ—ποιουμένῳ ] 'Now all art is about creation, and the contriving and considering how something may be created of those things whose existence is contingent, and whose efficient cause exists in the producer and not in the thing produced.' There is not any distinction intended between τεχνάζειν and θεωρεῖν. The absence of the article before θεωρεῖν shows that these belong to the same idea; they are both only an expansion of the term γένεσιν, and are not to be separated from it, as if the writer was describing different stages in the process of art. We find τεχνάζειν used by Aristotle simply in the sense of 'contriving,' Vol. i. xi. 12: ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἑπεξηγαγαν γενέσια μονοπολίας Ib. vi. vi. 8: τεχνάσατον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐθύρωρα γένοντως χρήσων.

 οὖν ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ.] Taken from Aristotle, Metaphys. x. vii. 3 (l.c.). Cf. v. i. 5: τῶν μὲν ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ νοῦς ἡ τέχνη ἡ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ πρασίνης. There is the same classification of causes here as in Eth. iii. iii. 7, into nature, necessity, chance, and the human intellect. On Aristotle's conception of nature, see Vol. I. Essay V, pp. 221-6.

 5 καὶ τρόπον τινὰ—τέχνη ] 'And in a way chance and art are concerned with the same objects.' Eudemus, taking this observation from Aristotle, illustrates it, after his own fashion, with a quotation from Agathon. Cf. Metaphys. vi. vii. 4: τούτων (ποιήσεων) δὲ τινὲς γίγνονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπληρῷς ὑπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ φύσεως γεγονόμενοι. Cf. Ib. vi. ix. 1, where the following question is started: ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις διὰ τι ἡ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνη καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, ὅπως ἄγεια, τὰ δ' οὖ, οὖν όξια. The answer is, that there is a
principle of self-movement in the matter to be operated on in the one case, but not in the other. That the devices of art are often suggested, and its results assisted, by chance, need not be confirmed by examples; but while art is thus assisted by chance, on the other hand, it is the main object of art to eliminate chance. Cf. *Metaphys.* i. i. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνης ἐποίησε, ὡς φησὶν Πέλας, ἀρθὸς λέγων, ἡ δὲ ἄπειρα τύχην. The theory of art is but meagre in the writings of Aristotle. His great defect with regard to the subject is, his not having entered into the philosophy of the imagination. Yet still he gives us remarks of far greater interest than what is contained in the brief *resumé* of Eudemus, cf. especially the saying, *Metaphys.* vi. vii. 4, that 'all things are done by art, of which the idea exists in the mind,' ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίνεται διὸν τὸ εἴδοσ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, and add *Post. Anal.* ii. xix. 4: εἰ δὲ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἰρμηνευόμενος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ τὰ πολλά, δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐν ἐνδεικτικῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τέχνης ἄρχῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃς, εἰὼν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, εἰὼν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὅν, ἐπιστήμῃς.

V. Wisdom (φρονήσις) is next discussed. Its nature we learn from the use of the word 'wise' (φόνομαι) to denote those who take good counsel with regard to the general ordering of life. This subject admits of no scientific demonstration; again, it is different from art. We see the quality of 'wisdom' exemplified in such men as Pericles, who know what is good for themselves and others. This knowledge and insight is preserved by temperament, which hence gets its name (σωφροσύνη). Art admits of degrees of excellence, but 'wisdom' does not. Voluntary error in art is better than non-voluntary, but the reverse in 'wisdom,' which thus is shown to be more than a mere quality of the intellect,—it becomes part of ourselves (φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστι λήθη).

1 perὶ δὲ φρονήσεως] From Socrates to Eudemus we may trace a distinct progress with regard to the doctrine of φρονήσις. Socrates said 'virtue is knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη), Plato first 'virtue is,' afterwards 'virtue implies wisdom' (φρονήσις). Cf. *Men.* p. 98 D: διδασκόντων ἔδοξεν εἰναί, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἄρετή, *Theat.* p. 176 B: ὁμολογοὺς δὲ (τῇ θείᾳ) δίκαιον καὶ δικαιούμενον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. *Phaedo,* p. 69 λ. ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ τὸ νῦμσια ὀρθόν, ἀνδὶ δὲ ἐπότα ταύτα καταλάμβανε, φρόνησις, καὶ τοῦτον μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ἀνάμειναι τὸ καὶ πιστασία μὲν τῷ ὑντὶ γὰρ, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐξουσία τῇ ἄλλῃ ἄρετῇ γὰρ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσαγροφμένων καὶ ἀπογιγμομένων.
tinas legeomean tous Phronimous. Doekei de Phronimou einai

to dynasbhai kalos bouleutasasbhai peri ta auti agha kai

smiferesan, ou kata meros, oin poia proes onyia o

isxun, alla poia proes to e8 xin. Smyeion 0' oti kai tais

tous peri ti Phronimous legeomev, than proes telesi ti ston

baion e8 logosonstai, ou mou esti tekhy. Oste kai olous

an e8i Phronimos o bouleustikos. Bouleustai 0' oudeis peri 3

cal hdonov kai fobanov kai taiv allon

pantov twn toioiton xerizomeve de

phronhseov kai allapatomev anati alla-

lon, me skiafigia tis yi toiothi

ereti kai to vnti androsothi. This

'wisdom,' however, he defined as the

contemplation of the absolute (Phaedo,
p. 79 in), and thus identified the

moral consciousness with philosophy

Aristotle, as we have already seen
(Post. Anal. iii. xxxiii. 8, quoted on ch.
iii. 1), proposed as a subject for dis-

cussion the distinction between phron-

sis and sophia. With him phronesis was

gradually coming to assume its dis-

tinctive meaning as practical wisdom;
but this was not always clearly

marked. Cf. Topics, v. vi. 10, where it

is said to be the essential property of

phronesis (wisdom) to be the highest

condition of the reasoning faculty (to

loogistikov), just as it is of temperance
to be the highest condition of the

appetitive part. In another place of

the Topics (iv. ii. 2) it is incidentally

mentioned that some think phronesis
to be both a virtue and also a science,

but that it is not universally conceded
to be a science. Doekei gar einois h

phronesis argeti te kai episstima einai,

kal oudesteron tov genon ou' oudesteron

periexebai. Oi mou ond pantov te

syxheristai tivn phronewn episstima

eivai. In the Politics, iii. iv. 17, it

is said to be the only virtue properly

belonging to a ruler. 'H de phronesis

axountos tous argeti moune. Tas gar

.addAll eiseke evangkai oin covvas kai
taiv arxhineov kai taiv arxhntov.

'Arxhineov de ge oin estin arethi

phronesis, alla doxa alaphi. Thus it

is used for practical wisdom, but in a

broad general sense, with reference to

state affairs rather than to individual

life, implying, however, an absolute

consciousness as opposed to alaphi

doza. Frequently Aristotle uses phro-
nesis simply to denote 'thought' or

'wisdom,' without reference to its

sphere. Cf. Eth. i. vi. 11, viii. 6, 

&c. Finally, it appears in its dis-

ctinutive sense, De An. i. ii. 9. 'Anaxa-

goras says that all animals possess

nois, they certainly do not all possess
equally the reason that gives "wis-

dom."' Oi phainetai 0' de ge kata phro-
nesis legeomenos nois paoi orizonte

eparkhein. Ethet. i. ix. 13: phronesis

0' estin arethi dianovs, kai 0' e8

bouleuasian deninastei peri aganov kai

kakon tivn epimevov eis eideiavn

Eth. x. viii. 3, where there is a con-

trast between the life of contempla-
tion and of practical virtue, phronesis

is spoken of as inseparably connected

with the latter, while the happiness

of contemplation by the pure reason

is something apart. In the present

book we have the Eudimian expo-
sition and development of Aristotle's

theory, which entirely contrasts phro-

nesis with sophia, and limits the

former to the regulation of individual

life.

3 Bouleustai 0' oudeis A verbal
tων ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, ουδὲ τῶν μη ἐνδεχόμενων αὐτῷ πράξει. οὕτω εἰπέρ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὡν ὁ ἄρχαὶ ἐνδεχόμενται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τοῦτον μὴ ἐστὶν ἀπώδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδεχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν θυελλόσωσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων), οὐκ ἂν εἶ ἡ Φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδεχεται το πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη ὅτι ἂν ἄλλο το γένος +πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτῇ ἐνια ἐξίν ἀληθῆ μετά λόγου πρακτικῆν περὶ τα ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· τής μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἔτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ 5πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἰ ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἡ ἐπιραξία τέλος. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φρονίμους οἰκεῖα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτώς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτως ἡγομένα τοὺς ἰοκομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς. ἐνδεχεται καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσά-6γορέουμεν τῷ ὑμνητὶ, ἀισ ἱσώντων τὴν Φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπασαν ὑπόληψιν repetition of ch. i. § 6. Cf. Elkh. Eud. ii. x. 9 (l. c.). 4 τῆς μὲν γὰρ] A repetition of ch. ii. § 5. 5 διὰ τοῦτο—πολιτικοὺς] 'Hence we consider such men as Pericles "wise," because they have a faculty of perceiving what is good for themselves and good for men in general. And we attribute the same character to those who have a turn for the management of households and of state affairs.' On φρόνησις as a quality for the ruler of a state, cf. Ar. Pol. iii. iv. 17 (l. c.), and on the connexion established by Eudemus between wisdom for the individual, for the family, and for the state, see below, ch. viii. § 1, note. ἐνδεχεται—ὑπόληψιν] 'Hence it is that we call temperance by its present name (σωφροσύνη) as preserving wisdom (σωφροσύνα τὴν φρόνησιν); and this is the kind of conception which it preserves,' i.e., a moral conception (περὶ το πρακτὸν) about the right and wrong, or, as it is here put, about 'the end' (τὸ οὖν ἔνσεια) of actions. The false etymology here given comes from Plato's Cratylus, p. 411 d, where, after a sportive derivation of φρόνησις, that of σωφροσύνη is added: Ἡ φρόνησις· φοράς γὰρ ἐστι καὶ βοῦν νόησις. Εἶ ὅ ἂν καὶ ὑπνήσαι Ὑπολα-βεῖν φορᾶς· ἀλλ' οὖν περὶ γη τὸ φέρεισθαι ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ γνώμη παντάπασι δηλοὶ νοεῖν σκέψει καὶ νόησειν· τὸ γὰρ νομαί καὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν ταῦτα, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἀυτὸ ἢ νόησι τοῦ νέου ἐστιν ἐστίν τὸ δὲ νέα εἶναι τὰ ὑπάτα σημαίνει γνόμομεν αἰτι εἰσὶ· τοιοῦτον οὖν ἐφείσησαι τὴν ψυχὴν μνημεία τὸ ὑμνή μὲν ὁ θείος τὴν νόησιν, οὐ γάρ νόησι τοῖς ἀρχαῖον ἐκαλείτο, ἀλλ' ἀυτὶ τοῦ ἢ ἢ ἐθείλει λέγειν διὸ νέον προσάγω σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὐ νῦν δὴ ἐσκέψει, φρόνησις. Of course σωφροσύνη merely means 'sound-mindedness.' On the ἄρχαι τῶν πρακτῶν see below, ch. xii. § 10, note, and Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 217— 218.
It must be added that while in art there are degrees of excellence, there are none in wisdom; and while in art he that errs voluntarily is the better, he that does so in wisdom is the worse, as is the case with the virtues also. Therefore it is plain that wisdom is a sort of virtue, and not an art. *Httou, as contrasted with *aiperotéres, stands for *htton aipers. The phrase *art of *excellent occurs again ch. vii. § 1. The present passage probably has reference to *Topics, iv. ii. 2 (L.C.), δοκει γάρ ἐνιοῦ ἡ φρόνσις *arêtē τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη *einaî, where *epistēmē answers to *excellence in the place before. To say that there are no degrees of excellence in *wisdom* gives it an absolute character, just as it is said that there are degrees in the understanding, but not in the reason. Common language would admit of degrees in wisdom. Cf. Ar. *Metaphys. 1. i. 2: διὰ τούτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μαθηματεύειν *éstin. De An. i. ii. 9, L.C. But here *wisdom* is considered as something ideal, just as afterwards, ch. xiii., § 6, it is said to imply all the virtues. *ekan *amartánav.] Eudemus seems often inclined to betake himself to a small antagonism against Platonic doctrines; whether in detail this was original, or borrowed from oral remarks or lost writings of Aristotle, we cannot tell. Cf. *Eth. v. ix. 16, v. xi. 9, vi. xiii. 3, &c. Here there seems to be an allusion to the *Socratico-Platonic paradox which forms the subject of the *Hippias Minor, that to do injustice voluntarily was better than doing it involuntarily (see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 125). Here the contrary is assumed with regard to *wisdom,* and the conclusion drawn is, that wisdom is not an art, in other words (as is said more distinctly afterwards), not merely intellectual. If wisdom were merely intellectual, then voluntary error in action would not be error at all, because knowledge would remain behind unimpaired; but if wisdom is a state of the will as well as of the intellect, then voluntary error, as implying a defect of the will, is the worst kind of error. The worst kind of error, morally, is thought to be sinning against knowledge, knowing the right and doing the wrong, which some philosophers deny to be possible. See below, Book viii. ch. iii.

8 δυνώ δ᾽—*éstin] *And as there
There are two parts of man's nature which possess reason, wisdom will be the highest state of one of these, namely, the opinative part, for opinion and wisdom both deal with the contingent. We must add that it is not merely an intellectual state (ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου), the proof of which is that while such states admit forgetfulness, wisdom does not.' To δοξαστικοῖ answers to το λογιστικόν, ch. i. § 6. That opinion deals with contingent matter, we are told, Ar. Post. Anal. 1. xxxiii. 2: λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν ἡ ἴδεις, εὐδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλος ἔχειν. After associating opinion with wisdom, the writer separates them just as Aristotle separates προσερέσει from δόξα, Eth. iii. ii. 11. In the present passage there is a great want of clearness. We are told that wisdom is an excellence, or highest state, of a part of the intellect. Hence we should naturally conclude that it was λόγος τις (cf. ch. xiii. § 5), but the formula throughout used is, that wisdom is ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου. This formula is itself an inaccuracy, since it implies not a state of intellect, but a state of the will under the law of the intellect (see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 39). But on the top of this another inaccuracy is laid, for we are now told that wisdom is not simply a ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου, by which the writer evidently means to say, that wisdom is not a mere state of the intellect. It may be indeed true that the moral intellect cannot be separated from the will and personality (cf. ch. xii. § 10), but what is to be complained of is, that the formula used for expressing all the truths connected with this subject are so very imperfect. Μετὰ λόγου is used in the present place probably to mean nothing more than 'rational.' Cf. Eth. Eud. viii. ii. 3: οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἐχεῖ λόγον διὰ τί οὐτως πράττει. It is used differently ch. iv. § 3, and again ch. vi. § 1.

σημεῖον ὅτι λόθην] Cf. Eth. i. x. 10: where it is said that 'the moments of virtuous consciousness in the mind are more abiding than the sciences,' and see note. Τὸ φρόνησις in the Platonic and general sense, of course forgetfulness might attach. Cf. Laws, p. 732 b: ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστιν ἐπιρρόη φρονήσεως ἀπελειπότητι.

VI. This chapter treats of reason, but goes no further into the subject than as follows,—science implies principles, and we cannot apprehend these principles by science itself nor by three out of the other four modes of mind which give us truth. It therefore remains, on the grounds of exhaustive division, that reason must be the organ by which we apprehend first principles.

On examination it will be found that the contents of the chapter are borrowed almost verbatim from Aristotle's Post. Analyt. ii. xix. 7: Ἐπεί δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξεών, αἱ ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδε-
V.—VII.] 

IΣΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΥΜΙΩΝ] VI. 163

καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως, εἰσὶ δὲ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γαρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὕτω ἄν ἐπιστήμη εἰς οὕτω τέχνη οὕτω Φρόνησις: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτὸν, αἱ δὲ ταὐτάνων οὕτω εἰς τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλας ἑξεις. οὖδὲ ὡς ὑπερεις τούτων ἐστὶ τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ οἷόν ἐστι ἀπὸ—

νοσιπέτου δύομα πρὶν τα μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ὣς καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλας ἑξεις, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τρίων μηδὲν ἐνδεχεσθαι εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάταις 7

χορταὶ τὸ ψεόδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμὸς, ἀλήθη δ' ἐτέραν ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμην ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῶς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδειξεων γνωριμωτέρας, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἀπαίσια μετὰ λόγου ἐστι, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἄν εἶπε, ἀπελ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθεστερον ἐνδεχεσθαι εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ἢ νοῶς, νοοῦ δὲ εἰς τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὃτι ἀποδειξεῖς ἀρχής οὐκ ἀπόδειξε, ὡςτε οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμης. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἐξομεν ἀλῆθες, νοοῦ δὲ εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἀρχής.

Aristotle argues that principles must be apprehended either by science or reason; they cannot be apprehended by science, therefore they must be by reason. Eudemus, it will be observed, follows this mode of arguing, only he applies it to all the five organs of truth, which he had before arbitrarily laid down as an exhaustive list. In following implicitly the passage above cited, he has ignored for the time the earlier part of the same chapter, in which Aristotle attributes the origin of universals rather to induction; ib. § 6: Ἀδήλου δὲ οὗτοι τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῆ γνωρίζεις ἀναγκαίων, καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀληθής ὡς τὸ καθάλου ἔποιεῖ. Also he is at variance with his own statement above, ch. iii. § 3. μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη] 'For science implies inference.' This is evidently the meaning of the present sentence, taken as it is from Post. Anal. l.c. Λόγος is frequently used to denote 'inference.' Cf. ch. viii. § 9: δ' μὲν γὰρ νοὸς τῶν ῥημάτων, ὡς οὖν ἐστι λόγος: xi. 4. τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῶν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, etc.

οὐδὲ δὴ—ἐστιν] 'Nor of course does philosophy apprehend these principles, for it is the part of the philosopher to possess demonstration about some things.' It need hardly be said that this is a very poor ground for establishing the point in question.

VII. What 'philosophy' is may be learnt from the use of the word σοφός, as applied to the arts. It denotes 'nicety,' 'subtlety,' 'exactness.' Philosophy, then, is the most subtle of the sciences. It embraces not only deductions, but also principles. It is 'a science of the highest objects with the head on.' It is above all practical wisdom and science.
are manifold, relative, and changeable. It is higher, as the cosmos is higher than man. Philosophy and not wisdom was the reputed property of men like Thales and Anaxagoras, who were thought to know strange and out-of-the-way, but useless things.

On the other hand, wisdom (φρόνησις) is good counsel about human things. It implies knowledge of particulars as well as of universals. Indeed, the knowledge of the particular gained by experience is its most important element, though it includes the universal also, and in its own sphere, namely, that of action, it is supreme and paramount (ἀρχητεκτονική).

1—2 τὴν δὲ σοφίαν—σοφία] 'The term σοφία we apply in the arts to those who are the most finished artists, as, for instance, we call Phidias a consummate (σοφός) sculptor, and Polycletus a consummate statury, and in this application we mean nothing else by σοφία than the highest excellence in art. But we conceive that some men possess the quality in a general and not a particular way—'nor in aught else accomplished,' as Homer says in the Margites—

'Not skilled to dig or plough the gods have made him, Nor in aught else accomplished.'

We may argue, then, that σοφία, in the sense of philosophy, is the most consummate of the sciences.' On the meaning of ἄριστεια as applied to the arts, and on the transition of meaning when it is applied to philosophy, see Eth. i. vii. 18, note, and ii. vi. 9, note.

3 ὡστ' εἰς—τιμωτάτων] 'So that philosophy must be the union of reason and science, as it were a science of the highest objects with its head on.' This excellent definition does not appear to have anything in Aristotle exactly answering to it. There are two chief places where Aristotle treats of σοφία, namely, Metaphysics, Book τ. i.–ii., and Ἰβ. Book χ. ch. i.–vii. Metaphys. Book χ. opens by showing an ascending scale in knowledge,—perception, experience, art, and the theoretic sciences, or philosophy. Of philosophy we are told that it is the science of first causes, it is most universal, most exact, and most entirely sought for its own sake, &c.
Philosophy begins in wonder, wonder at first about things near at hand, afterwards about the sun, moon, and stars, and the creation of the universe (Ib. § 9). It ends in certainty and a sense of the necessity of certain truths (Ib. § 16). We may see that this account is perfectly general—it does not distinguish in philosophy between mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. It even attributes a practical scope to philosophy, saying that philosophy, by taking cognisance of the good, determines the object of the other sciences (Ib. § 7), ἀρχικωτάτης δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ύποτευκτονίας, ἢ γνωρίζοντα τίνος ἕνεκεν ἐστὶ πρακτικῶν ἕκαστον· τωτό 6' ὢστ' τάγαθ' ἐν ἐκάστοις, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσι πάση. From a certain immaturity thus shown, it would be difficult to believe that the account in Metaphys. Book I was written after that in the present chapter of the Ethics. In Metaphys. Book x. the subject is taken up anew, and treated much more fully. Physics, practical science, and mathematics, are now separated from philosophy proper. Ib. i. 4: οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἰρημέναι αἰτίαις τὴν ἔργωμεν ἐπιστήμην βετόν. Οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οὐ ἐνεντοιούθην γάρ τάγαθαν, τούτῳ 6' ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς οὕσιν ἐν κυβισε. Ib. i. 7: οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά—χαριστῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐδέν. These, however, are branches of philosophy, Ib. iv. 3: οὐδὲ καὶ ταύτην (τὴν φυσικὴν) καὶ τὴν μαθηματικὴν ἐπιστήμην μέρη τῆς σοφίας εἶναι βετέρον.
4 εί δ' ὅτι βελτίστον—συνέστηκεν' 'And if it be said that man is the best of the animals, this will make no difference, for there are besides other things fur diviner in their nature than man, such as, to quote the most obvious instance, the parts out of which by which the symmetry of the heavens is composed.' On the Aristotelian view of man's position in the scale of dignity in the universe, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 226-9. On Aristotle's doctrine of the divine nature of the stars, &c., cf. De Coelo, i. ii. 9: 'Ἐκ τε δὴ τοῦτων φανερῶν ὅτι πέριφερέ 

κύκλῳ ἄνει. Cf. Metaphys. xi. viii. 5: 'Ὅτε γὰρ τῶν ἀστρῶν φύσις ἀλήθεις οὐδέ 

κοινωνία τείχος τοῦτο ἀπαντῶν (this has given rise to the notion of the 'quintessence'). Ith. i. ii. 11, which repeats the same. Ith. ii. iii. 2: Ἐκαστῷ ὤσιν, ὃν εἶτιν ἔργον, ἐνεκα τοῦ ἔργου. Θεοῦ δ' ἐνεργεία ἀκακαιρον, τοῦτο δ' ὤστιν κακό ἀλήθεις. Ὡστ' ἀνάγκη τῇ θεῷ κύκλῳ ἀλήθεις ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπει δ' ὅ ῥυθμὸν τοιοῦτον (σῶμα γὰρ τεθεῖν) διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ ἐγκύκλιον σῶμα, δ' φύσει κινεῖται
beforehand, and having sold at his own price, polla χρήματα συλλέγεται ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅτι ὀρθῶν ἔστι πλούσίων τῶν \[ϕιλοσόφων, ἄν \[βουλεύσαι, ἀλλ' οὐ \[τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ δ' σουδάζουσιν.

6 βουλεύεται θ' ὀδηγεῖ] A repetition for the third time of the same remark, cf. ch. i. § 6, ch. v. § 3.

7 Owing to its practical character, wisdom (φρονήσις) necessarily implies a knowledge of particulars. The particular, indeed, would seem for action the more important element, as appears also in other things, if we compare science with empirical knowledge.

did καὶ ἐνιαυτοὶ διδαχόμενοι] Cf. Αρ. \[Μετ. 1. i. 7—8 (whence this passage may probably be borrowed), πρὸς μὲν \[οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης ὀφθὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπί- τυγχάνοντας δρόμων τῶν ἐμπειρίων τῶν ἑνεν τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχοντων. Αὐτὸν θ' ὅτι ημὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ γνώσεως, θ' δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν εἰσιν.

VIII. This chapter fulfils a promise made before in the Eudemian Ethics (1. viii. 18), by distinguishing wisdom from other modifications of the same practical thought, namely, economy and the various forms of politics. This distinction would at first sight tend to reduce wisdom to mere egotism (§ 3: δοκεῖ μᾶλλον' εἰσιν ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐνα. § 4: τὸ ἀτρι' εἰδέναι), and thus to isolate the individual within himself. In order to obviate this, the writer brings forward arguments to show that the welfare of the individual is bound up with that of the family and the state (§ 4). He urges the difficulty of knowing one's own interest, hence concluding that wisdom is no mere instinct of selfishness. Wisdom implies a wide experience, on which account boys
cannot attain to it, no more than they
can to philosophy, though they are often
clever in mathematics (§§ 5—6).
Wisdom is a sort of deduction with a
universal and a particular element
(§ 7), and yet we must distinguish it
from science on this very account,
that it deals with particulars (§ 8).
It is the opposite to reason, which is
of first principles, while wisdom is
rather an intuition of particular facts
(analogous to apprehending a mathe-
matical figure). At all events, one
form of wisdom is of this character.

1—3 ἕστι δὲ—διάκωστικήν] 'Now
polities and wisdom are really the
same faculty of mind, though they
form quite distinct conceptions. Wis-
dom dealing with the state is divided
into—first, legislation, which is the
master-spirit as it were; and secondly,
polities in detail, which is practical as
being deliberative (for a 'measure' is
like the practical application of a
general principle) and which usurps
the common name of polities; hence
too they who are concerned with par-
ticular measures alone get the name of
politicians, for these alone act, like
workmen under a master. Just so
that appears to be especially wisdom
which is concerned with the individ-
ual self. And this kind usurps the
common name of wisdom, while the
other kinds I have alluded to may be
specified as—first, economy; second,
legislation; and third, polities (in the
restricted sense), which may be sub-
divided into the deliberative and the
judicial.' This distinction was pro-
mised before, Eth. End. i. viii. 8 :
"οὕτως τούτων ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸν
τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτικόν. Τότε
δ' ἦστι τὸ ἐπί τὸν κυρίαν πασῶν. Αὕτη
δ' ἦστι πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ
φρόνησις. Διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὕτη οἱ
ἐξεις πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰναὶ
πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἰ διαφέρουσιν,
ὑστέρον λεκτέων. It would appear
that Eudemus by a sort of afterthought
united the conception of φρόνησις,
which was developed later, to that of
πολιτική to which Aristotle had as-
signed the apprehension of the chief
good for man (cf. Eth. i. ii. 5). But
in so doing he had to bring together
two different things; for φρόνησις was
a psychological term expressing a
faculty of the mind, but πολιτικὴ was
merely one of the divisions of the
sciences. In order to make them con-
mensurate, Eudemus alters the signi-
fication of πολιτική. He treats it as a
state of mind (ἐξεις), as a mode of
φρόνησις, dealing with the state either
universally or in details. From the
same later point of view he adds also
οἰκονομικὴ; cf. Αr. Pol. i. iii. 1 : 'Επει
δὲ φανερὸν οἱ ἑαυτοὶ μορίας ἡ πόλις
συνείστηκαν, ἀναγκάσθηκαν περὶ οἰκονομιας εἰπεῖν
πρότερον, &c.

2 ὅς τοίχατον] The φύσιμα or
particular measure is here compared
to the minor term in a syllogism, i. e.
it constitutes the application of a
On the use of ἔσχατον in this
purely technical and logical sense, cf.
§§ 8—9: Αr. Met. x. i. 9: πᾶς γὰρ
λόγος καὶ πάσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου
The classification here intended is as follows,—φρόνησις or wisdom being first a general term and including politics with the other faculties mentioned, and second a special kind contrasted with the other faculties—

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<th>About the family</th>
<th>About the State</th>
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4 εἰδος μὲν οὖν—πολιτείας] 'Now it must be considered a species of knowledge to know one's own interest, but this is widely different (from true wisdom). A man who knows his own concerns and occupies himself with these is commonly thought wise, while politicians are thought meddlesome fellows, and hence Euripides wrote:—

Small wisdom was it in me to aspire,
When well I might, mixed with the common herd,
Enjoy a lot full equal with the best.
But ah! how full of vanity is man!
The restless meddling spirits in the state.

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Are gaped at still and made the country’s gods.

Men with these selfish principles seek their own advantage, and this, they consider, is what they have to do. From this notion the idea has grown that they are the wise. And yet, perhaps, the welfare of the individual is inseparable from the regulation of the household and from the existence of a state.'

τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι] Fritzsche reads τὸ τὰ αὐτῷ with the authority of two MSS., adding 'Ceterum in hac quoque praefacta orationis brevitate qui multum Eudemi Moralia diurnā nocturnāque manu volutavit Eudemi stilum agnoscat necesse est.'
αὐτὸν εἶδος καὶ διατρίβων φρόνμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες: διὸ Εὐριτίδης
πῶς εὖ ἔν χρονικῷ, ὁ παρὴν ὑπεραγμόνως ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἥμισυμείῳ στρατοῦ ἰσον μετασχεῖν;
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πρᾶσσοντας πλέον...

ξητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῦς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτως τοῦτο θεῖν πράττειν. ἐν ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυσε τὸ τούτους φρόνμος εἶναι· καὶ οὕς οὐκ ἦστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ ὁικονομίας οὕς ἄνευ πολιτείας· έτι ὅθε τὰ αὐτοὺ πῶς ἀεὶ διηνίκειν, ἄληθον καὶ σκεπτεῖν. σημεῖον ὁ εἶστι τοῦ εἰρή-
μένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νόεῖ καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνμος ὁ οὐ δοκεῖ γίνε-
σθαι. αἰτίαν ὁ ἐτὶ τῶν καὶ ἔκαστά ἐστὶν ἡ φρονήσις, ὁ γίνεται γνώμιμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος ὁ ἐμπειρὸς οὐκ ἔστιν·
πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὲ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἀν, σοφὸς δ' ἡ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἡ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δ' ἀφαιρέσειως

Εὐριτίδης] In the Philoctetes; the later lines are thus filled up by Wagner, Frgm. Eur. p. 401:—

ἰσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ γαίρει ἃς ἄνθρωποι σῶς μὲν περισσοῦς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον τιμῶμεν ἄνθρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.

The Scholastix and Paraphrast both conjecture Ζεὺς μυστὶ to govern περισσοῦς. This would give no metre, and only a very inferior sense.

4—5 ἔτι—γίνεσθαι] 'Moreover the directing one's own affairs is by no means simple, it is a subject for much consideration. In proof whereof we may allege that while boys learn geometry and mathematics, and become clever in such things, no boy seems to attain to "wisdom."' The writer is arguing against the identification of 'wisdom' with an instinct of selfishness. If it were so simple, why should not boys possess it? διὸτι is for δι' τι, as in Eth. Evol. vii. x. 20: Αἰτίων δὲ τοῦ μαχαθίαν, διότι καλλών μὲν ἡ θεῖκα φίλια, ἀναγκασκήτηρ ἢ ἡ χρησίμια. Cf. Ar. Meteor. iii. iii. 5: Χριστιανὸν δὲ τούτου διότι ἐνεπείδης γίνεται τὰ ἄνεμος ἄδει, ἢ κυρία γίνεται διάσπασις. Πλ. i. xiii. 23: Τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀφείλειν ἔχειν τὰς παρὰς μαυρουρίδι τῷ τῷ ἐννοίᾳ ἐπ' ἀλλόγον καὶ κατὰ μικρὰν ἐκ πολλῶν νοτίδων διαδίδοσιν δ' τότε καὶ γίνεται οὕτως αἱ παρὰς τῶν ποταμῶν.

ὁ σοφὸς δ' ἡ φυσικὸς οὖ' 'But not a metaphysician or physical philosop-

herr. Σαφὸς is here used in a distinct sense, 'philosopher,' par excellence, with a science above physics.
and mathematics, cf. ch. vii. § 3, note.

ή ὁτι—ἀδήλου] 'The reason surely is that the former matters (i.e. mathematics) are abstract, while the principles of the latter (physics and philosophy) are got by experience; thus boys repeat truths of the latter kind, without being really convinced of them; while the nature of the other subjects is easy to comprehend.'

di' ἀφαρέσεως] The form in Aristotle is either ὑν ἀφαρέσει or οὐ ἀφαρέσεως. He constantly applies these terms to denote the mathematics. The locus classicus on this subject is Metaphys, x. iii. 7: Καθέπερ δ' ὁ μαθηματικός περί τὰ ἢ ἀφαρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται, περιέλθῃ γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθήτα θεωρεῖ, οὐδὲν βάρος καὶ κοψά- τητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τούτων, έτι δὲ καὶ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς αἰσθήτας εναπτώσεις, μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ πολὺν καὶ συνεχές, κ.τ.λ. Cf. De Celo, iii. i. 11: διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἢ ἀφαρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἑκ προσθέ- σεις. De Animæ, iii. vii. 10: οὗτω τὰ μαθηματικὰ οὐ κεχωρισμένα ἢς κεχωρι- σμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ ἑκείνα.

πιστεύωσι] Cf. ch. iii. § 4, note, and Eth. viii. iii. 3: οἶ πρώτων μαθητές συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἵσται δ' οὕτω.

7 Another argument to prove the complex and difficult character of 'wisdom' is that it implies a kind of syllogism, wherein both the major premiss and the minor equally admit of error.

τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὑδατα φαῦλα] This was probably a medical notion of the day. Cf. Problems, i. xiii. where a similar superstition is maintained: 

Διά τί τοῦ τὰ ὑδατα μεταβαλλειν νοοῦδες φαιν ἐλυν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄρα οὖ ῃ— 

ὑδατος μὲν πολλὰ εἴδη ἐστὶ καὶ διάφορα καθ' αὐτὰ, ἄρος δὲ ὀθ, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτο αὐτίνιν.

8 ὁτι δ'—τοιοῦτον] 'But (though implying a syllogism) it is plain that wisdom is not science, for it deals with the particular, as we have said, the action being of this kind.'

9 ἀντικείμενοι—ἐδοξο] 'To reason, indeed, it forms the opposite pole; for while reason deals with those terms which are above all inference, wisdom on the other hand deals with the particular, which is below demonstration, and is apprehended by perception; not the perception of the separate senses, but analogous to that faculty by which we perceive that the immediate object presented to us in mathematics is a triangle. For on this side also demonstration must cease. However it is rather this particular mode of wisdom which is a perception, the other presents a different form.'

ἀντικειμενοι μεν δη τη νυ.] Having
alluded to the syllogistic nature of wisdom, the writer seems to have been reminded to distinguish it from science; and thus, having before (ch. v. § 8: ch. vii. § 6) contrasted it with art and philosophy, he is led on to finish the round by placing it in contrast with reason.

οὐχ ἢ τῶν ἰδιών, ἀλλὰ οὐχ ἀισθανόμεθα. This is the same as Aristotle’s famous distinction between the ‘separate senses’ and the ‘common sense.’ His own words are clear on the point, cf. De Anim, ii. vi. 2: Λέγω δ’ ἰδιον μὲν (ἀισθήσει) ὅ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐτέρα ἀισθῆσαι; καὶ περὶ ὅ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπαθήθηναι, οἷον ὅφις χρῆματος καὶ ἀκοὴ φόρου καὶ γεύσις χυμοῦ. —Τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἰδια ἐκάστου, κοινά δὲ κινήσεις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος: τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα αὐθεντικὴ ἐστὶν ἰδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσας καὶ γὰρ ἄφθα κινήσεις τίς ἐστὶν ἀισθήτη καὶ ὑφει. It will be seen that figure (σχῆμα) is one of the objects of the ‘common sense,’ the text gives an instance of this the perception of a triangle. In De An. iii. i. 6, Aristotle adds ‘unity’ to the list of ‘common sensibles,’ but he reduces them all to modifications of the perception of motion: τῶν γὰρ πάντα κινήσεις αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει. “Ὅστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γὰρ τι τὸ σχῆμα. Τὸ δ’ ἱρέμον τῷ μὴ κινεῖται: δ’ ἄριθμός τῇ ἀπαθώς τοῦ συνεχοῦς, κ.τ.λ. He admits (De An. ii. vi. 4) that ‘common sensibles’ can scarcely be said to be apprehended by sense at all, τῶν δὲ καθ’ αὐτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ίδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητά, cf. Eth. iii. i. 6, where it is said these are apprehended ac-

cidentally or concomitantly by the senses. This is surely the true view; we see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object. It would follow then that the senses cannot really be separated from the mind; the senses and the mind each contribute an element to every knowledge. Aristotle’s doctrine of κοινε ἀισθήσεως would go far, if carried out, to modify his doctrine of the simple and innate character of the senses, e.g. sight (cf. Eth. ii. i. 4), and would prevent its absolute collision with Berkeley’s Theory of Vision. On the general subject of κοινος. αἰσθήσεως, see Sir W. Hamilton, Reid’s Works, pp. 828–830.

ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἐσχάτον τρίγωνον] This has been frequently understood to mean that ‘the ultimate or simplest possible figure is a triangle.’ But the Paraphrast does not so explain it; his words are τοῦτον δὲ τὸ τρίγωνον καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γινώσκοντι τρίγωνον, κ.τ.λ. And referring to Ar. Post. Analyl. i. 4, we find exactly this instance given of a particular knowledge, the result of observation, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσλ. ὀρθάς ὀσμ., προφέρει ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικλιστῷ τρίγωνῳ ἐστὶ, ἀμα ἐπαγγέλονς ἐγνώσις. The term ἐσχάτου is used in the very next line: ἐνίων γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρίγωνον ἡ μαθήσει ἐστι, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἐσχάτον γνωρίζεται. It is true that in different places Aristotle uses ἐσχάτον in different senses, as denoting with various applications
VIII.—IX. HOIKÔN [EYΔIHMÎWÔN] VI.

The end of a series, thus cf. De An. iii. x. 2, where it means ‘final cause,’ Eth. iii. iii. 11, ‘the last step in analysis;’ Metaph. vii. iii. 6, ‘matter,’ &c. But in the place before us tò ἐνοχατον has been already appropriated to the logical meaning of ‘particular,’ ‘minor term,’ ‘immediate truth,’ cf. § 2 and § 3.

στήσεται γὰρ καθε[1] “For on that side too (i. e. in dealing with an object of the sense as well as an intuition of reason) demonstration must stop.” ἰστασθαι is a common logical form, it is opposed to προΐναι εἰς ἀπειρον, and is frequently impersonal, cf. Post. Anal. 1. iii. 1: ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὰ ἀπειρα διελθεῖν. Εἰ τε ἰστασθαί καὶ εἰσὶν ἄρχαι, κ.τ.λ. Met. 11. iv. 22, &c. ἀλλ’ ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἀλήθειας ἦν φρόνησις] Three of Bekker’s MSS. read ἦν φρόνησις, and this seems most natural, and to give the best sense (though ἦν is supported by the Paraphrast). What the writer means is apparently to add that only one kind of wisdom can be called analogous to the apprehension of a triangle; αὕτη refers to ἦ καθ’ ἐκαστα φρόνησις, mentioned above, ch. vii. § 7: δέι ἁρμόν ἐξειν ἢ ταὐτὴν μᾶλλον. There is another kind (ἐκεῖνης), namely, the possession of universal ideas (τῶν καθολοῦ) (i.e.), which is of a different nature.

IX. This chapter commences the examination of a set of faculties cognate to wisdom, or forming part of it. The first of these is good counsel (εὐδοκησία). This, says the writer, is to be distinguished from science, which does not deliberate; from guessing (ἐνοχατία), which is too quick; from sagacity (ἀγχισία), which is a kind of guessing; and from opinion, which is too definite. It is, then, a certain rightness of thought, it chooses the right means to a good end. The conception of this end wisdom itself must supply. There is a great assumption here of the manner of Aristotle. The chapter seems formed after Eth. iii. ii. § 6 reminds us of many similar passages in Book IV., and § 7 is after the manner of Eth. i. iii. 5. There is an advance upon Aristotle’s account of deliberation (Eth. iii. iii.) in two points, (1) the process is illustrated here by the logical formula of the syllogism, (2) there is a mention here of the faculty whereby ends are apprehended, which Aristotle had left unnoticed. See Eth. iii. iii. 1, note.

1 It is an abrupt, awkward commencement of the chapter to say, ‘enquiring and deliberating are different, for deliberating is a species of enquiring.’ But what is meant apparently is, to bring ‘good counsel’ under the head of enquiring, which separates it at once from both science and opinion.

3 ἐστι δὲ εὐστοχία της ἡ ἀγάπων] This is announced by Aristotle, Post. Anal. i. xxxiv. 1, in the very next line to that passage on the distinction of the organs of truth, which apparently suggested so much of the subjects of the present book, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπων ἐστιν εὐστοχία της ἐν ἀσκήτηι χρόνῳ τοῦ μὲν. In more general terms ἀγάπων is defined by Plato, Charmides, p. 160 a, as ἀξίως της τῆς ψυχῆς.

ἐπιστήμης μὲν—λογίζεται[ Now in science there is no such thing as “rightness,” for there is no such thing as wrongness. In opinion, on the other hand, rightness is truth. And besides, whatever we have an opinion about is already decided. But good counsel is not by any means beyond questioning (ἂνευ λόγου). Therefore it remains that good counsel is a rightness of the operation of thought (διανοια), for this does not amount to decision. Opinion is not an inquiry, but is already a kind of decision. On the other hand, he that deliberates, whether well or ill, is inquiring after something and calculating.'}

ἐπιστήμης] This is said here just as it was before said, ch. v. § 7, that there were no degrees of excellence in wisdom.

διανοιαί δ' Cf. Eth. iii. ii. 13, and above, ch. ii. § 2, note.

διανοιάς ἄρα] Plato, Repub. p. 511 ν, proposed to confine the term διάνοια to the discursive understanding as opposed to νοῦς, the intuitive and speculative reason, διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιοτών ἔξω ἄλλ' οὖ νοῦν, ἃς μεταξὺ τοῦ διανοίας τε καὶ νοῦ τῆς διάνοιαν ὀδον. Aristotle probably had the same distinction in view, Post. Anal. i. xxxiiii. 9 (l.c.), πώς δὲ διανοεῖται ἐκ τε διανοια καὶ νοῦ. But he did not maintain the distinction in his works, and certainly it is not observed by Eudemus in the present book, where both νοῦς πρακτικός and διάνοια θεωρητική are spoken of. In the place before us διάνοια apparently means the exercise of reason, a process of thought.
But, to riot or, false t

4 ἐπεὶ δὲ—βεβουλεύθησα] 'But since the term "rightness" is used in more senses than one, it is plain that "good counsel" does not answer to all the senses. For the incontinent or bad man will obtain, by his calculation, what he proposes to himself, so that he will have deliberated rightly, yet secured a great evil. Whereas, to have deliberated well is generally thought (δοκεῖ) to be a good.'

ῥήματος] i.e. Rightness of means, either respective, or irrespective, of rightness in the end; or, again, rightness of end (§ 5), whatever may have been the means.

οὗ ἀκρατῆς] It would seem rather the abandoned man (ἀκλόπατος) who by calculation attains bad ends. The incontinent man would not generally have deliberation attributed to him, cf. Eth. vii. ii. 2. But the characters cannot be kept very distinct.

ἰδεῖν] Perhaps ιδεῖν may be taken here as equivalent to something like σκοπῶν. The Scholium offers the following loose explanation: οὗ γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ φαύλος προτέθεται, ὡς τέλος ιδεῖν, ἦτοι σκέφτασθαι ὅπως αὐτὸς ἑπιτεθήκηται κ.τ.λ.

δοκεῖ δὲ ἀγαθὸν] Fritzsch quotes Herod. vii. 10: τὸ γὰρ εὖ βουλεύθησαί κέρδος μέγιστον εὐρήσκω ἕν. Sopho-
6—7 The writer first raises good counsel to the rank of one of the virtues, by the mention of all the qualifications necessary; afterwards he seems to modify this by saying that, besides the absolute good counsel which aims at the absolute end, there is also such a thing as relative good counsel aiming at relative ends.

One might have thought that it was unnecessary to give so separate a psychological existence to excellence in deliberation. However, the quality here described answers more nearly than προνοια to what we call ‘prudence.’ Προνοια, we are here told, is the conception of ends, and afterwards (ch. xii. § 9) it is shown to be the faculty of means. In truth, it is both, according to the Aristotelian views (as far as we can discern them); it implies both prudence (ευθυνία), and also a certain moral condition (ἀρετή), and it is implied by both of them. As compared with the one it is of ends, and as compared with the other it is of means.

X. This chapter treats of another faculty which forms an element in wisdom, and yet may be distinguished from it, namely, apprehension (σύνεσις). Apprehension is not mere opinion (else all would possess it), nor is it a science, for it deals with no separate class of objects whether necessary or contingent (οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἢ ἢ ἢντων καὶ ἀκινητῶν ἢ σύνεσις ἢτι, οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγαντεών ὄντων). It deals with all that can be matter of human deliberation, in short, with the same objects as wisdom. But wisdom commands, it is concerned with right action, in short, it belongs to the will as well as to reason. But apprehension only judges, it is merely intellectual. It is neither the having nor the getting wisdom, but rather it is the application of one’s knowledge to give a meaning to the dicta of wisdom. It is ‘understanding,’ as its name implies, or ‘taking in’ (συνέιναι), when another speaks. The word appears to mean ‘combination,’ ‘joining one thing to another.’

Aristotle had spoken of σύνεσις as one of the intellectual excellencies, Eth. i. xiii. 20: σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς. Eudemus does not apply the term ἀρετή to this, or to any of the other intellectual qualities which he treats of, except wisdom and philosophy. He gives here a psychological account of σύνεσις, the operation of which he confines to intellectual insight with regard to moral subjects, apprehension of
the meaning of moral dicta and critical judgment thereon. That there is such a faculty of apprehension, and of sympathetic or critical understanding, quite distinct from moral goodness in people, the experience of life seems to show. The author of the Magna Moralia gives a much inferior account of σύνεσις (I. xxxv. 17), making its characteristic to be that it deals with small matters, peri μικρών τε και ἐν μικροῖς ἦ κρίσις.

1 διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρόνησι.

It is used nearly equivalently to φρόνησις by Thucyd. I. 140: Δικαίως τόσον κοινῆ δύσων, ἦν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βούθεϊν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθώντας τῆς σύνεσις μεταποιεῖται.

2 ἢ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστὶν—ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον] The opposition of these terms is taken from Plato, Politics, p. 259 e—260 c, where it is argued that the arithmetician (λογιστής) is content with a knowledge and judgment about numbers, whereas the architect (ἀρχιτέκτων) must go on to apply his knowledge by directing the workmen—thus that all science may be divided under the two heads of critical and mandatory. (260 d) Οὐκόν γνωστικάλ μέν αἱ τε τοιαῦτα ἐξωπασί καὶ ὀπόσαι ἐξώπονται τῇ λογιστικῇ, κρίσεί δὲ καὶ ἐπιτάξει διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων τῶν γένεων—φαίνετον. Ἀρ' αὖν συμπάθης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαφορέῳμεν, προσεποίησε μεμελεῖοι ἄν χαίρεσί διηρθῇσαι;—κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐμὴν δύον.

3 ἀλλ' ὡσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνεῖν, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ] The word μανθάνειν was ambiguous in Greek, it meant either to 'learn' or to 'understand.' The Sophists used to play on this ambiguity, arguing that one could 'learn what one knew already.' Cf. Ar. Soph. Elench. iv. 1, 2, which illustrates the present passage: Εἰδὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὑμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιαῦτα τῶν λόγων, οἰον ὃτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι, τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μανθάνουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί. Τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ἀρχαίως, τὸ τε ξυπνᾶν ἰρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.
XI. This chapter (which is not conveniently divided as it stands) opens with a mention of the quality of considerateness (γνώμη), and proceeds to point out how various qualities unite in wisdom, and what are the natural and intuitive elements which it contains.

By the progress of psychology, this term came to bear the special meaning of ‘considerateness.’ At first it meant knowledge in general, cf. Theognis, ν. 95 sq.

It was probably from the association of συγγνώμη that γνώμη came to have its distinctive meaning. The author of the Magna Moralia calls it εὐγνωμοσύνη, and makes it a sort of passive form of ἐπιστέκεια (π. ii. 1): εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν οὗτος ἐπιστέκειας ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη, τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίναι τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράστειν κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἑπισκέπτου.

In the text above, it is said that ‘considerateness is a right judgment of the equitable man.’ ‘Pardon is a right critical considerateness of the equitable man.’

᾽Ωρθὴ ἢ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] ‘Now by a right judgment is meant a true one.’ This must be the import of the sentence, but the writer says not ἄληθῆς, but τοῦ ἀληθοῦς—probably ‘by attraction’ to τοῦ ἑπισκέπτου. But it is an inaccuracy of language to speak of ‘a true man’ in the sense of ‘a man whose judgment is true.’ Eudemus, as we have seen (ch. ii. § 2, note), is inclined to confuse the application of ὀρθὸς to acts of the desire and will.

2 εἰσὶ δὲ—[Ἄλλων] ‘Now all the (above-mentioned) conditions of mind
naturally tend to the same point; we apply (ἔπιθέροντες) the terms considerateness, apprehension, wisdom, and reason to the same persons, and say (λέγομεν) that they have considerateness, that they have attained to (ἥθη) reason—that they are wise—that they are apprehensive. For all these faculties deal with immediate truths (τῶν ἐσχάτων) and particulars; and it is by being able to judge of those matters with which the wise man is concerned, that a man is apprehensive, considerate, or forgiving. Equity extends itself over all the forms of good which consist in a relation to one's neighbour.

νοών ἥθη] What this means is not quite clear. It may refer to what is said in § 6, ἥθε ἡ ἥλικαι νοών ἔχει. Thus it might be nearly equivalent to our saying of a person that he had 'attained to years of discretion.' Or again, it may refer to the moment of action, and ἥθη would be thus equivalent to the French volî. 'There is reason exhibited.' 'ἥθη' is used similarly to denote the present moment, Eth. End. ii. viii. 11: Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκατατεθμένος λυπεῖται παρὰ τῶν ἐπιθύμιων πράττων ἥθη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ’ ἐλπίδος ἤδονη, ὅτι ἄστερον ὄφελήθησαι, ἢ καὶ ἥθη ὄφελείται ὧγιάλων.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ] This is said because γνώμη and συγγνώμη are acts of equity. Cf. Eth. v. x. 1, note.

4—5 καὶ ὁ νοῶν τῶν ἐσχάτων— νοῶν] 'And reason is of the ultimates at both ends of the series. Both the first and the last terms are apprehended, not by inference, but by reason. On the one hand, the scientific and demonstrative reason (ὅ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις) apprehends those terms which are immutable and primary. And on the other hand, the practical reason (ὅ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς) apprehends the particular (ἐσχάτων) and contingent truth, and the minor premiss. For these constitute the sources of our idea of the end, the universal being developed out of the particulars. Of these particulars, then, one must have perception, and this perception is reason.' The writer having before (in § 3) connected the faculties of 'apprehension,' &c., with wisdom, on the ground of their all being concerned with particulars (ἐσχάτα), proceeds to include reason (νοῶν) under the same category, and says that this apprehends ἐσχάτα at both ends of the series. But now comes in a piece of confusion which is thoroughly Eudemian, for he goes on to say that the scientific reason apprehends first truths or principles (cf. ch. vi.), while the practical reason apprehends last terms or particulars. To mix up considerations of the scientific reason with the present discussion is to introduce what is entirely irrelevant. We see
kai πρῶτων, ὃ 'ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐπέρας προτάσεως: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἡ ἑνεκα αὕτη τοῦ καθόλου. τούτων οὖν ἐχεῖν ἄλλη αἰσθήσειν, αὕτη ὃ ἐστὶ νοῦς. διὸ καὶ συνετίς καὶ νοῦν. οὕτως οὗ ὃτι καὶ ταῖς ἐνα-κήσις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ήτε ή ἡ ἐνα-κησις νοῦν ἐχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἵτις οὕσης. διὸ καὶ ἀρχή καὶ

here a bringing together of two things which were before placed in contrast with each other (ch. viii. § 9), namely, the reason which apprehends first principles, and wisdom apprehending particular facts (ἰσχατων). In the present passage, what was before called wisdom (φρόνησις) is called reason (νοῦς), and it is said that reason is the faculty which perceives or apprehends the particular in moral subjects (ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς). This, then, is the main purport of the present remarks. Setting aside as irrelevant what is said of the scientific reason, we learn that the moral judgment is intuitive, that moral intuitions are to be attributed to the reason, and that out of these particular intuitions the moral universal grows up. When stripped of its ambiguities of statement, the sense of the passage becomes unexceptionable. We may compare it with the incidental observations of Aristotle, Eth. i. iv. 7: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ζύτι καὶ εἰ τούτῳ φαίνεται ἀρχικότως, οὔδὲν προσ-θεΐεται τοῦ διὸτι. δὲ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἡ ἐξεῖ ἡ λάβαι ἄν ἀρχάς ῥαβίας. Eth. vii. 20: ἵκανον ἐν τισὶ τὸ ζύτι δειχθῆναι καλός, οὐδὲν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς: τὸ δ’ ζύτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. The expression of Eudemus is not so strong as that of Aristotle. Eudemus says ἐκ τῶν καὶ ἐκατα τὸ καθόλου, while Aristotle said ἀρχὴ τὸ ζύτι. The latter must be true if reason be the organ by which

the fact is apprehended, for reason is in itself universal, and whatever it apprehends must be of the nature of the universal.

ἀρχη γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἑνεκα αὕτη.] This is similar in form of expression to ch. iii. § 3: ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ εἰσὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου. Ον οὗ ἑνεκα see below, ch. xii. § 10, note.

αὕτη ὃ’ ἐστὶ νοῦς] To say that ‘reason is a perception of particulars’ is only the counterpart of Aristotle’s saying that we can have ‘a perception of universals.’ Eth. i. vii. 20: τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἐκβολοῦνται. Aristotle expresses the intuitive character of reason by saying that it ‘touches’ its object. Cf. Metaphys. viii. x. 5: το μὲν ὑμεῖς καὶ φαίνει ἀληθείας . . . το δ’ ἀγνοεῖ μὴ θυγάνειν. Ib. xi. vii. 8: αὐτῶν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοστίων· νοστίων γὰρ γίγνεται βιγγάκων καὶ νοῦς, ὡστε παλτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοστίων. That reason, while it is on the one hand intuitive, is on the other hand developed by experience, we learn from the discussions in Post. Anal. ii. ch. xix. The same is expressed above in the saying that ‘reason is the beginning and the end.’ 5—6 διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ—ἀρθῶς]

Hence it is that these faculties are thought to come naturally, and that although no one without conscious effort (φύσει) gets to be a philosopher, men do get naturally to have considerateness, and apprehension, and
A proof of this is, that we think they ought successively to appear as age advances, and (we say that) such and such an age possesses reason and considerateness, as if these things came from nature. Hence reason is the beginning and the end, the matter of premises and conclusions is the same. Thus we must pay regard to the unproved assertions and opinions of the elderly and experienced, or of the wise, no less than to demonstrations. For, from having obtained the eye of 'old experience,' they see aright.' In this excellent marking the subject is brought round again to the contrast between philosophy and wisdom. The former never comes naturally, but the latter does. The nature of reason, and its growth in the mind, is illustrated by the common fact of the respect paid to age.

In this and the following chapter, by mooting the question, of what use are wisdom and philosophy? the writer shows the relation of the two qualities to each other, and the inseparable connexion existing between wisdom and virtue. The following difficulties are first stated.

1. Philosophy is not practical, it does not consider at all the means to happiness, how then can it be useful?

2. Wisdom, on the other hand, though it treats of happiness, might be said to be mere knowledge. It might be said that a man no more acts in well from having this knowledge of the good, than he is well from having a knowledge of medicine.

3. Or again, if wisdom be useful for telling us how to be good, why not get this advice from others? Why should it be necessary to have wisdom, any more than it is to learn medicine, when one can go to a doctor?

If philosophy be better than wisdom, how is it that the latter controls the former? The answer to question (1) is, that both philosophy and wisdom are good in themselves, and desirable as being perfections of our nature, even though they were not useful as means to anything beyond. But they are not without results. Philosophy, if it does not serve as an instrument to happiness, is identical with happi-
ness itself. Questions (2) and (3) are answered by showing the relation of wisdom to virtue. Virtue gives the right aim, and wisdom the right means. They are inseparable from one another. Wisdom without virtue would be mere cleverness apt to degenerate into cunning, and virtue without wisdom would be a mere gift of nature, a generous instinct capable of perversion. While thus inseparable from virtue, wisdom is not to be identified with it. In this respect an advance has been made beyond the crude formula of Socrates. Wisdom accompanies the virtues, and is a sort of centre-point to them all (אμα τὴν φρονήσεις μὴ οὕσα πάσαι ὑπάρξεις, xiii. 6). Question (4) is easily answered, since wisdom rather ministers to philosophy than thinks of controlling it.

1 οὐδεμίας γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως] Suggested perhaps by Eth. x. vii. 5, where it is said of the θεωρητική ενέργεια—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρήσας. Ib. § 7: δικεῖ . . . παρ’ αὐτὴν οὐδένος ἐφίεσθαι τέλους.

εἰπὲρ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ ἀνθρώπων] 'If wisdom be that which is concerned

with things just and noble and good for man.' Η is indefinite, being probably feminine on account of the preceding φρόνησις. This passage is the first that asserts strongly the moral nature of wisdom. We are told here that wisdom takes cognizance of the just and the noble; before it was only said to be concerned with what was good (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἁγαθά, ch. v. § 6). These concluding discussions about φρόνησις show the inadequacy of the term 'prudence,' by which it has been so often translated, really to represent it.

οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικάτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά] The answer to this objection has virtually been already given, ch. v. § 8: where φρόνησις was said not to be a merely intellectual quality.

2 εἰ δὲ μὴ—πείθεσθαι] 'But suppose we assume that a man is wise not for this object (i.e. mere knowledge of virtue), but with a view to becoming (virtuous), we must then concede that to those who are virtuous wisdom will be of no use; but neither will it be so to those who have not got (virtue), for there will be no difference whether they have (wisdom) themselves, or follow the advice of
I. Wisdom and philosophy cannot be otherwise than desirable, as they are the best state of the human mind. And the mind must necessarily (ἀναγκαῖον) desire its own best state.

II. It makes one happy by the consciousness of possessing it.

This phrase, which never occurs in the writings of Aristotle, is frequent in those of Eudemus. Cf. Eth. Eud. ii. i. 9: καὶ ἐστι ἥδι καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀπεταῖς, καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀσαίτως (ἔ μὲν γὰρ ἄδηλή, ἡ δὲ μόριον). Ἡμ. § 14: διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τὸ μόριον ἔστι ἴσχεσις, ὧν τὸ βραχίστον, τὸ τούτου ἀρετὴ ὄν ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς ὑδατῆς ἀρετῆς. Eth. Eud. iv. (Nic. v.) ii. 7: ὅτι μὲν ἔν ἔν ἐναὶ δικαιοσύνης πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶ τεῖς καὶ ἐπίρα παρὰ τὴν ὑδΑν ἀρετῆς, διαρομα. Ἡμ. § 10: ἡ μὲν ἄν κατὰ τὴν ὑδατὴν ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη. This conception Eudemus came to identify with καλοκαγαθία, Eth. Eud. viii. iii. i: κατὰ μέρος μὲν ὄν ἐπὶ ἐκάστης ἀρετῆς ἐφηστι πρότερον ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διεῖλους τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διαφιδρότευον τῆς ἐκ τούτων, ἡν ἐκαλολιμνῇ ὡς καλοκαγαθία.

It makes one happy by the consciousness of possessing it.

Eudemus used here is quite in the style of Eudemus, and so is the confusion caused by the careless writing in τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν ἔχειν, where ἔχουσιν and ἔχειν appear to refer to different things.

3 δὲ χείραν τῆς σοφίας ὀφεικοριστέρα αὐτῆς ἐσταν] This difficulty may have been partly suggested by the prominent position assigned to wisdom in the present book (cf. ch. viii. § 7: ὅτι δὲ ἂν τις καὶ ἐστατὰ ἀρχίσεκτονική, partly by the authoritative character attributed to wisdom by Aristotle, Eth. i. ii. 4—6: δόξει δὲ ἂν τῆς κυριότάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχίσεκτονικῆς τοιαῦτη δὴ ἡ πολιτική φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato on the βασιλική τέχνη, Lauthiden. p. 291 b, quoted Vol. i. Essay III. p. 149.

4 Wisdom and philosophy cannot be otherwise than desirable, as they are the best state of the human mind. And the mind must necessarily (ἀναγκαῖον) desire its own best state.

5 ἐξετάζω — ἐνδοιάμονα] ‘Furthermore they do produce happiness—philosophy produces it, not in the way that medicine produces health, but rather it operates like health itself. Being a part of the entire well-being (τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς) of man,
accordance with wisdom and moral virtue. For virtue makes the aim right, and wisdom the means to the attainment of this. The conception of τὸ ἔργον is taken from Ar. Eth. i. vii. 10. The rest of the psychology here is different from that of Aristotle (see Eth. iii. v. 1, note), but is identical with that adopted by Eudemus in his earlier books. Cf. Eth. End. ii. xi. 1: τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων λέγομεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὑδάν, οὕτως ὀστε ὡν ἕνηκα δεὶ προαιρεῖται, ἡ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἀγράτεια. 'Εστι δὲ τούτῳ ἀγράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τῶν λόγων. 'Εστι δὲ ἄρητη καὶ ἀγράτεια ἦτεραν. Λεκτέων δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ποιεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν (this refers to ch. v. § 6, where, however, σωφρονεύς is substituted for ἀγράτεια). 

Πχ. § 3: πότερον δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; τιμή-μεθα δὴ δὴ τὸν σκόπον, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. 

Πχ. § 6, quoted below.

tοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Eth. End. ii. i. 14 (l.c.). There is apparently an attempt here to bring under one view the functions of the different parts of human nature, in relation to morality.—On πράττει, see ch. ii. § 2, note.

7 The first step to prove the use and practical necessity of wisdom, is to show that moral action implies consciousness and a conscious purpose.

8 τὴν μὲν—δυναμεσ] 'Now virtue makes the purpose right, but the means to this (ὅσα ἐκείνη ἔνεκα πέ-φυκε πράττεσθαι) do not belong to virtue, but to another faculty.' There is some confusion here in speaking of the means to a purpose, προαιρεσις itself being in the Aristotelian psychology a faculty of means; but cf. Eth. End. ii. xi. 5—6, where προαιρεσις is said to imply both end and means, and whence the present passage is repeated almost verbatim. 'Εστι γὰρ πώς προαιρεσις τίνος καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος. Οὐ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετὴ τὸ (τΈ, Fritzsche, e conj.) προαιρέσθην οὐ ἕνεκα. 'Εστι
mētōn ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τῶν τοῦτον ἔνεκα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τυχάνει τοῦτον ἔκλεις δυνάμεως, ὡσ ἐνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεὶ πράττετι, τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαίρεσεως, οὐ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία.

S—10 λεκτόν δ'—ἀγαθῶν] 'But we must speak on the point with a more exact attention. There is a certain faculty which is called "cleverness," this is of a nature to perform and to hit upon the means that conduct to any given aim. Now if the aim be good, this faculty is praise-worthy, but if bad, it turns to cunning. Hence both wise men and cunning men get the name of "clever." Now wisdom is not cleverness, but it is not without a faculty of the kind. But this eye of the mind attains its full condition not without virtue, as we have already stated, and as is clear, for the syllogisms of action have as their major premisess—"Since such and such is the end and the best."—(being whatever it is,—something for the sake of argument, it matters not what). But this (major premisse) cannot be apprehended except by the good man; for vice distorts (the mind), and makes it false with regard to the principles of action. Hence it is evident that one cannot possess wisdom unless he be good.'

καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἰναι] We should have expected τοὺς πανούργους. That want of clearness of mind which is characteristic of Eudemus shows itself in his use of the article, cf. ch. xi. § 6: τῶν ἐμπειρῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἡ φρονιμία, where one would have expected τῶν φρονίμων.


οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν] The form of the practical syllogism is similarly given, Eth. Eud. ii. xi. 4: ἄσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς πνευματικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχή καὶ ὑπόθεσις: ἣ τειχί ἐς τὸ τὸ οὐγιαίων, ἀνάγκη τοῦ ὑπάρχει, ν' ἔσται ἐκείνη, ἄσπερ ἐκεί, ἵν' ἐστι τοῦ τρίγυνον δύο ὄρθια, ἀνάγκη τοῦ ἐστιν,
On the doctrine of the practical syllogism, see Vol. I. Essay IV, pp. 212—219. It was there doubted whether Aristotle was himself the author of this formula which appears in the Eudemian Ethics, and in the probably spurious treatise De Motu Animalium. But, in fact, one passage, at all events, in the De Anima, proves that Aristotle had himself applied the syllogistic form to the process which the mind goes through in forming a practical resolution, though Eudemus undoubtedly carried out the application farther and used it more constantly; cf. De An. iii. xi. 4: 'Επει δ' ἡ μὲν καθόκου υπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' έκκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει δι' ἔντων τοιοῦτων τὸ τι οὐδεὶς πράπτειν, ἡ δὲ δι' τὸ τοῦ τινος τοιοῦτον, κἀγὼ δὲ τιοῦτε) ἢ ἡ αὕτη κυνεὶ ἡ δύσα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλων. Ἡ δέ ἰμορφο, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἴμεοιά μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὖθ'.

XIII. Ἐκείνον δὴ—κυρίαν' 'We must consider then, over again, the nature of virtue. For there is a relation in virtue analogous to that borne by wisdom to cleverness. Cleverness, though not the same as wisdom, is similar to it, and this is the way in which natural virtue stands related to virtue proper.' The doctrine of the natural element in virtue was clearly given by Aristotle, cf. Eth. x. ix. 6—8: Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθως ὁλοντά, οἰ μὲν φύσει, εἰ δ' έκει, οἱ δὲ διδακτεῖ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δεῦρον ὡς όνος ἐφ' ἥμων ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινας θειας αἰτίας τοις ὑπὸ δινηθέως εὐτυχείοις ὑπάρχει—Δεὶ δὴ τὸ ἤδον προσπάρχειν ποι ὁμοιών τῆς ἀρετῆς, στήριγμα τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεράνον τὸ αἰχρὸν. In the present passage, the analogy between the development of the reason and of the moral will is well drawn out. At first, there is the intellectual faculty, cleverness, undetermined as yet for good or bad, but requiring a right direction to be given to its aims. This the moral feelings can alone supply. On the other side, there is the generous instinct, the impulse to bravery, justice, and the like, but this is deficient in consciousness and in the idea of a law, which reason can alone supply. The joint development of these two sides gives, on the one hand, wisdom, on the other hand, virtue, in its complete and proper form. What there is difficult or strange in the doctrine, is, that virtue has apparently assigned to it the intellectual function of apprehending the end of action. This appears an inversion. 'Ἀρετή seems now to have changed places with λόγος. But, at all events, the point is clearly established that an intellectual side and a moral side are entirely inseparable.
καὶ γὰρ παιὸν—ἀρετή] 'For the natural dispositions belong both to children and beasts, but without reason they appear harmful. At least this seems evident, that as a strong body, if moved without sight, comes into violent collisions because it has not sight to guide it, so is it in mental things (ἐνταῦθα). If the natural qualifications have reason added to them, they then excel in action, and the state, which (before) was a semblance of virtue, now becomes virtue in the true sense of the term.' Φυσικαὶ ἔξεις is used inaccurately for φυσικαὶ διάθεσις, cf. Eth. n. vii. 6, note. On the moral qualities of brutes Aristotle often speaks; cf. Hist. An. 1. i.; ix. i. &c. The 'courage' of brutes, being undirected, is no doubt harmful, so the generosity, &c., of boys. That fine natures are capable of the worst perversion, is an opinion to be found stated in Plato's Republic, p. 491 E: Ὅδε γὰρ, ἢν δ' ἦγο, ὃ 'Αδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὑστὸν φώμεν τὰς εὑρετάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχόσας διαφερότως κακὰς γέγενον; ἢ οἷς τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηριὰν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φώσεως τροφῆς διαλογισμὸς γέγενον, ἀνθρώπω δὲ φῶνει μεγάλων ὁπτέ ἀγαθῶν ὁπτὲ κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἐσκέφθης: 3—5 διόπερ—μετὰ λόγου] 'Hence it is that some say that all the virtues are wisdoms; and thus Socrates was partly right and partly wrong in his investigations. He was wrong in thinking the virtues wisdoms, but perfectly right in thinking that they were inseparable from wisdom. The same point is testified to by the fact that, at present, persons, when they wish to define virtue, add the terms "state (specifying the particular object), according to the right law." And that law is right which is in accordance with wisdom. All men therefore seem to have a presentiment that a particular state in accordance with wisdom is virtue. But a little alteration is necessary. Not merely the state according to the right law, but that which is conscious of (μετὰ) the right law constitutes virtue. Now in such matters wisdom is right law. Socrates then considered that the
virtues were laws (for he defined them all as sciences), but we consider that they are conscious of a law.

καὶ Σωκράτης] On the doctrine of Socrates that 'virtue is science,' see Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 122—124. In Eth. iii. viii. 6, the phrase is ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, on which Bishop Fitzgerald remarks that by prefixing the article Aristotle appears to have indicated the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, the dramatic, and not the historical, philosopher. Thus speaking similarly of characters in books, Aristotle says, Eth. iii. viii. 2, τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα, Ἰβ. ii. ix. 3, ἡ Καλιφάν. ii. ix. 6, πρὸς τὴν Ἐλεόνην. And contrariwise of real persons he speaks without the article. Eth. i. iv. 5, Ἐβ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἦπερει, Ἰβ. i. v. 3, ὁμοσπαθῶν Σαρδαναπάλων. i. vi. 8, οἷς δὴ καὶ Σωκράτις, i. x. 1, κατὰ Σάλωνα. All through the first book of the Metaphysics, when writing the history of philosophy, Aristotle speaks of the different philosophers without the article, and so too elsewhere in contrasting Socrates with Plato, &c. The only exceptions to this rule are the cases of renewed mention. Cf. Met. xii. iv. 5: ὃς γὰρ ἐστίν ἥδ' ἐν ἀποδοχή Σωκράτει δικαίως—Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. But in discussing Plato's Republic and Laws (Pol. i. i.—vi.), Aristotle invariably speaks of ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγου, &c., as referring not to a real but to a represented personage. Assuming that Eudemus has followed the same rule, we may conclude that here and in Eth. vii. ii. 1, Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ διὸς ἐμάχητο, Ἰβ. vii. iii. 14, ὃ εἴητε Σωκράτης,—the actual and historical Socrates is designated.

καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες] i.e. since the establishment of the Peripatetic doctrine. Eudemus refines upon the usual Peripatetic formula, substituting μετὰ λόγου for κατὰ λόγου. On the meaning of this alteration see Eth. i. vii. 14, note.

6 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος—ὄπαρξουσιν]
Thus the opinion is refuted of him who would argue that the virtues are separated from one another, that the same man is not equally gifted by nature for all the virtues, so that he will acquire one now and another later. This is possible with regard to natural good qualities, but not so with regard to those which constitute a good man absolutely; for together with wisdom, which is one, all the virtues will be in his possession. The same perfect character is attributed to wisdom below, Eth. vii. ii. 5: πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐθελίων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετὰς. The theory is, that he who has wisdom can do no wrong. It will be seen how nearly this ap-
PLAN OF BOOK VII.

THIS last of the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books consists of two parts, of which the one is a necessary complement to Aristotle's ethical system; the other superfluous, being little more than a modification of Aristotle's (far superior) treatise on Pleasure.

Part I. having enumerated the moral states which are above, below, and between virtue and vice, mentions six ordinary opinions on these states (Ch. I.), points out the difficult questions to which these opinions give rise (Ch. II.), and proceeds to elucidate them.

In Ch. III. the question is discussed, How is incontinence compatible with a knowledge of the right?

In Ch. IV. the question, Whether incontinence is confined to any definite object-matter?

Chs. V. and VI., pursuing the same inquiry, treat of certain morbid and unnatural kinds of incontinence, and of incontinence (analogously so called) in the matter of anger.

Ch. VII. compares generally incontinence with intemperance, treats of the subordinate forms of the intermediate moral states (endurance, softness, &c.), and traces incontinence to two separate sources in the character.

Ch. VIII. continues the comparison between intemperance and incontinence, reverts to two questions before mooted, namely:—

(1) Is intemperance more curable than incontinence? (2) Is incontinence to be regarded as absolutely bad? and gives a negative answer to both.

Ch. IX. §§ 1–4 discusses the question mooted in Ch. II., Does continence consist in sticking to an opinion or purpose, right or wrong? In answering this question, a good distinction is drawn between obstinacy and continence.

Ch. IX. § 5—Ch. X. winds up the previous discussions and
formally settles the remaining questions of Ch. II. Is intemperance the same as incontinence? Can the wise man be incontinent?

These chapters form, as we have said, a necessary complement to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of view (ἄλλην ἄφθασιν) than that which would divide mankind simply into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states; and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction between the 'intemperate' and the 'incontinent,' as the use of these English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to give a certain special and technical meaning to the word 'intemperate' in order to make it stand as the representative of ἀκόλαστος.

A subtle, but not always clear, psychology is employed to explain the phenomena of moral weakness, and it is observable that physical and medical considerations are prominently appealed to throughout this book. The remarks on bestiality, cretinism, or morbid depravity (θηρίων) here made have attracted the notice of modern writers on the psychology of insanity (as for instance Dr. Thomas Mayo).* And the interesting allusions here made to the melancholic, or bilious, temperament might be illustrated, not only from Aristotle's Problems, but also from Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy. The chief thing that we have to complain of in this book is the too vague way in which incontinence is treated. For the sake of forming a more definite notion of the standard of Greek morality, we could have wished a graphic portrait of the continent man, in the style of Aristotle's fourth Book. As it is, we must be content to know that the continent man yields to temptation less, and the incontinent man more, than people in general.

* 'Now according to this view of the subject, we have a class of persons, differing from the majority of mankind in their incapacity for moral distinction, differing from the insane, in not labouring under any suspension of the power of will. On the first of these grounds, they have a right to a place in our system of mental pathology. On the last, they must constitute a distinct head from insanity. I am not at present considering this class generally; I exclude indeed that section of persons, in whom the absence of principle is obviated by the harmlessness of their tendencies. I am speaking of persons destitute of the moral faculty, and also vicious in their propensities. For these I have borrowed the designation given to them by Aristotle: and I call them brutal.'—Mayo, Elements of the Pathology of the Human Mind, p. 127.
Part II. consists of that superfluous treatise on Pleasure, the authorship of which has been so much disputed. While professing to treat of pleasure as falling under the philosophy of human life, the writer seems to confine himself almost entirely to a refutation of three positions maintained by the Platonic school: 1st. That pleasure is in no sense a good. 2nd. That most pleasures (i.e. physical pleasures) are bad. 3rd. That no pleasure can be the chief good.

The first and third of these positions are refuted in Chs. XII. and XIII., and the second in Ch. XIV. The subject is treated in this book under a more physiological and practical aspect than in the tenth book of the Nicomachean work.
This chapter proposes a new field of inquiry (ἄλλως ἄρχῇ) in Ethics, namely to consider those intermediate states, continence and incontinence, together with their subordinate forms (softness, luxury, and endurance), which are ‘neither identical with virtue and vice, nor yet wholly distinct from them.’ After an enumeration of the moral states above, below, and between, virtue and vice, the writer announces that his method of inquiry will be, as elsewhere, to collect current opinions on the subject, to raise doubts and objections to them, and by a process of sifting to reject such existing opinions as are untenable, and to leave a residue of ‘sufficiently demonstrated’ theory. He accordingly mentions six common notions about the states in question.

1 τὰ δ’ ἐναντία κ. τ. λ.] A scale of the moral states is here drawn out, which stands as follows: 1. Divine virtue, or pure reason. 2. Virtue (afterwards called temperance, σωφροσύνη), or the perfect harmony of passion subjugated to reason. 3. Continence, or the mastery of reason over passion after a struggle. 4. Incontinence, or the mastery of passion over reason, after a struggle. 5. Vice (afterwards called ἀκολογία, intemperance), or the perfect harmony of reason subjugated to passion. 6. Bestiality, or pure passion. It is remarkable that the terms σωφροσύνη and ἀκολογία, which in this book certainly supply the place of ἀρετή and κακία, are actually introduced extremely late. Cf. ch. v. § 9.

Ἡρωίκην τινα] Cf. Arist. Pol. vii. xiv. 2, where the gods and heroes are mentioned as excelling men. Dr. Hampden, in his Bampton Lectures, mentions that, in the canonisation of a Roman Catholic Saint, it was customary to declare that he had graduated ‘in heroico gradu virtutis.’
οὖν ἐφ' ἑκείνῳ ἀνέρός τε θεόν ταῖς ἢμεναι ἄλλα θείον.

II. xxiv. 258.
3 of Λάκωνες] Apparently taken from the Meno of Plato, p. 99 D.
4 ὀστερον] i.e. in chapter v.
πρότερον εἴρηται.] Cf. Eth. Eud. ii. x. 28, &c.
5 δει δ' ὀστερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων—ικανώς] Our course must be, as elsewhere, to state existing ideas (τὰ φαινόμενα), and, having gone through the doubts (which these ideas suggest), to establish thus if possible all, but if not all, anyhow the greater number and the most important of the ideas which are generally admitted (ἔνδοξα) about these conditions of mind. For if the difficulties be resolved and at the same time the generally admitted ideas be suffered to stand, the thing will be established sufficiently.' This passage is obscure, chiefly on account of the ambiguity in the words ἐὰν γὰρ λόγοι τε τὰ διωχητὰ καὶ καταλείπτωσί τὰ ἐνδοξα. Two meanings might be attributed to λόγοι τὰ διωχητὰ, which might either refer (1) to the rejection of ideas that involved a difficulty; or (2) to the clearing up of difficulties attaching to any of the popular ideas. The former interpretation would seem best to suit the context, and to be justified by the actual procedure of subsequent chapters, and accordingly the following is the way in which the passage is rendered by the Paraphrast. 

λέγωμεν δὴ περὶ αὕτων κατὰ τῶν τρόπων καθ' ὅν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμενεῖ· ἐκθεσμοθεὶ γὰρ τῶν δυσκολίας περὶ αὕτων λόγων, ἄν τὸς μὴ συμβαίνωσι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐλέγχονται, τοὺς μάλιστα ἐνδόξους καταλείποντες βεβαιώσομεν· καὶ οὕτως ἢσται φανερὸς ὁ περὶ αὕτων λόγος. But on looking below we find a sentence answering to, and in fact repeating, the present one in such a way that we cannot help taking it as a decisive guide as to what is here meant. After a statement of the
various ideas, and of the difficulties which they suggest, the writer adds α' μὲν οὖν ἀπορίας τοιαύται τινες συμβαλλοντος, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνέλειν δεί, τὰ δὲ καταλείπειν· ἡ γὰρ λοιπὴ τῆς ἀπορίας ἐβραίεις έστιν (ιι. 12). The words before us, λοιπὴ τὰ δυσχερά, correspond with τὰ μὲν ἀνέλειν (τῶν ἀποριῶν) and with ἡ λοιπὴ τῆς ἀπορίας. It is to be observed, however, that καταλείπειν is used in the one place to refer to the popular ideas, and in the other to the objections (ἀπορίαι) urged against those ideas. τὰ φαινόμενα, as shown by what follows, is here equivalent to τὰ λεγόμενα in § 7, the common sayings and ideas of men. It is used in the same sense, Eth. End. i. vi. 1: πειρατείαν δὲ περὶ τούτων πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίας καὶ παραθεγμάτων χρωμένον τοῖς φαινομένοις.

6—7 The common ideas are now enumerated. They are six in number:

(1) 'That continence and endurance are morally good, while incontinence and softness are morally bad.'

(2) 'That the continent man is he who sticks to his opinion, while the Incontinent man is he who departs from his opinion.'

(3) 'That the Incontinent man errs through his peculiar state, knowing all the while that he is doing wrong; while owing to this knowledge the continent man abstains.'

(4) 'That temperance is the same as continence, and in like manner incontinence is sometimes confused with intemperance.'

(5) 'It is occasionally maintained that wise and clever men may be Incontinent.'

(6) 'That there is such a thing as incontinence of other things beside pleasure, e.g. of anger, of honour, and of gain.'

6 δοκεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Xenophon, Memorab. i. v. 4—5, where it is said that Socrates considered ἐγκράτεια the foundation of the virtues. (Cf. Ib. iv. v. 1, iv. v. 3—7, i1.)

καὶ τῶν σώφρων μὲν ἐγκρατή καὶ καρτεριῶν] The distinction between σωφρασινή, ἐγκράτεια, and καρτέρια, was not accurately maintained either by Xenophon or Plato; cf. Memorab. iv. v. 7, ii. 1, &c. Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 ι: πῶς ἱστοῦ ἐρχοντα Λήγεις; οὐδὲν ποιίλου, ἀλλὰ ἦστε ποτὲ οἱ πολλοὶ, σώφρωνα ὡστα καὶ ἐγκρατή αὐτῶν ἱστοῦ, τῶν ἱδρυῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν ἐρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἱστοῖ. Νεπ. p. 430 Β: κόσμος πον
introduces also an objection to idea (5)—that the wise man may be incontinent. Some fancy that wisdom (though not knowledge in the scientific sense) may coexist with incontinence. But this shows a misconception of the nature of wisdom. The wise man can do no wrong.

6 Contains an objection to idea (4). How can continence be the same as temperance, since the former implies evil desires to be controlled, but the latter is a harmonious state of the moral nature?

7—10 Show the difficulties and absurdities which attach to idea (2), that continence consists in sticking to your opinion. If so it must be bad sometimes; Neoptolemus was incontinent; folly and incontinence combined will produce right actions; the abandoned man will be a more hopeful character than the incontinent, &c.

II. This chapter contains a statement of the objections and difficulties which may be raised against the above-mentioned ideas.

1—4 state the difficulties which attach to the third-mentioned idea—that the incontinent man sins against knowledge. How is this possible? how can one know the best and not do it? Socrates denied the possibility of incontinence altogether, making it convertible with ignorance; but with what kind of ignorance remains to be asked. Others confess that it is not knowledge which is perverted in the mind of the incontinent, but only opinion, i.e. a vague and weak conviction.

5 Continuing the same subject,
thing, as Socrates thought, if knowledge were there, that anything else should master him and twist him about like a slave. Socrates in short was totally opposed to the idea, (arguing) as if incontinence did not exist at all, for he said no one with a conception of what was best could act differently from that best, but he could only so act through ignorance.' On this doctrine of Socrates, and on its connection with the rest of his ethical views, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 125.

The omission of the article before ὅσως appears to show that the real man, and not the personage of Plato's dialogues, is referred to, (see above, note on Eth. vi. xiii. 3), but yet the words of the passage before us have obvious reference to Plato's Protagoras, p. 352 b: δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιούτων τι, οὐκ ἴσχυρόν οὐδὲ ἐγγενείαν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ἢπεί τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν ὑποσταίται, ἀλλ' ἐνοῦσις πολλάκις ἀνθρώπω ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτέ μὲν θυμὸν, τοτέ δὲ ἴδιον, τοτέ δὲ λύπη, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβοι, ἀπεχώρησις διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὡσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, περιληπτικής ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

οὐκ ἐμάχετο] This is repeated in strong terms by the author of the Magna Moralia, ii. vi. 2: Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτες ἀνήρει ὅλως καὶ οὐκ ἐφει ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὡς ὁδῆς εἰδὼς τα κακὰ ὑπ' ὑπόν ὁδόν' ἄν. Cf. Plato Protag. p. 357 ε: ἤ ἐν εἰρήματι ἐπιστήμης ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ ἀναφραίται, &c.

2 οὖστοι μὲν οὖν—φανερῶς] 'Now this reasoning is manifestly at variance with experience, and we require to ask with regard to the state, supposing it to arise from ignorance, what manner of ignorance it is that takes place, for it is plain that the person who acts incontinently does not at all events think (that he must so act) before he gets into the particular state.' ἐνοῦσις here refers no doubt to the actual facts of life, and accordingly the rendering of the Paraphrast is, οὖστοι δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐναιτίος ἐστι τοῖς φανεροῖς. And yet there is probably some allusion also to the ἐνοῦσις mentioned above (i. 5); we may represent the double allusion of the word by translating it 'experience,' comparing with it also the use of τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, Eth. i. viii. 1.

οὐκ οἴεται γε] There seems to be an ellipsis of δὲν πράττειν & πράττειν. Cf. below, iii. 2: ὅ δ' οὖν οἴεται μὲν, διώκει δὲ. The writer argues that if incontinence be ignorance, it is a peculiar kind of ignorance, an ignorance that comes on (γίνεται), not a consistent ignorance; for the incontinent person does not think ignorantly, i.e. wrongly, before the time of temptation.

5 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις—ἀρετάς] 'And besides, it has been previously demonstrated that the wise man is emphatically (γε) one who acts, for his province is to deal with particulars, and he possesses also all the virtues.' πρότερον, cf. Eth. vi. vii. 7, vi. viii. 8 ; τῶν ἐσχάτων is here the genitive of the object, as, in the place last quoted, τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἑστὶν (ἡ φρονήσις.)
Endemus than of Aristotle. The allusion is repeated below, c. ix. § 4. For the sake of observing more accurately the 'noble incontinence' of Neoptolemus, it is worth while to quote at length the passage referred to (Soph. Phil. 895—916).

N. παπάς: 'τι δή; ἂν δρόμιν ἐγώ τοὺν θέντο γε;
Φ. τί θ' ἔστιν, ὡ παῖ; ποὺ ποτ' ἐξέβης λόγῳ;
Ν. οὐκ ὁδ' ὑποκρίτη τάπορον τρέπειν ἐποιο.
Φ. ἀπορεῖς δὲ τοῦ σοῦ; μὴ λέγῃ, ὡ τέκνον, τάδε.
Ν. ἄλλα ἐνεδάδ' ἤδη τούδε τοῦ πάθους κυρω.
Φ. οὐ δή σε δυσχέρεια τοῦ νοσήματος ἐπείσεν ὡστε μὴ μ' ἄγειν ναῦτην ἐτί;
Ν. ἀπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἡπάνων τις δρά τὰ μὴ προσεικον.κότα.
Φ. άλλ' οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ ὑπεύθυνσιν σὺν γε δράς οὐδὲ φονείς, ἐστὶν ἄνδρ' ἐπωφελῶν.
Ν. αἰσχρὸς φανοῦμαι· τοῦτ' ἀνώμαι πάλαι.
Φ. οὐκοῦν ἐν οἷς γε δρᾶς· ἐν οἷς δ' αἰδής ὀκνῶ.
Ν. οὐ ζεύ, τί δρᾶσι; δεότερον ληφθὼ κακός, κράτοιν ὃ καὶ μὴ δεῖ καὶ λέγων αἰσχροτ' ἐπάνω;
Φ. ἀνήρδ', εἰ μὴ ἰχνώ κακὸς γνώμην ἐφὼν, προδοῦς μ' ἐοίκει κάκαλητών τὸν πλοῦν στελεῖν.
Ν. λεπίαν μὲν οὐκ ἔγογξε· λυπηρῶς δὲ μὴ πέμπω σε μάλλον, τούτ' ἀνώμαι πάλαι.

Φ. τί ποτε λέγεις, ὡ τέκνον, ὡς οὐ μανθάνα.
Ν. οὐδέν σε κρύψω. δεῖ γάρ ἐσ Tρολαν 
πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαϊους καὶ τὸν Ἀτρει- 
δών στόλον.

8—9 ἐτι ο σοφιστικῶς—κακὰ πρά- 
ξει] 'Again (if we accept the above- 
mentioned definition of continence) 
the sophistical argument [though 
lying] will cause us perplexity. For 
from the sophists wishing to confute, 
and at the same time astonish (παμά- 
δοξα ἐλέγχων), in order that on suc- 
ceeding they may establish a reputation 
for power,—they construct a piece of 
reasoning which perplexes, since the 
intellect is fettered, on the one hand 
not wishing to abide by a conclusion 
which does not please, and, on the 
other hand, being unable to get loose, 
from having no means of breaking 
the chain of argument. Now from 
one of their reasoning it ensues that 
folly together with incontinence will 
make up virtue; for (he who possesses 
these qualities) does the reverse of 
what he conceives (he ought) by 
reason of his incontinence, but he 
conceives good to be bad and that he 
ought not to do it, and thus he will 
do what is good and not what is bad.' 
In the Oxford edition of Bekker (1837) there is a misprint of μένειν μὲν δὴ. The Berlin edition of Bekker, like all other editions, reads μένειν μὲν μή. The MSS. appear to vary with regard to μὲν (which by some of them is omitted), but not with regard to μή.
The great difficulty in the passage before us is caused by the word ἰσευδόμενος. This is explained either to be (1) an additional adjective to ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος, in which position it has an awkward appearance, or (2) to refer to the well-known puzzle of Eubulides the Megarian, which was called ὁ ἰσευδόμενος, and in logic books 'Mentiens' or 'the liar.' The puzzle was as follows: 'If a man says that he lies, does he lie or speak the truth?' to which of course no simple answer can be given. He may lie, and yet speak the truth in saying that he lies; for if he lies in saying that he lies, then he speaks the truth. This was a specimen of the 'eristic' of the Megarians, which consisted to a great extent in drawing out the difficulties that beset the common forms of language. Chrysippus wrote six books on the puzzle of 'the Liar;' and Philetas of Cos is said to have died of vexation from failing to solve it. Hegel (Geschichte der Philos. ii. 117) compares it to the squaring of the circle. But clearly this puzzle has nothing to do with the subject under discussion in the text. Indeed one might almost fancy that the word ἰσευδόμενος was an interpolation which had crept in owing to the occurrence of the words διὰ τὸ λυπητέοντας ἰσευδόμενον in the line before. The acquaintance of the copyist with the fallacy 'Mentiens' might have tended to shroud the mistake. Evidently the words συμβαινεὶ δ' ἐκ τινος λόγου are an explanation of ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος, and the Paraphrast, seeing this, ignores the word ἰσευδόμενος altogether. Supposing, however, that it be allowed to stand, we must interpret it in a logical sense, not as if it had anything to do with the fallacy of Eubulides. The explanation of it is to be found in the Sophist. Ethnec. of Aristotle, iii. 1–2, where it is said that the aims of the Sophists and Eristics are five in number, ἔλεγχος καὶ ψευδός καὶ παράδοξον καὶ σολοκισμός (making one talk bad grammar) καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιήσαι ἀδολοχήσασα (making one repeat the same thing over and over) ... μάλιστα μὲν ἄρο προαιροῦται φαινεῖται ἐλέγχοντες, δεύτερον δὲ ἰσευδόμενον τι δεικνύοντο, τρίτον εἰς παράδοξον ἁγείν, κ.τ.λ. In the above passage we see that the writer has brought together two of these separate terms, speaking of παράδοξα ἐλέγχειν. It is possible that he may also have qualified the 'sophistical reasoning' with another of these logical formule, though, as before said, its addition presents an awkward appearance. On the eristic of the Sophists, see Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 99–100.
II.—III.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΙΗΜΙΩΝ] VII. 201

οὐ τὰ κακὰ πρᾶξιν.  Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπείσθαι πράξσιν καὶ διό-10
κοινὰ τὰ θέασαι καὶ προσιροφομένους βελτίων ἄν δοξεῖν τῷ μη-
δια λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δ’ ἀκρασίαν ἐπιτάχτερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ
μεταπεισθῶν ἢν. ὁ δ’ ἀκρατὴς ἐνοχὸς τῷ παρομίᾳ εἰς τῇ
φαμέν “ὅταν τὸ ὑδάρ πνίγῃ, τί οἱ ἐπιπίεσειν;” ἐί μὲν
γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ὁ πράττει, μεταπεισθῆσθαι ἢν ἐπαύσαστο-
νῶν δὲ πεπείσθενος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἀλλὰ πράττει. Ἔτι εἰι
περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τῆς οἷς ἀπλοὺς
ἀκρατῆς; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν
ὁ εἶναι τινας ἀπλοὺς. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τιναί τινες
συμβάινουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν οἱ ἤ τὰ ἀδε12
καταλιπέται. ἢ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας ὑπερεῖς ἐστιν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σχετέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ τινὲς 3
εἰδότες, εἶτα περὶ ποια τὸν ἀκρατή καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατή

10 Ἔτι ὁ τῷ—ἔλλα πράττει] ‘Again
he who on conviction and with full
purpose acts and purses pleasure
would seem to be in a better state
than he who does so not from reason-
ing, but from incontinence; for (the
former) is more curable, since there is
a possibility of changing his con-
victions, whereas the incontinent man
is open to the saying “When water
chokes, what must one take to wash it
down?” Had he not been convinced
before with regard to his actions,
there might have been a hope of his
mind being enlightened and his
cessing so to act; but as it is, with
all the conviction in the world, he
still acts contrary to it.’ This is a
reductio ad absurdum of the saying
that incontinence means never acting
on your conviction, and that continence
means sticking to your conviction.
If it were so, intemperance (ἀκολασία)
would seem to be a sort of continence,
and, on the other hand, incontinence
would seem incurable. The reverse,
however, of all this is true. See below
ch. viii.

ei μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο] Some MSS.
omit μὴ, which is not to be wondered
at, as there is a transition of meaning
in the use of ἐπέπειστο: (1) the in-
temperate man is said to act τῷ
πεπείσθαι, i.e. with a wrong conviction,
thinking bad to be good; (2) the in-
continent man acts οὐ τῷ πεπείσθαι,
not by reason of a conviction that he
ought to do as he does; (3) the in-
continent man πεπείσται ἢ πράττει,
has a full conviction with regard to
what he does (i.e. that it is wrong),
but does not abide by that conviction.

12 αἱ μὲν οὖν—ἐστιν] ‘This then
is the kind of difficulties which arise;
part of them we must explain away
(ἀνελεῖσαι), while we leave part un-
answered, for resolving a difficulty is
finding something out.’ Cf. Ar. Meta-
phys. II. i. 2.: ἐστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορήσαι
βουλομένους προβρέγχω τὸ διαπορήσαι
καλῶς. ἢ γὰρ ἐστερον εὐπορία λειψά
τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστι, λέειν
δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀγνοοῦσας τῶν δεσμῶν.
See above, ch. i. 5, note.

III. This chapter discusses that
which is really the most important
and interesting question with regard
to incontinence and the whole nature of the moral will, namely, how is it possible to know the right and yet do the wrong? It treats of the third of the popular opinions mentioned above (ch. i. § 6), and the difficulties arising out of the same (ch. ii. §§ 1-4). The commencement of the chapter is rather confused, as it touches on, without discussing, the nature of the object-matter of continence and incontinence, &c. With § 3 the main question is opened, namely the relation of knowledge to incontinence, and a preliminary step is taken by the assertion that it makes no difference whether it be right opinion or knowledge which the incontinent man possesses, since opinion may be held quite as strongly as knowledge.

In §§ 5—8 it is shown that the real point to be ascertained is, what is meant by knowing or having knowledge. A man may have knowledge which is in abeyance, either because he does not apply a minor premiss to his general principle, or because he is under the influence of sleep, wine, madness, or the like.

9—14 A more intimate examination tells us that there may be two syllogisms in the mind, the one leading to continence and the other to incontinence. The former is not drawn out, but remains in want of a minor premise; the latter through the instincts of sense and desire becomes realised and is acted on. However, the former knowledge cannot be said to have been present in a complete form to the mind, and therefore Socrates was not wrong in denying that knowledge of the right could exist, and yet be overborne.

1—2 There is something awkward in the way in which the questions to be discussed in succeeding chapters are here propounded. The writer might have made it his ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως to consider what is the exact point of difference between continence and incontinence, but as a matter of fact he has not done so. There is a want of art in the sudden announcement (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἤγεται κ.τ.λ.) of the distinction between intemperance and incontinence. The same want of art, proceeding from whatever cause, marks
the whole of these two sections, and the main business of the chapter only commences with section 3.

3—4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. above ch. ii. §§ 3—4. We must dismiss any idea that the phenomena of incontinence can be explained by saying that the incontinent man has only moral opinions, and that opinions are weak. Heraclitus shows' that opinions may be as strongly held as scientific certainties. Of course neither Aristotle nor his school would wish to do away with the distinction which Plato had established between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. It is only as connected with the will, and as forming a ground for action, that opinion can be considered as strong as science.

δηλαὶ δ᾿ Ἡρακλείτου] Heraclitus had a reputation with the ancients for pride and dogmatism; cf. Diog. Laert. ix. i. 5: ἥκουσας τε οὕδενς ἀλλὰ οὗτος ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ’ ἐαυτῷ. ib. ix. i. 1: μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ’ ὑπνίαν καὶ ὑπερπόθησα, ὡς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συγγράμματος αὐτοῦ δήλον ἐκ τῆς φθονῆς: πολυμιθήν μνὸς εἰς διδάσκει. Ἡσιόδου γὰρ ἄν ἐδιδάξει καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὐτὸς τε Ἐυνοφάνει τε καὶ Ἐκατον. εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τῷ σοφὲν ἐπιστάσαι γνῶ­

μὴν ἦτε οἱ ἐγκαθηρησάμενοι πάντα διὰ πάντων.

5 ἀλλὰ ἔπει διεξόντως—θεωροῦν] ‘But since we use the term ‘knowing’ in two senses, both to denote the man who possesses without applying, and the man who applies knowledge, there will be a difference between doing what is wrong, when you have the knowledge but do not attend to it, and doing the same when you have the knowledge and pay attention to it. The latter case seems strange, but not so if you act without attending.’ This distinction between the possessions and the application of knowledge, which is of the utmost importance for explaining moral weakness, was perhaps first started by Plato in the Theaetetus, pp. 197—198, where he introduces his famous image of the pigeon-house. Every knowledge once acquired by the mind is like a bird caught and placed in a pigeon-house; it is possessed, but not available, till it be chased within the enclosure and captured anew.

μὴ θεωροῦντα] theorōn is used to express ‘direct observation,’ just as in Eik. vi. iii. 2: ὅταν ἐξο τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένησα.
6 ἐτι ἐπεὶ—διαμαστῶν] 'Again since the premises (in a syllogism) are of two modes, nothing hinders a man acting against knowledge, although he possesses both these, if he apply only the universal premise, but not the particular, for it is particulars which are the objects of action. Moreover there is a distinction which may be made in the universal itself; part of it applies to the subject (ἐφ') ἐαυτοῦ, and part to the object (ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος), for instance (you may have the universal) "dry things are good for all men," and (the minor premiss) "this is a man," or "such and such is dry:" but (the further knowledge) that "this object is such and such," the person either has not or it is not realised. According then to these different mode of the premises there will be an immense difference (in the way one knows), so that there is nothing paradoxical in (the incontinent man) "knowing" in the way I have specified, but that he should know otherwise would be marvellous.' This section well points out the number of particular applications which have to be made before a general moral principle can be realised and acted on. Else it remains in abeyance, and the man who possesses it may yet act against it.

7 ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν—οἰνομένον] 'For in the case of having and not using we see that the having (τὴν ἔξιν) becomes quite a different thing, so that in such cases a man has (knowledge) after a manner, and has it not, as for instance in sleep, in madness, and in drunkenness.' ἔξις is used here simply as the verbal noun of ἔχειν, as it is in a passage of Plato, already alluded to, which the writer possibly had before his mind, Thetætus, p. 197 α.: ἀκήκοας οὖν δὲ νῦν λέγοντι τὸ ἐπιστήμως:—

"Idos: οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεῖον. —Εἰπὼν ἔξις πον ἔξιν φασίν αὐτῷ εἶναι."
8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν—ἀκρατευμένους] 'Now repeating the words which belong to knowledge is no sign, for those also who are in the states I have mentioned repeat demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who are beginning to learn string the words together without yet understanding them; for (to be understood) a thing must grow up in the mind, and for this time is required. So in short we must suppose that men in a state of incontinence speak just like actors.' This is an extremely subtle observation. The writer having said that passion is like sleep or madness, which make one know and yet not know at the same time, proceeds to remark that men acting incontinently will often speak as if they were fully aware of the nature of their acts. They will say at the very moment of yielding to temptation, 'I know I ought not to do this.' But such words are no sign that the knowledge is really felt and realised; they are only like the verses of Empedocles which a man might mutter in his sleep; they are like the repetition of a schoolboy's task; they are hollow like the ranting of an actor.

ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης] 'That are caused by, are the results of, science.' Cf. Met. 1. iv. 4: ἄλλοι οὕτω ἐκεῖνοι ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης, 'they do it not because of science;' and see below, ix. ix. 6.


9—11 ἐτι καὶ ἀδικεῖ—μοῖχον] 'Again in the following manner one might psychologically consider the cause. There is first a general belief, and secondly a particular belief, which is no longer under the domain of reason, but under that of sense. Now when out of these two a third is created, it is a necessity that the mind should on the one hand assert the conclusion, and in the sphere of practice should straightway carry it out. As for instance, if (there be the general proposition) "one ought to taste all that is sweet," and the particular one "this thing is sweet," it is a necessity that he who is able, and is not hindered, should at once proceed to act upon the knowledge. When therefore there is in the mind one universal which forbids tasting, but another which says, "all that is sweet is pleasant," (having a minor) "this thing is sweet," and thus the second universal is realised,—and supposing that desire happen to be there; (in this case) the first universal says, "avoid this," but desire leads us on (to take it), from the power which it has of setting in motion every one of our organs. Thus the result is that one is incontinent under the sanction as it were of reason and belief, and a belief too which is opposed not directly but only acciden-
tally (to the true knowledge). For it is desire, and not the intellectual belief, which is opposed to the right law. And this consideration leads us to see why it is that brutes are not incontinent, namely, because they have no conception of universals, but only an image and a memory of particulars.

This passage gives an admirable explanation of the way in which a man under temptation may ignore his moral principles. Action (as the writer implies) always depends on a syllogism in the mind, and, if a minor premise was applied to the right moral principle, wrong action could never take place. But it is equally true that the man who acts wrongly does so under some sort of shadow of reason. The story of the temptation of Eve is typical of all similar cases of yielding. There are always arguments and considerations on which the mind, self-deceived and blinded by desire, may form a syllogism. And, as the writer observes, the misleading principle thus applied is not directly false or contrary to what is right. The saying ‘sweet things are pleasant’ is not in itself contrary to the principle ‘intemperance is to be avoided.’ Accidentally and in their effects the two propositions are brought into collision, though not originally opposed.

φυσικῶς] Perhaps ‘psychologically’ is the most representative translation which we can give of this word in the present passage. Psychology was, as we know, considered as a branch of physics by Aristotle, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 237, and cf. Eth. ix. ix. 7.

ηδὴ] A circumlocution is necessary to express what was probably here meant by this word. Cf. Eth. vi. xi. 2.

ἐνθα μὲν] i.e. in the sphere of the reason, to which ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς is opposed. For the latter phrase we should have expected to find ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, a formula which occurs Eth. vi. xi. 4. But in the Eudemian Ethics, ii. xi. 4. exactly the same usage is found: ἀσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὁποθέτεις ἀρχαί, ὅτε καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. It is not easy to say what substantive is understood. Perhaps αἱ πρακτικαὶ (or ποιητικαὶ) ἐπιστήμαι was the original phrase.


τῶν μορίων] i.e. ‘the parts of the body.’ This is mixing up a physical explanation with the account of mental phenomena. The same thing is done
II.

HOIKΩΝ [ΕΥΔΙΜΙΩΝ], VII.

πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἦ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' 11 οὔχ ἦ δόξη, τῷ ὁρών λόγῳ. ἦστε δὲ καὶ διὰ τούτο τὰ ἔσχα τοῖς ἀκρατῇ, ἦταν ὡς εἰκοῦς τῶν καθόλου ὑπολήψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστάς φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. πώς δὲ λύσται ἡ 12 ἀγνοία καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατικός, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ὁμοανεύν καὶ καθευδόντος καὶ οὐκ ὅδος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δὲ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκόουσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξη τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ 13 κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ ἦν ἕχει ὃ ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄν,

in the Peripatetic treatise *De Motu Animalium*; cf. especially with the present passage *De. vili. 5*: διὰ τούτῳ δ' ἠμα δῶ εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὅτι πορευέντων καὶ πορεύεται, ἂν μὴ τι ἐποδίετ' ἐπερον, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄργανα μὴρ παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηθεῖα τὰ πόθη, ἢ δ' ὧρεῖς τὰ πόθη, τίνι δ' ὤτε ἡ φαντασία: αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἡ διὰ νοσήσου ἢ δ' αἰσθήσουσι.

11 The mere intellectual knowledge that a thing is pleasant is not opposed to the moral law. It is only when this knowledge has become desire, i.e. part of the will, which implies acting, that an opposition is felt. Brutes act on desire, but their intellectual apprehension being entirely of particulars, there is a harmony between desire and the data of perception which prevents our attributing incontinence to brutes.—It might be said that there are dawnings of the moral faculty, traces of a sense of right and wrong, in some animals, for instance, dogs; but the writer here does not enter upon the subject. On the meaning given by Aristotle to *phantasia*, see note on *Eth. iii. v. 17*.

12 'Now to explain how the oblivion (ἐγνοει) of the incontinent man is stopped, and how he comes again to the use of his knowledge, requires no special account peculiar to this condition, but the same account as is to be given about (the recovery of) the intoxicated man or the sleeper, for which we must inquire of the physiologists.' The most interesting relic of the speculations of the old physiologists upon the above question which has come down to us, is the account given by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math. vii. 129*) of the opinion of Heraclitus, who thought that our rationality depended upon our communion through the senses with the universal reason that surrounds us; in sleep we become foolish because cut off from all communication with this, except through the act of breathing alone, but on awaking we are again replenished. Τούτῳ δὲ τῶν θείων λόγων καθ' Ἰράκλειτον δ' ἀναπνοῆς σπᾶσατε νοσφόροι γυνόμεθα, καί ἐν ὑπνοῖς λήθαιοι, κατά δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμφρωνες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑπνοῖς μυσάσαντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, χωρίζεται τῆς πρόο το περιέχον συμφοράς ὃ ἐν ἡμῖν νοεῖ, μᾶνης τῆς καθ' ἀναπνοῆς προσφώσεως σωζομένης, οὐνεὶ τίνος δίζης χωρισθεῖς θέται ἀπευθεῖας ἀν πρώτων εἶχε μηνήσασθαι δύσμας. ἐν δὲ ἐγγυηροῦσι πάλιν δ' αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, ὧσπερ διὰ τῶν νυφῶν προ- κύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβάλλων λογικὴν ὤνθεται δύσμας.

13—14 ἐπεὶ δ'—αἰσθητικῆς] 'But the minor premises being a belief with regard to perception of the senses
and being what determines action,—this is either not possessed by a man in the condition we have been describing, or he possesses it in a way in which, as we said (ὡς οὐκ ἦν), possession is not knowledge, but is only a form of words, like the drunken man spouting Empedocles. And since the minor term is not universal and has not the same scientific character as the universal, the question raised by Socrates seems really (κἂν) to be substantiated. For it is not knowledge properly so called that is present when the condition arises, nor is it this which is twisted about by the condition of mind that comes on,—but only per
ceptional knowledge.' This section winds up the discussion of the com
patibility of knowledge with inconstency. The first sentence is clear enough, but there is some little ob
scurity in the saying that perceptional knowledge is present in inconstency, and is overborne by passion. What is meant apparently is, that passion
prevents that perception which would cause the moral principle existent in the mind to be realised. Hence, in short, there is a moral oblivion, and it is quite true that Socrates was justified in saying that inconstency could not take place if knowledge of the right, were really present to the conscious
ness of the actor.

καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου] Lambinus, followed by Fritzsche, places a full stop before these words, and connects them with κἂν ἔσκατον ὁ Σωκράτης. This punctuation has been adopted in the above translation as making far better sense. It must be confessed, however, that the Paraphrast favours the punctu
tation of Bekker. The occurrence of κἂν before ἔσκατον would naturally lead to a full stop being placed after ὁρον, but it might still be justified, as merely giving emphasis to ἔσκατον συμβαίνειν, cf. ch. x. 2: διὸ κἂν δοκοῦσιν ἐνικεῖν κ.τ.λ. Eth. iii. viii. 6: ὅθεν κἂν ὁ Σωκράτης. Ἰβ. § 10, ὅθεν κἂν "Ομηρος.

ἡ τελευταία πρότασις] This phrase is equivalent to ἡ ἐτέρα πρότασις, Eth. vi. xi. 4. The minor premiss is so called as containing the ἔσχατος ὅρος, or minor term, which is mentioned shortly after.

ὡς οὐκ ἦν] With this use of the past tense cf. Eth. v. vi. 9: κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, 'for this is, as we have said, according to law.'

ὅ ἐξῆτε] This is sometimes translated 'what Socrates meant,' for which the Greek would have been ὁ ἰθήκης or ἑυθύλεκτο λέγειν. ὅ ἐξῆτε must mean the questionings or doubts of Socrates, i.e. as to the possibility of acting against knowledge. Cf. Eth. i. iv. 5: Ἐδ γὰρ κἂν Πλάτων ἡπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξῆτε.  

τῆς ἁλαθητικῆς] The phrase ἁλαθητικῆ ἐπιστήμη would to some philosophers
be a contradiction in terms, as they would hold that sensible things cannot be known. A doctrine was attributed to Speusippus, of which we may be here reminded, viz. that besides science there is 'scientific perception.' Cf. Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. vii. 145: "Σπευσίππος δὲ, ἵπτε τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθήτα τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἰσθησίαν ὑπελήφη καθεστάνα τὴν μεταλλαμβάνουσα τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας.

IV. This chapter discusses the question mooted above (ch. i. § 7, ch. ii. § 11), as to whether incontinence is an absolute term, having a definite object-matter, or is merely relative. The answer is very simple. Pleasure is divided into necessary and desirable (§ 2), or into good, bad, and indifferent (§ 5). Incontinence, in an absolute sense, applies only to the necessary or bodily pleasures. It has then the same range of objects as were before assigned to Temperance and Intemperance, and differs from Intemperance chiefly in that it goes against the reason and the will, instead of carrying them on its side. Having thus laid down a definite notion of Incontinence as something absolute and positive, it is easy to see that the idea and the term may be applied in a sort of analogous sense to mean an ill-control of the desires for other kinds of pleasures also, beside the bodily pleasures, e.g. wealth or honour. In such applications we must recollect that the use of the word Incontinence is metaphorical.

1. Eth. Nic. ii. 5: 'Επει δ' ὁ σώφρων ἔστιν περὶ θεών, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δει δὴ λαβεῖν περὶ τινας. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἀπαντα τὰ ἰδέα ὁ σώφρων ἔπιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δῶμαν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τοῦ γενόσου καὶ τὸ ἀπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθεία περὶ τοῦ ἀπτόν, κ.τ.λ. This is of course taken from Eth. Nic. iii. x. 3-8.

tοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν Here commences the apodosis to ἐπει δ' ἐστι, which is a complicated sentence with two parenthases (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα—σωφροσύνην) and (λέγω δ' οὖν—τίδον).

tοὺς μὲν—ἐπειρός ἄρα] 'Those then who with regard to these latter objects
(i.e. good pleasures) transgress that right law which they have within themselves, we do not call simply "incontinent," but we add a qualifying term (προστίθεντες) and speak of them as incontinent of wealth, gain, honour, rage,—not as absolutely incontinent, because they are different from this and are only called incontinent by analogy, as in the phrase "Man that has been victor at Olympia;" there the general conception (of man) differed but little from the special conception of the individual in question, and yet still it was different.† The meaning of this passage is clear, not so however that of the illustration which closes it. It is plain that the word ἀκρατείς when spoken of in relation to anger, money, &c., has a somewhat different sense from the unqualified term ἀκρατής, which implies a certain moral weakness with regard to bodily indulgence. But what is meant by saying that ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλυμπιανὰ μενεκμένος is different from the general conception Man? There appear to be only two explanations possible: (1) that supported by the Scholiast on this place and also the Scholiast on Eth. v. i.,—by Alexander Aphrod. ad Topica i. xvi., by Suidas, and by Eustathius on Ἰλιάδ, l. p. 847; namely, that there was a certain Olympionices whose name was "Ἀνθρώπος. It might be said that this name Ἀνθρώπος was not more distinct from the general term 'Man,' than the term ἀκρατής in the phrase ἀκρατής θυμοῦ is from the general conception of incontinence. The historical tenses διέφερεν and ἔτερος ἦν are in favour of this interpretation. (2) It might be argued that these very tenses had given rise to a conjectural fiction about a person called Ἀνθρώπος. The Paraphrast takes no notice of the tradition, and treats the illustration as a logical one, which would come merely to this, 'the conception of an individual implies a certain diversity from the conception of the genus.' If this be accepted, the past tenses of the verbs must be understood to mean a reference to some previous logical discourse with which the school was familiar. In short the passage must be considered to bear traces of being a scrap from some oral lecture—a hypothesis not to be entirely set aside with regard to parts of the Ἐθικες of Aristotle.
παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατής λέγεται, ὡς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν, καθάπερ ὁργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλοὶς μονον. σημείου δὲ καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταῦτα, περὶ ἐκείνων ὁ οὐδεμίαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἀκρατῶν καὶ τῶν ἀκόλουθων τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆς καὶ σωφρόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τάς αὐτάς πιστῶν ἡδωνᾶς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλουθον ἄν εἰποίμεν, ὡς τις μὴ ἔπιθυμον ἢ ἡμέρα διώκει τὰς υπερθολας καὶ ψεύτη μετρίας λύπας, οὐ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα: τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνων ποιήσεις, εἰ προσγέναιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανική καὶ περὶ τάς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔνδειας λύπη ἰσχυρὰ; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμίων καὶ τῶν ἡδωνῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων· τῶν γὰρ ἡδωνῶν εἰναὶ φύσεις αἰρέτα, τὰ δ' ἐναντία ταύτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρὸς τοῖς, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ χίλια καὶ τιμής· πρὸς ἀπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ἰσχύονται, ἀλλὰ τῶν πιστῶν ὑπερβάλλειν.
5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐνα μὲν ἡδὲ φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν μοιχθεῖα μὲν οὖν] This is an anacoluthon. The sentence ought to form an apodosis and supply a verb to διὸ ὦσι μὲν κ.τ.λ. We therefore require μοιχθεῖα μὲν οὖν οἰσίν, κ.τ.λ.

6 δὲ οἱμοιότητα δὲ[ ] The writer seems here to make a mistake about the history of the word ἀκραθίς, just as before (Eh. v. x. 1) about the history of the word ἐπεικής. Ἀκραθίς in a limited and special sense, to denote want of control over a particular set of desires, is certainly later than the general use of the word, as in the phrase ἀκραθίς ὁργή, κ.τ.λ. Hence the latter is not to be regarded (historically) as a metaphorical extension of the former.

V. This chapter discusses those
kinds of incontinence which are something more than incontinence, being morbid or bestial. Certain pleasures are specified which imply a depravity either of nature or habits. A sort of classification of these is suggested, but the whole style of the chapter is careless and inaccurate.

1 etel 5—[εξε]s] 'Now while some things are natural pleasures, either absolutely so, or relatively to the different races of animals and men, other pleasures are not natural, but depend on physical defects or habits or depravity of the nature; and we may see moral conditions corresponding to each of these latter kinds.' The apodosis to etel is etei kai peri touton. The things which are 'pleasures absolutely' are for instance life and consciousness; while it depends on the constitution of the race whether it be pleasant to live on land or water, &c. In this passage φῶς is used in two senses, (1) φῶςει—in accordance with the entire constitution of things, not only what is, but what ought to be. (This corresponds with head V. in the note on Eth. ii. i. 3.) (2) φῶςει means individual natures, not as they ought to be, but as they are. (See the same note, head IV.)

2 τὰς θηριόδεις i.e. εξείς,

τὴν ἄνθρωπον] 'The female.' The word ἄνθρωπος (in the feminine) was applied contemnuously, as for instance to female slaves. Here it denotes the monstrous nature of the person in question, who was not to be called 'a woman.' Perhaps for the same reason it was applied by Herodotus to the gigantic Phye. Book i. ch. 60: καὶ εἰν τῷ ζατεί πειθόμενοι τὴν γυναίκα εἰσάγω αὐτήν τὴν θεόν προσειχοῦσα τῇ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐθέκοντο τὸν Πεισίστρατον. Who was the monster alluded to in the text is not known. It appears a mere fiction of the Scholiast to connect her with the Lamia mentioned by Horace, A. P. 340.

touσ δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλῆλοις eis εὐχαίριον] 'And others (they say) lend their children to each other (in turn) to be served up as a banquet.'

Cf. 2 Kings vii. 26–29, where the same horrible arrangement is said to have been made under the compulsion of famine. The shores of the Black Sea seem to have had a character for cannibalism. Cf. Ar. Pol. viii. iv. 3: πολλὰ δ’ ἐστὶ τῶν θυμῶν & πρὸς τὸ κτεῖνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχερές εξείς, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνδροί.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαρν λεγόμενον] Some story now lost, which is apparently referred to again in § 7.

3 αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ νόσους—αἱ δὲ νοση-
ματώδεις] These clauses are a repetition of each other, the style is unfinished.

η τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν] It is important to observe here the strong terms in which the unnatural character of these practices is denounced. An equally strong and more explicit passage occurs in the Laws of Plato, p. 636 b, where the advantages and disadvantages of the gymnasia and syssitia are discussed: Καὶ δὴ καὶ παλαιῶν νόμων δοκεῖ τούτο τὸ ἑπτή-δεκαμα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδισία ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων διεφθαρκέναι. Καὶ τούτων τὰς ὑμετέρας πόλεις (Sparta and Crete) πρῶτα ἀν τις αἰτιότα καὶ ύσαι τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἀποκεκόμηται τῶν γυμνασίων· καὶ εἰτε παῖζοντα εἴτε στοιχεῖα ἐννοεῖν δεὶ τὰ τυχαῖα, ἐννοητέον διὸ τῇ θυρείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρέσχον φύσει eis κοινωνίαν λυόντι τῇ γενήσεις η ἐπὶ ταύτα ἡδωνή κατὰ φύσιν ἁπαθεῖόν ταῦτα, δοκεί, διπλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἡ θηλείαν

πρὸς θυρείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρῶτων τὸ τόλμημα εἶναι δι’ ἀκράτειαν ἢδονῆς.

4—5 ὅσοι, μὲν ὁὐν—λεκτόν] 'Where nature is the cause, one cannot call people incontinent, just as no one would find fault with women for being not male but female; and it is the same with those who by habit have superinduced a morbid condition. To possess, indeed, any of these tendencies is beyond the pale of vice, just as bestiality is; and if a person possesses them, his subduing them or being subdued by them is a matter not of simple incontinence (or continence), but is the analogous kind, exactly as a man who is in this condition with regard to his angry passions may be called (incontinent of anger), but not simply incontinent.' What the writer here implies is quite true, that morality requires for its sphere certain natural conditions of body and mind. In states that are entirely morbid, whether originally so or from the
effects of an ill-regulated life, the distinctions of right and wrong are no longer applicable. Cf. ch. vii. 7.

7 eι Φάλαιρος κατείχεν] 'Had Phalaris refrained.' With this use of κατείχεν, cf. Aristoph. Peace, 944, where it is applied to a wind lulling:

ἐπειγέτε νῦν ἐν ὅσῳ σοβαρά θεόδον κατείχει παλέμον μετάπτωσις ἀβρα.

And Soph. Ἐδ. Ῥαξ, 782:

κάγω βαρυθεῖς τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ἤμεραν μὸλις κατέσχον.

VI. It having been repeatedly laid down that there are some kinds of incontinence not simply to be called so without a qualification, there now follows a comparison of some of these kinds, from a moral point of view, with incontinence proper. Incontinence of anger is not so bad as incontinence of lust, (1) because there is more semblance of reason in anger; (2) because anger is more a matter of constitution; (3) it admits of less deliberate purpose; (4) because anger is exercised under a sort of pain, and not in wantonness. As to the rest, incontinence which exceeds the pale of human weakness is more horrible, but at the same time is rarer, and less mischievous, than vice.
tiμωρίαν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ὡς Φαντασία ὅτι ὃθερς ἢ ὑλιγνωρία ἐσχάλτωσεν, ὃ δὲ ὀστερ συλλογισάμενος ὃτι δὲι τῷ τοιαύτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει· ὥς εὕθες· ὃ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἓν μόνον εἶπη ὅτι τοῦ ὁ λόγος ἢ ὅ τι αὐτήσεις, ὃρμά ἐν τῷ ἀπόλαυσιν. οὐσθ' ὃ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολούθηκε τῷ λόγῳ ποιεῖ, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία ὁσ. αἰσχρόν ὁδό. ὃ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατης τοῦ λόγου ποικ ἦττάται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὗ τοῦ 2 λόγου. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολούθηεν

1 ὃ μὲν γὰρ λόγος—οδ' 'For first (μὲν) reason or fancy tells that there is insin or slight, and then (anger) drawing a sort of conclusion, "I must fight with such and such," forthwith rages accordingly. But desire, if reason or sense merely assert that a thing is pleasant, rushes to the enjoyment of it; so that anger in a way follows reason, but desire does not.' 

Φαντασία here seems nearly to correspond to our word 'fancy,' which has of course grown out of the Greek term, though it has come to imply widely different associations. We are told in Ar. De An. iii. iii. 15 that φαντασία may be mistaken. See the note on Elkh. iii. v. 17.

The present passage might seem discrepant from ch. iii. § 10, ἄπαντες συμβαίνει ἣν ἄπώλου παρακολουθεῖσθαι, where incontinence is said to have some sort of reasoning in what it does. And if the comparison were exactly carried out, it would probably appear that incontinent anger had no more reason in it than incontinent desire. But it is true that anger is fundamentally based on an idea of justice, however wild that idea may be. Hence there is a peculiar force in συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δὲι. And hence too anger is a less immediately selfish passion than desire. It is less debasing in the long run to the character.

On anger, cf. Elkh. v. viii. 10: οδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ γεγένεται ἢ μὴ ἤμφασβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινόμενη γὰρ ἀδικία ἢ ὄργη ἐστίν: and Ar. Rhet. ii. 1: "Ἔστω δὴ ὄργη ὄρεξι μετὰ λόγης τιμωρίας φαινόμενης διὰ φαινομένης ὑλιγνωρίας. The illustrations in the text comparing anger to an overhasty servant who runs off before he has heard half the message, or to a dog who barks without waiting to see who it is, are most admirable.

2 The next plea urged in favour of anger is that it is more natural (or, we might say, constitutional) than desire: in support of which two humorous stories are told in the text (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 165). The argument appears somewhat contradictory to Elkh. ii. iii. 10: ἔτι δὲ χαλεπάτειν ἰδον ὄνταν μάθεσθαι ἢ ὄντα αὐτῷ, καθάπερ φολοῦ Ἰμάκλειτος. However, when we look closely at the text, we find that it is 'excessive and unnecessary desire' with which anger is here compared (τῶν ἐπιθυμιών τῶν τῆς ἐπεμβολῆς καὶ τῶν μη ἀνάγκαιων). This no doubt makes the above assertion true, but it gives a new conception of incontinence, as compared with the mention of ἀνάγκαια ἢδεια, c. iv. § 2. It sets incontinence too much in the light of ὕπομή. But indeed the vagueness of the term ἀκρασία, and the uncertainty as to what it exactly implies, must be felt throughout the present discussions.

With regard to anger, it is true that hot temper is frequently consti-
Incontinence of desire is full of wantonness and exultation, while anger implies pain and suffering. This argument is similar to that used, Eth. III. xii. 2, to prove that temperance is more voluntary than cowardice.

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While he who wantons acts with pleasure, there seems to be a double meaning in this passage to the word ἐρηται, exactly as there might be to our word 'wantonness.' It first means 'to act insolently' or 'wantonly' in a general sense, and second, it means to 'act wantonly' in a particular sense, i.e. lasciviously.

The difference between continence and incontinence, which with other things is treated of in the next chapter. There is a want of method about the sequence of different parts in this book. The reference which follows, ὀσπερ εἰρηται κατ᾽ ἀρχάς only goes back to ch. v. 1, and gives colour to a suspicion that the book may have been put together out of separate pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of which may have commenced with the fifth chapter.

Hence we do not call brutes either temperate or intemperate, except by a metaphor, and where it happens that one whole race of animals in comparison with another is remarkable for wantonness it may be (τινα), or lechery, or voracity; for (animals) have no purpose or reasoning, but are beside themselves like madmen. Different races of animals have good or bad moral characteristics ascribed to them. The goat, the ass, and the monkey have a bad reputation for wantonness, and the shark, &c., for voracity. It is not quite clear what is meant by ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως. Perhaps it may best be taken to imply not that animals transgress their own nature, but simply that they get into a state of ecstasy, like madmen, and have no senses nor any principle which would justify their being called either temperate or intemperate.

Now bestiality is less evil than vice, but it is more fearful, for in it the good principle is not corrupted, as in a man, but does not exist. Therefore (comparing bes-
tiality with vice) is like comparing what is inanimate with a living thing, and asking which is worse. Evil is always less harmful when it has no guiding principle, and reason is the guiding principle. So it is just like comparing injustice with an unjust man; each is in a different sense worse. A bad man will do ten thousandfold more evil than a beast.'

έχει] sc. τὸ θήριον. The whole passage is briefly expressed, but perhaps requires no further comment.

VII. This chapter, after a general comparison between intemperance and incontinence (§ 1-3), makes some remarks on endurance, softness, and childishness (§ 4-7); and ends by distinguishing two kinds of incontinence, of which the one proceeds from impetuousity, the other from weakness of character.


έστι μὲν—κείρους] 'It is possible to be in such a state as to yield to things that most men are superior to, and again it is possible to overcome things that most men yield to. Of those who possess these opposite dispositions, with regard to pleasures, the first is an incontinent man, and the second a continent man; with regard to pains, the first is soft and the second enduring. But the state of the majority of mankind lies between these opposites, albeit men verge rather to the side of the worse.' Moral designations may be fixed either in relation to the standard of what is, or of what ought to be. Cf. Eth. iii. xi. 4: τῶν γὰρ φιλότοισοντων λεγομένων ἢ τῶν χαρίσμων ὁ μὲν ἀτέ, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον ὢν πολλοὶ, Eth. iv. iv. 4: ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὢν πολλοὶ, ψιγνοῦτες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὢν δέ. The above passage fixes the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent' relatively to what is, as implying more or less continence than people in general have. And yet there is evidently some reference beside to the standard of what ought to be, else it could not be said that people in general verge rather to the worse side. To represent the majority of mankind as possessing a mediocre moral character, neither eminently
good nor bad, but inclining to weakness, was in accordance with the Greek point of view. Widely different from this was what may be called the Semitic point of view, which, regarding man with greater religious earnestness, attributed to him 'desperate wickedness.' The latter feeling was not confined to the Jews and to the pages of the Bible, but in some degree made itself known to the world in the Stoical philosophy. See Essay VI. p. 261 &c.

2 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνιαὶ-ἀνίατος] 'Now as some pleasures are necessary, but others are not to be called so, as being (καὶ) only necessary in certain degrees, while their excesses or deficiencies are not necessary, (and the same division holds with regard to desires and pains), he who pursues excessive pleasures, or who pursues pleasures not in themselves excessive in an excessive way, and does so from deliberate purpose, with no ulterior aim beyond the pleasures themselves, is abandoned (ἀκόλαστος), (and he may well be called so), for it stands to reason (ἀνάγκη) that he is not likely to repent, and so he is incurable; for without repentance there is no cure.'

οὖθα αἰ ἐλλεῖψεις] This might seem superfluous. But what is meant is, that in some pleasures the μέσον is good and necessary. Cf. below, ὅ δ' ἐλλεῖψεις ὁ ἀντικείμενος.

ἡ καθ’ ὑπερβολάσ ἤ διὰ προαιρέσειν] The Paraphrast well expresses the meaning of this passage as follows: ὅ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκει τῶν ἠδονῶν, καὶ ἡ τάς φύει μεγάλας ἀεὶ ζητῶν ἠδονᾶς, ἡ τάς φύει μετρίας ὑπερβολ- λόντως ζητῶν, οὓς ἐλκύόμενοι βιαστὶ ποιοὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ προαιρέσεως ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τρέχον, οὐ δὲ ἄλλο τι, δέχειν, φέρει εἰπεῖν, ἡ κέρδος, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰς δὲ οἰκτρὰς, ἀκόλαστος. It is plain that ἤ before διὰ προαιρέσειν in the text must be a mistake. One of Bekker's MSS. reads καὶ—which would be very easily changed into ἤ, especially with the clause ἤ καθ’ ὑπερβολάς preceding. It would answer also to the expansion of the Paraphrast, οὐχ ἐλκύο- μενος κ. τ. λ.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ] If a man with deliberate purpose pursues pleasure for its own sake, he is not likely to repent of his course, therefore he is ἀκόλαστος. This is the first intimation we have had that an unrepenting character belongs to 'intemperance'; it is an irregular argument, unless we regard it as laying some stress on the etymology of the word ἀκόλαστος. Cf. Eik. iii. xii. 5-7, iv. i. 5.
mias, aste diaferousin allhlan. Pau'ti d' an do'zeis chei-
rov einai, ei tis mh epitoumwn h' hrema prattai ti as xorwn,
' ei sfoora epitoumwn, kai ei mh orhizomenos tuptoi h' 
ei orhizomenos. Ti gar an epoiei en pathi mwn; did o akol-
lastos cheirin tou akратous. Twn dh leghentwn to mu
malakias eidos malallon, o d' akolastos. Antikeitaidei de tiw
mhn akratei o egkathtis, tw d' malakhi o karteriko. To
mhn gar karterein etstiv en tw anethein, h' egkrateia en
to karatein, eteron de to anethein kai karatein, tsperei kai
to mu hpettasotai tou nika kai airopoton egkratei-
tenia karterias etstiv. O d' elleipan proos o oin polloi kai 5
anhteinou kai ouxanai, oustos malakos kai truph, kai
gar h truph malakia tiei etstiv. Oe elkei to imatov, ina
mu ponsi thn ap tov airopon lutn, kai meromumenos tov
kaimontai oux oietai abhios einai, abhios omoios ov, oimoio

3 aste diaferousin allhlan] 'So
that they are distinct from one
another,' i.e. on the one hand the
reprobate (akolastos), in his two forms of
systematically seeking pleasure, and
of systematically avoiding pain; and
on the other hand the morally weak,
whether in the form of yielding to the
allurements of pleasure (akrathtis), or
flying from the pressure of pain
(malakos). The comparison is not
between the two forms of the mh
proairopomena, but these are together
contrasted with akolasia.

pauti d' en do'zeis] A repetition of
ch. iv. § 4, on which see note.

twn dh leghentwn to mhn malakias
eidos malallon, o d' akolastos.] The
temptation is great to refer twv dh
leghentwn to twv mh proairopomenwn,
and to read akrathtis for akolastos,
taking the sentence in connection with
what follows. Wilkinson does so
without any variation of the MSS, to
justify him, although the Pamphrast
has akrathtis. But when we consider
(1) the unanimity of MSS.; (2) that
malakia has been already distinguished
from akratia, in § 1; (3) the import of
malallon, we shall be led to see that
the sentence comes in, though rather
in a disjointed way, to wind up the
comparison here made generally be-
tween incontinence and intemperance,
(cf. ch. vi. § 5, and above, § 1). In-
continence may be said to be more
like a kind of softness, while deter-
minate vice is something different.
Malakia, according to this interpre-
tation, is used here in a general sense,
in the next section with a special
and limited import.

4 Continence, it is argued, is finer
than endurance, just as victory is finer
than holding out. This argument is
not sound, since continence is in
reality nothing more than holding out
against temptation. To noble natures
continence would doubtless cause a
greater struggle than mere endurance
of pains; and in this sense it might be
called finer.

5 o d' elleipan—oomos d'v] 'Now
he who faints before things against
which most men hold out and are
strong,—he is soft and luxurious, (for
luxury, it may be added, is a kind of softness), he for instance who trails his cloak, rather than have the trouble of lifting it, and who imitates the languor of an invalid, without seeing that it is miserable to be like one who is miserable.' This passage is somewhat in the style of the Characters of Theophrastus. To illustrate the affection of weakness described above, Coray quotes from Athenaeus a story of the Sybarites, one of whom said that he had been in the fields, and that 'to see the men digging had given him a rupture.' To which his friend replied, that 'the very mention of it gave him a pain in his side.'


Καρπίνου] Of this tragic poet nothing appears to be known.

Χιονοφάντως] Giphanius finds in Seneca, De Ira, ii. 2, a mention of Xenophon as a musician of Alexander the Great.

οίον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεύσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος] Aspasius for Σκυθῶν reads Περσῶν. But the commentators refer us to Herodotus i. 105: τοῖς δὲ τῶν Σκύθων συλήσας τῆς ρήματος ἐκείνου, ἐπεὶ ἀνάπαυσις τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταυτήν ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδισόδης ἐστίν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προτέτεια τὸ δὲ ἀσθένεια: οἱ μὲν γὰρ θλιβομαίνοντες οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐξεβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ
VII.]

ΠΟΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VII.

πάθος, οί δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἀγοῦνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔναι γὰρ, ὡσπέρ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προσομοιέναι καὶ προδοῦντες καὶ προσγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὕτω ἤττούνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὐτ' ἂν ἦδο ἢ οὔτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα οἱ οἶξείς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετὴ ἀκρασίαν εἶσιν ἄκρατεῖς· οί μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτητα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφορότητα ὅψις ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοῦ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

and sometimes weakness. Some men, when they have deliberated, do not abide by their deliberations, owing to the state into which they are thrown, (and this is weakness): while others, from never having deliberated, are carried away by their feelings. Some on the contrary, like the beginners in a tickling match, who cannot be tickled,—having prescience, and foresight, and having roused up themselves and their reason beforehand, are not overcome by their feelings, whether pleasant or painful. It is especially persons of a quick or bilious temperament who are subject to the impetuous kind of incontinence, for the one through the rapidity, and the other through the intensity; of their nature, do not wait to see what is the law of right, because they are apt to follow impressions.'

Ὡσπέρ οἱ προγαργαλίσαντες The Paraphrast understands ἑαυτοῖς, rendering the passage ὡσπέρ τὰ προστριβίντα καὶ προγαργαλ σθέντα μέλη οὐ γαργαλίζονται. And two of Bekker's MSS. read οἱ προγαργαλίσαντες. It might be possible by previous tickling to exhaust the irritability of the cuticle, but this would not be a usual process, and in one of the Problems attributed to Aristotle (xxxv. vi.) it is discussed, 'Why cannot a man tickle himself?' To which the answer is, 'For the same reason that he can hardly be tickled by anybody else if he knows that it is going to happen. For laughter implies a sudden revulsion and a surprise.' Surely this is exactly what is meant in the text.

οἱ δὲ οἶξείς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ] An account which seems at first sight the opposite of this is given by the author of the Μεγεία Μοράλια (v. vi. 43): 'Εκείνη μὲν οὖν (the impetuous kind of incontinence) οὐδ' ἢ λεῖν δόξεις εἶναι φεκτῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ τουαότητα ἐγκίνεται, ἐν τοῖς βερμοῖς καὶ εὐφυέσιν· ἡ δὲ (the weak kind) ἐν τοῖς ψυχρῶις καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι φεκτοὶ. If however we consult the curious disquisition on μελαγχολικοί καὶ μελαγχολικοί, o haul toioûto phsakoû. If we however we consult the curious disquisition on μελαγχολικοί καὶ μελαγχολικοί, o haul toioûto phsakoû.
warmth, passion, and eccentricity of genius. Cf. Plato, Repub. 573 c: "Τώραννὸς δὲ, ἴν ἂν ἡγούμενος, ἀνήρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν τῇ φύσει ἢ ἑπιστήμηι ἢ ἀριστεροῖς μεθυστικοῖς τε καὶ ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς γένηται. Cf. also Ar. Prob. xi. xxxviii: τὸ τῆς φαντασίας ἀκολουθεῖν ταχῶς τὸ μελαγχολικὸν εἶναι ἐστὶν. In the language of our own day, 'The passionate heart of the poet is whirl'd into folly and vice.' For more remarks on μέλανα χολή, see below.

VIII. This chapter is not separated by any marked logical boundary from the preceding one. Rather it is a continuation of the same subject, as it goes on comparing incontinence with intemperance. Two previously mooted questions are now discussed, namely, is intemperance more culpable than incontinence? (which is answered in the negative), and, is incontinence to be regarded as absolutely bad? (See above ch. i. § 6). This is also answered in the negative.

1 "Εστι δ' ὃ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὗ μεταμελητικός" Cf. c. vii. § 2. The continuity of the subject is preserved, if we consider that the writer, having mentioned the various ways in which incontinent people submit to temptation, next reflects that, after yielding, these are all repentant (μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς), while the intemperate man forms a contrast to them, and is unrepentant.

2 ἀυτὸν δὲ τούτων βελτίως οἱ ἑκστατικοὶ ὅταν τὸν λόγον ἐχοντές μὲν, μη ἐμμένοντες δὲ ὑπ' ἐλάττων γὰρ πάθους
where it is said of Ajax, ἐκστατικὸς ἐγκεύτωτος παντελῶς (i.e. mad). Cf. above ch. vi. § 6. Ἐκστατικὸς is used presently (§ 5) in a different sense to express 'departing from' a purpose, as also before, ch. i. § 6, and ii. § 7.

οἱ τῶν λόγων ἔχοντες] On this phrase see Eth. vi. i. 1, and note.

ἔμοιον γὰρ—οἱ πολλοὶ] 'For the man who is weakly insectent is like those who are soon intoxicated, and by a small quantity of wine, less than intoxicates people in general.' ὅ ἀκρατῆς seems used in this sentence as if specially applicable to the weak kind of incontinence. It is in contrast to ἐκστατικὸς. Weakness is worse than being carried away by passion, for it is acting against warning, and with less temptation.

3 Incontinence is not vice, though it resembles vice in what it does (κατὰ τὰς πράξεις), but it goes against the will, while vice goes with the will. It is like the saying of Demodocus against the Milesians. 'The Milesians are not fools, but they act just as if they were fools.' The incontinent are not bad, but they do wrong.

Δημοδόκου] This was an epigrammatist of the island of Leros, not far from Miletus. Some of his epigrams against different cities are preserved in the Anthology.

ἀδικώσθη] In the general sense 'do wrong.' Cf. Eth. v. ii. 2.

4 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ—ἐναρτήσας] 'For virtue on the one hand preserves, while vice destroys, the major premiss. Now the end is in action just what the hypotheses are in mathematics, namely, a major premiss on which everything depends; hence, neither in the one case nor in the other is it the chain of inference (ὁ λόγος) that demonstrates the major premiss, but in the case of action (ἐναρτά) it is virtue either natural or acquired to which a right opinion with regard to the major premiss is due. He who possesses this is temperate, while the contrary person is intemperate.' This passage comes in as a final argument against the notion that incontinence is more ennable than intemperance. In the latter the fountain-head of action (the ἀρχὴ) is destroyed. While the temperate man has in himself the source of all good action, the intemperate man is the direct opposite, and the
incontinent man is something intermediate.

η δὲ σώζει] cf. Eth. vi. v. 6, where almost all the ideas which occur above are given, even the reference to mathematical axioms. Ib. ch. xii. § 10: where a still more explicit statement is made of the relation of virtue to the practical syllogism.

αι ὑπόθεσεις] This term is used precisely in the same way in the Eudemian Ethics, ii. x. 20: ρεί μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐδὲς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τούτ’ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὁπερὲν ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπόθεσεις ἐγρηγοροῦσι, δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχίονοι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δὲ ἀκριβείαι (i.e. the Analytics of Eudemus). Cf. Ib. ch. xi. § 4: ὁπερὲν γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑπόθεσεις ἀρχαὶ, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. In Eth. Eud. vii. ii. 4, ὑπόθεσις is used as equivalent to ἀρχή.—(§ 3) ρεῖ τούτων . . . περιτέων διαρκέστερα, λαβούν μὲν ἀρχὴν τῆς . . . τούτων δὲ διαφανείον ληπτῶν ὑπόθεσιν ἔτερον. Plato, Repub. p. 510 —511, reproaches mathematics with always resting on hypotheses of which they can give no account. P. 510 c: οἷμα γὰρ σε εἰδέναι διάνει τις περὶ τῶν γεωμετριῶν τέλη λογισμοῦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέτειν τὸ τε περιτόν καὶ τὸ ὄρατον καὶ τὰ ξήματα καὶ γομμῶν τριτᾶ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ’ ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὃς εἶδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὔδενα λόγον οὕτω αὐτοῖς οὖσα ἀλλοις ἐπὶ ἀξίωσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὃς παντὶ φαινέρας, ἐκ τούτων δ’ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ὧδε διεξάγετε τελευταίοις ὁμολογομένως ὑπὸ τοῦτο, οὐ δι’ εἴπι σκέψιν ἀρχηγοῦσιν. Aristotle, Post. Anal. i. ii. 7, defines thesis or assumption as an immediate syllogistic principle, indemonstrable, but not (as the axioms are) a necessary antecedent to all reasoning. He divides theses into hypotheses and definitions, which differ in that the former assert existence or non-existence, while the latter do not. The hypothesis then is a peculiar principle (οἰκεία ἀρχή), and differs from an axiom, (1) in that it varies in the different sciences; (2) in that it is wanting in recognisable necessity. (Cf. Post. Anal. i. x. 6: οὐκ ἐστὶ δ’ ὑπόθεσις . . . δ’ ἀνάγκη εἶναι δι’ αὐτὸ καὶ δοκεῖν ἀνάγκην.) The Aristotelian hypothesis is however widely different from the hypothesis of the moderns, which means in short little more than a conjecture. For more particulars on this subject see Mr. Poste’s Logie of Science (Oxford, 1850), p. 139—143.

tοῦ ὀρθοδοξεί] By what the grammarians call σεγωμα, this genitive goes with τῶν ἀρχῶν, as governed by διδασκαλίκος. One would have expected αἰτία.
The other hand is not at all deaf to the voice of persuasion, it is only the voice of passion when opposed to reason which he resists. Nor is a man to be called incontinent if he deserts a resolution, even for the sake of pleasure. Since Neoptolemus deserted his resolution to deceive, in order to obtain the noble pleasure of preserving his honour.

1. ἢ ὁ τῷ ἑφεδρίῳ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ Various solutions have been proposed for the difficulty involved in this sentence. (1) Aspasius, followed by Argyropulus, Fritzsche, &c., think that ἐμέμενα is to be understood as carried on from μὴ ἐμέμενα in the line before. But this will not do. The ἄκρατης cannot be said to 'abide by a false opinion.'

(2) Some understand the clause as applying to cases like those of Neoptolemus. 'Is a man incontinent who does not stick to a false opinion?' But all this is implied in ὁ ὀπισθὸς κ.τ.λ. And moreover this interpretation would give a new sense to ἢ, making it a particle of opposition instead of a particle of contrast, which is required for the sake of correspondence with the opening sentence. (3) One of Bekker's MSS. reads τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ. This is a very natural correction to make, and it seems followed by
the Paraphrast, who has ο μὴ ἐμμένων τῇ ὁρᾷ. But since the correction is so natural, why should such a preponderance of MSS. have failed to adopt it? Though the sense absolutely requires some such reading, it seems better to conclude that there is some original confusion in the text. The author may have carelessly written as above, from a mistaken antithesis to ἡ ἡ τῇ ὁρᾷ in the former sentence.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τῷ πρῶτον] One chooses the means ‘accidentally.’ This is a mere illustration of the import of καθ’ αὐτὸ and συμβεβηκός. The whole paragraph seems perfectly irrelevant. It may be compared with Eth. v. xi. 8: καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ τῶν φαίλων, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ’ οὖθεν καλῶς μείζων εἶναι καλὸν, which is a weak qualification of the moral principle, that to injure is worse than to be injured.

2 ἀστερ ὁ ἀσωτος κ.τ.λ.] The same illustrations are coupled together in the Eudemian Ethics iii. vii. 14: τὸ λαμβάνειν ἢ τὸν ἐναντίον φαινέται, οἷον πέσαντο τῷ βράσος πρὸς τῷ ἄρασι καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

ο ἀσωτος — ἦδον ἐν.] ‘But the obstinate man (is immovable) not from the influence of reason, for such men assuredly admit desires, and many of them are carried away by the allurements of pleasures.’ The curious phrase ἐπιθυμιάς λαμβάνομεν occurs in the Eudemian Ethics, iii. ii. 13: πάντες γὰρ τούτων φύσει τε χαίρουσιν, καὶ ἐπιθυμιάς λαμβάνομεν.

4 οὖν ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ] See above ch. ii. § 7, note.
Incontinent is the state which has good laws, but does not act upon them. The bad man like a state with a bad code, which she carries out. Both the terms incontinence and continence are used comparatively, as implying more firmness than is common, or less. Of the two kinds of incontinence, that which is caused by passion is more curable than that caused by weakness, that which proceeds from habit is more curable than that which is natural.

5 cal ovd, oivetera, metadinei. This is an Atticism for kal ovd, oivetera, metadinei. The attempt to make continence into 'a mean' can hardly be called successful. It can only be done by assuming the same ἁλεψις for this quality as for temperance. You will have one set of terms, ἀκολουθία, σωφροσύνη, ἀναισθησία, and another set ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια, ἀναισθησία. It is plain that ἐγκράτεια is not a mean, in the sense of being a balance, or harmony of the mind. It is only imperfect temperance, it is temperance in the act of forming.

6 ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἢ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὀμοιότητα ἡκολουθήκει. 'The "continence" of the temperate man has come to be called so derivatively (ἡκολουθήκει) and by analogy.'
The image contains a page of text in Greek, which is a classical language. The text appears to be a philosophical or scholarly work, possibly discussing ethical or moral concepts. Without translating the content, it's difficult to provide a meaningful summary. The pagination suggests it is from a larger work, possibly a book or a collection of essays. The text is dense and formatted in a classical manner, with paragraphs structured according to the syntactical and grammatical rules of ancient Greek language.
In Plato, *Republic*, p. 352 c, the term ἡμιμόχθρος is used, in proving that there must be honour even among thieves.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίθυμοι] Though lust as compared with anger is called ἐπίθυμοι (cf. ch. vi. § 3), yet it is true on the other hand that the incontinent man is not a designing character.

οὔτε μὲν ἡμιμόχθρος] Cf. above ch. vii. § 8, ch. viii. § 2.

ὥσπερ 'Αναξαγόριδης] A Rhodian comic poet, who is said to have satirized the Athenians. Aristotle mentions one of his plays, the *Γεροντομαχία* (*Rhet.* iii. xii. 3). Also a famous saying of his (*Lb.* iii. xi. 8), 'Ἀναξαγόριδον τὸ ἐπαυνομένον—

καλὸν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν βανατόν δρῆν ἢξιον.

And another witticism (*Lb.* iii. x. 7).

Cf. Athenaeus, *Deipnosoph.,* ix. 16.

4 τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως] Cf. ch. vii. 1, note.

ὥσπερ καὶ Ἑρμής] An elegiac and gnomic poet of Paros, who appears to have been a contemporary and friend of Socrates.

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον κ.τ.λ.] 'Habit sticketh long and fast, Second nature 'tis at last.'

μελέτην] 'That which is acquired by culture and habit.' That habit is 'second nature,' we are told by Aristotle, *De Mem.* ii. 16: ὥσπερ γὰρ φῶς ἤδη τὸ ἑδός, διὸ καὶ πολλάκις ἔννοιαν ταχὺ ἀναμμηνησκόμεθα: ὥσπερ γὰρ φῶς ἐνδέκα τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἑστίν, ὅτως καὶ ἐνεργεία: τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φῶςι ποιεῖ.
XI. We now come to a treatise upon the nature of Pleasure. With regard to the authorship and character of this treatise see the remarks in Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 34 and 38, and Essay III. p. 145. A notable scholiast discovered by Professor Brandis in the Vatican, and quoted by Spengel and Fritzsche, attributes it to Eudemus, though in a merely conjectural way; see below ch. xiii. § 2, note.

In the outset of the Eudemian Ethics, a discussion on Pleasure is promised in terms which correspond both to the contents and the position of the present chapters. (Eth. Eud. i. v. 11.) τούτων δ’ (i.e. with regard to the three kinds of life) ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σάματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἠδονῆς, καὶ τὸς καὶ πολα τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὗ διδόλου, ἄστε ὦ τίνες εἰσὶ δει κτετεινμεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ συντείνοντι τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ, καὶ πᾶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότεν εἰ δεῖ προσάπτει τῇ ζην καλὰς ἠδονὰς τινὰς, ταῦτα δει προσάπτει, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλων τίποτον ἀκάθεκτον κοινωνίαν, ἄλλη δ’ εἰσιν ἠδοναὶ δι’ ἀς εὐλογίως συνεται τὸν εὐδαιμονίας ζην ἠδείας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἄλλως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπισκεπτοῦν, περὶ δ’ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν. It is quite in agreement with the terms of this program that the present treatise is prominently concerned with the discussion of bodily pleasure (ἡ περὶ τὰ σάματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἠδονῆς). At the close of the Eudemian Ethics there is also a reference backward to these chapters (Eth. Eud. viii. iii. 11): καὶ περὶ ἠδονῆς δ’ εἶρηται ποιῶν τι καὶ πῶς ἠγαθῶν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἠδεία καὶ καλὰ, καὶ τὰ (γε) ἀπλῶς ἠγαθὰ ἠδεία. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἠδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει; διὰ τούτο οἱ ἀκάθεκτοι εὐδαιμόνοι καὶ ἔξαιτο ζήσει, καὶ τούτῳ οὔ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐξειδον. (Cf. this Book, ch. xii. § 3, and § 7; ch. xiii. § 2.)

1 — 2 περὶ δὲ ἠδονῆς — χαίρειν

‘Pleasure and pain are subjects which come within the scope of him who makes politics a philosophy, for he has to frame the idea of that supreme end, in reference to which we call things absolutely good and bad. Also these are quite necessary for us to consider, since we have laid down the principle that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures, and since people in general hold that pleasure is involved in happiness, whence they have given the happy man his name (μακάρως from χαίρειν).’

There are three reasons given here for discussing pleasure; (1) Because it has claims to be ‘the end.’ (Cf. Eth. Eud. ii. i. 1, where as a reason for discussing psychology it is said, φρονήσεις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἠδονῆς ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀν η ἡ πάσα τέλος εἰσί δοκεῖ πάντως). (2) From the connection before shown to exist between pleasure and morality, cf. Eth. Eud. ii. iv. 2–4. (3) Because the idea of pleasure is involved in the common idea of happiness, as shown by the etymology (a false one) of μακάρως.

ἀρχιτέκτων τοῦ τέλους] i.e. to conceive in a grand and liberal way, independently of details, that supreme human good at which a state should aim. Cf. Eth. i. xiii. 1–3, and i. i. 4, note.

ἀπλῶς λέγομεν] There is some con-
fusion in this expression, for though things are called good in reference to the supreme end, yet they are not called so absolutely. All such goods are merely means, and therefore goods relatively. What is here meant is more definitely expressed in Eth. End. 1. viii. 18, 8τι δ’ αἰτίων τὸ τέλος τῶν ὑψʼ αὑτῷ, δηλαὶ η διδασκαλία. ὅρθραι

μενοὶ γὰρ τὸ τέλος τάλα δεικνύωσιν, ὥστε ἐκαστὸν αἰτίων ἁγαθῶν ἀιτίων γὰρ τὸ οὖ εἰνεκα.

καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑδόνῃς. The first sentence of the Eudemian Ethics asserts that happiness is not only most good and beautiful, but also most pleasurable; this is taken, of course, from Eth. Nic. 1. viii. 4.

3—5 The writer now mentions three existing opinions with regard to pleasure, and the arguments by which they are supported.

1 That pleasure is in no sense a good.

2 That some pleasures may be good but that most are bad; supported by instances of morbid and hurtful pleasures.

3 That pleasure is at all events not the chief good; because it is not an end-in-itself, but a state of becoming. 8τι δὲν 8ν οὖν δοκεῖ] The opinions stated here are negative. The writer in all probability had before him Aristotle's treatise on Pleasure (Eth,
XII. The arguments used in this chapter are as follows: (1) Before deciding on the goodness or badness of pleasure, a distinction has to be made between absolute and relative goodness or badness, and then various degrees have to be admitted among the relative kinds of goodness, § 1. (2) We must allow that real pleasure consists in life itself (εὐρήκεια), not what merely produces life (γένεσις). Hence all the arguments founded on defining pleasure to be a γένεσις fall to the ground. Those processes which restore nature are only pleasures in a subsidiary and accidental way. And even in them what is pleasant is the life (εὐρήκεια) which accompanies them, §§ 2-3. (3) Some pleasures may be morbid or they may hinder thought; but this only proves that from one point of view they are not good: but again the pleasures of thought are an assistance to thought, § 4-5. (4) There is no art of pleasure, because art is of conditions, not of functions, not of life itself, § 6. (5) The arguments about the wise man, the temperate man, and the child (ch. xi. § 4), all apply merely to the inferior and subsidiary, that is the bodily, pleasures, § 7.

The course of procedure here is like that in Eth. x. ii.-iii., where the objections of the school of Speusippus are answered before Aristotle gives his own theory of the nature of pleasure. The arguments above are rather confused in statement. Those in § 1 are apparently meant to answer the assertion that no pleasure is good,
the sake of relief, as for instance the pleasures of the sick.'

2. ἔτι ἐπεὶ—ἅπων τοὺς]. 'Secondly, "good" may be either a state or the operation of a state, and so the processes which restore any one to his normal state (φύσις ἔστω) are pleasantly (not in themselves, but) accidentally (and by association). In fact there is an operation or vital action in desire, namely that of the powers in us which remain unimpaired (τῆς ἔνθεσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ φύσιν). (And it may be proved that pleasure depends not on want and desire, but on vital action), because there are pleasures which do not imply want and desire, as for instance the pleasures of thought, which take place when the nature is in no respect deficient. A proof (that the processes before-mentioned are only accidentally pleasurable) is to be found in the fact that men do not find delight in the same pleasure while their nature is being recruited (ἀναπληρωμένην) and when it is in a settled condition, but when it is settled they delight in things which are absolutely pleasant, and during the other process in things that are even quite the reverse: as in sharp and bitter things, which are not naturally nor abstractedly pleasant.

Nor is the enjoyment of them natural, for as pleasant things, regarded objectively (τὰ ἥπαλα), are to one another, so are the subjective feelings which these excite (ὁδοιαί).'}
This passage is expressed so elliptically as to require several links of thought to be supplied. In the above translation this has been attempted. A bare rendering of the sentences into English would leave them utterly unintelligible.

αι καθιστάσαι] ἵπτερες καὶ οἰκήσεις, carried on from the previous section. The argument is that it is only life and the vital action (φυσική ἓξις καὶ ταύτης ἐνέργεια) which is good and pleasant; the restorative processes are only secondarily, non-essentially, and by a sort of inference, pleasant. The words καθιστάσαι and καθιστηκών correspond with the term κάταστασις, which is used of pleasure in Ar. Rhetoric, i. xi. 1: κάταστασις ἄθροι καὶ αἰσθήτη εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσα φόσιν.

τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἑξευς] The argument goes on to add that even in these restorative processes there is vital action (ἐνέργεια), namely of those organs that remain unimpaired. The Paraphrast and others understand ὑπολοίπον to mean ‘deficient,’ and as being equivalent to ἑξευς in the next line. But the above translation is not only more suitable to the doctrine of the Peripatetics, (see Vol. I. Essay IV, p. 199), but it is borne out by e. xiv. § 7: Λίγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἥδεα τὰ ἐντέρωντα: οτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἐντερωτεῖσαι τὸν ὑπολοίπον τῆς ἁγίασμα πρὸς τί, ἣν τούτῳ ἤδει δικεῖ εἶναι. Cf. Eth. x. iii. 6.

ὁδὲ καὶ πικροῖς] Mentioned as an instance of things only pleasant during a morbid condition of the body. Cf. Eth. x. iii. 8.

Moreover it does not follow that these must be something better than pleasure, as some argue, in the same way that the end is better than the process which leads to it. For all pleasures are not transition-states nor the accompaniments of such, but they are rather life itself and the end itself. They do not result from our coming to our powers (γιορμένων), but from our using those powers (χραμένων); and it is not true that all pleasures have an end separate from them; this is only true of such as are felt by persons in the process of being restored to their normal condition. Hence it is not right to define pleasure as a "sensible transition," but rather we should call it "a vital action of one's natural state," and
Instead of "sensible," "unimpeded."

Now pleasure appears to people to be a transition-process from its being-good in the full sense of the term, for people confound the ideas of process and action, whereas they are distinct.

After this, in all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speusippus, are here alluded to. Nowhere in Plato do the exact words of this definition of pleasure occur (γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητήν), but they represent his views, though perhaps carried rather farther. The present section places in opposition to each other the theories of the Platonic and the Aristotelian school, of whom the one considered pleasure to be a relief from pain, a return from depression, an addition to the vital powers; the other considered it to be the play of life itself, the flow of life outward rather than anything received. On these two divergent theories see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 197–201. The same subject may be found worked out at greater length, and with interesting notices of the opinions held by later philosophers, in Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. II. lect. xliii. pp. 444–475.

Aristotle when writing accurately distinguishes pleasure from the moments of life and consciousness (ἐνέργεια), from which it is inseparable. Cf. Eth. x. v. 6: αὐτὸ δὲ (ἡδωναὶ) συνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνέργειαις, καὶ ἀδιέρετοι αὖτως οὕτως ἐχειν ἀμφιβολίσαντα εἰς ταῦτα ἐτίμαι ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὐ μὴν δὲ γάρ ἢ ἡ ἡδονή διάνοια εἶναι οὖσσοι αἰσθήσεις· οὕτως γὰρ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαινεται τις ταῦτα. He however does not more specifically define it than as ἐπιγιγνομένον τῷ τέλος (τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ), Eth. x. iv. 8, &c. Eudemus does not preserve the distinction, but simply says that pleasure should be defined as 'the unimpeded play of life.' Aristotle himself occasionally writes in this way; cf. Metaphys. xi. vii. 7: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐνέργεια ταῦτα. The term ἐνέργεια, besides other associations, implies consciousness, as has been shown in Vol. I. Essay III. pp. 193–196.

At first sight there appears to be a contradiction in saying that pleasure is thought not to be a good, because it is a γένεσις (ch. xi. § 4); and that it is thought to be a γένεσις because it is a good. The explanation is that the latter clause refers not to the Platonists, but to the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics, who considered pleasure the chief good, defined it as an equable process in the soul. Plato accepted this definition, and turned it against them, arguing that by the very terms used the Cyrenaics had proved pleasure not to be the chief good. The Platonists then were originally
indebted for their definition of pleasure (αἰσθητὴ γένεσις) to the Cyrenaics. See Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 132–133.

4—5 To δὲ εἰναί φαῦλας—μανθάνειν]

'To say that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealth is like saying (health is bad) because some healthy things are bad for money making. From that point of view it is true they are both bad, but they are not on account of this incidental badness bad simpliciter; since even thought is sometimes injurious to health, and neither wisdom nor any other state of mind is impeded by its own pleasure, but only by foreign pleasures; for the pleasures of learning and thought will make one learn and think more.' The argument here is that a thing good in itself may be relatively bad, e.g. health, and thought itself. One good may clash with another, and be from that point of view (ταῦτα) bad. The writing is elliptical; we might have expected ἀπλῶς to be added to φαῦλα.

The last clause in section 5, which asserts that a mental function is rather assisted than impaired by its own proper pleasure, is taken from Ar. Eth. x. v. 2–3. Νοσῶθη seems to mean 'producing disease,' cf. ch. xi. § 5: as νοσώματαθης before (ch. v. § 3, &c.) means 'produced by disease.' Φρονήσει is evidently used above as the verbal noun of φρονεῖν, in the general sense of 'thought,' and not in the restricted sense which is given to it in Book vi. Cf. Eth. i. vii: Eth. Eud. ii. i. i (quoted above).

6 To δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ.] Cf. ch. xi. § 4. An answer is now given to an argument probably occurring in the works of Speusippus. This argument, if fairly represented here, must have had a false major premiss, namely, 'All that is good is the subject of art.' The answer consists of two different pleas; (1) pleasure, like life, is above art, which can only deal with the conditions tending to these things. (2) In another sense there are arts of pleasure, e.g. the cook's or the perfumer's art.

7 Most of the arguments against pleasure ignore the distinction between different kinds of pleasures, the one kind being of the nature of life, and the end, and therefore good in themselves (§ 3); the other kind being
XII.—XIII. ΗΟΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VII. 239

ηθρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύται πάντα, ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθὰ πᾶσιν αἰ ἡμοῖς, τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ διήρκεια καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ Φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ’ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς (τοιαύτας γὰρ αὐταί) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ’ ἄγο οὔτος ἀκόλουθος ἀκόλουθος. οἴδ’ ο ὕφεραν Φεὐγεὶ τούτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσίν ἡμοῖς καὶ σῶφρονοι.

'Αλλα μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακῶν ἰμαλογεῖται, καὶ ἡ θυγατέρι αὐτῶν ἐν γὰρ ἀπλὸς κακός, η ὃς τῷ πῇ ἐμποδί-

connected with inferior conditions of our nature, with pain, want, &c., and being therefore only secondarily and accidentally good (§ 2). This latter kind, and excess in them, are made the ground of reproaches against pleasure in general.

XIII. In this chapter, after refuting (§ 1) the objection of Speusippus (that pleasure may be the opposite of pain without being a good), Eudemus urges the claims of pleasure, of the highest kind, to be considered the chief good, because from the terms of its definition it is inseparable from and indeed identical with happiness (§ 2). It is a mere paradox to talk of a man being happy in torture, &c. Happiness requires prosperity, that an 'unimpeded function' may be obtained, i.e. pleasure, though there must not be too much prosperity, else happiness is 'impeded' in another way (§§ 3-4). The instinct of all creatures testifies to pleasure being the chief good (§ 5); and it is a mistake to think that bodily pleasure is the only kind that exists (§ 6). In short that pleasure is necessary for happiness proves that it is a good (§ 7).

1 ἀλλὰ μὴν—ἐγνώρν] 'But we may go further—it is universally agreed that pain is an evil, and detestable—for it is either absolutely an evil, or is so relatively as impeding the individual in some way or other.—But that which is contrary to the detestable in that very point which makes it detestable and evil, is good. Therefore it follows that pleasure must be a good. For the answer of Speusippus to this argument does not hold, that "(pleasure is contrary to pain and to the absence of pain) in the same way that the greater is contrary to the less, and also to the equal." For no one could ever say that pleasure is identical with any form of evil.' That pleasure is a good because it is the contrary of pain, is an argument attributed to Eudoxus, Eth. x. ii. 2, Aristotle there (Ib. § 5) mentions the answer to it, and refutes that answer as above. Eudemus, in accordance with his usual style, adds the name of Speusippus. Aulus Gellius, ix. 5, mentions this doctrine: 'Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter se: bonum autem esse quod utrinque medium foris.' Accordingly, the neutral state between pain and pleasure would have to be regarded as good. Aristotle and Eudemus reply that the point of contrariety between pain and pleasure is that the one is φευγτός, and the other οἰστός, therefore the one must be considered an evil, the other a good.
We are probably to understand this, with the Paraphrast and Scholast. Speusippus would have said that pleasure is an evil. Cf. Eth. x. ii. 5.

2. ἀρεστὸν τ’ οὖνν καλότε[This admission is directly contrary to the conclusions of Aristotle (cf. Eth. x. iii. 13). It is to be explained as an after development of the system of Aristotle, and an attempt to bring different parts of that system into harmony with each other. Aristotle having used the same formula (ἐνεργείαι) to express both pleasure and happiness, Eudemus from the force of the terms identifies them. In this he is quite justified, for it is impossible to distinguish the highest kind of pleasure or joy from happiness, especially if we consider peace (ἐνεργείαι τῆς ἀκινήτης) to be a mode of joy. It is in accordance with the rest of the Eudemian Ethics to speak in this way of pleasure as being an essential element in, and as inseparable from, happiness. Cf. Eth. Eud. i. i. 6–7. i. v. 11–12 (quoted above). v. iii. 11, &c. See Vol. I. Essay IV. 200.

The Vatican scholium on this passage speaks of it as being merly dialectical (but this is from an unwillingness to recognise the discrepancy between Books vii. and x). It proceeds to attribute the present trea-
tise conjecturally to Eudemus. Διὰ μὲν αὐτὸ τοῖς διαλέγον καὶ αἰσθάνεται τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ μὴν οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας γένειν ἦν ἡ φύσις τῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν, δὲ καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑπικαλεῖται καὶ ἐπειδής ἐνδεέσως ὡς ἐννυ αὐτὴν τὸ ἀριστὸν λέγειν, ἔτει ἐν τοῖς Νικομαχείοις ἑυθὺς διεκλείεται καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἴρηκεν αὐτὴν μὴ ταῦτα εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἀλλὰ παρακαλοῦσθαι ἄσπερ τοὺς ἀκινιαῖς τὴν ἁραν. σημείων δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλοις ἀλλ’ Ἐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ κ’ (Book X.) λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς οὔδετω δι’ αὐτῆς διειλεγμένοις. πλὴν εἴτε Ἐδήμου τούτα ἐστὶν εἰσ’ Ἀριστοτέλοις, ἐνδεέσως εἴρηκεν, διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται τὸ ἀριστὸν ἡδονὴ ὡς σὺν τῷ ἀριστῳ καὶ ἀχώριστον αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο δὲ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ τὰ ἔξοδα. This, which is a remarkably favourable specimen of the Scholia, may serve to show the wavering and unprofitable character of these commentaries.

[Ἀστερ καὶ ἐπιστῆμην] This must not be taken very strictly, since pleasure and knowledge cannot both be the chief good. Both however may be considered as forms of the absolute good. Cf. Eth. i. vii. 5. The article is omitted at first with ἀρεστὸν, but is added below. Knowledge is good, though some things it is better not to know.

τῶν ἐν σώματι ἄγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός καὶ τῆς τύχης] This is the principle with regard to happiness which is laid down in Eth. Nic. i. viii. 15-17. It was afterwards considered characteristic of the Peripatetic School. Cf. Cicero, De Fin. ii. vi. 19: 'Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vite perfecte prosperitate coniunctius.'

3 οἱ δὲ—Ἅγουσιν] 'But they who allege that he who is being racked on the wheel, or he that is plunged in great calamities, is happy, provided he be virtuous, talk nonsense, whether intentionally or not.' Cf. Eth. Nic. i. v. 6. The words ἐκόντες οὐδὲν λέγοντι answer to εἰ μὴ θέτων διαφόρολάττως in that place. The paradox alluded to was maintained by the Cynics, and afterwards by the Stoics (who denied that pain was an evil). Cf. Cicero, Tuscul. v. ix. 24: Theophrastus quum status cum verbera, tormenta, cruciatus, patriae eversionses, exsilia, orbitates, magnam vim habere ad male misericordia vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqui, quum humiliter demissecque sentiret.—Vexatur autem ab omnibus primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quamobrem is, qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non posse: in eo etiam putatur diecere in rotam beatam vitam non essendem' (quoted by Fritzscbe). Cf. also Cicero, Paradoxa, ii.

4 ταύτων εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία] Cf. Eth. Eud. i. i. 4: ἢ διὰ τῆς τυχῆς πολλοῖς γὰρ ταύτων φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. This, together with the present passage, is taken from Eth. Nic. i. viii. 17.

αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλονσα ἐμποδίως ἐστιν] A more forcible expression of what is said Eth. x. viii. 9: οὐ γὰρ εὐτῆ ὑπερβαλλεῖ τὸ αὕταρκες κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἱσώς—ἀὑτῆς] 'And perhaps (when it is overweening), we should no longer call it prosperity; for the standard of prosperity consists in its being conducive to happiness.' The use of the term άπας here is by itself.
I almost a conclusive sign that this is the writing of Eudemus. Cf. Eth. vi. i. 1, note; and Vol. I. Essay I. p. 22.

5 καὶ τὸ διώκειν ὑṃ—θέσσιν—θέσσιν' In short that all things pursue pleasure, both beasts and men, is a proof that it is in some sort the chief good,—

"For mankind's universal voice can not
Be wholly vain and false."

Since however there is no one nature or state which is, or is thought to be, the best for all, so neither do they all pursue the same pleasure, but still they all pursue pleasure. Nay, perhaps unconsciously they are pursuing, not what they think, or would declare, but (in reality) the same; for all things have within them by nature a divine instinct.' This is said, Eth. x. ii. 1, to have been the argument of Eudoxus: 

Εἴδοσος μὲν ὦν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθαν ὄφει εἰναι διὰ τὸ πάσιν ὦν ἐφήμερα αὐτής καὶ ἄλλης καὶ ἄλλης. Ib. § 4. Aristotle justifies the argument against objectors in much the same terms as those adopted in the text.

5 πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὄρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν 

Φήμη δ' ὦν τί γε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἤν τίνα λαοὶ 

terious instinct all creatures, in seek-

ing life and joy, seek under different 
manifestations one and the same prin-
ciple of good. Cf. the dream-images in 
Goethe's Faust:

'Einige gitten
Ueber die Höhen,
Andere schwimmen
Ueber die Seen,
Andere schweben
Alle zum Leben;
Alle zur Ferne
Lieberter Sterne,
Seliger Huld.'

Aristotle, Eth. x. ii. 4 (which is the source of the above passage), does not go so far as to make all creatures aim at the same good, ἑνώ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φῶτοις ἔστὶ τι φυσικῶν ἀγαθῶν κρεῖτ
tον ἢ καθ’ αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίλεται τῶν εἰκῶν ἀγαθῶν. 

ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι—ωνταί εἰναι But bodily pleasures have usurped the possession of the name of pleasure, from men's most often resorting to them, and from all men partaking of them; hence because these are the only pleasures they know of, they think they are the only ones which exist.' παραβάλλειν appears to mean 'lay themselves alongside,' 'apply themselves to.'
Finally it is plain that unless pleasure and the action of life are a good, the happy man cannot live pleasurably. For why should he need pleasure, if it be not a good, and if it be possible for him to live painfully? (and it will be possible), for pain will be neither evil nor good, unless pleasure is; so why should he avoid it? and hence it will follow that the life of the good man will not be more pleasurable than that of the bad man, if his moments of action are not more pleasurable. This is a reductio ad absurdum of the position that pleasure is not a good. We shall be reduced to think (1) that the happy man may live devoid of pleasure; for nothing that is not good can form part of happiness—or even he may live a life of pain, which is the contrary of pleasure; (2) that the good man will have no more pleasure than the bad man, unless pleasure attaches to good acts, in which case it will be part of the good.

XIV. Hitherto Endemann has followed the lead of Aristotle, only in one respect making a slight development of his conclusions. He now discusses a subject untouched by Aristotle, but which he had proposed to himself in his first book; cf. Leth. End.

1. v. 11: πότερον, ἐὰν δὲ προσάπτων τῷ ζῆν κελᾶς ἥδονας τινα, ταῦτα (i.e. τὰ σωματικά) δὲ προσάπτων, ὑ τοῦτον μὲν ἄλλου τινα τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν—ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων υπότερον ἐπισκεπτέον. Assuming that there are higher pleasures, and that pleasure in the highest form is identical with happiness and the chief good, what is to be said of bodily pleasure? is it an evil or a good? and why is it that men indulge in it so much? To this twofold problem the answers are, Bodily pleasure is in itself a good, as being the contrary of pain; but it is only good under certain limits, as it admits of excess, and the excess is bad (§ 2). There are various reasons why bodily pleasure recommends itself to human nature. (1) It expels the sense of pain, and hence as an anodyne is universally desired from a physical law, for life is full of labour, and the ordinary functions of the senses are laborious acts, only mitigated by custom, §§ 4. 5. (2) The period of youth especially craves after physical pleasure. (3) There are special cases where it is in a way necessary, namely, where peculiarities of temperament render men constitutionally depressed and in want of a sort of relief, §§ 4. 6. (4) From the mixture of the material with the
spiritual in us, we are unable to continue perpetually delighting in one pure pleasure, that is, the pleasure of thought. God alone is capable of this; to us, through a fault in our nature (οὐ γὰρ ἀλήθη οὐδὲ ἐπικής), change appears sweet, because lower and contradictory elements in us require to be allowed their due action, § 8.

1 τῶν λέγουσιν] i.e. that section of the Platonists referred to above, ch. xi. § 3: τῶν δ' ἐναὶ μὲν ἐναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαίλαι.

2 τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν—ὑπερβολήν] But right bodily pleasures admit of excess, and the bad man (is bad) in that he seeks that excess, instead of seeking such pleasures as are necessary. All men find delight in meat, and wine, and love, though not all according to the proper law. And reversely all men avoid pain (ἐναντίως δ' ἐστὶ τῆς λίπης). A man does not avoid the excess of pain, but pain in general. Pain is not contrary to the excess of pleasure, except to him who pursues the excess of pleasure.' This argument goes to prove that bodily pleasure is in itself good; only when in excess is it evil. On the other hand all pain is evil. Pleasure and pain then are opposite terms, the one being good and the other evil. To make the doctrine of Speusippus (ch. xiii. 1) hold good, it would be necessary to make pain and the excess of pleasure opposite terms. But they are not so, except perhaps in the mind of the inconstant man, who thinks that the only alternative is between excessive pleasure and a painful sensation.

3 This section is not logically continuous with what immediately precedes. It no longer deals with the opinion of the Platonists that bodily pleasure is an evil, but takes up another question already partly anticipated, ch. xiii. § 6: namely, How is the vulgar error to be accounted for, which gives so much prominence to physical pleasure in the scale of pleasures?
The secondly, genital, theoretically being, and that like opposites are remedies, of the condition, to the remedy, when

4 πρῶτον—φαίνεσθαι] The first reason is that it drives out pain. When overwhelmed with pain, as a remedy men seek excessive pleasure, and in short bodily pleasure. Now remedies are naturally violent, and they are adopted because they seem to match (παρὰ) their opposites.' On the opinion that remedies are the opposites of the diseases to be cured, cf. Eth. ii. iii. 4.

καὶ οὐ σποουδαῖον δὴ—σποουδαίαι] 'It is on account of these two causes, then, that pleasure is thought not to be a good; first, that some pleasures, as we have said before (ch. v. 1.), are the actions of a depraved nature, whether congenital, like that of a beast, or acquired, like that of depraved men; secondly, that other pleasures are remedies, implying imperfection, since a normal condition (εὐςιον) is better than the process of arriving at that condition, and some pleasures take place while we are arriving at a complete state of being, hence they are only inferentially and not directly (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) good.' This paragraph reverts parenthetically to the opinion of the Platonists.

5—6 εἰτὶ διώκονται—γίνονται] The argument is now resumed from the sentence ending φαίνεσθαι. 'Another reason why physical pleasure is sought, is its comparatively coarse and violent character, which suits those who require strong excitement. And indeed such men even create in themselves certain artificial thirsts for pleasure. If this does not hurt their health, it is no harm. Such men are incapable of enjoying the purer and simpler pleasures, and a neutral state of the sensations is to many painful by a law of nature. For the living creature ever travails, as the physiological books testify, telling us that the acts of seeing and hearing are laborious, only that we are accustomed to them (so they say). So also the young, in the first place, owing to the principle of growth in them, are like those who are intoxicated, and youth is pleasant in itself. And again those of bilious nature are ever in need of an anodyne. Their body is continually fretted by reason of their temperament, and they are ever in vehement desire. Now pleasure, be it the opposite of a given pain, or be it what it may, provided it be strong
Illo Iliow [EYJIMIOW] VII. [Chap.

The pleasures of drinking are enjoyed, at least in part, because they give relief from certain pains. The Scholiast, after Fritzschle, offers a discussion of this, with the following points:

1. The physical indulgence of wine, driven out that pain. And hence persons of the bilious temperament become intemperate and vicious. This passage gives two reasons to explain why a neutral state of the sensations is distasteful, first a general reason: that the laborious action of the human faculties calls for alleviation; second, a special reason: that certain periods of life and certain temperaments produce a craving after physical indulgence.

2. Scholiast on τινὰς. The Scholiast, understanding this literally, that some men make themselves thirsty to enjoy the pleasure of drinking. But the use of the plural seems to indicate that we should rather follow the Paraphrast, and the majority of the commentators, in understanding it generally of artificial desires for pleasure, ἐπισκευασταὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, as the Paraphrast calls them.

3. οὕτως ο' ἐν μὲν κ. τ. λ.] The best commentary on this passage will be found in Aristotle's Problems, bk. xxx. ch. 1., where a frequent comparison is made between the effects of wine, youth, and the melancholy (or bilious) temperament, in producing desire. Cf. § 5: (γὰρ ὁ λόγος ὁ πολὺς μὲλίστα φαίνεται παρασκευαζόμενος τοιοῦτος ἡμῶν λέγομεν τοὺς μελαγχολικοὺς εἶναι. § 10: καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ πνευματῶδος τὴν δύναμιν. διὸ δὴ ἐστὶν τὴν φύσιν ἠμαί ὁ τε ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ κράτις, κ. τ. λ. Cf. Prob. iv. xxx.: διὰ τὶ ἀφροδισιαστικὸ τοῖς μελαγχολικοῖς; ἡ δ' ὁ πνευματῶδες, κ. τ. λ. The Scholiast gives a rapid explanation of the words ὅσπερ οἱ εἰνομένοι in the passage before us. Evidently, all that is meant is to compare the desires of youth with those of drunkenness, and of the melancholy temperament. We may compare the lines of Goethe:

'Trunken müssen wir alle sein;
Jugend ist Trunkenheit ohne Wein.'

The principle of αἰδοίως in youth is represented as producing the same results as the humour (χυμός ὁ μελαγχολικός—ἡ τῆς μελανίης χολῆς κράτις) in the bilious temperament.

7—8 ai δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν—ἐπειδής] The pleasures unprecedented by pain do not admit of excess, they are essentially and not accidentally pleasures.
By the accidental pleasures, I mean such as are of the nature of a remedy. Because, when it happens that we are relieved, owing to some operation of that part in us which continues sound, the result is a sensation of pleasure. By the natural pleasures, I mean those which produce the action of any given nature. The same thing is never continuously pleasant to us, because our nature is not simple, but there is in us a second element, by reason of which we are destructurable. Thus, when the one element is in action, it thwarts the tendencies of the second element. And when the two elements are balanced, the result appears neither painful, nor pleasant. If there is any being whose nature is simple, the same mode of action will be continuously and in the highest degree pleasurable to him. Hence God enjoys everlastingly one pure pleasure. For there is a function not only of motion, but of rest; and pleasure consists rather in tranquillity than in motion. "Change," as the poet says, "is the sweetest of all things," on account of a certain fault in our nature. The bad man is fond of change, and of the same character is the nature which requires change; it is not simple or good. In the above passage we see a reproduction, and to some extent a carrying out, of Aristotle's doctrines in the tenth Book of the Ethics, cf. especially ch. iv. 9: Πώς οὖν οδηγεῖς σωφρόνως ζεῖται; η κάμει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀδοκιμεῖ σωφρόνως ἐνέργειαν. On the comparison between the compound nature of man and the purely divine nature of God, cf. ch. vii. 8: ὃ δὲ τοιοῦτο τὸν ἐν ἐνίοτε βίον πρεπέτων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων: οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρώπως ἢτοι οὕτω βιωτίσεται, ἀλλ' ήθεν τί ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει; ὅπως δὲ διαφέρει τούτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἔλλην ἀρετήν.
καὶ λύτης εἰρηταὶ, καὶ τί ἔκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἄγαθα
αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά. ἔλοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας
ἐροῦμεν.

It is to be remarked that the present Book, which commences with
a mention of θεία ἀμεθή, or the operation of reason unalloyed by passion,
ends with a mention of θεία ἱδρυν, which is the consciousness of the
same.

PLAN OF BOOKS VIII.—IX.

ARISTOTLE'S treatise on Friendship, here contained, is quite continuous. The division of it into two books is merely artificial. There is really no break between the end of Book VIII. and the beginning of Book IX. The words περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τιρῆσῳ (VIII. xiv. 4), introduced to create a division, are evidently from an Editor's and not from the Author's hand.

The use of the phrase ἐν ἄρχῃ (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, IX. iii. 1), in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., has led some persons to suppose that this was originally an independent treatise. But nothing is more clear than that it was written to form a part of Aristotle's work on ethics. Besides general expressions of the author's purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view (see VIII. i. 7, IX. ii. 2), we find direct quotations of, or references to, the first books of the Nicomachean Ethics. (Compare IX. ix. 5 with Eth. Nic. I. vii. 14; and I. viii. 13, and IX. iv. 2, with Eth. Nic. III. iv. 5.)

The present treatise has a close connection with the first three books of the Nicomachean Ethics. But it is remarkable that it has no connection with Books V., VI., VII. Friendship is here treated in relation to Happiness and in relation to Justice. What is said of Happiness forms the complement to Eth. Nic. Book I., but what is said of Justice has no reference to Eth. Nic. Book V.; rather it appears written tentatively, perhaps before the Politics of Aristotle, from which the theories of Eth. Nic. Book V. seem to have been derived. (See VIII. vi. 6, VIII. vii. 2–3, VIII. ix., x., IX. i. 1–2.)

Again, it is equally striking that there is no reference to Book VII. in the parts of this treatise where the phenomena of vice are discussed (see IX. iv. 8–9, IX. viii. 6). Indeed the views taken

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here are inconsistent with those of Book VII., which contain a
more rigid analysis. (Compare IX. iv. 8 with VII. viii. 1.)

The style of these two Books is certainly unlike that of Books V.,
VI., VII., while it bears a close similarity with that of Eth. Nic. I.
and X. Not one of the 'Eudemian' forms of expression is to be
found here.

The treatise on Friendship may be roughly divided into three
parts:—

I. On the different kinds of Friendship, and on the nature of the
highest and truest type, VIII. i.—viii.

II. On the connection of Friendship with Justice, (1) as arising
(with certain exceptions, see c. xii.) out of political relationships, or
coinciding with them; (2) as implying obligations to be repaid,
VIII. ix.—IX. iii.

III. On other questions connected with the nature of Friend-
ship, and especially on its relation to Happiness, IX. iv.—xii.

Though the treatise is continuous, yet it is easy to see that the
writer's views became deeper and more definite as he advanced.
(Thus compare IX. vi. with VIII. i. 4; IX. x. with VIII. i. 5;
and VIII. vi. 2—3, VIII. viii. 7 with VIII. i. 6.)

At the same time we see what a powerful instrument was the
Aristotelian analysis for producing clearness of view. By an
analysis of the objects of liking (τὸ φιλητὸν, VIII. ii. 1), Aristotle
clears away all the vagueness which the Lysis of Plato had left
around the nature of Friendship. By an application of his own
philosophical form ἐνυφέω (IX. vii. 4—6, IX. ix. 5—6, IX. xii. 1),
he obtains a profound theory of the operation of the highest kind
of Friendship in relation to human happiness.
I. The discussion of Friendship is justified here (analogously to the way in which the discussion of the voluntary is justified, Eth. iii. i. 1–2) first, on the ground of its connection with virtue, secondly, on the ground that it is a means to happiness (ἀναγκαιότατον) in all conditions of life. As a commencement of the discussion, Aristotle mentions the difficulties raised on the subject in the Lysis of Plato: Does friendship depend on similarity or on contrast? Can bad men be friends to each other? and he adds another: Is there only one species of friendship, or are there more? Aristotle by his own analysis of the likeable (τὸ φιλητὸν) immediately cuts straight through these difficulties.

1 ἀρετὴ τις ἡ μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς: We have of course nothing here to do with that nameless excellence, mentioned Eth. iv. vi. 4, which is said to resemble φιλία, and which in the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia, is brought into the list of virtues, under the name of φιλία, as a mean between ἔχθρα καὶ κοιλακεία.

2 σὺν τέ δ᾽ ἐρχομένων: The saying of Diomede when about to penetrate the Trojan camp, Il. x. 224.
3 καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτερον. Φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν έξουκε πρὸς τὸ γεγενημένον τῷ γεγονόταντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεγονόταν τῷ γεγονότανν, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν όρνοι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμολήγησι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς Φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. Θείοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις οὓς οἰκείοιν ἀπαίνθρωποι ἀνθρώπων καὶ 4 Φίλου. έξουκε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνεχεῖν έις Φίλια, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτῶν σπουδάζειν ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἡ γὰρ ὀμόνοια ὀμοίον τῇ Φίλια έξουκε εἰναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίζεται καὶ τῇ στάσιν ἐξήραν ὃ διὰν μάλιστα ἐξελάσαντι. καὶ Φίλου μὲν ὂντων ὡντες δὲ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὧντες προσέδονται Φίλιας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ 5 μάλιστα Φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαίον ἔστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλὸν τοὺς γὰρ Φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τὶ εἰναι, καὶ ἐνοί τοὺς αὐτοὺς ὡνται ἄνθρακς ἀγαθοῖς εἰναι καὶ Φίλου.

6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οἷς ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν

σῶν τε δ' ἐρξομένων, καὶ τε πρὸ ὅ τους ἐννόσησεν, ὅπως κέρδος ἐγ' ὡμοίον ὡς ἑπερ τε νοῇσθ. ἀλλὰ τε οἱ βράσων τε νόσο, λεπτὴ δὲ τε μῆτις.

The words here quoted had become proverbial. Cf. Plato Alcib. p. 1140 δ; Protag. 348 c.

3 τοῖς ὁμοσθναί] This word is applied here to brutes as well as men. In the same sense ὁμοσθναί is used, Eth. Eind. vii. v. 3, and συγγεζό, Ar. Rhet. 1. xi. 25.

Τοῦ δ' ἄν τις—φίλων] 'And in travelling too one may see how near and dear every man is to man,' i.e. one may see this both as a matter of general observation, and as oneself meeting with kindness and hospitality.

4 καὶ οἱ ρωμάτικα] Cf. the speech of Lysias in Plato's Phedrus.

καὶ τῶν ἐκκαίων—δοκεῖ] 'And the height of justice appears to be of the nature of friendship.' Under the words τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα equity (τὸ ἑπικεῖσθαι) appears to be meant. Cf. Eth. v. x. 6—8.

5 ἀλλὰ καὶ καλὸν] This is repeating in other words that friendship is ἄρετή τις. The distinction between ἀναγκαίον and καλὸν is common in Aristotle, and the one term suggests the other. Cf. Eth. ix. x. 1.

ἡ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ] 'To have many friends is commonly thought to be something noble.' This popular opinion is considerably qualified on further examination, cf. Eth. ix. x. 6.

καὶ ἐνοί—φίλων] 'And some think that the term "good friend" is convertible with that of "good man."' Cf. a similar form of expression, Eth. v. ii. 11: οὐ γὰρ ίσος ταυτῶν ἀληθῇ τ' ἀγαθοὶ εἰναι καὶ πολλὴν παντὶ.

6 διαμφισβητεῖται] The questions mentioned here are raised in the Lysis
γὰρ δημοιώτητα τινὰ τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ἦλθεν τὸν ὁμοίου φασίν ὡς τὸν ὁμοίου, καὶ κολοίν ποτὶ κολοίν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαύτα· οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἕναντίας κεραμείς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλους φασίν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικῶτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν Φάσκιον ἔραν μὲν ὁμβρὸν γαῖαν ἔφρανθείς, ἔραν δὲ σεμνὸν ὄφραν πληρομένου ὁμβρὸν πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἰράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίστοιο συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαΦέρων καλλίστην ἀρμοδίαν καὶ πάντα κατ’ ἐριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἕναντίας δὲ τούτως ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίου τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφείσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν 7 Φυσικά τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς περιούσης σκέψεως)· οὐσα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικά καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἁγια καὶ τὰ πᾶνθη, ταῦτα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, οὗν πότερον ἐν πάσι γίνεσθαι φιλία ἡ ὁχὶ οἶον τε μοχθρόσυς

of Plato, pp. 214-215: (214 a) Δέγνωσί δὲ (ὅσι ποιητή) πώς ταύτα, ὡς ἐγχώμαι, ἀνί
αἰεὶ τοῦ τὸν ὁμοίον ἔγειρε γένος ὧς τὸν ὁμοίον καὶ ποιεῖ γράφομον . . . ὁδοὺν καὶ τοῖς τῶν συφωτάτων συγγραμμάσιν ἐντείλχχεον ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγοντειν, ὃτι τὸ ὁμοίον τὸ ὁμαίη ἀνάγκη ἐξι φίλον εἶναι; εἰς δὲ ποι ὅστιν οἱ περὶ φίλεσως τε καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες, ἀληθῆ, ἐφι, λέγεις . . . (215 c) Ἀθηναίοι τοῦ ἱστορία λέγοντος, καὶ ἄρτι ἀναμιμηθομένοι, ὃτι τὸ μὲν ὁμοίον τὸ ὁμαίη καὶ οἱ ἄγαθοι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμοῦται εἰς· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Ἡσίωνος ἐπήγγει πάντῃ, λέγειν ὡς ἄρα καὶ κεραμεῖν κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ άοδος ἀοίδος
καὶ πτωκός πτωκός.
καὶ τὰλλα δὴ πάντα ὦτος ἐφή ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ ὁμοιότατα πρὸς ἄλληλα φύσεως τε καὶ φιλοσοφικὰς καὶ ἔχθες ἐμπίπλασθαι, τὰ δ’ ἀνομοίτατα φιλίαι . . . τὸ γὰρ ἕναντίωτα τὸν ἕναντιτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον, ἐπισκεψόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐκεινοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὗ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔρημον ἔγροι, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμαῖον, τὸ δὲ πυρβυχμός, τὸ δὲ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρότερον καὶ τὸ πλήρες δὲ κενότερον. Which of the two views is true, is not decided in the Lysis, where however it is laid down that friendship cannot consist in pure contrariety.

καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν—φυσικῶτερον] 'And about these very questions some inquire in a more deep and philosophical way,' i.e. not limiting their view to the phenomena of friendship itself, but bringing in the analogies of the physical world. Aristotle sets aside such speculations as not belonging to ethics; he remarks parenthetically below (Eth. viii. viii. 7), that the contrary in nature does not desire its extreme contrary, but the mean.

Εὐριπίδης] The verses occur in a fragment of an uncertain play, which is preserved by Athenaeus, xiii. p. 599.

7 ἡ οὖς οἶον τε μοχθρὸς ὄντας] This question is started in the Lysis,
οὐτὸς φίλος εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἰδοὶ τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἡ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἴόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον, οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπιστεύκασι σημεῖον. ἐξεταί γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἦττον καὶ τὰ ἐτέρα τῷ εἶσει. ἔφηρται δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐξηροτέθην.

2 Τάχα δὲ ἄν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερῶν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοξεὶ γὰρ οὗ πάν φιλεῖσθαι ἄλλα τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι ἁγαθὸν ἢ ἱδονή ἢ χρήσιμον. δοξεὶ δὲ ἄν χρήσιμον εἶναι δὴ οὗ γίνεται ἁγαθὸν τι ἡ ἱδονή, ἀφτὶ 2 φιλητὰ ἄν εἰς τάγαθον τε καὶ τὸ ἱδονὸν ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τάγαθον φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἁγαθὸν; διαφορεῖ γὰρ ἐνιότε ταῦτα. ὡμοῖος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἱδονὸν. ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἁγαθόν φιλεῖν ἐκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τάγαθόν φιλητόν, ἐκαστος δὲ τὸ ἐκάστοτε. Φιλεῖ δὲ ἐκαστὸς οὗ τὸ ὑπὸ αὐτῶ ἁγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. ὁμοίου δὲ οὐκέτων.

3 ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον. τρίῳ δὲ ὑπόνων δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ πλείω. p. 214 ν: τούτῳ τοῖσιν ἀἰσθητοῖσι, ὅπερ ἐμὸι διδοῦσιν, ὅ ἐταῖρε, οἱ τὸ δυομιον τῷ ὑμεῖσιν φίλον λέγοντες, ὅ ἄγαθον τῷ ἁγαθῷ μόνος μόνος φίλος, ὃ δὲ κακὸς αὐτῷ ἁγαθός οὔτε κακῶς οὔδεποτε εἰς ἀληθῆν ἄλογον ἐφηρταί. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἰόμενοι κ.τ.λ.] 'For they who think that there is only one species of friendship, because it admits of degrees, trust to an insufficient proof. For things also that differ in species admit of degrees. But we have spoken about them before.' Aristotle immediately proceeds to show that there are three distinct species of friendship, in accordance with the three objects of liking. He also says that the friendships for pleasure or profit are less friendships than that for the good (ἡπτὸν εἰσιν, viii. vi. 7). All three kinds admit of the idea (ἄλογος) of friendship, thus they are comparable in point of degree. Cf. Ar. Categ. viii. 36: ἀπλῶς δὲ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ βρηκότως τὸ ἐτέρον τοῦ ἐτέρου μᾶλλον. As there is no place in the Ethics where Aristotle has discussed this logical question before, a Scholiast says with regard to the last words of the paragraph; ἔστω δὲ εἰρήσθαι ἐν τοῖσ ἐκπεπτωκώσι τῶν Νικομαχείων. But most probably the words εἰρήσθαι δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν are the interpolation of a copyist, who was perhaps thinking vaguely of Eth. ii. viii. 5, to which the commentators generally refer. These words spoil the grammar of the sentence, as περὶ αὐτῶν is used in the next line with a different reference.

II. 2 πότερον οὖν—αὐτοῖς ἁγαθῶν] Aristotle here guards himself against the appearance of having admitted the Platonic theory, that the absolute good is always the object of human desire. Cf. Eth. iii. iv. 1, and note. ἕσται γὰρ—φαινόμενον] 'For in that case the object of liking will be an apparent and not an absolute object.'
III. 1 ταύτα ἡ φιλίαν  ἢ 'According to the particular mode of their friendship.' The differences of mode are specified afterwards.

οὐ καθ’ αὑτῶν φιλίαν  'Do not love each other for their very selves.' This phrase καθ’ αὑτῶν is rather a logical formula than an ordinary grammatical combination. It seems to have arisen from καθ’ αὑτό, 'the absolute.' Cf. viii. iii. 7, and the use of δι’ αὑτῶν, viii. iv. 6, ix. i. 7.
The chief blessing of friendship. Cf. ix. ix. 10: 'If she were a man of high standing, she would not protect her friends, in order to become their friend, but by reason of his being useful or pleasant.' The personal existence of the friend is, according to Aristotle,
II \[HOIKΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ VIII.\] 257

διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὦσιν, ἣ ἡ ἀρετὴ μόνιμων. καὶ ἐστιν ἐκάστως ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φιλῷ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλους αὐθέντες ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἤδεις· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢδεὶς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἴδιον εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαύται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἀὑταὶ ἢ ὀμοίαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμως εὐλογοῦσιν ἐστὶν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάντ᾽ ὅσα ταῖς φίλοις δεῖ οὕμνησιν. πάσα γὰρ φιλία διὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν ἢ διὶ ἴδιον, ἢ ἀπλῶς τῷ φιλῷντι, καὶ καθ' ὀμοιότητα τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάντ᾽ ὑπάρχει τά εἰρημένα καθ' ἄντοις· ταύτῃ γὰρ ὄμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τὸ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴδιο ἀπλῶς ἐστίν. μάλιστα δὲ ταύτα φιλήτα, καὶ τὸ φιλίου δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἄρστῃ, στατικῶς δὲ εἰκός τάς τοιαύτας εἰναι· διὰγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιούτοι. ἐτὶ δὲ προσδέιται χρόνῳ καὶ συνηθείᾳ· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν

6 ἐκάστῳ γὰρ—ὅμως] 'For to every man his own actions and those similar to them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are (to the good) identical (with their own actions) or similar.' The friend being alter ego, the delight of friendship is that it gives an increased sense of existence.

7 συνάπτει] Neuter, as in viii. iv. 5: οἱ πάντ᾽ δ᾽ αὑτὰ συνάπτομεν.

πᾶσα γὰρ—ταύτῃ] 'For every friendship is for good or for pleasure; either absolute, or else relative to him who feels the friendship, and only bearing a certain resemblance to the absolutely good or pleasurable.' The comma should surely be omitted after τῷ φιλῶντι. Aristotle is not here saying (as the commentators fancy) that every friendship implies similarity. But that every friendship, whether the genuine type or one of the secondary and reflected species, aims at either good or pleasure. This is made clear by the next chapter, § 4: πρῶτος μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἢ ἄγαθον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὀμοιότητα.

ταύτῃ γὰρ ὄμως καὶ τὰ λοιπα, τὸ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴδιο ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν] 'For the other kinds of friendship moreover are resemblances of this (the perfect kind), and the absolutely good is also absolutely pleasurable.'

This passage has vexed the commentators. Zell thinks that ὄμως may be referred to καθ' ὀμοιότητα τινα in the previous sentence (which he mistakes), and explains, 'In this kind of friendship there is similarity and all the other requisite qualities.' But we surely then should have expected τὰ ὄμως. Cardwell, following Giphanius, Zwinger, and the Scholiast, reads ταύτῃ γὰρ ὄμως καὶ τὰ λοιπα. 'In this kind of friendship, men are similar, et cetera.' The common reading, as above explained, seems borne out by the opening of the next chapter, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἥδιν ὄμωσα ταύτης ἔχει. Cf. viii. vi. 7. Ὅμως here is in opposition to ταύτη—καθ' ἄντοις.

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οὐδὲ ἀποδέχεσθαι δὴ—φίλους | *Nor indeed can they be satisfied that they are friends at all.* Cf. viii. v. 3: οἱ δ' ἀποδέχεσθαι ἄλληλους. ix. iii. 3:

ἐώς δ' ἀποδέχηται ὃς ἀγαθὸς. Xen. Mem. iv. i. 1: ἀποδέχεσθαι Σαμφάτην.

9 εἰ μὴ—[ὑποθέσεως] *Unless they are likeable (by one another), and are assured of this.*

IV. 2 καὶ εἰσὶν ἤπειροι—διαμέτρους | *Are both friends in a less degree and are (less) abiding.*

καὶ μηδέτερον ὑποστολήν | *And he who is neither good nor bad may be a friend*
either to the good or to the bad, or to him who is neither one nor the other.' For the word μηδέτερος to express a neutral or intermediate state, cf. Eth. vii. xiv. 5: το μηδέτερον, 'that which is neither pleasure, nor pain.'

3 καὶ μόνη δὲ—γίνεσθαι.] 'And in short the friendship of the good is alone incapable of being disturbed by accusations. For it is not easy (for the good) to believe any person about a man whom they have long probed. And the sayings about "having faith," and that (the friend) "never could wrong one," and all the other points which are demanded in ideal friendship, are realised in the friendship of the good. But in the other kinds nothing prevents disturbances from accusations (τα τοιαύτα) arising.' Διαβάλλω is 'to set two people by the ears.' Cf. Plato, Repub. p. 498 c: μὴ διαβάλλει ἡμὶ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας.

4 ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ ἰδιων, ταύτη φίλοι] 'For so far as (these kinds of friendship exhibit) something good and resembling the good, so far (those who exercise them) are friends.' The commentators are again deceived by the word ἰδιων, taking it to mean 'similarity of character.' See above ch. iii. § 7, note.

5 οὐ πάνω—συμβεβηκός] 'But the above-mentioned kinds of friendship do not always coincide. Nor do the same men become friends for the sake of the useful, as for the sake of the pleasant. For things only accidentally connected are not always found together.' On συμβεβηκός, cf. Ar. Met. iv. xxx. 1: συμβεβηκὼς λέγεται δ ὑπάρχει μὲν τινὶ καὶ ἀληθεὶς εἰπὼν, οὐ μεντοὶ οὖν 'ἐξ ἀνάχθησιν οὖν' ἔτι τὸ πολύ. See also below, § 6.
Φίλοι δὲ ἡ ὁδὸς ἄτοι τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτη ὁμοιοὶ ὀντες, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ δὲ αὐτοὶς φίλοι. ἦ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ. οὔτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ τῷ ἄμοι-ώσθαι τούτοις.

5 "Ωστερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἔξωι οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὔτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζώντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλους καὶ πορίζουσι τάγαθα, οἱ δὲ καθεδόντες ἢ κεχαρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δὲ ἔχουσιν ὅτι ἐνέργειαν Φιλικοῦ. ὁ γὰρ τόπος οὗ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρώμιος ἢ ἀποστιά γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήψῃν ποιεῖν. οὗν εἰρήται

τολλᾶς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσφηγομενε εἴλυσεν.

2ος Φαίνονται δὲ οὕθ' οἱ προσβωται οὕθ' οἱ στρυφοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι. διαχ' γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡποτῆς, οὔτεις δὲ δύναται συνημερεύσειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὔτε τῷ μὴ ἔδει. μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις Φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἀφεσθαί δὲ τούτος ἡ ὑδέος. οἱ δὲ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζώντες δὲ, εὔνους ἐοικασὶ μάλλον ἡ φίλιοι. οὗτοι γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων αὐς τὸ συζην. αφελεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεις ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακαρίοι. μονάταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει, συνιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἐστι μὴ ἱδέος ὄντας μηδὲ χαίρουτας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ η ἐταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ τολλάκις εἰρήται. δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητῶν μὲν καὶ αἰρετῶν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἢδ' ἐκαστῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον. οὗ δὲ

6 ταῦτη ὁμοιοὶ ὀντες] 'In this respect (i.e. as affording and seeking pleasure or utility) being like (the good).'

V. 1 οἱ δὲ καθεδόντες—ἐνέργειαι] 'But those who are asleeep, or who are separated by the intervals of space, do not exercise friendship, though they have all the disposition to exercise it. For the intervals of space do not destroy friendship, but only its exercise.' This is of course a most inadequate translation of ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἔχουσιν. These words must be understood by a study of Aristotle's forms of thought. See Vol. I. Essay IV. On the ἐνέργεια of friendship, cf. Eth. ix. ix.

3 οἱ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους] 'They who are satisfied with one another.' Cf. above, vtt. iii. 3.

διὰ τη ἐταιρική δοκει ἔχειν] 'And this (i.e. pleasure and sympathy) seems the property of companionship.'

4 οὗ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δὲ ἄμφω ταῦτα] 'Now the good man (is a
friend) to the good man for the sake of both these things,' (i.e. the absolutely good and the absolutely pleasant).

5 έσικε δ'—έξεσσ[1] 'Loving is like an emotion, but friendship like a settled disposition of the mind. For loving exists just as well towards inanimate objects; but when men reciprocate friendship it implies purpose, and purpose proceeds from a settled disposition of the mind.' In Eth. iv. vi. 5 (cf. ii. v. 2), Aristotle makes friendship to be an emotion, or characterized by emotion. The present passage does not in the least contradict this, as ἐξεσσ, or a settled disposition of mind, is merely the result of regulated emotions, and the tendency to reproduce them.

6 ἡ δὲ προαιρέσεις, κ. τ. λ. [In Eth. iii. ii. 1, Aristotle speaks of 'purpose' as the test of character; ib. § 11, as constituting character; ib. § 2, as not acting suddenly; ib. § 17, as implying reason and forethought.]

έκατέρος—ηδὲι] 'Each of the two then loves that which is a personal

good to himself, and he makes an equal return both in wishing good and in (actual) pleasure.' Zell, following two MSS., reads εἴδει. But Bekker's reading (ηδὲι) appears preferable: (1) because ένον εἴδει would not be a natural expression; it confounds degree with kind; we should expect ταυτόν εἴδει: (2) because ηδὲι gives very good sense, since it is one thing to reciprocate the motives or feelings of friendship, and another to give your friend the same amount of pleasure as he gives you.

Λέγεται—ηδότησι] 'For equality is said to constitute friendship.' A Pythagorean saying, connecting moral ideas with the ideas of number. Cf. Diog. Laert. viii. i. 8: εἴπη τε πρώτος (ἀς φησι Τίμαιος) κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι: καὶ φιλιὰν ἱσότητα.

VI. 1 This section is an awkward repetition of what has been said before, ch. v. § 2. This, however, merely shows that we have probably the uncorrected draft of Aristotle's treatise on Friendship.
It is not possible to be a friend to many men on the footing of the perfect kind of friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many at the same time. For (the perfect friendship) is a sort of excess of feeling, which naturally arises towards one person alone; again, it is not easy for many persons to be intensely pleasing to the same individual, and perhaps not easy that many should be good.' - ὁπερβολὴ here would be nearly represented by the French word abeâdon; it implies the throwing away of limits and restraints, a giving up of one's whole self. Cf. ix. iv. 6: ἡ ὁπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιώσει. Of course there is an association of Aristotelian ideas (μεσότης, ἔλεεψις, &c.) in the term. It is repeated Eth. ix. x. 5, where the question of the plurality of friendships is carefully gone into.

We should have expected πολλοὶς ἡμῖν ἄρεσκες, on the analogy of the last sentence, πολλοὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ἄρεσκες, but the writing seems careless and the expression is inverted.

οἱ τοιοῦτοι i.e. the useful and the pleasant. Cf. § 6, where τοιοῦτοι again takes its sense from the context.


χρησιμῶν μὲν οὐδὲν ἐδονταί] i.e. Happiness by its definition implies a sufficiency of external means, Eth. i. viii. 15.

οὐδ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἄγαθὸν, εἰ λυκηρῶν] This sentence is παρ' ὑπάρχουσιν, in other
It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the Absolute Good as painful. Cf. Ar. Rhet. i. vi. 2: "εστὶν δὴ ἀγαθὸν  ὅ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐαυτῷ ἑνεκα  ἢ αἴρετον, καὶ ὃ ἐνεκα ἄλλο ἀριστομεθα, καὶ ὃ ἐφιέται πάντα ᾧ πάντα ἡ αἰσθηθιν̄ ἐχοῡν ἢ νο̄ν,  ᾧ οἴ λάβοι νο̄ν ἐκατ̄ορ̄ντα πάντα ἡ αὐτόρ̄ντα ἡ πάντα ἡ αἰσθηθιν̄ ἐχοῡν ἢ νο̄ν,  ᾧ ει λάβοι νο̄ν — καὶ ὃ κατ̄ορ̄ντα ἡ διάκειται καὶ αὐτόρ̄ντα ἡ πάντα ἡ αἰσθηθιν̄ ἐχοῡν, κ.τ.λ.

dei δ' ἡσὺς—αὐτοῖς] 'And perhaps (in seeking friends) one ought (to require) that even good men should have this qualification (i.e. pleasantness), and moreover not in a merely universal way, but relatively to oneself.'

5 οί δ' ἐν ταῖς—φίλοις] 'Great potentates' (cf. Eth. i. v. 3) 'however seem to make use of their friends separately;' i.e. they keep two sets of friends, one for profit or business, and another for pleasure.

6 ἢδος δὲ—γίνεσθαι] 'Now we have already said that the good man is both pleasant and useful at once. But such a man does not become a friend to his superior (in rank), unless he be surpassed (by that superior) in virtue also. Else, he does not find himself in that position of equality which is produced by superiority in proportion to merit. Such persons, however (as potentates who surpass the good in virtue), are not produced every day.' The commentators have strangely interpreted this passage, making ὑπερέχοντα take for its nominative ὁ ὑπερέχων, as though Aristotle had said that a good man would not be a friend to a potentate, if that potentate had superior moral qualities; and as though 'equality' were produced by one man having all the merit and another all the power. On the contrary, Aristotle would have said that 'proportionate equality' is produced, according to the principles of distributive justice, by each man having in proportion to his merits, cf. Eth. v. iii. 6, Pol. iii. ix. 15. There is no sense of inequality produced by the position of a man socially exalted in intellect and character; inequality is felt when a fool or a villain occupies a high social position. ἵδαιμον is doubtless intransitive, and ἀνάλογον
The same principle of distributive justice, main-
tained above in § 6 of the last chapter, is again appealed to. Where friends are not equal, their friendship must be regulated by proportion.

But equality seems to stand differently in justice and in friendship. In justice,
proportionate equality is primary, and quantitative equality secondary; in friendship, quantitative equality is the first, and proportionate equality the second consideration. Distributive justice begins by presupposing inequalities between man and man, and by proportionate assignments it equalizes these. Justice, however, cares little about bringing men to quantitative or exact equality. The latter kind of equality at all events is aimed at only in democracies, while the proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments, cf. Ar. Pol. vi. ii. 2. Friendship on the other hand begins by presupposing equality between the parties, and though a certain amount of inequality may be made up by proportionate assignment of affection, &c., yet a wide interval of inequality will render friendship altogether impossible.

The original Berlin edition has πλείστον.

5 ἀκριβῆς—οὐκέτα] In such cases there is no exact definition up to what point friendship is possible; for though many (advantages) be taken away (from the one side), friendship still abides; but when (the one friend) is far removed from the other, as, for instance, God is from man, there is no friendship any longer.

6 θευ καὶ—τάγαθα] From this the question has arisen whether friends wish for their friends the greatest of all goods, as for instance to be gods. For having attained this, they would no longer at all be friends to those who formed the wish, and therefore no advantage to them, for friends are an advantage. If then it has been rightly stated that the friend wishes all that is good to his friend for that friend’s sake, it will be necessary for that friend to remain as he is, and then he will wish for him, being a man, the greatest goods.
After all, perhaps he will not wish him to have everything. For every one especially wishes for himself what is good. Under the words ἀπορεῖται μὴ ποτὲ οὗ is included a question both as to fact and cause. Ὅππος γὰρ denies the fact and states the cause, which is that if we wished our friend to become a god, we should wish him to be in a position where he can no longer be our friend. The last sentence (ἵσως ἢ ὧν πάντα) qualifies the previous statement, and guards against the notion that any human friendship can be utterly disinterested and selfless. The same topic is fully discussed in the eighth chapter of Book IX.

VIII. 1—2 Though the essence of friendship consists rather in loving than in being loved, the mass of men prefer the latter, as ministering to their vanity. Being loved is akin to being honoured. Parenthetically it may be observed, that honour is sought not for itself but on account of things variously associated with it (κατὰ συμβεβηκόν). (1) To be honoured by the great affords a hope of promotion. (2) To be honoured by the wise and good is an evidence to men of their own merits. Thus honour is desired as a means to the consciousness of virtue. Cf. Eth. 1. v. 5: ἐφιάσας τὴν τιμήν διόκειται ἐν πίστευσιν ἑαυτοῖς ἄγαθοις εἶναι: ζητοῦσι γὰρ ὅποι τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ᾽ ὃς γεγνώσκονται, καὶ ἔτι ἀρετή.
to be brought up by other persons, and go on loving them, though not even recognised by them.

4—5 It is this active spirit of love which constitutes the virtue of friendship, and which causes us to praise those who are of a friendly disposition. This then explains what was above stated merely as a fact, Eth. viii. i. 5. The same spirit serves as the equalising principle in unequal friendships, greater merit being met by greater love.

5—7 Friendship is based on equality and similarity, especially the friendship of the good. Friendships for the sake of pleasure or profit seem rather based on contrariety, as for instance on the contrariety of riches and poverty. But, after all, one would say not that the contrary seeks its contrary, but that the contrary seeks the mean.

5 μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑμοιότης] Cf. the Ilysis of Plato, p. 214, quoted above upon ch. i. 6. τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐπιτρέπειν] ‘For the good will neither do wrong themselves, nor permit their friends to do it.’

7 ὥρεθη τοῦ μέσου] This phrase is in accordance with the pantheistic side of Aristotle’s philosophy, attri-
buting to nature a desire for the good.

Cf. De Animā, i. iv. 3: πάντα γάρ ἐκεῖνον (τοῦθεν) ὁρέγεται, κακεῖνον ἐνεκα πράττει διὰ πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. Eth. x. ii. 4: ὅσοι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαννίξις ἴσης τι φιλικόν ἐγαθύνων κρείττων ἢ καθ' ἀυτὰ, δὴ ἐφέσαι τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγάθου.

IX. i ἐν ἄρχῃ] Eth. viii. i. 4. περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς] 'About the same things, and in the same persons.' Cf. Eth. v. iii. 5: οἷς τε γάρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει οὖν, δόσ τε ἐστι, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δόσ. Pol. iii. ix. 3: τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἴσητη διόμολογοτι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφιβολοθετεῖ.

3 Αὕτη δὲ—διῆκοντα] 'Justice of necessity becomes more binding as friendship becomes closer, for they exist in the same subjects, and are coextensive in their application.'

4 αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι—Βιον] 'All communities are like parts of the political community; for (the members of them) unite with a view to some advantage, and to providing some of the conveniences of life.'
...the religious festivals of the Hindoos. 

Cf. Plato's Republic, p. 364. vii: 

5 θεαστῶν καὶ ἱεραστῶν] Cardew refers for illustration of these terms to Demosthenes, pp. 313, 23; 403, 19; 1355, 3: 1217, 14.

By omitting, with Fritzsch, Bcker's full stop after συνοισίας, and by placing the words οὗ γὰρ — τῶν βίων in a parenthesis, we see that the participles θεάωντες, ἱεράωντες, πολιτεύοντες are to be referred to κοινωνία, as implied in κοινωνίαν above. The passage which speaks of men ' awarding honour to the gods, while providing recreation and pleasure for themselves,' is highly characteristic of the Greek religion. This sort of thing can perhaps be best understood in the present day by those who have seen...
state to be governed by good laws than by the best individual will; further on, Pol. iii. xvii., he qualifies this by admitting that for some peoples monarchy is better suited.

I pαρεκβάσεις] ‘Perversions’ or ‘abnormal growths’; cf. Pol. iii. vi. 11, where a form of government is pronounced to be normal as long as it aims at the public good, abnormal when its end is private interest: φανερόν τοινών ὡς ὅσα μὲν πολιτεία τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον σκοπούσιν, αὐτὰ μὲν ἄρα τυχανούσαν ὅσα κατὰ τὸ ἀπλόν δίκαιον, ὅσα δὲ τὸ σφέτερόν μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἡμαρτημέναι πάσα καὶ παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὁρθῶν πολιτειῶν: δεσποτικὰ γὰρ, ὡς τὸ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἄντιν.

πολιτείαν δ’ αὐτὴν εἷδασαν οἱ πλείστωτα καλεῖν] ‘But most people are accustomed to term it “a constitution.”’

The word πολιτεία was used by the Greeks in a restricted sense, just as the word ‘constitution’ is in English, to denote a balanced form of government. Cf. Ar. Pol. iii. vii. 3: ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύσῃ: συμ ἔρων, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ἐνόμα παπάν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. Aristotle does not use the word in the Polities to denote a timocracy. In the ninth chapter of Book IV, he uses it to denote a mixed form between oligarchy and democracy. He also uses it to express his own ideal of a state, which was far from being a timocracy.

2 ὅ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτον κληροτᾶς ἐν τὶς εἰς βασιλείας] ‘For he who had not these qualifications would be a sort of ballot-box king.’ It is difficult to express the word κληροτᾶς, which as coupled with βασιλείας is certainly meant to be contemptuous. Aristotle does not appear to mean any definite form of monarchy, so we learn nothing from Pol. iii. xiv., to which the commentators refer us. Aristotle here says that the genuine king must be independent in property and position, and above all his subjects in this respect. Externally wanting nothing for himself, he will administer the state for the good of his subjects. If this is not the case, he will be no genuine king, but a parvenu, κληροτᾶς τις, like a person who had been raised to the throne by the contingency of lot, and therefore insecure in his position, with perhaps only a temporary tenure of office. The word ἁμισθόων is coupled with μὴ κληροτᾶς, (as an epithet of περαταχαίος), Pol. ii. xi. 7. It is possible that in the present passage a notion of ‘paid services’ may be implied. If so, ‘birding monarch’ would express the terms under notice.
κληροτός ἂν τις εἰς βασιλείας. ἢ δὲ τυραννίς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης τῷ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ Φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειριστής· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίόν τις βελτίστως. μεταβαίνει δὲ ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· θαυμάζει γὰρ ἐστὶ μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς· οὐ δὲ μοχάρως βασιλείας τυραννὸς γίνεται. εἰς ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οὐ νέμοισι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἁξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλούστειν· ὁλίγοι δὲ ἀρχοῦσι καὶ μοχάρως ἀντί τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ ἡ τιμοκρατίας εἰς ὁμοκρατίαν σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσίν αὐταί· πλῆθος γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ὅσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμῆματι. ὃς εἶσται δὲ μοχαρὸν ἐστίν ἡ ὁμοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεξήγαγε τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν ὑπὸν μάλιστα οὕτως αἱ πολιτείαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ βάστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιόμορα δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσον παραδείγματα λάβοι τὰς ἄν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις, ἢ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱῶν κοινωνία βασιλείας ἢ χεὶς σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλειε· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ἕμηρος τῶν Δία πατέρα προσαγόρευει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἁρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δὲ ἡ του πατρὸς τυραννίκη· χρῶνται γὰρ αἷς δούλως τοῖς υἱῶσιν. τυραννική δὲ· καὶ ἡ δεσποτοῦ πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσποτῶν συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὐτῇ μὲν ὅλῃ ἡ ἁγία φαίνεται, ἡ Ἱερακίη δὲ ἰμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαι διάφοραι. ἀρνόμενος δὲ καὶ γυναικος ἀριστο-κρατική φαίνεται· κατὰ ἁξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνήρ ἀρχεῖ, καὶ περὶ ταύτα ὃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικεὶ ἀρμόζει, ἐκεῖνη ἀποδίδονται. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνήρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεμιστήσει παρὰ τὴν ἁξίαν γὰρ αὐτῷ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἀμείνου. ἐνώς δὲ ἀρχουσιν αἱ γυναικεῖς ἐπικληροὶ υἱόι.  

4 τῶν διαφερόντων—διάφοροι οἱ θείοι θεοί. For those who differ should be governed differently. And therefore the Persian system is wrong, which governs children as if they were the same as slaves.  

5 γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι οἱ θείοι θεοί. The Greek feeling about 'heiress' is strongly expressed in a fragment of Menander (i.v.).
I I. Kal ἐκάστην ἃ τῶν πολιτείων Φιλία φαίνεται, ἐὰν ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεύει μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἐνεργεσίας· ἐὰν γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγάθος ὁν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ νομέως προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τῶν 'Αγαμε-2 μέμνονα ποιήσει λαίδιν εἶπεν. τοιαύτῃ δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ, διαφερεῖ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἐνεργεστήματων· αὐτίος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγάς τοῦ, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας· καὶ ταῖς προμοίων δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονεμεῖται. φύσει τε ἔρωτικος πατήρ οἰνόν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασι-3 λευκμένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ Φιλίαι αὐταί, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γυνεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ οὐ ταῦτα 4 ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ Φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναίκα ἢ αὐτὴ Φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίας· κατ' ἀρετὴν γὰρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνῳ πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῷ ἀμείβειν 5 ἐκάστω· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐοικε· άνθρωπος καὶ καιρικῶς, οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὁ ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἦσαν δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατίαν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολίται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιμαινόμενοι εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ 6 ἐξ ὅσου· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκμάθεσιν, αὕστερος καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ Φιλία

XI. 3 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ—γυνεῖς] 'All these friendships imply superiority on the one side, and hence it is that parents are honoured,' i.e. because superiority demands honour, as well as love.

5 ἵσοι γὰρ—ἐπιν] 'For it is the part of the citizens (in a timocracy) to live equally and equitably with one another.' To understand the full meaning of ἐπινείας, see the fine passage from Rhét. i. xiii., translated in the note on Eth. v. x. i., and cf. ix. x.

6. Βούλονται expresses a natural tendency, cf. viii. x. 3: πλῆθος γὰρ βούλ- λοται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι.
6 ἄφελεται—δίκαιον] 'For though all these things receive benefit from those who make use of them, yet neither friendship nor justice is possible toward inanimate objects.' The corresponding passage in the Eudemian Ethics serves as a commentary on this: Eth. End. vii. x. 4: συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ [ἐκ συν. Bonitz] ὑγιάνων ἐπιμελείας τιναχάνειν, ὡς δίκαιων πρὸς τὸ ἔργαν, ἐκεῖνου γὰρ ἐνεκέν ἔστι. The instrument receives just so much care from its maker, as will keep it in proper condition for the exercise of its functions. The slave, who is treated not as a person but as a thing, receives the same kind of attention. Friendship and justice imply the recognition of personality, they imply treating men not as instruments, but as ends in themselves. On the slavery of the body to the soul, cf. Ar. Pol. i. v. 6–8.

XII. 1 ἄφρισεις δὲ ἄν τις] In saying that all friendships imply community of interests, an exception is to be made of the friendships of relations.
and companions, which depend on feeling rather than on any sort of compact.

3 ή γάρ πρὸς ἑκείνα ταῦτα ἄλλοις ταὐτότηται 'For their identity with the parents identifies them with one another.' ἑκείνα is in the neutral gender on account of the words ἄκ τῶν αὐτῶν to which it immediately refers.

4 ἄνεφοι δὲ—ἐδεικνύοντο 'But cousins and all other relations get their bond of unity from these (i.e. the brothers); for (it depends) on their coming from the same stock. Relations are more or less closely united to one another, in proportion as their common ancestor is more or less near.'
and would covet. They set up their children as rulers over the family. Ka\ and his sons.

The family, as Aristotle argues, that, without the idea of the state, the terms ‘man’ and ‘family’ would lose their meaning. Thus, the idea of family pre-supposes that of the state, which will accordingly be prior. In the same way, the family is more necessary as a means, the state as an end. They help one another therefore, bringing what they each have separately into the common stock.’ Fritzsche quotes the saying of Ischomachus to his wife in the *Economics* of Xenophon (vii. 13.) 

\[XIII. 1 εν ἀρχήν] Eth. νη 1. iii. 1.\]
ομείων χειρον, ὁμοιός δὲ καὶ ίδεις, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἑσάκυντες ταῖς ὀψίνειαίς καὶ ὁπισφέροντες), τοὺς ὑπὸν μὲν κατ᾽ ἱσότητα δει τῷ Φιλίῳ καὶ τοὺς λατρεύοντες ἵσαζειν, τοὺς τὰς ἀλλήλους ὑπολογίας, γίγνεται οὖ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ οἱ μέμνησις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον Φιλίᾳ ἡ μόνη ἡ μάλιστα εὐλογίας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἀρετὰς Φιλίον ὑπτες εἶ δὲ ὀρῶν ἀλλήλους προσκυνοῦσιν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἀρετὰς καὶ Φιλίας. τρὸς τούτῳ ὁ ἄμιλλωμενοις οὐκ ἑστίν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι. τῶν γὰρ Φιλίων καὶ εὖ ποιῶντα οὐδεὶς διόγαρε καὶ ἀμὰς καὶ γένεται εἰ ὁμοῖοι. τὸ ὀπλαίλλαυν, τυγχάνοις οὔ ἐφείται, οὐκ ἂν ἔκαθην τῷ Φιλῷ· ἐκάθερον γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῶ 3 ἐφείται. οὐ πάνω οὐ οὗ ἐν τοῖς δὲ ἱδονών· ἀμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὐ ὑφείται, εἰ τῷ συνωδόγειον χαράσσειν. γελοίοις οὐ ὁ Φιλῖοι καὶ ὁ ἔκαθην τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, 4 ἐξὸν μὴ συνωδόβεον. η δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκλήματικος, ἐπ᾽ ὀψίνεια γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλους ἀνεί τοῦ πλεύνος θέουται, καὶ ἐκαθομοι ἕχειν ὑπτεί τοῦ προσκυνοῦσας, καὶ μέμφυνται ὅτι οὐκ ὁσαν ἑοντας τοσοῦτον τυγχάνουσιν ἀντιθετες. οὐ δὲ ποιῶντες οὐ δόνται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαύτη ὅσαν οἱ 5 πάσιν οὐσίον ἑονται. ήοικε δὲ, καθρέπτε το ὀίκαιον ἔστι διττον, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ

2 οὐδεὶς δοξαρεῖος, ἀλλὰ δέν ἐκ ἀρετῶν] «No one takes it ill, but (every one), if he be of gentle mind, pays him back in good deeds.» The subject to ἐμφυτεύει is implied in ὀδύσει. Fritzche quotes Horace Sat. i. i. 1.

Nemo quam sibi sortem
Seu ratio dedicit, seu foris objecedit, illa
Contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentes.

χαρίεις has nothing to do with «gratitude.» It means much the same as is conveyed in the word «gentleman.» Cf. Plut. i. v. 4: «I δὲ χαρίεις καὶ πρακτικολ. iv. viii. 9: χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθερος.

5 έοικε—διαλυόνται] «Now as justice is twofold, the one unwritten, the other according to law, so also of utilitarian friendship there appear to be two branches, the one moral, and the other legal. The complaints then (which arise) chiefly take place when men do not conclude their connection in the same branch in which they commenced it, ἀναλάττειν is to make a contract, διαλύεσθαι to wind up a contract by the mutual performance of the terms. Men who consider that they have entered upon a so-called friendship with a fixed stipulation (τομικῆς) of certain advantages to be received, will complain if the fixed stipulation is denied, and only a general moral obligation (ἡμικῆς) to render services is admitted.»
Yet (the giver) claims to get as much, or more, as though he had not given but lent. And if he does not come off in the connection as well as he commenced, he will complain. Now this (sort of disappointment) takes place because all or most men wish that which is noble, but practically choose that which is expedient. It is noble to do good not with a view to receive it back, but it is expedient to be benefited." This passage discriminately exposes a sort of vaillation between disinterestedness and self-interest, which occurs in utilitarian friendships. A man at one moment thinks vaguely (bollesia) of aiming at the noble, and makes a gift as if he expected no return. But presently the more definite bent of his mind (prapsia) reverts to the profitable, and he claims to get back as good as he gave. On the distinction between bollesia and prapsia cf. Eth. iii. iv. i, v, ix. 6, and the notes.

6 ἐστὶ—συναλλάξαντας] 'That which is on stated conditions then is legal (utilitarian friendship). One sort of it is wholly commercial, implying payment on the spot (ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χειρὰ); another is more liberal, allowing time (εἰς χρόνον), but still on the understanding of a specified return. In this then the debt is plain and undoubted, but the delay which it admits of is friendly. Hence in some states no suits are allowed in cases of this kind, but men think that those who have contracted on faith should abide (by the issue).' ἀναβαλῇ in commerce answers to 'credit,' cf. Plato's Laws, xi. p. 915 d: μην' ἐπὶ ἀναβαλῇ πρᾶσιν μοι ἄνιν ποιεῖσθαι. Or it may answer to buying or selling for future delivery. φιλικῶν ('of the nature of friendship') stands here as a predicate. Cf. Eth. viii. i. 4: τὰν δικαίων τὸ μάκαστα φιλικῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

7—8 ἡ ἵδικὴ—εὔργετεσθαι] 'On the other hand the moral (branch of utilitarian friendship) is not on stated conditions, but the gift, or whatever else it be, is made as if to a friend.
for one must not make a man a friend against his will (i.e. treat him as if he were disinterested, when he did not really mean to be so). (One must act) as if one had made a mistake at the outset, and had received a benefit from one whom one ought not to have received it from, that is to say not from a friend, or from some one doing a friendly action; one must conclude the business therefore as if one had been benefited on stated conditions. And (in this case) one would stipulate to repay to the best of one’s ability:— if one were unable, not even the giver could demand it; so in short, if one is able, one should repay. But one ought to consider at the outset by whom one is benefited, and on what terms, so that one may agree to accept those terms, or not.” The words καὶ εἰκόνι are omitted in the above translation. They are left out by two of the MSS., and while they merely interrupt the sense of the passage, they may easily be conceived to have arisen out of the following words ἄκοντα γὰρ. The passage prescribes the mode of dealing with a person who having conferred a benefit (as described in the last section) expects a return for it. The accusative case διαμαρτύτωτα is governed by the verbal adjective διαλυτέων which follows, cf. Eth. vii. 1: λεκτικὸν ἀλλὰ προσημαίνων ἀρχήν. Some editions read ὄμολογηται δ’ ἂν, which the commentators explain to be governed by δεί, as implied in the verbal adjectives ἀνταποδοτέων, διαλυτέων.

Surely, as the friendship is for the sake of utility,
the benefit accruing to the recipient is the gauge (of what is to be repaid). For he (the recipient) is the asking party, and (the other) assists him on the understanding that he will receive the same value. The assistance rendered then is exactly so much as the recipient has been benefited; and he ought therefore to repay as much as he has reaped, or more.'

XIV. 1 διαφέρονται 'Men have differences' in those friendships which are contracted between a superior and an inferior. Aristotle says that these differences ought to be settled by both parties respectively getting more than each other; the one receiving more money or good, the other receiving more honour.

3 oδ γάρ ἐστιν ὑπομένει] 'For it is not allowable that a man should at once gain money, and honour out of the public, for no one endures to have the inferior position in all points.' This notion, that the state-officers should have *either* pay or honour, but not both,—is expressed before, Eth. v. vi. 6-7. It is drawn from the Athenian ideas of liberty and equality, but is hardly in accordance with the practice of the modern world.
περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττωμένω τιμῇ ἀπονέμωσι καὶ τῷ ὅσον ῥυθμόν χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἄξιαν γὰρ ἐπανιστεί καὶ σὰν ἔσχε τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἰρήνη. οὕτω ἤν καὶ τοὺς ἀνίσοις ὁμολύτειον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ἀφελομένω ἡ ἐἰς ἀρετὴν

τιμῇ ἀνταποδοτέων, ἀνταποδιδόντα τῷ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ καὶ κατ' ἄξιαν· οὕδε γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν πάσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὕδεις γὰρ ἃν ποτε τὴν ἄξιαν ἀποδοθῇ, εἰς ὄνομαν ἢ ὁ βεβαιεύων ἐπιτείχης εἴναι δοκεῖ. οὐκὰς ὀδὲ ἔσειν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι οὐδὲ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' οὐλὸν ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέων, οὐδὲν ὰς ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργομένων ἀνδρακεν, ὡς τ' ἂει ὀφείλει. οἷς ἡ ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφείναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή, ἥμα ὃ ὅσις οὐδεὶς ποτ' ἀν ἀποστῆται δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλουσας μοχθηρίας· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς θυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικῶν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ θεσκτῶν ἢ 'οὐ σπουδαστόν τὸ ἐπαρ-κεῖν, μοχθηρίᾳ ἄν τι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγωσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές. ƒνερὶ μὲν οὖν τού-των ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

4 ἀπείπασθαι] 'To disown.' Card- weel quotes Herodotus i. 59: εἰ τίς οἱ τυχάναι εἶναι πάλιν, τοῦτον ἀπείπασθαι. Demosthenes 1006. 21: (ὁ νόμος) τοὺς γονεάς ποιεῖ κυρίου ὡς μόνου θεοῦ τοῦμεν ἐξ ἄρχης, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν ἐξαλείφησθαι καὶ βούλονται καὶ ἄποθησία.

χωρὶς γὰρ—διωθεῖσθαι] 'For independently of natural affection, it is a human instinct not to reject the assistance (which he might derive from his son).' διωθεῖσθαι is used in the same sense, Eth. ix. xi. 6.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτου εἴπτοςοῦτον εἰρήσθω] This has every appearance of being the interpolation of an editor. There is no real division between Books VIII. and IX. They follow each other continuously without any break in the subject. The editor who divided one treatise into two books has added the above artificial division.
I. In heterogeneous friendships, equality is to be obtained by the rule of proportion. The same rule holds good in political economy, where the most heterogeneous products are equalized against one another. In political economy there is the convenience of a common standard, money, by which products may be measured. In friendship there is, unfortunately, no such standard.

1 ἀνομοιοειδέσι] This is not quite the same as ταῖς καθ’ ὑποροχὴν φιλίαις. It implies relationships in which the two parties have respectively different objects in view, as for instance, in the case of the employer and the employed, the ἐρώμενος and the ἔραστής, &c.


ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ] By the modern division of sciences, Political Economy has been raised into separate existence, so as in its method to be entirely independent of, and in its results subordinate to, Politics. On the Aristotelian theory of the law of value in exchange, see Eth. v. v. 8, and note.

3 ἦ τῶν ἑδαν] ‘Moral friendship’ or ‘friendship based on character,’ the same as ἦ κατ’ ἀρετὴν φιλία. Cf. Eth. viii. xiii. 11: ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ’ ἀρετὴν—τῇ ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡδου,
k. t. l. Of course the above terms have nothing to do with the 'moral' branch of utilitarian friendship, mentioned Eth. viii. xiii. 5. 7.

4 οὖν—εφι 'As in the case of him who promises (a reward) to the harper, and "the better he sang, the more he should have," but when the man next morning demands the fulfilment of his promises, said that "he had paid pleasure for pleasure,"' (i.e. the pleasure of hope, for the pleasure of hearing music). The present tenses ἐπαγγελόμενος, ἀπαστούντι, seem to imply an oft-repeated and current story. The story itself is repeated by Plutarch (De Alexandri Fortunâ, ii. 1) where the trick is attributed to Dionysius. Διονύσιος γαῖν οἱ τύραννοι, ὡς φασί, κινδραφθοῦν τίνος εἰδοκιμαίνοντο ἀκούσιν ἐπηγγελλόστο ωρᾳν αὐτῷ τὰ λαβών. τῇ δ' ὀστερᾷ του ἀνθρώπου τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀπαστούντος. χθές, εἰπεν, εἰφαινόμενος ὡτὶ σὺν παρ' ᾧ ἤδε χρόνον, εὔφρατα κάγω σε ταῖς ἐλπίσιν. διότι τὸν μετών ὃν ἐπερεῖ ἀπελάμβανες ἐθύμοι, ἀπετρεπόμενος.

'ὡν γάρ δεόμενοι—δόσεις' 'For a man sets his mind on the things he happens to want, and for the sake of that he will give what he himself possesses.'

The beginning of the sentence (_focus δεόμενοι) is a general statement, the words κακεινοῦ γε contain an application of the general statement to a particular case.

5 τὴν ἄξιαν δὲ—τοσοῦτον 'But whose part is it to settle the value (of a benefit) —is it the part of the giver in the first instance, or of the recipient? (One would say it was the part of him who was the recipient in the first instance) for the giver seems to leave it to the other. Which they mention Protagoras as doing, for whenever he taught anything he used to bid the learner estimate "how much worth he thinks he has learnt," and he used to take exactly so much.

ὅ προτείμενος is used in a peculiar sense here to denote 'qui prior donum dedid,' in opposition to ὃ προλαβὼν (or ὃ προέχων, § 8), 'qui prior ab altero acceptit.' Protagoras was said to be the first philosopher who taught for money. He probably found it not disadvantageous to assume a high and liberal attitude towards his pupils. On the wealth which he amassed by teaching, see Plato's Meno, p. 91 b, and above, Vol. I. Essay II. p. 80.
στασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσότους. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ 6 ἐνίοις ἀφίσκει τὸ 'μεθὺς ὁ ἄνδρις,' οἱ δὲ προκαθόρισις τὸ ἀγγύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ἄν ἐφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελίων, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήματι γίνονται, οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ὁμολογήσαν. τοῦτο δὲ ἦσαν 7 ποιεῖν οἱ σοφίσται ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἀν δοῦναι ἀγγύριον ἄν ἐπίστανται. ὡστὶς μὲν ὁν ἐλαβον τῶν μισθῶν μὴ ποιοῦντες, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσίν· ἐν αἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπογραφῆς, οἱ μὲν δὲ αὐτοὺς προείμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνένεκτοι· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἢ καὶ ἀρετὴν φιλία. τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν· αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ μίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὡστὶ δὲ οἷς καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνύσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήσην ἢ αξία μετείηται, τιμὴ τ' ἴσορροπος οὐχ ἄν γένοιτο,

6—7 ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις—ἐπίστανται] 'In such matters some like the principle of "a stated wage."' Those, however, who take the money beforehand, and then do nothing of what they promised, are naturally blamed in consequence of their excessive promises, for they do not fulfil what they agreed. But this course the Sophists are perhaps obliged to adopt, because no one would be likely to give money for the things which they know.' Protagoras had no fixed price for his teaching, he left it to the pupil. But some people prefer having terms settled beforehand, μισθὸς εἰρημένος, as it is called in the line of Hesiod (Works and Days, v. 368): Μισθὸς δ' ἄνδρι φίλῳ εἰρημένοις ἄρκι τοῦ ἐτῶν. It is the perversion of this when men take the money beforehand, and then fail in performing that which was paid for. The Sophists (says Aristotle with severe irony) are perhaps obliged to insist on payment beforehand, on account of the utter worthlessness of their teaching. Aristotle contrasts the conduct of Protagoras (of whom he speaks honourably) with that of 'the Sophists' after the profession had become regularly settled.

7 ἐν οἷς δὲ—φιλία] 'But supposing there is no agreement with regard to the service rendered—then, in the first place (οἷ μὲν), with regard to those who give purely for personal reasons, we have said that they are free from all chance of complaint; for this is the mode of virtuous friendship.' δ' αὐτοῖς is more of a logical than a grammatical formula, and would be represented by per se in Latin. This phrase and καθ' αὐτοῖς are frequently used by Aristotle to characterise the highest kind of friendship, which is an 'absolute' feeling. Eth. viii. iii. 1: οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον φιλοῦντες ἄλληνος οὐ καθ' αὐτοῖς φιλοῦσιν. In the following section, ἐπὶ τινι, 'for some external object,' is contrasted with δι' αὐτοῖς, 'that which looks to the personal character alone.' Cf. ix. x. 6: δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦς (φιλία) οὐκ ἐπι τρὸς τολμᾶτος.

οὕτω δὲ οἷς—ἐπιεξεχόμενον] 'And thus it seems that they ought to act, who are made partakers in philosophy (i.e. they should measure the benefit
received by the intention of their teacher), for the worth of philosophy is not measured against money, and no amount of honour can balance it. But, perhaps, as also towards the gods and one’s parents, it is enough if one gives what one can.’ Aristotle, perhaps mindful of the twenty years which he passed in the school of Plato, places very highly the spiritual dignity of teaching in philosophy. After ἐσοκρατείν, ἐν αὐτόν is to be understood.

8 η τοιαύτης θ' ὀφθης] ‘In the second place, when the gift is not of this kind,’ i.e. not δι’ αὐτοῦς.

8 τοῦ προέχοντα] ‘The first recipient,’ see above § 5.

8—9 καὶ γὰρ ἐν—ἐκατωμένην] ‘For this is what is done in the market (i.e. the buyer, who is the recipient, settles the price); and in some places it is the law that there must be no actions on voluntary contracts, it being right that one should conclude with a person whom one has trusted on the same terms as those on which one entered on the contract with him.’

Cf. Ἐθ. viii. xiii. 6: κοινωνία here is used in the same sense as συμπαλατίτες there.
the real state of the case, the claim is of course not equal: and even if it be not, but the parties only think so, such conduct does not seem unreasonable.'

This and the other casuistical questions here discussed have very little interest.

εἰρηται vide § 3.

προοπαρχην 'that which was pre-existing,' here 'primary obligation.'


6 μὲν—τῷ δὲ These words, by carelessness of writing, refer to the same subject.

εἰτε τῇ ἤνω—εἰτ' ἐξει μὲν μὴ] This double protasis, instead of having as usual only one, has a double apodosis.

6 ὅπερ ὁφ' πολλάκις εἰρηται] Cf. Eth. 1. iii. 1; ii. ii. 3, and above § 2.
7 οὐδὲ τῷ Δίῳ δύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλου· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐτέρα γονέωσι καὶ ἀδιέφορος καὶ ἐτάφος καὶ εὐεργεταῖς, ἐκάστοις τὰ ὁικεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀναφέροντα ἀπονεμένειν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν Φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τοῦτοις γὰρ καὶ τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο ἡ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήθη δὲ μάλιστ' ὠσαύτω δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντῶν διὰ ταύτω. ὄδει εἰ δ' ἄν τροφῆς μὲν γονέωσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλονται, καὶ τοῖς αἰτῶι τούτο εἶναι κάλλιον ὅν ἡ ἐαυτοῖς εἰς ταύτ' ἐπαρκεῖν. καὶ τιμήν δὲ γονεόν καθάπερ θείας, οὐ πᾶσαν δὲ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀκτήν πατρί καὶ μητρί· οὐδ' αὐτ' τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἡ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, ὁμοίους δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ προσβυτέρῳ τιμήν τὴν καθ' ἐλλικάν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τιούτοις. πρὸς ἐτάφος δ' αὐτ' καὶ ἀδιέφορος παραρρήσαν καὶ ἀπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενεῖς ὅτι καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀπαντῶν ἀεί πειράτεον τὸ ὁικεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνεις τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ὑπαικύταιρα καὶ ἀκτήνια.  

10 καὶ ἀρετὴν ἡ χρῆσιν, τῶν μὲν οὖν ὀμογενῶν μίαν ἡ χρήσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργασίαιστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἐνδυέχεται, οὕτω διοριστέον.  

3 "Ερχεί δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διακλέσθαι τὰς φιλιὰς ἡ μη πρὸς τοὺς μη διαμείνοντας. ἡ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ

οὐδὲ τῷ Δίῳ δύεται] 'Not even to Zeus are all things indiscriminately sacrificed.' It is given as an illustration of conventional right, Eth. v. vii. 1, that goats and not sheep are sacrificed to Zeus.

7 καὶ εἰς τὰ κήθη—διὰ ταύτο] 'And for the same reason men think that relations ought especially to meet at funeral ceremonies.'

8 τροφῆς ἐπαρκεῖν] 'To furnish subsistence.' Fritzsche quotes Xenophon, Memor. ii. vi. 23: δύναται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ τότιν—κοιμώνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑπάρκειν ἄλληλοι.

9 ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει] 'Rising up to greet them, and conducting them to the seat of honour.' Cf. Plato Repub. p. 425 a: συγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρά προσβυτέροις, δό πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.  

10 τῶν μὲν οὖν ὀμογενῶν μίαν ἡ χρήσις] i.e. It is easy to compare a relation with a relation, a tribesman with a tribesman, &c., but to compare a tribesman with a relation would be more troublesome.

III. 1 πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμείνοντας] 'Who do not continue the same.' Cf. Eth. x. iii. 3: ἀλλ' ἀνεμένῃ διαμένει ἕως τινός.  

εὐκαλύπτει δ'—ἠδος] 'But one might complain, if a man who liked one for
II.—III.] ΠΟΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΩΝ IX. 287

χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ηδὸν φίλους ὄντως, ὥστεν μηκέτε ταὐτῷ ἐκείνων, οὐδὲν ἀτομον διαλύσθαι; εἰκέναι γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι ὅν τοῖς ἀπολιπότοις εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσεις δ' ἂν τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ηδὸν ἀγαπῶν προσεποίητο διὰ τὸ ἦδος. ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἄρχῃ εἰπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοράι γίγνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὠμοίως ὁμιλητοί καὶ ὁμοίως φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαφεύσης τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ, διείσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦδος, μὴν τοῖοτον ἐκείνοις πράττοντος, ἐκατὸν αἰτεῖται ἂν ὅταν ὦτα τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατηθάντι, καὶ μάλλον ἓ τοῖς τῷ νόμῳ νᾶ κεβοθλεύσουσιν, ὥσπερ περὶ τιμίωτερον ἡ κακουργία. ἔαν δ' ἀποδέχεσθαι ὡς ἀγαθὸν, γένηται δὲς μοιχηρὸς καὶ δοξῆ, ἂρ' ἔτι φιλητεύον; ἢ οὐ δυνατὸν, ἐπερ μὴ πάν τινα πληρόν ἀλλὰ τάκαθον; οὐτε δὲ φιλητεύον πωνηρὸν οὔτε οὖν. Фιλοτόπην γὰρ οὐ χρῆ εἰναι, οὖν ὠμοιοῦσθαι φαύλως εἰσῆται δ' ὅτι τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ὁμοίου φίλου. ἅρ' οὖν εὔθες διαλυτόν; ἢ οὐ πάσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιμάτοις κατα τὴν μοιχηρίαν; ἐπανωθοὺσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέων εἰς τὸ ἦδος ἢ τὴν ὁυσίαν, ὧσι βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξει δ' ἂν δ' ἡ διαλυμένος οὖν ἀτομον ποιεῖν οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φίλος ἰν' ἀλλιουθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασώσαι ἄφισταται. εἰ δ' οὐ μὴν διαμένοι δ' ἐπειξεῖσθαι οὖν τερος γένοιτο καὶ πολύ διαλλάτται τῇ ἀρστῇ, ἀρα χρηστέων φίλων, ἢ οὖκ εὐδέχεσθαι; ἐν μεγάλῃ δ' διαστάσει μάλιστα διαφεύσης answers to διαμαρτύρτα in Eth. viii. xiii. 9. 

κεβοθλεύσων] To counterfeit friendship, says Aristotle, is worse than counterfeiting the coinage. The commentators quote Theognis, vv. 119 sqq., where the same maxim occurs.

3 ὅστε δὲ φιλητεύον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ] The MSS. vary extremely about the meaning of this word, and there is evidently something wrong. οὔτε δεῖ is at all events an interpolation. Fritzsche thinks that the whole is a double gloss upon φιλοτόπην.

ἐπανωθοῦσιν δ' ἔχουσι] 'To those who are capable of restoration.'
II0IKQN

4 ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι] 'But without these things it is not possible, as we said, that they should be friends.' On this use of the past tense ἦν in reference to what has been previously said by the writer, cf. Metaph. xi. vi. 1: ἦπει δ’ ἦσαν τρεῖς ὄντες. Eth. iii. v. 3: τῶτον δ’ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς εἶναι. v. i. 12: ἦπει δ’ ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν, &c. Aristotle is here referring to Eth. viii. iii. 9; viii. v. 3.

IV. 1 ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες—προσκεκρουκότες] 'Which mothers feel towards their children, and which friends who have had a rupture (feel towards each other),' i.e. they quite disinterestedly, since in the latter case intercourse is precluded, wish each other to live. On the disinterested feeling of mothers, cf. Eth. viii. viii. 3. On the use of προσκεκροῦν, cf. Polities, ii. v. 4: οἱ πλείοντες διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποικιλίας ἐκ μικρῶν προσκεκροῦσαν ἀλλήλους. θὲ δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτων μάλιστα προσκεκροῦμεν, οἷς πλείον προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακοινίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους.

2 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν—εἶναι] 'The good man has every one of these feelings towards himself, and other men have them in so far as they set up to be good;' (i.e. wherever they fall short in these feelings, they fall short also in their attempt to be good). 'For, as we have said, virtue and the good man are the standard for everything.' Cf. Eth. iii. iv. 5; x. v. 10.
But every man wishes what is good for himself. No one, on condition of becoming another man, chooses that that new thing, which he should become, should possess everything, (for God has now all good); but (every man desires to possess what is good) remaining his present self. And the thinking faculty would appear to be each man's proper self, or more so than anything else. The usual punctuation of this passage has been altered to obtain the above translation, which has been suggested to the annotator, and which seems to give a more natural explanation of the text than has been arrived at by the commentators, who universally explain ἀλλ' ἄν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστιν to refer to the unchangeableness or to the personality of God. If the passage be read as above, it will be seen that the words ἄν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστιν are in opposition to γενόμενος ὅ ἄλλος. Aristotle says that to every man his personality is what is dear to him, he would not relinquish this to gain all the world, for by relinquishing it he would not gain anything. With a changed personality, he would no more possess any good thing, than he now possesses it because God possesses all good. All his wishes are made on the basis of being still what he is. The good man, who fosters his thinking faculty, most of all takes care of his proper self.
6 ταύτι ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ ποτέρον ἔστιν ἢ ὁδὴ ἔστιν 
φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἕπι τοῦ παρόντος· δέχεσθαι ἡ ἄν ταὐτῇ 
εἶναι φιλία, ἥ ἔστιν ὁδὸν ἢ πλεῖον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι 
7 ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοίωται. Φαίνεται 
δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίτερ ὁδὶ 
φαύλως. ἂρ' ὁδὴ ἢ ἀφείσθω ἐαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἑπικείμενα, 
ταὐτῇ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπὶ τῶν 
γε κοιμοῦτοι φαύλως καὶ ἀνοσιοφρῶν ὀδίνει ταῦτ' ὑπάρχειν, 
8 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς Φαύλωσι· διά- 
Φέρονται γὰρ ἐαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα 
δὲ βούλουνται, οὕτως οἱ ἄκρατες· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν 

6 πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ—ὅμοιωται] 'But whether friendship towards oneself is, 
or is not, possible, we may leave undecided for the present. It would 
seem to be possible in so far as two or 
more of the above mentioned conditions 
exist, and because the extreme of 
friendship resembles one's feelings' 
towards oneself.' Several commenta-
tors explain ἦ στιν δὲν ἢ πλεῖον to 
mean 'in so far as man consists of 
two or more parts,' and εἰκ τῶν εἰρη-
μένων they would translate 'in ac-
cordance with what we have before 
said,' referring to Eth. 13, xiii. 9. In 
this sense the passage would be a 
parallel one to Eth. v. xi. 9. But it 
is clear from the next section that εἰκ 
τῶν εἰρημένων refers to the definitions 
of friendship, given in § 1 of this 
chapter. ἀφείσθω is used as in Eth. 
viii. i. 7, viii. viii. 7. We are not 
here referred to the subsequent dis-
cussion in Eth. ix. vii., where by no 
means the same subject is renewed. 

8 Σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλωσι— 
ἐαυτοῖς] 'But one might almost say 
that these things do not appertain to 
the bad at all. For they are at variance 
with themselves, and desire one set of 
things while they wish another, 
just like the continent; instead of 
what seems to them to be good they 
choose the pleasant though it is hurt-
ful; and others through cowardice 
and want of spirit abstain from doing 
what they think to be best for them-
selves; and they who through wicked-
ness have committed many crimes hate 
their life, and fly from it, and put an 
end to themselves.' The 'desire' of 
the wicked, as being of the particular 
and subject to the domination of the 
senses (Eth. vii. iii. 9), is at 
variance with their 'wish,' which is of 
the universal and implies a conception 
of the good. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 6, viii. 
xiii. 8. The description of bad men 
given here ignores and is at variance 
with the conclusions of Book vii. In 
that book the strength, and here the 
weakness, of vice is represented. Thus 
in Eth. viii. vili. the bad man is de-
scribed as unrepentant, abiding by his 
purpose (§ 1), having the major pre-
m iss of his mind corrupted (§ 4), 
and therefore having no wish for the good, 
even in the universal. The account 
in Book vii., which makes ἄκολασα 
or abandoned vice free from all weak-
ness, is more theoretical and less drawn 
from nature than the above descrip-
tion. All that is said here has a close 
relation to, and was probably suggested 
by, the words in the Lysis of Plato, p. 
214 C: τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς, ὑπὲρ καὶ λέγεται
peri avtovn, meideste omoiouv, mn' avtovs elnav, all' elplhktos te kal oastambhtous.

9—10 stasaidei—gymonov] 'For their soul is in tumult, the one part of it, through viciousness, grieves at abstaining from certain things, but the other part is pleased (at this abstinence), and the one pulls this way, the other that way, as though tearing (the man) in pieces. If it is not possible to feel pain and pleasure at the same moment, at all events after a little while (the bad man) is pained that he felt pleasure, and he "could have wished that those pleasures had not happened to him;" for the wicked are full of repentance.' This picture of the mental struggles of the bad does not recall either the phraseology or the doctrines of Book viii., where moxphria is contrasted with, and opposed to, akrapia (cf. vii. viii. 1). The metaphor stasaidei occurs repeatedly in Plato's Republic, cf. 1. p. 352 a: (7) adikia) en ein—enousia—prwton mn' adnavaton avtovn prpstein poleisai stasaidei—zontai kal oiv omonovnta avtovn iavtop, epsteita ephvovn kal evtop kai tois dikaios. Cf. Ech. i. xiii. 15.

V. 'H 8' eunoi—akolouthei] 'Now
good-will is like friendship, but yet it is not friendship, for good will is exercised both towards unknown persons, and when its own existence is unknown (to the object), which is not the case with friendship. But all this has been said already. It is not even the same as loving; for it exhibits neither violence nor longing, which are the accompaniments of loving. The Saxon word 'Good-will,' and not the Latin 'Benevolence,' which is too abstract and general, is the representative of εὐνοια. Goodwill, says Aristotle, is engendered by the appearance of noble qualities, it is rapidly conceived, but is passive in its character, and is only the prelude of friendship. There being no correspondent adjective to the substantive 'Good-will,' we must express εὐνοια by 'Well-disposed.' Just as in Eth. iii. the cognitive faculties to Purpose, and in Eth. vi. the cognitive qualities to Wisdom are discussed, so Aristotle here introduces a discussion of the feelings which are cognate to Friendship.

καὶ πρότερον δὲ] viii. ii. 3-4.

διάσασθαι] 'Intensity,' 'straining,' 'violence.' In the previous section διαστερείμαι means 'strenuously.' Cf. Ar. Politi. vii. xviii. 6: τὰς διαστάσεις τῶν πάθων καὶ κλαυθμῶν, 'the violent passions and cryings of children.'

2 ἡ δ' εὐνοια—συμβαίνει] While loving implies acquaintance and familiarity, good-will is conceived instantaneously; thus men conceive goodwill towards particular competitors in the games from their appearance, and are inclined to wish them success.

3 Good-will, says Aristotle, is the prelude of Friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the prelude of love. This however does not constitute love. The test of love is longing for a person in absence. Cf. Ar. Rhet. 1. xi. 11: where the same test is given. In accordance with the unhappy notions of the Greeks, ἀπόστα is here put in the masculine gender.

ἡ δὲ τῆς ὑπερεσ] In Plato's Cratylus, p. 420 a, it is suggested that ἔρως is derived from ἕρωιν.—Ἔρως ὃτι ἔρωι ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἷκελα ἐστὶν ἡ ῥή αὐτὴ τῷ ἔχοντι, ἀλλὰ ἐπεζωκτος διὰ τῶν ὁμόματων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτό ἔρος τὸ γε παλαιὸ ἐκαλεῖτο. Cf. Shakspeare Merchant of Venice, Act iii. Sc. ii.

'It is engendered in the eyes,
By gazing fed.'

And Romeo and Juliet, Act I. Sc. iii.
'I'll look to like, if looking liking move.'
οὐ τίνι διὰ τοῦ χρησίμου] 'Goodwill' is essentially disinterested in its character.
VI. 1 φιλικόν δε—ὁμοδοξία] 'Unanimity also appears to be of the nature of friendship; therefore it is not the same as agreement of opinion.' On φιλικόν, cf. Eth. viii. i. 4; viii. xiii. 6.

οίον τούς περὶ τῶν υδάτων] Cf. Eth. iii. 3: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἅπαξ ὄνομα βουλευταί, οίον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. Aristotle arrives at his definition of ὑμνον indubitably, saying that we do not find the name applied to agreement of opinion in general, nor again to agreement of opinion about every particular subject, but we do find it used of states whose citizens are unanimous on the measures to be adopted for the common weal. Hence we get the idea that unanimity is 'political friendship.' Cf. Eth. viii. i. 4, where ὑμνον is used as the opposite of στάσις.

2 ἡ ἀρχεῖν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἔφεσι.] 'Or (if all agree) that Pittacus shall rule, (supposing this to be) during the period when he himself was willing to rule.' Pittacus, having held his
elective monarchy for ten years, resigned. Had the citizens after this period wished him to reign, his own will would have been wanting to make unanimity in the state.


τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὅθηποτε]
The commentators illustrate this by the joke of the man who said 'that he and his wife had always perfectly agreed—in wishing to govern the house.'

3 ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντως, ἴσως εἰπεῖν'

'Being on the same moorings, as it were,' as opposed to the ebbings and flowings of a Euripus. Cf. Demosthenes, De Corona, p. 319, § 281, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ὁμοίᾳ τοῖς παλλοῖς, sc. ἀνεκφόρα.

4 This is a picture of the discord produced by evil passions, where every one grasping at the larger share in good things, and shirking his part in labours and services, watches (ἐξετάζει) his neighbour to prevent him encroaching. Thus men force each other to do what is right, while unwilling to do it themselves.

VII. Aristotle says, it is noticed as something extraordinary (ὡς παρὰ λόγον ἐπικριτῇ) that benefactors seem to love those, to whom they have done a kindness, more than the benefited persons love them. The common explanation of the paradox
is, that benefactors look forward to obtaining a return for their kindness, they thus cherish the persons of those who are indebted to them. This selfish theory views mankind on the dark side (ἐν πονηρῷ δεχόμενοι), but is not altogether devoid of truth. A deeper reason however may be assigned for the phenomenon in question, namely, that as we can only be said to exist when we are conscious of our vital powers (ἐσμέν ἐνεργεῖα), so anything which gives or increases the sense of those powers is dear to us. The benefitted person stands to the benefactor in the relation of a work to the artist, he is an exponent of the benefactor's self, and is thus regarded with feelings of affection, as being associated by the benefactor with the sense of his own existence (περικύριοι δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι). These feelings of course cannot be reciprocated by the benefitted person. Again, the benefactor associates an idea of the noble (τὸ καλὸν) with the recipient of his good deeds; the other associates with him only an idea of the profitable, and this is a less loveable idea, especially when viewed in the past, and become a matter of memory. Again, the active part taken by the benefactor has more affinity to the active principle of loving.

τοῖς μὲν ὀνὸν πλείστοις] This explanation is put by Thucydides (π. 40) into the mouth of Pericles: ἐβιβάζω τερός δὲ ὁ δρᾶσας τὴν χάριν διὸ ἄρα ὡφειλομένῳ δι᾽ εὐνοίας ὁ δὲ δίδωκε σάρκων· ὁ δὲ εἰποθῆσαν ἀμβλυτέρως, εἰδοκαί ὑπὸ τοῦ χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ὡφελεία τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδίδοσαν.

Ἐπιχαρμος] The words ἐν πονηρῷ δεχόμενοι seem to have been taken
out of some iambic or trochaic verse of the Sicilian poet, but the verse itself has not been preserved.

4 τοιούτω δὴ—μηνωί] 'The case of benefactors seems then something of the same kind. For the object benefited is their "work;" they love this therefore more than the work loves him who made it. The cause of this is that existence is desired and loved by all, but we exist by consciousness, that is to say by living and acting. Thus he who has made the work in question exists consciously, and therefore he loves the work, because he loves his existence. And this is a principle of nature; for that which exists potentially, the work proves to exist actually.' On this mode of paraphrasing ἐνεργεία, see Vol. I. Essay IV. Any work of art, or creation of the mind, or moral achievement, is here said to shew us externally to ourselves. It causes us to exist ἐνεργεία, that is, not only in ourselves, but for ourselves. It thus becomes a union of the objective and the subjective. And the philosophical principle explains a whole class of homogeneous facts, not only the feelings of benefactors towards the benefited, but of poets towards their poems, of parents, and especially mothers, towards their children; and of those who have made fortunes towards their property. These facts were brought together, without being analysed, by Plato, cf. Republic, p. 330 b-c, and Eth. iv. i. 20.

ἐνεργεία δὴ—ποιη] Many commentators understand these words to mean, 'Therefore by means of conscious activity the maker is in a sense his work,' in which they are supported by Eustathius and the Paraphrast. This would not materially alter the general drift of the passage.

6 ἡδεία δὲ ἐστι—μηνη] 'Now of the present the living reality is sweet, of the future the hope, of the past the memory.' In two clauses of this sentence subjective words are used (ἐλπίς and μηνη), but ἐνεργεία in the remaining clause hovers between the objective and the subjective. Cf. Ar. De Memoria, i. 4, where αἰσθασις is used in an analogous sentence: τὸν μὲν παρόντος (ἐστιν) αἰσθασις, τὸν δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τὸν δὲ γενομένου μηνη.
VII.—VIII.]

INICHNON NIKOMAXIEION IX.

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τὴν ἐνεργειαν, καὶ Φιλέτου ὅμοιος. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιη-
κότι μὲνει τὸ ἐργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ
παθότι τὸ χρῆσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν
καλῶν ήδεια, τῶν δὲ χρήσιμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἤπτον· ἢ προσ-
δοξία δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν εὐοικεν, καὶ ἢ μὲν Φίλησις
ποιήσεις οὐκεν, τὸ διείσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν. τοῖς υπερ-
ἐχουσι δὴ περὶ τὴν πράξειν ἐπέται τοῦ Φιλείν καὶ τὰ
φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιτόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλονι
στέργουσιν, οὖν καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν
παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ μὲν εὐθείᾳ ἀπόνοια εἶναι,
tὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἐγκάζει. διὰ τάτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μυτέρες
φιλοσκυντεραί· ἐπιποωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον
ἰσασίν ὑπὶ αὐτῶν. δοξέει δ' ὁ ἄν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ἐνεργεῖταις
οἰκεῖοι εἶναι.

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δὲι Φιλείν ἐαυτῶν μάλιστα 8
ἠ ἀλλον τινα· ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς μάλιστα ἁγα-
pώσι, καὶ ὡς εἰ αἰσχρῶς φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ
tε ὁ μὲν φαύλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσοι
ἀν μοχυφρότερος ἢ, τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῶ
ὑπὶ οὐθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν· ο' δ' ἐπισεικής διὰ τὸ καλόν,
καὶ ὅσοι ἄν βελτίων ἢ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ Φιλοῦ
ἐνεχα· τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρήσιων. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτως τὰ 2

VIII. In this interesting chapter, Aristotle discusses the difficulty as to
'whether one ought to love oneself especially, or some one else.' On the one
hand, 'self-loving' is used as a term of reproach; on the other hand, one's
feelings towards oneself are made the standard for one's feelings towards
friends. These two points of view require reconciliation, which may be ef-
fected by a distinction of terms. For the word 'self' has two senses—the
lower and the higher self, the one consisting in appetites and passions, the
other in the intellect and the higher moral faculties. He that gratifies his
lower self at the expense of others is 'self-loving' in the bad sense of the
term. He that ministers to his higher

self promotes at the same time the good
of others, and is worthy of all praise.
Such self-love as this may lead a man
even to die for his friends or for his
country. A man, grasping at the
noble, may give up honour, power,
life itself; and thus the greatest self-

sacrifice will be identical with the

greatest self-love. These considera-
tions show in what sense one ought,
and in what sense one ought not, to

'love oneself.'

1 ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ ἢ, ὡς εἰ αἰσχρῶς φιλαύτου πράττειν, 'As a term of
reproach,'

οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 'He does

nothing apart from himself.'

'Nihil

alius

rationibus

alius.'

2 τοὺς λόγους δὲ—οὐκ ἀλλόγως] 'With
theses theories men's actions, not un-
reasonable, are at variance.' To the list of the meanings of the word ἔργα given in the note on Eth. i. vii. 11, we must add the above use of τὰ ἔργα to mean 'actions' as opposed to theory. Cf. Eth. ν. i. 3: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἢπτῶν...
6 εσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις—ἀνθρώπος]

But as the predominant part (in a state) seems before all things to be
the state, and as the predominant part in every other system seems to
be that system, so (the predominant part in man seems, above all things,
to be) man." Cf. Eth. x. vii. 9: δόξης
δ' ἥν καὶ εἶναι ἐκαστὸς τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ
κόσμον καὶ ἄμελον. On the uses of
the word κόσμος cf. note on Eth. 1. ii. 4.
in the above passage τὸ κυρίωτατον
means the 'most absolute,' the 'ruling'
part. Cf. Ar. Politics, iii. viii. 2: ἀριστείμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κόσμον τῶν πόλεων,
ἀνάγκη δ' εἶσαι κόσμον ἢ ἐν ἡ ἀλλών ἢ
tοὺς πολλάκις.

7 εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιῶν ἑστιν]

'If virtue is one of the greatest of
goods.'

8-10 The sentiments expressed in
these sections may be compared with
the elevated description of the self-
sacrifice of the brave man, in Eth. iii.
IIGIKUN described self-love yiyvsTai' [ClIAP. Tro'A/^ag auaTog of interest A al<ouvTai We 7ro?vuv oto to To of still

IIX. Does the happy man, who is all-sufficient in himself, need friends, or not? To prove the affirmative of this question, Aristotle uses the following arguments.

1. A priori, we might assume that, as happiness is the sum of all human goods, the possession of friends, one of the greatest of external goods, would necessarily be included (§ 2).

2. Friends will be required by the happy man, not so much as the givers, but rather as the recipients, of kindness (§ 2).

3. We might assume also that the happy man should neither be condemned to be a solitary, nor to live with strangers and chance people (§ 3).

4. Those who take the negative side in the question have an unworthy conception of friends, as persons affording profit or pleasure. The happy man is almost independent of such (§ 4), but yet he may want friends in a higher sense. Happiness consists in the play of life (évérēma), and he that sees before his eyes the virtuous
καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά. αὐτάρκειας ὁσὶν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδείσθαι, τὸν δὲ Φίλον, ἔτερον αὐτῶν ὄντα, ποίησιν ἄ ὑeus αὐτοῦ ἄδυνατει. οὕεν τὸ ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδό, τί ἐς φίλων;

ἐξίκε δ’ ἀτόπω πάντ’ ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθά τῷ εὐδαίμ. μον ἐὰν Φίλος μὴ ἀποδούναι, ὁ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἰναι. εἰ τε Φίλος μάλλον ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἡ πάσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ’ εὖ ποιεῖν Φίλος ὄνειαν, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δείκσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. οὗ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μάλλον δεῖ Φίλον ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, οὐς καὶ τοῦ ἀνυχούτος δεσμένου τῶν εὐεργετησῶντος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχώντων οὕς εὖ ποιήσωσιν. ἄτοπον δ’ ἰσός καὶ τὸ μονό-3 την ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον: οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιπ’ ἄν καὶ οὐτὸν τὰ πάντ’ ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος καὶ σοφὸς πειθός· καὶ τὸ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦ ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά ἔχει. ἄδηλον δ’ ὅσο μετὰ Φίλον καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρείττων ἦ μετ’ ὄνειαν καὶ τῶν τυχόντων

acts of a friend has a delightful sense of the play of life, seeing harmonious action and identifying it with himself (ἐπιεικῶς καὶ οἰκεῖας, § 5).

5 Again, the sympathy and excitement of friends enables a man to prolong that vivid action and glow of the mind which is the essence of happiness (§§ 5–6).

6 It also confirms him in the practice of virtue (§§ 6–7).

7 Finally, a deeper reason may be assigned for the necessity of friends to the happy man; it depends on our love of life. That sympathetic consciousness (συναιθαίνεσιν) which we have of a friend’s existence, by means of intercourse with him, is, only, in a secondary degree (παραπληθόν), the same as the sense of our own existence.

1 αὐτάρκεια] The quality αὐτάρκεια is claimed for happiness, Eth. 1. vii. 6, where Aristotle guards himself against the supposition that it implies a lonely life. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκες εἰναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνον τῷ ἐξαιτίας ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονείσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γνωσίας καὶ διὰ τοῦ φίλου καὶ πολιτές, ἐπιεικῆ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἀνθρώπος.

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων) from the Orestes of Euripides, 665, sqq.: τοὺς φίλους εὐτοῖς κακοῖς χρή τοῖς φίλοις ὁφελεῖν· ὅταν δ’ ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδό, τί δεί φίλων; ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ θεός ὁ φιλεῖ θέλων.

2 ἀπονέμοντας] ‘Us who allot,’ cf. Eth. 1. vii. 8, where happiness is said to be τέλειον τι καὶ αὐτάρκες. The form of expression here used is similar to that in Eth. 1. x. 2: ἡ τοιοῦτο γαντελὼς ἄτοπον, ἀλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἑνέργειαν τίνα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν;

5 ἐν ἀρχή—πράξειν] 'For we said at the outset (Eth. i. viii. 14) that happiness is a certain function of the consciousness, and it is plain that this arises in us, and does not exist in us like a possession. But if being happy consists in the play of life, and the actions of the good man are good and essentially pleasurable, as we said before (Eth. i. viii. 15), and also the sense of a thing being identified with oneself is one of the sources of pleasure, but we are able to contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves, and their actions better than our own, then the actions of good men being their friends are pleasurable to the good; (such actions) contain both the two elements that are essentially pleasurable. The supremely happy man then will require friends of this character, if he wishes to contemplate actions which are good and also identified with himself; and such are the actions of the good man being his friend.

Again, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasurably, whereas life is painful to the solitary man, for by oneself it is difficult to maintain long a vivid state of the mind, but with others and in relation to others this is easier.'

The first part of this sentence contains a complex protasis, to which the apodosis is αἵ ὑπὸν σπουδαίων δή, κ.τ.λ. τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια] In the passage referred to (Eth. i. viii. 13) the words are αἵ καὶ ἀρετήν πράξεις, which may justify the above translation.

ἀμφαῖ γὰρ ἠξουσία] Some of the commentators take ἀμφαῖ as though it were the nominative case to ἠξουσία, and meant 'both the good man and
his friend.' But it would be irrelevant to speak of the feelings of the friend. The question is, what advantage does the happy man get out of having friends? ἀμφοτερον evidently applies to τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα, as is further proved by the words ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκεῖαι in the next sentence; it refers to what has gone before, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν —οἰκεῖων τῶν ἡδέων.

6—7 ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος—φησιν] The good man, feeling the same sort of pleasure in the moral acts reciprocated between himself and his friend which the musical man feels in good music, will prolong and enjoy that reciprocation, and as Theognis says ‘will learn what is good by associating with the good.’ The advantage here attributed to friendship is that, by adding the element of pleasure to the best functions of our nature, it assists and develops them. Cf. Eth. x. v. 2: συμφωνεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἑνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδὸν—δυνατὸς δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσαι καὶ φιλοκοθούμαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστοι ἐπιδείδασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ.

καθάπερ δ’ ουκείως] On the ‘moral sense’ in its analogy to the ‘musical ear,’ cf. Eth. x. iii. 10.

7 τὸ δὲ [ἡν—νοεῖν] ‘People define “living” in the case of animals by the power of sensation, in the case of men by the power of sensation or thought. But the word “power” has its whole meaning in reference to the exercise of that power, and the distinctive part of the conception lies in the “exercise.” Thus the act of living appears distinctively to be an act of perceiving or thinking.’ The train of reasoning in this latter part of the chapter is, that life consists in consciousness: life is good and sweet; consciousness is intensified, and life therefore is made better and sweeter, by intercourse with friends.

tοῖς [καίσ] On the ascending scale of life from the plant to the man, cf. De Anima, ii. iii. 1–9, Eth. i. vii. 12, and Vol. i. Essay V.
I. DE DYNAMIS EIS TIN ENERGIEIN ANAGYETAI. TO OX KURION EN TIN ENERGIEIN. EIOIKE DHE TO XHN EINAI KURIOS TO AIHTHANESTHAI H NOEI. TO OX XHN TON KAI AUTO AGATHON KAI YDEW:

But yerai}

Pythagorean law, in which there is a certain physical sweetness, cf. Ar. Politics, iii. vi. 5: ΔΗΛΟΝ Δ' ΉΣ ΚΑΡΤΕΡΟΥΣΙ ΠΟΛΛΗΝ ΚΑΒΟΤΑΘΕΙΑΝ ΟΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΓΛΙΧΘΕΜΕΝΟΙ ΤΟΙ XHN, ΌΣ ΕΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΜΕΡΙΑΣ ΕΝ ΑΥΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΓΛΥΚΟΤΤΟΣ ΦΩΝΑΚΗΣ. This Greek view of the sweetness of life contrasts with the philosophy of the Hindus, which represents life as a burden, and individuality as a curse.

8 OY DE OY—PHAEROSTERON] 'But one must not take (as an instance) a vicious and corrupt life, nor one in pain; for such a life is unharmonised, like its characteristics. In the following discourse the nature of pain will be made more clear.'


'ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ] We have here an unfulfilled promise, like that in Eth. i. vii. 7: for in 'the following book' there is nothing on the 'unlimited' or 'unharmonised' nature of pain. The sentence may possibly be an interpolation.

9 EI OY AUTO TO XI H AGATHON] This is the beginning of a complex protasis, which goes on prolonging itself, δ' ΩΡΩΝ—ΤΟ ΩΡΩΝ ΟΙ ΑΙΘΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΑ, &c., till at last it finds its apodosis in § 10: ΚΑΘΑΡΕΥΩΝ ΟΥΝ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΙΘΘΑΝΟΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΚΑΣΤΟΦ, ΟΥΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΦΙΛΩΝ, Η ΠΑΡΑΠΛΗΣΙΑ.

και ΕΠΙ ΤΩΝ ΆΛΛΩΝ—ΝΟΕΩΝ] 'And with respect to all the other functions, in like manner there is something which perceives that we are exerising them, so then we can perceive that we perceive, and think that we think. But this (perceiving) that we perceive or think, is perceiving that we exist; for existing, as we said (§ 7), consists in perceiving or thinking.' ΕΝΕΡΓΟΥΜΕΝ is here used in a purely objective sense; the ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ is here distinguished from the consciousness which necessarily accompanies it, and with
which it is frequently identified. See Vol. I. Essay IV. The absolute unity of existence with thought here laid down anticipates the 'cogito ergo sum' of Descartes.

10 Συνασιστεια—νέμεσθαι] 'Therefore we ought to have a sympathetic consciousness of the existence of our friend, and this can arise by means of living together with him, and sharing words and thought with him, which is the true meaning of "living together" in the case of men; it does not mean, as with cattle, simply herding in the same spot.' This view of the importance of 'intercourse,' and of the advantages to be derived from it, is repeated and summarized in ch. xii., and forms the conclusion of the treatise.

X. The question of the plurality of friends is brought under analysis in this chapter. The number of one's friends for use or for pleasure is shown to be limited by convenience. The
1 ἐμελῶς εἰρήσαται 1 'Neatly expressed.'

μήτε πολύξεινος] From Hesiod, Works and Days, 713.

μηδὲ πολύξεινον μηδ’ ἀξέινον καλέσθαι.

The line is untranslatable into English, as we have no word (like the German Gastfreund) to express both 'host,' and 'guest,' as εἶναι does.

2 This section may be said to re-tract, upon further consideration, what was admitted, Elh. viii. vi. 3: Διὰ τὸ χρῆσινον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἢδ’ πολλοὶ ἀρίσκευν ἐνδέχεται. πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ αὐτὸν ἐπηρεῖαν.

ικανός] This reading, adopted by Bekker from a majority of MSS., is surprising; ικανός περίεργοι would not be a natural phrase, whereas the context really requires οἱ πλείους δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ικανῶν.

3 οὕτω γὰρ—πόλις ἑστιν] 'For a state could not consist of ten men, nor again if consisting of a hundred thousand does it still continue to be a state.' This extremely limited idea of the size of a state is based on the Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the administration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thousand citizens might easily appear unwieldy. Aristotle in the Politics, vii. iv. 9, represents the state as an organism of limited size. ἐστὶν τι καὶ πόλις μεγάλως μέτρου, ἄστικη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ἥπαν, φυτῶν, ὄργανων: καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐκατὸν οὕτω Λαοὶ μικρὸν οὕτω κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλου ἑξεῖ τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν, κ. τ. λ.
which Aristotle compares to the feeling between brothers, is much more akin to the perfect and ideal friendship than it is to either of the lower forms of friendship (for gain or for pleasure). It is essentially based on personal considerations (δι' αὑτού), though not necessarily on moral considerations (δι' ἀρετής).

ai δ' ὑμνούμεναι] Fritzsche quotes Plutarch De Am. Müll. 2: τῶν μακρῶν καὶ παλαιῶν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα ἄμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ συμβουλίων λάβωμεν, ἐν δὲ κατὰ ζεύγος φιλίας λέγονται οὖσας καὶ Πειρίδου, Ἀχίλλεως καὶ Πάτροκλος, Ὀρίστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φυτίας καὶ Δάμων, Ἐπαμεινόνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας, οἱ δὲ πολυφιλοὶ — οὐδένι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι] Cf. Eudemian Ethics, vii. xii. 17: τὸ γεῖτν ών καὶ εὐχέσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἀμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς φίλος ὁ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἄμως λέγεται ὀρθῶς, which sentence reconciles the above passage with Eth. vii. i. 5. In an external way (πολιτικῶς) a man should have many friends, personally (δι' αὐτούς) a few.

XI. The question whether friends are most needed in adversity or prosperity is here answered by saying, that in adversity friendship is more necessary, and in prosperity more glorious. Some remarks are added on the exact operation of friendship in alleviating sorrow, and some practical rules are deduced.

2 ὰσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν] 'Whether they take part of the burden, as it were.' This is the ordinary metaphor. Cf. Xenophon, Memor. ii. vii. i. (Συγκράτης) Ἀριστοτέχνος ποτὲ ὁμοιος αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνει· ἀρετή, ἐθική, καὶ Ἀριστοτέχνη, βαρέως φέρειν τι, ἐχεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μεταδίδοναι τοῖς φίλοις. ἡμῶν γὰρ αντικαὶ ἦμεις κοινωνίας. Aristotle hints at, without fully giving, a more psychological account of the operation of friendship in adversity.

3 μικτῇ τις] Cf. Eth. iii. 6, iv. ix. 8.
And, as if almost to demand it, theởs  Phoebus issued this oracle to Odysseus:

4 A word spoken thus by the Phoebus—

And (such a one), unless he be excessively impassive, cannot endure the pain which is brought upon them; and altogether he does not like sympathetic wailers, not being given to wailing himself. The words καν μη κ.τ.λ. have troubled the commentators. The Paraphrast explains them as if meaning:—'And unless (the sympathetic presence of friends) be exceedingly painless to them.' But evidently the clause is brought in in reference to οι ἄνδράδες. 'Manly natures' are not at all unlikely to be somewhat blunt and callous, and deficient in sensibility for the feelings of others. One might almost fancy that Aristotle was thinking of the Ajax of Sophocles, vv. 319, 320:

5 Αλλις ἐγὼ δυστυχὼν] These words are not to be found in any extant play or fragment. The nearest approach to them is in Sophocles, Ed. Tyr. 1061: Αλλα νοσοῦν ἐγώ.

6 Φίλον γὰρ—ἴδιον] 'For it behoves a friend to benefit (his friends), and especially those who are in need, and to (benefit) them when they have not asked. For this is nobler and sweeter for both parties.' With καὶ τὸ, εἴ ποιεῖν is to be repeated. Some editions, against the MSS., read καὶ τόδε.
12 "Aρ' οὖν, ὁσπερ τοῖς ἔρωσι τὸ ὅραν ἀγαπητότατον ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν ἀισθησιν ἣ τὰς λοιπὰς, ὥς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἐρωτοῦ ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὗτῳ καὶ τοῖς φίλωσι αἰρετότατον ἔστι τῷ συζήν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὗτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. περὶ αὐτῶν ᾗ ἡ αἰσθησις ὑπὲρ ἔστιν αἰρετή; καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον ὡς. ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζήν, ὡστ' εἰκόνας τούτου ἐφείνται. Καὶ ὁ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἐκάστοις τῷ εἶναι η ἕν χάριν αἰροῦνται τῷ συζήν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν. οἱσπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγχυβεύουσιν, ἀλλαὶ δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἡ συμφιλοσοφῶσιν, ἐκαστοὶ ἐν τούτῳ συνημέρευστες οἱ τί περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίω συζήν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινοῦσιν οἷς ὀοῦνται 3 συζήν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοιχηρᾶ. κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοιχηροὶ δὲ

But one should beware perhaps of getting the reputation of churlishness in rejecting (benefits); for this sometimes happens. 

'And answers to the 'insanavis, acerbus' of Horace, Sat. i. iii. 85.

XII. In conclusion, the best thing in friendship is—intercourse. This gives vividness to the pursuits of life; and when good men have intercourse with each other, they mutually strengthen and increase the good that is in them.

1 ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζήν 'But it is by living together that they attain the fulness of life.' The word ἐνέργεια here has evident reference to ἡ αἰσθησις ὑπὲρ ἔστιν in the preceding sentence. 

Cardwell follow some of the MSS in reading αὐτῆς, i.e. τῆς αἰσθησιας. But ἡ ἐνέργεια stands naturally alone (cf. Eth. ix. ix. 6), meaning 'the vivid sense of life.' And a similar collocation occurs Eth. viii. iii. 5: γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φίλαν ὀοῦς. 

3 κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ—ἀλλήλοις 'For, being of an unstable nature, they have fellowship in evil, and become bad by assimilation to each other.' 

Cf. Eth. ix. i. 7: τοὺς φιλοσοφασ κοινονησαιν. The word ἀβέβαιον here is not connected with the use of βεβαιον in Eth. viii. viii. 5: Of δὲ μοιχηρὸν τὸ μὲν βεβαιον ὅν πέλεξον. Aristotle is not talking here of the instability of the friendship between bad men, but of its evil results mutually. Throughout the treatise on Friendship
he speaks of the weakness of vice (cf. note on ix. iv. 9), and here he says that bad men, from the weakness and instability of their natures, imbibe evil example.

'For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like.' Cf. Aristophanes, Ranae, v. 1040.

On this passage of Theognis, which is referred to above, Eth. ix. ix. 7, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 61. It is after Aristotle's manner to end a treatise with a line of poetry; cf. Metaphysics, xi. x. 14, where the book ends with the verse

Οὔκ ἄγαθον πολυκορανή: εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω.

Accordingly the unnecessary paragraph περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας κ.τ.λ. is probably the interpolation of an editor.
THIS Book, beginning with a treatise on Pleasure, (which subject is introduced (1) because of its connection with Morals; (2) because of the controversies about it), and rising from the critical examination of extreme views to Aristotle's own theory of Pleasure, namely, that it is the sense of the Vital Functions, or in other words, of the harmonious action of some one faculty; proceeds, almost without transition, to declare that Happiness in the truest sense of the term must consist in the action of the highest faculty, and that, this highest faculty being Intellect, Philosophy must, beyond all comparison with anything else, whether idle amusement or even the exercise of the moral virtues, constitute Happiness, or that practical Chief Good which is the end of Man, and the province of the ethical branch of Politics.

Thus far this branch of Science, having obtained a definite conception, might be thought to be complete. But it still remains to ask whether something cannot be added towards its practical realization, and, as habits of life are clearly necessary for the attainment of human excellence, on which the Chief Good depends, it follows that we shall require such domestic institutions as may be favourable to the cultivation of human excellence. These institutions, whether of public or private ordinance, can only be rightly conceived after a scientific study of the principles of Legislation, i.e. of Politics in its highest form. To this then Aristotle proposes to address himself, considering it to be a branch of science which has hitherto been neglected. He roughly sketches out the plan of his work on Politics, with a transition to which the ethical treatise concludes.

This tenth book then shows us the Ethics as a rounded whole. It is written in close connection with Book I. (cf. X. vi. 1.), and it sums up referentially the contents of Books I., II., III., IV., VIII., IX. But while the Ethics are thus rounded off in their beginning
and end, and as to part of their contents, it is clear on the other hand that they contain a *lacuna* which has been artificially filled up. Book IV., as we have already seen, ends in an abrupt and almost fragmentary manner. And then follow three Books which, we may say decisively, have no literary connection with the other parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, while they stand in close relation to the whole of the *Eudemian Ethics*, of which in almost all MSS. they form a part. Those persons who believe the whole of the *Eudemian Ethics* to be as entirely the writing of Aristotle as Book X. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as the *Politics*, or as Book I. of the *Metaphysics*, must at all events admit that there is some reason to say that the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books (*Eth.* V. VI. VII.) were written separately from, and in all probability later than, the rest of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Those who consider that the Eudemian treatise, as a whole, gives us the thoughts of Aristotle conveyed in the words of Eudemus, will probably conclude that the same account is to be given of the disputed books.
I. The treatise on Pleasure opens analogously to that on the Voluntary (Eth. iii. i. 1), and that on Friendship (viii. i. 1, 6), justifying the introduction of the subject, (1) as connected with Ethics, (2) as having been made matter of controversy.

1 μᾶλλον γάρ — ἡμῶν] 'For it seems to be most intimately connected with the human race.' Omni sed non soli, see below v. 8.

2 οἱ παιδεύοντες κ. τ. ἐ.] This is all taken from Plato's Laws, ii. p. 653. See note on Eth. ii. iii. 2, where the passage is quoted.

2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ — μέσων] 'For some call pleasure the chief good, others on the contrary call it exceedingly evil, (of these latter) some perhaps believing it to be so, but others thinking it for the interests of morality to declare pleasure to be an evil, even if it be not so, because most men incline to-
wards it, and are enslaved to pleasures, and so one ought to lead men in the opposite direction, for thus they will arrive at the mean.'

In all probability Aristotle here alludes immediately to two sections of the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Eudoxus, whose arguments are quoted; (2) that headed by Speusippus, whose anti-hedonistic arguments were contained in two books mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, under the titles Περὶ ἥδων ἀ' Ἀριστίππος ἀ', and which are now passed under review. Under the class of those who 'call pleasure the chief good,' Aristotle less directly refers to Aristippus, who, though he belonged to a bygone era, still lived in the pages of Plato's Philebus, and in the book of Speusippus bearing his name.

ἐδείξει γὰρ—μέσον] Cf. Eth. ii. ix. 5, where it is said that by going counter to one's natural bias one may attain the mean. Aristotle does not approve of this being done by means of a sacrifice of truth.

3 μὴ ποτὲ—λέγεται] 'But perhaps this is not rightly said.' Cf. Plato, Meno, p. 89 c: ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἡμολογήσαμεν. This use of μὴ ποτὲ became very common in the later Greek.

ο γὰρ ἤργων—πολλῶν] 'For he who blames pleasure (unreservedly), and yet is seen occasionally desiring it, is thought to incline towards it as being altogether good; for ordinary persons cannot discriminate.' τοιαύτην here, as τοιαύτος does frequently in Aristotle, takes its sense from the context. Cf. Eth. vii. vi. 6, x. ii. 4, &c. From what is above stated we learn that, the decline of philosophy having commenced, some of the Platonists enunciated theories which were meant to be practically useful, rather than true. Thus they overstated what they believed to be the truth about pleasure, in order to counteract men's universal tendency towards it. Aristotle 'doubts whether this is good policy.' Their whole theory is likely to be upset by their occasionally indulging in the higher kinds of pleasure.

τοὺς ἤργοις] 'Those who comprehend them,' i.e. appreciating the truth of the theories, as shown by their agreement with men's actions. Cf. Eth. vi. x. 1, note. On τοὺς ἤργοις cf. ix. viii. 2.
II. This chapter contains the grounds on which Eudoxus 'used to think that pleasure is the chief good'; and an examination of three objections, which had been started to those reasonings. The arguments of Eudoxus are, (1) that all things seek pleasure, (2) that pain is essentially (καθ' αύτό) an object of aversion, and therefore pleasure, its contrary, must be essentially an object of desire, (3) that pleasure is always desired as an end-in-itself, and not as a means to anything, (4) that pleasure, when added to any other good, makes it more desirable. The objections to these arguments are, (1) the opinion of Plato (which serves as an objection to argument 4th), that the chief good must be incapable of being added to any other good, and so made better. This objection Aristotle allows as valid. (2) An objection to the 1st argument, probably suggested by Plato's Philebus, p. 67, and repeated by Spensippus,—that the testimony of irrational creatures is of no value. This objection is disallowed. (3) The counter-argument of Spensippus to the 2nd argument of Eudoxus,—that not pleasure, but the neutral state, is the true contrary to pain. This is refuted.

1 τὸ αἰρέτων ἐπισκέψεως] We have here a quotation of the very words of Eudoxus. In § 4, Aristotle generally approves of the present argument. His whole conclusion is to be found Eth. x. iii. 13:—that Eudoxus was more right than his opponents, but wrong in not discriminating between the different kinds of pleasure, and in going so far as to say that pleasure is the chief good. The term τὸ αἰρέτων, in opposition to τὸ φευρτόν, seems to have played a great part in the reasonings of Eudoxus. It is admitted by Plato, Philebus, p. 20, as a necessary attribute of the chief good, and so also by Aristotle, Eth. 1. vii. 8; x. ii. 4. Here it is implied in the word ἔφειται. It appears simply to mean 'that which is a reasonable object of desire,' cf. Eth. viii. vii. 2: ἡ φιλία καθ' αὑτὴν αἰρέτη, and x. iii. 13. ήδονή οὐ πᾶσα αἰρέτη. As implying will and choice, it is applicable in a relative, as well as an absolute sense, to means as well as to ends. Book III. of the Topics contains hints on the method of dealing with this term, and throws light on its use, which fluctuates between a reference to the good, the useful, and the pleasant (cf. Top. iii. 7).

ἐπισκέψεως δ' οἶ λόγοι] This is a pleasing allusion to the personal character of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who lived about 366 B.C., and who enjoyed great fame as an astronomer. He appears to have introduced the sphere from Egypt into Greece. The poem of Aratus is a versification of his Φαεδόμενα. Certain stories in Diogenes would leave the impression that, being Plato's pupil, he quarreled with his
I. master. Aristotle (or, as Diogenes says, ‘Nicomachus’) is the only authority for his ethical opinions.

2. The end is better than the means, but this does not prove anything as to the comparative superiority of pleasure to the rest of the whole class of ends. Thus the argument of Eudoxus overshot the mark. A similar argument of his is mentioned with careless approbation, Eth. i. xii. 5: ἐνδικεῖ καλῶς συνηγορήσας, says Aristotle, ‘Eudoxus is thought to have pleaded well’ in favour of pleasure being the chief good, because it is never praised. This argument would only prove that it belongs to the class of τὰ τίμια.

προστιθέμενα] It is suggested as a commonplace of reasoning, Topics, iii. ii. 2, that you may say ‘Justice and courage are better with pleasure than without.’

3. For that “every good is better in combination with another good than alone.” This is indeed the very argument by which Plato proves pleasure not to be the highest good. For the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without.’ Cf. Philebus, pp. 21-22: where however the proposition οὗδεῖς προστεθέντος—γίνεσθαι is not to be found. Plato only argued that, as the highest conception of human good implied a combination of both pleasure and knowledge, pleasure separately could not be the chief good. It is a deduction of Aristotle’s from the terms ἱερόν καὶ τέλεον, used by Plato, that the chief good is incapable of addition or improvement. Cf. Topics, iii. ii. 2: where it is said that the end plus the means cannot be called more desirable than the end by itself, cf. Eth. i. vii. 8, where the same
opinion seems to be conveyed, though that interpretation of the passage has been disputed.

4 τί οὖν—ἐκπεισείται] ‘What is there then which has these characteristics (i.e. supreme goodness without the capability of addition) which we men can partake of? For such is the very object of our enquiries.’ That is, not a transcendental good, but something to be practically realised. Cf. Eth. i. vi. 13.

οὐ γὰρ πάσι δοκεῖ] This acceptance of the testimony of instinct occurs also in the Eudemian book, Eth. vii. xiii. 5.

οὐ δὲ ἀναφέρων] Probably Speusippus, taking up a suggestion from Plato, Philebus, p. 67.

τῶν φαίλον] In the neuter gender, ‘the lower creatures;”—alluding to the θηρία mentioned by Plato, Philebus, i. e.

5 οὐ γὰρ φασιν] As we learn from the Eudemian book, Eth. vii. xiii. 1, Speusippus was the author of this objection.

III. Aristotle investigates remaining arguments used by the Platonists to prove that pleasure is not a good; (1) that it is ‘not a quality.’ This argument would prove too much, as it would be equally decisive against happiness, or the actions of virtue; (2) that it is ‘unlimited.’ But (a) in one sense this will apply to virtue also, (b) in another sense it is only applicable to the ‘mixed pleasures,’ which are analogous to health, i.e. a proportion variable according to circumstances; (3) that it is ‘not final’
that the pleasures, which can be felt by the mental, are mixed up with the bodily pleasure of gratification; (2) the pleasure of expecting this restoration, where the bodily pain of want is mixed up with the mental pleasure of the idea of relief; (3) the pleasure which we feel in the ludicrous, where the mental pain of seeing the un-beautiful is mixed with the mental pleasure of laughing at it. The unmixed pleasures, i.e., in which no pain is implied, are (1) those of smell; (2) those of sight and hearing; (3) those that belong to the intellect. Of these two classes Plato confines the attribute of ἀμετρία, 'want of measure,' to the first class. The unmixed or pure pleasures necessarily possess ἀμετρία, cf. Philob. p. 52 c. The same doctrine is given Eth. vii. xiv. 6: οἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὑδαίναις—συνείσι—οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. Spesius, forgetful of this distinction, appears to have made ἀμετρία (ἀδριστόν ἐναῖ) a universal predicate of pleasure.
Even the mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit the idea of proportion (συμμετρία), just as health is a proportion, though a relative and variable one, of the elements in the human body. In the Top. vi. ii. 1, the words ἡ ὑγίεια συμμετρία θερμών καὶ ψυχρῶν are given as an instance of an ambiguous definition. συμμετρία being used in more senses than one.

οὐ γὰρ—ήττον] 'Health is not the same proportion of elements in all men, nor even in the same man always, but with a certain laxity of variation it still remains health, though admitting of difference in the degrees (according to which the elements are compounded).'

4 τέλειων τε τάγαθν τιθέντες κ. τ. λ.] Plato, in the Phædrus, p. 53 c, accepted the doctrine of the Cyrenaics, ὡς ἀλί γένεσις ἐστιν (ἡ ἱδρον), and then, by the contrast of means and end, γένεσις and οὐσία, he proved that pleasure could not be the chief good. As said above, Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 198, Plato seems to have recognised a class of pleasures above those which were mere states of transition, but to have had no formula to express them. Speusippus probably applied the argument drawn from the Cyrenaic definition not merely ad homines, as Plato had done, but as if absolutely valid.

οῖον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου i.e. οὐκ ἐστι τάχος καὶ βραδυτής καθ' αὐτήν. 'All motion has speed and slowness properly belonging to it, if not relatively to itself, as for instance the motion of the universe has no speed or slowness in itself (because it moves equably)—at all events in relation to other things.' Aristotle argues that though it is possible 'to be pleased' (ἡσθιναι—μεταβάλλει εἰς ἱδρον) more or less quickly, it is not possible to 'feel pleasure' (ἡσθιαι) either quickly or slowly. This argument seems a verbal one, like some of those in Eth. i. vi. against Plato's doctrine of ideas. If pleasure be identified with κίνησις, the argument holds good. But if it only be held to have the same relation to κίνησις as Aristotle himself makes it have to ἐνέργεια, Eth. x. viii. 4, the argument falls to the ground. This argument and the one in § 6 really only apply to the want of a sufficiently subjective formula to express pleasure. If pleasure were defined as 'the consciousness of a transition,' there might then be degrees of speed in the transition, though not in the consciousness of it.
Aristotle's real objection to the term κίνησις lies deeper than these mere dialectical skirmishings, and has been explained, Vol. I. Essay IV., p. 197-9.

5 γένεσις τε—φθορά] 'And how can it be a creation? For it does not seem to be the case that anything can be created out of anything; a thing is resolved into that out of which it is created. And (as the Platonists say) pain is the destruction of that of which pleasure is the creation.' This elliptical argument seems to require for its conclusion, 'Where then are the elements out of which our perfect nature (νοσός) is created by the process called pleasure, and into which it is resolved by the destructive process called pain? We find pain called a destruction in the Philobus, p. 31 ε.: δύσος δ' αὖ φθορά καὶ λύπη καὶ λύσις, ἡ δ' ἐν τού γρήγορον πάλιν τὸ ἐξηράθεν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή. Aristotle, arguing polemically, says, 'Where then are the elements with which the creative and the destructive process must begin and end?'

He afterwards reasonably substitutes ἐνέργεια for γένεσις as a better formula, but the above polemic seems not to have much value.

6 οὖν ἐστιν ἄρα—λυπότο] 'Neither is pleasure therefore a replenishment, though one may feel pleasure while replenishment is taking place, just as one may feel pain while one is being cut.' Pleasure, says Aristotle, may be synchronous with replenishment, but cannot be identical with it, for pleasure is a state of the mind, and not of the body, cf. Eth. i. viii. 10: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢδεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν. All that is proved here is that a more subjective formula than ἀναπλήρωσις is required to express the nature of pleasure. Plato had used the formula πλήρωσις, Philobus, p. 31 ε., and Speusippus probably repeated it.

tεμνόμενοι] The words τοιαὶ καὶ κακοῖς were commonly used by Plato, as instances of bodily pain. Cf. Timaeus, p. 65 h: ταῦτα δ' αὖ περὶ τὰς κακοῖς καὶ τομάς τοῦ σώματος γιγνομένα ἐστὶ κατάδηλα.
οδείς γαγενήσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν προφήτην λυπῶν καὶ ἠδονῶν· ἐνυδείς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προπληθεύσας ἦδεσθαι 
7 τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο ἐὰν οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἠδονὰς· ἀλλούποι γὰρ εἰσίν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν 
κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀψήφισεως, καὶ ἀκραίματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα ποιλὰ καὶ μονάδα καὶ ἐλπίδες. 
τίνος οὖν αὐτίς γενέσεις ἔστου; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνθει 
8 γεγένηται, οὐ γένοιτο ἀν ἀναπληροφοσίν. πρὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποφέροντα ταῖς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἠδονῶν λέγει τις ἄν 
ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτῷ ἔθει· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τῶν κακῶν διακει-
μένως ἔθει· καθώς οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμινουσιν ὑγιείᾳ ἦ 
γλυκεὰ ἤ πικρά, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς 
9 ὑφαλμίωσιν. ἡ οὕτω λέγει τάν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἠδοναὶ 
αἰρεται εἰσίν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐὰν τούτων, ὀσπερ καὶ τῷ 
πλουτεῖν, προδότει ὅ οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνει, οὐ μὴν ὄτιον 
10 φαγόντι. ἡ τῶν εἰδεὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἠδοναί· ἔτεραι γὰρ 
αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν 
ἡσύχασε τὴν τοῦ δίκαιου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ 
μούσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοιὸς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
11 ὡμφανίζειν ὅ ὁδείς καὶ ὁ φίλος· ἔτερος ὁν τοῦ κόλακος, 
οὐκ οὕσαν ἀγαθὸν τῆν ἠδονήν ἢ διαφόρους εἰδεί· ὃ μὲν γὰρ 
πρὸς τὰ γαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν ὁδείς, ὅ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν 
capable of feeling certain pleasures; (b) that the flatterer is different from the friend; (c) that the pleasures of childhood differ from those of maturity. The whole reasoning is repeated in better form in chap. V. 
11 ὡμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος] The term ‘friend’ is used here in a distinctive sense to denote ‘the true friend,’ just as it is in Eth. viii. xiii. 
9: ἄκαντα γὰρ φίλον ὅν ποιήσον. Common language, which contrasts the flatterer, who ministers pleasure, from the friend, who ministers good, testifies to the non-identity of pleasure (in all forms) with good.
III.—IV.] ΗΟΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ Χ. 323

ονειδίζεται, τὸν ὁ ἐπινοεῖν ὡς πρὸς ἐτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδὲς τ' ἐν ἐλειτο ἔγν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχουν ὅτα ὧν, 12 ἡδομένος ἐφ' ὡς τὰ παιδία ὃς ὧν τ' εὑρίσκα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, μὴ δέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλαὶ τ' σπουδὴν ποιητικὴν ἄν καὶ ἐι μυθεμαὶ ἐπιφέροι ἡδονῆ, ὃν ὑμᾶς, μεταμομείνει, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἐπονται τούτων ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει: ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἄν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνουτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὃτι μὲν ὡς ὡς τάγαθων ἦ χρ. ἡδονή ὡς πάσα αἱρετῆ, δῆλον ἰδικεῖν εἴναι, καὶ ὃτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ ἑδεῖ ἄρι ὡς. τὰ μὲν ὡς leγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἰκανῶς εἰρήκαμεν.

Τ' ὁ ἐστίν ἡ ποιῶν τι, καταανέστερον γένοιτ' ἄν ἀπ' 4 ἀρχής ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοξεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καὶ ὄντι-

12 περὶ πολλὰ τ' ἦν Πίστευσαν τῆς τεκνικὴν τούτην. Πύργος περὶ τούτων εἰς πολλὰ τι περιέχειν. Πολλοὶ δὲ τούτων ἢμι συναυτούς καὶ τούτους εἰσήκουσαν τῷ ὡς ὡς ἄρ. τὰ μὲν ὡς leγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἰκανῶς εἰρήκαμεν.

IV. Having finished his critical remarks on existing theories (τὰ λεγόμενα) about pleasure, Aristotle proceeds synthetically to state his own views, as follows: (1) Pleasure is, like sight, something whole and entire, not gradually arrived at, but a moment of consciousness, at one perfect, independent of the conditions of time, §§ 1-4. (2) It arises from any faculty obtaining its proper object; but is better in proportion to the excellence of the faculty exercised, §§ 5-7. (3) It is thus the perfection of our functions, but is distinct from the functions themselves, § 8. (4) It cannot be continuously maintained, owing to the weakness of our powers, our functions being soon blunted by fatigue, § 9. (5) Pleasure, in short, results from the sense of life, and is inseparably connected with the idea of life, §§ 10-11.

1 τ' ὁ ἐστίν ἡ ποιῶν τι ἦν Πίστευσαν την ἀπ' 4 ἐρετὴν σκεπτόν. Ἱβ. τι. 1: δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον 

οὔτως εἰπέων, ὃτι εἰς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὰ τις. The genus (τι ἐστί) of pleasure here given is that it is ὡς ὡς τι, one of those moments of consciousness which are complete in themselves; the differentia (ποιῶν τι) is that it results from the exercise of any faculty upon its proper object. It may be said that this definition would leave pleasure undefined; but in fact it is a simple sensation, not admitting of entire explication.

ἡ μὲν ὄρασις Modern researches in optics would tend to modify this view of the entirely simple nature of an act of sight. But it may be conceded that any 'process' which takes place in sight is too swift to be noticed by the mind. Cf. Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, book II. c. xiv. § 10. 'Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an instant, and is that which takes up
the time of only one idea in our minds without the succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no succession at all.'

2 δύσπε-ἀπαντι] 'Therefore it is not a process; for every process is under conditions of time and aims at some end, as for instance, the (process of) architecture is perfect, when it has effected what it aims at. May we not say (ἡ) then that it is perfect in the particular (τοῦτο) time viewed as a whole? But in the separate parts of the time occupied all processes are imperfect, and are different in species, both from the whole process, and from each other. For the collection of the stones is different from the fluting of the pillars, and both from the making of the temple. And the making the temple is a perfect process, for it wants nothing towards its proposed object; but that of the basement and the triglyph are imperfect, for they are each the making of a part. Therefore they differ in species, and it is not possible to find a process perfect in species in any time whatsoever, unless it be in the time occupied viewed as a whole.' With Michelet, who follows two MSS., ἡ has been omitted above before τούτο. The reading ἡ τούτῳ makes no sense, unless one which would be opposed to what is said afterwards (ὡς ἐστιν ἐν ὀστρών κ. τ. λ.). The form ἡ with a question, used for conveying Aristotle's opinion on any subject, occurs again in § 9 of this chapter, ἡ καὶ μεί. In the illustration given, two of the processes mentioned are merely preparatory, the collection of the stones for building, and the fluting of the pillars before they are set up; two others are substantive parts of the building, the laying of the foundation (the first act), and the adding the triglyph, which was a fluted tablet added as an ornament to
ta tòmaità. ou mónon o' óutos, allà kai en auti' tì báðiei: to yap pòsèn poi ou tautoi en tò stàðiwc kai en tò mérei, kai en étèmò mérei kai étèròw, ódòe to dièzei nai tìn grafìmê fínde kàkeiùn. ou mónon yap grafìmê dia-poreúetai, allà kai en tôn éwos ówos, en étèmò o' autì 'ékineis. di' ákrìbeías meû ouè peri kivnèseis en allòs eîrntai, 'óike o' ouè en ápantì chrómo têleíze ènvaî, allì' aî tollài âtèlèis kai diafèrousan tòv eîdei, eîter to pòsèn poi eîdopoiôn. tîs ëkounès o' en étaitow chróno têleión tò + eîdos. dèllon ouè ouè eîterai t' àn èven allàlìoun, kai tôn allon ti kai têleiôn ë hronh. dèzèie o' àn tòtò kai èk tòv miè èndëxèsthai kivnèsthai miè en chrómo, ëdèsthai dé: to yap èn tòv wòv allon ti. èk tòtóon òè dèllon kai òti ou kalòs lêgousi kínìsìh ë gènesin ènvaî tìn ëkounh, ou yap pàntan taúta légetai, allà tòn meðiístòn kai miè

the frieze (perhaps the last act in the creation of the temple). The creation of the temple as a whole, regarded in the whole time which it occupies, is alone to be regarded as a perfect process.

3—4 ὅμως δὲ—εἴδος] 'So too in the case of walking, and all other processes. For if passage be a process from place to place, even of this there are different species, flying, walking, jumping, and the like. And not only this, but even in walking itself (there are different species), for the whence and the whither are not the same in the whole course and in the part of the course, and in one part and the other part; nor is it the same thing to cross this line and that. For a person not only passes a line, but a line in space, and this line is in different space from that line. We have treated exactly of process elsewhere, but it seems not to be perfect in every time, but the majority of processes seem imperfect and differing in species, if the whence and the whither constitute a differentia. But pleasure seems perfect in kind in any time (of its existence) whatsoever.' Every process, says Aristotle, is under conditions of time, and its parts being under a law of succession are essentially different from each other; the δετέρον is different from the πρώτερον, the beginning, middle, and end, differ essentially from one another. In pleasure nothing of the kind is to be found. One moment of pleasure does not lead up, as a preparative, to another more advanced moment. Pleasure, when felt, is, ipsa facta, complete. en allòs eîrntai] This refers generally to the Physics of Aristotle. See especially Books IV. and V.

οùκ ἐν ἀπαντί] 'Non in quolibet tempore,' this is of course different from en ἀπαντί τῇ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, and en τῇ ἀπαντί, in the preceding section, en ὄτιφων] 'In quolibet,' but above, οὔτων ἐν ὄτιφων means 'in nullo potest.'

4 δῆλον οὖν—ἡδονή] 'It is clear then that (process and pleasure) must
be different from one another, and that pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and perfect.  
6 telεiοι δὲ—ιγαίανεν] ‘Pleasure renders the exercise of a faculty perfect, but not in the same way in which the goodness of the faculty itself and of its object does so, just as health and the physician are in different ways the cause of one’s being well;’ i.e. pleasure is the formal, and not the efficient, cause of a perfect function. ‘Cause’ in this Aristotelian usage becomes equivalent to ‘result.’ The illustration used here is given also, with a slight confusion of terms, in the Endemian book, Eth. vi. xii. 5. ‘Επειτα καὶ ποιοίς μὲν, οὐχ ἀλλὰ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ἴγιεσιν, ἀλλὰ ἂς ἴγιεσι.  
7 τοιοῦτον καὶ ὑπὸν—πεισόμενον] ‘But if the object and the percipient be in this (highest) condition, there always will be pleasure as long as subject and object remain.’ The relative terms τὸ ποιόν and τὸ πάσχον take their meaning from the way in which they are applied. Thus, Eth. v. v. 9, they are used for ‘producer and
consumer.' Here ΤΟ ΠΟΥΩΝ is used for the percepient, ΤΟ ΠΑΣΧΩΝ for the object perceived.

8 όμων γάρ έντων—γίνεσθαι] 'For from similar pairs of relatives, bearing the same relation to one another, i.e. the active and passive, the same result is naturally produced.' This appears to be an abstract and á priori way of stating the universality of pleasure attendant on the harmony between a faculty and its proper object.

9 πῶς οὖν—ἀμαρωται] 'How is it then that no one is continuously in a state of pleasure? The reason must be that one grows weary. For all human things are incapable of continuous activity. Pleasure therefore ceases to be produced, for it depends on the activity of the faculties. It is on this same account that some things please us while they are new, but afterwards not in the same way. For at first the intellect is excited and acts strenuously on the objects in question (as in the case of sight, when one first fixes one's glance) but afterwards the action is not equally vivid, but relaxed, and so one's pleasure also fades.' On this doctrine, cf. Vol. I. Essay IV. and Ar. Metaph. viii. viii. 18, there quoted, p. 201.

10 It is natural to say that all desire pleasure, from its inseparable connection with the sense of life, and with each of the vital functions. Thus far Eudoxus was right, but he was wrong in not recognizing a difference in kind between different pleasures, and this point is demonstrated in the ensuing chapter.
V. Pleasures may be thought to differ in kind, (1) Because our several functions (mental and others) differ from each other in kind, and things different in kind are perfected by things different in kind, §§ 1–2. (2) Because while its own pleasure promotes any particular exercise of the faculties, an alien pleasure impedes it, §§ 2–5. (3) Because the human functions differ from each other in a moral point of view, and the pleasures therefore which are so closely connected with them as almost to be identical must differ in the same way from each other, §§ 6–7. (4) Creatures different in kind must have, and by common consent do have, different pleasures, § 8. (5) The pleasures of man when in a morbid state must differ from the pleasures of man when in a healthy state. As a corollary to the last argument it may be added, that reasonings against pleasure from a reference to the morbid pleasures have no weight. The answer to them would be, that such are not pleasures at all.

1 καὶ τὰ φυσικά καὶ τὰ ὅπο τέχνης] The ἐνέργειαι here mentioned appear to be taken as equivalent to τὰ πρακτᾶ. Thus we have the classification of things capable of being made perfect, into nature, art, and morality. Cf. Eth. m. iii. 7: αὐτὰ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἐτὶ ἐν νοῦ καὶ πᾶν τῷ δῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

2 φανεῖν ὅ'—τελειοι] 'This would also seem to be shown by the intimate connection existing between each pleasure and the function which it perfects.' Cf. Eth. x. 1: μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνφειδώθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν. Pleasure, generally speaking, is proper to the human race; from another point of view, each function has its own proper pleasure, and the pleasure 'proper' to one function is 'alien' to other functions. This distinction of οἰκεία and ἀλλοτρία ἡδονή was perhaps suggested by a passage in the Republic of Plato, ix. 587 a, where these terms are used, though not with quite the same application. It is there said that in the philosopher each part of his soul does its proper work and attains its proper pleasure; but when some lower passion has the predominance, that passion, causing disturbance, does not itself attain its
IV.—

own pleasure, and compels the other faculties to pursue a pleasure which is alien to them: "when you take one of these arts, you turn your mind away from the study of these arts, and this is what the word ἐξακριβωθῆναι means. When you give the last finish to, it is used intransitively Eth. 1. vii. 13: ἐξακριβωθῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦτον, 'to refine.'

4. καί ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις—δρώειν] 'And those who munch sweetmeats in the theatres do so especially when the actors are bad.' This is one of those illustrations from common life, which are richly strewed about the writings of Aristotle; the art of making which he perhaps learnt first from Plato.
6—7 καὶ διδόμοστιν—ταυτών] 'And they are so indivisible as to raise a doubt whether the function is not identical with the pleasure attached to it. And yet pleasure can hardly be thought or perception, this would be absurd; but through their not being separated, some persons fancy them to be identical.' To 'divide' and to 'distinguish' are, as Coleridge tells us, two different things. Pleasure, though not divided, should be distinguished, from the vital functions. The author of the Eudemian books, however, Ekh. vii. xii. 3, identified them, and we might well ask Aristotle why happiness, any more than pleasure, should be identified with éνέργεια.

7 καθαρότητι] On the superior purity of sight, hearing, and smell over taste, cf. Plato, Philebus, p. 51, and Ekh. iii. x. 3—11.

8 ἧσσηρ καὶ ἐργον] Cf. Plato, Republic, p. 352 a: 'Ἀμα οὖν τοιοῦτον ἐν θείῳ καὶ ἑπτάκλοι καὶ ἅλλον ὄνομαν ἐργον, ὃ ἄν ἢ μόνη ἐκείνη ποιή τις ἢ ἄριστα· καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος—χρυσόν] 'As
Heraclitus says that "an ass would prefer hay to gold,"—the reason being that he is an ass. This saying of Heraclitus, which reminds us of the Aesopic fable of the Cock and the Jewels, was probably meant to satirize the low desires of the human race. It forms the pendant to that other saying, 'Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.'

10 οὕτων ἕκαστον μέτρον ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ὁ ἄγαθος] That there is a definite standard of pleasure and of taste, as of other apparently variable things, is most clearly laid down in Aristotle's discussion upon the saying of Protagoras, that 'man is the measure of all things.' Cf. Metaphysics, x. vi. 6: φανερῶν δὲ τούτ' ἐκ τῶν γιγαντιών κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν: οὐδὲσθε γὰρ τὸ

καθαρὸν φαινέσθαι τοῖς μὲν γλυκὸν, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτων, μὴ διερθαρμένοι καὶ λεκα

βημένοις τῶν ἐτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν, τούτων δὲ ὕπολυπτέρων μέτρων εἰναι, τούτω δὲ ἐτέρων ὑπὸ ὑπολυπτερίων, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἔτι ἄγαθον καὶ κακόν, καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀισχρόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. Those who are vicious and corrupt are to be pronounced not to be right judges of what is good or pleasant. Their pleasures are to be pronounced not pleasures at all. Cf. Plato, Philebus, p. 40 c: φεύδεσθαι ὧν ἡ

νομίζεις τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηρὶ χαῖρομαιν, οἱ δὲ ἄγαθοι τῶν ἄθροισσών αἰσθήσεων.
VI. Aristotle having concluded his
treatise upon the nature of pleasure
reverts now to the general question of
the nature of happiness, or the chief
good for man. He takes up from the
first book the following fundamental
propositions: (1) that happiness must
be a development (ενέργεια) and not
a state (ἐἶνα) of the faculties; (2) that
it must be final and satisfying; (3)
that it must consist in some develop-
ment of the faculties sought for its
own sake. The remainder of the
chapter is occupied with excluding
games and amusements from the
above definition. Though exercises
of the faculties sought for their own
sake, these are (a) patronised by un-
worthy judges,—tyrants, children,
and the like; (b) after all, they are
rather the means to working, than
ends in themselves; (c) they do not
represent the higher faculties in man.

1 εἰρήμενον δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ
ηθονῶν, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελέγων, εἴτε
τελος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ
προειρήμενα συντομώτεροσ ἀν εἴη τὸ λόγος. εἴτομεν
ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ξίδιος, καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθέσθωτι διὰ βίου
ὑπάρχει ᾧν, φυτῶν ξύωντι βίου, καὶ τῷ θυσιμοῦντι
τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὲ ταύτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
eἰς ἐνέργειαν τινα θετέων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πράτεροι ἐγκα
ται, τῶν ο' ἐνεργείων αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἐτερα
ἀρεταῖ, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν
καθ' αὐτάς αἱρετῶν τινα θετέων καὶ οὐ τῶν ο' ἀλλο. οὐδὲν

2 γὰρ ἐνδιδὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης, καθ' αὐτάς δ' ἐισὶν ἀρεταῖ, ἀφ' οὗ μὴν ἐπιζήτηται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
τοιαύταί δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσίν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεως ἡ
gὰρ καλαὶ καὶ σπουδαία πράττειν τῶν ο' αὐτά 'ἀρετῶν.
καὶ τῶν παιδίων οδ' αἱ ηθεῖαι. ο' γὰρ δι' ἐτερα αὐτάς
αἱροῦται. βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἡ ὥφελοιν-
tαι, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. κατά-
φεύγοντι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμο-

1 Eθ. i. xiii. 1, where the analysis of ἀρετή, or
human excellence (the most important
part of the conception of happiness,
Eθ. i. x. 9) is introduced; Eθ. viii.
i. 1, where the discussion of friendship,
partly as connected with virtue and
partly as an external blessing, is
justified; Eθ. x. i. 1, where a treatise
on pleasure is added on account of
the human interest of the topic, and
the controversies which have been
raised about it.

2 εἴτομεν δ' ὑπὶ κ.τ.λ.α.] Cf. Eθ. i.
vi. 13; i. v. 6.

3 τῶν εὐδαιμονικομένων] Of those
who are called happy,' cf. Eth. 1. ix. 11: τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδέσι εὐδαιμονίᾳ.

3–4 δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἐνεργείαν

'These things are fancied to be constitutives of happiness because monarchs spend their leisure in them. But perhaps after all monarchs are no evidence, for neither virtue nor reason, on which the higher functions of man depend, are involved in kingly power.' Cf. Eth. 1. v. 3, where it is said that brutish pleasures 'obtain consideration' owing to potentates, who have everything at their command, devoting themselves to such.

4 ἀγευστοῖ] This reminds one of the saying about greedily and corrupt kings, in Hesiod, Works and Days, vv. 40, sq.:

ὑπ' ισαι οὖν ὅσοι πλέον ἠμαστός,
οὖν ὅσον ἐν μαλαχί τε καὶ ἀφοδέλφῳ μέγ' ἔνειρα.

6 οὖν ἐν παῖδι ἥρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία] With the whole of the present chapter we may compare the interesting discussion in Ar. Polis, viii. v. 12–14. On the relation of amusements to happiness, see Vol. I. Essay IV.
whether our thoughts, be
timor to the philosophers, and that by which
time, it would be necessary to
to the philosopher, and the
to the divine, it is a

8 εὐδαιμονίας δ’ οὐδέλα—βίου] ‘For no one allows a slave to share in happiness, any more than in the social life of a citizen.’ In Politics, i. xiii. 13, it is said that the slave, as distinguished from the artisan, is κοινώδης φύσις, i.e. he ‘lives with the family,’ but he is not κοινώδη βίου, he does not share in the career of his master.

VII. Aristotle’s argument now culminates in the declaration that happiness, in the highest sense, consists in philosophy; (1) because this is the function of the most excellent part of our nature; (2) because it most admits of continuance; (3) because it affords most pure and solid pleasure; (4) because it has pre-eminently the character of being self-sufficient; (5) because it is above all things an end-in-itself, and not a means to ulterior results; (6) because it is a sort of repose, and as it were the fruit of our exertions. It is indeed something higher than man regarded as a composite being, and is only attainable by him through virtue of a divine element which is in him. But we must not listen to those who would preach down our divine aspirations. On the contrary we should encourage them, and endeavour to live in harmony with our noblest part, which is in fact our proper self.

1 εἰτε βέλων—θειότατον] ‘Whether it be absolutely divine, or relatively speaking the divinest thing in our nature.’ Philosophy is said in the Metaphysics, i. ii. 14, to be most divine in two ways, first, as being kindred to the thought of God; second, as being knowledge of things divine. τοιαύτη δὲ διὰ τῆς ἐνεχθείς μοι ὅτι τὸ γὰρ μάλιστ’ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔχει, θέλει τὸν ἐπιστημούν εἰτε, καὶ εἰ τίς τῶν βέλων εἰ. Cf. the note on Eth. i. ii. 8.
2 ὡτι δ' ἔστι θεωρητικὴ, εὑρηταῖ. It is difficult to point out a precise passage corresponding to this reference (cf. Eth. IX. iii. 1, where a similar vague reference occurs). But perhaps it partly is meant to recall Eth. i. xiii. 20: διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν παύσαν: λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἣδικὰς, partly Eth. i. v. 7: τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικὸς, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιητικαῖς. There is nothing in Book VI. which corresponds.

3 εὐθυγρογοφι τέ—ἐνιαῖ Ἀnd it is reasonable to suppose that those who know pass their time more pleasantly than those who are enquiring. This is opposed to the often repeated saying that ‘the search for truth is more precious than truth itself.’ Thus Bishop Butler says, ‘Knowledge is not our proper happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see, that it is the gaining, not the having of it, which is the entertainment of the mind. Indeed, if the proper happiness of man consisted in knowledge considered as a possession or treasure, men who are possessed of the largest share would have a very ill time of it; as they would be infinitely more sensible than others of their poverty in this respect. Thus he who increases knowledge would eminently increase sorrow.’ (Sermon XV.) In one respect these two views are reconcilable; for Aristotle never meant to say that the ἐξίς or κτήσις τῆς σοφίας constitutes happiness, but the ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, ‘the play of the mind under the guidance of philosophy.’ He contrasts the peace and repose of conviction with the restlessness of doubt. In the same spirit Bacon said (Essay l.), ‘Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man’s mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.’ But in another respect the views of Aristotle are irreconcilable with those above quoted from Butler. The one over-states, nearly as much as the other under-states, the blessings of knowledge. And Aristotle strangely leaves out of account that sense of ignorance which the wisest man will always retain. His statement is chargeable with philosophic pride, which, as we have said (Vol. I. Essay III. p. 165), Socrates and Plato were free from.
πρὸς οὐς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ’ ὅν, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐκαστός, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸν οὗ ἄλλως βεβηκὼς, καὶ ὅσον ἂν σοφότερος ἢ μάλλον βέλτιον ὁ ἴσις συνεργὸς ἔχων,

σαλὶ ὁμοὶ αὐτάρκεστατος. ὅτευκι τ’ ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δὲ

αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τῷ

θεωρῆται, ἀπὸ ὃς τῶν πρακτικῶν ἡ πλείον ἡ ἐλαττον περί-

6 ποιομέθει παρὰ τὴν πράξειν. δοκεῖ τ’ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ

σχολῇ εἶναι ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἕνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ

πολεμοῦμεν ἐν ἐκτίμησι ἀγοιμεί. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν

ἀρέτῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἢ ἐνέργειαν.

αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοῦν εἰναι, αἱ μὲν

πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελεῖς οὔδεις γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολέμιν

τοῦ πολεμίν ἔνεκα, οὔδεις παρασκευάζει πολέμον ὃδεις

γὰρ ἂν παντελεῖς μιαφόσις τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πο-

λεμίους ποιῆτο, ἢν µάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοντο. ἐστὶ δὲ

καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος καὶ παρ’ ἄλλῃ τὸ πολιτεύ-

εσθαί περιποιουμενή ὑποκατεῖν καὶ τιμᾶς ἡ τὴν, γε εὐδαι-

μονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολιτικαῖς, ἔτεραν οὕτων τῆς πολι-

τικῆς ἢ καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ἢς ἔτεραν οὕτων. εἰ δὴ

τὸν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ

πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχομεν, αὐτὰ δὲ

ἀσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐξεταίρει καὶ οὐ δὲ αὐτὰς

αἱρετὰ εἰσαί, ἢ δὲ τὸν νῦν ἐνέργεια σποῦδη τε διαφέρειν

δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ ὡσα, καὶ παρ’ αὐτὴν οὖσαν ἐξεταίρει
tέλους, ἐξεῖν τε ἡ δονήν οἰκεῖαν, αὐτὴ δὲ συναίρει τῇ

ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες ὡς καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ

ἀτρυφὼν ὡς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὅσα ἀλλ’ ἂν ἄν πολύσχη

μετατεί, κατὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται οὕτων. ἡ

τελεία ὡς εὐδαιμονία αὐτῇ ἂν εἰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων, λαβοῦσα

6 ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ—

ἐτέραν οὕτων] ‘But moreover the

(function) of the politician also is

restless, and beyond mere administra-

tion it aims at power and distinctions,

or, if happiness for the man himself

and his citizens, at all events a happy-

ness which is something distinct from

the exercise of the political art; may

we are in search of this happiness—

plainly as something distinct.’ σοφία,

while producing happiness, is identical

with it; but πολιτική is to happiness

as means to end. Cf. Eth. VI. xii. 5:

οὐγ ᾧ ἄν αἰτρικὴ ὤνα, ἀλλ᾿ ᾧ ἡ ὤνα,

οὕτως ἡ σοφία (ποιεῖ) εὐδαιμονίαν. The
words ην καὶ ζητούμεν may be referred to Eth. i. ii. 9: η μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἔφεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα.  

2 κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦσας] The moralists, says Aristotle, take a shallow view in bidding us tame down our aspirations to our mental condition. Cf. Jlch. ii. xxii. 6, where the gnome, ἄνατα χρῆ των θανῶν φρονεῖν, is quoted from Epicarmus. Isocrates (Ad Dem. p. 9 b) gives a sort of reconciliation of the views: άδάνατα μὲν φρόνει τῷ μεγαλόψυχῳ εἶναι: ὑπηκοὸν δὲ τῷ συμμέτρῳ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀνθρώπων, which reminds one of George Herbert's quaint lines:—

'Pitch thy behaviour low, thy projects high:  
So shalt thou humble and magnanimous be:  
Sink not in spirit: who aimeth at the sky  
Shoots higher much than he that means a tree.  
A grain of gloric mixt with humblenesse  
Cures both a fever and lethargicknesse:'

ei γάρ καὶ τῷ ὑγείᾳ—ὑπερέχει] 'For though (this noblest part) be small in proportionate bulk, yet in power and dignity it far surpasses all the other parts of our nature.' Aristotle here signifieth that the divine particle (νοῦς) bears a small proportion to the whole of our composite nature. And in accordance with this he elsewhere intimates that only at short and rare intervals can man enjoy the fruition of his diviner nature. Cf. Metaph. xi. vii. 9: εἰ οὖν οὕτως εἴδε ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὃ θεὸς ἔαί, θαυμαστόν. Pol. viii. v. 12: εἴ μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι. With which we may compare the saying of Spinoza (De Intellectus Emensiatione, II.), that at first he found himself only able to rest in the idea of 'the truly good' for short intervals, yet that these intervals became longer and more frequent as he went on. 'Et quamvis in initio hoc intervalla essent rara et per admodum exiguum temporis durarent, postquam tamen Verum Bonum magis ac magis inimicit innotuit, intervalla ista frequentiora et longiora fuerunt.' Aristotle idealises these moments of the philosopher, suppos-
ing them to extend throughout life, ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὐτὴ ἐν εἷς ἀνθρώπων, λαβοῦσα μήκος βιου τέλειων.

VIII. Aristotle, pursuing his theme, declares further the paramount excellence of the philosophic life, by showing that the life of practical morality holds a merely secondary place, (1) because it is bound up with man's composite nature, that is, with the passions; (2) because it is more dependent on external circumstances; (3) because such a life cannot possibly be attributed to the gods. He adds that though the philosopher will certainly require a degree of external prosperity, this will only be a very moderate degree, as the sayings of ancient sages testify. And if there be any providence of the gods watching over men, it may be presumed that this will especially watch over the philosopher, who loves and honours that which is divine.

3 συνέζευγταί δὲ—ἀνθρωπικαί] Wisdom moreover seems inseparably connected with excellence of the moral nature, and this with wisdom, since the major premises of wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues, and 'the right' in morals is that which is in accordance with wisdom. But as wisdom and moral virtue are bound up with the passions, they must be concerned with our composite nature; and the virtues of the composite nature must be purely human.' And therefore secondary to philosophy, which is more than human. This passage appears to contain the germ of much that is expanded in the Endemian books, cf. Eth. vi. xii. 9-10; xiii. 4. But we may observe, 1st, that wisdom (φρόνησις) is here as if for the first time coming forward in opposition to philosophy (σοφία), and not in that recognised opposition which would have been the case, had Book VI. been previously written; 2nd, that there is no reference to any previous discussions on the moral syllogism.

συνέζευγταί] Wisdom and moral virtue are here said to be reciprocally connected, just as it is said of pleasure
and life, chap. iv. 11: συνεξεύχοιται μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χαρισμῶν οὐ δίχεσθαι.


4 τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων—Διότι] 'For though on the one hand both (the philosopher and the practical man) will have an equal need of the ordinary means of life, even if the practical man takes more trouble about the concerns of the body and such like—for there will be but little difference in this respect—on the other hand there will be a wide difference with regard to their discharge of their respective functions.' The term ἰδιωτικός here appears to be used in opposition to ὁ σοφός (§ 13), not as distinctively indicating 'the politician,' but as representing the whole class of the active virtues, which are subsequently analysed. Thus, Eth. i. v. 4, we find οἱ χαρισματεῖς καὶ πρακτικοὶ given as equivalents for οἱ πολιτικοὶ.

τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἰδιωτικῶς] δύναμις here seems used in a sense exactly corresponding to 'physical power.' In modern warfare, a weak body may often be accompanied by the highest personal courage, but in the ancient mode of fighting this would have been impossible or useless.

τὸ σάφρων ἐξουσίας] 'The temperate man will require full liberty of gratification.' Cf. Eth. i. v. 3: διὰ τὸν πολλοῦς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίασ ἑισοδευθῆναι Σαρδανάπαλο. viii. vi. 5: οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς
The use of the article, and of the plural number, makes a slight difference in signification.

7 dieξουσι δὲ—θεῶν] 'And if we went through all the virtues, we should see that whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of the gods.' Aristotle argues here that we cannot attribute morality to the Deity without falling into mere anthropomorphism; but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought. Aristotle himself felt this difficulty, and elsewhere defined the thought of God as 'the thinking upon thought' (Metaph. xi. ix. 4), which would not only deprive the Deity of all those fatherly and tender functions, which the human race is prone to attribute to Him; but would also remove Him from the conditions of all human thinking. If it be conceded that the life of God is only analogous to that of the philosopher; we might then ask, why not also analogous to the life of the good man? Plato, by placing the 'idea of justice' in the supra-sensible world, allowed a more than mortal interest to morality.
And he speaks of the just man, by the practice of virtue, being ‘made like to God.’ R. p. 613 a, quoted below.

10 Aristotle seems to lose no opportunity of expressing his contempt for great potentates. ‘Reason is not implied in kingly power,’ Eth. x. vi. 4. ‘One may do noble deeds without ruling over land and sea,’ &c. We may again refer to George Herbert, who in his verses on Church Musick says,

1 Now I in you without a bolie move,
Rising and falling with your wings;
We both together sweetly live and love,
Yet say sometimes, God help poore kings.’

[ikanov de tosaTh] ὑπάρχει] i.e. τὰ μέτρια, referring to ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων above.

κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν] i.e. whether philosophic or moral excellency.

11 καὶ Σόλων δὲ] Referring to the well-known story in Herodotus, i.e. 30, sq., where Solon pronounces Tellus, the Athenian citizen, to have been the happiest man he had ever known.

Εἰς δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας—μῦδον
‘Anaxagoras moreover seems not to have conceived of “the happy man” as a rich man or a potentate, when he said that he should not be surprised if (his “happy man”) appeared a strange person to the crowd, for they judge by externals, having no sense
of aught beside.' Anaxagoras, being asked to define "the happy man," said that his opinion, if he declared it, would be thought paradoxical.

12 συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐικικασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν ὄφει. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τιμάντα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δὲ αληθές ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου χρίνεται: ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρήμανα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τοῦ βίου ἐπιστήμων, καὶ συναφώντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἁπλοκτέων, διαφωνώντων ὀς λόγος ὑποληπτέων. οὐδὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύον καὶ διακεῖμενος ἁριστα καὶ θεοφιλεστατος ἐοικεν εἶναι: εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὡσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἰ ἂν εὐλογὸν χαῖρειν

Aristotle expresses here no opinion, one way or the other, as to the reality of a Divine Providence. ὁ δοκεῖ merely indicates that an opinion is held; the word is frequently used to indicate a false opinion or fancy. Cf. Eth. vii. xii. 5: ὁ δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἁγαθῶν, x. vi. 3: ὁ δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐθαμομενα ταῦτα εἶναι, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Plato had said that moral virtue (see the last note) placed men peculiarly under the care of the gods. Aristotle, differing from Plato in his conception of the Deity, says, if there be any care of men by the gods, it must surely be extended in an especial degree not to the just man, but to the philosopher, since philosophy is most akin to the life of the Deity Himself.
te autous taw ariston, kal taw syngeneustato (tought o'v en e' i' o' vou') kai touds agapwontas malista tought kai timumwv abeuteuvion ois twn filon autois epimeleuvmeneus kai ophwos te kai kalivos prattontas. 'Ite 'de pantta twta taw sofow malisth uparxhe, oik adhlon. theofilestatos a'ra. twn auton o' eikhs kai eudaimonievstoton: woste xan autous e' i' sofow malisth' eudaimon.

'nautos] 'Even on this supposition.' It seems probable that Aristotle had in his mind the very words of Plato, above quoted.

IX. The theory of human life now being complete, Aristotle asks if anything more is wanting? The answer is Yes, since theory is not by itself enough to make men good. For virtue three things are required, nature, teaching, and custom. The first is beyond man's control; the second may be identified with theory, which we have now supplied; the third requires institutions for the regulation of life, which may either be (1) of public, or (2) of private ordinance. As a fact, the state too much neglects (§ 14) the arrangement of daily life, and therefore private individuals must address themselves to the task, in a scientific spirit, and must first learn the principles of legislation. Whence are these principles to be learnt? On the one hand we find that practical politicians neither write nor speak on the principles of their art. On the other hand the Sophists, who profess to teach politics, are far from understanding even what it is, and their mode of teaching is merely empirical. So far from imparting principles, they go to work in an eclectic way, collecting laws, which are mere results, lying, as it were, on the surface. Legislation, as a science, has in short been neglected hitherto, and must now be essayed. We must enter at once upon the whole theory of the state, examining former speculations, and existing constitutions, and developing a conception of the best form of government.

According to the sequence of ideas in this chapter, it would appear that the connecting link between ethics and politics is to be found in the word eido, custom, or mode of life. As custom has great influence upon men's power of attaining virtue and the chief good, and on the other hand as the institutions of individual life have a close connection with those of the state, it follows that politics are the complement of ethics.

1 alla malion to prattew auta] Under the head of 'doing' are of course included the functions of thought, which, as we have just been told, are the highest forms of action in man. Cf. Pol. vii. iii. 8: alla tov praktikov oik anagkaion einai pros
The last line is quoted in the Meno of Plato, p. 95 e, to indicate that Theognis held teaching ineffectuals to produce virtue. Aristotle borrows the application. On Theognis see Vol. I. Essay II.

κατακώχμων ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς] 'Under the influence of virtue.' This word, which is also written κατακώχμων, seems derived from κατέχειν, with a reduplication. In Ar. Pol. ii. ix. 8, we find κατακώχμων πρὸς, and in viii. vii. 4, κατακώχμων ὁποῖον ἐπιτελεῖν ὡς ὅπερ ἡμῖν ύπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινάς θεῖας αἰτίας τῶν ἀληθῶς εὐτυχείς εὐτυχέσιν
I see Athens; I mistake, in essential and interfering things, the praise of the grownup and the people who boasted the whole of this. It was indeed the case, Thucydides praised the free system of Athens; on the other hand Aristotle praised the organised and educational system of Sparta; see below § 13, and cf. Eth. 1. xiii. 3, and note. He was probably led into this political mistake, partly by the state of society in Athens itself, partly by the influence of Plato, from whom he imbibed the essential idea of communism,—which is, that the state should arrange as much as possible, instead of as little as possible.
Referring to Homer, 

Odyssey. IX. 114:

Aristotle considers that any people among whom the state does not settle by law the customs of daily life is unworthy to be called a society at all. He ignores that element called 'public opinion,' which in so many respects, and more naturally, supplies the place of legislation.
do this (i.e. to help his children and friends towards virtue) after learning the principles of legislation.' As we find from Eth. vi. viii. 2, legislation was considered by Aristotle to be the superior (ἀρχιτεκτονικὸν) form of political thought. A person possessing the general principles of scientific legislation (see below, § 16) would be best able to deduce rules for the guidance of his family, and at the same time to allow of such exceptions as individual peculiarities might call for. That the family is a deduction from the state, which is prior in point of idea, we know to have been Aristotle's opinion, Pol. i. ii. 12.

16 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ—ἐμπειρίαν] 'And yet perhaps nothing hinders a man even without scientific knowledge treating well some particular case, from an accurate observation, empirically, of what results on each thing being tried.' Cf. Metaph. 1. i. 7: "πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ..."
μᾶλλον ἐπιτησχάνοντας ὁμοίως τοὺς ἐμπερόρους τῶν ἁνευ ἡς ἐμπερίας λόγων ἐχόντων.

17 ὡστινα γὰρ ὃν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα] 'Any one you like to propose.' Cf. Eth. i. iii. 8: τί προτεθέμεθα, 'what we propose to ourselves.'

18 μόριον γὰρ ἔδοξεν τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι] 'For, as we said, legislation is generally considered to be a branch of politics.' This probably refers to Eth. i. ii. 7: χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λατιστικοῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετοῦσα τί δεῖ πράσσειν καὶ τῶν ἀλέχεται.

ἐπαγγέλλονται μέν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφοί] Cf. Plato, Meno, p. 95 b: οἱ σοφισταὶ οἷς οὕτως, ὀπτέρ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, διδασκόν θάκτοι οντεῖς ἀρετῆς; The whole of the present discussion on the teaching of political science is evidently suggested by that on the teaching of virtue in the Meno, where it was shown that the great statesmen do not attempt to teach their sons virtue, and that the Sophists, who
profess to teach it, are doubtful instructors.

20 oδε νόμοι.—εἰςκαίσιν[1] 'But laws are as it were the results of political science.' Aristotle's account of the Sophists' method of teaching politics is precisely analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. He here speaks of their taking a shallow view of politics, and making it an inferior branch of rhetoric; and he adds that they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touching upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are uninstructed in principles are wholly useless. In the same way (Soph. Fenech. xxxii. 16) he says they gave various specimens of argument to be learnt by heart, and that this was no more use than if a person who undertook to teach shoemaking were to provide his pupils with an assortment of shoes. Λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ· οἱ δὲ ἀρχιτέκτοναι ἤδεισαν· εἰς οὓς πλειστάκες ἐμπίπτοντες φύσεως ἐκάτεροι τοὺς ἀνίκτους λόγους. Διότερ τοιχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνοι ὃ ἂν ἡ διαθήκη τοῖς μαθήμασι παράδειγμα, ὁσπερ ἂν εἰς ἐπιστήμην φάσκοι παραδέχομαι ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν ποιεῖν τοὺς πόδας, ἐβάλλετο συντομίκως μὲν ἡ διδάσκω, μὴ δὲν διδάσκων παρίσχεσι τὰ ποιεῖται, διότερ δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδεῖς ὑποθέσεως.

21 οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται—ἐξεῖσι[2] 'For men do not appear to learn the physician's art from treatises, though (they who write such treatises) aim at stating not only modes of treatment, but how people can be cured and how each person is to be treated, according to a classification of habits (of body).'}
which bears Plato's name we find συγγράμματα used as a generic word, of which several species, iatriká, γεωργικά, μαγειρικά, &c., are mentioned, and are compared (as here) with 'laws.' Cf. Minos, p. 316 c sqq.: ἥδι ποτὲ ἐνέτυχε τα συγγράμματα περὶ ὑγείας τῶν καμήντων; Ἑγογκ.-Ιατρικά ἀρα καὶ ἱατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν; Ἰατρικά μέντοι.—'Αριστοτέλεια ἂρα καὶ γεωργικά συγγράμματα γεωργικὸν νόμον εἰσὶν; κ.τ.λ. The συγγράμματα here mentioned were perhaps 'reports of cases,' or monographs on particular diseases.

tοῖς δὲ ἄνευ—γένοιτο] 'But those who without proper training study such things would not be able to judge of them correctly (except indeed by natural ability), though they might gain an appreciative faculty with regard to the subject.' ἔνευ here denotes the state of mind formed by scientific training. Such a training especially produces 'judgment' (τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς). Cf. Pol. iii. xi. 14: ἦσαν γὰρ ἐκαστὸς μὲν χεῖραν κριτὴς τῶν εἰσιον. Eth. i. iii. 5, and note. This kind of judgment, as being deep and original, is distin-
guished above from σύνεσις, the power of appreciation, but in Eth. vi. x. 2 σύνεσις is called πρακτική, in a lower sense, and as contrasted with wisdom, which is πρακτική.

22 παραλιπόντων ὄντων] One must be struck with the disdainful way in which Aristotle here quite sets aside the Republic and Laws of Plato, by which he had been himself so much influenced, as if they were not to be reckoned as even attempts at founding the science of politics. Below, he alludes to them as 'perhaps on some particular points having made good remarks.'

23 πρῶτον μὲν ὄν] A rough outline of the Politics is here given, as Aristotle conceived it before writing it. The sketch is so very general that it omits the subject of Book L, and yet critics have thought that this passage may be taken as evidence of what the order of books in Aristotle's Politics should be.
Diogenes Laertius, in his list of the works of Aristotle, mentions (v. i. 12): πολεῑ ια των δεολειαῑ δεολειαν δε λεια μεν και λοιδοις και ον ποια ποια πολιτεια άριστη, και ποιε έκαστη ταυχεισα, και τις υμοις και εθεις χραμενη. λεγαμεν οιν αρεμενοι.

instituta, disciplinas; a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus.' The fragments of this work have been collected by C. F. Neumann, and may be found in the Oxford reprint of Bekker's edition of Aristotle.
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